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Working on the Troubles in Northern Ireland: The Role of International Funding Bodies in the Peace Process

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CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE

**Working on the Troubles in Northern Ireland:
The Role of International Funding Bodies in the Peace Process**

SUBMITTED TO

PROFESSOR SALTZMAN

AND

DEAN NICHOLAS WARNER

BY

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For

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Abstract

This senior thesis is a study of international funding bodies in the case of Northern Ireland peace process. I examine the role of the European Union PEACE Fund and International Fund for Ireland. Particularly, I focus on creating, structuring, and maintaining these funds and their impact the local community. In conclusion, I find there are several recommendations for the formation and sustaining of international economic and political support from the Northern Irish case that can be applied in future cases. This includes utilizing multiple strategies that adjust to the needs of the community and creating networks for support and collaboration.

Acknowledgments

I would like to start with the people who inspired this work. To everyone I met in Northern Ireland, thank you for taking me in. I am indebted to Cooperation Ireland for giving me a chance and to Emer and Anthony who guided me throughout my time there.

Next I have to dedicate this paper to my support team. To my parents who never fail to help me, whenever I need them. Thank you for supporting me in my dreams; I could not have done any of this without you. To my sister, thank you for reading my final draft and constantly pushing me to be my best. To my papa, who taught me that I could do anything I set my mind to. I also have the most incredible friends who I am very grateful for; they have challenged me to think critically and to enjoy all the chaos. To Jen, thank you for always calming me down and caring about my sanity. Lauren, together we survived and would not have wanted anyone else to share the stress with.

Finally, I would like to thank to those who have guided me these past four years. I would like to express my appreciation to the Mgrublian Center for Human Rights and both directors, Professor Haley and Professor Lower, for their support in my academic and professional interests. Thank you for giving me a safe haven to write this paper. I am also sincerely grateful to the Uroboros Fellowship program and the Claremont McKenna sponsored summer internship program that financed my internship in Belfast. Most of all, I am lucky to have worked with Professor Saltzman and would like to thank him for his patience, encouragement, and guidance this year.

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Introduction

Two years ago I moved to Belfast, Northern Ireland for the summer. What originally started out as a minor interest in post-conflict studies turned into an unexpected passion for the peace and reconciliation process. This transition was due in large part to the people I met, including my Northern Irish housemates, colleagues, and friends. Working with a nonprofit in the heart of Belfast, I was able to directly interact with the community and see for myself the work being done to create a lasting peace. I attended workshops, visited local community centers and participated in their programming, but most importantly, I met real people affected by the conflict. Each person had a different story. My housemates, who came from different parts of the region and from different communities, were educated and showed me what their generation could achieve when they put the past behind them. The community leaders, who at one point might have been paramilitary members, policemen, or wrongfully conflicted innocents, showed the compassion and determination of the previous generation to forge a new path for their communities. Schoolchildren and their parents, participating in cross-community activities, proved the breakdown of sectarianism that has occurred in Northern Ireland and the hope for a future in which all children can play together. I also saw the remaining struggles in Northern Ireland. I met teenagers who were gathering firewood and preparing for their 12th night bonfire.¹ I attended these bonfires and was able to see the

¹ The 12th night is known for causing sectarian conflict and the bonfires are often adorned with racist and anti-Irish emblems.

progress and the lingering issues within the loyalist communities. Military families, who still receive death threats, were finally gathering to discuss their feelings and needs from a community that has often ostracized them. These were the people I met; these were the stories that changed my academic interests.

Drawn to the issues that still remained in this post-conflict society, I started to ask questions. Why were there still sectarian sentiments among communities? What is being done to fix this? I came to realize through my experience in Northern Ireland that there are fundamental human rights that are stripped from people during conflict, such as the lack of justice and the fear of safety in your local community. It also became apparent that it is through the post-conflict transition to peace that it becomes possible to tackling these issues and establishing rights for all. Talking with the people I met, I realized that of course these issues still remain. Only fifteen years after the peace agreement, there are still plenty of people whose lives were affected by the violence of the Troubles. I took note of the continued human rights issues in the region, but what I noticed most was the people who cared about and worked on these issue were peace practitioners. Most of the peace and reconciliation work in Northern Ireland is addressed through the nonprofit or nongovernmental sector that has boomed in the region. These organizations are constantly creating and implementing programing that tries to tackle the big issues of sectarian sentiment, marginalized communities, and dealing with the past. This led me to a whole other set of questions. Who is funding these programs? Are they making a difference? How long will they last? This last one, of course, is the question that led me to my thesis. Talking with my colleagues, I understood that the European Union Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of

Ireland (EU PEACE programme) provided the resources for a great number of the programs I was working on. I was also told about the International Fund for Ireland that also financed programs in the region. This was the first time I realized the role of the international community, removed from the violence and history of the region, in the peace process. International funding bodies have created 29 years of programing and dedicated their efforts to maintaining peace in the region. While I was in Belfast, President Obama came to visit for the G8 summit. His visit convinced me of the importance of international involvement in the peace process. He spoke about the need for integrated schools. After his visit, a poll in the Belfast Telegraph showed that support for shared education had soared.² As for the effectiveness of the programs, I had seen that these efforts were trying to bridge the divide between communities who harbor so much misunderstanding and hate. Though not always successful, and occasionally flawed, I also realized that they were the only efforts taken to directly address the issues of the social-cultural-religious aspects of the post-conflict reconciliation. I came to realize the importance of their continued existence.

I arrived in Northern Ireland at just the right time to grasp how critical international funding was to these organizations. In the summer of 2013, many of these programs were going into their last year of funding as PEACE III finished and PEACE IV was being debated among European leaders. These programs depended on foreign money to support the ongoing work, but the end of one funding cycle meant uncertainty

² Adrian Rutherford and Lindsay Fergus, "Public Mood in Northern Ireland Is for an End to Segregation in Schools," *BelfastTelegraph.co.uk*, June 26, 2013, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/public-mood-in-northern-ireland-is-for-an-end-to-segregation-in-schools-29372424.html>.

of another round or how much would be pledged. It was this debate that was taking place during my few months in Belfast. I saw that the peace process was long from over and that without funding many of these programs would cease to help local communities. I also knew that very few people in the U.S. understood what was going on in Northern Ireland. My classmates studying International Relations had little understanding of the conflict, let alone the peace process. With many of them focused on the Middle East, I found myself having to explain how Northern Ireland can provide insights for conflicts in the region. Not only could Northern Ireland give guidance for the creation of peace agreements, but the experience of post-conflict rebuilding in the region can also be an example and warning to future situations. The peace process has been seen as a success story because it has prevented violence and worked towards resolving issues peacefully, making it a useful case study.

When international actors want to support the peace process, they often turn to economic aid and establishing organizations to administer the funds. How are these funds established? What institutional structures does this funding create? What effect does international participation in the peace process have? Why does foreign aid matter? What are the problems with these organizations? But most importantly, what is the important takeaway from the Northern Ireland example for future areas of peace and reconciliation work? These are the questions I seek to answer in my paper.

Human Rights and the Connection to Peace

This chapter serves to introduce the different fields that are a part of this paper. Particularly, how human rights and peace studies are the two central issues regarding the post-conflict Northern Ireland. As these fields are relatively young, I begin by discussing the history of these concepts and how they are related. Then I review relevant literature and scholarship dealing with peace studies overall, focusing particularly on materials about Northern Ireland. I finish by placing this paper within the context of Northern Irish peace studies and outlining the rest of the paper.

