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# A Note on Why Quarter of Birth is Not a Valid Instrument for Educational Attainment 

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# A NOTE ON WHY QUARTER OF BIRTH IS NOT A VALID INSTRUMENT FOR EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 

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## 1. Angrist and Krueger (1991)

The goal in Angrist and Krueger (1991) is to use variation in schooling attainment unrelated to ability to identify the effect of attending an additional year of school. The paper uses date of birth and compulsory education laws as a natural experiment to assign one group of students an extra year of education. While the paper rightly focuses much attention on demonstrating the effectiveness of compulsory education laws, it does not give sufficient consideration to the problems generated for the IV framework if there is significant redshirting ${ }^{1}$ around entrance cutoff dates. This problem is distinct from those discussed in Bound and Jaeger (2000), which assumes "the typical compulsory school attendance law requires students to start first grade in the autumn of the calendar year in which they turn $6, "$ precluding the possibility of redshirting.
1.1. Monotonicity. The implicit assumption needed to identify the effect of attending an additional year of school is that children enroll in school when first eligible. Without this implicit assumption, the explicit assumption of Monotonicity (Angrist and Imbens (1995)) does not hold. As reported in Aliprantis (2007), in 1998 about $30 \%$ of parents in the US chose to delay their children's enrollment in primary school if their child's birthday was within two months of their school's entrance cutoff date. This rate was almost one in four for the youngest quarter of eligibility to enroll. Furthermore, this selection was not random, as will be discussed in Section 2.

To illustrate the problem with this implicit assumption suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that all children born in quarter $1\left(Q_{1}\right)$ are born on February 15 th, quarter $2\left(Q_{2}\right)$ on May 15th, quarter $3\left(Q_{3}\right)$ on August 15th, and quarter $4\left(Q_{4}\right)$ on November 15th. Assume that school starts on August 15th and the cutoff date for all children to turn six is December 31st of the academic school year. Then Table 1 shows the pattern of ages at entry of first grade we will observe.

Now assume that all children must attend school until they reach 16 years of age and that we are looking only at those children who would like to drop out once they turn 15 years old. Then Table 2 shows the years of completed schooling at which students are eligible to drop out conditional on redshirting and quarter of birth. The spirit of the identification scheme used in Angrist and Krueger (1991) is that since laws apply to a student's age, and not their years of completed schooling,

[^0]variation in students' birth dates means they face different laws regarding the years of schooling they must complete. In our example, students born in $Q_{4}$ must stay in school until they complete 10.25 years of schooling, while individuals born in $Q_{1}$ only have to complete 9.5 years of schooling before being eligible to drop out. Thus comparing these groups will tell us the treatment effect (ie, the effect of attending an extra year of school against one's will).

There is a problem with this scheme if there is significant redshirting that is not random with respect to expected educational attainment. Let us begin with the framework in Angrist and Imbens (1995), comparing only those children born in the first and last quarters of the year. Define treatment as being eligible to enroll when young (ie, being born in $Q_{4}$ ). Let $S_{1}$ be the years completed for those exposed to treatment, and $S_{0}$ the years of completed schooling for those not exposed to treatment. Then if all children enroll when eligible and comply with the compulsory education law, we have from Table 2 that $S_{1}=10.25$ and $S_{0}=9.5$. Thus

$$
E\left[Y_{i} \mid Q_{4}\right]-E\left[Y_{i} \mid Q_{1}\right]=E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{1}\right]-E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{0}\right]=E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{0}+0.75\right]-E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{0}\right]
$$

However, consider what happens if not all parents enroll their child when first eligible. Suppose that there are two types, H and L. Assume that both types enroll when eligible when born in $Q_{1}$, but that only those of type H enroll when eligible if they are born in $Q_{4}$. Let $B_{j}$ be the cohort of children born $j$ months before their school's cutoff date. Table 3 shows that this assumption is reasonable in the ECLS-K data set. For those of type $\mathrm{H}, S_{1}=S_{0}+0.75$. However, for those of type L, $S_{1}=S_{0}-0.25$. Thus for those of type $\mathrm{H}, S_{1}-S_{0}=0.75>0$, but for those of type L, $S_{1}-S_{0}=-0.25<0$. This violates the assumption of Monotonicity.

To illustrate why this creates a problem, consider what would happen if those who would drop out when 15 years of age are all of type L. In this case we would expect that those entering school when younger tend to complete more schooling precisely what is reported in Dobkin and Ferreira (2007). Then comparing outcomes of groups $Q_{4}$ and $Q_{1}$ would yield something very different from the parameter of interest:

$$
E\left[Y_{i} \mid Q_{4}\right]-E\left[Y_{i} \mid Q_{1}\right]=E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{1}\right]-E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{0}\right]=E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{0}-0.25\right]-E\left[Y_{i} \mid S_{0}\right]
$$

This leaves us unable to interpret the IV estimates, similarly to other cases discussed in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000).

