

Japanese Monarchy: Past and Present

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Will an empress save the Japanese monarchy? p.1

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A royal alliance: Anglo-Japanese Court Relations, 1900-41 p.18

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Preface

A symposium was held on 23 February 2006 in the Michio Morishima room at STICERD to discuss aspects of Japanese and British royalty.

Professor Ben-Ami Shillony discussed the future succession to the Japanese throne in the light of the current debate about female succession, outlined in his recent book Enigma of the Emperors (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005). Dr Best analysed the changing Anglo-Japanese court relationship which had originally been underpinned by the Anglo-Japanese alliance but had become a secondary factor by the 1930s.

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Abstracts

Shillony: Paper examines how Japan's imperial dynasty dependent on the male line of succession has lasted so long and analyses how it will overcome its present difficulties. An Advisory Panel was created to recommend future policy to the Koizumi cabinet but its report in 2005 was criticized. The impasse over the Panel's report was broken by the birth of a son in September 2006 to Princess Kiko, wife of Prince Akishino.

Best: Paper explains why the royal relationship with Japan became so important to Britain. During the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-23), relations between the two Courts were cordial. The ending of the alliance did not lead to immediate substantial change. But as political relations deteriorated in the 'thirties, Court diplomacy did not yield important results, though officials continued experimenting.

Keywords: Japanese Emperor; Japanese reigning empresses; concubines; collateral princely families; Imperial Household Laws; Koizumi; Advisory Panel on Succession; Crown Prince Akihito; Princess Masako; Prince Hisahito.

Keywords: Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Order of the Garter; Emperor Hirohito; Prince of Wales; Prince Takamatsu, Prince Chichibu.

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The Japanese Imperial Institution: Crisis and Continuity

Ben-Ami Shillony

Introduction

In many ways, the present Japanese monarchy resembles West European monarchies, where the king or the queen is a symbolic figure. However, there are significant differences. On the one hand, the status of the emperor of Japan is lower than that of all other kings or queens. Unlike the Queen of England, he is neither the sovereign, nor the head of state, nor the commander in chief of the armed forces, nor the head of a national church, nor the apex of an aristocracy, nor the owner of big land estates. He is merely, as the constitution states, "the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people" (Article 1), who performs the functions of a head of state with the advice and approval of the cabinet (Article 7).

On the other hand, the status of the emperor of Japan is higher than that of other monarchs. His title "emperor" suggests that he occupies a superior rank, and the fact that he is today the only emperor in the world puts him in a unique position. The Shinto rituals that he performs, not mentioned in the constitution or the laws, are a continuation of the rites that Japanese emperors have been performing for at least a millennium and a half. Believed to be the descendants of the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami, they were the intermediaries between the realm and the gods. The imperial dynasty, which has no name, was usually weak and manipulated by others, but it was so sacred that no one ever dared to depose it or replace it. It is therefore the oldest dynasty in the world, and the only one that the Japanese can remember. Except for a period of 56 years in the fourteenth century, in which it split into the Northern and Southern Courts, it remained united and there was always one emperor whom everyone recognized.

As the emperors had little else to do, their main function was to exist and to ensure the continuity of their "unbroken line of ten thousand generations"

(*bansei ikkei*). The well being of Japan as a country blessed by the gods (*shinkoku*) depended on their male-line continuity. However, ensuring this continuity, when other aristocratic families often died out, was not an easy task. How did the imperial dynasty manage to survive for such a long time, why has its continuity become endangered in recent years, how has this problem been solved for the moment, and what long-range solutions are being considered? These are the questions which this essay will try to address.

Concubines Guarantee Progeny

The classical method of kings and emperors all over the world to guarantee progeny was to maintain a harem. Keeping a large number of concubines was the privilege and status symbol of royalty in many countries. In Japan, as in China, emperors had, in addition to the chief consort, other wives of various ranks. Access to many women was to assure that there would always be a son to continue the dynasty. In Japan, not only emperors maintained harems, but also shoguns and high aristocrats. A shogun's harem was usually larger than that of the emperor, because he had the means to keep more concubines.

This system worked most of the time well, but it had its problems. Maintaining many concubines could result in too many sons, a situation which put a burden on court resources and created succession feuds. In the Heian period, when the harems were big and the number of imperial sons was large, the emperors from time to time "pruned" their progeny, by giving some of their sons or grandsons estates and surnames and establishing them as independent commoner (*shinka*) families. This was the origin of the Taira and the Minamoto clans.

But there was also the opposite danger of too few sons. Infant mortality in the imperial family was always high due to inbreeding, the low age of mothers, and the ban on doctors to touch the bodies of imperial babies. In the late Edo period, when harems were small, the number of imperial sons barely provided continuity. Thus, of the seventeen children of Emperor Kōkaku (r. 1780-1817),

only one son survived infancy to become Emperor Ninkō (r. 1817-46). Of Emperor Ninkō's fifteen children, only one son survived to become Emperor Kōmei (r. 1846-67). Of Emperor Kōmei's six children, only one son survived to become Emperor Meiji, and of Emperor Meiji's fourteen children only one sickly son survived to become Emperor Taishō.

The chief consorts of all the emperors in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were either barren or lost their children. As a result, all the emperors born at that time, from Ninkō to Taishō, were the sons of concubines. In each case, the future heir was adopted by the chief consort to become her formal son. But other kinds of adoption, that were common among ordinary families, could not be practiced in the palace. As imperial succession was based on biological ("blood") male-line continuity, the emperor could adopt a son from within his own family, but he could not adopt a son from another family. This limitation preserved the monopoly of the imperial family and prevented other powerful families, like the Fujiwara or the Tokugawa, from putting their sons on the throne through marriage or adoption.

Collateral Families Back Up the Main Line

Concubines were not always a solution. If the emperor himself was sterile, or if he died before producing a son, no concubine could help. In the Kamakura period, a system was developed, by which an emperor's son, who was not destined to succeed him, was sometimes established as the head of a collateral princely family (*miyake*). From then on, he and his heirs, the heads of that family, would carry the title of imperial prince (*shinnō*) and would have the right to ascend the throne in case the main line failed to produce an heir.