World War II and the Creation of a Movement

While the origins of human rights can be found in religious traditions since antiquity and in the 17th and 18th centuries, it was not until World War II that human rights emerged as a concept worthy of international academic and political discussion.¹ Similarly, the concept of peace is rooted in the religious practices and teachings of pacifism and nonviolence, but the destruction of WWII placed a high priority on the need

¹ Scholars such as Plato, Aristotle and Cicero and religious theory from Christianity, Judaism, Muslim, Buddhism and Confucianism all mention concepts related to human rights. It was within the Enlightenment that scholars such as Locke, Voltaire, and Milton focused primarily the rights of people in society. For more on the religious and political origins and growth of human rights see: Micheline Ishay, ed., *The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches, and Documents from Ancient Times to the Present*, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2007). The first examples of human rights in the political sphere can be shown in the 1789 American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. For a detailed history of human rights see: Lynn Avery Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History*, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007).

for further study of the prevention of conflict and in sustaining peace. During the war, American policy makers began using human rights as justification for U.S. military intervention. Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) for example, outlined in his Four Freedoms speech essential human freedoms everywhere in the world: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.² The events of WWII would forever change international relations in both intervention in conflict and in the need for maintaining stability and protecting rights. In an effort to prevent further wars, the international community renewed interest in international organization that could hold states accountable and attempt to protect the rights of all people. Thus the United Nations was created to “maintain international peace and security...[through] removal of threats to the peace” and “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights...in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”³ Parallel efforts were made within Europe to prevent future conflict among nations in Europe starting with the European Coal and Steel community, and leading to the European Economic Community. These institutions aim to promote peace using economic incentive and political reasoning to prevent conflict. These organizations were committed to the prevention of war, but they also were concerned about the rights and freedoms of states and people. Shortly after the end of the war, the UN published the Universal Declaration

² FDR’s Four Freedoms State of the Union speech outlines these freedoms and the foundations for democracy that all center on human rights. These freedoms and rights were part of FDR’s justification for supporting the war effort and were sentiments reiterated in the pledge to the Allied powers’ statement of war aims from 1942 committing the US to fight for these rights. Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 10 (New York: Random house, 1938), 663.

³ The Charter of the United Nations outlines the goals of peace and human rights in the preamble and in several articles. See: United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (United Nations, 1978).

of Human Rights in 1948, officially outlining specific rights and freedoms.⁴ The events of WWII created an international interest in explicitly studying and outlining the need for peace and human rights. This interest would transcend the international organizations created from WWII and spark academic and professional attention to the fields of human rights and peace.⁵ The postwar era marked the beginning of a movement that would create two new fields of study, including human rights and peace and conflict resolution.

Emergence of Two Fields

As these new organizations were created, giving new precedent for human rights, there was a budding interest from professionals in the field of human rights. At first dominated by international law scholars and practitioners, such as Arnold McNair, Hersch Lauterpacht, and Egon Schwelb, the field of human rights expanded to include political and historical scholars and practitioners. Important books included *International Law and Human Rights* by Lauterpacht. In the 1960s and 70s human rights began to grow as an international concern and this translated to more scholarship and study.⁶ Eventually academic institutes were established to study human rights such as the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School founded in 1999.

⁴ Led by John Peters Humphrey and Rene Cassin, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlines general principles of human rights, individual rights, individual rights in relation to groups, spiritual, public, political, economic, social and cultural rights. See: "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," accessed March 17, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

⁵ For more information on the evolution of human rights since WWII and the growth of the field see: Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, eds., *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*, Reinterpreting History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁶ For more details on specific works and scholars see: *Ibid.*, 5.

During the same post-war period, there was a merging interest in peace and conflict prevention studies. While there was a single Peace Studies Institute and Conflict Resolution Program at Manchester University in Indiana (established in 1948), the field did not grow until Johan Galtung created the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 1959. PIRO's research focuses on "the driving forces as well as the consequences of violent conflict, and on ways in which peace can be built, maintained and spread."⁷ Galtung also developed the *Journal of Peace Research* to promote scholarly articles and generate a larger academic interest in peace studies. Peter Lawler reviews Galtung's work and explains, "He was there at the beginning of institutionalized peace research...Inscribed upon his work are all of the debates that have both impelled peace research onward and occasionally scarred it."⁸ From this beginning, the field grew into other institutes and other academic schools were created in Europe, including the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute. These centers encouraged academic scholarship and established databases and research positions to further the field. Eventually academic programs expanded in the U.S as well. One prominent school, the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, believes peace studies to be a diverse and multi-disciplinary field that looks at "armed conflict, prevention of war, genocide, terrorism, violations of human rights, and build peaceful societies."⁹ This diverse field

⁷ "Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)," accessed March 18, 2015, <http://www.prio.org/>.

⁸ Peter Lawler, *A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), vii.

⁹ "Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies," *Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies*, accessed March 18, 2015, <http://kroc.nd.edu/>.

has now expanded to over 400 colleges and universities around the world, offering peace studies programs focusing on the issues of today such as genocide, nuclear arms race, civil war, religious and ethnic violence and terrorism.¹⁰

While these fields emerged as international interests at the same time, scholars and practitioners often separate human rights from peace studies. The creation of special institutes and academic disciplines further divides these concepts. This causes a perception that peace and human rights are not connected. However, scholars are increasingly trying to bridge these two fields. Christine Bell writes in *Peace Agreements and Human Rights* that the peace agreement must include protections of human rights and the relationship of these agreements to international law.¹¹ A journal entitled *Human Rights Dialogue*, printed an issue from 2002 that focuses on “integrating Human Rights and Peace Work.”¹² In addition, the organizations that originally promoted human rights, the UN and the EU, also work to point out the intersection of peace and human rights efforts. The Secretary-General for the UN, Ban Ki-moon, spoke on the International Day of Peace marking the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

We know that human rights are essential to peace...yet too many people around the world still have their rights violated-especially during and after armed conflict. That is why we must ensure that the rights in the

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements and Human Rights*, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹² Christine Bell, “Principle versus Pragmatism,” *Human Rights Dialogue* 2, no. 7 (November 7, 2002): 6–9.

Declaration are a living reality-that they are known, understood and enjoyed by everyone, everywhere.¹³

Statements like Ban's explain the inextricable link between human rights and peace. Documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also support this claim. Article Three of the document states, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."¹⁴ Fundamental human rights cannot be achieved during violent conflict, making stable long-term peace the prerequisite for improving human rights. It is during violent conflict that the worst human rights abuses can occur, and it is through the peace process that these violations can be rectified. After World War II, the Nuremberg Trials were the first attempt at a peace process in which war criminals were prosecuted. While at times the human rights field focuses on social issues, such as women's rights, minority rights, gay and lesbian rights, and ethnic rights, peace has always been an important part of the study of human rights. Likewise, peace studies emphasizes the prevention of war and the need to de-escalate conflicts, but scholars continue to emphasize the importance of reinstating human rights in a post-conflict society.¹⁵ Human rights and peace are

¹³ United Nations News Service Section, "UN News - On International Day, UN Spotlights Link between Human Rights and Peace," *UN News Service Section*, September 21, 2008,

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28143#.VRh002ZEqmK>.

¹⁴ "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

¹⁵ David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions* (U of Nebraska Press, 1993); Julie Mertus and Jeffrey Helsing, eds., *Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2006); Terrence Edward Paupp, *Redefining Human Rights in the Struggle for Peace and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

inextricably linked in their goals and aspirations, which is why the post-conflict society must look at both peace and human rights studies.

Examining Northern Irish Peace Studies

The overall study of peace centers on how structures are created to support and maintain peace. Academics focus on the divisions that cause conflict and the attempts to prevent and bring an end to violent conflict. Peace building is comprised of diverse professionals including: international and national policymakers, non-governmental organizations, local communities, academics and practitioners. Academics have sought to create research and theories that will aid in the peacebuilding process. One of the seminal figures in peace studies, John Paul Lederach, wrote the book *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* to create a new framework for peacebuilding that attempts to address the root causes of the conflict by building relationships and addressing the socio-political issues.¹⁶ Lederach is just one example of the many scholars attempting to define approaches and mechanisms for addressing conflict after the cessation of violence.¹⁷ These academic works surround the topics such as disarmaments, an end to structural violence and establishing human conditions.¹⁸ New research continues to emerge and bring about interest in new areas such as the role of external

¹⁶ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1998).

¹⁷ Other important scholars and works include: Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, 1 edition (West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1996); Robert J. Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995); Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, eds., *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 1 edition (London: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁸ David J. Dunn, *The First Fifty Years of Peace Research: A Survey and Interpretation* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).

economic assistance and the importance of economic equality in peace studies.¹⁹ This new research guides questions in a new direction, and helps the field explore new issues surrounding peace and conflict resolution.