## 2. Redshirting in the ECLS-K Data Set

I am not aware of any historical data on redshirting. Thus I cannot draw any conclusions from the above discussion about the validity of the estimates presented in papers such as Angrist and Krueger (1991), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), or Lochner and Moretti (2004). Nevertheless, a first glance at this issue can be seen in Table 1, which shows the average age at enrollment for boys in the 1960 Census by quarter of birth (as reported in Angrist and Krueger (1991)), including the difference between the census average and the age predicted by our simple assumptions. Note that there is a large discrepancy in $Q_{4}$. This difference could be generated by schools with cutoff dates before January 1st, but it could also be evidence of significant redshirting in the fourth quarter.

In the ECLS-K data set we observe four groups of children whose birth dates are within one month of their school's cutoff date, as shown in Figure 1:
Cohort $C_{1}$ : Children eligible in the fall of 1997 but who chose to wait until the fall of 1998 to enroll.
Cohort $C_{2}$ : Children ineligible in the fall of 1997 who waited until the fall 1998 to enroll.
Cohort $C_{3}$ : Children eligible in the fall of 1998 who chose to enroll.
Cohort $C_{4}$ : Children ineligible in the fall of 1998 but who chose to enroll anyway.
As shown in Table 3, very few parents would choose to delay their child when first eligible if they are in Cohort $C_{2}$. In contrast, cohort $C_{1}$ is made up entirely of children whose parents chose to delay their enrollment when eligible in 1997, while $C_{3}$ is made up entirely of children whose parents chose to enroll them when eligible in 1998. This allows us to exploit the difference in the composition of groups $C_{1}$ and $C_{3}$ to obtain information about those children whose parents would choose to delay their enrollment. Tables 4-9 show how these cohorts differ. The children who delayed enrollment were disproportionately wealthy, white, male, English-speaking, and had better-educated parents. These characteristics are correlated with educational attainment, casting doubt on the validity of the instrument generated by entrance cutoff dates and compulsory education laws.

## References

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TABLES

Table 1: Entrance Age (in Years) by Quarter of Birth

| Entrance Age (in Years) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Entry | $Q_{1}$ |  | $Q_{2}$ |  | $Q_{3}$ |
|  |  |  | $Q_{4}$ |  |  |
| When Eligible | 6.5 |  | 6.25 |  | 6 |
|  |  | 5.75 |  |  |  |
| Redshirted | 7.5 |  | 7.25 |  | 7 |

Table 2: Years of Schooling Completed before Eligible to Drop Out by Quarter of Birth

| Years of Schooling Completed |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Entry | $Q_{1}$ | $Q_{2}$ | $Q_{3}$ | $Q_{4}$ |
| When Eligible | 9.5 | 9.75 | 10 | 10.25 |
| Redshirted | 8.5 | 8.75 | 9 | 9 |

Table 3: Redshirting in the ECLS-K

Percent Redshirting

| Cohort | $B_{1}\left(C_{1}+C_{3}\right)$ | $B_{2}$ | $B_{3}$ | $B_{4}$ | $B_{5}$ | $B_{6}$ | $B_{7}$ | $B_{8}$ | $B_{9}$ | $B_{10}$ | $B_{11}$ | $B_{12}\left(C_{2}\right)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \% Redshirting | 28.8 | 29.8 | 13.9 | 14.0 | 11.3 | 7.7 | 8.0 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 3.7 |

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Cohort

| Different Variables Summarized by Cohort |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Statistic | ECLS-K | Cohort 1 | Cohort 2 | Cohort 3 | Cohort 4 |
| Income | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{aligned} & 52,946 \\ & 36,375 \\ & 12,326 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 61,098 \\ 40,389 \\ 241 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 52,456 \\ 34,959 \\ 702 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 48,531 \\ 34,466 \\ 619 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 61,912 \\ 40,146 \\ 57 \end{gathered}$ |
| \# of Books | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{gathered} 74.35 \\ 59.87 \\ 14,910 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86.89 \\ 60.64 \\ 300 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 75.11 \\ 57.57 \\ 849 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 69.74 \\ 57.45 \\ 744 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 76.84 \\ 65.18 \\ 63 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| \# of Children's <br> Records, Tapes, or CD's | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{gathered} 15.37 \\ 17.86 \\ 15,008 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.26 \\ 20.33 \\ 303 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.09 \\ 18.81 \\ 851 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.99 \\ 17.42 \\ 750 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.70 \\ 17.68 \\ 63 \end{gathered}$ |
| Age at entry to K (in months) | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{gathered} 65.56 \\ 4.26 \\ 15,042 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 68.34 \\ 5.53 \\ 302 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 70.63 \\ 2.91 \\ 851 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 60.07 \\ 1.67 \\ 751 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 62.00 \\ 5.25 \\ 63 \end{gathered}$ |
| Mother's Age <br> (At First Birth) | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{gathered} 23.98 \\ 5.44 \\ 14,054 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 25.26 \\ 5.74 \\ 288 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.93 \\ 5.58 \\ 793 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.64 \\ 5.37 \\ 696 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24.12 \\ 5.49 \\ 57 \end{gathered}$ |
| Cost Nonparental Childcare (Pre-K, in \$) | Mean Std. Dev. n | 43.82 <br> 51.72 <br> 11,465 | $\begin{gathered} 51.43 \\ 49.18 \\ 223 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 41.50 \\ 46.17 \\ 653 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 39.74 \\ 44.66 \\ 559 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59.38 \\ 77.77 \\ 54 \end{gathered}$ |
| Age at first <br> Nonparental Care (in Months) | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{gathered} 22.28 \\ 19.59 \\ 13,047 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24.08 \\ 20.95 \\ 266 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 22.80 \\ 20.72 \\ 754 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.69 \\ 18.24 \\ 637 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.71 \\ 17.71 \\ 58 \end{gathered}$ |
| Hours Spent in <br> Nonparental Care (Pre-K) | Mean Std. Dev. n | $\begin{gathered} 25.23 \\ 21.73 \\ 14,858 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 22.05 \\ 19.79 \\ 298 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26.66 \\ 23.31 \\ 839 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 25.33 \\ 22.15 \\ 744 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 27.08 \\ 20.32 \\ 63 \end{gathered}$ |