This system was activated in 1428, when Emperor Shōkō (r. 1413-28) died at the age of 26 without leaving a successor, and the nine-year old head of the collateral Fushimi family, a great-grandson of the Northern-Court Emperor Sukō (r. 1348-1351), ascended the throne as Emperor Go-Hanazono (r. 1428-65). The last time that this system was implemented was in 1780, when Emperor Go-Momozono (r. 1771-79) died at the age of 21 without leaving an heir, and the seven-year old head of the collateral Kan'in family, a great-

grandson of Emperor Higashiyama (r. 1687-1709), ascended the throne as Emperor Kōkaku (r. 1780-1816). From Emperor Kōkaku until the present, for seven generations, every emperor was luckily survived by a son who succeeded him. Thus, for more than 200 years the throne has been passing smoothly from father to son, an unprecedented phenomenon in the long history of the imperial family (if we disregard the mythological emperors, most of whom were succeeded by their sons).

A collateral system also existed in shogunal families. When the seventh Tokugawa shogun Ietsugu died in 1716, at the age of seven (he became shogun at the age of four), without leaving an heir, the 32-year old head of the Kii family, a grandson of Tokugawa Iyasu, succeeded him as Tokugawa Yoshimune. But collateral families, lacking back-up branches of their own, faced the danger of extinction. Of the four collateral families of the imperial line at the beginning of the nineteenth century, only one, Fushimi, still existed a hundred years later. The other three, Kan'in, Katsura, and Arisugawa, died out in 1852, 1881, and 1913 respectively, because a lack of heirs.

Reigning Empresses Sustain the Male Line

The third mechanism to ensure continuity, employed only in the imperial family, was to allow a woman, the daughter of an emperor or an imperial prince, to ascend the throne sometimes when a male heir could not be found. The reigning empresses were virgins or widows, and they could not marry, as there could be no one superior to them. They were succeeded by men from the male line or, in one case, by another imperial princess. Unlike China, where a female emperor was considered to be an aberration (there was only one such case there, of Empress Wu, r. 690-705, who was vilified by historians), Japan had eight reigning empresses, most of them quite prominent. From the late sixth to the late eighth century, six women reigned in Japan, two of them ascending the throne twice under different posthumous names, a phenomenon which never existed among male monarchs.

The reigning empresses included Suiko (r. 593-628), who promoted Buddhism and was the first monarch to assume the title *tennō*; Jitō (r.686-

697), who built the first imperial capital Fujiwara-kyō; Gemmei (r.707-715), who built the capital Heijō-kyō (Nara) and sponsored the compilation of the *Kojiki*; and Genshō (r. 715-723) who sponsored the compilation of the *Nihon shoki*. Empress Genshō succeeded her mother Empress Gemmei, because the father of Genshō, Kusakabe, was an imperial prince, the son of Emperor Temmu. After the death of Empress Shōtoku in 770, no woman occupied the throne for more than 850 years, because of the fear that the Buddhist clergy might manipulate the empress, as had happened in the case of Shōtoku. In the Edo period, two reigning empresses again appeared, they were Meishō (r. 1629-1643) and Go-Sakuramachi (r. 1762-1770).

Meiji: Keeping Concubines, Expanding Collateral Families, and Excluding Women from the Throne

The Meiji Restoration did not abolish the institution of imperial concubines. As the emperor was restored to a central position in the modern state, ensuring the continuity of his dynasty became a central concern of the government. Emperor Meiji's wife Haruko could not bear children, so in 1871, when the young emperor was 19, he was provided with two concubines (*sokushitsu*), selected by the empress from among the court ladies (*nyokan*). Altogether, Emperor Meiji had nine concubines. The first two, Hamuro Mitsuko and Hashimoto Natsuko, died in 1873 when giving birth to children who also died. Of the other seven, Sono Sachiko bore two sons and six daughters, of whom only four daughters survived, and Chigusa Kotoko bore two children who died shortly after birth. Four concubines, Ogura Fumiko, Katakura Toshiko, Anenokoji Yoshiko, and Imazono Ayako, remained childless. Only one concubine, Yanagihara Naruko, bore a son, Yoshihito, who despite his sickness reached adulthood and became Emperor Taishō.

As concubines by themselves could not assure continuity, the Meiji government expanded the mechanism of collateral families. Between 1870 and 1906, ten members of the Fushimi family, the only collateral family which had not dwindled by that time, were established as imperial princes heading new collateral families. These new families were: Nashimoto, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Higashikuni, Takeda, and

Kan'in. In this way, the extinct Kan'in family was restored, while the two other extinct families, Katsura and Arisugawa, were not restored. Emperor Meiji's four daughters, and later Emperor Shōwa's four daughters, married the heads of these collateral families.

Although the Meiji leaders maintained the system of imperial concubines and expanded the system of collateral families, they abolished the third mechanism of ensuring imperial continuity, that of female emperors. Their decision to exclude women from the throne contradicted Japanese tradition, contradicted their own policy of elevating the status of women through better education and modern professions, and contradicted the model of the leading western country of that time, Great Britain, where Queen Victoria reigned. Some of the private constitution drafts that were circulated in the 1880s favored female monarchs (Kornicki 1999:138-41), but the government preferred an exclusively male monarchy. The justification for that was that women did not serve in the army and therefore could not exercise the emperor's new important role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 119 years after Empress Go-Sakuramachi had stepped down from the throne, the Meiji Constitution of 1889, for the first time in Japanese history, banned female emperors. Its Article 2 stated: "The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law."

Emperor Meiji's wife Haruko enjoyed a higher status than her predecessors. She was bestowed the loftiest title of imperial consorts, *kōgō*, which until then had been reserved for consorts who were also daughters of emperors. The previous time that such a title had been conferred was in the thirteenth century, but from her on it has been bestowed on every wife of an emperor. Haruko represented the modern woman. She wore western clothes, accompanied her husband on official duties, and was active in promoting women's education and social welfare. She set the standard of the modern empress, who is involved in state affairs. Despite this progress, as far as women's right to inherit the throne was concerned, the Meiji period marked a clear regression.