As peace studies arose as a distinct academic field, scholars looked to case studies of conflict areas to apply these frameworks and theories. Perhaps by chance just as experts were emerging the conflict in Northern Ireland was a perfect case study to examine the transition from violence to peace. Almost immediately after the cease-fire was agreed upon in the late 1990s, scholars in peace started to address the case of Northern Ireland. Within the context of Northern Ireland scholars have focused on various topics including: disarmament and demilitarization, power sharing and the restructuring of government and civil society, high-level diplomacy leading to agreements, advancements in human rights and reconciliation among communities. Prominent scholars such as Colin Knox and Roger Mac Ginty both focused on devolution. Mac Ginty was one of the first scholars to write about the importance of decommissioning the paramilitaries and the ongoing paramilitary violence as deterrence to peace.²⁰ Knox researched the role of continued paramilitary activity, reshaping local government, civil service reform, and human rights issues. Recently he has advocated for

¹⁹ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, 1 edition (Oxford University Press, 2008); William R. Easterly, ed., *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, First Edition edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2008); Finn Tarp, ed., *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions For The Future* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000); Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 1 edition (Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁰ Roger Mac Ginty and John Darby, *Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace Process* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002); Roger Mac Ginty, “‘Biting the Bullet’: Decommissioning in the Transition from War to Peace in Northern Ireland,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 10 (January 1, 1999): 237–47.

a need to reduce racism in Northern Ireland and to create a shared public school system in order to fully integrate the two communities.²¹ Other academics such as Mary-Alice Clancy study the need for power-sharing and the role of high-level negotiations between the two groups with the help of third parties finding that the role of the U.S. was essential in bringing together Irish and British leadership.²² While some scholars tend to focus on the elite initiatives that typically include the main political and paramilitary figures involved in the negotiation the grassroots participation in the negotiation and peace building process are equally important. Frederic Pearson looks at the importance of incorporating grassroots efforts in the peace process in order to create lasting change.²³ *Human Rights as War by Other Means*, by Jennifer Curtis focuses on the role of human rights in the peace process and highlights the continued need for improved relations between communities. She discusses the everyday problems of people in Northern

²¹ Vani K. Borooah and Colin Knox, “The Contribution of ‘Shared Education’ to Catholic-Protestant Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A Third Way?,” *British Educational Research Journal* 39, no. 5 (October 2013): 925–46; Paul Carmichael and Colin Knox, “Devolution, Governance and the Peace Process,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3 (January 1, 2004): 593–621; Colin Knox and Paul Carmichael, “Improving Public Services: Public Administration Reform in Northern Ireland,” *Journal of Social Policy* 35, no. 01 (January 2006): 97–120; Colin Knox, “‘See No Evil, Hear No Evil’. Insidious Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland,” *British Journal of Criminology* 42, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 164–85; Colin Knox, “The Politics of Local Government Reform in Northern Ireland,” *Local Government Studies* 35, no. 4 (August 1, 2009): 435–55; Colin Knox, “Tackling Racism in Northern Ireland: ‘The Race Hate Capital of Europe,’” *Journal of Social Policy* 40, no. 02 (April 2011): 387–412.

²² Clancy focuses on the important role the US played in brokering a political agreement between the two communities. She also discusses the need for disarmament of the different paramilitaries. See: Mary-Alice C. Clancy, *Peace Without Consensus* (Farnham, Surrey England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).

²³ Frederic S. Pearson, “Dimensions of Conflict Resolution in Ethnopolitical Disputes,” *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (May 1, 2001): 275–87.

Ireland.²⁴ Scholars continue to be interested in the Northern Irish peace process years after the GFA was signed. These works contributed to the ongoing peace and reconciliation field that hopes to investigate the peace process in an attempt to improve the transition from conflict to peace.

While the economic conditions leading to conflict are carefully outlined in the literature, the economic conditions of post-conflict are not as prominent. There is a lack of scholarship that specifically looks at the peace and reconciliation process from the perspective of international economic intervention. However, institutes such as The Portland Trust have created reports on the role of economics in peacemaking that claim economic progress and international involvement is a key aspect of peace.²⁵ However, this report does not emphasize the importance of creating and maintaining international funding bodies, such as the International Fund for Ireland. Other scholars such as Curtis share this interest in economic equality in the post-conflict society. Yet, there is little interest or research done on the need for economic support for the peace process. Many of the programs and processes required to sustain peace need financial assistance. In the case of Northern Ireland, there is significant third party economic funding that provides the necessary money to sustain programs. The importance of domestic and international

²⁴ Jennifer Curtis, *Human Rights as War by Other Means: Peace Politics in Northern Ireland*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

²⁵ “Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland” (The Portland Trust, May 2007). This report emphasizes the role of economic progress as crucial to the political forces that create peace. It names the role of the US in providing direct foreign investment in encouraging business. It also believes that economic discussions can become a platform for political settlement the way the US began negotiations over economic issues in Northern Ireland. For more on the economic conditions that led to the conflict see: D. P. Doumitt, *Conflict in Northern Ireland: The History, the Problem, and the Challenge* (New York: P. Lang, 1985), 71–101.

support for the continued programs is essential to the peace process and must be studied further. Sean Byrne has become one of a few scholars who address this angle in peace research. He continues to investigate the role of these external funds in the peace process. He writes extensively about understanding the importance of funding the programs and the influence that the aid has on the economic conditions in the country.²⁶ Byrne focuses on how these funds bring communities together, reduce violence, and create an environment that sustains peace. Byrne conducts research primarily on the effect of the international funds rather than on the creation of these structures and the need to maintain this support. He is also critical of the ability for Northern Ireland to maintain agency in the peace process, but his work does not discuss how these organizations are structured to encourage collaboration among different actors. Linda Racioppi and Katherine O'Sullivan See explore how the third party economic funders can maintain contact at the grassroots level.²⁷ Yet their work on this subject is limited to only one funding source

²⁶ To name a few sources that will be used later in this paper: Sean Byrne et al., "The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland," *International Politics* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 229–50; Sean Byrne et al., "Economic Aid: The End of Phase II and the Impact on Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 3 (November 2009): 345–63; Sean Byrne, PDA (Project : Coutts Information Services), and MyiLibrary, *Economic Assistance and Conflict Transformation: Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland*, Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011); Olga Sklarlato, Sean Byrne, and Chuck Thiessen, "The Eu Peace II Fund and The International Fund For Ireland: Transforming Conflict and Building Peace in Northern Ireland and The Border Counties," *Razprave in Gradivo - Inštitut Za Narodnostna Vprašanja*, no. 62 (2010): 92–124; Peter Karari et al., "The Role of External Economic Assistance in Nurturing Cross-Community Contact and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties," *Community Development Journal*, November 20, 2012, bss054.

²⁷ Linda Racioppi and Katherine O'Sullivan See, "Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention: The European Union's Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland," *Peace & Change* 32, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 361–90.

and does not detail how to best establish these organizations to encourage collaboration and communication at all levels. While there are some scholars and institutes researching the role of economics in the peace process, this paper aims to add to that scholarship by specifically focusing on international participation in the peace process through economic means.

Given that economics is crucial for the sustainability of peace, this paper will address the issues of economically supporting the peace process, particularly the need for third-party support. I will be focusing on two specific funds for Northern Ireland supported by the European Union and the U.S. Without the support from the EU and U.S., peace and reconciliation work would not be funded and there would be very little continued support for the peace process. Removing these programs would put Northern Ireland at risk of dealing with the remaining sectarian problems with violence rather than peaceful solutions. Threats to the peace in Northern Ireland still exist and will be outlined in the next chapter. I am interested in how these structures are established to help maintain support years in the future and what challenges face these sources of funding. I am also interested in exploring the organizational structures that help different members of the peace process interact and collaborate. These two subjects are strongly related due to the need for the third-party funders to communicate with those practitioners in Northern Ireland. This scholarship focuses on the need to create and sustain institutional structures that will aid the peace process. I address the benefits and risks of creating international funding bodies and explore the different approaches to incorporating various actors into the organization. There is a strong emphasis on how economic incentives can encourage local actors to participate in the reconciliation efforts and how providing

economic aid draws international attention to the region, further engaging them in the peace process.

