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Local Social Capital and Geographical Mobility: Some Empirics and a Conjecture on the Nature of European Unemployment

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# **ABSTRACT**

# Local Social Capital and Geographical Mobility: Some Empirics and a Conjecture on the Nature of European Unemployment\*

European labor markets are characterized by the low geographical mobility of workers. The absence of mobility is a factor behind high unemployment when jobless people prefer to remain in their home region rather than to go prospecting in more dynamic areas. In this paper, we attempt to understand the determinants of mobility by introducing the concept of *local* social capital. Using data from a European household panel (ECHP), we provide various measures of social capital, which appears to be a strong factor of immobility. It is also a fairly large factor of unemployment when social capital is clearly local, while other types of social capital are found to have a positive effect on employability. We also find evidence of the reciprocal causality, that is, individuals born in another region have accumulated less local social capital. Finally, observing that individuals in the South of Europe appear to accumulate more local social capital, while in Northern Europe they tend to invest in more general types of social capital, we argue that part of the European unemployment puzzle can be better understood thanks to the concept of local social capital.

JEL Classification: J2, J61, Z1

Keywords: European unemployment, geographical mobility, social capital

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In an influential work, Bertola and Ichino (1995) documented the inability of European workers to move to more dynamic regions. This arose according to the authors, because of wage and income compression, lowering the returns from mobility. Low mobility and wage compressing labor market institutions have indeed been central in many explanations of unemployment in Europe (see Layard et al. 1991 and Layard and Nickell 1999).

In this work, we want to better understand the determinants and implications of low mobility and provide an alternative explanation for low mobility. We do not focus on the returns of mobility, as in Bertola and Ichino (1995), even though this dimension will be present, but, in a dual perspective, on the *costs of mobility*.

The novelty of our approach is first to give an explicit content to mobility costs, namely social capital. In a companion paper (David et al. 2008), we have indeed developed the concept of local social capital and provided a theoretical model in which moving from one region to another had a cost to individuals in terms of social capital losses. We found two relevant concepts of social capital: the part of social capital which is made of connections with friends, relatives and the closer family, and the part of social capital which is more linked to professional ties. While both have a local component, the first part is presumably more local than the second part. We argued in a simple model that local social capital has a negative impact on mobility and, to a lesser extent, a positive impact on unemployment. We pointed out implications on the determinants of European unemployment and the possible inability of labor market reforms to make significant progress in terms of employment, given the likely existence of multiple equilibria.

In this paper, we attempt to match some of the concepts with the data. We show that local social capital affects the cost of moving. Based on various measures of local social capital, we find that it is a dominant factor of immobility. It is also a fairly large factor of unemployment when social capital is clearly local, while other types of social capital are found to have a positive effect on employability. We also find evidence of the reciprocal causality, that is, individuals born in another region have accumulated less local social capital. This gives some credibility to a theory of multiple equilibria developped in David et al. (2008).

Finally, observing that individuals in the South of Europe appear to accumulate more local social capital, while in Northern Europe they tend to invest in more general types of social capital, we argue that part of the European unemployment puzzle can be better understood thanks to the concept of local social capital.

A few recent works are related to ours. We survey them more in detail in our companion paper. Let us only cite Bentolila et al. (2008) who emphasize the potential negative links between social capital and labor markets: jobs obtained through social networks tend to have a wage discount, distorting choices towards inefficiency. Belot and Ermisch (2006) show that geographical proximity of friends matters for mobility decisions in the UK. In a different context, Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a and b) argue that US black workers are less mobile than white workers because of family ties (2004b) and successfully test this using the PSID survey. Kan (2007) also assesses the impact of local social capital on residential mobility. He also explores the role of friends and relatives using the PSID data. In Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004a), they model how the double matching in the labor market and social environment can explain migration patterns. An implication is the existence of multiple equilibria.

In **Section 2**, we define the concept of local social capital and then propose a match between theory and the data. We attempt to measure social capital relevant to the European context using panel data analysis from the European Community Household Panel: for instance, local social capital can be approximated by measures such as the intensity of relations with friends and neighborhood connections, while being a member of clubs, associations, etc. is a more global type of social capital.

In Section 3, we then explore the links between mobility and social capital in Europe. We carry out various empirical exercises to underline the mechanisms at work. The first causality, from social capital to mobility, is tested treating first social capital as given or predetermined. Mobility is measured as year-to-year change of "area of residence". We indeed find, as expected, that our measures of local social capital lead to a strong reduction of residential mobility. We use a succession of different instruments for social capital, such as regional social capital, individual lags, family composition, regional turnout in elections and regional population density. The second causality, from mobility to social capital accumulation, is also verified in the data: individuals living in a region different from their region of birth indeed have accumulated less social capital. We finally explore the role of local social capital on unemployment: here, interestingly, social capital of various sorts have opposite effects on unemployment: neighborhood variables usually raise unemployment, while club membership and friends reduce it. We finally attempt to correlate social capital with traditional labor market variables such as reservation wages - as defined by individuals and the duration of unemployment before re-employment.

Finally, in **Section 4**, we summarize our insights and then explore how social capital could help understand intra-European differences in unemployment at the country level.

# 1 Local social capital

#### 1.1 Definition

In this Section, we clarify our meaning of the expression *social capital*, for which there are many definitions. The key concept is the *localness* of social capital.

Assume an individual endowed with S units of social capital, leaving in a region (say, the South) to study or work in another region (say, the North). Once the individual leaves the South, her social capital is partly depreciated: she only retains a fraction of it, because she looses friends or will see them less often. Let us denote by  $\delta_{\lambda}$  the depreciation rate, which describes the degree of localness of social capital. We may think for instance that by leaving the native region, she looses  $\delta_{\lambda}$  of her friends, or meets her relative less frequently. Therefore, a higher level of local social capital may be associated with a reluctance to move to another region.

At the same time, a higher level of social capital can provide information about job offers (Granovetter 1995), this both in the South and in the North. Social capital may thus have an ambiguous effect on unemployment. Social capital may also be more or less local. Then, for a given level of social capital, a more local type of social capital reduces the likelihood an individual moves toward job opportunities, and therefore to be employed.

Therefore, and along the lines of David et al. (2008), we expect to find a negative link between measures of local social capital and mobility, and a link between social capital and unemployment that may be either positive or negative, depending on whether social capital is local or more general.

#### 1.2 Matching the concepts to the data

We will attempt to find an empirical counterpart to the concept of local social capital. We will base the analysis on a widely used dataset, the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP). In our context, it is particularly useful because it surveys various dimensions of the social life and social capital of individuals. In the literature surveyed in Glaeser et al. (2002), many works rely on trust questions to approximate social capital. However, Glaeser et al. (2002)

argue that, along with Putnam (2000), one should focus instead on association membership. There is indeed implicitly a revealed preference argument here: in a survey interview, talking about confidence and trust is relatively cheap. Further, in European countries of different languages, responses may be subject to translation bias. Here, we will indeed follow the logic of Glaeser et al. (2002) and Putnam (2000) and use information of three types: club membership as in Glaeser et al. (2002), and the frequency of social contacts with friends and neighbors. We tend to prefer the latter two, because they are presumably more closely associated with the concept of localness we have in mind. Soccer club is local, but chess or Scrabble associations bring usually country-wide ties.

#### 1.3 Data description

More precisely, the social capital measures are derived from the three following questions in the ECHP survey:

- 1. Are you a member of any club, such as a sport or entertainment club, a local or neighborhood group, a party etc...?
- 2. How often do you talk to any of your neighbors?
- 3. How often do you meet friends or relatives not living with you, whether here at home or elsewhere?

Questions 2 and 3 precisely correspond to a type of social capital that is clearly local. The "friend" question may in part refer to professional social capital (that is, capital that depreciates when the individual is unemployed). The "club" question may refer to less local social capital. Even though it is phrased as suggesting non-professional social capital, it may be professional if associations are professional ones. We have however no direct evidence in one sense or the other.<sup>1</sup>

The answer to the first question is yes/no (and is attributed the value 1 or 0). The answer to the last two questions defines a frequency on a discrete support, as follows: 1. On most days;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Note that Belot and Ermisch (2006), who address a similar question to ours, have more precise data than us (although for a single country the UK): their data allows them to explore two dimensions of the strength of social ties: location of the closest friends and frequency of contacts. Their results actually emphasize the importance of the first factor.

2. Once or twice a week; 3. Once or twice a month; 4. Less often than once a month; 5. Never. In order to simplify the exposition of the results, we build an index measure as follows:

$$Z_{i,t} = I\left[X_{i,t} = 1\right] + I\left[X_{i,t} = 2\right] \cdot \frac{2}{7} + I\left[X_{i,t} = 3\right] \cdot \frac{2}{30} + I\left[X_{i,t} = 4\right] \cdot \frac{1}{60} + I\left[X_{i,t} = 5\right] \cdot 0,$$

where  $Z_{i,t}$  is the index value for individual i at time t and  $X_{i,t}$  the answer to the question. I[.] is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the expression in brackets is true and 0 if it is wrong.<sup>2</sup> The top of Table 1 presents relevant summary statistics.

# 2 Mobility, unemployment and local social capital

#### 2.1 Short-Run

The mechanisms we want to highlight can be uncovered estimating the following equations:

$$\begin{split} P_m^{i,t+1} &= \pi_m x^{i,t} + \beta_m friend freq^{i,t} + \gamma_m neib freq^{i,t} + \phi_m club^{i,t} + \epsilon_m^{i,t+1}, \\ P_u^{i,t+1} &= \pi_u x^{i,t} + \beta_u friend freq^{i,t} + \gamma_u neib freq^{i,t} + \phi_u club^{i,t} + \epsilon_u^{i,t+1}, \end{split}$$

where  $P_m^{i,t+1}$  and  $P_u^{i,t+1}$  are respectively the probabilities of moving to another area and of being unemployed for individual i in period t+1, the time period being a year.  $x^{i,t}$  is a vector of exogenous controls: Sex (1 if female, 0 if male), house tenure (categorical variable stating whether the individual is owner of his house, whether he rents it or has it for free), age category (16 to 25, 26 to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 55 and 56+), number of years of education, a dummy variable for unemployment, household size (1, 2, 3, 4 persons or 5 and more); marital status (married, separated, divorced, widowed or never married), time effects. The variables  $friendfreq^{i,t}$  and  $neibfreq^{i,t}$  will correspond to our measures of social capital. Hence, the predictions to be tested are whether  $\beta_m$  and  $\gamma_m$  (and possibly  $\phi_m$ ) are negative and whether  $\beta_u$ ,  $\gamma_u$  or  $\phi_u$  are uniformally positive or possibly negative.

The sample is restricted to the active population. A full description of the variables can be found in Appendix. See Table 1 for summary statistics. Note that we also estimated an employment equation (instead of unemployment) of the larger sample of 26-55 year old individuals—thus including non-participants—but found no qualitative difference. We will thus only display

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>We have tried a few other specifications, one including the log of this variable (but we need to replace the zero with, arbitrarily, either 1/365 or half of this number) which improves the significance of coefficients at the cost of introducing some arbitrariness. We also tried dummy variables for the five possible answers, to detect non-monotonicity. We did not find any non-monotonicity for the impact of social capital on mobility, and decided to keep a simple, linear specification throughout.

the mobility and the unemployment results. To estimate these equations, we will proceed as follows. In the first set of regressions, we consider social capital measures as exogenous and run simple probit regressions. We introduce the various measures of social capital separately or together, because there could be some positive correlation across individuals in these three social capital variables.<sup>3</sup> We will also check whether the inclusion of 92 regional effects affects the results.

