

INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION BETWEEN FIRMS

ALESSANDRO ARRIGHETTI AND ALBERTO GUENZI*

1. Complementarity, co-ordination and regulation costs

The setting up of formal co-operative relationships between competitors, as in providing any club collective good depends on the solution of collective action dilemmas and co-ordination of choice between agents.¹ The expectation of significant advantages from co-operation is in fact not sufficient to ensure that a collective project is put into action. In this article we hypothesize that, apart from free riding and opportunism, there are other reasons for lack or failure of co-operative action.² One of these reasons is linked with the

* The authors are particularly grateful to M. Belfanti, C.A. Davids, V. Dall'Aglio, A. Lasagni, S. Magagnoli, M. Raimondi, G. Seravalli, G. Wolleb for comments on earlier versions of this contribution.

¹ J.M. Buchanan, 'Una teoria economica dei club', in J.M. Buchanan, *Stato mercato e libertà* (Bologna 1989) 147 – 165; M. Olson, *The logic of collective action* (Harvard 1965); R. Hardin, *Collective action* (Baltimore 1982). Cp. F. Sachwald, 'Co-operative agreements and the theory of the firm: focusing on barriers to change', *Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization* (1988) vol. 35, 203 - 225. 'The most striking type of agreements involves competitors (. . .) Equity joint ventures are easy to identify, but many co-operative agreements involve joint activities without the creation of a new corporate entity and even without equity shareholding from the parties. A number of studies thus consider that the important point is *the existence of a common project*, and hence a *need for co-ordination over time*, rather than a specific type of agreement between parties' (204; emphasis ours). This article examines non-collusive co-operative agreements involving sets of firms unrestricted by number (>3 units) which are formalized at least by deeds of constitution.

² There are various different approaches to this question. One is based on 'constitutional order' (G. Herrigel, 'Industry as form of order: a comparison of the historical development of the machine tool industries in the United States and Ger-

expected costs of definition and adjustment over time of the co-operative project and with the role of these costs in cancelling out the gross benefits of collective action.

This hypothesis is based on the observation that joint initiatives between economically and legally independent organizations are based on the presence of strategic complementarity: the more resources invested in a project and/or the higher the number of agents who agree to align their conduct, the higher the return of the various factors tends to be, at least up to a certain threshold level. Consequently, if all conditions are equal, the benefit for the agent from the realization of a joint project is higher than the individual provision of the same good.³ Complementarity advantages appear when club goals are pursued. These can be, for example, the fixing of technical standards, the regulation of acquisition of information on overseas markets, access to technological services, joint research and development programmes and centralized purchase of production input.

The presence of positive complementarity alone however is not sufficient to guarantee that it will be exploited. The benefits of co-operation can in fact be considerably reduced or nullified by various costs borne by participants. These include costs of identifying an equilibrium solution that allows individual courses of action to be aligned to the general plan,⁴ as well as costs of limiting the risk of hold-up of the benefits from collective action.⁵

many', in J. R. Hollisworth, P. C. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds.), *Governing capitalist economies. Performances and control of economic sectors* (New York 1994). This work relates governing mechanisms in a given set of firms (industry) to the wider pre-existing framework of social norms which influence the behaviour of economic actors. Another approach is based on the concept of network (B. Axelsson and G. Easton (eds.), *Industrial networks: a new view of reality* (London 1992)) and another on the role of reputation in community enforcement (J. Bendor and B. Mookherjee, 'Norms, third-party sanctions and cooperation', *Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations* (1990) vol. 6, 33 - 63; A. Barone, *Dilemma del prigioniero e meccanismi che inducono alla cooperazione* (Rome 1995)). Yet another approach looks at the legal system and forms of institutional regulation, such as technical standards, in furthering co-operation (C. Lane, 'The social regulation of inter-firm relations in Britain and Germany: market rules, legal norms and technical standards', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (1997) vol. 21, no. 2, 197 - 216; A. Arrighetti, R. Bachmann and S. Deakin, 'Contract law, social norms and inter-firm cooperation', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (1997) vol. 21, no. 2, 171 - 195).

³ See for a detailed discussion: A. Arrighetti and G. Seravalli, *Istituzioni e costi di coordinamento* Working Papers 6, Istituto di Scienze Economiche, Università di Parma (Parma 1999).

⁴ In other words agents have to look, either tacitly or by negotiation, for forms of reciprocal co-ordination on actions to undertake. The decision which gives

Costs of matching individual conduct to the collective plan are generated by the selfsame nature of complementarity advantages. The existence of positive externalities, which increase with the number of agents, the amount of resources invested in the project and the range of initiatives pursued, leads to a multiplicity of equilibriums. So before the common action is started, agents have to be able to order and choose the optimum equilibrium. In other words, they need to identify the alternative that gives the maximum expected benefit, from among a wide range. Participants need to decide how many and which subjects are to be involved, what initiatives to take, what technology to use, what form of organization to adopt, how to plan intervention etc. These decisions often require significant investment in information, transfer of knowledge, comparison of practicable alternatives and negotiation, and can be very costly. Finally they have to bear the cost of adapting individual behaviour to the general plan, which may involve modifying individual plans and setting synchronization mechanisms.⁶

The second category of costs has to do with limiting free riding, which is recognized to be endemic in most collective processes. Once the collective project is defined, individual agents may try to maximize net benefit by lowering their own contribution. Since the advantages of the availability of a public good are shared out among a large group of users, the cost of the individual contribution to the initiative tends to be perceived as higher than the potential individual benefits. Moreover, since collective action inevitably reduces individual freedom, incentives to defection can be latent and only surface over time. These incentives can include opportunities for earning which are in conflict with the collective interest, benefits of breaking common (shared) constraints and advantages of not complying with agreed practices. Pursuing a common objective thus requires a framework of sanctions to ensure respect of the constitutive and regulative rules underlying collective action.⁷ It also involves necessary costs of controlling individual opportunism. If there is no regulation of participants' behaviour, individual agents

lower benefits (or bigger disadvantages) is discordant initiatives. For basic aspects of co-ordination problems see D. K. Lewis, *Convention. A philosophical study* (Cambridge 1969); T. C. Schelling, *The strategy of conflict* (Cambridge 1980); Hardin, *Collective action*.

⁵ See E. Ostrom, *Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action* (Cambridge 1990) who emphasises that 'making the switch (. . .) from independent to co-ordinated or collective action is a non-trivial problem. The costs involved in transforming a situation from one in which individuals act independently to one in which they co-ordinate activities can be quite high' (40).

⁶ Arrighetti and Seravalli, *Istituzioni e costi di coordinamento*.

⁷ L. Parri, 'I giochi della cooperazione tra piccoli imprenditori: i consorzi di vendita come istituzioni', *Quaderni di sociologia* (1997) vol. 41, 109 - 139.

realize that they will not enjoy all the benefits of their own investment and will tend to under-invest. And a spread of this phenomenon leads to the failure of collective action.

The start up of a co-operative project thus depends on the simultaneous solution of different problems: measuring expected benefits of complementarity, advance quantification of co-ordination costs and development of formal ties and sanction mechanisms to detect and punish opportunism. The sum of complementarity benefits, i.e. net co-ordination and regulation costs, needs to be positive in order for a collective action to be started.

2. Start-up and consolidation of a co-operative project

The need for strongly binding agreements, the fact that investment in knowledge made before the start of the initiative is sunk and the size of informational obstacles⁸ mean that few collective agreements are made spontaneously.⁹ Our proposed framework shows a) factors that influence the starting phase of the initiative and thus the result of the evaluation process preceding the activation of the collective project and b) obstacles that affect the development of the co-operative solution itself over time. Regarding the former factors, the positive correlation between the level of benefits and the costs of the considered variables make the dilemmas of collective action more problematic. Frequently in fact the complementarity effects are higher, the lower net return of individual action (absence of private alternatives).¹⁰ But if the return from individual action is low or negative, agents, who lack economic incentives to start an activity autonomously, have little experience themselves in managing such a production process and thus have little knowledge of technological and organizational alternatives to be evaluated, the optimum input level to choose and net profits to be made. Consequently, overcoming incompleteness in information leads to an increase in co-ordination and regulation costs, which is sometimes proportionally higher compared to the possible benefit.

8 The structural uncertainty of many co-operative projects between firms and the consequent information problems are described in detail in A. Mody, 'Learning through alliances', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (1993) vol. 20, 151 - 170.

9 There is much evidence for the difficulty of starting up and the unstable nature of co-operative agreements; see B. Kogut, 'The stability of joint venture: reciprocity and competitive rivalry', *Journal of Industrial Economics* (1989) vol. 38, no. 2, 183 - 198.

10 Hardin, *Collective action*.

It has moreover been observed that the value of complementarity tends to be higher between firms that are technologically different than between technologically similar firms.¹¹ But the greater the difference between firms the more serious are informational and communication problems and difficulties of accurately evaluating potential benefit of the collective action. These again push up the level of co-ordination and regulation costs. An increased co-ordination difficulty between individual agents makes regulation more expensive. Shortages of information, which raise the cost of synchronization and of selecting the equilibrium, also tend to raise the cost of designing efficient sanction mechanisms against opportunism.

The correlation between complementarity benefits and co-ordination and regulation costs is important for the start-up of the co-operation project, but these variables become even more important in the evolution and continuity over time of the project. In fact if it is assumed that learning, the emergence of differentiated technological opportunities between firms and the dynamics of the information capital alter the evolution of each economic organization, it can be hypothesized that the benefits of co-operation are variable over time.¹² Incentives to collective action can appear high at one stage in a firm's development and much less significant or even cancelled out by the advantages of individual action in subsequent stages, and vice versa.

Our framework shows two main dimensions of the problem: the dynamics between the size of co-operation costs and benefits and the fact that they can change asymmetrically. The impact of such variables on incentives to co-operation between firms can be examined through a simple assurance game.¹³ At the first stage, two players, realising the existence of complementarity effects, have identified the optimum equilibrium and measured the benefit of overall complementarity. This result has been reached by paying co-ordination and regulation costs, which although they reduce the co-operation surplus, ensure in any case a positive value for net complementarity, higher than the alternative of individual production of the good. In order to generalize, it is assumed that the agents are able to produce the good collectively and individually and that they are free to do either at any point in the game, and that in the case of co-operation they also continue to produce a share of the good individually.

11 K.R. Harrigan, *Managing for joint ventures success* (Lexington 1986).

12 See R. Gulati, T. Khanna and N. Nohria, 'Unilateral commitments and the importance of process in alliances', *Sloan Management Review* (Spring 1994) 61 - 69.

13 The assurance game seems more appropriate than the prisoner's dilemma in representing the strategic relations between firms. A. Sen, 'A game theoretical analysis of theories of collectivism in allocation', in T. Majumdar (ed.), *Growth and choice* (Oxford 1969); Parri, 'I giochi della cooperazione tra piccoli imprenditori'; R. Cortazar, 'Non-redundant groups, the assurance game and the origins of collective ac-

To counteract the risk of unilateral defection, the parties agree on the automatic application of a sanction mechanism by which the defector has to pay all co-ordination and regulation costs borne by the other party during the time period the agreement is considered binding. At the end of each period, the agreement can be renewed or dissolved with no further obligations for each party. Sanctions are applied only where one party defects; there are no penalties in cases where both parties decide to abandon the agreement.

It is also assumed that the players have acquired in the first period the experience necessary to supply sufficiently accurate estimates for complementarity benefits and co-ordination and regulation costs of the second period.

On the hypothesis that benefits and costs are invariable, the game in the second period will be identical to that in the first period. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix where complementary benefits are $B_c = 3$, co-ordination and regulation costs $C_{cr} = 2$, profit from individual action $B_i = 3$, and the sanction is $S = 2$.

Table 1: Assurance game 1

		P_2	
		C	I
P_1	C	4,4	3,1
	I	1,3	3,3

Table 2: Assurance game 2

		P_2	
		C	I
P_1	C	4,2	3,1
	I	-1,3	3,3

The game shows two equilibria: either both agents opt for the co-operative solution, that is, collective production of the good together with individual production (C,C) or they refuse the co-operative solution and the good is only produced individually (I,I). Given that I,I is strictly inferior to C,C ($4.4 > 3.3$), rational agents will adopt co-operation.¹⁴

The result is significantly different when assumption of invariability of costs and benefits among players is relaxed and if it is hypothesized that co-operation costs and benefits are differentiated. The game in Table 2 shows that there is much less incentive for co-operation where co-ordination and regulation costs are asymmetrical.

The increase of C_{cr} for P_2 , while C_{cr} remains stable for P_1 , leads to two different equilibria, neither of which is strictly superior to the other. The consequence is that the co-operative agreement is not renewed for the second period by P_2 , and that the collective activity is interrupted.

3. The hypotheses of heterogeneity

The negative result for co-operation in Game 2 can be avoided in two ways: a) by reformulating the hypotheses of agents' behaviour, and b) by introducing an institutional actor into the game. Solution a) is linked to the concept of heterogeneity and critical mass presented in Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira (1985), Oliver and Marwell (1985) and Marwell, Oliver and Prael (1985).¹⁵ Significant variation in the distribution of advantages from availability of the collective good between actors can push a subset of potential participants into the role of catalysing agent (or critical mass) of co-operation as they make significant contribution to the start-up or maintenance of collective action. 'If an interest group is heterogeneous, there may be some highly interested or highly resourceful people available for a critical mass even when the mean interest or resource level is rather low'¹⁶ Given that the agents can

tion', *Public Choice* (1997) vol. 92, 41 - 53. For an analysis of the shortcomings of the prisoner's dilemma in interpreting the evolution of alliances between firms see also Gulati et al., 'Unilateral commitments'

14 M. Taylor, *The possibility of cooperation* (Cambridge 1987)

15 P. Oliver, G. Marwell and R.A. Teixeira, 'Theory of the critical mass I. Interdependence, group heterogeneity, and the production of collective action', *American Journal of Sociology* (1985) vol. 91, no. 3, 522 - 556; P. Oliver and G. Marwell, 'The paradox of group size in collective action: a theory of the critical mass II', *American Sociological Review* (1985) vol. 53, no. 1, 1 - 8; G. Marwell, P. Oliver and R. Prael, 'Social networks and collective action. A theory of the critical mass III', *American Journal of Sociology* (1988) vol. 94, no. 3, 502 - 534

16 Oliver and Marwell, 'The paradox of group size in collective action', 529.

draw different levels of advantage from collective action, some of them may in fact find it useful to modify individual behaviour compared to average behaviour, and thus make possible a co-operative result that would otherwise be impossible to achieve or maintain.

The hypothesis of heterogeneity means that the result of Game 2 can be inverted and favourable conditions for collective action can be re-established. If a form of co-operative precommitment is reached¹⁷, P_1 could pay a large share of the increase in overall co-ordination and regulation costs previously paid by P_2 , 'forcing' it thus towards C,C (see Table 3).¹⁸

Table 3: Assurance game 3

		P_2	
		C	I
P_1	C	4,4	3,-1
	I	1,3	3,3

Equilibrium I,I thus becomes strictly inferior to C,C and collective production of the good again becomes advantageous for both players. This solution is however subject to the condition that P_1 receives a higher complementarity benefit than at the start.¹⁹ This makes the solution less easy to generalize; it can only be adopted in certain contexts.

4. The role of institutional action

The second solution inserts an institutional actor external to the initial set-up of the game and has wider application. In traditional literature, institutional subjects essentially have the function of regulating with the aim of overcoming market failure and limiting free riding.²⁰ This function can be

17 Taylor, *The possibility of cooperation*

18 See R. Gulati et al, 'Unilateral commitments' for the importance of unilateral commitments in the development of co-operative relations.