Taishō and Early Shōwa: The End of Concubines

The glorious institution of imperial concubines, which had existed for more than a millennium and a half, came to an end at the beginning of the twentieth century. As modern medicine entered the palace, and doctors were allowed to touch, treat and inoculate the emperor's children and grandchildren, infant mortality in the imperial family dropped sharply. With imperial princes reaching maturity, concubines became redundant. The Civil Code of 1898 outlawed polygamy, and although Emperor Meiji continued to keep his concubines, his son Emperor Taishō became the first monogamous monarch of Japan. Taishō's wife Sadako, whom he married in 1900, bore him four robust sons, who not only reached maturity but lived long lives. The eldest one, Emperor Hirohito, lived and reigned until the unprecedented age of 88. The second son, Prince Chichibu died at the age of 51. The third son, Prince Takamatsu, lived until the age of 82, and the youngest one, Prince Mikasa, is still alive in 2006 at the age of 91.

In 1927, shortly after the beginning of the Shōwa era, the court ladies' quarters (*tsubone*) were closed down. But then, Hirohito's wife Nagako bore four daughters one after the other, and the possibility of an imperial concubine was again contemplated. According to Nagako's biographer Koyama Itoko, the young emperor at first favored the idea, but he gave it up when his wife objected (Koyama 1958:73-87). The problem was solved in 1933, when Nagako, then only 30 years old, bore a son, the future Emperor Akihito. Later, she bore another son, Prince Hitachi, and another daughter, altogether two boys and five girls, of whom only one daughter died in infancy.

The Allied Occupation Abolishes Collateral Families

At the end of the Pacific War, when the Japanese feared that the Americans might abolish the monarchy and kill the emperor and all his family, the army prepared a plan to hide the eight-year old head of the collateral Kitashirakawa family, so that in the future he might revive the dynasty (Hata 1994:116-9). The war ended before this plan could be implemented and, fortunately for Japan, no such measure was needed.

The American-led occupation democratized Japan, but it left Hirohito on the throne. However, the emperor's status was reduced from that of sovereign to that of symbol, and the aristocracy, which had occupied a central part in the monarchy, was abolished. Although nobilities existed in several West European democracies, the Japanese aristocracy, composed of the old nobility and the new peerage, was dissolved. Article 14 of the 1947 constitution said: "All of the people are equal under the law... Peers and peerage shall not be recognized." This single sentence put an end to the aristocratic class, which for a millennium and a half had surrounded the emperor, served him and controlled him.

The dissolution of the aristocracy led to the abolition of the collateral families. As some of the princes who headed these families had held prominent positions in the army and navy, the occupation authorities decided to get rid of them in order to detach the emperor from the military. However, the emperor himself, until recently the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and his three brothers, who had occupied senior military positions, were not shorn of their titles. The Imperial House Law (*kōshitsu tenpan*) of 1947 reduced the prewar extended imperial family (*kōzoku*), which included the heads of the collateral families, into a nuclear imperial family (*kōshitsu*), which consisted only of the sons and grandsons of an emperor in the male line, their wives and their unmarried daughters. This new definition, which excluded great grandsons of emperors from the imperial family, prevented the reappearance of new collateral families.

On 18 October 1947, eleven former princes, heads of the disbanded collateral families, visited the palace to bid farewell to Emperor Hirohito, Empress Nagako, and Empress Dowager Sadako. They and their families had become, like the rest of the aristocracy, commoners. From then on, any marriage of an imperial prince or princess had to be with a commoner, as the imperial family was too small to enable marriages among its members. The new Imperial House Law asserted that a commoner woman who marries a prince joins the

imperial family and becomes a princess, while an imperial princess who marries a commoner leaves the family and becomes a commoner.

The Imperial House Law Retains the Exclusion of Women

The 1947 constitution established the equality of sexes. Article 14 said that “there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” Accordingly, unlike the Meiji Constitution, the new constitution said nothing about the gender of the emperor. However, the new Imperial House Law, which was enacted together with the constitution, preserved the male monarchy. Article 1 of that law stated that the throne “shall be succeeded by male descendants in the male line.” Thus the exclusion of women from the throne was not abolished, but only shifted from the constitution, which is difficult to change, to a law, which can be changed by a simple majority in the Diet.

Why did the American-led occupation, which wished to establish gender equality, endorse the limitation of the throne to men? The rationale provided by the Meiji leaders, that women could not become emperors because they could not command the armed forces, was not valid anymore, as the link between the emperor and the military had been severed. The exclusively male monarchy was probably retained in order to placate the conservatives, who had been forced to swallow many changes in the emperor's status. In addition, enabling women to reign would have opened the controversial issue of whether, on the basis of gender equality, to discard the venerated male line and allow the possibility of a female line. The occupation authorities preferred to defer this question to future generations.

Without concubines, without reigning empresses, without collateral families, and with a reduced imperial family, the continuity of the dynasty now depended on the ability of a few young princesses to produce sons. This situation created the risk that there might come a time when there would be no one to ascend the throne. In the first postwar decades this risk looked remote. When the law was enacted, Emperor Hirohito had two sons, Akihito and Masahito (Prince Hitachi), while his brother Prince Mikasa had one son,

Tomohito. By 1965, Crown Prince Akihito's wife Michiko had born two sons, Naruhito and Fumihito (Prince Akishino), while the Mikasa couple had produced two more sons, Yoshihito (Prince Katsura) and Norihito (Prince Takamado), all of them qualified to succeed the throne.

Yet, the unusual phenomenon of fertile imperial consorts, which had existed for three consecutive generations in the twentieth century, came to an end. Infertility has been a constant occurrence in the imperial family. Of Emperor Taishō's four sons, only two (Hirohito and Mikasa) begot children, while the other two (Chichibu and Takamatsu) were childless. Of Emperor Hirohito's two sons only one (Akihito) had children, while the other one (Hitachi) remained childless; and of Emperor Akihito's two sons only one (Akishino) had children shortly after marriage, while the other one (Crown Prince Naruhito) remained childless for eight years.

The Lack of Sons Prompts a Search for Solutions

By the end of the twentieth century, the danger which fifty years earlier had looked remote was assuming the proportions of a crisis. From the time of Prince Akishino's birth in 1965 until the end of the century, eight girls were born in the imperial family (Princess Nori, daughter of Akihito and Michiko; Princesses Mako and Kako, daughters of Prince Akishino and Princess Kiko; two daughters of Prince Mikasa's eldest son Tomohito; and three daughters of Mikasa's youngest son Prince Takamado). But at that same time no boy was born. That meant that if no more sons were born, there would be no one to succeed Naruhito or his brother Akishino when they are gone some time in the mid-twenty first century.