In a second step, we attempt to control for potential endogeneity and instrument social capital with various instruments. We tried several of them, which generally yield the same kind of results. A first instrument is the lag of individual social capital. It is highly correlated with contemporaneous social capital, but can be criticized for not removing all endogeneity. A second type of instrument is the average social capital in the region<sup>4</sup>. It is more likely to be exogenous, but could be weaker, that is, less correlated with contemporaneous social capital of the individual. In that case, we also use the lagged value of social capital at the regional level. We will report these two types of IV estimations, since each of them has pros and cons. Alternative instruments we also used are described in Appendix<sup>5</sup>.

Table 2 offers a summary of the mobility regressions with all specifications discussed above. Full Tables A-1 to A-3 in Appendix present the other coefficients. Generally speaking, all three variables measuring social capital have negative and significant effects on mobility. In IV regressions, as the full tables in Appendix (Tables A-2 and A-3) indicate, the number of observations is also reduced by 25% approximately, due to the presence of lags and, when instruments are the regional level of social capital, due to the fact that the region of residence is sometimes missing. There is thus some efficiency loss in the estimates, but generally speaking, the coefficients remain negative and usually significant. In particular, the "neighbor" variable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The correlation structure is actually 0.32 between "friend" and "neighbor" but close to zero between "club" and the first two variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The richness of the dataset used by Belot and Ermisch (2006) allows them to explore other instruments describing the environment in which the individual grew up as a child. They consider the number of biological siblings in the household when the individual was fourteen years old, his birth-order, the level of education of his parents and whether he grew up in a rural or urban area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Technically, in all IV regressions, we follow a two-stage procedure: we first regress the social capital measures on the instruments, and use the projection as regressors in probit regressions. The IV regressions we present therefore have biased standard errors. The reason for using this procedure is that the standard ivprobit procedure in Stata 9 provides the s.e. correction but however does not support clustering and the panel dimension. We are thus left with two alternatives: either we choose to correct for the bias in s.e. due to IV, or to correct for the bias due to individual clustering due to the panel dimension. We chose here to correct for clustering, the main reason being that the implementation of the correction procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2002) for the IV correction would actually lead the s.e. to be lower than with the uncorrected s.e. as displayed in the IV tables. The s.e. displayed here are thus an upper bound for the "true" s.e.

has a significant and negative impact on mobility, while the "club" variable is typically no longer significant. Note also from the full Tables A-2 and A-3 that the other variables included present reasonable coefficients: women are less mobile, as well as house owners, older people, large families and married individuals. Unemployed are not significantly more mobile, but the educated are clearly much more mobile. To be exhaustive, Table A-4 in Appendix produces fixed effect regressions for the mobility equation. Without surprise, the coefficients of social capital turn out to be much less significant, even though the "neighbor" variable remains quite significant. This indicates that even the —necessarily moderate—variations in time in social capital "neighbor" for a given individual generate a decline in mobility. Other coefficients displayed are those for which time variation was observed.

Table 3 shows a summary of individual unemployment regressions. Results are relatively stable across specifications, but with interesting changes in sign and significance across social capital measures. The main findings are that the "neighbor" has a positive impact on the unemployment probability, while "club" has a negative impact on unemployment, this with or without regional effects. The "friend" variable is generally not significant, or marginally positive, except in the last set of IV regressions when instruments are social capital at the regional level. Full Tables A-5 to A-7 present the other coefficients.

Finally, we attempted to estimate a multinomial logit model where the dependent variable, denote it by  $y^{i,t+1}$ , takes value 1 if the individual stays in the region and works, 2 if she stays and is unemployed, 3 if she moves and works, 4 if she moves and is unemployed. However, at this stage, the multinomial one fails at explaining individual unemployment, where the coefficient are never significant, but the same results as in Tables 2 and 3 are obtained for inter-area mobility. We do not reproduce those results, available upon request.

We can summarize the effect of social capital on mobility and unemployment in offering a summary, as displayed in Table 4. This table calculates the conditional mobility rate and the conditional unemployment rate for two groups of individuals in the sample (say, an Italian male, owner, 36-45 years old, etc... and a dutch woman, tenant with rent, 26-35 years old, etc...). The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The lack of significance of "Friends" can also be explained by a light non monotonicity of its effect on unemployment. Indeed, individuals with both very low or very high frequency of visits to friends are those with highest unemployment rates, while individuals with intermediate frequency have lower unemployment. To make sense of the non-monotonicity, we would need to introduce additional ingredients in the theory exposed next Section, notably search and network effects à la Granovetter (1995). See e.g. the series of papers by Calvó-Armengol (2004), Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) or Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005). Here, we do not explore further this interesting question and leave it for future research.

mobility rate is respectively, in the absence of social capital (all social capital variables fixed to zero) 0.20% and 6.31%, while unemployment rates are 4.18% and 7.79%. We next consider the impact of the maximum amount of social capital (1 for "club" and the highest possible frequency of visits of friends and neighbors). The largest impact on mobility is the "friend" variable, which can bring back the mobility rate almost to zero for the Italian male and reduces it by two thirds for the Dutch woman. The impact of social capital on unemployment is more ambiguous. As far as "club" is concerned, the unemployment risk is reduced by a third, while instead, the other two variables contribute to an increase of that risk by a third approximately.

These are extremely large numbers. Note however they are obtained in the most favorable case in which coefficients are the largest. The impact of social capital is divided by two if one considers alternative specifications, for instance the regular probit model without instruments. Nevertheless, they remain large enough to deserve more attention than what has usually been the case. A final remark concerns the facts that high social capital individuals may be individuals endowed with better skills to make new connections. In this case, to the extent that our IV regressions have not sufficiently taken care of such an endogeneity problem, we can argue that this leads to an underestimation of the magnitude of the negative effects of social capital on mobility: individuals with better skills at making friends, if anything, should be more, not less mobile. The effect on unemployment might also be larger than what we measure, since such individuals are presumably also more able to obtain jobs. Our claim, based on these regressions, is not to measure any structural coefficient: it is actually much more modest, to argue that social capital and notably its local component deserves the full consideration of labor economists.<sup>7</sup>

## 2.2 Long-Run

As already argued in introduction, the link between social capital and mobility potentially goes both ways. In the short-run, social capital is predetermined to a large extent, hence the regressions in the previous sub-Section are a good first investigation. However, in the long run, it might be that individuals forecast future mobility episodes and so, endogenously determine their level of social capital. Thus we need to dissociate *short-run* mobility from *long-run* mobility and we now explore how social capital may depend on long-run mobility. Now, the mobility

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>...as many of them have recently started to recognize (e.g. Calvo and Jackson 2006, Calvo and Zenou 2005, Cahuc and Fontaine 2002).

variable  $P_m^{i,t}$  takes value 0 if "the individual was born in the country of current residence and has lived in the same region since birth" and 1 in the opposite case. We regress our measures of local social capital on this long-run mobility variable, which is now predetermined. Table 5 shows that indeed, having experienced a geographical mobility episode in the past leads to a huge discount in social capital, giving some sense to the concept of localness of social capital. The full table is in Table A-8 in Appendix.

# 3 Additional regressions

The ECHP contains a few additional variables which can be used to complement the previous analysis. In particular, we explore the impact of social capital on unemployment and its duration. In order to simplify the exposition of results, we limit tables to a few coefficients (that of social capital) and of very few additional variables when relevant, such as whether individuals receive unemployment benefits. The sample and the specification are kept as close as possible from the previous set of regressions: sex, house tenure, age categories, education measured in years, household size, marital status and time dummies. For each dependent variable, we present in general three different specifications: the first is without geographical control, the second adds country dummies and the third one has regional dummies. Table A-9 in Appendix presents these regressions.

In the first part of Table A-9, we analyze the effect of social capital on a variable reflecting whether individuals have experienced long term unemployment. The idea is to test whether social capital can be powerful enough to significantly reduce the risk of long spells of unemployment: connected people may be able to obtain a new job immediately after a layoff. For that, we restrict the sample to people looking for a job, not working or working less than 15 hours a week. We find that only the "club" variable has a negative impact on having been unemployed at a time, while the other social capital variables have no effect.

A second test is to determine, for currently employed individuals, whether social capital reduced the probability of having experienced a spell of unemployment before the current job. The idea is similar to the previous one: connected people may move easily from job-to-job. The effect of "club" is still strong and negative, while now, we find marginally positive impact of the "neighbor" variable.

In the second part of Table A-9, we regress the number of months of unemployment before

the current job on our social capital variables and the usual controls.<sup>8</sup>. To these usual controls, we add a set of time controls, not at the time of the survey, but at the time of entrance in the previous job. That is, if an individual is interviewed in 1996 and has been employed in the current job for six years, that individual is attributed a time dummy (y90=1), in order to control for the economic cycle at the time of job search.<sup>9</sup> Columns (1) to (3) only consider the length of unemployment of those having experienced some unemployment (log specification) while Columns (4) to (6) also include those having faced no unemployment. We find that belonging to a club is generally associated with shorter unemployment spells, and that the neighboor variable is marginally positively significant.

Finally, we also tried similar regressions with a measure of the reservation wage but found them disappointing, probably due to measurement error and do not report them here.

However, our conclusions from these additional regressions is that social capital has positive impact on employability when it is not local, and has a negative or nul impact when it is local, which is in line with the previous results in this paper and the theoretical results in David et al. (2008).

## 3.1 Summary

We first summarize the few stable relations in the data. Our regressions suggest unambiguous effects of social capital on individual mobility and adverse effects on individual employment probabilities too. The magnitude of the effects was even quite striking. It notably appears that:

- 1. Individuals endowed with more local social capital as described by the variables "friend", "neighbor" or "club" are less likely to move to another region in the short-run.
- 2. Individuals endowed with more local social capital such as described by the variables friends or neighbors are more likely to become unemployed in the short-run.
- 3. In contrast, individuals who are members of a club are less likely to become unemployed in the short-run.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Note that here, we do not have any right-censoring problem since we know the exact number of months of unemployment prior to re-employment, contrary to a classical duration analysis where we would observe transitions between different stats instead. In addition, the sample is restricted to persons that are "normally working" at the time of the survey, i.e. working more than 15 hours per week, and that started their current job at the earliest 2 years before they joined the survey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Note an obvious limitation of this specification, as well as the next specifications: we investigate the relationship between past unemployment experience of an individual and current social capital. We see the results presented in those tables as correlations between variables rather than deterministic relationship.

4. Workers in a region different from their birth region have a lower stock of social capital in all three dimensions measured ("friend", "neighbor" and "club"). and suggesting interpretations and extensions of our results.