19 In Assurance Game 3, B_c of P_1 goes from 3 to 5.

20 R.S. Scott, *Institutions and organizations* (London 1995).

carried out either by central institutional agencies, or less commonly by local structures. Central institutions include national agencies such as those responsible for fixing technical standards, which control the application of consumer protection laws and which regulate competition. Local structures can be certification centres and boards regulating typical local products. From the point of view of regulation, their institutional activity is similar to that of a 'third party', which arbitrates conflicts and safeguards contracts. A more general interpretation of their role is that of reducing uncertainty and supporting firm capital formation.²¹ This is because they introduce into the market system informational infrastructures and behavioural obligations that favour exchange between economic agents and safeguard their ownership rights.

This interpretation means that regulatory institutions contribute to solving the problems inherent in collective action, for example through the reduction of the cost of direct sanctions for defection. They do this even though they and their contribution are external to the definition and direct operation of the co-operative project.

The problems of the collective production of club goods, as we have tried to show, cannot however be circumscribed to the deterrence of opportunism and laying down of sanction mechanisms. The introduction into the analytical model of co-ordination problems as a variable influencing start-up and continuation of collective action shows clearly the importance of other costs: information collection and transmission, identification of participants, comparison and selection of practicable alternatives, and definition and maintenance of project organization. Overcoming problems of co-ordination is thus a pre-condition for the start-up of collective action. The level of costs of identifying the optimum solution influences the final outcome. Any solution that allows co-ordination costs to be reduced thus makes a collective action more likely to be successful. Institutional organizations, for various reasons, are able to act in this direction.²²

Observations on how the collective projects are planned and their relation to co-ordination costs warrant this conclusion. In general the solution of the problem of co-ordination lies in a decentralized mechanism or through centralized procedures. In a decentralized mechanism, each agent participates

21 D.C. North, *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance* (Cambridge 1990); D.C. North, 'Institutions and credible commitment', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* (1993) no. 1, 11 - 23.

22 For a discussion of the relationship between co-ordination costs and institutional action see Arrighetti and Seravalli, *Istituzioni e costi di coordinamento*; Arrighetti and G. Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* (Rome 1999).

directly in drawing up the co-operative project,²³ whereas in a centralized procedure, a limited representative subset of agents identifies the optimum plan for co-operative initiative. This centralized procedure is sometimes more efficient than decentralization, as the project is planned by a small number of subjects, with homogenous information resources and skills. This in fact reduces the information exchange and simplifies the decisional process, with positive effects on overall co-ordination costs.²⁴

These advantages of the centralized solution raise the net payoff for co-operation and this explains why it is often a small group of promoters who originate and operate collective action. In our hypothesis, unlike in the hypothesis of 'critical mass', agents who expect higher than average benefits from co-operation do not necessarily carry out promotion. Rather these agents tend to have the following characteristics:

- i) They have better co-ordination resources, more information²⁵ and higher (non-financial) incentives to collective action than other participants in the project;
- ii) They are able to ensure a fair distribution of the benefits of the collective good between the participants.

In many cases these are the characteristics of institutional administrations and organizations, particularly local ones such as chambers of commerce, town halls, business interest associations, local banks, etc.²⁶ Institutional actors in fact have the following characteristics:

- i) By their nature they carry out centralized co-ordination functions (provision of categorical collective goods).

23 The main points of the theory of self-organized collective action are covered in Ostrom, *Governing the commons*.

24 The centralized mechanism proves superior to the decentralized in some cases. These can be where there are significant differences between preferences and information possessed by participants and also when the efficient equilibrium can be reached through a number of technological solutions which all appear equivalent, at least at the start. Arrighetti and Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale*.

25 Obviously, it cannot be taken for granted that institutional authority in effect has adequate information available (see Ostrom, *Governing the commons*).

26 See A. Guenzi, 'Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale: un approccio di storia e economica', in Arrighetti and Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale*; M. Belfanti, 'Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale in prospettiva storica', in Arrighetti and Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale*; S. Magagnoli, 'Autorevolezza municipale e architettura istituzionale intermedia', in Arrighetti and Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* for a discussion of this from an economic historical angle.

- ii) They ensure the non-excludability of benefits as a constitutive element and norm in their action.
- iii) They already carry out data collection as part of their administrative duties.
- iv) Unlike private subjects, they show a zero or negative opportunity cost for defection or abandonment of collective action.²⁷

The insertion of an institutional third party into the co-operative agreement can help prevent the difficulties encountered in Game 2. The institution's role of 'promotion' is the absorption and especially the reduction of the overall level of co-ordination and regulation costs. Consequently, below a certain level of these costs, even asymmetry between the parties is compatible with a co-operative result.²⁸ Table 4 shows that I,I becomes significantly lower than C,C.

Table 4: Assurance game 4

P_2		C	I
		6,4	3,3
P_1	C	6,4	3,3
	I	1,3	3,3

Moreover, if we look at the evolution of co-operation, the institutional actor has for the most part negative benefits from the interruption of collective

27 Institutional subject receives from its participation in the collective project benefits essentially in terms of legitimization and consensus. These advantages can be enjoyed exclusively through the continuation of the collective action. A move to individual solutions leads inevitably to a loss of influence and role.

28 G. Seravalli, *Innovazione e istituzioni* (Università di Parma, Parma 1999), achieves a similar result showing that in the case of interdependence between two subjects in the exploitation of an innovation, individual incentives to innovation are aligned towards collective incentives only in the presence of an institutional third party which carries out an indispensable function of co-ordination by funding a reward for innovation.

action,²⁹ and will thus have higher incentives than the private actor to continue with the initiative once it is started. This point leads to two observations. The first concerns the time dimension of the project: the presence of an institutional actor, helping to push forward in time the 'shadow of the future' increases stability over time.³⁰ The second observation concerns the dynamics of complementarity effects. As was hypothesized above, not only co-ordination and regulation costs, but also benefits of co-operation, vary considerably over time. The trend towards decline of collective action advantages,³¹ shown in the empirical evidence presented in the next pages, indicates that even where co-ordination and regulation costs do not vary, the probability of the collective project being abandoned increases over time. The continuation of the collective project therefore requires the constant revision of the range of programmed activities and the substitution/diversification of the content of the initiative itself, so that complementarity advantages are not progressively eroded. In this case too, institutional subjects can make an important contribution. The main restrictions on leaving, together with the lower costs of co-ordination, are an incentive for the institutions to extend co-operative activity to other sectors apart from the initial ones, to adjust the formal structure and to maintain the project.

5. Institutions and forms of co-operation between entrepreneurs: the production system of the spectacles sector in Cadore

The analytical framework outlined in Section 2-4 can be used to interpret co-operation arrangements between firms in local production systems. Early results of the research currently being undertaken indicate that:

- a) co-operation between entrepreneurs is a significant variable in explaining local industrialization processes over the long term, and
- b) intermediate institutions play an important role in promoting co-operative initiatives and affecting their development over time.

In empirical analysis, a series of case studies regarding industrial districts of *Terza Italia*, (the area of Italy where small firms are prevalent and flourishing) show that co-operation between entrepreneurs, which includes vocational training, local bank action and land planning carried out by local authorities, is an important instrument in understanding the origin and nature of such a development model.³² This article looks at the relationship be-

²⁹ See footnote 27.

³⁰ R. Axelrod, *The evolution of cooperation* (New York 1984)

³¹ Different hypotheses on the progressive reduction of co-operation advantages are discussed in Sachwald, 'Cooperative agreements'

³² Guenzi, 'Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale'.

tween the emergence of inter-firm co-operation, the behaviour of local institutional actors and the formation of institutional spin-off in solving problems of collective action.

The case of the Cadore spectacle industry appears to represent one of the most advanced models of firm co-operation based on a system of local institutions able to grow and reform according to new requirements.

Cadore is in the Alps area and includes seventeen *comuni* or local administrative areas. It covers 1500 square kilometres and is in the northern part of Belluno province. In 1997 the area had 175 large and medium firms and 900 artisan firms, which all together employed approximately 13,000 people.

The origin of the area goes back to Angelo Frescura, who founded the first firm in 1878. In the early years of the twentieth century, Frescura's partners and ex-employees set up nine new firms. By 1940 there were 17 firms and three artisan firms employing more than a thousand people.³³ The war saw little change; in 1945 there were 17 firms with almost 1200 employees. But it was during the years of post-war reconstruction that growth was increasingly impressive. In Table 5 figures from industrial censuses illustrate take-off and subsequent growth: from the 1970s it becomes clear that growth is especially based on artisan and small and medium firms. This is shown by the big fall in the average number of employees per firm.

Table 5: Number of local units in spectacle district by size (number of employees)

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991
1-10	46	37	82	412	630
11-50	29	42	42	76	78
51-100	3	6	7	10	15
>100	3	4	6	5	10
Local units	81	89	137	503	733
Employees	1852	2429	2600	4268	8903
Average number of employees per local unit	23	27	19	9	12

Source: Industrial Censuses 1951-1991

³³ G. Bevilacqua, *L'occhialeria in Cadore* (San Vito di Cadore 1942); E. De Lotto, *Dallo smeraldo di Nerone agli occhiali del Cadore* (Belluno 1956); I. Diamanti, *Il distretto dell'occhiale in Cadore* (Vicenza 1996); C. Pellegrini, *Le istituzioni intermedie nello sviluppo locale. Il distretto dell'occhiale del Cadore* (Belluno) (Parma 1999)

In the mid 1990s, there was growth in large firms (Luxottica, Safilo, Marcolin and De Rigo), which have a total of 5,350 employees in 11 different factories, and in medium firms, which have a total of 2,500 employees in 900 different factories. Between 1991 and 1995 annual exports rose from 425 billion to 1,470 billion lire.

These figures are important because the take-off and subsequent growth can in this case be connected with the start and continuation of a system of local institutions. The system in Cadore is among the best developed in number and complexity of links among all those hitherto examined in Italy. The history of the district in this respect can be divided into three different phases. During the first phase, the three organizations representing respectively large, medium and artisan firms equipped themselves with structures for supporting their members. The second phase started in the mid 1970s; institutions for the spectacles sector were promoted autonomously by various organizations but were made available to help all firms. The third phase, during the 1990s, saw the initiatives being combined and jointly managed by business representatives.

We now examine these three different phases in detail. In the first phase, the following institutions played an important role.

Associazione degli industriali della Provincia di Belluno (Belluno Province Employers' Organization). This was founded in 1945 and nowadays includes almost all the firms of the province (633 out of a total of 780). It runs a service agency for the training of entrepreneurs (REVIVISCAR) and a consortium of credit guarantors (CONFIDI) founded in 1968 and extended several times. This consortium provides smaller firms with a guarantee for short- and medium-term credit. The Employers' Organization has been organized into different sections for different activities since its beginning. Spectacle firms could thus use the SIPAO (spectacle and other eyewear article manufactures section), which represented the sector interests and organized services. SIPAO currently represents approximately 160 firms all in the Cadore area and deals with trade union relations, legal advice and facilitated credit access.³⁴ Since the formation in 1975 of the consortium 'Dolomiti Export', SIPAO has collaborated with artisan associations in the creation of sector institutions

34 D. Arsellini, *I 50 anni dell'associazione fra gli industriali della provincia di Belluno* (Belluno 1995)

APPLA Associazione provinciale piccole industrie e artigianato (Province Association of Small and Artisan Firms). This association was founded in the 1950s and is a member of the CNA, (the National Confederation of Artisan Firms) It represents small and medium firms. Since the 1970s it has spawned several structures: APPIA Firm Services for accounting and bookkeeping, ECIPA the training organization and CONFIDART, a consortium for facilitated credit access.³⁵ APPIA has approximately 200 members in the spectacle sector.

Unione Artigiani (Artisans' Union). This was founded immediately after the war and since the 1970s has offered the widest and most interesting variety of initiatives. These range from traditional initiatives for an artisan association to more advanced ones. The more traditional initiatives include the *Cooperativa artigiana di garanzia* (Artisan Guarantor Co-operative) (1972) for facilitated credit Feinar (1972), bookkeeping and accountancy service, Consortium Centre (1981) for the promotion and co-ordination of consortia and Artigianfidi (1983) for facilitated credit. The more advanced initiatives include Tecno Innovazione (1986) to encourage innovation, *Consorzio Ambiente*, (the Environment Consortium) (1988) which deals with safety, storage of toxic waste and waste water disposal and Dimensione Impresa (1995) advanced services for firms (CCCLAA Belluno 1984 and 1995). The Artisans' Union is a large system of associations spread over the area. There are about 600 spectacle firm members registered with the office in Pieve di Cadore. Since the 1960s, the Union has extended its activities beyond traditional ones. It supports vocational training by financing new branches of the Belluno Brustolon Institute of Training in the smaller towns of Pieve and Santo Stefano. It promotes the creation of consortia to help manufacturing firms by providing a bridge with local administrations, and here it has achieved significant results. More generally the Artisans' Union has played a role, often decisive and always important, in creating all the institutions of the industrial district.

The second phase, characterized by institutions dealing with problems of all firms (large, medium, small and artisan units) saw the foundation of several new organizations.

Consorzio Dolomiti Export (The Dolomite Export Consortium). This was the first organization to experiment with co-operation between different employers' organizations. It was created in 1975 for a nine-year period; both large and

35 A. Amantia, *Gli industriali di Belluno e la ricostruzione* (Vicenza 1996)

artisan firms became members. In 1984 it was renewed for another sixteen years up to the year 2000. The consortium is reported to have brought immediate benefits; by the end of the 1970s exports accounted for about 70% of the district's output.

Consorzio centro occhileria (Consortium centre for spectacles) This consortium also grouped larger and artisan firms. Its 1984 statute laid down that it was to promote and support activities such as the training of entrepreneurs and quality trademarks etc. In reality its function was to coordinate a relevant share of the economic transactions involving small and large firms of the industry (CCIAA Belluno 1995).

Centro servizi occhileria (Spectacle service centre) This was formed in 1985 by the *Unione Artigiani* (National Union of Artisans). Its aims were training, technical assistance and promotion. Especially important was the foundation in 1990 of the Spectacle Museum in Pieve di Cadore, with a collection of approximately 2,000 pairs of spectacles from prestigious collections. With this museum the artisans aimed to build a cultural identity for the district by emphasising tradition and its links with local production. The district was to appear the exclusive repository of ancient craft and knowledge, cultivated for centuries in the workshops of European capitals. The implicit message is to emphasize the inimitable qualities of the Cadore product and thus maintain a high quality profile and an explicit differentiation from competitors.

Certottica. This is a mixed public and private consortium between organizations belonging to the national Confindustria, the employers' association, and local institutions. It is however financed by big firms in the district. It was officially founded in 1992 in compliance with European legislation, but became functional only in 1995. Although it was started up in a climate of uncertainty, today it provides certification for products made by approximately 250 firms. It is thus an established point of reference both for big and small firms of the district (CCIAA Belluno 1997).

The third phase began in the 1990s, with the foundation of the *Comitato di iniziativa per lo sviluppo dell'occhileria* (Committee for the Initiatives in Development of Spectacle Manufacturing) in Belluno. This was an organization grouping business organizations, trade unions and intermediate local institutions, in other words the provincial authorities and the mountain area administration. Its brief was to draw up a plan for reorganization of the system of intermediate institutions present in the industrial district, with the declared intent of emphasising complementarity existing in the local system (Assindustria Belluno 1995). The project, named '*Cittadella dell'occhiale*' ('Spectacle fortress') concerned five different structures corresponding to five in-

stitutions, in part new and in part already existing. These were the *Osservatorio sulle dinamiche del distretto* (Observatory of Industrial District Dynamics), *Certottica*, *Centro servizi occhileria*, (the Centre for Spectacle Services), *Scuola dell'Occhiale* (the Spectacle School) and the *Fondazione per il museo dell'occhiale* (the Spectacle Museum Foundation). Financed by the Veneto Regional Authority the Committee completed its work by setting up in 1996 a new institution, the '*Operatore collettivo per l'occhileria bellunese*' (the Collective Operator for Spectacles in the Belluno Area). This umbrella organization includes three public bodies, the Chamber of Commerce and two mountain area administrations, and three private ones, *Confindustria* (the Employers' Association), APPIA and the Artisans' Union. The Collective Operator also receives EU funding (Leader II) and works with the five structures listed above. It provides all normal services but is especially important in diffusion of technical know-how and economic and trading information. *Certottica* has a decisive role in training as it communicates information on innovation in quality standards. The Service Centre guarantees horizontal communication, again regarding technological innovation, between firms. The new School, *Scuola dell'Occhiale*, has two levels: the first aims to incorporate more academic scientific knowledge into the District through the Diploma in Spectacle Technology at the Engineering Faculty of Padua, held at Feltre. The second level, run by *Certottica*, encourages life-long education of management and skilled workers.