Had the collateral families existed, one of their heads might succeed the throne. The collateral family closest to the emperor before 1945 was Higashikuni. In 1915 the first Higashikuni Prince, Naruhiko, married Emperor Meiji's daughter Toshiko. Thirty years later, when Japan surrendered, he served as prime minister. In 1943, Naruhiko's son, Morihiro, married Hirohito's eldest daughter Shigeko. They had three sons and two daughters, and all their sons have had sons of their own. Had the Higashikuni family retained its

collateral status, Morihiro's eldest grandson could marry one of the imperial princesses and become emperor. But once the collateral system was abolished it is difficult to restore it. There were many cases in the past of imperial princes who were demoted to the status of subjects, but there was hardly a case of a subject who rose to become an imperial prince.

By the end of the twentieth century it seemed that the continuity of the imperial dynasty hinged on the ability of Crown Princess Masako to produce a son. The psychological pressure on her was great, but for a long time she could not bear children. In December 2001, after eight years of marriage and an abortion, Masako gave birth to a girl, Princess Aiko (second name: Princess Toshi). In 2003, Masako dropped from public view and ceased to fulfill her official duties. It was reported that she was suffering from depression (euphemistically dubbed "adjustment disorder"). Her depression was attributed to the failure to bear a son and to the difficulty to adjust to court life after giving up her former career as a diplomat.

In December 2004, when Princess Masako reached the age of 41 and her chances to bear more children became dim, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō appointed a 10-member advisory panel to recommend legal changes that would guarantee the continuity of the dynasty. The panel was composed of establishment figures. It was headed by 71-year old Yoshikawa Hiroyuki, a former president of Tokyo University and an expert on robot engineering. His deputy was 75-year old Sonobe Itsuo, a former judge of the Supreme Court, who was a member of the Imperial Household Council and an expert on the Imperial House Law. There were two women on the panel: Ogata Sadako, former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and Iwao Sumiko, a sociologist and authority on gender issues. The other six members were: Tokyo University President Sasaki Takeshi, constitutional scholar Satō Kōji, western classics scholar Kubo Masaaki, ancient Japanese history scholar Sasayama Haruo, Toyota Motor Corporation chairman Okuda Hiroshi, and former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Furukawa Teijirō. Of the ten members, only two, Sonobe and Sasayama, were authorities on imperial family affairs.

Controversial Recommendations

The panel met once a month for about an hour or two each time. It heard experts, but refused to hear the views of members of the imperial family, on the grounds that they were irrelevant. In November 2005, eleven months after its appointment, the panel submitted a report. Despite its conservative composition, the panel's report was radical. Basing its recommendations on the principles of gender equality and the wishes of the people, it rejected the ideas of reviving concubinage and collateral families as undemocratic and unpopular. Instead, it recommended allowing women to become emperors. This recommendation by itself was not revolutionary as there had been reigning empresses in the past. But the panel went further and recommended that the first-born child of an emperor or empress, regardless of its sex, succeed the throne, something which had never existed before. It also recommended that imperial princesses who marry commoners remain in the imperial family and their husbands join it and become imperial princes. The most revolutionary recommendation was that reigning empresses would be allowed to marry a commoner and have their offspring succeed them. This meant the end to the exclusive male line and the start of a female line.

Although these recommendations were radical departures from the past, public opinion supported them and the conservative prime minister endorsed them. The cabinet started preparations for amending the Imperial House Law according to the panel's report. Had the law been amended, Princess Aiko would have become the heir to her father, even if a son was later born in the imperial family. She would then be able to marry a commoner and their first child, whether boy or girl, would succeed her.

But not everyone in Japan was happy with the panel's report. The right-wingers and traditionalists were outraged. The opposition to the recommendations was led by the Association of Shinto Shrines (*Jinja honchō*), whose president Kuni Kuniaki, a nephew of Hirohito's wife Nagako, was the chief priest of Ise Shrine. Together with conservative

parliamentarians and activists it established the Japan Congress (*Nihon kaigi*), which organized rallies and collected petitions against a female emperor and a female line. The Japan Congress claimed that the panel's recommendations, far from saving the dynasty, were actually killing it. Instead of reigning empresses and a female line, the Congress advocated the idea of reviving the collateral families, which could provide male heirs to the throne. Its spokesmen dismissed the argument that public opinion supported the recommendations, claiming that the ill-informed public could hardly distinguish between a female emperor (*jotei*) and a female line (*jokei*). The Japan Congress maintained that the imperial dynasty did not belong only to the present generation, but also to the past and future ones. Therefore cardinal change of the succession rules required long and serious deliberations by experts and could not be decided hastily by a group of amateurs.

The emperor was not allowed to express his opinion, because this was a political issue, and his immediate relatives also kept silent. Only one member of the imperial family, Tomohito, the eldest son and heir of Prince Mikasa, broke the silence. In magazine articles and interviews he voiced his strong opposition to the panel's report. He rejected the idea of reigning empresses and a female line and recommended the revival of concubinage and the restoration of collateral families. His suggestions were ridiculed by liberals, but were applauded by traditionalists and right wingers. It was difficult to guess to what extent, if at all, he represented the views of the imperial family.

The Birth of Hisahito Nullifies the Panel's Recommendations

The impasse was broken by the surprising announcement, in February 2006, that the 39-year old Princess Kiko, wife of Prince Akishino and mother of two teenage girls, was expecting a baby. The prospect that an imperial heir might, after all, be born convinced Prime Minister Koizumi to suspend his initiative to amend the law. The conservative camp was saved from a serious split. Feminists and liberals were disappointed, but traditionalists were relieved. When Princess Kiko gave birth to a boy on 6 September 2006, there was a general elation. As the newborn baby was just a child of a prince, it was given only one name, Hisahito, unlike the sons and daughters of the emperor and

the crown prince, who are given two names (Naruhito was also Prince Hiro, Aiko is also Princess Toshi). Hisahito became No. 3 in the line of succession, after his uncle Naruhito and his father Akishino. He precedes Prince Hitachi, the emperor's brother (No. 4); Prince Mikasa, Hirohito's brother (No. 5); Tomohito, Prince Mikasa's eldest son (No. 6); and Prince Katsura, Prince Mikasa's second son (No. 7). Prince Mikasa's third son, Prince Takamado, who should have been No. 8, died in 2002 of a heart attack.