The next chapter will start with a historical overview of Northern Ireland including the issues that led to conflict, the events of the Troubles, the creation of a peace agreement, and the peace process until today. The next section will discuss the creation international economic aid organizations and the structure they establish to promote the peace. The following section details the importance, and the benefits and difficulties with foreign involvement. The final section will explain why looking at the Northern Ireland case is important and what lessons can be learned for future areas of conflict.

What is the Trouble with Peace?

History of Northern Ireland

Though there are many books that can give a comprehensive history of Northern Ireland, this brief overview provides basic historical facts in order to put the conflict into context for the purpose of this paper.¹ While there is an extensive history of England and Ireland from the Middle Ages the present tension is a direct reflection of the events in the 1600s. When Henry VIII created the Church of England and mandated Protestantism the Irish fought back, refusing to convert. This led to a series of uprisings and battles that ended in 1690 when the Protestant William of Orange defeated the Catholic James II at the Battle of the Boyne River.² From this point forward, Protestants dominated political and economic life in Ireland.³ By 1703 only 14 percent of land was in possession of the Catholic Irish and in the nine counties of Ulster only 5 percent of land was held by

¹ For a more comprehensive history of Northern Ireland see: F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine* (Fontana, 2009); Hepburn, *The Conflict of Nationality in Modern Ireland*, First Edition edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1980); J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923*, 1966.

² This battle is still seen as a monumental historical moment in Northern Ireland and is memorialized in a public holiday. The 12th of July is seen as a day for celebrating British nationality and the successful take over of Ireland. It is also one of the most contentious days of the year in Northern Ireland. Marked by violence and discontent, this day is well know for the historical and modern importance to the conflict. For more information see: Dominic Bryan, *Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition, and Control*, Anthropology, Culture, and Society (London ; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), <http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=72456>.

³ D. P. Doumitt, *Conflict in Northern Ireland: The History, the Problem, and the Challenge* (New York: P. Lang, 1985), 25.

Catholic Irish citizens.⁴ Colonists from England overran Ireland, bringing a different culture, religion, and political loyalty to the crown that conflicted with the native Irish. British settlers dominated the Ulster region and continued to increase their numbers to make it difficult to expel them from the region.⁵ As Donald D. Doumitt explains, these conditions created two forms of nationalism: Northern Protestant Loyalism as well as Irish Republicanism.⁶ In the later half of the 19th century tension increased. Protestants created sectarian areas to separate Catholics and Protestants. This ultimately led to a separation of Ulster from the rest of Ireland.⁷

Irish resistance to British control eventually led to a fight for independence. In 1916 the Easter Rising in Dublin started an Irish rebellion that was eventually defeated by overwhelming British power. However, in 1921 the Anglo-Irish Treaty created the Irish Free State as a dominion of the British Commonwealth and marked the beginning of the division of Ireland from England. This division included the separation of Ulster from the other counties of Ireland. Illustration 1 shows the division of Ulster from the rest of the island.⁸ The 1920 Government of Ireland Act stated that Ulster remains a part of the

⁴ John Darby, ed., *Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict* (Belfast, Northern Ireland : Syracuse, N.Y: Appletree Press ; Syracuse University Press, 1983), 14.

⁵ Ulster originally described all nine counties of the island: Antrim, Down, Armagh, Derry, Tyrone, Fermanagh, Donegal, Monaghan and Cavan. Since 1921 the term Ulster refers to the first six counties and is also called Northern Ireland. For the purpose of this book, Northern Ireland will be used to refer to the six counties and Ulster to the nine counties.

⁶ Doumitt, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, 27.

⁷ Two contributing factors were a part of this division. The industrial revolution almost exclusively came to the northern part of the country and created a closer connection to Britain. The other event of importance being the potato famine in the 1840s that created severe living conditions primarily in the south of the island. The famine completely altered political, economic and social developments in the south that would ultimately lead to the fight for independence. Darby, *Northern Ireland*, 18.

United Kingdom and allowed the Ulster Parliament to vote on decisive division from Dublin and the southern counties.⁹ The treaty and act allowed for two states that would have their newly won parliament to deal with domestic issues and would send a representative to Westminster and a council of Ireland for communal interests.¹⁰ With the creation of Northern Ireland and an Irish Free State the region was ready for the conflict that would ensue in the northern region. Illustration 2 provides a map of Northern Ireland in relation to the Republic of Ireland and United Kingdom.¹¹

⁸ George McFinnigan, February 26, 2006. *Ireland Spanish Map*. [map] (wikimedia, accessed 25, March, 2015); https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ireland_Spanish_map.gif#/media/File:Ireland_Spanish_map.gif.

⁹ Doumitt, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, 30.

¹⁰ The division of the two states was based primarily on religious affiliation. Ulster's original nine counties included 900,000 Protestants who were mostly loyal to the crown and 700,000 Catholics who mostly wanted to separate from the UK. The six counties that became Ulster or Northern Ireland were comprised of 820,000 Protestants and 430,000 Catholics. To maintain the majority, Unionists accepted the six county divisions. Darby, *Northern Ireland*, 20.

¹¹ User: Cnrb, *United Kingdom Labeled Map*. [map]. (wikimedia, accessed 25, March, 2015); https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_Kingdom_labelled_map7_vector.svg#/media/File:United_Kingdom_labelled_map7_vector.svg.




Illustration 1: Counties of the Island of Ireland




Illustration 2: The United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

Two Sides Opposed

In order to understand the conflict within Northern Ireland, it is essential to grasp the two opposing communities that are at odds with one another. Various lines divide the groups: religious, political, national, social, economic, etc. This conflict is often discussed in terms of these divisions. However, when talking with those who live in Northern Ireland the response to “how do you identify yourself” can alter over time. People must make decisions about which label identifies them most at the moment and will vary from being predominantly religious to mainly nationality-focused. While this can be a very difficult discussion, and there are those who explain these details further, for the purpose of this paper I will be making general statements that are recognized as the majority opinion.¹² I will start with discussing the status of these two groups at the time right before and during the Troubles.

In 1968 at the beginning of the Troubles about 58 percent of the population identified as Protestant, making them the majority group over Catholics. Identifying Catholics and Protestants was the easiest way to get numbers for each group.¹³ However, these religious identities were tied up with other labels. For example, when asked “which

¹² There are many who see an issue of defining strict lines for the two sides since there are a minority of people who do not fit the [binary/status quo] and therefore making generalizations can be dangerous. However, this paper is not trying to challenge the widely held belief that the majority of the people in Northern Ireland are on opposing ends of this conflict. For a more extensive look at the issue of defining the different groups and the issue of national identity in Northern Ireland see: Edward Moxon-Browne, *Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland*, Gower International Library of Research and Practice (Aldershot, Hants, England: Gower, 1983).

¹³ Landon Hancock, “Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing” (INCORE, 1998), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/landon.htm>.

terms best describes the way you usually think of yourself?” a majority of Protestants responded British or Ulster. While Catholics who were asked the same question responded predominantly Irish.¹⁴ The term was also linked to political parties. Seventy-one percent of The Official Unionist party members identified as British, while the Social Democratic and Labour party had seventy-six percent of their members identify as Irish.¹⁵ This political divide meant differences in opinion about the status of Northern Ireland. Ninety-one percent of Protestants supported the effort to get the Irish government to remove from its Constitution the claim to Northern Ireland and the Irish should stop talking about the goal of reunification. Eighty-two percent of Catholics believed the effort for a united Ireland was a worthwhile objective provided it could be achieved by peaceful means.¹⁶

These opposing opinions created two groups:

1. The Unionist/Loyalists that wanted to keep Northern Ireland a part of the United Kingdom and remain “loyal” to the crown. Those committed to this cause and willing to use force would later join the conflict as a part of the Ulster Defense Associate or Ulster Volunteer Force.
2. The Nationalist/Republicans that want to reunify the Island of Ireland and sever ties with the UK. Militant members of this group were a part of the Irish Republican Army and would participate in the violence to take place.

