

**Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to
the 'Common Rule'**

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Abstract

Can unions substitute a procedural justice role for their traditional reliance on establishing a 'common rule'? The decline of 'bureaucratic' models of employee management and the rise of performance pay and performance management conflicts with the common rule as management seek to tie rewards more closely to individual and organisational performance. CEP studies of performance pay in the British public services illustrate the potential for a procedural justice role to ensure that such pay systems are operated fairly, otherwise they risk demotivating staff. Evidence is presented to show that employees regard unions as effective vehicles for procedural justice. In this way, management can achieve better operation of their incentive schemes, and employees may experience less unfairness and poisoned work relations.

Keywords: performance-related pay, public services, procedural justice, management
JEL Classifications: J33; M12

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1. New Work Systems and ‘Procedural Justice’

New management thinking on work organisation and pay brings it into direct conflict with long-established methods trade unions have used to defend their members’ interests and their ideas of fairness. No doubt, this has contributed to the declining management interest in ‘joint regulation’ with unions in recent decades, and not just in Britain and the US. As employers have striven to make their organisations more responsive to more competitive and faster changing markets, they have sought to devolve decision-making in their organisations, and to rely more upon employees thinking for themselves and using their initiative. To break away from bureaucratic patterns of organisation, they have needed to adopt more performance-oriented reward systems so that they can reward initiative and flexible working, and reinforce the message about the need for ‘performance’ (Cappelli et al, 1997, Ch. 1).

Historically, the ‘common rule’ has been a key principle of trade union regulation of workers’ pay and conditions, and has given substance to notions of fairness (Webb S & Webb B, 1898). One of its most important manifestations has been the ‘standard rate’, the idea that unions should seek to establish a minimum rate of pay for particular types of work: a minimum rate per unit of time, or per piece or job realised. Today, in continental Europe and still in large parts of the British public services, there are sectoral agreements establishing such standard rates of pay, usually linking these to complex systems of job classification.

In the workplace too, the idea of a common rule fitted with traditional payment-by-results (PBR) systems that applied common rates of pay to particular jobs, or applied common rules for the number of pieces produced. William Brown’s famous study of piecework bargaining (1973) illustrates just how the logic of a common rule could apply even in at the workgroup level. Management acts, of commission or omission, establish precedents, and the workplace representatives use these to lever up the pay of all, establishing a new common rule.

For many decades, such rules also fitted with management’s approach to work organisation and performance, often referred to as the ‘bureaucratic’ model of work organisation (Jacoby, 1985). For unions and their members, such rules are simple to enforce as it is relatively easy to detect backsliding by management. For management, having a standard set of rates of pay greatly eases day-to-day work assignments by removing the incentive to use each change as a pretext for renewed negotiation over pay. In a word, one might characterise the ‘common rule’ as focusing on the *job* or the *skill* as the bearer of

rewards, with adjustments being made for workloads and working conditions. Fairness meant giving the same rewards for comparable jobs. Employee performance was assumed to be determined by the job. This was always a fiction. Any line-manager or experienced trade unionist would tell you there are 'good' and 'bad' workers. But as bureaucratic work systems set rather narrow limits within which individual employees could vary their performance, it was a reasonable approximation.

Rewarding individual performance rather than the job makes the old-style 'common rule' inapplicable, and has boosted management's preference for non-union arrangements. I should like to argue that by maintaining the fairness with which modern incentive systems operate, their 'procedural justice', unions have a very important role to play. The early Christian missionaries understood that they had to win over the local chief as well as the people to establish their churches. In the same way, unions' success in representing their members depends upon gaining recognition from employers. In turn, this depends on convincing them that jointly managed reward systems work better than those they manage unilaterally.

2. The Advantages for Management

Across the UK public sector, performance management and performance pay have been introduced over the past 15 years, mostly being based on line management appraisals of individual employee performance. This follows a similar movement in the private sector (Richardson, 1999). There increasing numbers of employees are on some kind of performance related pay, with line-manager appraisal playing a key role. At the same time, traditional methods of payment-by-results have greatly declined.

The heart of the problem for management is to induce their employees to use their work discretion to the benefit of the organisation. This has also been at the core of theories of Personnel Economics and of Work Psychology. In both cases, the dominant theories teach that monetary incentives will only achieve this if employees believe their efforts will be rewarded, or at least, there is a good chance they will be.