# 4 A conjecture on European unemployment

We now try to document a conjecture developped in the introduction: can we really explain country-differences in aggregate unemployment? Table 6 indicates that there is indeed a North-South divide in the *nature* of social capital: in the South of Europe (and in Ireland too), social capital seems to be more local, explaining the lower geographical mobility rates and difficulty to reduce unemployment. In the North of Europe, being part of clubs is instead much more frequent. To the extent that being a member of a club (such as a Scrabble or a chess league) helps to cope with mobility—this is indeed a very good way to re-establish a social network when moving to a new city—, we may have an interesting characterization of the way labor markets work in Europe.

We can go one step further here. Without claiming much causal evidence, but just as a way to summarize the data, we now regress national unemployment on these average measures of social capital, in a cross-country analysis, in an approach inspired by Layard-Nickell (1999). Table 7 regresses the log of unemployment on country-averages of local social capital. Table 8 adds conventional covariates capturing labor market institutions, Table 9 uses lagged employment protection measures for the period before 1990 as instruments, as well as owner occupation rates. The main finding is that the "friend" variable is significant and raises unemployment. The "neighbor" variable also raises unemployment but only when it is alone. Multicollinearity with "friend" leads however to instability when both are added. These regressions are only to be thought as preliminary steps. They indicate that the social organization of populations may matter much more than what is commonly believed.

Beyond these last three summary regressions based on macro data, the empirical analysis based on microdata suggests that, to understand better European unemployment, more is to be learnt from non-standard factors. Notably, social capital may be an interesting avenue to explore, confirming the fruitfulness of the concept.

Table 1:  $Summary\ statistics$ 

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Friends	566281	0.488	0.41	0	1
Neighbors	566281	0.438	0.43	0	1
Club	500053	37.4%	0.48	0	1
Club		91.470	0.40		
Geographic Mobility	441024	0.7%	0.08	0	1
Male	566281	57.1%	0.49	0	1
Female	566281	42.9%	0.49	0	1
Rent-free accommodation	560878	3.4%	0.18	0	1
Owner	560878	71.6%	0.45	0	1
Tenant with rent	560878	25.1%	0.43	0	1
Age category 16-25	566281	15.4%	0.36	0	1
Age category 26-35	566281	28.4%	0.45	0	1
Age category 36-45	566281	26.0%	0.44	0	1
Age category 46-55	566281	21.0%	0.41	0	1
Age category 56-65	566281	9.3%	0.29	0	1
Years of education	566281	10.5	5.53	0	25
Employed	566281	90.1%	0.30	0	1
Unemployed	566281	9.9%	0.30	0	1
Living alone	566281	8.9%	0.29	0	1
Two members in household	566281	19.9%	0.40	0	1
Three members in household	566281	22.3%	0.42	0	1
Four members in household	566281	28.2%	0.45	0	1
Five members in household	566281	20.7%	0.41	0	1
Separated	552771	1.4%	0.12	0	1
Divorced	552771	$\frac{1.4\%}{4.7\%}$	0.12 $0.21$	0	1
Widowed	552771	1.4%	0.21 $0.12$	0	1
Never married	552771	33.8%	0.12 $0.47$	0	1
TOTOL MINITION	552111	33.070	0.11	U	1

Notes: The summary statistics are calculated from the ECHP data over the period 1994-2001. 14 EU countries are considered: Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Germany, UK. The sample is restricted to the active population.

Table 2: Summary of the Results for Inter-Area Mobility

	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit
Friends	-0.139	r	r	-0.104	-0.115	<u>r</u> · · · ·	r	-0.079
	(5.06)**			(3.54)**	(3.94)**			(2.51)*
Neighbors	()	-0.149		-0.125	( )	-0.159		-0.141
G		(5.48)**		(4.29)**		(5.44)**		(4.46)**
Club		,	-0.063	-0.059		,	-0.059	-0.055
			(3.08)**	(2.85)**			(2.59)**	(2.40)*
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit
Friends	-0.454			-0.378	-0.413			-0.330
	(5.08)**			(3.65)**	(4.39)**			(2.99)**
Neighbors		-0.146		-0.001		-0.145		-0.007
		(2.27)*		(0.01)		(2.07)*		(0.08)
Club			-0.040	-0.010			-0.021	0.006
			(0.86)	(0.21)			(0.41)	(0.12)
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit				
Friends	-0.253			0.260				
	(0.99)			(0.69)				
Neighbors		-0.876		-0.866				
		(2.99)*		(2.01)*				
Club			-0.605	-0.415				
			(1.40)	(0.91)				
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No				

Notes: As additional explicative variables, the above regressions include sex, house tenure, age categories, years of education, a dummy for unemployment, household size, marital status. For the first set of IV estimations, social capital measures are instrumented by their lag and the lag of the other explicative variables. For the second set of IV estimations, social capital measures are instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag. See Tables 10, 11 and 12 in the Appendix for more detailed results. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 3: Summary of the Results for Individual Unemployment

	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit	probit
Friends	0.005			0.005	-0.004			-0.003
	(0.39)			(0.38)	(0.27)			(0.18)
Neighbors	, ,	0.052		0.061	,	0.045		0.058
-		(4.04)**		(4.53)**		(3.23)**		(3.90)**
Club			-0.131	-0.133			-0.135	-0.137
			(11.74)**	(11.87)**			(10.57)**	(10.67)**
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit
Friends	0.116			0.096	0.090			0.068
	(2.86)**			(2.00)*	(2.02)*			(1.29)
Neighbors		0.163		0.165		0.145		0.160
		(5.36)**		(4.59)**		(4.27)**		(3.96)**
Club			-0.254	-0.271			-0.244	-0.260
			(10.72)**	(11.24)**			(9.06)**	(9.47)**
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit	IVprobit				
Friends	0.572			0.328				
	(5.88)**			(2.11)*				
Neighbors		0.231		0.308				
		(2.23)*		(1.84)				
Club			-2.153	-2.245				
			(14.16)**	(13.45)**				
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No				

Notes: As additional explicative variables, the above regressions include sex, house tenure, age categories, years of education, a dummy for unemployment, household size, marital status. For the first set of IV estimations, social capital measures are instrumented by their lag and the lag of the other explicative variables. For the second set of IV estimations, social capital measures are instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag. See Tables 14, 15 and 16 in the Appendix for more detailed results. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 4: Probabilities of moving and being unemployed: examples

	Probability of $\rightarrow$	Moving	Unemployment
Italian man, owner, 36-45 years old, married, living with someone, year 2000	0.20%	4.18%	
married, hving with sometie, year 2000	-0.16%	+0.48%	
	-0.04%	+0.82%	
	if club	-0.02%	-1.43%
Fraction of mobility reduced by the maximum Fraction of unemployment added by the maximum	-100%	+31%	
Dutch women tonent with next 26 25 years al	ld, No social capital	6.31%	7.79%
Dutch woman, tenant with rent, 26-35 years of never married, living alone, year 1996	•		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	If friends and family, every day	-3.95%	+0.83%
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·	-3.95% -0.76%	$+0.83\% \\ +1.41\%$
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	If friends and family, every day		
never married, living alone, year 1996  Fraction of mobility reduced by the maximum	If friends and family, every day If neighbors, every day If club	-0.76%	+1.41%

Note: the above probabilities are computed from the fitted values of the instrumental variable probit regression from Tables 11 and 15 with country dummies and all social capital measures introduced as regressors.

Table 5: Summary of the Results for Long-Run Social Capital Investment

Social Capital:	Friendfreq		Neib	freq	Club		
Estimation Method:	OLS		OLS		Probit		
Born in another region	-0.04	-0.04	-0.039	-0.034	-0.116	-0.09	
	(13.43)**	(13.25)**	(10.93)**	(9.40)**	(9.25)**	(6.89)**	
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country Dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Region Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	

Notes: As additional explicative variables, the above regressions include sex, house tenure, age categories, years of education, a dummy for unemployment, household size, marital status. See Table 17 in the Appendix for more detailed results. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 6: Aggregate social capital

Country	friend freq	neibfreq	club
N. 11			
Nordic countries and the UK			
Denmark	43	41.8	62.1
Finland	45.9	52.3	52.5
Sweden	43.6	na	69.4
UK	57.6	28	62.7
Western Europe			
Austria	35.8	46.3	49.5
Belgium	41	39	39.4
Germany	14.7	$_{ m na}$	32.8
Ireland	78.9	62	48.7
Luxembourg	44.8	47.3	41
Netherlands	42	36.7	48
Southern Europe			
Greece	69.5	80.8	12.1
Italy	57.6	54.7	23.8
Portugal	47.8	66.6	21.5
Spain	74	68.1	28.5
Correlation with:			
friend freq	1	0.61	-0.22
neibfreq	0.61	1	-0.79
club	-0.22	-0.79	1

Notes: the Table displays the average value of the social capital measures by country over the period 1994-2001 for the active population.

<sup>&</sup>quot;na" refers to non-available data. See Section 1 for more details on the methodology used to construct these indexes.

Table 7: Log Unemployment Rate Regressed on our Measures of Social Capital.

Friends	1.176 (4.10)***		1.746 (3.32)***
Neighbors	(1.10)	1.729	0.388
Constant	1.434	(4.52)*** $1.085$	$(0.72) \\ 0.879$
Constant	$(8.87)^{***}$	$(4.84)^{***}$	$(4.00)^{***}$
Observations	95	80	80
Adjusted $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.14	0.2	0.29

Note: The estimation is by OLS using 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data and the unemployment rates are the standardized OECD rates. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

 ${\it Table~8:~Log~Unemployment~Rate~Regressed~on~Measures~of~Social~Capital~and~Labor~Market~Institutions.}$ 

Friends		0.92		7.239
		(2.44)**		(6.69)**
Neighbors		( )	2.518	-2.672
O			(6.83)**	(3.25)**
Total Tax Wedge	0.03	0.026	0.041	0.03
<u> </u>	(6.71)**	(5.74)**	(10.41)**	(8.80)**
Union Density	0.003	0.000	0.004	-0.021
v	(1.38)	(0.06)	(1.46)	(4.88)**
Union Coverage Index	0.527	$0.39^{'}$	0.042	-0.765
Ţ.	(3.49)**	(2.49)*	(0.27)	(4.58)**
Co-ordination (Union+Employer)	-0.274			
,	(5.52)**	(1.59)	(2.70)**	(4.77)**
Replacement Rate	0.002	0.000	0.004	-0.004
	(0.96)	(0.16)	(1.78)	(1.94)
Benefit Duration	0.095	0.126	0.197	0.236
	(2.59)**	(3.35)**	(4.33)**	(6.82)**
Active Labor Market Policies	-0.000	-0.000	0.024	0.127
	(0.1)	(0.02)	(2.33)*	(7.37)**
Observations	87	87	72	72
Number of countries	12	12	10	10
$R^2$	0.6219	0.6516	0.8142	0.8976

Note: The estimation is by Random Effect GLS using 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data, data on labor market institutions is taken from Nickell and Layard (1999) and the unemployment rates are the standardized OECD rates. Some ECHP data was not available for Germany and Sweden. Constant and time dummies not reported. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 9: Log Unemployment Rate Regressed on Measures of Social Capital and Labor Market Institutions, Where Social Capital Measures are Instrumented.