Identity is central to the Northern Irish conflict and making generalizations oversimplifies the complexity of this society. During the Troubles each group represented a specific identity and played a part in creating the discord; therefore each group would eventually

¹⁴ Moxon-Browne, *Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland*, 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 21–35.

need to be a part of the solution. The following are the different groups, along with their leaders within Northern Ireland and their main beliefs that led to conflict.¹⁷

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)- The UUP was the largest political party that dominated the government in Northern Ireland from 1921-1972. Led by Terence O’Neil and David Trimble, the UUP was interested in reform and sought to reconcile the sectarian issues in the region. During the Troubles, the UUP lost ground to the emerging new Unionist political parties.

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)- As a response to the rising tensions the DUP emerged as the dominating Unionist party that was strongly anti-nationalists and anti-power sharing. Led by Ian Paisley throughout the Troubles and the peace process, the DUP was also strongly tied to the UDA paramilitary.

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)- David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson, two UVF ex-prisoners, started the party in 1978. They represented part of the loyalist community in the peace talks. They are often tied to the UVF.

Loyalist Paramilitaries- This includes the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Loyalists Volunteer Force (LVF), and the Red Hand Commandos (RHC). Together they represent the loyalist community. While there is no unifying ideology to these three groups, they all hold the extreme belief that using force to prevent unification with the Republic of Ireland was

¹⁷ R. J. Crisp, M. Hewstone, and E. Cairns, “Multiple Identities in Northern Ireland: Hierarchical Ordering in the Representation of Group Membership,” *The British Journal of Social Psychology / the British Psychological Society* 40, no. Pt 4 (December 2001): 501–14; Clare Cassidy and Karen Trew, “Identities in Northern Ireland: A Multidimensional Approach,” *Journal of Social Issues* 54, no. 4 (January 1, 1998): 725–40; William D. Flackes and Sydney Elliott, *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-1993*, 3rd edition (Belfast: Blackstaff Pr, 1995).

necessary during the Troubles. During the peace process, they combined to form the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) to be included in the discussions.¹⁸

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)- Led by John Hume, this political party was associated with NICRA and advocated for internal reforms over unification of Ireland. Until the uprising of Sinn Fein, the SDPL was the main political party of the Nationalists.

Sinn Fein- Often referred to as the political arm of the paramilitary; this political party was associated with the partition movement and did not gain significant political support until the Troubles. The party advocates for the removal of all British presence and immediate unification with Ireland. Led by Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein was often excluded from the peace process until the very end.

Irish Republican Army/ Provisional Republican Army (IRA/PIRA)- The Republican paramilitary believes force will and must be used to remove the British from Ireland. Led by Martin McGuinness, the PIRA worked closely with Adams to represent the Nationalist interest in the peace process.¹⁹

Together these groups formed two sides that will for clarity's sake be referred to as the Unionist and Nationalists communities. In addition to these political and military organizations, these groups were divided religiously. Nationalists were almost exclusively Catholic and Unionists were predominantly Protestant. Societal divisions of

¹⁸ For more on the Loyalist paramilitaries during and after the conflict see: Carolyn Gallaher, *After the Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Post-Accord Northern Ireland* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

¹⁹ For more on the IRA see: Kevin Kelley, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA*, New ed (Westport, Conn. : London: Lawrence Hill ; Zed, 1988).

Northern Ireland between Nationalists and Unionists created a legacy of discrimination. As the majority, Unionists historically monopolized land holdings, commerce, industry and government, while the opposing community (Nationalists) was discriminated against in all of these areas.²⁰ These social and economic restrictions caused animosity and mistrust among the Northern Irish community. A strong connection to group identity formed from these hostilities that would not only spark the Troubles, but also lead to lingering problems post-conflict.

Trouble erupts in Northern Ireland

Eventually the Irish decided to fight against the inequalities that placed them as second-class citizens. In February of 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (N.I.C.R.A) was formed in order to peacefully protest for changes that would bring about fairness in housing, employment and politics.²¹ During a protest in Derry on October 5th 1968 a group of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) blocked the march and surrounded the participants. The violence that followed would incite anger and radicalize the Nationalist community members to action.²² It was this moment along with several others (the Battle of the Bogside and the deployment of British Troops in August of 1969) that

²⁰ The British majority took advantage of gerrymandering in order to secure political dominance, for a detailed example refer to Table 1 on page 73. In the workforce, the British comprised a significantly larger portion of the employed while the Irish were heavily unemployed. Table 6 on page 79 shows the amount of Catholics versus Protestants employed in each industry in 1971. Overall living conditions for the Irish were much worse as show in Table 11 on page 87. See: Doumitt, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, 71–87.

²¹ Kevin Kelley, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA*, New ed (Westport, Conn. and London: Lawrence Hill and Zed, 1988), 99.

²² The RUC is the Six County police force that was comprised overwhelmingly of Protestants and was known by the Irish community for their brutality.

marked the beginning of the Troubles. For the next 30 years, Northern Ireland would be engulfed by a protracted conflict, marked by constant violence and a deepening of the sectarian divide within the communities.²³ In the end it has been estimated to affect over half the population of Northern Ireland. More than 3,700 people died (2.5 percent of the population) and 30,000 to 50,000 were injured.²⁴ There were casualties and violence on all sides of the fight, including many civilians.

Peace and the Day After

After almost three decades of conflict, there were those in both communities ready to create peace. Each part of the Nationalist and Unionist communities played a role in the transition from conflict to peace. These included the political and paramilitary leaders for each side. In August of 1994 came the first of many ceasefire announcements. This signaled a serious interest from paramilitaries in ending the violence. In order to bring parties together, there was significant international involvement in the efforts to reach an agreement. Starting in 1995, President Clinton appointed George Mitchell as the special advisor to the president and the secretary of state on economic initiatives. The U.S. would play a critical role in bringing groups together for negotiations. One issue Mitchell astutely observed was the need to not only bring all the groups in Northern Ireland together, but also “that if there was to be an end to the periodic outbreaks of violence in Northern Ireland, there had to be cooperation between Britain and the

²³ For a more detailed version of the Troubles see: Kelley, *The Longest War*.

²⁴ Mari Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland* (United Nations University Press, 2002), 18, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10016466>.

Republic.”²⁵ John Hume, leader of the SDLP, called for relationships between Unionists, Nationalists, Republic of Ireland and Britain to join together in discussion.²⁶ With Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of Britain, these relationships continued to remain divided.²⁷ The following years included extensive political negotiations among members of the British, Irish and Northern Irish governments. However, these talks demanded a decommissioning of paramilitaries in order for these groups to participate in the talks. Therefore the British government excluded the IRA. This led the IRA to end the ceasefire and return to violence.²⁸

However, in 1997 Tony Blair became Prime Minister and the Labour party took power announcing that decommissioning would no longer prevent anyone from participating in the negotiations. As scholar Mari Fitzduff explains, “For the first time ever, talks which included all the parties to the conflict, that is the two governments, all the major political parties, and parties representing the main paramilitary organisations, began in September 1997.”²⁹ All major Northern Irish parties were represented in the negotiations. McGuinness, Adams, Hume, Trimble, Paisley, Ervine, and others were consulted and participated in the talks. Blair would work closely with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, Bertie Ahern, to reach an agreement. Having international

²⁵ George Mitchell, *Making Peace* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012), 15.

²⁶ Mitchell, *Making Peace*.

²⁷ Frank Gaffikin and Mike Morrissey, *Northern Ireland: The Thatcher Years* (London ; Atlantic Highlands, N.J., USA: Zed Books Ltd, 1989).

²⁸ For more information on the political negotiations see: Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence*, 15.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

third party involvement was critical to the process. Mitchell chaired the peace talks along with John de Chastelain from Canada and Harri Holkeri from Finland.³⁰

Finally on Friday April 10th 1998 the parties announced that they had reached an agreement. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA), also referred to as the Belfast Agreement, created a devolved government that would transfer power from London back to Belfast.³¹ For a description of the key points of the Good Friday Agreement see Appendix 1. The agreement required the ratification of the majority of people both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. Seventy-one percent of the people who voted in Northern Ireland and 94 percent in the Republic of Ireland accepted the referendum.³²

For the following years the devolved government remained unstable and both decommissioning and police reform proved challenging. Paramilitary violence returned sporadically and the sectarian divide did not diminish.³³ Many people believed decommissioning the paramilitaries as well as removing the increased number of British military would lead to peace.³⁴ When the IRA and other paramilitaries did not fully dismantle operations and violence erupted, London suspended the devolved government

³⁰ For more on the negotiations see: Tony Blair, *A Journey: My Political Life*, 1st ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010); Gaffikin and Morrissey, *Northern Ireland*.