The economic theory of incentives, broadly covered by the 'principal-agent' problem, alerts us to three kinds of problems with performance incentive schemes. First, it assumes that employers and employees are self-interested maximisers. This leads to the conclusion

that if employee rewards are the same whatever the level of their effort, then they will be better off if they slack than if they work hard, especially if they can avoid detection. Performance incentives are designed to make employees better off if they work harder, and to punish them if they slack.

By making pay at least partly contingent on performance, employee rewards become variable, which introduces a degree of uncertainty. This leads to the second observation: that employees themselves differ in their preferences about the stability of their income, and differ as to what they regard as a reasonable trade-off between pay levels and pay variability. Some may be very risk averse, whereas others enjoy a challenge. It is quite likely that most employees are rather risk averse, and there is some rather fragmentary evidence that public sector employees may be more so than those in the private sector as risk averse people seek more secure jobs (Mayntz, 1985). Performance-linked pay systems introduce a third element, that is how accurately and honestly management measures performance. Employees may fear that their managers will cheat when assessing employee performance in order to save money or engage in favouritism.

In a perfect market, such problems may not matter too much. Workers can choose between similar jobs offering different kinds of incentives: one can work as an accountant in local government or for a performance-oriented private firm. Similarly, if a firm gets a bad reputation for manipulating its performance schemes, it will find it harder to attract good employees, and so will have to pay more. Either way, fairness issues are dealt with at the moment of hiring: people won't accept job offers they consider unfair. However, most employees continue to be engaged in long-term jobs, and so a rather different set of issues arises (Auer and Cazes, 2000).

With incumbent employees, market sanctions are greatly diminished by the costs to either party of breaking the employment relationship. Employees have acquired organisation-specific skills and knowledge they cannot easily use elsewhere, and from which their employers also benefit. This creates scope for either party to exploit the other by trying to appropriate all the gains, and pushing the other almost to the point at which they would quit. Within these limits, then, one side can impose its preferences on the other, and each side knows this. This is sometimes called the 'hold-up' problem and it becomes an obstacle to free cooperation (Teulings and Hartog, 1998).

Management bad faith can take two forms, both of which are relevant for the understanding of performance pay systems. Management may simply not be competent to measure performance accurately, and as a result, make employees' pay more of a lottery than

they would like. Although management's intentions may not be devious, they choose to ignore employee feelings about the appropriate level of uncertainty in their pay. Cheap performance appraisal systems, in which management invests few resources, but which it uses to determine pay, can also be a form of cost-saving for management. More seriously, management may be seen as devious rather than incompetent. The latter is probably the more common of the two, but its consequences are often similar. Employees are likely to regard both kinds of behaviour as 'unfair' because they believe management is going back on what was agreed, and is trying to get away with it because it knows that quitting is an expensive option.

Employee perceptions of the risk of bad faith by management greatly complicate the operation of incentive schemes that seek to mobilise employee discretion. If employees don't believe the rewards for extra effort will be forthcoming, they are less likely to respond to the incentive scheme. If they suspect management is being devious, they may resort to the minimum prescribed performance standards for their jobs as a sanction against management. In practice, as job descriptions are seldom complete or up-to-date, this may mean sticking to conventionally accepted performance standards. Often it is precisely these that management is seeking to change. The general prediction then is that performance pay systems will not work unless employees regard them as fair in their design and operation, and corresponding to their own preferences for incentives and variability.

The psychological theory of expectancy (Lawler 1971) makes rather similar predictions (sketched in Figure 1). According to this view, employees will respond to performance incentives if they value the reward, if they believe their extra effort will generate additional performance, and that management will reward it. If they believe that management cannot measure performance accurately, or that it will renege on promised rewards, then again they will not respond to them. The expectancy framework highlights an additional source of potential unfairness, namely that employees may not be in a position to improve their performance because of inadequate skills, or poor goal setting and coordination by management.

The argument has been taken a step further by Cropanzano and Fulger (1974). They argue that 'procedural justice' is as important for motivating employees as 'distributive justice'. The former relates to procedures that operate fairly, and give employees a fair chance of gaining a particular reward, in this context, a performance increment. The latter relates to the structure of rewards provided. These authors show that employees are more likely to accept adverse performance ratings if they believe management's procedures are

fair, and hence they argue that ‘procedural justice’ is a key element in the motivational aspects of incentive pay systems.

The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) work on performance pay systems and their effects on employee motivation underline the relevance of these considerations (Marsden and Richardson 1994, Marsden and French, 1998). Table 1 summarises employee responses to the CEP surveys concerning employee confidence in management’s operation of performance pay systems.