6. Verification of the hypotheses and closing observations

The information available and the evidence collected show several regularities in the nature of collective action dilemmas faced and in the solutions adopted by firms and institutional entities. Conclusions drawn from evidence appear consistent with the interpretation framework proposed in the previous sections. There appear to be three important themes for analysis. The first concerns the role of local institutions, particularly business associations, in drawing up and promoting collective plans and in carrying out adaptation as the plans are put into action. The second theme concerns the importance of reducing co-ordination costs compared to the cost of lowering the risk of free riding in management of collective action. The third theme concerns the instability and thus the variety of problems of collective action, which appear over time.

The role of institutional subjects

Empirical verification confirms the hypothesis developed in Section 4, which attributed a function of limiting uncertainty and synchronization costs to

local institutions. The presence of information advantages and positive incentives for the continuation of collective action allowed some institutional actors (like business interest associations) to lower coordination costs and thus increase the net benefits of complementarity. The consequence was an increase in the propensity of firms to participate in common initiatives.

The history of the spectacle production system in Cadore shows the emergence of differentiated complementarity effects which are sometimes markedly heterogeneous. In spite of this, institutional initiative plays a constant and critical role in the activation of collective action between firms.

As we saw, up to the 1970s the main problem of co-ordination concerned the establishment of collective structures able to reduce costs of supplying specific services (accounting, tax consultancy, salary and insurance contribution, bookkeeping, etc.), and able to widen access to particularly scarce resources (commercial credit and fixed capital investment financing). The centralization of these activities in trade associations or organizations created by trade associations, such as consortia of debt guarantors, allowed the exploitation of scale economies and containment of financial risk with important consequences for the costs and the availability of these collective goods for firms in the industry overall.

In the 1980s, new structures to solve a second co-ordination problem were added. This problem involved information management and reaching a sufficient level of local supply of intermediate inputs to make deverticalization of a significant share of production of larger firms possible and economically advantageous. In this case strategic complementarity is linked to incompleteness of markets. Even though the expected benefits for large and small firms appeared great, obstacles of dispersion in the artisan sector and the limited nature of information on the potential of individual supplier firms possessed by the outsourcing firm hampered externalization. Moreover, small firms also needed to make simultaneous large investments given that technological and organization resources were in most cases clearly below quality standards required by the big firm. These requirements could only be met with considerable difficulty if exclusively ordinary contractual mechanisms were used. In fact, especially in the start-up phase of a large-scale process, resorting to arm's-length contracting, because of the high levels of uncertainty about continuity of the trade over time, gives the supplier firm only limited incentives for making the necessary supplementary investments. Consequently, although positive benefits can be expected, there is frequently no co-ordination between agents, and necessary additional resources to support collective action are not produced.

Moreover, deverticalization was hampered by serious problems of indivisibility. Given the limited production capacity of each individual firm, the number of artisan firms involved in externalized production needed to be

very high. The decision to make recourse to the market was therefore economically advantageous only when almost all artisan firms were involved in the process.

The diverse components of the problem of co-ordination meant that a decentralized solution was complex. A centralized co-ordination mechanism was more successful. The double objective of, on one side, ensuring continuity in trade relationships and stability of supply over time and, on the other, achieving a sufficient level of supply, was pursued through the creation of the *Consorzio Centro Occbialeria*. Promoted by the artisan and industry associations, this structure acted as intermediate contractual party between the large firms and the artisans. It also guaranteed medium-term stability of contractual relationships and promoted the process of technological adjustment by smaller firms to the requirements of the larger firms.

More recently, a new co-ordination problem has appeared in addition to the above. New large firm policies, such as increasing attention to brand names, large investment in advertising and reduction of the intermediate stages of trading, have reduced market space for smaller firms. One measure to counter this tendency involved groups of small to medium firms joining in consortia or firm groups that were large enough for organization and production to make possible differentiation policies similar to those operated by large firms. It is generally agreed that this objective could be pursued and maintained over time only on condition that the consortium or joint venture was created in order to protect a club good such as a common line of products. Firms adhering to the initiative should initially supply finances to support planning of the new line and its marketing, and subsequently participate in the sharing out of orders, and contribute to production on the basis of their technological specializations.

The first problem of collective action in this type of initiative concerned the simultaneous identification of the brand policy to be developed, the division of labour between firms to be enacted and the distribution model to follow. The number of participants and the level and destination of investments depended on these decisions.

Evidence so far shows that in these circumstances selecting the optimum equilibrium requires the mobilization of significant resources to find information, to plan and to compare the different hypotheses. The cost of this investment and uncertainty about the possibility of reaching a positive result made a decentralized decision-making process difficult to set up. Recourse to a centralized model, where business interests sustained initial planning expenses and co-ordinated investment in finding information necessary for starting the initiative, proved less costly.

Moreover, in projects which require particularly high investment in co-ordination before start-up, the risks of collective failure remain high inde-

pendent of the expected net benefits. It was in fact noted that for a long phase with the increase of co-ordination costs, there is no corresponding reduction in uncertainty as to the final result of the collective action, nor a reasonable increase in the profitability of the investment. Incentives for participation in collective action are thus low over the long term, while the delayed entry into the consortium remains the most efficient alternative, if, as often happens, firms participating from the beginning cannot count on economic rewards from learning processes or exclusion of new contributors. This means that in cases where costs and benefits of collective action are unbalanced over the long term, the presence of a high risk of interruption of the project requires the intervention of institutional actors, not only to reduce co-ordination costs as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s, but also to advance initial investment and keep the incentive for developing the common project sufficiently high.

Co-ordination costs vs. regulation costs

The solution to the problem of collective action was seen to depend on the sanction mechanisms that agents establish before the collective action starts. In our interpretation, these costs are important, but there is also a second type. These are co-ordination costs and are based in the necessary investment for selecting the optimum equilibrium and making agents' individually converge in a single overall plan. The amount of these costs affects the start-up and the continuation of collective action, given that change in their level reflects on net co-operation benefits which agents gain from harmonising their action. In other words, such costs influence the value of the difference between benefits from collective action and individual action and thus provide incentive for agents' behaviour toward one solution or the other. An adequate regulation structure ensures division of the benefits corresponding to expectation or agreements. But it becomes important only when participants in collective action have been able to verify the existence of a solution towards which they want to harmonize their behaviour, and a positive net benefit from co-operation higher than individual action would bring.

This conclusion was confirmed empirically by evidence presented in this article. In the planning and start-up phases of consortium initiatives described in the previous section, adherence to the initiative was essentially determined by the expectation that collective action would be able to generate a limited level of net benefit, constant over time, rather than by strictness and fairness of benefits-sharing principles. The definition of binding redistribution criteria and the possibility of applying sanctions against free riding were important in ensuring the initiative's duration, but enforcement capacity was not perceived as a preliminary condition for the start-up of collective activity. Sanctioning was viewed rather as an automatic corollary of the availability of

information on participants which the decision-making body is compelled to collect in order to carry out its function of co-ordination and management of collective action, and as an inevitable appendix to its role in day-to-day management of the consortium. To put it briefly, unlike circumstances where respect for regulations and adoption of appropriate conduct ensures stability and predictability of the benefits of collective action, in the cases we examined the problem of distribution appears secondary to the problem of ensuring a sufficiently large surplus to divide amongst participants.

Instability in co-ordination problems

As we have emphasized, consortia and associations between firms are characterized by marked instability of incentives for joint action. The benefits of co-operation can decline because of improvements in prospects for individual action or simply because complementarity effects become smaller. Benefits can also decline because the co-ordination problem changes nature and includes new variables, which cannot be dealt with by the existing co-ordination structure. This leads us to a third regularity in evolution over time of the initiatives examined. In order to face new co-ordination problems and in order to make specialization economies worthwhile, associations tend over time to organize an increasing variety of initiatives. Consequently institutional subjects, as well as managing existing activities, are repeatedly engaged in planning new initiatives to supplement and renew the supply of collective goods of a selective nature present in the industry.

Between new and existing initiatives moreover there is complex interdependence. Past achievement of positive results by joint action encourages the planning of new intervention and strengthens the capacity of intermediate institutions to mobilize and lead. The evidence found here in fact unanimously confirms that the start-up of what we called 'second phase' initiatives depends to a great extent on good results of collective goods production in the first phase.

There is however a double causal link. The efficient administration of activities and services already supplied to firms in fact depends on the institutions' capacity to deal with new co-ordination problems emerging in the industry. The organization of new initiatives in fact allows institutions to gather information on the dynamics of complementarity, to identify variables sensitive to competition and to understand the direction of technological progress. This information is a useful element in adapting the efficiency of services already supplied such as technical assistance, vocational training and organ-

ization consultancy. It is also useful in directing quality certification (see the example of *Certottica* in the previous section) and avoiding investing resources in activities with decreasing returns.³⁶

Information gathered for new intervention, together with the strengthening of legitimization as a 'co-operation' actor, emphasizes the institutional characteristics of promoters (see Section 4). Consequently co-ordination and regulation costs are limited and thus positive results of collective action further encouraged. Of course, analogous considerations in the opposite sense are true where promoters fail to co-ordinate new joint action. In this sense it can be observed that the greater the complementarity effects of new initiatives, the more serious will be the negative impact of the failure of collective action in developing the sector. The lower growth is, the more limited will be the opportunities of making available collective goods, and so lower the gross benefits from collective action undertaken in the past.

36 An example is Dolomiti Export which at one time was important in sector growth. Recently however as competition has moved from design to brands Dolomiti Export is no longer able to efficiently support trade initiatives by smaller firms on foreign markets

REFERENCES

- Abu-Lughod, Janet L., *Before European hegemony The world system A.D. 1250-1350* (Oxford 1989).
- Abu-Lughod, Janet L., *The world system in the thirteenth century: dead-end or precursor?* (Washington 1993)
- Agay, (Frédéric d'), 'Une entreprise nobiliaire au XVIII^e siècle: la Compagnie des mines de Provence', *Annales du Sud-Est varoi* (1980) vol. 5, 8 - 41.
- Ågren, M. (ed.), *Iron-making societies. Early industrial development in Sweden and Russia, 1600-1900* (Providence/Oxford 1998).
- Allen, G.C. and A.G. Donnithorne, *Western enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya A study in economic development* (London 1957).
- Allen, R.C., 'Collective invention', *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization* (1983) vol. 4, 1 - 24.
- Allen, S. and C. Truman, *Women in business Perspectives on women entrepreneurs* (London 1993).
- Amantia, A., *Gli industriali di Belluno e la ricostruzione* (Vicenza 1996).
- Åmark, Karl, *Sveriges statsfinanser 1719-1809* (Stockholm 1961).
- Amatori, F., D. Bigazzi, R. Giannetti and L. Segreto (eds), *Storia d'Italia Annali L'industria* (Turin 1999).
- Andrieux, J.-Y., *Forges et hauts-fourneaux en Bretagne du XVII^e au XIX^e siècle* (Nantes 1987).
- Arrighetti, A., R. Bachmann and S. Deakin, 'Contract law, social norms and inter-firm cooperation', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (1997) vol. 21, no. 2, 171 - 195.
- Arrighetti, A. and G. Seravalli, 'Istituzioni e dualismo dimensionale nell'industria italiana', in F. Barca (ed.), *Storia del capitalismo italiano* (Rome 1997) 335 - 383.
- Arrighetti, A. and G. Seravalli, *Istituzioni e costi di coordinamento*. Working Papers 6, Istituto di Scienze Economiche, Università di Parma (Parma 1999).
- Arrighetti, A. and G. Seravalli (eds), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* (Rome 1999).
- Arsellini, D., *I 50 anni dell'associazione fra gli industriali della provincia di Belluno* (Belluno 1995).
- Assindustria Belluno, *Il progetto cittadella dell'occhiale* (Belluno 1995).
- Aubin G. and A. Kunze, *Leinenerzeugung und Leinenabsatz im östlichen Mittelddeutschland zur Zeit der Zunftkäufe* (Stuttgart 1940).
- Aubin H., 'Die Anfänge der großen schlesischen Leinenweberei und -handlung', in H. Aubin, *Grundlagen und Perspektiven geschichtlicher Kulturraumforschung und Kulturmorphologie* (Bonn 1965) 686 - 731.
- Aubin, H., *Grundlagen und Perspektiven geschichtlicher Kulturraumforschung und Kulturmorphologie* (Bonn 1965).
- Axelrod, R., *The evolution of cooperation* (New York 1984).
- Axelsson, B. and G. Easton (eds), *Industrial networks: a new view of reality* (London 1992).
- Aymard, M.A. (ed.), *Dutch capitalism and world capitalism* (Cambridge 1982).

- Bagnasco, Arnaldo, *Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano* (Bologna 1997).
- Ballot, C., *L'introduction du machinisme dans l'industrie française* (1923; reprint Geneva 1978).
- Barca, F. (ed.), *Storia del capitalismo italiano* (Rome 1997).
- Barone, A., *Dilemma del prigioniero e meccanismi che inducono alla cooperazione* (Rome 1995).
- Barozzi, G., L. Beduschi and M. Bertolotti (eds.), *Mantova e il suo territorio* (Milan 1982).
- Bauer, P.T., *The rubber industry. A study in competition and monopoly* (London 1948).
- Baumol, William J., 'Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive', *Journal of Political Economy* (1990) vol. 98, 893 - 921.
- Baumol, William J., R.R. Nelson and E.N. Wolff (eds.), *Convergence of productivity. Cross-national studies and historical evidence* (Oxford 1994).
- Becattini, G., 'Riflessioni sullo sviluppo economico-sociale della Toscana in questo dopoguerra', in G. Mori (ed.), *La Toscana* (Turin 1986) 901 - 923.
- Becattini, G., 'Il distretto industriale marshalliano come concetto socio-economico', in F. Pyke, G. Becattini and W. Segenberger (eds.), *Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia* (Florence 1991) 51 - 66.
- Becattini, G., 'The industrial district as a creative milieu', in Georges Benko and Mick Dunford, *Industrial change and regional development: the transformation of new industrial spaces* (London 1991) 102 - 114.
- Beck, Patrick (ed.), *L'innovation technique au Moyen Age* (Paris 1999).
- Behúl, L., 'Struktura příjmu alechty boleslavského kraje v polovine 18 století na základe tereziánského katastru', in L. Bobková (ed.), *•ivot na alechtickém sídle v 16-18 století* (Ústí n L. 1992).
- Belfanti, C.M., 'Due secoli di storia del distretto industriale di Lumezzane', in A. Cova, P. Mezzanotte and G. Rumi (eds.), *Brescia e il suo territorio* (Milan 1996) 503 - 528.
- Belfanti, C.M. and T. Maccabelli (eds.), *Un paradigma per i distretti industriali. Radici storiche, attualità e sfide future* (Brescia 1997).
- Belfanti, C.M., 'Mezzadri, artigiani, operai: personaggi in cerca d'autore alle origini del distretto industriale', in C.M. Belfanti and T. Maccabelli (eds.), *Un paradigma per i distretti industriali. Radici storiche, attualità e sfide future* (Brescia 1997) 31 - 38.
- Belfanti, M., 'A chain of skills: the production cycle of firearms manufacture in the Brescia area from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries', in A. Guenzi, P. Massa and F. P. Caselli (eds.), *Guilds, markets and work regulations in Italy, 16th-19th Centuries* (Aldershot 1998) 267 - 283.
- Belfanti, M., 'Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale in prospettiva storica', in A. Arrighetti and G. Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* (Rome 1999) 124 - 141.
- Bellandi, M. and M. Russo (eds.), *Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale* (Turin 1994).
- Bellandi, M., "'Terza Italia" e "distretti industriali" dopo la Seconda guerra mondiale', in F. Amatori, D. Bigazzi, R. Giannetti and L. Segreto (eds.), *Storia d'Italia Annali L'industria* (Turin 1999) 843-883.