³¹ For a full copy of the Good Friday Agreement see: “The Agreement,” accessed February 24, 2015, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.pdf>.

³² Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence*, 131.

³³ For more information about the instability of the Devolved government see: Kristin Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 8, 2014,

<http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=10141&groupid=106703&pgId=7f4fdb2a-1c76-4919-add8-b29ba3a3cb0d>.

³⁴ At the time of the GFA, the police force in Northern Ireland was approximately 12,000 and a British army presence that averaged 18,000. Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence*, 73.

and reinstated direct rule in October 2002. In 2005 the IRA finally called for an end to armed conflict and ordered all units to “dump arms.”³⁵ Finally in a historic moment, Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams met for the first time and created a new agreement for a power-sharing government in the spring of 2007. This new government focused more on domestic issues including health care, housing and education.

Fifteen Years Later

Despite the success of finally returning power to Belfast, there are still challenges that face this region. Northern Ireland continues to search for an effective way of addressing the legacy of the Troubles including the violence, the prevailing dissent, the remaining sectarian divide, and the need for economic development. There are three main issues that continue to threaten the peaceful post-conflict society: 1) police mistrust and the need for historical justice 2) continued segregation that prevents a shared society and equality for all, and 3) growing unrest within Loyalist youth community.

The need for transitional justice is still a constant demand from the citizens of Northern Ireland. Baroness Nuala O’Loan, former police ombudsman, testified to the U.S. Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 2014 in support for an independent commission. This commission will ensure that “ordinary people are able to find out what happened...we set people free of the trauma which is currently limiting so much of our progress, and we allow our country to move on.”³⁶ There is still mistrust and anger

³⁵ Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 5.

³⁶ “The Northern Ireland Peace Process Today: Attempting to Deal with the Past,” March 11, 2014, 9, <http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?>

directed to the newly formed Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI) that replaced the RUC. Resentment directed towards PSNI has led to violent rioting in recent years.³⁷

Segregation in territory and public spaces are still an issue and are intensified by the “peace walls” that have been built purposely to keep people apart. Worst still, only 7 percent of children attend integrated schools, leaving the majority of children in segregated schools.³⁸ Much of Northern Irish society is still divided. This means there are separate schools, housing areas, and public areas for each community. One other major issue to maintaining peace remains the economic inequality and the need for further growth in Northern Ireland. While the economy has grown (5.6 percent on average from 1997 to 2007) and there have been efforts to promote equality in the workforce, there are still problems with unemployment poverty among Irish communities. The government is attempting to stimulate further growth and deal with the problem of economic inactivity by creating jobs for 300,000 people.³⁹

Another significant threat to the peace process is the erupting issues within the Loyalist youth community. In the winter of 2012 and 2013, the Belfast City Council voted to fly the union flag at city hall only on designated days. This sparked protests and

accountid=10141&groupid=106703&pgId=3bb1ca10-5582-4814-8068-bc1883a66df0&rsId=14B1E17E1EB.

³⁷ Henry McDonald, Irel, and correspondent, “Northern Ireland Violence Triggered by Ideology and a Mistrust of the Police | Analysis,” *The Guardian*, accessed April 26, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jul/12/northern-ireland-violence-ideology-police>.

³⁸ However, as this article shows, there is a demand for a more intense focus on integrated education. 68 percent of the public believes the issue of segregated education should be a top priority. See: Adrian Rutherford and Lindsay Fergus, 26 June 2013, “Public Mood in Northern Ireland Is for an End to Segregation in Schools,” *BelfastTelegraph.co.uk*, accessed February 24, 2015, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/debateni/blogs/public-mood-in-northern-ireland-is-for-an-end-to-segregation-in-schools-29372424.html>.

³⁹ Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 14–15.

violence among Loyalists almost immediately after the motion passed causing a reaction from the police. Many criticized the actions of the police throughout the protest. The resulting “flags protest” ended with 140 police officers injured and more than 200 people arrested.⁴⁰ Many of the young protestors expressed frustration with the peace process. Becky Rowan, a loyalist participant in the protests, explained, “It’s not just about the flag anymore. In my opinion it is about so much more, such as giving Sinn Fein everything they wanted. They are trying to take away everything that is British in this society.”⁴¹ Like many of her peers, Rowan feels left out of the reconciliation process and overpowered by the Nationalist community. During these protests, Northern Ireland’s economy took a dramatic downturn, effectively shutting down Belfast. Tourism stalled and efforts to bring in foreign investment from China were threatened by the upheaval.⁴² The “flags protest” is evidence of prevailing sectarian attitudes in Northern Ireland that continue to divide the region. Issues of emblems, such as the flag, and national holidays, such as the marching season in July, are unresolved issues that must be addressed. These lingering concerns prove the continued need for the peace process and the programming that encourages the two communities to reconcile their differences and build a future

⁴⁰ This protests led to the reemergence and revitalization of violence form the British paramilitaries. See: Press Association, “Union Flag Protests: More than 200 Arrested in Northern Ireland,” *The Guardian*, accessed February 24, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/03/union-flag-protests-arrested-northern-ireland>.

⁴¹ Henry McDonald, “Belfast: ‘It’s Not Just the Flag. They Want to Take Everything British Away’,” *The Guardian*, accessed April 26, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/13/belfast-protest-flag-young-loyalists>.

⁴² “Q&A: Northern Ireland Flag Protests,” *BBC News*, accessed April 26, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20651163>; “Wrapped in the Flag,” *The Economist*, January 12, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21569391-loyalist-protests-belfast-have-almost-nothing-do-politics-why-they-are-so>.

together. Thus far I have focused on the historical mistrust in the community and the different groups involved in both the conflict and the peace process. The following chapter will survey the involvement of the international community in creating organizations to help in the transition to peace.

Creating and Structuring the Peace Process

Establishing and maintaining international economic aid is an important aspect of the Northern Ireland peace process. It is important to sustain these organizations in order to continue programming for peace and reconciliation. However, the peace process is not simply about providing funds for these programs; it is also about how these international bodies are organized and structured. The IFI and EU PEACE funds function in different ways, which shape the programs they support. These organizations must make decisions about whether to target high-level or lower-level actors to participate in the decision-making process, which dictates the overall goals of the programs. Bringing together high-ranking political figures with grassroots community leaders and creating spaces for them to collaborate is an ultimate goal of the post-conflict Northern Ireland. This chapter will discuss the creation of these funding bodies and how the bodies have changed since their creation. Then I will explore the structure of the different funding bodies and how they provide opportunities to bring different sectors and actors together in order to create an inclusive peace process.

Creating the International Fund for Ireland

Following the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), both the British and Irish governments established the International Fund for Ireland (IFI or The Fund) in 1986 to address “the underlying causes of sectarianism and violence and to build reconciliation

between people, and within and between communities in Ireland, North and South.”¹ Financially supported by the United States, the EU, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the IFI has provided significant funding to the peace process in Northern Ireland. Though there are many countries funding this body, the U.S. has been the most significant contributor to the IFI.² The IFI provided a pivotal shift of U.S. policy in Northern Ireland, encouraging further involvement in the peace process through economic means and leading to a leadership role in the peace negotiations.³ Originally the IFI focused mainly on promoting economic reconstruction through supporting economic development programs. Many of these programs sought to create jobs and economic opportunities that would encourage contact and dialogue between the two sides. Programs encouraged development in the following sectors: tourism, urban and rural development, agriculture, technology, and business and community development. However, in 2005 after an independently commissioned report from Deloitte indicated a need for change, the IFI decided to create a new strategy aimed at “building a sustainable infrastructure for reconciliation operating beyond the Fund’s lifetime. Much of the Fund’s traditional economic-based activities ceased, with resources diverted towards grassroots community

¹ Olga Sklarlato, Sean Byrne, and Chuck Thiessen, “The EU Peace II Fund and The

² According the U.S. State Department the U.S. has provided \$500 million since the start of the IFI, which is nearly half of the total funding of the IFI. See: Kristin Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 8, 2014, 16,

<http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=10141&groupid=106703&pgId=7f4fdb2a-1c76-4919-add8-b29ba3a3cb0d>.