All of these PRP schemes depended on performance appraisal by line-managers except for the group-PRP scheme in one of the trust hospitals, which separated performance appraisal from pay. There was a widespread belief that management could not be trusted. Line-managers were often thought to act through favouritism, and senior management was believed to operate a quota on good ratings however well people actually performed. The perceived motivation for the quota was exactly that predicted by the principal-agent model, to save on pay costs: three quarters of Inland Revenue respondents in the 1996 survey believed the purpose of PRP was to save money. Another sign of employee cynicism was the belief that those getting performance pay were cleverer at negotiating their performance agreements. In other words, it was felt that those who had learned how to work the system were the ones who got the rewards, and not necessarily those who put in the increased effort the schemes were designed to promote.

These expressions of employee distrust of management are not peculiar to Britain, and so not just a reflection of British ‘them and us’ social attitudes. Milkovitch and Wigdor (1991) report similar suspicions of favouritism and quotas in the US Federal Service performance management systems. And indeed, Koike (1994) provides evidence on how Japanese workers seek to control favouritism by line managers in their performance management systems.

Although our studies have only very limited performance data, it is possible to trace the impact of such beliefs on aspects of employee motivation. Using a more synthetic analysis, we ran logit regressions on the same CEP data sets to assess the likelihood that employees would be motivated or de-motivated by different aspects of PRP schemes (Marsden, French and Kubo, 2000). These highlight the debilitating effects of perceived management bad faith, and when it was felt that management could not evaluate performance properly. When employees did not believe management knew enough to evaluate their performance, they were more likely to find the PRP schemes de-motivating. Conversely, if they believed appraisals were conducted properly and fairly, they were more likely to find it

motivating. Summarising these and other research findings on the main public service performance pay schemes, the government's Makinson report (2000: p.3) concluded that current arrangements were 'ineffective and discredited' and contrasted 'approval of the principle and disenchantment with the practice of performance pay'.

Both theory and this evidence indicate that management has much to gain from measures that can build employee confidence in the design and operation of their performance management systems. The problem is that it is hard for them to demonstrate the credibility of their promises to employees who are already cynical about them. They are caught in the trap of 'they would say that wouldn't they'.

3. A Role for Unions?

In the course of the CEP's research on performance management, discussions with public service unions, and the survey results, show that unions have a potentially important part to play in improving the procedural justice of these new types of pay and performance management systems. This role can be of benefit both to their members and to management. Management can benefit for the reasons just outlined. Employees can benefit because they may gain some protection against unfair treatment by their managers, and perhaps more important, it is not pleasant to work in an environment in which colleagues are demoralised and relations with management soured.

Let us consider three key areas in which unions can intervene:

- the operation of PRP schemes and performance management;
- the choice of incentives that employee feel are appropriate for their work;
- conveying employees' views on measurement difficulties.

Our surveys provide some useful indicators on all of these counts.

3.1 Operation of performance management

A recurrent theme across the public services covered by our studies has been the need for some kind of control over the way management operates performance management systems. The fear of favouritism and the belief that management operated a quota on good assessments

are both areas in which independent review of management's actions would seem relevant. In the organisations in which we asked about appeals procedures (civil service departments/agencies, hospitals and classroom teachers) there was a clear concern among a substantial minority, and a majority in the case of teachers, that appeal procedures needed to be more effective.

In fact, in the civil service and the hospitals, management went to considerable lengths to communicate with staff and their representative organisations. Our survey results were discussed jointly. More importantly, a certain amount of information about the operation of performance management systems is shared. Management have usually given the unions information on the distribution of appraisal scores at a fairly aggregated level. Under the March 2000 'Partnership Agreement' between the Cabinet Office and the Civil Service unions, union involvement in the operation of pay reform was accorded an official place, although relations became more strained subsequently.

3.2 The design of performance management systems

A recurrent theme in our survey returns has been that while most public servants in the civil service and hospitals (but not schools) approve of the principle of linking pay to performance, they are much less happy about the way in which this is done. While some of this no doubt reflects concerns about the operation of performance management systems, some may also reflect deeper unease about the type of incentives offered. Three examples arise from our work: whether professional employees respond differently to performance incentives compared with those in bureaucratic occupations; how effective pay incentives are for organisationally committed employees; and divergent views about the purposes of the organisation and consequently about the relevance of different kinds of performance.