Two weeks after the birth of the new prince, a political "prince", Abe Shinzō, the grandson of former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, succeeded Koizumi as prime minister. Being more conservative than Koizumi, Abe shelved the recommendations of the advisory panel, and the prospect of reigning empresses or a female line for the time disappeared. Considering the longevity of the Japanese, which is now the highest in the world, male successors to the Japanese throne seem to be guaranteed until the end of this century. Yet, the dependence of the dynasty on the survival of one person, who is still a baby, and on his ability in the future to father a son, leaves the imperial dynasty in a precarious position. If a female line is not going to be adopted, collateral families will have to be restored in some form.

A few days after the inauguration of the Abe cabinet, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shimomura Hakubun announced that the cabinet would not be constrained by the report of the advisory panel, but would seek new ways to ensure a "stable male-line succession of emperors." He called on Diet members to join a new parliamentarians' league for preserving the "traditional imperial succession rules" (*The Japan Times*, 1 October 2006). The league, formed in October 2006 and headed by former agriculture, forestry and fisheries minister Shimamura Yoshinobu, numbered 201 Diet members, from both the LDP and the opposition Democratic Party. Its purpose was to find ways to revive the discarded collateral system, so that female emperors and a female line would not be necessary.

Will The Crown Prince Abdicate the Throne?

How will the birth of Hisahito affect the crown prince and princess? As the pressure on Princess Masako to bear an heir has been removed, she may regain her health and get out of the depression. She may be relieved that her daughter Princess Aiko is not going to become a reigning empress, and therefore there is no need to worry about her "imperial education" (*teiō kyōiku*), her marriage prospects, and her future responsibilities. The little princess can grow up almost as a normal child. Nevertheless, Crown Princess Masako is still destined to become an emperor's wife, with all the burdens involved in that positions. Is she willing to shoulder these burdens? If she overcomes her depression, adjusts to court life, and feels relaxed in exercising her public duties, the answer is yes. But if she continues to be depressed, finds it difficult to conform to palace life, craves for privacy for herself and her daughter, and finds her public duties boring and meaningless, she may not be interested in becoming an emperor's wife.

The birth of Hisahito may alleviate Princess Masako's depression, but it may also aggravate it. With her sister-in-law Princess Kiko receiving public praise for her loyalty to the imperial family, her self sacrifice for the nation, her cordial relations with the emperor and empress, her cheerful personality, and her fertility, Princess Masako may feel frustrated for allegedly representing the opposite attributes. The relations between the two princesses, so different in their personalities and former careers, are far from cordial. The success of Princess Kiko to accomplish what Princess Masako has failed to do may exacerbate the feelings of bitterness and make the crown princess wish to leave the imperial family.

Before the announcement of Princess Kiko's pregnancy, some weekly magazines speculated about the possibility of a divorce. Some people suggested that the crown prince should divorce his wife in order to marry another woman who would adjust to palace life and bear him a son. Others gossiped that the crown princess wanted to divorce in order to escape her ordeal. If these reports are true, then in both cases this move was blocked by Naruhito, who loves his wife and does not want to divorce her.

If Princess Masako decides to leave the imperial family, Naruhito will face the choice of either agreeing to a divorce or following her outside the family. At their wedding, he promised to protect her with all his might, so he may prefer the second option. This will mean resigning the position of crown prince. In that case, his brother will become crown prince and the throne will pass smoothly from father to son, which means from Akihito to Akishino and from Akishino to Hisahito.

Abdication of emperors was quite frequent in the past. Until the nineteenth century, nearly half of the Japanese emperors resigned either of their own will or on the demands of the people in power. But abdication of a crown prince is hardly known. The Imperial House Law does not mention abdication, but this does not mean that it is banned. After Japan's defeat in 1945, there were calls on Hirohito to assume responsibility for the war and resign, and he himself contemplated it, but General McArthur and the Japanese government opposed this move out of fear that it might create turmoil and bring about Hirohito's prosecution (Shillony 2005:217-219).

Naruhito's abdication, still a mere speculation, will cause problems. It will be seen as a scandal and will embarrass the imperial family and the Imperial Household Agency. It will require that Prince Akishino receive belatedly the "imperial education" which he is allegedly lacking, although there was little difference between the educations that the two brothers have received. In the long run, all sides may be satisfied. Princess Kiko may be happy to perform the public duties of a crown princess and an empress, and Princess Masako may be happy to regain a normal life.

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**A Royal Alliance: Court Diplomacy and Anglo-Japanese Relations,
1900-41**

Antony Best

In the first half of the twentieth century probably the most important royal relationship that Britain had was the one with Imperial Japan. This might seem a strange comment, but it should be recalled that after the collapse of empires of the Romanovs, the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs in 1917-18 only Britain, Japan and Italy remained as monarchical Great Powers. The royal relationship with Japan was important, because in contrast to the Italian case, the relations between the two courts clearly had an overt political purpose. During the years of the alliance, in an attempt to signify mutual respect, the very highest decorations were exchanged and royal princes from both countries set out on formal visits that took them to the other side of the world. Moreover, even after the alliance ended these ties continued into the inter-war period and were still used as a way of indicating that close ties of friendship still existed. To look at why this royal relationship with Japan became so important to Britain is therefore a useful way of comprehending the nature of the larger Anglo-Japanese relationship.¹

In order to understand why royal diplomacy came to play such an important role, one needs to begin in the late nineteenth century. During this period Japan was engaged in a major effort to modernize itself. As well as engaging in industrialization and the construction of a modern state apparatus, this also meant turning away from the ceremonial practices of the Sinocentric world. Accordingly, the Japanese monarchy sought to co-opt some of the customs and rituals of the courts in Europe. Thus, the Emperor began to wear Western-style military dress, which emphasized his link with the newly formed conscription army, while the nobility was organized into a British-based order of precedence.² These efforts to make Japan the equal of the Europeans were, however, compromised by the patronizing treatment that the Japanese court received at the hands of the West. A particular sinner in this respect was Britain. For example, in 1887 when Queen Victoria marked the fiftieth

anniversary of her accession to the throne, the Japanese representative at the celebrations, Prince Komatsu, felt insulted by the inadequate welcome he received at British hands.³

The result of these perceived slights was that Japan developed a great sensitivity where royal relations were concerned. For example, in 1897 the Japanese only agreed to send a representative to the Queen's diamond jubilee once Britain had guaranteed that he would be given the same treatment as European royalty.⁴ Thus, even before the alliance was signed in January 1902, it was clear that one criterion by which Japan would judge foreign countries would be how the latter treated the Emperor and his family. The obvious corollary to this was that if a Western country sought to develop a close relationship with Japan, it had to be aware that extraordinary scrutiny would be applied to the formal aspects of diplomacy to ensure that relations were being carried out on the basis of equality. At the same time, however, this also implied that Japan might be susceptible to flattery and that stressing royal ties might be a way of cementing the political relationship.