- Belluno, C.C.I.A.A. di, *Rapporto conoscitivo sull'artigianato bellunese* (Belluno 1984).
- Belluno, C.C.I.A.A. di, *L'occhialeria artigiana in provincia di Belluno* (Belluno 1995).
- Belluno, C.C.I.A.A. di, *L'industria ottica a Belluno: tradizione, qualità e design* (Longarone 1997).
- Bendor, J. and Mookherjee, B., 'Norms, third-party sanctions and cooperation', *Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations* (1990) vol. 6, 33 - 63.
- Benko, George and Mick Dunford, *Industrial change and regional development: the transformation of new industrial spaces* (London 1991).
- Benoit, P. and D. Cailleaux, *Hommes et travail du métal dans les villes médiévales* (Paris 1988).
- Berg, M. (ed.), *Markets and manufacture in early industrial Europe* (London 1991).
- Berg, M., 'Product innovation in core consumer industries in eighteenth-century Britain', in M. Berg and K. Bruland (eds.), *Technological revolutions in Europe* (London 1998) 138 - 157.
- Berg, M. and K. Bruland (eds.), *Technological revolutions in Europe* (London 1998).
- Berg, M. and K. Bruland, 'New luxuries and their consumers in eighteenth-century England', in M. Berg and H. Clifford (eds.), *Consumers and luxury. Consumer culture in Europe, 1650-1850* (Manchester 1999) 63 - 85.
- Berg, M. and H. Clifford (eds.), *Consumers and luxury. Consumer Culture in Europe, 1650-1850* (Manchester 1999).
- Berger, P.L. and H. H. M. Hsiao (eds.), *In search of an East Asian development model* (New Brunswick 1988).
- Bernstein, H., 'Variations on capitalism', in B. Crow et al., *Survival and change in the third world* (Cambridge 1988).
- Best, Michael H., *The new competition: institutions of industrial restructuring* (Oxford 1990).
- Bevilacqua, G., *L'occhialeria in Cadore* (San Vito di Cadore 1942).
- Bin Wong, R., *China transformed. Historical change and the limits of European experience* (New York 1997).
- Birembaut, A., 'L'enseignement de la minéralogie et des techniques minières', in *Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIII^e siècle*, R. Taton, gen. ed. (Paris 1964) 365 - 418.
- Blaut, James M., *1492. The debate on colonialism, Eurocentrism and history* (Renton 1992).
- Blaut, James M., *The colonizers model of the world* (New York 1993).
- Blussé, Leonard and Femme Gaastra (eds.), *Companies and trade. Essays on overseas trading companies during the Ancien Régime* (Leiden 1981).
- Boëthius, Bertil, 'Christiernin, Pehr Niclas', *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon* (1929) vol. 8, 473 - 490.
- Boëthius, Bertil and Åke Kromnow, *Jernkontorets historia. Grundläggningstiden* vol. 1 (Stockholm 1947).
- Boldorf, M. 'Institutional barriers to economic development: the Silesian linen proto-industry (17th to 19th century)', *Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung* (1999) 566-599.
- Boomgaard, P., 'The welfare services in Indonesia 1900-1942', *Itinerario* (1986) vol. 10, no. 1, 57 - 81.

- Borovoi, S Ia., *Kredit i banki Rossii (seredina XVI v. - 1861 g.)* (Moscow 1958).
- Boyce, Gordon H., *Information, mediation and institutional development. The rise of large-scale enterprise in British shipping, 1870-1919* (Manchester 1995).
- Bradley, K. and A. Gelb, *Co-operation at work: the Mondragón experience* (London 1983).
- Braudel, Fernand, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris 1982, 5th edn).
- Braudel, Fernand, *Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th Century 2, The Wheels of Commerce* (London 1985).
- Bräuer, H., *Handwerk im alten Chemnitz. Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Chemnitzer Handwerks von den Anfängen bis zum Beginn der industriellen Revolution* (Chemnitz 1992).
- Brentano, L., 'Ueber den Einfluss der Grundherrlichkeit und Friedrichs des Grossen auf das schlesische Leinengewerbe. Eine Antwort an meine Collegen Grünhagen und Sombart in Breslau', *Zeitschrift für Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1894) vol. 2, 295 - 376.
- Brown, Jonathan and Mary B. Rose, *Entrepreneurship, networks, and modern business* (Manchester 1993).
- Bruland, K. and Patrick O'Brien, *From family firms to corporate capitalism. Essays in business and industrial history in honour of Peter Mathias* (Oxford 1998).
- Brulé-Garçon, A.-E., 'L'introduction en France du four à réverbère: l'apport de l'analyse historique', in P. Benoît (ed.), *Les chemins de la recherche, Mines et métallurgie* (Lyon 1994) 285-300.
- Brusco, S., 'Small firms and the provision of real services', in F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (eds), *Industrial districts and local economic regeneration* (Geneva 1992) 177 - 196.
- Brusco, S. and S. Paba, 'Per una storia dei distretti industriali italiani dal dopoguerra agli anni novanta', in F. Barca (ed.), *Storia del capitalismo italiano* (Rome 1997) 265-329.
- Brusco, S., 'Piccole imprese e distretti industriali', in S. Brusco, *Piccole imprese e distretti industriali* (Turin 1989) 481-485.
- Brusco, S., *Piccole imprese e distretti industriali* (Turin 1989).
- Buchanan, J. M., 'Una teoria economica dei club', in J. M. Buchanan, *Stato mercato e libertà* (Bologna 1989) 147 - 165.
- Buchanan, J. M., *Stato mercato e libertà* (Bologna 1989).
- Burt, R., *The British lead mining industry* (Redruth 1984).
- Butcher, John and Howard Dick (eds), *The rise and fall of revenue farming* (London 1993).
- Cable, Boyd, *A hundred year history of the P&O 1837-1937* (London 1937).
- Cadène, P. and M. Holmström (eds), *Decentralized production in India: industrial districts, flexible specialization, and employment* (New Delhi/London 1998).
- Cameron, Euan, *Early modern Europe. An Oxford history* (Oxford 1999).
- Cameron, Rondo, 'The Industrial Revolution: a misnomer', in J. Schneider (ed.), *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege* (1981) 367 - 377.
- Cardoso, Fernando and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and development in Latin America* (Berkeley 1979).

- Carlén, Stefan, *Staten som marknadens salt. En studie i institutionsbildning, kollektivt handlande och tidig välfärdspolitik på en strategisk varumarknad i övergången mellan merkantilism och liberalism 1720-1862* (Stockholm 1997).
- Carlos, Ann M. and Stephen Nicolas, 'Giants of earlier capitalism: the chartered trading companies as modern multinationals', *Business History Review* (1988) vol. 62, 398 - 419.
- Carsin, R., *Les techniques à la mine de Pont-Péan, 1730-1798. De l'extraction à l'affinage: méthodes et machines* (Rennes 1967).
- Carvounis, C., 'Efficiency and contradictions of multinational activity. The case of Greek shipping' (PhD Thesis New School for Social Research, 1979).
- Casson, Mark, 'Entrepreneurial networks. A theoretical perspective', in M. Moss and A. Slaven (eds), *Entrepreneurial networks and business culture. Proceedings Twelfth International Economic History Congress* (Madrid 1998).
- Castells, M., *The rise of the network society* (Oxford 2000).
- Cator, W. J., *The economic position of the Chinese in the Netherlands-Indies* (Oxford 1936).
- Cayez, P., *Métiers jacquard et hauts-fourneaux. Aux origines de l'industrie lyonnaise* (Lyon 1978).
- Cerman, M., 'Forme di organizzazione protoindustriale: i casi dell'Austria e della Boemia', *Società e storia* (1994) vol. 63, 161 - 187.
- Cerman, M., 'Proto-Industrialisierung und Grundherrschaft. Sozialstruktur, Feudalherrschaft und Textilgewerbe in Nordböhmen (15. bis 17. Jahrhundert)', in D. Ebeling and W. Mager (eds), *Protoindustrie in der Region Europäische Gewerblandschaften vom 16. zum bis 19. Jahrhundert* (Bielefeld 1997) 157 - 198.
- Cerman, M., 'Gutsherrschaft und untätiges Gewerbe: die Herrschaften Frýdlant und Liberec in Nordböhmen', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (1999) vol. 47, 2 - 19.
- Cerutti, S., *La ville et ses métiers. Naissance d'un langage corporatif (Turin, 17e-18e siècles)* (Paris 1990).
- Chalupa, A. et al. (eds), *Tereziánský katastr Ceský*, vol. 3 (Prague 1970).
- Chandler Jr, Alfred D., *The visible hand. The managerial revolution in American business* (Cambridge 1977).
- Chandler Jr, Alfred D., *Scale and scope. The dynamics of industrial capitalism* (Cambridge 1990).
- Chandler Jr, Alfred D., et al., *Big business and the wealth of nations* (Cambridge 1997).
- Chapman, Stanley, *Merchant enterprise in Britain. From Industrial Revolution to World War I* (Cambridge 1992).
- Chapon, P., 'Evolution des techniques métallurgiques aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles. L'exemple de Peisey-Nancroix', in P. Benoît (ed.), *Les chemins de la recherche, Mines et métallurgie* (Lyon 1994) 275 - 284.
- Chartier, R., *L'Ordre des livres. Lecteurs, auteurs, bibliothèques en Europe entre XIV^e et XVIII^e siècle* (Aix-en-Provence 1992).
- Chaudhuri, K. N., 'The English East India Company in the 17th and 18th centuries: A pre-modern multinational organization', in Leonard Blussé and Femme Gastra (eds), *Companies and trade. Essays on overseas trading companies during the Ancien Régime* (Leiden 1981) 29 - 47.
- Chen, J. H., *Cooperative networks and life structure* (Taipei 1994).

- Chen Jiexuan, *Subcontracting network and life structure. An socio-economic analysis of Taiwan's SMEs* (Taipei 1994)
- Chen Mingzhang, 'The way of the cooperation between the large and small business', in Chen Mingzhang (ed.), *Development of SMEs of Taiwan* (Taipei 1994).
- Chen Mingzhang (ed.), *Development of SMEs of Taiwan* (Taipei 1994).
- Chen Shengyi, *The establishing of industrial estates* (Taipei 1982)
- Cheng Lim-keak, *Social change and the Chinese in Singapore* (Singapore 1985).
- Chermette, A., 'La famille Jars et sa contribution à l'exploitation des mines lyonnaises aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles', *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences et belles-lettres de Lyon* (1979) série 3, vol. 33, 1056
- Chinese Institute of Economics, *A study of the provision of industry finance of SMEs* (Taipei 1992).
- Chiro, Daniel and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Essential outsiders. Chinese and Jews in the modern transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle, Washington 1997).
- Chiro, Daniel, 'Conflicting identities and the dangers of communalism', in Daniel Chiro and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Essential outsiders. Chinese and Jews in the modern transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle, Washington 1997).
- Chiu, S., K. C. Ho, and T. L. Lui, *City-states in the global economy* (Boulder 1997).
- Choi Chi-Cheung, 'Kinship and business. Paternal and maternal kin in Chaozhou Chinese family firms', *Business History* (1998) vol. 40, no. 1, 26 - 49
- Christiernin, Pehr Niclas, *Utdrag af föreläsningar angående den i Swea Rike uppstignen wexel-coursen* (Stockholm 1761).
- Chu Tse Seng, 'The Singapore Chinese Protectorate, 1900-1941', *Journal of the South Seas Society* (1971) vol. 26, no. 1
- Chulkov, M.D., *Istoricheskoe opisaniye rossiiskoi kommersii pri vsexh portakh, granitsakh*, vol. 4, book 4 (St Petersburg 1785).
- Cicognetti, L. and M. Pezzini, 'Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi', in M. Bellandi and M. Russo (eds.), *Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale* (Turin 1994) 107 - 126.
- Cizakca, Murat, *A comparative evolution of business partnerships: the Islamic world and Europe, with specific reference to the Ottoman archives* (Leiden 1996).
- Clarkson, L., *Proto-industrialization. The first phase of industrialization?* (London 1985)
- Colli, A., *Legami di ferro. Storia del distretto metallurgico e meccanico lecchese tra Otto e Novecento* (Rome 1999).
- Colli, A., 'Piccole imprese e "piccole industrie" in Italia sino al 1945', in F. Amatori, D. Bigazzi, R. Giannetti and L. Segreto (eds.), *Storia d'Italia. Annali. L'industria* (Turin 1999) 790-792.
- Comisso, E. T., *Workers' control under plan and market: implications of Yugoslav self-management* (New Haven 1979).
- Conrad, H.-G., 'The early mining legal norms in Southwestern German silver ore mining in comparison with the Great Mining Law regulations of Saxony and Bohemia', in *Silver in the history of science, technology and art*. (Prbam 1971)
- Cordingly, David, *Life among the pirates. The romance and the reality* (London 1995).
- Cortazar, R., 'Non-redundant groups, the assurance game and the origins of collective action', *Public Choice* (1997) vol. 92, 41 - 53

- Cottureau, Alain, 'The fate of collective manufactures in the industrial world: the silk industries of Lyons and London, 1880-1850', in C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds.), *World of possibilities. Flexibility and mass production in Western industrialization* (Cambridge 1997) 75 - 152
- Cova, A., P. Mezzanotte and G. Rumi (eds.), *Brescia e il suo territorio* (Milan 1996).
- Craddock, P.T. (ed.), *Two thousand years of zinc and brass* (London 1990)
- Crafts, N.F.R., *British economic growth during the Industrial Revolution* (Oxford 1985).
- Craig, Robin, 'The emergence of a shipowning community at Llanelly, 1800-1850', *Carmarthen Antiquary* (1959) vol. 3, part 1, 17 - 26.
- Craig, Robin, 'Shipping and shipbuilding in the port of Chester in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire* (1964) vol. 116.
- Craig, Robin, 'Capital formation in shipping', in J.P.P. Higgins and Sidney Pollard, *Aspects of capital investment in Great Britain (1750-1850)* (Methuen 1970).
- Craig, Robin, 'Shipowning in the South-West in its national context, 1800-1914', in H.E.S. Fisher and W.E. Minchinton (eds.), *Transport and shipowning in the Westcountry* (Exeter 1973).
- Craig, Robin, *The ship. Steam tramps and cargo liners, 1850-1950* (London 1980)
- Crow, B. et al. (eds.), *Survival and change in the third world* (Cambridge 1988)
- Curtin, Philip, *Cross cultural trade in World History* (Cambridge 1984).
- Czok, K. and H. Bräuer (eds.), *Studien zur älteren sächsischen Handwerksgechichte* (Berlin 1990)
- Davies, Peter N., *The trade markets. Elder Dempster in West Africa* (London 1973).
- Davies, Peter N., *Sir Alfred Jones: shipping entrepreneur par excellence* (London 1978).
- Davies, Peter N., *Henry Tyrer: a Liverpool shipping agent and his enterprise 1879-1979* (London 1979)
- Davis, Ralph, *The rise of British shipping in the 17th and 18th centuries* (London 1962)
- De Lotto, E., *Dallo smeraldo di Nerone agli occhiali del Cadore* (Belluno 1956).
- De Vries, Jan and Ad van der Woude, *The first modern economy. Success, failure and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge 1997).
- De Vries, Jan, *The economy of Europe in an age of crisis, 1660-1750* (Cambridge 1976).
- De Vries, Jan, *European urbanization 1500-1800* (London 1984).
- Deane, Phyllis, *The First Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge 1979, 2nd edition).
- Demsetz, Harold, 'Dogs and tails in the economic development story', in Claude Ménard (ed.), *Institutions, contracts and organizations. Perspectives from New Institutional Economics* (Cheltenham 2000) 69 - 88.
- Deng Gang, *Development versus stagnation: technological continuity and agricultural progress in pre-modern China* (London/Westport 1993)
- Deng Gang, *Chinese maritime activities and socioeconomic development, c. 2100 BC - 1900 A.D.* (London/Westport 1997).
- Deng Gang, *Maritime sector, institutions, and sea power of premodern China* (London/Westport 1999)
- Denti, I., 'Gli scopai di Cicognara', in G. Barozzi, L. Beduschi and M. Bertolotti (eds.), *Mantova e il suo territorio* (Milan 1982) 209 - 236.
- Diamanti, I., *Il distretto dell'occhiale in Cadore* (Vicenza 1996)