Professional versus bureaucratic occupations

Our logit regressions showed that public servants in professional occupations were less happy about performance pay than those in what might be called 'bureaucratic' ones (Marsden, French and Kubo, 2000). Teachers were far less happy than civil servants. Within the hospitals we have a broader mix of professional and bureaucratic occupations, and there we find a clear sign that professionals are less happy than their bureaucratic colleagues. Professionals were also more likely to respond that performance pay had no effect on their

performance because they already worked to a professional standard. Such standards are inculcated during the training process, and sustained by peer group activities and professional organisations. Employees in bureaucratic functions are more likely to be used to more direct management control of their work so that performance appraisal and performance pay appear as less of an intrusion into their professional activities.

Incentive pay and organisational commitment

If one follows the ‘principal-agent’ analysis of performance incentives, it is easy to overlook the importance of the initial behavioural assumptions: that employees will opt for low levels of effort unless they have financial incentives to put in more effort. This may not be an appropriate assumption for certain categories of workers, particularly those with a strong professional or public service orientation. The CEP PRP surveys all showed quite high levels of organisational commitment, using standard measures, compared with studies of other employees, and the regression analysis mentioned earlier also found that commitment played an important part as a stabiliser of employee motivation. Although the public servants found many aspects of their PRP schemes de-motivating, organisational commitment seemed to counteract these to some extent. If commitment is strong enough to do this, it may also counteract the key danger predicted by principal-agent analysis, namely that of moral hazard. Committed employees with a strong professional ethic may work to what they consider appropriate standards rather than seeking to minimise effort for a given reward, thus rendering short-term performance incentives inappropriate, and possibly counter-productive.

One other piece of evidence on this score comes from teachers’ explanations of why they work long hours during term time (and possibly also into school holidays). These hours are worked on top of a weekly ‘directed time’ of about 33 hours. Directed hours are those for which teachers’ work is directed by the school’s management. ‘Non-directed’ hours are discretionary and during which teachers would work to fulfil their professional duties. The dispersion of non-directed hours worked reveals the discretion teachers have, but at the same time, the number of such hours they work each week, and the reasons they give for this are largely at odds with the assumptions of the principal-agent model. This appears to be driven by their strong concern for their pupils, a high level of commitment to their schools, and strong professional values (Table 2).

The teachers’ unions have worked hard both to oppose the introduction of a form of performance pay for classroom teachers, and to ensure the final version implemented fits the

conditions and aspirations of teachers. There are some aspects of their scheme, introduced in 2000, which differ from the forms of PRP applied elsewhere in the public services, and which make it almost more akin to acquiring an additional qualification than to appraisal-based pay. It would be tempting to see this as a manifestation of the influence of the teachers' unions, but this has to be confirmed by more careful research.

Different views concerning organisational objectives and legitimate incentives

There may also be divergent views on the objectives of public services. In health services, the relative weights attached to aspects of performance that relate to patient care and budgetary management are very controversial. How long should a ward cleaner or a nurse chat to a sick patient? No doubt it improves the quality of a stay in hospital, and perhaps assists recovery, but it also consumes scarce resources. In the Employment Service, public employees saw their main purpose as helping job seekers find suitable work, but it was often hard to do this within the time limits for interviews set by management to control costs. Teachers, it seems, are prepared to contribute large amounts of their own time towards supporting their pupils because budgetary pressures leave them little alternative if they are to give the quality of education they think right.

Top management, which decides on whether to adopt certain types of incentive schemes, is often far removed from such information. Yet inappropriately designed incentives often lead to a great deal of needless conflict.

3.3 Practical difficulties of performance measurement and improvement

Whatever the philosophical and moral problems of determining performance objectives, there are also much more down-to-earth problems of measuring performance and determining whether people can actually improve their performance even if they want to.

There was widespread concern about management's ability to measure different aspects of performance, and to cover what might be called performance in the whole job. Our civil service respondents thought there was too much emphasis on quantity, which is more easily measured than quality, despite management information campaigns stressing the importance of quality. The former may have been their agenda, but it was not successfully communicated to their staff.

Performance assessment in team working raises particular measurement problems, especially when management focus on individual performance. In schools for example, both heads and classroom teachers strongly believed that it was hard to relate pupil performance to the work of individual teachers. Thus a scheme that purports to link pay to the performance of individual teachers' pupils is felt to be measuring the wrong thing.