³ Involvement as funders to the IFI led U.S. policy to focus on economic issues. This eventually led Clinton to create a special envoy for economic concerns to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, who became an important actor to the peace process.

development.”⁴ The objectives for this strategy from 2006-2010 were: “promoting understanding between communities in [Northern Ireland], working with communities suffering from economic and social deprivation, facilitating the integration of the two communities.”⁵ Appendix 2 provides a breakdown of programs from January 2006-February 2010. More recently, the IFI also created a “Strategic Framework for Action 2012-2015” that would provide “a greater focus on community transformation rather than conflict management...to address some of the most significant remaining challenges to lasting peace.”⁶ Since 1986 the IFI has supported over 5,800 projects and created 55,000 direct and indirect jobs.⁷ The IFI has been an important international body that has allowed the U.S. to financially fund the peace process and play a larger role in the negotiations and direction of the post-conflict society.

Creating the PEACE Programme

After the 1994 IRA and Unionist paramilitary ceasefires, the European Commission (EC) looked for a practical way to support the peace process.⁸ A Task Force

⁴ Deloitte, “External Review of the International Fund for Ireland: Final Report December 2010,” n.d.,

http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/images/stories/documents/publications/deloitte/IFI_Final_report_with_exec_summary.pdf.

⁵ Sklarlato, Byrne, and Thiessen, “The Eu Peace II Fund and The International Fund For Ireland,” 97.

⁶ Adrian Johnston, “Community Transformation: Strategic Framework for Action 2012-2015. Chairman’s Foreword,” n.d., 2,

http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/images/stories/documents/Strategic_Framework/ifi_strategic_framework_for_action.pdf.

⁷ Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 16.

⁸ Up until the ceasefires, the EU was not a significant actor in Northern Ireland as participants in creating peace. It was not until Hugh Logue and two other EC officials asked for EU involvement that Monika Wulf-Matthies and others helped develop the task

was commissioned to advise on suggestions for the EC. The resulting conclusions from the Task Force led to the creation of a Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland in 1995. The program would also be known as SSPPR or Programme for Peace and Reconciliation or PEACE I.⁹ The goal of this project was to bring about peace by “promoting social inclusion of those at the margins of economic and social life” and through exploiting “the opportunities and addressing the needs arising from the peace process in order to boost economic growth and stimulate social and economic regeneration.”¹⁰ PEACE I focused primarily on the immediate legacy of the conflict. After completing PEACE I (1995-1999), Northern Ireland entered the official post-conflict era with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). O’Dowd and McCall explain:

The GFA is designed to reduce the problematical territorialism at the root of the conflict by multiplying the arena for dialogue, interaction, and persuasion thereby circumscribing and diluting the zero-sum politics which has characterized Northern Ireland. It seeks to transform the external and negotiated relationships.¹¹

force and the program. See: Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See, “Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention: The European Union’s Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” *Peace & Change* 32, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 369.

⁹ “EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000-2004 Operational Programme,” n.d., 1, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/country/overmap/pdf_region/fp2mc_en.pdf.

¹⁰ Martin Melaugh, “The EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation,” *Central Community Relations Unit*, n.d., <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ccru/relations/ssppr.htm>.

¹¹ Liam O’Dowd and Cathal McCall, “Escaping the Cage of Ethno-National Conflict in Northern Ireland? The Importance of Transnational Networks,” *Ethnopolitics* 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 87.

In order to support the efforts for the peace process, the EC decided to continue supporting Northern Ireland and extended the PEACE Programme into PEACE II for 5 years creating a monitoring and administrative entity, Special EU Programme Body (SEUPB). PEACE II (2000-2004) aimed to “promote economic and social development with a special focus on those groups, sectors/activities and areas which have been most affected by the conflict,” with the overall goal to “reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation.”¹² This round of funding targeted economic development and cross-border cooperation. PEACE II was successful at building relationships and promoting interaction between communities.¹³ PEACE III aimed to promote reconciliation with the past and create a shared society.¹⁴ As PEACE III formally ended in 2013, studies are now being conducted on the overall impact of this round of funding. PEACE IV started in 2014 and will continue until 2020. Overall, the PEACE funds have provided substantial funding to the reconciliation effort resulting in positive change in the communities. Figure 1 shows the amount of funding and programs of each round of PEACE operations.¹⁵ For a more detailed explanation of these programs including: eligible areas, delivery structure, target groups, aims outputs, benefits/impacts, and monitoring for each PEACE program see Appendix 3.

¹² “EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000-2004 Operational Programme,” 30–31.

¹³ Sean Byrne et al., “Economic Aid: The End of Phase II and the Impact on Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 3 (November 2009): 352.

¹⁴ “SEUPB- What Is the PEACE III Programme?,” *Special EU Programmes Body*, n.d., <http://www.seupb.eu/programmes2007-2013/peaceiiiprogramme/overview.aspx>.

¹⁵ Sarah McCarthy, “Special EU Programmes Body: Mid-Term Evaluative Study of the Experiences of the Peace III Programme to Date Including Implications for a Peace IV Programme” (SJ Cartmin, June 2013), 4.

| Theme | Peace I | Peace II | Peace II Ext. | Peace III | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Period | 1995 - 1999 | 2000 - 2004 | 2004 - 2006 | 2007 - 2013 | 18 years |
| EC Contribution | €500m | €531m | €78m | €225m | €1,334m |
| National Contribution | €167m | €304m | €82m | €108m | €661m |
| Projects | 15,000 | 7,500 | | 218* | 22,900 |
| Total | €667m | €835m | €160m | €333m | €1,995m |

*projects committed as at 31st December 2012

Figure 1: Peace Programme Funding Allocation (1995-2013)

Structure of the International Fund for Ireland

Bringing together different third party countries as funders, the IFI has managed to create an international body that incorporates international interest to the peace process. The structure of the IFI was established to link the British and Irish government. It was this cross-government collaboration that created an organization that focuses on bringing together high-level members of the international community. This structure established a precedent for dealing with higher-level actors in the peace process. Government officials were asked to participate in the IFI as official observers. These international members represent their national interest policy in Northern Ireland, but they are not voting members of the IFI. For example, the U.S. policy in 1994 was to focus on economic development, this included conferences for trade, investment and commerce. That led to an increase in funding to the IFI.¹⁶ However, it is not only foreign political interest that is represented through the IFI. The Northern Irish government has a representative within the Fund as well who support the initiative. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers, expressed her support for the IFI and its mission, “I am fully supportive...that a greater focus on community

¹⁶ “Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland,” *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 5, no. 45 (November 7, 1994): 755.

transformation is now required to address some of the most significant remaining challenges to lasting peace.”¹⁷ These higher level government officials are responsible for how the Fund operates and the direction of the organization. These elite actors established an emphasis on economic programs in the early years of the IFI and then they were responsible for a shift towards community initiatives.

Originally the International Fund for Ireland was focused on economic development, but in 2006 an external review by Deloitte consultants directed the Fund in a new direction. Consultants compiled a report that informed the organization and encouraged a new strategy that incorporated reconciliation programs. While the consultants play a role in shifting policy in the IFI, their biggest influence was encouraging the IFI to focus more on community relations and needs. The subsequent strategic plan focused more on community relations by encouraging integration, understanding, reconciliation and a shared future. As the strategic framework explains:

The mission of the International Fund for Ireland is to underpin efforts towards peace by promoting economic and social advance and encouraging contact, dialogue, and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland. As we enter a crucial phase for the peace process, the Fund’s strategic direction remains unchanged although the balance of its priorities is shifting.¹⁸

¹⁷ “Community Transformation: Strategic Framework for Action 2012-2015” (International Fund for Ireland, n.d.), <http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/strategy-document>.