Friends	3.712		13.436
Tionas	(4.09)**		$(6.12)^*$
Neighbors	( )	2.632	-7.112
Ţ.		(7.00)**	(4.36)**
Total Tax Wedge	0.015	0.042	0.02
	(2.21)*	(10.46)**	(4.00)**
Union Density	-0.011	0.004	-0.043
	(2.31)*	(1.51)	(5.25)**
Union Coverage Index	-0.027	0.025	-1.456
	(0.11)	(0.16)	
Co-ordination (Union+Employer)	0.332	-0.14	1.044
	(2.06)*	(2.60)**	(5.22)**
Replacement Rate	-0.006	0.004	-0.011
	(1.5)	(1.82)	(3.35)**
Benefit Duration	0.219	0.199	0.269
	(3.90)**	(4.37)**	(6.03)**
Active Labor Market Policies	0.001	0.024	0.215
	(0.16)	(2.29)*	(6.57)**
01	0.7	70	70
Observations	87	72	72
Number of Countries	12	10	10
$R^2$	0.4976	0.8140	0.8525

Note: The estimation is by Instrumental Variable Random Effect GLS using 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Social capital is instrumented by the employment protection index and owner occupation rate before 1994 from Nickell and Layard (1999). Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data, data on labor market institutions is taken from Nickell and Layard (1999) and the unemployment rates are the standardized OECD rates. Some ECHP data was not available for Germany and Sweden. Constant and time dummies not reported. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

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# A Appendix

## A.1 Description of the explicative variables

- House tenure: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question: Does your household own this dwelling or do you rent it? The possible answers are (1) owner, (2) tenant / subtenant, paying rent (including when rent recovered from housing benefit) and (3) accommodation is provided rent-free.
- Age category: we grouped individuals into four categories: 16-24, 16-34, 35-54, and 55-64.
- Education: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question: Age when the Highest Level of General or Higher Education was Completed. The possible answers are numbers between 9 and 75. To correct for potential bias we followed the procedure proposed in Wasmer et al. (2005).
- Household size: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question: Household Size (Total Number of Household Members at Present). The possible answers are numbers between 1 and 96. We grouped the answers into five categories: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5+.
- Marital status: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question: Present Marital Status. The possible answers are (1) Married, (2) Separated, (3) Divorced, (4) Widowed, (5) Never married.
- Regional dummies: in the survey, this variable refers to the following question: Region in which the Household is Presently Situated. The classification followed for this question is the NUTS2 AGGREGATES from the European Commission, which considers comparable regions with a population comprised between 800 000 and 3 millions inhabitants. For more information, please refer to the following web site: <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts">http://ec.europa.eu/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts</a>. Note also that some countries like the Netherlands have not filled this question.

## A.2 Description of the instruments

As explained in the text, we tried several intruments. The one we found most convincing is the average level of social capital in the region where the individual lives: it is clearly exogenous to the individuals and fairly correlated to individual's social capital. We have however made several other attempts.

A first set of additional instrument relates to the regional vote and turnout in elections. In particular, we considered regional turnout at parliamentary elections. The intuition is that higher turnout is the sign of higher social cohesion, hence more social capital. Exogeneity in the unemployment/mobility equation is insured by the fact that we choose lagged turnout, that is, the last election before year 1990 in each available country. The data are missing for Austria, Greece and France. Unfortunately, correlation with our measures of social capital was poor, resulting in important loss of efficiency.

A second set of additional instruments can be found in the anthropological analysis of family structures. Todd (1990), a well known demographer and anthropologist, has argued that such structures are extremely stable over the pace of centuries, and can be categorized in four or five groups, based on the balance of authority (nuclear vs. "souche", that is, patriarcal) and of the type transmission of land and wealth (equalitarian, each offspring getting an equal share, or inequalitarian, the elder getting the largest share). Combining these two criteria leads, according to Todd, to a map of regions in Europe where in each region, one type of the four possible family structure is dominant, with sometimes several types coexisting. Note that we discovered after doing this that Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004b) had used similar instruments for their US study. In attributing a number for each category of structure, we build an instrument for social capital which is used in individual regressions. It appears to be very correlated with our measures of social capital. With this set of instruments, the results are robust for the mobility equation. However, for the unemployment equation results were not consistent across specifications.