From the civil service and hospital studies, we find that a substantial number of line managers who carry out appraisals believe PRP is problematic because staff have insufficient control over their jobs to increase their performance. Around 60% thought this in the civil service, and around 40% in the two hospitals. Our more recent study of classroom teachers sheds further light on this issue as we asked teachers whether they thought there were significant variations in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in their school, to which about 55% replied 'yes'. Even more interesting are the reasons teachers gave for these individual variations (Table 3). Of these, only differences in motivation or morale would seem to fit well with the principal-agent model, and this is probably an upper limit as some morale may be the result of school-wide factors, or of management. Many of the others probably cannot be addressed without management support: more time for training, better organisation of workloads by management, and so on.

It is often difficult for individual employees to communicate such information to their line managers. There is a fine line between failing to perform because one is incompetent, and failing because one lacks necessary resources. Line managers may also think their staff are bargaining for easier targets. If the problem is poor line management, it becomes even harder to transmit the information to higher management. For these, and other reasons, higher management may well be cut off from the information it needs to design and operate its incentive schemes effectively: hence the potential role for collective voice.

4. Do Public Employees Believe the Unions are the Bodies to Represent Them?

Whether or not unions are the best-placed bodies to take up these issues must depend on the confidence of their members. If they do not believe their unions can help redress unfair action by their managers, then there is little unions can do to boost procedural justice and its beneficial effects on the operation of performance management.

Our study of classroom teachers provides some evidence on this issue (Marsden, 2000). We asked which groups teachers identified as being on their side in connection with performance management (Table 4). ‘Other teachers’ came out unsurprisingly as the group most likely to share the same interests. However, the teachers’ unions and professional associations came out strongly, much more so than the DfEE or LEA and the school’s governors.

We also asked who might provide a legitimate voice for teachers’ views about the goal of performance standards: who should determine standards of excellence in teaching? The teaching profession emerged as the leading candidate (Table 5). As the unions play an important part in maintaining the overall coherence of the teaching profession, this suggests that they can have a clear role.

In view of the union involvement with management in the operation of all of the schemes studied, one might object that this demonstrates the counter argument. The first Inland Revenue performance pay scheme was introduced as part of the 1988 pay agreement in which it was enshrined. The Employment Service scheme had the unions negotiating the pot of money to be distributed as performance pay. The two hospitals involved the unions in the operation of their schemes, and the schemes for school heads and classroom teachers have gone through a lengthy process of public debate. These are hardly schemes that were just dropped on the staff from out of the blue, and on which employee organisations have had no voice.

Nevertheless, all of these schemes could have enlisted greater involvement from unions and professional organisations. In the 1988 Inland Revenue agreement the then Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) was more or less told if it did not accept PRP there would be no agreement. Similarly, the scheme examined in 1996 kept the unions at arm’s length. Given its emphasis on team working, the Employment Service would have been benefited from a group incentive scheme had not Treasury policy insisted on individual schemes. In the two NHS trust hospitals, the schemes were designed and introduced by management, and only then did the staff organisations become involved. The classroom teachers’ new pay system has involved rather more consultation, but still less than was legally required judging by the successful National Union of Teachers (NUT) action in July 2000 (The Guardian Newspaper, 15.7.02)¹.

¹ ‘Blunkett humiliated in pay row: Judge rules that formula to decide teachers’ wages in illegal’, The Guardian Newspaper, (15.7.02).

5. Tensions Within the 'Procedural Justice' Role for Unions

In the past, the 'common rule' was an effective basis for worker mobilisation in defence of common interests. Dealing with procedural justice issues implicates the unions more closely with management because of the nature of the issues to be handled. One cannot take an arm's length approach while at the same time giving an employee input into the design and running of performance management systems. There is then a risk of 'incorporation', that is to say, of becoming so involved in joint management of a scheme that one ends up by giving too much weight to managerial considerations, and too little to the concerns of ordinary employees.

This is a real risk, but it is not a new one. Although the 'common rule' has been a long-standing trade union method of regulation, it has never been possible to rely solely upon it. Piecework is never as simple in reality as it is in theory because 'pieces' are never quite the same, and more important, working conditions are variable. What seemed a fair rate of earnings when people could produce a target number of pieces a week becomes inadequate if conditions change and it is possible to produce only a fraction of these. Older piecework systems built up complex sets of rules for managing this. Adjustments would be made if the quality of components, or the working environment, deteriorated. Someone had to decide whether the change was sufficiently great for the special adjustment to be applied. Management cannot do this alone for the very reasons discussed earlier. Workplace union representatives became heavily involved in such issues, and had to manage the tensions involved in this role.