Certainly it seems that even when the alliance was being negotiated, Britain was aware of the importance of using the Court as a symbol of its good intentions. Moreover, this task was made considerably easier by the fact that King Edward VII was broadly favourable to the alignment with Japan.⁵ Thus, when the leading Japanese politician, Hirobumi Ito, came to Britain in December 1901, he was invited for an audience with the King and was presented with the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB).⁶ In the following year at the time of the King's coronation, the Japanese representatives were treated with considerable attention in order to ensure that their *amour propre* was not disturbed in any way. For example, the royal suite was housed in Claridges at the Foreign Office's expense, even though this was considerably more expensive than other hotels.⁷

The early years of the alliance were, however, still marked on the British side by continued ambivalence about what attitude to take towards non-European monarchs. For example, in 1902-3 those closely involved in diplomacy with

Japan called for the Order of the Garter to be presented to the Meiji Emperor.⁸ This request could not have come at a worse moment for the whole issue of whether this most esteemed decoration could be presented to non-Christian monarchs was in the balance in the summer and autumn of 1902 due to what became known as 'the Shah and Garter' episode. The question of whether the Shah of Persia should be made a Knight of the Garter was finally settled in favour of his sponsor, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, but the price Edward VII that demanded for his acquiescence was that no further requests were to be entertained.⁹ Thus the Meiji Emperor was denied.

This situation only changed when Japan, through its defeat of Russia in the war of 1904-5, unequivocally demonstrated that it was no mere Oriental potentate. In January 1905, as Japanese victory over Russia appeared ever more likely, the issue of whether the Garter should be presented to the Meiji Emperor was raised again.¹⁰ At this point ministers approved the idea in principle but it was only at war's end in September 1905, and with the alliance just renewed, that the idea was put to the King. This time Edward VII proved more amenable and agreed that a Garter mission led by Prince Arthur of Connaught should travel to Japan in the following year.¹¹

With Prince Arthur's mission the royal relationship between the two countries entered a new stage, for this began a tradition of high-ranking official visits that would continue into the inter-war period. The result was that, although the two royal houses did not share any dynastic links or even the same religion, a special bond began to develop, which was not seen in the British court's ties with any other non-European dynasty. That is not to say, however, that the relationship evolved smoothly eschewing all difficulties, for there was a wide geographical and cultural divide that had to be bridged. Geography was important because the most significant type of state visit, one by the reigning monarch, could not be contemplated. Thus all missions had to be carried out by princes representing the sovereign. This created problems because the royal houses of Europe had developed very particular codes of conduct and precedence in their dealings with each other. How a royal prince was to be treated when on an official visit to another country was seen as entirely

dependent on his status within his own court. However, these gradations of ceremony and ritual were sometimes lost on the Japanese, leading to embarrassing incidents.

This trait first manifested itself in Prince Arthur's visit to Japan in 1906, when the Japanese decided to assign its most senior military figures to his suite as a sign of respect for their ally. However, as Prince Arthur was only the King's nephew this was clearly inappropriate for someone of his standing. Yet no complaint or correction was made, for fear that this might appear ungrateful. The consequences became clear the next year when the Emperor's representative, Prince Fushimi, came on an official visit to London to express the Emperor's gratitude at receiving the Garter. Fearing that offence would be given if the previous year's practice were not reciprocated, those responsible for relations with Japan decided to provide Fushimi with a reception that strictly speaking was too grand for someone of his rank. For example, Field Marshal Lord Roberts and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour were attached to his suite, and he was awarded the distinction of an official welcome to the City of London. This break with European precedence created unease at court, for the King was a stickler for protocol and let it be known that 'a regular day in the city with troops lining the streets etc., is too much for Prince Fushimi'.¹² Thus, officials were forced into the unenviable task of charting a course between a suspicious Japan and a disgruntled King.

Moreover, Japan's continuing sensitivity about how it was perceived by the West also led to other difficulties. A notable example during Fushimi's visit was that, to their horror, officials at the Japanese embassy in London learnt shortly before the prince's arrival that a new D'Oyly Carte production of *The Mikado*, was about to open. Briefed on the offence that this would give, the British Lord Chamberlain's Office promptly moved into action to suppress the production. Further panic ensued when it was realised that the conductors of military bands might well think that tunes from *The Mikado* might provide an appropriate welcome to the Japanese prince. A hint to the contrary was therefore urgently conveyed to the Services.¹³

Despite these problems, the rise of political and commercial disputes between Britain and Japan in the late 1900s and into the 1910s meant that if anything the relationship between the two courts became even more important, because they acted as a useful means of ameliorating tension. This was aided by circumstance, for this difficult period coincided with the deaths of the two monarchs. The relatively short space of time that elapsed between the death of Edward VII in 1910 and that of Meiji in 1912 created in the form of funerals and coronations a number of ceremonial occasions in which Britain and Japan could demonstrate their mutual respect.¹⁴ The frequency and grandeur of these events meant that the royal relationship now came to be seen as the personification of the close ties that existed between the two countries.