- Diamond, Jared, *Guns, germs and steel. A short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years* (London 1998).
- Dohnal, M., *Puvodní akumulace a vznik manufaktur v severomoravské plátenické oblasti* (Prague 1966).
- Doyon, A. et L. Liaigre, *Jacques Vaucanson, mécanicien de génie* (Paris 1966).
- Dunning, John H., *Multinational enterprises and the global economy* (Wokingham 1992).
- Dunning, John H., *The globalization of business* (London 1993).
- Ebeling, D. and W. Mager (eds.), *Protoindustrie in der Region. Europäische Gewerbelandschaften vom 16. zum bis 19. Jahrhundert* (Bielefeld 1997).
- Eggertsson, T., *Economic behaviour and institutions* (Cambridge 1990).
- Elbaum, Bernard and William Lazonick (eds.), *The decline of the British economy* (Oxford 1986).
- Elson, R. E., *The end of peasantry in Southeast Asia. A social and economic history of peasant livelihood, 1800-1990s* (London/New York 1997).
- Epstein, Stephan R. et al. (eds.), *Guilds, economy and society*. Proceedings B1, Twelfth International Economic History Congress (Sevilla 1998).
- Evans, Peter, *Dependent development. The alliance of multinational, state and local capital in Brazil* (Princeton 1979).
- Evans, Peter, *Embedded autonomy. States and industrial transformation* (Princeton 1995).
- Examination Committee of Economic Development, Executive Yuan, *Study of the satellite factory system in our country* (Taipei 1979).
- Farnie, D.A., review of John R. Harris, *Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the eighteenth Century* (Aldershot 1998), *Technology and Culture* (2000) vol. 41, 357.
- Ferguson, Niall, *The house of Rothschild. The world's banker, 1849-1999* (London 1999).
- Fernando, M. R. and D. Bulbeck (eds.), *Chinese economic activity in Netherlands India. Selected translations from the Dutch* (Singapore 1992).
- Feuer, L. S. (ed.), *Marx and Engels: basic writings and philosophy* (Garden City 1959).
- Fields, Karl, 'Trading companies in South Korea and Taiwan', *Asian Survey*, (1989) vol. 29, no. 11.
- Fields, Karl, 'Developmental capitalism and industrial organization: Chaebol and the state in Korea', in Hong Yung Lee and Dai-joong Chang (eds.), *Political authority and economic exchange in Korea* (Seoul 1994).
- Firsov, N. N., *Pravitelstvo i obschchestvo v ikh otnosheniakh k vnesnei torgovle Rossii v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II* (Kazan 1902).
- Fischer, G., *Aus zwei Jahrhunderten Leipziger Handelsgeschichte 1471-1650* (Leipzig 1929).
- Fischer, Lewis R. and Helge W. Nordvik, *Shipping & trade 1750-1950. Essays in international maritime economic history* (Pontefract 1990).
- Fisher, H. E. S. and W. E. Minchinton (eds.), *Transport and shipowning in the Westcountry* (Exeter 1973).
- Fong, Lai Yoke, The Singapore Chinese Advisory Board, 1889-1933 (Unpublished BA honours thesis, National University of Singapore, 1989).
- Fontana, G. L. (ed.), *Le vie dell'industrializzazione europea* (Bologna 1997).

- Fontana, G. L., 'Radici storiche dei sistemi produttivi del Veneto', in C. M. Belfanti and T. Maccabelli (eds.), *Un paradigma per i distretti industriali. Radici storiche, attualità e sfide future* (Brescia 1997) 45 - 70.
- Forbes Munro, J., 'Shipping subsidies and railway guarantees. Scottish overseas enterprise and the lure of London. The Mackinnon Shipping Group, 1847-1893', *Scottish Economic and Social History* (1988) vol. 8, 73 - 87.
- Forbes Munro, J., 'Sir William Mackinnon', in A. Slaven and S. G. Cheldand (eds.), *Scottish dictionary of business biography* (Glasgow 1990) vol. 2, 279 - 301.
- Forbes Munro, J., 'Suez and the shipowner: the response of the Mackinnon Shipping Group to the opening of the Canal, 1869-84', in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik, *Shipping & trade 1750-1950. Essays in international maritime economic history* (Pontefract 1990) 97 - 118.
- Fox, R. (ed.), *Technological change: methods and themes in the history of technology* (Amsterdam 1996).
- Frank, Andre Gunder, *ReOrient. Global economies in the Asian age* (London 1998).
- Freitag, Ulrike and William G. Clarence-Smith, *Hadrami traders, scholars and statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s* (Leiden 1997).
- Freudenberger, H., 'Three mercantilist protofactories', *Business History Review* (1966) vol. 40, 167 - 189.
- Freudenberger, H., 'Die proto-industrielle Entwicklungsphase in Österreich. Proto-Industrialisierung als sozialer Lernprozeß', in H. Matis (ed.), *Von der Glückseligkeit des Staates* (Berlin 1981) 355 - 381.
- Freudenberger, H., 'An industrial momentum achieved in the Habsburg Monarchy', *Journal of European Economic History* (1983) vol. 12, 339 - 350.
- Friedman, David, *The misunderstood miracle. Industrial development and political change in Japan* (Ithaca/London 1988).
- Garçon, A.-F., Les métaux non ferreux aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles. Ruptures, blocages, évolution au sein des systèmes techniques, 4 vol. (EHES thesis, typescript, Paris 1995).
- Garçon, A.-F., 'L'innovation au regard du complexe technique minéro-métallurgique armoricain', *Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest* (1997) vol. 104, no. 3, 23 - 37.
- Garçon, A.-F., *Mine et métal. Les non-ferreux et l'industrialisation, 1780-1880* (Rennes 1998).
- Garçon, A.-F., 'Fours debout, fours couchés. L'horizontalité et son apport en métallurgie', *Archives Internationales en Histoire des Sciences* (1999) no. 143, vol. 49, 302 - 330.
- Garçon, A.-F., 'Gabriel Jars, un ingénieur à l'Académie', in *Règlements, usages et science dans la France de l'Absolutisme*, Actes du Colloque international, Paris 8-10 juin 1999, forthcoming.
- Garçon, A.-F. and L. Hilaire-Pérez eds., *Pratiques historiques de l'innovation. Historicité de l'économie des savoirs, XVI^e-XX^e siècle*, Actes du colloque CNAM-CRHIISCO-CNRS, 21-22-23 March 2000, to be published.
- Garden, M., *Lyon et les Lyonnais au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris 1970).
- Garnaut, R. G. and P. T. McCauley (eds.), *Indonesia. Dualism, growth and poverty* (Canberra 1980).

- Gellner, Ernest, *Thought and change* (London 1964).
- Gereffi, Gary and Donald L. Wyman (eds.), *Manufacturing miracles Paths of industrialization in Latin America and East Asia* (Princeton 1990)
- Gereffi, Gary, 'The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains How U.S. retailers shape overseas production networks', in Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.), *Commodity chains and global capitalism* (Westport, Connecticut/London 1993) 96 - 99.
- Gereffi, Gary and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.), *Commodity chains and global capitalism* (Westport, Connecticut/London 1993)
- Gestwa, K., 'Das "russische Manchester" und die Grafenfamilie 'eremetev. Baumwollgewerbe und Gutsherrschaft auf dem Landgut Ivanovo, 1743-1861', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (1999) vol. 47, 20 - 39.
- Gestwa, K., *Proto-Industrialisierung in Rußland. Wirtschaft, Herrschaft und Kultur in Ivanovo und Pavlovo 1741-1932* (Göttingen 1999).
- Ghinzelli, A., *Le scope di saggina: la gente e la storia* (Viadana 1991)
- Ghosh, Amitav, *In an antique land* (New Delhi/London 1992)
- Gille, B., 'L'administration des mines en France sous l'Ancien Régime', *Revue d'Histoire des Mines et de la Métallurgie* (1969) vol. 1, no. 1, 3 - 35.
- Godart, J., *L'ouvrier en soie. Monographie du tisseur lyonnais. Etude historique, économique et sociale* (1899; reprint Geneva 1976).
- Godley, Michael, 'The late Ch'ing courtship of the Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Asian Studies* (1975) vol. 24.
- Godley, Michael, 'The Treaty Port connection', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (1981) vol. 12, no. 1
- Gohau, G., *Histoire de la géologie* (Paris 1987).
- Goodman, E. and J. Bamford (eds.), *Small firms and industrial districts in Italy* (London 1989)
- Goodman, Jordan and Katrina Honeyman, *Gainful pursuits The making of industrial Europe, 1600-1914* (reprint, London 1992).
- Granovetter, Mark, *Getting a job* (Cambridge, Mass 1974).
- Granovetter, Mark, 'Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness', *American Journal of Sociology* (1985) vol. 91, 481 - 510
- Green, Edwin and Michael Moss, *A Business of National Importance. The Royal Mail Shipping Group, 1902-1937* (London 1982).
- Green, N.L., *Du Sentier à la 7e Avenue. La confection et les immigrés. Paris - New York 1880-1980* (Paris 1998).
- Green, William A., 'The problem of periodization in world history', *Journal of World History* (1992) vol. 3, no. 1, 40 - 53.
- Greif, Avner, 'Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies', *Journal of Political Economy* (1994) vol. 102, no. 5, 912 - 950.
- Grünhagen, C., 'Über den grundherrlichen Charakter des schlesischen Leinengewerbes', *Zeitschrift für Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1894) vol. 2, 295 - 376.

- Guenzi, A., 'La storia economica e i distretti industriali marshalliani: qualche considerazione su approcci e risultati', in C.M. Belfanti and T. Maccabelli (eds.), *Un paradigma per i distretti industriali. Radici storiche, attualità e sfide future* (Brescia 1997) 19 - 30.
- Guenzi, A., P. Massa and F. P. Caselli (eds.), *Guilds, markets and work regulations in Italy, 16th-19th Centuries* (Aldershot 1998).
- Guenzi, A., 'Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale: un approccio di storia e economica', in A. Arrighetti and G. Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* (Rome 1999).
- Gulati, R., T. Khanna, and N. Nohria, 'Unilateral commitments and the importance of process in alliances', *Sloan Management Review* (Spring 1994) 61 - 69
- Gustafsson, Bo (ed.), *Power and economic institutions. Reinterpretations in economic history* (Aldershot 1991).
- Haftor, D.M., 'The "programmed" brocade loom and the decline of the drawgirl', in M. Moore Trescott (ed.), *Dynamos and virgins revisited: women and technological change in history* (New Jersey 1979) 49 - 66.
- Haftor, D.M., 'Women who wove in the eighteenth-century silk industry of Lyon', in D.M. Haftor (ed.), *European women and the preindustrial craft* (Bloomington 1995) 42 - 64.
- Haftor, D.M. (ed.), *European women and the preindustrial craft* (Bloomington 1995).
- Haggard, S., *Pathways from the periphery* (Princeton 1990).
- Hamilton, G. and N. W. Biggart, 'Market, culture, and authority', *American Journal of Sociology* (1988) vol. 94, 52 - 94.
- Hamilton, G. and C. S. Kao, 'The institutional foundations of Chinese business', *Comparative Social Research* (1990) vol. 12, 135 - 151.
- Hamilton, G. (ed.), *Business networks and economic development in East and Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong 1991).
- Hardin, R., *Collective action* (Baltimore 1982)
- Harlaftis, Gelina, *Greek shipowners and Greece, 1945-1975. From separate development to mutual interdependence* (Athens 1993).
- Harlaftis, Gelina, *A history of Greek-owned shipping* (London 1996)
- Harrigan, Kathryn Rudie, *Managing for joint ventures success* (Lexington 1986)
- Harris, John R., *Industrial espionage and technology transfer: Britain and France in the eighteenth century* (Aldershot 1998).
- Harvey, D., *The condition of postmodernity* (London 1990).
- Hasiotis, I., 'Continuity and change in the modern Greek diaspora', *Journal of Maritime History* (1989) vol. 6, 9 - 24.
- Hasiotis, I.K., *A survey of the history of modern Greek diaspora* (Athens 1993).
- Haugard, Joel, *Gustaf Kierrman. Ett fantastiskt levnadsöde under Frihetstiden* (Stockholm 1947).
- Hawke, Gary, 'Reinterpretations of the Industrial Revolution', in Patrick O'Brien and Roland Quinault (eds.), *The Industrial Revolution and British society* (Cambridge 1993) 54 - 79.
- Heckscher, Eli F., *Merkantilismen. Ett led i den ekonomiska politikens historia*, 2 vols. (Stockholm 1952).

- Heeks, R., *India's software industries: state policy, liberalisation and industrial development* (New Delhi 1996).
- Heinich, Nathalie, *Du peintre à l'artiste Artisans et académiciens à l'âge classique* (Paris 1993).
- Heitz, G., *Ländliche Leinenproduktion in Sachsen (1470-1555)* (Berlin 1961).
- Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, *Global transformations* (Cambridge 1999).
- Hellot, J., 'Etat des mines du Royaume, distribué par provinces', introduction to: Schlutter, *De la fonte des mines*, vol. I (1750).
- Heng, Pek Koon, 'The social and ideological origins of the Malayan Chinese Association', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (1983) vol. 24.
- Herrigel, G., 'Industry as form of order: a comparison of the historical development of the machine tool industries in the United States and Germany', in J.R. Hollisworth, P.C. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds.), *Governing capitalist economies Performances and control of economic sectors* (New York 1994).
- Hesse, P.-J., *La mine et les mineurs en France de 1300 à 1550* (Paris 1968).
- Higgins, B., 'The dualistic theory of underdeveloped areas', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (1956) vol. 4, 99 - 115.
- Higgins, J.P.P. and Sidney Pollard, *Aspects of capital investment in Great Britain (1750-1850)* (Methuen 1970).
- Hilaire-Pérez, L., *L'invention technique au siècle des Lumières* (Paris 2000).
- Hirst, P. and G. Thompson, *Globalization in question* (Cambridge 1996).
- Ho, Samuel P.S., 'Economic development and rural industry in South Korea and Taiwan', *World Development* (1982) vol. 10, no. 11.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M., *Economics and evolution Bringing life back into economics* (Michigan 1997).
- Holbach, R., *Frühformen von Verlag und Großbetrieb in der gewerblichen Produktion (13 - 16 Jh.)* (Stuttgart 1994).
- Hollisworth, J.R., P.C. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds.), *Governing capitalist economies Performances and control of economic sectors* (New York 1994).
- Holmström, Mark, *Industrial democracy in Italy: workers co-ops and the self-management debate* (Aldershot 1989).
- Holmström, Mark, 'A new map of Indian industrial society: the cartographer all at sea.', *Oxford Development Studies* (1999) vol. 27, no. 2, 165 - 186.
- Holmström, Mark, 'Racehorses or rabbits? Are entrepreneurs a scarce resource?', *Journal of Entrepreneurship* (July-Dec 1999).
- Holmström, Mark, 'Business systems in India', in E. Torp and G. Jakobsen (eds), *Understanding business systems in developing countries* (Newbury Park/London/New Delhi 2000).
- Holmström, Mark, *Spain's new social economy: workers' self-management in Catalonia* (Oxford/Providence 1993).
- Holton, R.J., *Globalization and the nation-state* (London 1998).
- Honderich, T. (ed.), *Oxford companion to philosophy* (Oxford 1995).
- Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Report on 1997 annual survey of industrial production* (Hong Kong 1999).
- Hong Kong Industrial Technology Center Corporation (HKITCC), *Annual report 1996*.