Table 5: WIC Benefits

| Did the Child Receive any WIC Benefits as a Child (in \%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ECLS-K | Cohort 1 | Cohort 2 | Cohort 3 | Cohort 4 |
| Yes | 42.88 | 31.35 | 40.66 | 47.87 | 39.68 |
| No | 56.00 | 67.66 | 58.05 | 51.06 | 60.32 |
| n | 15,064 | 303 | 851 | 752 | 63 |

Table 6: Child's Language to Mother

| Language to Mother in \% |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Speaks Non-English Language | ECLS-K | Cohort 1 | Cohort 2 | Cohort 3 | Cohort 4 |
| Never | 79.53 | 93.07 | 80.85 | 79.26 | 77.78 |
| Sometimes, Often, or Very Often | 18.53 | 5.28 | 16.93 | 18.36 | 17.46 |
| n | 15,064 | 303 | 851 | 752 | 63 |

Table 7: Race

| The Composition of Cohorts by Race (in \%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Race | ECLS-K | Cohort 1 | Cohort 2 | Cohort 3 | Cohort 4 |
| White, Non-Hispanic | 56.31 | 75.29 | 60.95 | 53.94 | 63.01 |
| Black or African-American, Non-Hispanic | 14.20 | 9.30 | 13.18 | 13.87 | 12.33 |
| Hispanic, Race Specified | 8.52 | 3.49 | 7.51 | 6.58 | 1.37 |
| Hispanic, Race Not Specified | 8.91 | 5.52 | 7.71 | 11.40 | 4.11 |
| Asian | 6.35 | 2.03 | 5.68 | 7.17 | 15.07 |
| Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander | 1.14 | - | 1.12 | 2.47 | - |
| Native American or Native Alaskan | 1.80 | 1.74 | 1.01 | 2.00 | 1.37 |
| More than one race, Non-Hispanic | 2.55 | 2.62 | 2.64 | 2.59 | 2.74 |
| n | 17,527 | 344 | 984 | 851 | 73 |

Table 8: Gender

| The Composition of Cohorts by Gender (in \%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | ECLS-K | Cohort 1 | Cohort 2 | Cohort 3 | Cohort 4 |
| Male | 51.15 | 63.66 | 53.25 | 49.82 | 32.88 |
| Female | 48.78 | 36.34 | 46.75 | 50.18 | 67.12 |
| n | 17,554 | 344 | 986 | 851 | 73 |

Table 9: Parent's Highest Education Level

| Parent's Highest Education Level by Cohort in \% |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ECLS-K | Cohort 1 | Cohort 2 | Cohort 3 | Cohort 4 |
| 8th Grade or Below | 3.09 | 0.95 | 2.76 | 3.05 | 1.43 |
| 9th-12th Grade | 6.55 | 3.15 | 6.62 | 6.62 | 4.29 |
| High School Diploma/Equivalent | 23.80 | 17.67 | 25.69 | 27.61 | 21.43 |
| Voc/Tech Program | 6.77 | 5.36 | 8.27 | 7.12 | 4.29 |
| Some College | 26.50 | 27.13 | 25.69 | 27.86 | 28.57 |
| Bachelor's Degree | 18.53 | 26.81 | 16.43 | 17.05 | 21.43 |
| Grad/Professional School - No Degree | 2.56 | 3.15 | 2.65 | 1.65 | 2.86 |
| Master's Degree (MA, MS) | 7.50 | 7.89 | 6.73 | 6.49 | 12.86 |
| Doctorate or Professional Degree | 4.71 | 7.89 | 5.18 | 2.54 | 2.86 |
| n | 15,961 | 317 | 907 | 786 | 70 |

Figures


Figure 1: ECLS-K Cohorts


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    I acknowledge financial support from the Institute of Education Statistics.
    ${ }^{1}$ Redshirting is the term given to parents voluntarily delaying their children's enrollment