The start of the Great War at first reduced contact between the courts to telegraphic communications of goodwill, but because the conflict also led to political tensions arising, it was still necessary to play the royal card. The ultimate use of the court as a method for signalling continued friendship in the midst of trouble thus came in 1918 when the British decided to honour the Taisho Emperor by making him a Field Marshal, the first non-European to be honoured in such a manner. This plan originated with Major F.S.G. Piggott, who had previously received language training in Japan. Piggott was concerned that there had been little acknowledgement of Japan's help in the Great War and feared the effect that this might have on the alliance. He therefore argued that a gesture was urgently needed to make the Japanese feel appreciated.¹⁵ Indeed, this suggestion came at a crucial point during the conflict, for by the end of 1917 Britain, despite its disappointment at the lack of Japanese assistance to the point, hoped that Japan might send forces to help bring stability to post-revolution Siberia. At first, there was some talk of sending a political mission at the same time as the military mission that would carry out the field marshal's baton for Taisho. However, after a long debate, it was decided to rely on a military mission alone, led once again by Prince Arthur. Very deliberately, all the officers chosen for the mission, including the prince himself, had served on the Western Front and during the visit, in order to emphasise this point, they wore khaki rather than ceremonial dress. The

effect was profound. Immediately after the visit, the British ambassador in Tokyo, reported to the Foreign Office that:

... it seems to me that the Prince's visit has been the very best kind of propaganda, because it made people think well of Britain, and yet made them do so unconsciously ... it has ... given British and Japanese alike an opportunity of drawing closer together, and of thus re-forging links which the wear and tear of warfare had perhaps tended to impair.¹⁶

The visit thus underlined the power of royal symbolism as a tool in this relationship.

The Japanese again reciprocated, this time with a visit to London by Prince Higashifumi in October 1918. This, however, was low-key compared to Japan's next gesture, for in 1921 the Japanese court sent the young Crown Prince, Hirohito, on a European tour with Britain as his main port of call. The decision to send Hirohito to Britain was in part for educational reasons and also perhaps reflected tensions at court about his choice of bride.¹⁷ However, it is also difficult not to believe that his tour was intended to have a political purpose, for his arrival coincided with a prolonged debate in London about whether or not Britain should renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Certainly officials in Whitehall interpreted the visit as being political in nature, and as the future of the alliance was very much in doubt, they responded by doing their best to de-politicise the visit. For example, great care was taken to ensure that the British speeches of welcome from that by the King down to addresses by municipal mayors lauded the alliance's past but did not predict the future.¹⁸

In the end a decision to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance was made at the Washington conference of 1921-22. This did not, however, lead to any substantial diminishing of the role played by relations between the two royal houses. The end of the alliance was not, after all, supposed to indicate a parting of ways brought about by profound differences over policy, but rather was presented as merely an acknowledgement that defence pacts were anachronistic in the age of 'new diplomacy'. Britain and Japan, it was emphasized, were still friendly powers, and to prove that this was indeed the

case, the royal relationship had to continue to prosper. The post-alliance era thus began with as clear a signal as could be made – a reciprocal visit by the Prince of Wales to Japan in 1922.

The visit was an interesting affair because the Prince of Wales brought with him a very new image of what royalty could be. The young energetic prince had already shown a gift for informality, and he demonstrated it on this tour by, in one well-publicized incident, riding a bicycle in front of an adoring crowd.¹⁹ This kind of behaviour was accepted, within limits, by British court officials for it helped to humanize the royal family. This, after all, was an important task in an age of democracy and mass media, particularly when one recalls that most of the major royal houses in Europe had been extinguished at the end of the Great War. Some of the Japanese court could also see potential in such an image and as a result Hirohito, who was only seven years younger than the Prince of Wales, was encouraged to join in a game of golf with the British visitors. Moreover, to add an extra popular touch the media, whether spontaneously or as the result of a briefing is unclear, talked of the supposed friendship that had developed between the two heirs to the throne. The result was that the royal visit proved to be marked success. Moreover, it even raised the prospect, as one British newspaper put it, of Britain acquiring a new responsibility, namely teaching the Japanese house how to act as a constitutional monarchy, which was surely a fitting role in this democratic post-alliance era.²⁰

The reality of the tour, however, was somewhat different. In truth the Prince of Wales thought that Hirohito, whose golfing skills were negligible, was ‘dippy’ and told the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Charles Eliot, that the Japanese royal family were ‘a queer set of creatures’, whose only role seemed to be to act as national mascots.²¹ The prince’s sharp tongue appears to have been precipitated by his resentment of the stuffy formality of the Japanese court, which he had found impossibly over-prescriptive. One of the prince’s suite, Lord Louis Mountbatten, observed on leaving Japan that he felt that had regained his ‘freedom of speech’; the Prince of Wales was blunter, for

according to one source, his last words on departure were 'Thank God that's the last of the bloody Japanese!'²²

Problems arose out of this discrepancy between the media image and the actual sentiments of the prince, for once the myth of friendship had been invented it had to be perpetuated. The difficulty here was that with the alliance now a thing of the past, both the prince and his father, King George, proved to be less willing than before to put themselves out for the sake of Anglo-Japanese relations. For example, in 1924 Hirohito's long-delayed wedding finally took place. In accordance with the previous stress on the importance of the royal relationship, Eliot recommended that a royal prince should attend, but George V promptly vetoed the idea, and then, to Eliot's consternation, even proved sticky on the question of whether he and the Prince of Wales should send presents.²³ Moreover, neither side showed any enthusiasm for the idea that the British court should teach the ways of constitutional monarchy to their Japanese counterparts.

The lull in the royal relationship was, however, short-lived, for from 1925-30 it revived in a new burst of activity. As with prior periods of frequent contact the reasons for this were essentially political. In 1925 the international order in East Asia that had been created at the Washington conference was challenged by the rise of Chinese nationalism. Britain and Japan, who both suffered at the hands of the Chinese nationalists, showed great uncertainty during these years about the attitude of the other. Both hoped that the other could be persuaded to co-operate in resisting the Chinese, but felt no confidence that this aspiration would come to fruition. In such an atmosphere making overt calls for assistance was unrealistic, for there was fear of rejection, and as a result both sought to use the royal relationship as a means of indicating their continuing favour. This manifested itself most obviously in the decision by the British government in 1929 to send a Garter Mission to Japan, where it made a considerable impact on public opinion. In return, Emperor Hirohito in the following year despatched one of his younger brothers, Prince Takamatsu, to Britain to convey his gratitude to King George. Accompanying these visits, decorations and presents were liberally distributed

among court officials in order to oil the waters and, of course, due attention was paid by the British to royal protocol to ensure that nothing was done that might cause offence.²⁴

In the end, however, this effort to use the royal channel as a means of signalling the desire for closer ties produced no substantial results, apart from a general sense of goodwill. This is not surprising, for the political and economic interests that the two countries had in China were by this time beginning to diverge, and no mere act of *politesse* could change that fact. However, it is an interesting comment on the role of royal relations that such an effort should even have been made, for it implies that officials were still apt to believe that the court relationship could continue to play a political role. This perhaps was a reflection of the fact that by the middle of the 1920s some commentators, including on a number of occasions the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, began to talk about the alliance being dead but its spirit living on.²⁵ If that was taken on trust, then it surely followed that this spirit dwelt above all in the royal relationship, which had never been sullied by the expediency that had affected political ties and, moreover, that any resurrection of the alliance would have to begin in the royal sphere.