- Hong Yung Lee and Dai-joong Chang (eds.), *Political authority and economic exchange in Korea* (Seoul 1994).
- Horlings, Edwin, 'Pre-industrial economic growth and the transition to an industrial economy', in Maarten Prak (ed.), *Early modern capitalism Economic and social change in Europe, 1400-1800* (London 2001) 88 - 105.
- Hoselitz, B.F. and W.E. Moore (eds.), *Industrialization and society* (The Hague 1963).
- Houben, V.J.H., 'Labour conditions on Western firms in colonial Indonesia Outline of an approach', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1995) vol. 1, 93 - 108.
- Houben, V.J.H. and J.Th. Lindblad (eds.), *Coolie labour in colonial Indonesia A study of labour relations in the Outer Islands, c. 1900-1940* (Wiesbaden 1999).
- Houston, R.A., 'Colonies, enterprises and wealth: the economies of Europe and the wider world in the seventeenth century', in Euan Cameron, *Early modern Europe An Oxford history* (Oxford 1999) 137 - 171.
- Howarth, David and Stephen Howarth, *The story of P&O* (London 1986).
- Hsieh, Jiann, *Internal structure and socio-cultural change: a Chinese case in the multi-ethnic society of Singapore* (Pittsburgh 1977).
- Huang Yongren, 'Retrospection and prospect of Taiwan's SMEs financial system', in Chen Mingzhang (ed.), *Development of SMEs of Taiwan* (Taipei 1994).
- Hudson, P., 'Landholding and the organization of textile manufacture in Yorkshire rural townships, c. 1660-1810', in M. Berg (ed.), *Markets and manufacture in early industrial Europe* (London 1991).
- Huff, W.G., *The economic growth of Singapore Trade and development in the twentieth century* (Cambridge 1994).
- Humphrey, John and Hubert Schmitz, *Trust and economic development*. Discussion paper 335, Institute of Development Studies (Brighton 1996).
- Humphrey, John and Hubert Schmitz, 'Trust and inter-firm relations in developing and transition economies', *Journal of Development Studies* (1998) vol. 134, no. 4, 32 - 61.
- Hunt, Edwin, S. and James M. Murray, *A history of business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500* (Cambridge 1999).
- Hyde, Francis E., *Blue Funnel. A history of Alfred Holt & Company of Liverpool 1865-1914* (Liverpool 1956).
- Hyde, Francis E., *Shipping enterprise and management, 1830-1939: Harrisons of Liverpool* (Liverpool 1967).
- Hyde, Francis E., *Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840-1914* (Liverpool 1975).
- Indonesian economics The concept of dualism in theory and policy* (with an introduction by W.F. Wertheim) (The Hague, 1991).
- Israel, J.I., *Dutch primacy in world trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford 1989).
- Israel, J.I., *European Jewry in the age of mercantilism, 1550-1750* (Oxford 1989).
- Iukht, A.I., *Torgovlia s vostochnymi stranami i vnutrennii rynek Rossii (20-60-e gody XVIII veka)* (Moscow 1994).
- Jars, Gabriel, *Voyages métallurgiques*, 3 vols. (Lyon 1774-1784).
- Jones, Eric L., *Growth recurring Economic change in world history* (Oxford 1988).
- Jones, Eric, L., *The European miracle: environments, economics and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia* (Cambridge 1988, 2nd edition).

- Jones, Geoffrey and Mary B. Rose (eds), *Family capitalism*, special issue *Business History* (1993) vol. 35, no. 4, 1 - 16
- Jones, Geoffrey, *The evolution of international business. An introduction* (London 1996).
- Jung-en Woo, *Race to the swift: state and finance in Korean industrialization* (New York 1991)
- Kaplan, S L., 'Social classification and representation in the corporate world of eighteenth-century France: Turgot's "carnival"', in S L. Kaplan and C.J. Koepf (eds), *Work in France* (Ithaca/London 1986) 176 - 228.
- Kaplan, S L. and C.J. Koepf (eds), *Work in France*, (London 1986).
- Kaplinsky, R. and A. Posthuma, *Easternization: the spread of Japanese management techniques to developing countries* (London 1994).
- Kaulbach, H., *Aus der Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Stadt Jauer vom Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges bis zur preußischen Besitzergreifung* (Wrocław 1936).
- Ke Zhiming, *Market, social network, and the production organization of small-scale industry in Taiwan. The garment industries in Wufengpu* (Taipei 1993)
- Keller, K., 'Handwerkeralltag im 16. Jahrhundert. Zu grundlegenden Lebensverhältnissen von Meistern der Leipziger Leder- und Textilhandwerke', in K. Czok and H. Bräuer (eds), *Studien zur älteren sächsischen Handwerksgechichte* (Berlin 1990) 8-49.
- Keynes, J.M., *Treatise on money*. II. *The applied theory of money* (London 1930)
- King, A Y.C. and D. H. K. Leung, *The Chinese touch in small industrial organizations* (Hong Kong 1975).
- King, A Y.C., 'Kuan-hsi and network building', *Daedalus* (1991) vol. 120, 63 - 84.
- Kirkaldy, W., *British shipping* (London 1914)
- Kisch, H., 'The textile industries of Silesia and the Rhineland: a comparative study of industrialization', *Journal of Economic History* (1959) vol. 19, 541 - 564.
- Klein, P.W., *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen 1965).
- Klíma, A., *Manufakturní období v Čechách* (Prague 1955).
- Klíma, A., 'English merchant capital in Bohemia in the eighteenth century', *Economic History Review* (1959) vol. 12, 34 - 48.
- Klíma, A., 'The rural domestic industries in Bohemia in the eighteenth century', *Economic History Review* (1974) vol. 27, 48 - 56.
- Klíma, A., *Economy, industry and society in Bohemia in the 17th-19th centuries* (Prague 1991).
- Knoke, David and James H. Kuklinski, *Network analysis* (Beverly Hills 1982).
- Kogut, B., 'The stability of joint venture: reciprocity and competitive rivalry', *Journal of Industrial Economics* (1989) vol. 38, no. 2, 183 - 198.
- Koninckx, Christian, *The first and second charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731-1766)* (Kortrijk 1980).
- Koropec'kyi, I.S. (ed.), *Ukrainian economic history: interpretative essays* (Cambridge 1991)
- Kozlova, N.V., 'Organizatsiia kommercheskogo obrazovaniia v Rossii v XVIII v', *Istoricheskie zapiski* (1989) vol. 117
- Kozlova, N.V., *Rossiiskii absolutizm i kupchestvo v XVIII veke* (Moscow 1999).

- Kriedte, P., H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, *Industrialisierung vor der Industrialisierung* (Göttingen 1977).
- Kriedte, P., H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, *Industrialization before industrialization. Rural industry in the genesis of capitalism* (Cambridge 1981).
- Kriedte, P., H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, 'Proto-industrialization revisited: demography, social structure, and modern domestic industry', *Continuity and Change* (1993) vol. 8, 217 - 252.
- Kriedte, P., H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, 'Eine Forschungslandschaft in Bewegung', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1998) vol. 2, 9 - 20
- Kulczykowski, M., 'Zwischen Protoindustrie und Desindustrialisierung. Zu den ökonomischen Problemen der Textilindustrie in Polen und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert', in H. Mecherowicz-Urbanska and M. Matzmüller (eds), *Studia Polono - Helvetica* (Basel/Frankfurt/M. 1989) 67 - 78.
- Kunze, A., *Die nordböhmischesächsische Leinwand und der Nürnberger Großhandel mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Friedländisch-Reichenberger Gebiets* (Liberec 1926).
- Kunze, A., 'Die Frankenger Leinwand und das Nürnberger Handelskapital im 16. Jahrhundert', *Heimat. Monatsschrift des Altertumsvereins für Frankenberg und Umgebung* (1932) vol. 11, 49 - 56
- Kunze, A., 'Die Leinwandfärberei und der Waidhandel der Frankenger Weberzunft im 16. Jahrhundert', *Heimat. Monatsschrift des Altertumsvereins für Frankenberg und Umgebung* (1932) vol. 11, 77 - 88
- Kunze, A., *Der Frühkapitalismus in Chemnitz* (Karl-Marx-Stadt 1958)
- Kunze, A., 'Vom Bauerndorf zum Weberdorf. Zur sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Struktur der Waldhufendörfer der südlichen Oberlausitz im 16., 17. und 18. Jahrhundert', in M. Reuther (ed.), *Oberlausitzer Forschungen. Beiträge zur Landesgeschichte* (Leipzig 1961) 165 - 192
- Lagerqvist, Lars O. and Ernst Nathorst-Böös, *Vad kostade det? Priser och löner från medeltid till våra dagar* (Stockholm 1997).
- Landes, David, *The wealth and poverty of nations. Why some are so rich and some are so poor* (New York 1998)
- Lane, C., 'The social regulation of inter-firm relations in Britain and Germany: market rules, legal norms and technical standards', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (1997) vol. 21, no. 2, 197 - 216.
- Lau, S.K. and H. C. Kuan, *The ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong 1988).
- Lazonick, William, *Business organization and the myth of the market economy* (Cambridge 1993).
- Lazonick, William, Ronald Dore and Henk W. de Jong, *The Corporate Triangle. The structure and performance of corporate systems in a global economy* (Oxford 1997).
- Leboutte, R. (ed.), *Protoindustrialisation: recherches récentes et nouvelles perspectives. Mélanges en souvenir de Franklin Mendels* (Genève 1996).
- Lehmann, D. (ed.), *Development theory: four critical studies* (London 1979).
- Lewald, U., 'Die Entwicklung der ländlichen Textilindustrie im Rheinland und in Schlesien. Ein Vergleich', *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* (1961) vol. 10, 601 - 630.
- Lewis, D.K., *Convention. A philosophical study* (Cambridge 1969).
- Li Guoding, 'Retrospection and prospect of Taiwan's SMEs', in Department of Small Business, Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Collections of SMEs* (Taipei 1989).

- Lin Zhongxiong and Peng Baixian, a comparison of the provision of SMEs' finance and general finance, in Chen Mingzhang (ed.), *Development of SMEs of Taiwan* (Taipei 1994).
- Lindblad, J. Th., *Between Dayak and Dutch; the economic history of Southeast Kalimantan* (Dordrecht/Providence 1988).
- Lis, C., and H. Soly, 'Corporatisme, onderaanneming en loonarbeid. Flexibiliseren en dereguleren van de arbeidsmarkt in Westeuropese steden (veertiende - achttiende eeuw)', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* (1984) vol. 20, 365 - 390.
- Liu Mincheng and Zuo Hongchou, *Improving investment environments* (Taipei 1983).
- Liu Taiying, 'The environment of investment of SMEs in Taiwan', in Chen Mingzhang (ed.), *Development of SMEs of Taiwan* (Taipei 1994).
- Lodyzhenskii, K., *Istoriia russkogo tamozhennogo tarifa* (St Petersburg 1886).
- Lui, T.L. and T. Wong, *Chinese entrepreneurship in context*, Occasional Paper, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong 1994).
- Luthy, H., *La banque protestante en France de la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 2 vols. (Paris 1959-1961).
- Luytjes, A., *De bevolkingsrubbercultuur in Nederlandsch-Indië IIa, Zuid- en Oost Borneo* (Weltevreden 1925).
- Luytjes, A., *De bevolkingsrubbercultuur in Nederlandsch-Indië VII, Eindrapport* (Weltevreden 1925).
- Maccabelli, T. and F. Sforzi, 'Totalità e cambiamento: il paradigma dei distretti industriali', in C.M. Belfanti and T. Maccabelli (eds.), *Un paradigma per i distretti industriali. Radici storiche, attualità e sfide future* (Brescia 1997).
- Mackie, J.A.C. (ed.), *The Chinese in Indonesia. Five essays* (Melbourne 1976).
- Maddison, A. and G. Prince (eds.), *Economic growth in Indonesia 1820-1940* (Dordrecht/Providence 1989).
- Magagnoli, S., 'Autorevolezza municipale e architettura istituzionale intermedia', in A. Arrighetti, and G. Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* (Rome 1999).
- Magnusson, Lars, *Korruption och borgerlig ordning. Naturrätt och ekonomisk diskurs i Sverige under Frihetstiden*. Uppsala Papers in Economic History no. 20 (Uppsala 1989).
- Magnusson, Lars, *Mercantilism. The shaping of an economic language* (London 1994).
- Mainuš, F., 'Janovické harrachovské podnikání v letech 1756-1778', *Slezský sborník* (1957) vol. 55, 392 - 411, 461 - 480.
- Mainuš, F., *Plátenictví na Morave a ve Slezsku v 17. a 18. století* (Ostrava 1959).
- Mainuš, F., *Vlnarství a bavlnarství na Morave a ve Slezsku v XVII a XVIII století* (Prague 1960).
- Majumdar, T. (ed.), *Growth and choice* (Oxford 1996).
- Malmström, Carl Gustaf, *Sveriges politiska historia från konung Karl XII:s död till statsvälföringen 1772*, vol. 4 (Stockholm 1899).
- Marriner, Sheila and Francis E. Hyde, *The Senior: John Samuel Swire 1825-98. Management in Far Eastern shipping trades* (Liverpool 1967).
- Marshall, Alfred A., *Principles of economics* (London 1920, 8th edition, reprinted 1966).

- Marwell, G., P. Oliver and R. Pahl, 'Social networks and collective action. A theory of the critical mass III', *American Journal of Sociology* (1988) vol. 94, no. 3, 502 - 534.
- Marx, Karl, 'The British rule in India' (*New York Times*, 25 June 1853), in L. S. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engels: basic writings and philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y. 1959) 474 - 481.
- Matis, H. (ed.), *Von der Glückseligkeit des Staates* (Berlin 1981).
- McClelland, David C., 'The achievement motive in economic growth', in B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore (eds.), *Industrialization and society* (The Hague 1963).
- McClelland, David C., 'The impulse to modernization', in M. Weiner (ed.), *Modernization* (New York 1966).
- McFadyean, A. (ed.), *The history of rubber regulation 1934-1943* (London 1944).
- McIntyre, Alasdair, *A short history of ethics* (London 1966).
- McNeill, William, *The rise of the West* (Chicago 1963).
- McVey, Ruth, 'The materialization of the southeast Asian entrepreneur', in R. McVey (ed.), *Southeast Asian capitalists* (Ithaca 1992) 7 - 33.
- McVey, Ruth (ed.), *Southeast Asian capitalists* (Ithaca 1992).
- Mecherowicz-Urbanska, H. and M. Mattmüller (eds.), *Studia Polono - Helvetica* (Basel/Frankfurt/M. 1989).
- Melton, E., 'Proto-industrialization, serf agriculture and agrarian social structure: two estates in nineteenth-century Russia', *Past and Present* (1987) vol. 115, 69 - 106.
- Ménard, Claude, *Transaction cost economics. Recent developments* (Cheltenham 1997).
- Ménard, Claude (ed.), *Institutions, contracts and organizations. Perspectives from New Institutional Economics* (Cheltenham 2000).
- Mendels, F.F., 'Proto-industrialization: the first phase of the industrialization process', *Journal of Economic History* (1972) vol. 32, 241 - 262.
- Mendels, F.F., 'Proto-industrialization: theory and reality. General report', in *Eighteenth International Economic History Congress. "A"-Themes* (Budapest 1982) 69 - 107.
- Mengoli, P., 'Dal truciolo alla maglieria: alle radici del distretto industriale di Carpi', *Padania* (1993) no. 14.
- Merzario, R., *Il capitalismo nelle montagne. Strategie familiari nella prima fase di industrializzazione del Comasco* (Bologna 1989).
- Meyssonnier, S., *La balance et l'horloge. La genèse de la pensée libérale en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Montreuil 1989).
- Michalkiewicz, St., *Gospodarka magnacka na Śląsku w drugiej połowie XVIII wieku (na przykładzie majątku Ksi-1)* (Wrocław 1969).
- 'Mines et mineurs dans l'Ouest lyonnais', *L'Araire* (1989) vol. 26.
- Minoglou, Joanna Pepelasis and Helen I.ouri, 'Diaspora entrepreneurial networks of the Black Sea and Greece, 1870-1917', *Journal of European Economic History* (1997) 26 (1), 69 - 104.
- Minoglou, Joanna Pepelasis, 'The Greek merchant house of the Russian Black Sea. A nineteenth century example of a traders' coalition', *International Journal of Maritime History* (1998) vol. 10, no. 1, 1 - 44.
- Mody, A., 'Learning through alliances', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, (1993) vol. 20, 151 - 170.