#### A.3 Additional tables

Neighbors at t $(5.06)^{**}$ $(5.48)^{**}$ $(3.54)^{**}$ $(3.94)^{**}$ $(3.94)^{**}$ $(3.44)^{**}$	Table A-1: Probit Re	egression E	xplaining In	nter-Area M	Iobility at T	Time $t+1$			
Neighbors at t	Friends at t				-0.104	-0.115			-0.079
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(5.06)**			(3.54)**	(3.94)**			(2.51)*
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Neighbors at t				-0.125				-0.141
Male         ref         ref <td></td> <td></td> <td>(5.48)**</td> <td></td> <td>(4.29)**</td> <td></td> <td>(5.44)**</td> <td></td> <td>(4.46)**</td>			(5.48)**		(4.29)**		(5.44)**		(4.46)**
Male Female         ref -0.014         ref (0.66)         ref (0.58)         ref (0.08)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.06)         -0.015         -0.015         -0.013         -0.022         -0.07           Rent-free accommodation at t Owner at t         ref (10.21)**         ref (10.29)**         ref (10.29)**         ref (10.29)**         ref (10.29)**         ref (10.29)**         ref (10.29)**         ref (1.60)         ref	Club at t				-0.059			-0.059	-0.055
Male Female         ref -0.014         ref (0.66)         ref (0.58)         ref (0.98)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.05)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.57)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.57)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.57)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.57)         ref (0.06)         ref (0.07)         ref (0.02)         ref (0				(3.08)**	(2.85)**			(2.59)**	(2.40)*
Rent-free accommodation at t ref	Male	$\operatorname{ref}$							
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Female	-0.014	-0.012	-0.02	-0.015	-0.015	-0.013	-0.022	-0.018
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.66)	(0.58)	(0.9)	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.57)	(0.94)	(0.75)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Rent-free accommodation at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Tenant with rent at t $0.095  0.099  0.088  0.09  0.088  0.093  0.085  0.009  0.088  0.093  0.085  0.009  0.088  0.093  0.085  0.009  0.088  0.093  0.085  0.009  0.088  0.093  0.085  0.009  0.088  0.093  0.085  0.009  0.088  0.009  0.089  0.028  0.012  0.04  0.009  0.088  0.009  0.028  0.0012  0.04  0.009  0.083  0.008  0.012  0.04  0.009  0.083  0.008  0.012  0.04  0.009  0.083  0.008  0.012  0.004  0.009  0.083  0.008  0.012  0.004  0.009  0.008  0.009  0.$	Owner at t	-0.516	-0.52	-0.499	-0.504	-0.5	-0.506	-0.491	-0.497
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(10.21)**	(10.29)**	(9.48)**	(9.54)**	(9.47)**	(9.58)**	(8.93)**	(9.01)**
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Tenant with rent at t	-0.095	-0.099	-0.087	-0.09	-0.088	-0.093	-0.085	-0.089
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(1.83)	(1.9)	(1.6)	(1.66)	(1.6)	(1.69)	(1.47)	(1.55)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age category 16-25 at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age category 26-35 at t	-0.039	-0.023	-0.042	-0.053	-0.028	-0.012	-0.04	-0.046
$\begin{array}{c} (8.69)^{**} & (8.00)^{**} & (8.27)^{**} & (8.63)^{**} & (7.67)^{**} & (7.08)^{**} & (7.47)^{**} & (7.64)^{**} \\ Age category 46-55 at t & -0.434 & -0.405 & -0.437 & -0.453 & -0.435 & -0.406 & -0.445 & -0.441 \\ & (10.62)^{**} & (10.02)^{**} & (10.41)^{**} & (10.64)^{**} & (9.75)^{**} & (9.25)^{**} & (9.69)^{**} & (9.73)^{**} \\ Age category 56-65 at t & -0.536 & -0.502 & -0.525 & -0.539 & -0.568 & -0.536 & -0.571 & -0.551 \\ & (9.48)^{**} & (8.90)^{**} & (8.92)^{**} & (9.11)^{**} & (9.46)^{**} & (8.97)^{**} & (9.13)^{**} & (9.17)^{**} \\ Years of education at t & 0.014 & 0.014 & 0.014 & 0.012 & 0.012 & 0.013 & 0.01 \\ & (7.07)^{**} & (7.15)^{**} & (7.04)^{**} & (6.71)^{**} & (5.66)^{**} & (5.65)^{**} & (5.56)^{**} & (5.28) \\ Employed at t & ref \\ Unemployed at t & -0.009 & -0.002 & -0.018 & -0.006 & 0 & 0.007 & -0.008 & 0.00 \\ & (0.26) & (0.05) & (0.54) & (0.17) & (0.01) & (0.2) & (0.22) & (0.02) \\ Living alone at t & ref \\ Two members & -0.16 & -0.152 & -0.149 & -0.156 & -0.133 & -0.126 & -0.119 & -0.12 \\ in household at t & (4.53)^{**} & (4.31)^{**} & (4.01)^{**} & (4.21)^{**} & (3.40)^{**} & (3.24)^{**} & (2.89)^{**} & (2.97)^{**} \\ Three members & -0.31 & -0.3 & -0.298 & -0.299 & -0.281 & -0.271 & -0.266 & -0.26 \\ in household at t & (8.56)^{**} & (8.29)^{**} & (7.86)^{**} & (7.87)^{**} & (7.15)^{**} & (6.92)^{**} & (6.43)^{**} & (6.37)^{**} \\ Four members & -0.442 & -0.43 & -0.435 & -0.433 & -0.406 & -0.395 & -0.391 & -0.31 \\ in household at t & (11.86)^{**} & (11.55)^{**} & (10.61)^{**} & (10.57)^{**} & (10.33)^{**} & (10.10)^{**} & (9.45)^{**} & (9.35)^{**} \\ Married at t & ref $		(1.29)	(0.76)	(1.31)	(1.67)	(0.85)	(0.38)	(1.15)	(1.32)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age category 36-45 at t	-0.309	-0.283	-0.305	-0.322	-0.298	-0.273	-0.304	-0.313
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(8.69)**	(8.00)**	(8.27)**	(8.63)**	(7.67)**	(7.08)**	(7.47)**	(7.64)**
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age category 46-55 at t		-0.405		-0.453				-0.453
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(10.62)**	(10.02)**	(10.41)**	(10.64)**	(9.75)**	(9.25)**	(9.69)**	(9.73)**
Years of education at t $(9.48)^{**}$ $(8.90)^{**}$ $(8.92)^{**}$ $(9.11)^{**}$ $(9.46)^{**}$ $(8.97)^{**}$ $(9.13)^{**}$ $(9.17)^{**}$ Years of education at t $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.012)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.013)$ $(0.014)$ $(0.07)^{**}$ $(7.15)^{**}$ $(7.15)^{**}$ $(7.04)^{**}$ $(6.71)^{**}$ $(5.66)^{**}$ $(5.65)^{**}$ $(5.56)^{**}$ $(5.28)^{**}$ Employed at t $(0.09)$ $(0.09)$ $(0.002)$ $(0.018)$ $(0.006)$ $(0.017)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.022)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.05)$ $(0.05)$ $(0.054)$ $(0.17)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.022)$ $(0.022)$ $(0.02)$ Living alone at t $(0.09)$ $(0.016)$ $(0.015)$ $(0.019)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.011)$ $(0.019)$	Age category 56-65 at t	-0.536	-0.502	` '	-0.539	. ,	-0.536	-0.571	-0.576
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(9.48)**	(8.90)**	(8.92)**	(9.11)**	(9.46)**	(8.97)**	(9.13)**	(9.17)**
Employed at t	Years of education at t							. ,	0.012
Employed at t		(7.07)**	(7.15)**	(7.04)**	(6.71)**	(5.66)**	(5.65)**	(5.56)**	(5.28)**
	Employed at t		, ,	, ,	, ,	. ,		. ,	ref
Living alone at t ref	Unemployed at t	-0.009	-0.002	-0.018	-0.006	0	0.007	-0.008	0.003
Living alone at t ref		(0.26)	(0.05)	(0.54)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.2)	(0.22)	(0.09)
in household at t $(4.53)^{**}$ $(4.31)^{**}$ $(4.01)^{**}$ $(4.21)^{**}$ $(3.40)^{**}$ $(3.24)^{**}$ $(2.89)^{**}$ $(2.97)^{**}$ Three members $-0.31$ $-0.3$ $-0.298$ $-0.299$ $-0.281$ $-0.271$ $-0.266$ $-0.266$ in household at t $(8.56)^{**}$ $(8.29)^{**}$ $(7.86)^{**}$ $(7.87)^{**}$ $(7.15)^{**}$ $(6.92)^{**}$ $(6.43)^{**}$ $(6.37)^{**}$ Four members $-0.442$ $-0.43$ $-0.435$ $-0.433$ $-0.406$ $-0.395$ $-0.391$ $-0.391$ in household at t $(11.86)^{**}$ $(11.55)^{**}$ $(11.05)^{**}$ $(10.99)^{**}$ $(9.98)^{**}$ $(9.71)^{**}$ $(9.01)^{**}$ $(8.91)^{**}$ Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.45$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref	Living alone at t	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	ref	$\operatorname{ref}$	ref
Three members $-0.31$ $-0.3$ $-0.298$ $-0.299$ $-0.281$ $-0.271$ $-0.266$ $-0.26$ in household at t $(8.56)^{**}$ $(8.29)^{**}$ $(7.86)^{**}$ $(7.87)^{**}$ $(7.15)^{**}$ $(6.92)^{**}$ $(6.43)^{**}$ $(6.37)^{**}$ Four members $-0.442$ $-0.43$ $-0.435$ $-0.433$ $-0.406$ $-0.395$ $-0.391$ $-0.38$ in household at t $(11.86)^{**}$ $(11.55)^{**}$ $(11.05)^{**}$ $(10.99)^{**}$ $(9.98)^{**}$ $(9.71)^{**}$ $(9.01)^{**}$ $(8.91)^{**}$ Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.45$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Separated at t $0.141$ $0.132$ $0.12$ $0.121$ $0.131$ $0.123$ $0.106$ $0.10$ $(1.56)$ $(1.46)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.53)$ $(1.43)$ $(1.11)$ $(1.11)$ Divorced at t $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$ $0.03$ $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.88)$	Two members	-0.16	-0.152	-0.149	-0.156	-0.133	-0.126	-0.119	-0.123
Three members $-0.31$ $-0.3$ $-0.298$ $-0.299$ $-0.281$ $-0.271$ $-0.266$ $-0.26$ in household at t $(8.56)^{**}$ $(8.29)^{**}$ $(7.86)^{**}$ $(7.87)^{**}$ $(7.15)^{**}$ $(6.92)^{**}$ $(6.43)^{**}$ $(6.37)^{**}$ Four members $-0.442$ $-0.43$ $-0.435$ $-0.433$ $-0.406$ $-0.395$ $-0.391$ $-0.38$ in household at t $(11.86)^{**}$ $(11.55)^{**}$ $(11.05)^{**}$ $(10.99)^{**}$ $(9.98)^{**}$ $(9.71)^{**}$ $(9.01)^{**}$ $(8.91)^{**}$ Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.45$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Separated at t $0.141$ $0.132$ $0.12$ $0.121$ $0.131$ $0.123$ $0.106$ $0.10$ $(1.56)$ $(1.46)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.53)$ $(1.43)$ $(1.11)$ $(1.11)$ Divorced at t $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$ $0.03$ $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.88)$	in household at t	(4.53)**	(4.31)**	(4.01)**	(4.21)**	(3.40)**	(3.24)**	(2.89)**	(2.97)**
Four members $-0.442$ $-0.43$ $-0.435$ $-0.433$ $-0.406$ $-0.395$ $-0.391$ $-0.385$ in household at t $(11.86)^{**}$ $(11.55)^{**}$ $(11.05)^{**}$ $(10.99)^{**}$ $(9.98)^{**}$ $(9.71)^{**}$ $(9.01)^{**}$ $(8.91)^{**}$ Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.459$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Separated at t $0.141$ $0.132$ $0.12$ $0.121$ $0.131$ $0.123$ $0.106$ $0.106$ $0.106$ $0.106$ $0.106$ $0.106$ $0.107$ $0.107$ $0.107$ $0.108$ $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$	Three members	-0.31	-0.3	-0.298	-0.299	-0.281	-0.271	-0.266	-0.264
in household at t $(11.86)^{**}$ $(11.55)^{**}$ $(11.05)^{**}$ $(10.99)^{**}$ $(9.98)^{**}$ $(9.71)^{**}$ $(9.01)^{**}$ $(8.91)^{**}$ Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.48$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref $(1.41)^{**}$ $(1.41)^{**}$ $(1.42)^{**}$ $(1.42)^{**}$ $(1.43)^{**}$ $(1.43)^{**}$ $(1.11)^{**}$ $(1.44)^{**}$ Divorced at t $(1.46)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.53)$ $(1.43)$ $(1.11)$ $(1.11)$ Divorced at t $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.88)$	in household at t	(8.56)**	(8.29)**	(7.86)**	(7.87)**	(7.15)**	(6.92)**	(6.43)**	(6.37)**
Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.45$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Separated at t $0.141$ $0.132$ $0.12$ $0.121$ $0.131$ $0.123$ $0.106$ $0.10$ $(1.56)$ $(1.46)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.53)$ $(1.43)$ $(1.11)$ $(1.11)$ Divorced at t $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$ $0.03$ $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.80)$	Four members	-0.442	-0.43	-0.435	-0.433	-0.406	-0.395	-0.391	-0.387
Five members $-0.497$ $-0.485$ $-0.482$ $-0.48$ $-0.477$ $-0.465$ $-0.459$ $-0.45$ in household at t $(11.47)^{**}$ $(11.20)^{**}$ $(10.61)^{**}$ $(10.57)^{**}$ $(10.33)^{**}$ $(10.10)^{**}$ $(9.45)^{**}$ $(9.35)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Separated at t $0.141$ $0.132$ $0.12$ $0.121$ $0.131$ $0.123$ $0.106$ $0.10$ $(1.56)$ $(1.46)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.2)$ $(1.53)$ $(1.43)$ $(1.11)$ $(1.11)$ Divorced at t $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$ $0.03$ $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.80)$	in household at t	(11.86)**	(11.55)**	(11.05)**	(10.99)**	(9.98)**	(9.71)**	(9.01)**	(8.91)**
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Five members	-0.497	-0.485	-0.482	-0.48	-0.477	-0.465	-0.459	-0.454
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	in household at t	(11.47)**	(11.20)**	(10.61)**	(10.57)**	(10.33)**	(10.10)**	(9.45)**	(9.35)**
Divorced at t $\begin{pmatrix} (1.56) & (1.46) & (1.2) & (1.2) & (1.53) & (1.43) & (1.11) & (1.11) \\ 0.011 & 0.006 & 0.023 & 0.023 & 0.018 & 0.014 & 0.035 & 0.03 \\ (0.27) & (0.16) & (0.54) & (0.54) & (0.41) & (0.32) & (0.77) & (0.88) \\ \end{pmatrix}$	Married at t			$\operatorname{ref}$	ref				ref
Divorced at t $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$ $0.03$ $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.88)$	Separated at t	0.141	0.132	0.12	0.121	0.131	0.123	0.106	0.106
Divorced at t $0.011$ $0.006$ $0.023$ $0.023$ $0.018$ $0.014$ $0.035$ $0.03$ $(0.27)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.54)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.77)$ $(0.88)$		(1.56)	(1.46)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.53)	(1.43)	(1.11)	(1.11)
	Divorced at t								0.037
		(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.41)	(0.32)	(0.77)	(0.8)
Widowed at t $0.004$ $0.006$ $0.025$ $0.035$ $-0.002$ $0.001$ $0.014$ $0.02$	Widowed at t	0.004	0.006	0.025	0.035	-0.002	0.001	0.014	0.022
									(0.22)
	Never married at t			. ,		, ,	,	, ,	-0.205
									(6.38)**
	Time dummies		, ,			. ,	` ,	. ,	Yes
			Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No		No
									Yes
	9								339086
	Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$							0.1782	0.1800

Note: The estimation is by Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.) The reference for the interpretation of the dummy variables is an employed male with rent-free accommodation, married, aged 16-24, living alone. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-2: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mobility at Time