Following the flurry of activity in the late 1920s, political events in the 1930s, such as the Manchurian crisis of 1931-33, pushed the relationship into the doldrums. However, it is noteworthy that, when in 1936-37 there was again some hope of rapprochement, the pattern that had appeared in the late 1920s repeated itself. Beginning with the memorial service for George V in February 1936 and running on until the coronation of King George VI in May 1937, the Japanese began to signal through royal diplomacy that they were prepared to enter into closer relations if Britain was willing to reciprocate. Recognising the signals emanating from Tokyo, the British responded in kind and tried to provide as warm a reception as possible to the Emperor's brother, Prince Chichibu, when he arrived to represent Japan at the coronation. Again, these efforts failed to bring about any substantial results, for the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 created a momentum that pushed Britain and Japan towards a sundering of relations rather than their repair.²⁶

The royal relationship was not, of course, strong enough to prevent Britain and Japan from going to war, but that does not mean that it should be treated as playing an insignificant and peripheral role in the ties between the two countries. From the signing of the alliance in 1902 until Chichibu's attendance at the coronation in 1937, royal diplomacy was used by both states as a means of communicating goodwill. Politicians, court officials and diplomats all recognized its importance and allocated much time to ensuring that the royal channel was working smoothly. In a relationship full of crises, it is easy to overlook what might seem to be mere arcane protocol, but the world of court relations has much to tell us about the nature of Anglo-Japanese relations in their most dramatic years.

¹ This study draws on material previously published in two of the author's recent articles: see Antony Best, 'Race, Monarchy and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922', *Social Science Japan Journal*, 2006, vol.9/2, and idem, "'Our Respective Empires Should Stand Together": The Royal Dimension in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 2005, vol.16/2, pp.259-79.

² See T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

³ M. Yoshimura, 'Nichi-Ei kyūtei kōryū shi no ichimen: sono seijiteki seikaku to hiseijiteki seikaku'[One Face of Anglo-Japanese Imperial Court Relations: Their Political and Non-Political Character] in Y. Kibata, I. Nish, C. Hosoya and T. Tanaka (eds), *Nichi-Ei kōryū shi, vol.1, Seiji-Gaikō* [The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Politics and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2000) pp.309-14

⁴ The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), FO83/1567 Salisbury to Satow (Tokyo) 2 April 1897 (tel.).

⁵ Lansdowne papers, British Library (BL), Lans (5) vol.4, Knollys to Lansdowne 6 November 1901.

⁶ N. Kimizuka, 'Ito Hirobumi no Roshia homon to Nichi-Ei domei: Igrisu seifu shunōbu no taiō o chushin ni' [Ito Hirobumi's Visit to Russia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Concentrating on the Response of the British Government] *Kanagawa-ken ritsu gaigo tanki daigaku kiyo*, no.23 (2000) pp.39-41.

⁷ TNA FO83/1982 Syngé (Treaty Dept) minute 23 January 1902.

⁸ Lansdowne papers, TNA, FO800/134 MacDonald (Tokyo) to Barrington (FO) 9 April 1902.

⁹ For the 'Shah and Garter' episode, see S. Heffer, *Power and Place: The Political Consequences of King Edward VII* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1998) pp.141-53.

¹⁰ Balfour papers, BL, Add.49747, Percy to Balfour 13 January 1905.

¹¹ Balfour papers, BL, Add.49729, Lansdowne to Balfour, 8 October 1905.

¹² TNA FO37261 12308/962/323 Ponsonby to Davidson 10 April 1907

¹³ TNA HO45/10533/150939/1 Lampson (FO) to Boyd (HO) 4 April 1907

¹⁴ I.H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923* (London: Athlone, 1972) p.84, and Yoshimura, op.cit. pp.318-19

¹⁵ Balfour papers, TNA, FO800/210 Piggott memorandum 11 November 1917.

¹⁶ Balfour papers, TNA, FO800/203 Greene (Tokyo) to Balfour 3 July 1918.
See also Yoshimura, op.cit. pp.321-3.

¹⁷ See M. Hatano, 'Taishō junen kōtaishi hoō – sono kettei e no porosesu to seika [The Crown Prince's visit to Europe in Taisho 10 – the process and result of the decision], *Hogaku Kenkyū*, 1993, no.66, pp.30-59, and Nish, op.cit., pp.321-4.

¹⁸ Best, "Our Respective Empires" p.262.

¹⁹ Yoshimura, op.cit. pp.324-9.

²⁰ *Daily Chronicle*, 18 April 1922.

²¹ R. Colvin, *The Memoirs of Sir Ragnar Colvin KBE CB 1882-1954* (Durley: Wintershill Publications, 1992) p.86 and Curzon papers, India Office Library and Records (IOLR), BL, Mss.Eur.F112/224a Eliot (Tokyo) to Curzon 23 May 1922

²² Mountbatten diary 9 May 1922, in P. Ziegler (ed.), *The Diaries of Lord Louis Mountbatten 1920-22: Tours with the Prince of Wales* (London: Collins, 1987) p.299, and Colvin, op.cit. p.86.

²³ Best, "Our Respective Empires", p.263.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.268-9.

²⁵ TNA FO371/13250 F6235/6235/23 Saburi (Japanese embassy) to Cushenden 13 November 1928

²⁶ Best, "Our Respective Empires", pp.272-4.