- Moe, Terry M., *The Organization of interests Incentives and the internal dynamics of political interest groups* (Chicago/London 1980).
- Mokyr, J., 'Evolution and technological change: a new metaphor for economic history?', in R. Fox (ed.), *Technological change: methods and themes in the history of technology* (Amsterdam 1996) 63 - 83.
- Mokyr, J., 'Was there a British Industrial Revolution?', *Research in Economic History* (1991) supplement 6, 253 - 286.
- Molenda, D., 'Investments in ore mining in Poland from the 13th to the 17th centuries', *The Journal of European Economic History* (1976) vol. 5, no. 1, 151 - 169.
- Monange, E., *Une entreprise industrielle au XVIII^e siècle. Les mines de Poullaouen et du Huelgoat (1732-1791)* (Rennes 1972).
- Moore-Trescott, M. (ed.), *Dynamos and virgins revisited: women and technological change in history* (New Jersey 1979).
- Mori, G. (ed.), *La Toscana* (Turin 1986).
- Morineau, M., 'Les frappes monétaires françaises de 1726 à 1793. Premières considérations', *Etudes d'histoire monétaire. Etudes réunies par John Day* (Lille 1984) 69 - 142.
- Moss, M. and A. Slaven (eds.), *Entrepreneurial networks and business culture. Proceedings, Twelfth International Economic History Congress* (Madrid 1998).
- Müller, Leos, *The merchant houses of Stockholm, c. 1640-1800. A comparative study of early-modern entrepreneurial behaviour* (Uppsala 1998).
- Musgrave, Peter, *The early modern European economy* (Basingstoke 1999).
- Myška, M., 'Pre-industrial iron-making in the Czech Lands: the labour force and production relations circa 1350-circa 1840', *Past and Present* (1979) vol. 82, 44 - 72.
- Myška, M., 'K charakteristice výrobních vztahu a forem v předení lnu ve slezsko-moravské "proto-industriální oblasti" v 16. a polovine 18. století', *Casopis Slezského muzea* (1984) vol. 33, 253 - 270.
- Myška, M., 'Die Proto-Industrialisierung im schlesisch-mährischen Wirtschaftsballungsraum', *Sborník prací filozofického fakulty Ostravské univerzity* (1994) vol. 144, *Historica* vol. 2, 89 - 121.
- Myška, M., 'Proto-industrialization in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia', in S. C. Ogilvie and M. Cerman (eds.), *European proto-industrialization* (Cambridge 1996) 188 - 207.
- Nadvi, Khalid, 'Collective efficiency and collective failure: the response of the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster to global quality pressures.' *World Development* (1999) vol. 27, no. 9, 1605 - 1626.
- Nagel, T., 'Equality', in T. Honderich (ed.), *Oxford companion to philosophy* (Oxford 1995) 248 - 249.
- Napier, Christopher J., 'Allies or subsidiaries? Inter-company relations in the P&O Group, 1914-39', *Business History* (1997) vol. 39, 67 - 93.
- Nava, P. 'Vite familiari e percorsi di carriera. Le donne carpigiane dal truciolo alla maglieria', *Padania* (1993) no. 14, 54 - 92.
- Ng, Wing Chung, Vincent (?), *Huiguan-regional institutions in the development of overseas Chinese nationalism in Singapore, 1912-1941* (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong s.a.)

- Nordencrantz, Anders, *Åtskillige memorialer angående myntet och wäxelcoursen tryckte på Högl. Ridderskapets och Adelns befallning wid riksdagen 1762* (Stockholm 1762).
- Norrby, Jonas, *Jennings* (Köping 1991).
- North, Douglass C. and R. Thomas, *The rise of the Western World: a new economic history* (Cambridge 1973).
- North, Douglass C., *Structure and change in economic history* (New York 1981).
- North, Douglass C., *Transaction costs, institutions, and economic performance. Occasional papers International Center for Economic Growth* (San Francisco 1992).
- North, Douglass C., 'Institutions and credible commitment', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* (1993) no. 1, 11 - 23.
- North, Douglass C., *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Political economy of institutions and decisions* (Cambridge 1995).
- North, Douglass C., 'Transaction costs through time', in Claude Ménard (ed.), *Transaction cost economics. Recent developments* (Cheltenham 1997) 149 - 161.
- North, Douglass C., 'Understanding institutions', in Claude Ménard (ed.), *Institutions, contracts and organizations. Perspectives from New Institutional Economics* (Cheltenham 2000) 7 - 11.
- Nuti, E., "Frantumazione" dei distretti industriali e nuova organizzazione dei rapporti tra imprese. Riesame della teoria e nuove osservazioni suggerite da indagini dirette', in C.M. Belfanti and T. Maccabelli (eds.), *Un paradigma per i distretti industriali. Radici storiche, attualità e sfide future* (Brescia 1997) 161 - 174.
- O'Brien, Patrick, 'Introduction: modern conceptions of the Industrial Revolution', in Patrick O'Brien and Roland Quinault (eds.), *The Industrial Revolution and British society* (Cambridge 1993) 1 - 31.
- O'Brien, Patrick and Roland Quinault (eds.), *The Industrial Revolution and British society* (Cambridge 1993).
- O'Brien, Patrick, 'The reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconfiguration of the British Industrial Revolution as a conjuncture in global history', *Itinerario* (2000) vol. 24, no. 3-4, 117 - 135.
- Ogilvie, S.C., 'Social institutions and proto-industrialization', in S. C. Ogilvie and M. Cerman (eds.), *European proto-industrialization* (Cambridge 1996) 23 - 37.
- Ogilvie, S.C. and M. Cerman (eds.), *European proto-industrialization* (Cambridge 1996).
- Ogorodnikov, S.F., *Očerki istorii goroda Arkhangelska v torgovo-promysblennom otshenii* (St Petersburg 1890).
- Okun', S.B., *Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia* (Moscow/Leningrad 1939).
- Olán, Eskil, *Sjörövarna på Medelhavet och Levantiska kompaniet. Historien om Sveriges gamla handel med Orienten* (Stockholm 1921).
- Oliver, P. and G. Marwell, 'The paradox of group size in collective action. A theory of the critical mass II', *American Sociological Review* (1985) vol. 53, no. 1, 1 - 8.
- Oliver, P., G. Marwell and R.A. Teixeira, 'Theory of the critical mass I. Interdependence, group heterogeneity, and the production of collective action', *American Journal of Sociology* (1985) vol. 91, no. 3, 522 - 556.
- Olson, Mancur, *The logic of collective action* (Cambridge 1965).
- Olson, Mancur, *The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups* (Cambridge 1980, revised edition).

- Olson, Mancur, *The rise and decline of nations Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities* (Westford 1982)
- Ong, A. and D. Nonini, *Underground empires* (New York 1995).
- Orru, Marco, 'The institutional logic of small-firm economies in Italy and Taiwan', in Marco Orru et al. (eds.), *The economic organization of East Asian capitalism* (New York 1997).
- Orru, Marco et al. (eds.), *The economic organization of East Asian capitalism* (New York 1997).
- Ostrom, E., *Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action* (Cambridge 1990).
- Palmer, R.R. and J. Colton, *A history of the modern world* (New York 1995, 8th edition).
- Parri, L., 'I giochi della cooperazione tra piccoli imprenditori: i consorzi di vendita come istituzioni', *Quaderni di sociologia* (1997) vol. 41, 109 - 139
- Pedersen, P.O., A. Sverrisson and M.P. van Dijk (eds.), *Flexible specialization: the dynamics of small-scale industries in the south* (London 1994).
- Pekelharing, N.R., *De bevolkingrubbercultuur in Nederlandsch-Indië Ib, Djambi* (Weltevreden 1925).
- Pekelharing, N.R., *Native rubber cultivation in the Dutch East-Indies I, Djambi* (1925)
- Pellegrini, C., *Le istituzioni intermedie nello sviluppo locale. Il distretto dell'Occiale del Cadore (Belluno)* (Parma 1999).
- Pelzer, K.J., *Planter and peasant, colonial policy and the agrarian struggle in East Sumatra 1863-1947* (The Hague 1987).
- Peng Bauixian and Zheng Suqing, 'The dual financial system and industrial development in Taiwan (Conference on Taiwan's Industrial Development, The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei 1985)
- Perlin, Frank, 'Financial institutions and business practices across the Euro-Asian interface: comparative and structural considerations, 1500-1900', in Hans Pohl (ed.), *The European discovery of the world and its economic effects on pre-industrial society, 1500-1800* (Stuttgart 1990) 257 - 304.
- Perrot, J.-C., 'Economie politique', *Une histoire intellectuelle de l'économie politique (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)* (Paris 1992) 63 - 95.
- Pfister, U., *Die Zürcher fabriques Protoindustrielles Wachstum vom 16. zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Zürich 1992)
- Pfister, U., 'A general model of proto-industrial growth', in R. Leboutte (ed.), *Protoindustrialisation: recherches récentes et nouvelles perspectives. Mélanges en souvenir de Franklin Mendels* (Genève 1996) 73 - 92.
- Pfister, U., 'Proto-industrielles Wachstum: ein theoretisches Modell', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1998) vol. 2, 21 - 47.
- Pfister, U., 'Craft guilds and proto-industrialization in Europe, 16th to 18th centuries', in Stephan R. Epstein et al. (eds.), *Guilds, economy and society. Proceedings B1, Twelfth International Economic History Congress* (Sevilla 1998) 11 - 23.
- Pfister, U., 'The craft guild as a firm' or guilds and proto-industrialization in Europe, 16th to 18th centuries (unpublished paper conference 'Guilds and non-industrial worlds', Utrecht 2000).

- Pfister, U., Subcontracting in European proto-industry, fifteenth to eighteenth centuries (unpublished paper conference 'Entrepreneurship and institutions in a comparative perspective', Rotterdam 2000).
- Phillips, J.R.S., *The Medieval expansion of Europe* (Oxford 1998, 2nd edition).
- Piore, Michael J. and Charles F. Sabel, *The second industrial divide: possibilities for prosperity* (New York 1984)
- Pohl, Hans (ed.), *The European discovery of the world and its economic effects on pre-industrial society, 1500-1800* (Stuttgart 1990).
- Pomeranz, Kenneth and Steven Topik, *The world that trade created. Society, culture, and the world economy, 1400-present* (New York 1999).
- Pomeranz, Kenneth, 'Re-thinking the late Imperial Chinese economy: development, disaggregation and decline, circa 1730-1930', *Itinerario* (2000) vol. 24, no. 3-4, 29 - 75.
- Pomeranz, Kenneth, *The great divergence. China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy* (Princeton 2000).
- Poni, C., 'Fashion as flexible production: market and production strategies of the Lyonnais silk merchants in the 18th century', in C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds.), *World of possibilities. Flexibility and mass production in Western industrialization* (Cambridge 1997) 37 - 74.
- Poni, C., 'Mode et innovation: les stratégies des marchands en soie de Lyon au XVIIIe siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* (1998) vol. 45, no. 3, 589 - 625.
- Popper, Karl, *The poverty of historicism* (London 1961).
- Post, P., 'The formation of the pribumi business élite in Indonesia, 1930s-1940s', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* (1996) vol. 152, 609 - 633.
- Pozner, M.V., *Istoricheskii obzor pravitelstvennykh meropriiatiia dlia razvitiia russkogo torgovogo moreplavaniia* (St Petersburg 1880).
- Prak, Maarten (ed.), *Early modern capitalism. Economic and social change in Europe, 1400-1800* (London 2001).
- Prest, W., *Albion ascendant. English history, 1660-1815* (Oxford 1998).
- Provasi, G., 'La società', in *Lumezzane terra di imprenditori* (Brescia 1995) 51 - 111.
- Pyke, F., G. Becattini and W. Segenberger (eds.), *Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia* (Florence 1991).
- Pyke, F. and W. Segenberger (eds.), *Industrial districts and local economic regeneration* (Geneva 1992).
- Rabson, Stephen and Kevin O'Donoghue, *P&O. A fleet history* (Kendal 1988).
- Ramella, F., *Terra e telai. Sistemi di parentela e manifattura nel Biellese dell'Ottocento* (Turin 1984).
- Rawls, John, *A theory of justice* (Oxford 1973).
- Redding, S. Gordon, *The spirit of Chinese capitalism* (New York 1993).
- Reid, Anthony, 'Entrepreneurial minorities, nationalism and the state', in Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Essential outsiders. Chinese and Jews in the modern transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle, Washington 1997).
- Repin, N.N., 'Iz istorii torgovykh svyazei Rossii so stranami Zapadnoi Evropy cherez Arkhangel'sk v pervoi chetverti XVIII v', in *Sbornik nauchnykh rabot aspirantov Istoricheskogo fakulteta* (Moscow 1970) 196 - 215.