· <del>+</del> 1								
Friends at t	-0.454			-0.378	-0.413			-0.330
	(5.08)**			(3.65)**	(4.39)**			(2.99)**
Neighbors at t		-0.146		-0.001		-0.145		-0.007
		(2.27)*		(0.01)		(2.07)*		(0.08)
Club at t			-0.040	-0.010			-0.021	0.006
			(0.86)	(0.21)			(0.41)	(0.12)
Male	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Female	-0.006	-0.003	-0.009	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005	-0.011	-0.008
	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.33)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.41)	(0.28)
Rent-free accommodation at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Owner at t	-0.475	-0.474	-0.455	-0.459	-0.454	-0.454	-0.442	-0.445
	(8.64)**	(8.63)**	(7.91)**	(7.95)**	(8.05)**	(8.04)**	(7.45)**	(7.48)**
Tenant with rent at t	-0.053	-0.055	-0.038	-0.038	-0.045	-0.048	-0.036	-0.036
	(0.94)	(0.97)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.82)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Age category 16-25 at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Age category 26-35 at t	-0.048	-0.005	-0.029	-0.063	-0.024	0.016	-0.017	-0.046
	(1.25)	(0.13)	(0.72)	(1.55)	(0.56)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(1.01)
Age category 36-45 at t	-0.348	-0.278	-0.310	-0.368	-0.324	-0.260	-0.302	-0.351
	(7.81)**	(6.63)**	(6.98)**	(7.63)**	(6.65)**	(5.69)**	(6.16)**	(6.62)**
Age category 46-55 at t	-0.450	-0.371	-0.409	-0.472	-0.434	-0.361	-0.407	-0.461
	(8.90)**	(7.80)**	(8.12)**	(8.69)**	(7.89)**	(7.01)**	(7.40)**	(7.76)**
Age category 56-65 at t	-0.557	-0.476	-0.508	-0.570	-0.582	-0.508	-0.554	-0.607
	(8.51)**	(7.44)**	(7.43)**	(8.05)**	(8.37)**	(7.49)**	(7.65)**	(8.06)**
Years of education at t	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.009
	(4.97)**	(5.42)**	(5.13)**	(4.41)**	(3.67)**	(3.99)**	(3.71)**	(3.13)**
Employed at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Unemployed at t	0.019	0.015	-0.004	0.010	0.045	0.042	0.028	0.040
	(0.48)	(0.36)	(0.10)	(0.25)	(1.07)	(0.98)	(0.62)	(0.90)
Living alone at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Two members	-0.198	-0.174	-0.167	-0.188	-0.166	-0.146	-0.134	-0.150
in household at t	(4.83)**	(4.26)**	(3.82)**	(4.29)**	(3.70)**	(3.27)**	(2.78)**	(3.10)**
Three members	-0.325	-0.303	-0.298	-0.313	-0.294	-0.274	-0.266	-0.278
in household at t	(8.06)**	(7.54)**	(6.99)**	(7.30)**	(6.81)**	(6.40)**	(5.77)**	(5.99)**
Four members	-0.421	-0.394	-0.392	-0.410	-0.380	-0.355	-0.344	-0.358
in household at t	(9.97)**	(9.37)**	(8.68)**	(8.95)**	(8.32)**	(7.84)**	(6.96)**	(7.16)**
Five members	-0.491	-0.464	-0.456	-0.474	-0.474	-0.450	-0.438	-0.452
in household at t	(9.86)**	(9.36)**	(8.66)**	(8.89)**	(9.00)**	(8.60)**	(7.81)**	(7.97)**
Married at t	$\operatorname{ref}$							
Separated at t	0.065	0.051	0.036	0.043	0.053	0.040	0.022	0.029
	(0.64)	(0.51)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.57)	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.28)
Divorced at t	-0.014	-0.022	-0.005	-0.001	-0.007	-0.015	0.011	0.016
	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.13)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.29)
Widowed at t	0.023	0.013	0.042	0.053	0.024	0.016	0.037	0.046
	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.39)	(0.49)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.31)	(0.39)
Never married at t	-0.120	-0.145	-0.148	-0.130	-0.169	-0.193	-0.204	-0.187
	(3.76)**	(4.54)**	(4.32)**	(3.78)**	(4.88)**	(5.55)**	(5.40)**	(4.96)**
Time Dummies	Yes							
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	316463	316463	299625	299625	279365	279365	262824	262824
Pseudo $R^2$	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18

Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.) Here, social capital is instrumented with its lag and the lag of the other explicative variables. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-3: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mobility at Time t+1

Friends at t	-0.253			0.260
	(0.99)			(0.69)
Neighbors at t		-0.876		-0.866
		(2.99)**		(2.01)*
Club at t			-0.605	-0.415
			(1.40)	(0.91)
Male	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$
Female	-0.019	0.007	-0.084	-0.037
	(0.78)	(0.28)	(1.55)	(0.61)
Rent-free accommodation at t	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$
Owner at t	-0.489	-0.510	-0.452	-0.481
	(8.76)**	(9.03)**	(7.36)**	(7.59)**
Tenant with rent at t	-0.090	-0.121	-0.099	-0.124
	(1.57)	(2.07)*	(1.61)	(1.99)*
Age category 16-25 at t	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$
Age category 26-35 at t	0.022	0.046	0.015	0.039
	(0.53)	(1.15)	(0.36)	(0.83)
Age category 36-45 at t	-0.263	-0.219	-0.245	-0.206
	(5.05)**	(4.93)**	(5.06)**	(3.26)**
Age category 46-55 at t	-0.369	-0.315	-0.349	-0.301
	(6.29)**	(6.24)**	(6.20)**	(4.10)**
Age category 56-65 at t	-0.503	-0.422	-0.483	-0.406
	(6.81)**	(6.02)**	(6.44)**	(4.39)**
Years of education at t	0.010	0.006	0.018	0.011
	(3.91)**	(1.95)	(3.07)**	(1.63)
Employed at t	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$
Unemployed at t	0.047	0.095	-0.007	0.054
	(1.09)	(2.05)*	(0.15)	(0.91)
Living alone at t	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$
Two members	-0.160	-0.158	-0.151	-0.146
in household at t	(3.60)**	(3.52)**	(3.10)**	(3.06)**
Three members	-0.306	-0.287	-0.301	-0.279
in household at t	(7.13)**	(6.71)**	(6.44)**	(5.93)**
Four members	-0.396	-0.369	-0.382	-0.354
in household at t	(8.71)**	(8.24)**	(7.80)**	(7.16)**
Five members	-0.465	-0.433	-0.445	-0.412
in household at t	(8.89)**	(8.40)**	(7.92)**	(7.47)**
Married at t	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$
Separated at t	0.057	0.010	-0.002	-0.038
	(0.60)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.35)
Divorced at t	-0.005	-0.029	-0.014	-0.030
	(0.10)	(0.57)	(0.25)	(0.52)
Widowed at t	-0.018	-0.010	-0.002	0.009
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Never married at t	-0.160	-0.196	-0.196	-0.228
	(4.31)**	(5.60)**	(5.40)**	(4.68)**
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No
Observations	286362	286362	269339	269339
Pseudo $R^2$	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17

Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. (Some data was not available for Germany and Sweden.) Here, social capital is instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-4: Fixed-Effect Logit Regression Explaining Inter-Area Mobility at Time t+1

Friends at t		0.040			0.400
Neighbors at t	Friends at t				
Club at t	27.1.11	(0.63)	0.001		
Club at t	Neighbors at t				
Rent-free accommodation at t			$(3.57)^{**}$		, ,
Rent-free accommodation at t   ref   Owner at t   O.407   -0.416   -0.271   -0.281	Club at t				
Owner at t         -0.407         -0.416         -0.271         -0.281           (2.42)*         (2.47)*         (1.46)         (1.52)           Tenant with rent at t         0.464         0.458         0.561         0.56           (2.80)**         (2.77)**         (3.09)**         (3.08)**           Age category 16-25 at t         ref         -0.335         -0.335         -0.335         -0.335         -0.335         -0.361         (2.87)**         (2.52)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.47)*         (2.55)*         (2.21)*         (2.17)*         (0.73)         (0.76)         (0.76)         (0.76)         (0.77)         (0.71)         (0.72)         (0.06)         (0.018)         (0.06)         (0.018)				. ,	` ′
Tenant with rent at t					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Owner at t				
Age category 16-25 at t ref ref ref ref regardates and selected at t ref	_	, ,	, ,	` /	` /
Age category 16-25 at t Age category 26-35 at t Age category 26-35 at t Age category 26-35 at t Age category 36-45 at t Age category 46-55 at t Age category 46-55 at t Age category 56-65 at t Age category 60-621 (0.067  Age category 60-65 at t Age category 60-621 (0.067  Age category 60-65 at	Tenant with rent at t				
Age category 26-35 at t			(2.77)**	, ,	
(2.87)** (2.87)** (2.52)* (2.47)*	9 9 1				
Age category 36-45 at t	Age category 26-35 at t				
Age category 46-55 at t  (2.25)* (2.24)* (1.73) (1.73)  Age category 46-55 at t  -0.307 -0.31 -0.208 -0.215  (1.15) (1.17) (0.71) (0.73)  Age category 56-65 at t  0.006 0.012 0.067 0.076  (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.18)  Years of education at t  0.019 0.02 0.018 0.018  Employed at t  ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  Tef  Two members  0.018 0.015 -0.08 -0.069  in household at t  (0.17) (0.15) (0.72) (0.63)  Three members  0.043 0.047 -0.023 0.001  in household at t  (0.35) (0.39) (0.17) (0.01)  Four members  0.228 0.24 0.146 0.173  in household at t  (1.67) (1.77) (1.00) (1.18)  Five members  0.406 0.413 0.361 0.386  in household at t  (2.26)* (2.29)* (1.85) (1.97)*  Married at t  ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  re		. ,	, ,		. ,
Age category 46-55 at t	Age category 36-45 at t				
Age category 56-65 at t		` /	` /	. ,	
Age category 56-65 at t	Age category 46-55 at t				
Years of education at t  (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.18)  Years of education at t  (0.019 0.02 0.018 0.018  (2.22)* (2.27)* (1.91) (1.9)  Employed at t  ref ref ref ref ref ref Years  (2.28)* (2.27)* (2.27)* (2.91)  Employed at t  (2.96)** (3.05)** (2.48)* (2.59)**  Living alone at t  ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Two members 0.018 0.015 -0.08 -0.069  in household at t  (0.17) (0.15) (0.72) (0.63)  Three members 0.043 0.047 -0.023 0.001  in household at t  (0.35) (0.39) (0.17) (0.01)  Four members 0.228 0.24 0.146 0.173  in household at t  (1.67) (1.77) (1.00) (1.18)  Five members 0.406 0.413 0.361 0.386  in household at t  (2.26)* (2.29)* (1.85) (1.97)*  Married at t  ref ref ref Separated at t  0.003 -0.012 -0.094 -0.11  (0.02) (0.06) (0.4) (0.47)  Divorced at t  0.031 0.035 0.011 0.009  (0.19) (0.21) (0.06) (0.05)  Widowed at t  0.835 0.846 0.707 0.709  (1.64) (1.66) (1.3) (1.32)  Never married at t  0.108 0.104 -0.05 -0.052  (0.87) (0.84) (0.37) (0.39)  Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes		` /	` /		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age category 56-65 at t				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			. ,	. ,	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Years of education at t				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		$(2.22)^*$	(2.27)*	,	, ,
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	- v				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Unemployed at t				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(2.96)**	(3.05)**	(2.48)*	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	~				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			, ,	, ,	, ,
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Three members				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	in household at t	, ,	. ,	. ,	(0.01)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Four members				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		, ,	. ,	. ,	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$				0.361	
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(2.26)*	` /	(1.85)	(1.97)*
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$					$\operatorname{ref}$
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Separated at t				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.4)	(0.47)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Divorced at t				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		, ,	` /	(0.06)	
Never married at t         0.108         0.104         -0.05         -0.052           (0.87)         (0.84)         (0.37)         (0.39)           Time dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes           Observations         12013         12013         9717         9717	Widowed at t				
Time dummies         (0.87)         (0.84)         (0.37)         (0.39)           Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes           Observations         12013         12013         9717         9717			,		(1.32)
Time dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes           Observations         12013         12013         9717         9717	Never married at t				
Observations 12013 12013 9717 9717		` /	` /	` /	` ′
Number of individuals 2306 2306 2062 2062					
	Number of individuals	2306	2306	2062	2062

Note: The estimation is by Fixed-Effect Logit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK (some data was missing for Germany and Sweden). Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant

Table A-5: Probit Regression Explaining Individual Unemployment at Time t+1

Neighbors at t $(0.39)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.18)$ $(0.18)$ Neighbors at t $(0.39)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.18)$ Neighbors at t $(0.39)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.18)$ Neighbors at t $(0.39)^{**}$ $(0.39)$	Table A-5: Probit F		explaining .	marviauai (	1 0		e t+1		
Neighbors at t	Friends at t	0.005			0.005	-0.004			-0.003
Club at t  -0.131		(0.39)			\ /	(0.27)			
Club at t	Neighbors at t								
Male			(4.04)**				(3.23)**		
Male   Female   0.12	Club at t								
Female				(11.74)**	(11.87)**			(10.57)**	(10.67)**
Rent-free accommodation at t ref				$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$				
Rent-free accommodation at t	Female								0.107
Owner at t		(12.42)**	(12.24)**	(11.63)**	(11.42)**	(10.70)**	(10.57)**	(9.92)**	(9.74)**
Tenant with rent at t	Rent-free accommodation at t	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$
Tenant with rent at t	Owner at t				-0.121		-0.115		
Age category 16-25 at t		(5.00)**	(4.97)**	(4.87)**	(4.83)**	(4.56)**	(4.54)**	(4.48)**	(4.45)**
Age category 16-25 at t         ref         d.043         20.021         20.14         20.14         20.04         20.04         20.01         20.01         20.01         20.01         20.01 <td>Tenant with rent at t</td> <td>0.078</td> <td>0.08</td> <td>0.065</td> <td>0.067</td> <td>0.108</td> <td>0.109</td> <td>0.096</td> <td>0.097</td>	Tenant with rent at t	0.078	0.08	0.065	0.067	0.108	0.109	0.096	0.097
Age category 26-35 at t		(3.01)**	(3.07)**	(2.44)*	(2.51)*	(4.04)**	(4.08)**	(3.50)**	(3.55)**
Age category 36-45 at	Age category 16-25 at t	ref	ref						
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Age category 26-35 at t	-0.052	-0.052	-0.052	-0.051	-0.079	-0.079	-0.08	-0.08
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	_	(3.50)**							(4.88)**
Age category 46-55 at t 0.005	Age category 36-45 at t	` /	` /		` /		` /	` /	` /
Age category 46-55 at t         0.005         0.003         0.014         0.015         -0.05         -0.041         -0.042           Age category 56-65 at t         0.18         0.177         0.176         0.174         0.15         0.148         0.145         0.142           Years of education at t         -0.018         -0.018         -0.017         -0.017         -0.017         -0.021         -0.021         -0.019         -0.019           Employed at t         ref	gg. y								
Age category 56-65 at t	Age category 46-55 at t		\ /		\ /	\ /	\ /		\ /
Age category 56-65 at t         0.18 (7.49)**         0.177 (7.49)**         0.176 (7.39)**         0.174 (7.39)**         0.145 (5.78)**         0.145 (5.71)**         0.145 (5.73)**         0.145 (5.58)**           Years of education at t         -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019         -0.019 -0	887								
Years of education at t         (7.49)** (7.39)** (7.48)** (7.39)** (7.39)** (5.78)** (5.71)** (5.73)** (5.58)**           Years of education at t         -0.018 (19.52)** (19.28)** (17.32)** (16.92)** (19.55)** (19.33)** (17.22)** (16.94)*           Employed at t         ref	Age category 56-65 at t	` /	` /	( /	\ /	` /	` /	( /	` /
Years of education at t         -0.018 (19.52)**         -0.018 (19.28)**         -0.017 (16.92)**         -0.021 (19.55)**         -0.013 (19.33)**         -0.019 (19.49)**         -0.016 (16.94)**           Employed at t Unemployed at t Unemployed at t Unemployed at t         1.931 1.928 1.926 1.922 1.904 1.902 1.901 1.897         1.902 1.901 1.897         1.897         1.897         1.897         1.904 1.902 1.901 1.897         1.994         1.902         1.903	1180 00008017 00 00 00 00								
Comployed at t	Years of education at t	\ /	\ /						\ /
Employed at t									
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Employed at t	\ /	( )	` /	\ /	,	\ /	` /	,
Living alone at t ref									
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	e nemproyed at t								
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Living alone at t								
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
Three members $0.128$ $0.127$ $0.118$ $0.118$ $0.073$ $0.073$ $0.061$ $0.06$ in household at t $(5.75)^{**}$ $(5.72)^{**}$ $(5.14)^{**}$ $(5.12)^{**}$ $(2.91)^{**}$ $(2.90)^{**}$ $(2.33)^{*}$ $(2.30)^{*}$ Four members $0.15$ $0.149$ $0.139$ $0.138$ $0.081$ $0.08$ $0.066$ $0.065$ in household at t $(6.60)^{**}$ $(6.56)^{**}$ $(5.77)^{**}$ $(5.94)^{**}$ $(3.13)^{**}$ $(3.11)^{**}$ $(2.47)^{**}$ $(2.47)^{**}$ $(2.44)^{**}$ Five members $0.204$ $0.203$ $0.192$ $0.191$ $0.123$ $0.122$ $0.107$ $0.106$ in household at t $(8.64)^{**}$ $(8.60)^{**}$ $(7.89)^{**}$ $(7.85)^{**}$ $(4.60)^{**}$ $(4.58)^{**}$ $(3.84)^{**}$ $(3.81)^{**}$ Married at t ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Separated at t $0.202$ $0.205$ $0.171$ $0.175$ $0.224$ $0.227$ $0.191$ $0.194$ $0.194$ $0.195$ $0$									
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
Four members $0.15$ $0.149$ $0.139$ $0.138$ $0.081$ $0.08$ $0.066$ $0.065$ in household at t $(6.60)^*$ $(6.56)^*$ $(5.97)^*$ $(5.94)^*$ $(3.13)^*$ $(3.11)^*$ $(2.47)^*$ $(2.44)^*$ Five members $0.204$ $0.203$ $0.192$ $0.191$ $0.123$ $0.122$ $0.107$ $0.106$ in household at t $(8.64)^*$ $(8.60)^*$ $(7.89)^*$ $(7.85)^*$ $(4.60)^*$ $(4.58)^*$ $(3.84)^*$ $(3.81)^*$ Married at t ref									
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
Five members $0.204$ $0.203$ $0.192$ $0.191$ $0.123$ $0.122$ $0.107$ $0.106$ in household at t $(8.64)^{**}$ $(8.60)^{**}$ $(7.89)^{**}$ $(7.85)^{**}$ $(4.60)^{**}$ $(4.58)^{**}$ $(3.84)^{**}$ $(3.81)^{**}$ Married at t ref									
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			\ /	\ /			\ /	\ /	
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$									
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	separated at t								
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	D:		` /		` /		` /		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Divorced at t								
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	XX7: 1 1 - 4 4								
Never married at t         0.205         0.207         0.202         0.204         0.224         0.225         0.222         0.224           (14.53)**         (14.67)**         (14.03)**         (14.12)**         (14.64)**         (14.71)**         (14.13)**         (14.20)*           Time dummies         Yes	widowed at t								
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	NT.								
Time dummies         Yes         Yes <t< td=""><td>never married at t</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>	never married at t								
Country dummies         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes           Observations         413599         413599         381493         381493         360291         360291         328309         328309	m: 1 ·								
Region dummies         No         No         No         No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes           Observations         41359         413599         381493         381493         360291         360291         328309         328309									
Observations 413599 413599 381493 381493 360291 360291 328309 328309									
Pseudo $R^2$ 0.3439 0.3438 0.3439 0.3437 0.3646 0.3642 0.3643 0.3644									
	Pseudo $R^2$	0.3439	0.3438	0.3439	0.3437	0.3646	0.3642	0.3643	0.3644

Note: The estimation is by Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data (some data was not available for Germany and Sweden). The reference for the interpretation of the dummy variables is an employed male with rent-free accommodation, married, aged 16-24, living alone. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-6: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Individual Unemployment at Time t+1

Friends at t	0.116 (2.86)**			0.096 (2.00)*	0.090 (2.02)*			0.068
Neighbors at t	(2.86)***	0.163		0.165	(2.02)	0.145		$(1.29) \\ 0.160$
		(5.36)**		(4.59)**		(4.27)**		(3.96)**
Club at t		` /	-0.254	-0.271		, ,	-0.244	-0.260
			(10.72)**	(11.24)**			(9.06)**	(9.47)**
Male Female	0.113	0.107	0.094	0.087	0.106	0.101	0.087	0.001
remaie	(10.20)**	(9.60)**			(8.65)**			0.081
Rent-free accommodation at t	ref	(9.60) · · ref	(8.10)** ref	(7.51)** ref	(8.65) · · ref	(8.17)** ref	(6.75)** ref	(6.24)** ref
Owner at t	-0.141	-0.138	-0.133	-0.129	-0.129	-0.127	-0.123	-0.119
Owner at t	(4.93)**	(4.83)**	(4.64)**	(4.47)**	(4.43)**	(4.33)**	(4.17)**	(4.03)**
Tenant with rent at t	0.071	0.076	0.056	0.062	0.100	0.104	0.086	0.092
Tenant with Tent at t	(2.37)*	(2.53)*	(1.83)	(2.03)*	(3.22)**	(3.36)**	(2.74)**	(2.91)**
Age category 16-25 at t	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref
Age category 26-35 at t	-0.043	-0.052	-0.056	-0.050	-0.076	-0.084	-0.088	-0.084
rige category 20 00 at t	(2.40)*	(2.99)**	(3.17)**	(2.75)**	(3.94)**	(4.41)**	(4.60)**	(4.28)**
Age category 36-45 at t	-0.086	-0.103	-0.096	-0.083	-0.140	-0.153	-0.146	-0.137
1180 04008017 00 10 40 0	(4.05)**	(5.03)**	(4.57)**	(3.76)**	(6.00)**	(6.82)**	(6.36)**	(5.67)**
Age category 46-55 at t	0.033	0.014	0.023	0.036	-0.027	-0.043	-0.035	-0.027
007	(1.44)	(0.61)	(1.03)	(1.51)	(1.06)	(1.80)	(1.44)	(1.04)
Age category 56-65 at t	0.217	0.193	0.190	0.197	0.180	0.159	0.154	0.156
gg. ,	(7.62)**	(6.88)**	(7.00)**	(7.00)**	(5.83)**	(5.26)**	(5.26)**	(5.15)**
Years of education at t	-0.017	-0.017	-0.015	-0.013	-0.020	-0.019	-0.017	-0.016
	(15.35)**	(14.86)**	(12.91)**	(11.32)**	(15.66)**	(15.19)**	(13.20)**	(11.90)**
Employed at t	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref
Unemployed at t	1.974	1.969	1.965	1.951	1.932	1.926	1.923	1.910
	(132.17)**	(131.75)**	(131.03)**	(128.49)**	(116.99)**	(116.55)**	(116.37)**	(113.99)**
Living alone at t	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref
Two members	0.114	0.111	0.101	0.108	0.079	0.077	0.069	0.074
in household at t	(4.46)**	(4.35)**	(3.85)**	(4.10)**	(2.70)**	(2.62)**	(2.28)*	(2.45)*
Three members	0.140	0.134	0.122	0.123	0.086	0.080	0.068	0.068
in household at t	(5.42)**	(5.19)**	(4.60)**	(4.62)**	(2.94)**	(2.76)**	(2.25)*	(2.25)*
Four members	0.161	0.152	0.140	0.141	0.087	0.080	0.066	0.067
in household at t	(6.07)**	(5.77)**	(5.23)**	(5.23)**	(2.90)**	(2.67)**	(2.16)*	(2.15)*
Five members	0.206	0.197	0.186	0.186	0.119	0.111	0.098	0.098
in household at t	(7.45)**	(7.15)**	(6.60)**	(6.56)**	(3.79)**	(3.56)**	(3.05)**	(3.02)**
Married at t	ref	ref	ref	$_{\mathrm{ref}}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	ref	ref	ref
Separated at t	0.231	0.240	0.195	0.203	0.244	0.253	0.206	0.215
<b>5.</b>	(5.66)**	(5.89)**	(4.61)**	(4.79)**	(5.75)**	(5.94)**	(4.67)**	(4.86)**
Divorced at t	0.214	0.220	0.199	0.203	0.261	0.265	0.250	0.253
XXX 1 1 1 1 1	(7.99)**	(8.20)**	(7.18)**	(7.33)**	(8.56)**	(8.70)**	(7.85)**	(7.96)**
Widowed at t	-0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.004	-0.017	-0.018	-0.013	-0.018
NT . 1	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.33)
Never married at t	0.210	0.221	0.210	0.210	0.230	0.238	0.229	0.230
Time Dummies	(12.78)**	(13.43)**	(12.61)**	(12.48)**	(12.85)**	(13.31)**	(12.63)**	(12.57)**
	0.164	0.166	0.160	0.161	0.144	0.146	0.139	0.140
Country Dummies Region Dummies	(8.65)**	(8.78)**	(8.40)** 0.103	(8.43)** 0.103	(6.84)**	(6.93)**	(6.57)**	(6.61)**
Observations	0.104 312270	0.108 312270	295933	295933	0.085 271545	0.089 271545	0.083 255280	0.083 255280
Observations Pseudo $R^2$								
rseudo K-	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37

Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data (some data was not available for Germany and Sweden). Here, social capital is instrumented with its lag and the lag of the other explicative variables. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-7: Instrumental Variable Probit Regression Explaining Individual Unemployment at Time t+1

Friends at t	0.572			0.329
	(5.88)**			(2.11)*
Neighbors at t		0.231		0.308
		(2.23)*		(1.84)
Club at t			-2.153	-2.245
			(14.16)**	(13.45)**
Male				
Female	0.099	0.089	-0.136	-0.153
	(8.27)**	(7.22)**	(6.58)**	(6.17)**
Rent-free accommodation at t				
Owner at t	-0.134	-0.132	-0.059	-0.044
	(4.64)**	(4.59)**	(1.97)*	(1.44)
Tenant with rent at t	0.103	0.105	0.010	0.026
	(3.36)**	(3.42)**	(0.32)	(0.80)
Age category 16-25 at t				
Age category 26-35 at t	-0.031	-0.072	-0.075	-0.055
	(1.57)	(3.97)**	(3.97)**	(2.40)*
Age category 36-45 at t	-0.078	-0.150	-0.074	-0.037
	(3.12)**	(6.92)**	(3.21)**	(1.21)
Age category 46-55 at t	0.044	-0.038	0.057	0.097
	(1.67)	(1.64)	(2.30)*	(2.91)**
Age category 56-65 at t	0.248	0.162	0.221	0.247
	(7.77)**	(5.37)**	(7.64)**	(6.32)**
Years of education at t	-0.019	-0.019	0.005	0.009
	(14.75)**	(14.12)**	(2.22)*	(3.52)**
Employed at t				
Unemployed at t	1.956	1.961	1.821	1.784
	(120.46)**	(115.58)**	(90.34)**	(76.80)**
Living alone at t				
Two members	0.112	0.099	0.064	0.074
in household at t	(3.97)**	(3.50)**	(2.16)*	(2.46)*
Three members	0.119	0.105	0.063	0.063
in household at t	(4.23)**	(3.76)**	(2.12)*	(2.09)*
Four members	0.136	0.116	0.089	0.091
in household at t	(4.69)**	(4.02)**	(2.97)**	(2.95)**
Five members	0.180	0.163	0.142	0.138
in household at t	(5.99)**	(5.40)**	(4.53)**	(4.26)**
Married at t				
Separated at t	0.231	0.253	0.110	0.116
	(5.75)**	(6.23)**	(2.53)*	(2.62)**
Divorced at t	0.256	0.273	0.177	0.174
	(8.82)**	(9.36)**	(5.68)**	(5.54)**
Widowed at t	-0.006	0.005	-0.040	-0.053
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.77)	(1.00)
Never married at t	0.207	0.242	0.200	0.190
	(11.61)**	(13.80)**	(11.04)**	(9.16)**
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Dummies	No	No	No	No
Observations	289026	289026	261298	261298
Pseudo $R^2$	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36

Note: The estimation is by IV Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data (some data was not available for Germany and Sweden). Here, social capital is instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-8: Regressions Explaining Social Capital

Table A-8: Regressions Explaining Social Capital								
Social Capital:	: Friends		Neig	hbors	Club			
Estimation Method:	0	LS	OLS		Probit			
Born in another region	-0.04	-0.04	-0.039	-0.034	-0.116	-0.09		
	(13.43)**	(13.25)**	(10.93)**	(9.40)**	(9.25)**	(6.89)**		
Male	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref		
Female	-0.009	-0.009	0.034	0.034	-0.369	-0.384		
	(3.92)**	(3.85)**	(12.31)**	(12.27)**	(36.47)**	(36.58)**		
Rent-free accommodation	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref		
Owner	-0.006	-0.005	-0.027	-0.025	0.116	0.117		
	(0.98)	(0.81)	(3.83)**	(3.54)**	(4.87)**	(4.86)**		
Tenant with rent	-0.014	-0.005	-0.049	-0.038	-0.083	-0.066		
	(2.08)*	(0.79)	(6.50)**	(4.96)**	(3.20)**	(2.52)*		
Age category 16-25	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	ref	$\operatorname{ref}$		
Age category 26-35	-0.077	-0.078	0.006	0.006	0.01	0.017		
	(21.11)**	(21.13)**	(1.33)	(1.43)	(0.7)	(1.1)		
Age category 36-45	-0.132	-0.133	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.123		
	(31.61)**	(31.56)**	(4.14)**	(4.20)**	(6.38)**	(6.89)**		
Age category 46-55	-0.146	-0.148	0.03	0.032	0.129	0.139		
	(32.54)**	(32.51)**	(5.92)**	(6.24)**	(6.96)**	(7.21)**		
Age category 56-65	-0.136	-0.139	0.074	0.073	0.086	0.099		
	(24.93)**	(25.22)**	(12.52)**	(12.22)**	(3.89)**	(4.35)**		
Years of education	-0.004	-0.004	-0.008	-0.007	0.039	0.041		
	(18.52)**	(14.70)**	(28.95)**	(25.15)**	(39.82)**	(40.22)**		
Employed	ref	$\operatorname{ref}$	ref	$\operatorname{ref}$	ref	$\operatorname{ref}$		
Unemployed	0.035	0.029	0.076	0.075	-0.268	-0.246		
	(10.64)**	(8.48)**	(21.16)**	(20.24)**	(19.77)**	(17.52)**		
Living alone	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$		
Two members	-0.044	-0.038	-0.007	-0.006	-0.043	-0.036		
in household	(8.13)**	(6.86)**	(1.05)	(0.89)	(1.85)	(1.49)		
Three members	-0.033	-0.03	0.022	0.022	-0.071	-0.064		
in household	(6.11)**	(5.36)**	(3.42)**	(3.37)**	(3.03)**	(2.65)**		
Four members	-0.042	-0.038	0.03	0.031	-0.045	-0.031		
in household	(7.61)**	(6.77)**	(4.62)**	(4.70)**	(1.88)	(1.25)		
Five members	-0.038	-0.032	0.038	0.038	-0.057	-0.037		
in household	(6.54)**	(5.46)**	(5.56)**	(5.46)**	(2.27)*	(1.43)		
Married	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$	$\operatorname{ref}$		
Separated	0.019	0.019	-0.057	-0.06	-0.153	-0.157		
	(2.18)*	(2.12)*	(5.51)**	(5.68)**	(4.11)**	(4.08)**		
Divorced	0.019	0.019	-0.032	-0.027	-0.098	-0.095		
	(3.17)**	(3.16)**	(4.61)**	(3.85)**	(3.94)**	(3.66)**		
Widowed	0.024	0.026	0.012	0.014	-0.133	-0.123		
	(2.27)*	$(2.47)^*$	(1.08)	(1.21)	(3.06)**	(2.76)**		
Never married	0.054	0.056	-0.033	-0.029	-0.06	-0.057		
	(15.82)**	(16.29)**	(8.49)**	(7.44)**	(4.22)**	(3.85)**		
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Country dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No		
Region dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes		
Observations	390662	373813	390662	373813	376326	359660		
R-squared	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.14		

Note: The estimation is by Probit using ECHP data on 8 time periods (1994-2001) and 12 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK. Our measures of social capital is based on ECHP data (some data was not available for Germany and Sweden). The reference for the interpretation of the dummy variables is an employed male, renting his accommodation, aged 16-24, living alone and separated. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table A-9: Summary of results for some additional regressions

	_	loyment loi	9	Unemployed before current job?			
	a year	during 5 la	st years?				
	Probit	Probit	IV Probit	Probit	Probit	IV Probit	
Friends at t	0.009	0.002	-0.161	0.004	0.001	-0.117	
	(0.43)	(0.1)	(0.45)	(0.6)	(0.15)	(0.57)	
Neighbors at t	0,033	0,046	$0,\!252$	0,038	0,033	0,892	
	(1.38)	(1.91)	(0.68)	(2.58)**	(2.12)*	(4.10)**	
Club at t	-0.113	-0.104	-2.196	-0.111	-0.1	-2.082	
	(5.64)**	(4.94)**	(5.77)**	(9.45)**	(7.77)**	(9.63)**	
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country Dummies	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
Region Dummies	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Observations	109258	101314	80090	279735	245971	201484	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.11	0.11	0.1	0.06	0.08	0.07	
Log of unemployment Unemployment							
	be	fore current	t job		fore curren	t job	
	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	OLS	IV	
Friends at t	-0.009	-0.013	0.304	-0.003	-0.092	2.754	
	-0.42	-0.55	-0.95	-0.01	-0.42	-0.89	
Neighbors at t	0.031	0.051	0.303	0.392	0.58	8.396	
	-1.21	(2.03)*	-0.91	-1.67	(2.33)*	(2.29)*	
Club at t	-0.067	-0.055	-3.505	-0.719	-0.55	-42.575	
	(3.42)**	(2.67)**	(9.95)**	(4.70)**	(3.15)**	(10.07)**	
Time Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Tenure Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country Dummies	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
Region Dummies	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Observations	83910	76289	63402	279586	245892	200878	
$R^2$	0.18	0.2	0.17	0.07	0.11	0.07	

Notes: As additional explicative variables, the above regressions include sex, house tenure, age categories, years of education, household size, marital status. For the set of IV estimations, social capital measures are instrumented by the regional average of social capital measures and their lag. Robust z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%