The ability of workplace representatives to manage this role depends heavily on the amount of back-up provided to them by their unions and professional organisations. With rising levels of general and higher education, management may have less of an educational advantage over union representatives than in the past, but they still have greater organisational resources at their command. Whether management should subsidise this function, given the benefits it derives from effective procedural justice, is a moot point. On balance, it would probably leave the unions too much in management's debt, and vulnerable to threats to reduce the expenditure. Management might also feel it wanted to have a say in the content of training of local representatives, and that might undermine their independence in the eyes of the membership.

This argument may seem like asking unions to help management. However, promoting procedural justice is also protecting their members against unfair treatment by their managers, and perhaps more important, it is not pleasant to work in an environment in which colleagues are demoralised and relations with management soured.

Tables

Table 1. Do public servants trust their management over PRP?

Question: % replying 'agree'	Civil Service			NHS trust hospitals		Schools (head teachers)	
	Inland Revenue 1991	Inland Revenue 1996	Employment Service	Individual PRP trust	Group PRP trust	Primary	Secondary
Relations with management							
My last appraisal was NOT a fair reflection of my performance*	27	28	31	33	19	33	29
Management use PRP to reward their favourites	35	57	41	41	27	Na	na
There is a quota on good assessments	74	78	74	57	na	48	45
Line manager views:							
PRP has reduced staff willingness to cooperate with management	20	45	39	30	27	Na	na

* reverse scored.

Note: Civil service: middle-ranking and junior administrative staff; hospitals: all staff except doctors who were outside the scheme; Schools: head teachers – classroom teachers had no performance pay scheme at the time.

Source: Marsden and French (1998), and Marsden and Richardson (1994).

Table 2. 'Non-directed' hours worked by teachers and their reasons

Type of out of hours activity	Mean weekly hours devoted to each activity	STRB mean *	First reason	Second reason
Lesson preparation and marking	14.3	15.0	Quality of education	To get the work done
Seeing parents and pupils outside class time	2.3	5.8	Quality of education	Activities occur after hours & don't let down pupils & colleagues
Involvement in school clubs, sports, orchestras, etc.	1.9	na	Activities after hours	Enjoy the work
School/staff management: meetings	3.3	3.1	Management pressure	To benefit school
General administrative tasks	4.2	2.0	To get the work done	Quality of education
Individual & professional development activities	2.0	3.1	Quality of education	Activities occur after hours

* As a rough check on our results, the distribution of hours between these activities is compared with that found by the STRB survey of teachers' working time in the spring of 1996. The figures relate to secondary schools, but they are very similar to those for primary schools. STRB (1996, Table B 2.5).

Source: Marsden (2000).

Table 3. Reasons teachers gave for differences in teaching effectiveness

If you believe there is such variation in teaching effectiveness, could you please say what you think is the most important cause:	<i>(Please circle one only)</i> (%)
a) different levels of teaching skills	25.4
b) differences in motivation or morale	33.4
c) differences in age	1.6
d) ability to motivate their pupils	19.7
e) some teachers have a very difficult workload	11.3
f) several of the above	3.1
g) other, please specify:	5.4
Total	100.0

Source: Marsden (2000).

Table 4. Which groups do you identify as sharing the same interests as you in connection with Performance Management?

When considering the implementation of PM, which groups do you feel share broadly the same interests as yourself? <i>(Please circle)</i>	<i>Broadly the same</i> %	<i>Mostly different</i> %	<i>It's hard to say</i> %
a) Your school's governors	23.3	14.3	62.4
b) The leadership group/management team in your school	53.7	17.0	29.4
c) Other teachers in your school	79.8	5.2	15.0
d) Other teachers in your union or professional association	63.5	4.8	31.6
e) Your union or professional association	60.4	7.5	32.0
f) The DfEE or your LEA	10.7	35.4	53.9

Note: DfEE: Dept for Education and Employment; LEA: Local Education Authority.

Source: Marsden (2000).


Table 5. Who should determine standards of teaching excellence?

Who do you think should have most say in determining standards of excellence in teaching? <i>(Please select the top two)</i>	<i>Please circle</i> %
a) The government and its agencies (eg, DfEE, Ofsted, QCA)	10.5
b) Practising teachers as a whole (the teaching profession)	36.5
c) Practising teachers in one's own discipline	23.4
d) The management team in individual schools	21.8
e) The school's governors	1.5
f) Parents	1.7
g) Local and national employers	1.6
h) Other (please specify)	1.9
i) Several of the above	1.1
All items	100.0

Source: Marsden (2000).

Figures

Figure 1. Outline of the 'expectancy' framework.



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