- Reuther, M. (ed.), *Oberlausitzer Forschungen Beiträge zur Landesgeschichte* (Leipzig 1961).
- Roberts, Michael, *The Age of Liberty: Sweden 1719-1772* (Cambridge 1986).
- Roche, Daniel, 'L'intellectuel au travail', in Daniel Roche, *Les Républicains des lettres. Gens de culture et Lumières au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris 1988) 225 - 241.
- Roche, Daniel, *Les Républicains des lettres. Gens de culture et Lumières au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris 1988).
- Rosenberg, Nathan and L.E. Birdzell Jr., *How the West grew rich. The economic transformation of the industrial world* (New York 1986).
- Rosenberg, Nathan, Ralph Landau, and David C. Mowery (eds.), *Technology and the wealth of nations* (Stanford 1992).
- Rostow, Walt W., *The stages of economic growth* (Cambridge 1962).
- Rouff, M., *Les mines de charbon en France au XVIII^e siècle, 1741-1791* (Paris 1922).
- Rudolph, Jurgen, *Reconstructing identities: a social history of the Babas in Singapore* (Aldershot 1988).
- Rudolph, R.L., 'Agricultural structure and proto-industrialization in Russia: economic development with unfree labor', *Journal of Economic History* (1985) vol. 45, 47 - 69.
- Rudolph, R.L., 'The East European peasant household and the beginnings of industry: East Galicia, 1786-1914', in I. S. Koropecky (ed.), *Ukrainian economic history: interpretative essays* (Cambridge 1991) 338 - 382.
- Ruprecht Jr, Louis A., 'Hebraism', *Diaspora* (1994) vol. 3, no. 2.
- Ruprecht Jr, Louis A., 'Hellenism', *Diaspora* (1994) vol. 3, no. 2.
- Russell, Bertrand, *History of western philosophy* (London 1961).
- Rutgers, A.A.L., *De toekomst van de bevolkingstrubber in Nederlandsch-Indië* (n.p. 1925; reprint from *De Indische Mercur*, 27-11-1925).
- Sabbatucci Severini, P., 'Dalla "industria paesana" al distretto industriale. Una tipologia manifatturiera di un'area semiperiferica', in G.L. Fontana (ed.), *Le vie dell'industrializzazione europea* (Bologna 1997) 1061 - 1097.
- Sabbatucci Severini, P., 'Ambiente industriali e istituzioni: Vigeveno e i paesi del Ferrmano', in A. Arrighetti and G. Seravalli (eds.), *Istituzioni intermedie e sviluppo locale* (Rome 1999) 93 - 118.
- Sabel, C.F. and J. Zeitlin, 'Historical alternatives to mass production: politics, markets and technology in nineteenth-century industrialization', *Past and Present* (1985) vol. 108, 133 - 175.
- Sabel, C.F., *Work and politics: the division of labor in industry* (Cambridge 1992).
- Sabel, C.F. and J. Zeitlin, 'Stories, strategies, structures: rethinking historical alternatives to mass production', in C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds.), *World of possibilities. Flexibility and mass production in Western industrialization* (Cambridge 1997) 1 - 33.
- Sabel, C.F. and J. Zeitlin (eds.), *World of possibilities. Flexibility and mass production in Western industrialization* (Cambridge 1997).
- Sachwald, F., 'Cooperative agreements and the theory of the firm: focusing on barriers to change', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* (1988) vol. 35, 203 - 225.

- Sahlins, M., 'On the sociology of primitive exchange', in M. Sahlins, *Stone age economics* (London 1974) 185 - 275.
- Sahlins, M., *Stone age economics* (London 1974).
- Samuelsson, Kurt, *De stora köpmansbusen i Stockholm 1730-1815. En studie i den svenska handelskapitalismens historia* (Stockholm 1951).
- Sargentson, C., *Merchants and luxury markets. The marchands merciers of eighteenth-century Paris* (London 1996).
- Schelling, T.C., *The strategy of conflict* (Cambridge 1980).
- Schmitz, Hubert, *Flexible specialization: a new paradigm of small-scale industrialization*. Discussion paper 261, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex (Brighton 1989).
- Schmitz, Hubert, 'Industrial districts: model and reality in Baden-Württemberg, Germany', in F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (eds.), *Industrial districts and local economic regeneration* (Geneva 1992) 86 - 121.
- Schmitz, Hubert, 'Global competition and local cooperation: success and failure in the Sinos valley, Brazil', *World Development* (1999) vol. 27, no. 9, 1627 - 1650.
- Schumpeter, J.A., *The theory of economic development* (Cambridge 1934).
- Schumpeter, J.A., *Capitalism, socialism and democracy* (London 1976, originally 1943).
- Scott, R.S., *Institutions and organizations* (London 1995).
- Scott, W. Richard, *Organizations: rational, natural and open systems* (Englewood Cliffs 1987, 2nd edition).
- Scranton, P., *Endless novelty. Specialty production and American industrialization 1865-1925* (Princeton 1997).
- Sée, H., 'Les origines de la société minière de Pont-Péan', *Mémoires de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Bretagne* (1924) vol. 5, 151 - 164.
- Seers, D., 'The meaning of development', in D. Lehmann (ed.), *Development theory: four critical studies* (London 1979).
- Seibold, G., *Die Viatris und Peller. Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer Handelsgesellschaft* (Cologne/Vienna 1977).
- Sen, A., 'A game theoretical analysis of theories of collectivism in allocation', in T. Majumdar (ed.), *Growth and choice* (Oxford 1996).
- Seravalli, G., *Innovazione e istituzioni* (Università di Parma, Parma 1999).
- Shaffer, Lynda, 'Southernization', *Journal of World History* (1994) vol. 5, no. 1, 1 - 21.
- Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.), *Modern diasporas in international politics* (New York 1986).
- Shieh, G.S., 'Boss' Island. The subcontracting network and micro-entrepreneurship in Taiwan's development' (New York 1992).
- Shieh, G.S., 'The invisible factory. Subcontracting points and homeworkers in Taiwan', *Taiwan. A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* (1992) no. 13.
- Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, *Fifty-eight years of enterprise; souvenir volume of the new building of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce* (Singapore 1964).
- Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, *Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and industry 80th anniversary souvenir* (Singapore 1986).
- Sit, V. and S. L. Wong, *Small and medium industries in an export-oriented economy* (Hong Kong 1989).
- Sjöstrand, Erik, *Mynt- och bankpolitik under Hatväldet 1738-1764* (Uppsala 1908).

- Skinner, G. William, *Chinese society in Thailand. An analytical history* (Ithaca 1957).
- Slaven, A., and S. G. Chekland, (eds.), *Scottish dictionary of business biography* (Glasgow 1990).
- Solinas, G., 'Competenze, grandi imprese e distretti industriali. Il caso Magneti Marelli', *Rivista di Storia economica* (1993) vol. 1, 79 - 111.
- Solinas, G., 'Grande impresa e formazione di competenze: l'industria meccanica di Carpi', in M. Bellandi and M. Russo (eds.), *Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale* (Turin 1994) 127 - 147.
- Somers Heidhues, M.F., *Bangka tin and Mentok pepper; Chinese settlement on an Indonesian island* (Singapore 1992).
- Song, Ong Siang, *One hundred years' history of the Chinese in Singapore* (London 1923; 2nd reprint, Singapore 1985, with an introduction by Edwin Lee).
- Souchou, Yao, Guanxi. Sentiment, performance and the trading of word (Draft paper, Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney, s.a.).
- Starkey, David J., 'Ownership structures in the British shipping industry: the case of Hull, 1820-1916', *International Journal of Maritime History* (1996) vol. 8, no. 2, 71 - 96.
- Starkey, David J. and Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850* (St. John's 1998).
- Staudinger, O., 'Die Löbauer Leinenweberei und der Leinwandhandel', *Neues Lausitzisches Magazin* (1924) vol. 100, 141 - 172.
- Staudinger, O., 'Ergänzungen zur Geschichte des Löbauer Leinenweberei und des Leinwandhandels', *Löbauer Heimatblätter* (1929/1930) vol. 77, vol. 82, 305 - 326.
- Steenstaad, Niels, 'The Dutch East India Company as an institutional innovation', in M.A. Aymard (ed.), *Dutch capitalism and world capitalism* (Cambridge 1982) 235 - 258.
- Stokes, Eric, *The English utilitarians and India* (Oxford 1959).
- Stoler, A.L., *Capitalism and confrontation in Sumatra's plantation belt 1870-1979* (New Haven/London 1985).
- Storper, M., *Industrialization, economic development and the regional question: from import substitution to flexible production* (London 1991).
- Sturmeijer, Stanley G., *Shipping and world competition* (London 1962).
- Šula, J., 'Pěstování a zpracování lnu a konopí v Orlických horách a v Podorlicku', *Z dějin textilů* (1985) vol. 9, 37 - 82.
- Suryadinata, Leo (ed.), *Chinese adaptation and diversity. Essays on society and literature in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore* (Singapore 1993).
- Suryadinata, Leo (ed.), *Southeast Asian Chinese and China; the politico-economic dimension* (Singapore 1995).
- Svenskt biografiskt lexikon (1918-)* (Stockholm s.a.).
- Sveriges Ridderskap och Adels Riksdagsprotokoll från och med 1719.
- Swain, J.T., *Industry before the Industrial Revolution. North-east Lancashire c. 1500-1640* (Manchester 1986).
- Swidler, A., 'Culture in action', *American Sociological Review* (1986) vol. 51, 273 - 286.
- Taylor, M., *The possibility of cooperation* (Cambridge 1987).
- Les techniques minières de l'Antiquité au XVIII^e siècle*. 113^e Congrès national des Sociétés savantes, Strasbourg 1988 (Paris 1992).

- The Siauw Giap, 'The socio-economic role of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1820-1940', in A. Maddison and G. Prince (eds.), *Economic growth in Indonesia 1820-1940* Verhandelingen KITLV 137 (Dordrecht/Providence 1989) 159 - 183.
- Thee Kian Wie, *Plantation agriculture and export growth. An economic history of East Sumatra, 1863-1942* (Jakarta 1977).
- Theotokas, John, 'Organizational and managerial patterns of Greek-owned shipping enterprises and the internationalization process from the interwar period to 1990', in David J. Starkey and Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Global markets: the internationalization of the sea transport industries since 1850* (St. John's 1998).
- Thibaud, 'Note sur le traitement du cuivre pyriteux à Sainbel', in *Voyage métallurgique en Angleterre* (1827) 243 - 254.
- Thomson, J.K.J., *Decline in history. The European experience* (Cambridge 1998).
- Todericiu, D., 'J. Hellot, savant chimiste, fondateur de la technologie chimique en France au XVIII^e siècle', *105^{ème} Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes* (Caen), fasc. 5, 201 - 211.
- Torp, E. and G. Jakobsen (eds.), *Understanding business systems in developing countries* (Newbury Park/London/New Delhi 2000).
- Touwen, L.J., 'Voordeel van veelzijdigheid'. De economische ontwikkeling van Palembang en Djambi tussen 1900 en 1942', *Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek* (1991) vol. 54, 134 - 182.
- Touwen, Jeroen, *Extremes in the archipelago. Trade and economic development in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Leiden 2001).
- Trocki, Carl, *Opium and empire; Chinese society in colonial Singapore* (Ithaca 1990).
- Tun-Jen Cheng, 'Political regimes and development strategies: South Korea and Taiwan', in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman (eds.), *Manufacturing miracles. Paths of industrialization in Latin America and East Asia* (Princeton 1990).
- Turnbull, M., *A history of Singapore, 1819-1988* (Singapore 1996, 2nd edition).
- Ulianitskii, V.A., *Russkie konsulstva za granitsei v XVIII veke*, vol. 1 (Moscow 1899).
- UNCTAD and DZT (eds.), *Technological dynamism in industrial districts: an alternative approach to industrialization in developing countries?* (New York/Geneva 1994).
- van de Klundert, Th., *Groei en instituties. Over de oorzaken van economische ontwikkeling* (Tilburg 1997).
- van der Eng, P., 'An observer of 65 years of socio-economic change in Indonesia, Egbert de Vries', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* (1991) vol. 27, no. 1, 39 - 55.
- van der Eng, P., *Agricultural growth in Indonesia since 1880. Productivity change and the impact of government policy* (Groningen 1993).
- van der Eng, P., *Agricultural growth in Indonesia. Productivity change and policy impact since 1880* (New York 1996).
- van der Wee, Herman, *The rise and decline of urban industries in Italy and in the Low Countries* (Leuven, 1988).
- van Dijk, J.J.J. and J.P.M. Groenewegen (eds.), *Changing business systems in Europe. An institutional approach* (Brussel 1994).

- van Houtum, H. en F. Boekema, 'Regions seen as laboratories for a new Europe: the applicability of the flexible specialization model', in J.J.J. van Dijck and J.P.M. Groenewegen (eds.), *Changing business systems in Europe. An institutional approach* (Brussel 1994).
- van Suchtelen, B.C.M.M., *Neêrlands nieuwe eereschuld aan Indië* (Hilversum 1939).
- van Zanden, Jan Luiten, 'The great convergence from a West-European perspective: some thoughts and hypotheses', *Itinerario* (2000) vol. 24, no. 3-4, 9 - 29.
- Vergani, R., 'Technology and organization of labor in the Venetian copper industry, XVIth-XVIIIth Centuries', *Journal of European Economic History* (1985) vol. 14, no. 1, 173 - 186.
- Vérin, H., 'La réduction en art et la science pratique au XVI^e siècle', in *Institutions et conventions* (Paris 1998) 119 - 144.
- Vleming J.L. (ed.), *Het Chineesche zakenleven in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Wetvevreden 1926).
- Wade, Robert, *Governing the market. Economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization* (Princeton 1990).
- Wai-keung Chung, The emergence of Chinese company. A case on institutional transformation (Paper presented at *Entrepreneurship and institutions in a comparative perspective*, Conference on business history, Europe and Asia, 16th-20th centuries, January 14 and 15 2000, Rotterdam, The Netherlands).
- Wallerstein, I., *The modern world-system: capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century*, 3 vols. (New York 1974-1988).
- Weber, Max, *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. Translated from the German by Talcott Parsons, with a foreword by R.H. Tawney (New York 1958).
- Weber, Max, *The religion of India* (Glencoe 1959).
- Weiner, M. (ed.), *Modernization* (New York 1966).
- Weingast, B., 'The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving federalism and economic development', *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* (1995) vol. 11, no. 1, 1 - 31.
- Weiss, Linda and John M. Hobson, *States and economic development: a comparative historical analysis* (Cambridge 1995).
- Whitley, R., *Divergent capitalisms. The social structuring and change of business systems* (Oxford 1994).
- Wiener, Martin J., *English culture and the decline of the industrial spirit 1850-1980* (Cambridge 1981).
- Williams, Raymond, *The Long Revolution* (London 1961).
- Wilson, Charles, *England's apprenticeship, 1603-1763* (Londen 1965).
- Wong, S.L., 'The Chinese family firm: a model', *British Journal of Sociology* (1985) vol. 36, 58 - 72.
- Wong, S.L., 'Modernization and Chinese culture in Hong Kong', *The China Quarterly* (1986) vol. 106, 306 - 325.
- Wong, S.L., *Emigrant entrepreneurs* (Hong Kong 1988).
- Wong, S.L., 'The applicability of Asian family values to other sociocultural settings', in P.L. Berger and H.H.M. Hsiao (eds.), *In search of an East Asian development model* (New Brunswick 1988) 134 - 152.

- Wong, S.L., Chinese entrepreneurs as cultural heroes (A public lecture for the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, November 3, 1997).
- Woronoff, D., *L'industrie sidérurgique en France pendant la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris 1984).
- Wu Huilin and Zhou Tiancheng, 'Getting the riddle of Taiwan's SMEs', in Chen Mingzhang (ed.), *Development of SMEs of Taiwan* (Taipei 1994).
- Yang, C.K., *The Chinese family in the Communist Revolution* (Cambridge 1959).
- Ye Wanan, *Evolution of Taiwan's economic planning agencies* (Taipei 1995).
- Yen, Ching-hwang, 'Ch'ing China and the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1906-1911', in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), *Southeast Asian Chinese and China; the politico-economic dimension* (Singapore, 1995).
- Yen, Ching-hwang, *Community and politics* (Singapore 1995).
- Yong, Ching-fatt, *Chinese leadership and power in colonial Singapore* (Singapore 1994).
- Zakharov, V.N. 'Der Anteil west- und mitteleuropäischer Kauffleute am Aussenhandel Russlands im 18. Jahrhundert', in *Berliner Jahrbuch für Osteuropäische Geschichte* (1997) 29-48.
- Zethelius, G.A., 'Stockholms-varven under 1700-talet', *Sjöhistorisk årsbok* (1955-1956) 57-100.
- Zhao Jichang, 'The guidance of Taiwan's SMEs', *Quarterly of Bank of Taiwan* (1983) vol. 34, no. 3, 90 - 91.
- Zhou Tiancheng, *Industrial organization of Taiwan* (Taipei 1992).
- Zimmermann, A., *Blüte und Verfall des Leinengewerbes in Schlesien. Gewerbe- und Handelpolitik dreier Jahrhunderte* (Wroclaw 1885) 40-42.
- Zimmermann, E., 'Der schlesische Garn- und Leinenhandel mit Holland im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert', *Economisch-historisch jaarboek* (1956) vol. 26, 193-25.