¹⁸ “Sharing This Space: A Strategic Framework for Action 2006-2010” (International Fund for Ireland), http://www.deni.gov.uk/sharing_this_space_-_ifi_strategy_document.pdf.

This shift has encouraged more local voices to participate in directing the peace process. In the executive summary from 2010, the direct input from stakeholders and project directors led the consultants to give their expert recommendations for future programming. The Deloitte report help to shape the peace process, but the local community informs their recommendations.¹⁹ The board of the IFI looked to external reviews to shift their focus and make sure they are including all levels and people in the peace process. Changing the attention of the organization to deal with local community and sectarian issues shows the leadership of the IFI has tried to make a conscious shift towards incorporating a more bottom-up to the traditionally top-down method.

While the structure of the IFI is more of an elite-focused organization, the Fund has made an effort to create a larger emphasis on lower-level issues. The grassroots participants are now a larger concentration of the organization. The new strategies created reflect this organizational shift to incorporate lower level actors. However, the IFI continues to concentrate on bringing together the international community and encouraging their support for the peace process.

Structure of the EU PEACE Fund

An important aspect of the PEACE fund was the changing conditions of the EU at the time of creating the funding body. The EU was attempting to change relations with individual European states by creating a stronger civil society to provide policy

¹⁹ Deloitte, “External Review of the International Fund for Ireland” (International Fund for Ireland, December 2010), <http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/deloitte-external-review>.

consultation. By creating partnerships with sub state, regional, and non-state actors, the EU believed it could play a supporting role in the peace process. It was with this goal in mind that the EU established the PEACE programs with a community approach and strong emphasis on partnership.²⁰ In order to further the overall mission of the EU as an institution for peace and cooperation within Europe it was important for the EU to play a part in rebuilding Northern Ireland.

The EU PEACE Fund was structured in order to incorporate different levels of actors into the peace process. Seeing that the elite government officials were negotiating for peace, the EU decided to create the fund with a special emphasis on grassroots and middle-level organizing. Hugh Logue helped create the PEACE Fund asserts, “The principles of partnership, grassroots involvement and decision-making, and social inclusion are the key original components.”²¹ The EU organization sought to address structural and social roots of the conflict through government and nongovernment mechanisms. Figure 2 shows the different stakeholders involved in the Northern Irish PEACE fund that were brought together by the SEUPB.²² The delivery mechanisms were established to ensure that the process would remain decentralized. As the European Commission explains, “Decentralisation is a key feature of the Programme’s implementation. Non-governmental organisations disburse a greater share of PEACE

²⁰ Kenneth Bush and Kenneth Houston, “The Story of Peace: Learning from EU PEACE Funding in Northern Ireland and the Border Region” (INCORE, n.d.), 15, http://www.seupb.eu/Libraries/Corporate_Documents/The_Story_Of_Peace.sflb.ashx.

²¹ Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See, “Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention: The European Union’s Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” *Peace & Change* 32, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 370.

²² Bush and Houston, “The Story of Peace: Learning from EU PEACE Funding in Northern Ireland and the Border Region,” 26.

resources than in any other EU-funded programme.”²³ The EU programs emphasized the need to bring the peace process from the elite level officials to the general community.




Figure 2: Stakeholders involved in Consultations

While the PEACE program did not particularly focus on the elite level of governance, the EU did require that both the British and Irish governments contributed money to the programs that would encourage each government to be involved in the peace process. See Appendix 4 for a detailed table of the different stakeholders in the EU PEACE fund including international actors. The Northern Irish government was also directed to focus their public programs on social development. PEACE funds therefore formed transnational networks that collaborated on cultural, social and economic issues between Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the British government. These collaborations have benefited the peace process at the higher level by creating networks

²³ Racioppi and O’Sullivan See, “Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention,” July 1, 2007, 370.

that have broken down the zero-sum territorial politics that marked Northern Ireland during the conflict.²⁴ The EU programs have also worked to decentralize this process from the higher-level officials by trying to incorporate grassroots networks as well. The peace process has benefited from these cross-community programs that have helped break down the sectarian divides and established new cross-community networks.²⁵

In an effort to decentralize the peace process, the EU created an organizational system that addressed the government and public sectors involvement in community reconciliation. The system had two main priorities: to incorporate marginalized communities and to decentralize the peace process by giving more autonomy to local actors. The funding allowed local communities to design and implement their own programs using small grants from PEACE I. These grants were important because they provided programming to different groups: “capacity-building for smaller, less-developed groups, and [enabled] single-identity groups to engage in small-scale cross-community and cross-border work with a reconciliation dimension.”²⁶ These programs were aimed at women, youth, paramilitary members, the poor, and the disabled. It is important to note that these programs were directed by the community initiatives; therefore programming is based on the capabilities and need of the community. For example, programs starting a

²⁴ O’Dowd and McCall, “Escaping the Cage of Ethno-National Conflict in Northern Ireland?”

²⁵ Peter Karari et al., “The Role of External Economic Assistance in Nurturing Cross-Community Contact and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties,” *Community Development Journal*, November 20, 2012, bss054.

²⁶ PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II Final Report” (Special European Union Programmes Body, November 2003), 58,

<http://www.seupb.eu/PEACENetwork/peaceprogrammedocumentation/PEACEprogrammeevaluations.aspx>.

discussion on historical remembrance in areas deeply divided would start by working with community groups separately. That means some programs only worked with Nationalist or Unionist communities. Over time, these programs would introduce members of opposing communities and work towards building new intercommunity networks. Providing funding opportunities for local initiatives was one way the PEACE fund tried to reach the grassroots level and make an impact on the community.




Figure 3: Delivery Structure for PEACE Programs

Not only were funds given directly to the community, but also the EU PEACE program created new structures to support the peace process. See Figure 3 for a flowchart that explains how these new agencies worked with SEUPB on peace programs.²⁷ The district councils have long been recognized as sources of conflict and sectarianism in

²⁷ Bush and Houston, “The Story of Peace: Learning from EU PEACE Funding in Northern Ireland and the Border Region,” 36.

Northern Ireland.²⁸ In order to change this perception and bring different groups together, the new District Partnerships (DPs) were created. This institution offered a new opportunity for the district councils to bring different leaders from the business and labor unions together with local politicians and community members. These multi-sector DPs provided an area for all levels of actors to participate in directing the peace programs. As Racioppi and O’Sullivan explain, “The purpose of the DPs was to support and extend political power-sharing eliminate disadvantage based on class and ethnic identity, stimulate local participation in the development of projects and encourage cross-community understanding.”²⁹ The DPs were originally only supported through PEACE funds until 2006. However, the Northern Ireland Executive decided to make the structures permanent and reinvented the DPs into Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs) to continue the commitment to local initiatives. These LSPs were even more autonomous than their former structure because they were given the opportunity to set their own goals and direction for community development. The EU programs encouraged the local government to create structures that would support the peace process, even when the funding ended to these programs.

Another agency the EU program established was through the Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) that provided support for nongovernmental organizations in the peace process. IFBs are “selected from nongovernmental and quasigovernmental

²⁸ For more information on the district councils and their restructuring after the troubles see: Mari Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland*. (United Nations University Press, 2002), 40–42, ProQuest ebrary.

²⁹ These DPs were responsible for 20 percent of the overall PEACE funding, making this organizational structure extremely important to the peace process that affected the success or failure of the programs. See: Racioppi and O’Sullivan See, “Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention,” 373.

organizations active in voluntary and community service...IFBs worked directly with NGOs on a range of social and economic development projects.”³⁰ Receiving 33 percent of funding, these IFBs are well recognized within the Northern Ireland community. Examples of IFBs are: Cooperation Ireland, the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Proteus, and Community Relations Council (CRC).³¹ These organizations are responsible for bringing together different sectors including business, politics, academics, and voluntary/community. Each organization has a different mission, but they all work to promote peace and reconciliation by bridging the divide that often separates these sectors. The creation of these IFBs shows the attempt to decentralize the peace process by creating structures that will encourage grassroots initiatives and civil society engagement.

Discussion

International funding bodies have provided significant funds and long-term commitment to the peace process. The IFI and PEACE funds also created important networks between different sectors. The system created continues to function today. The PEACE fund is going through a transition into PEACE IV that shows the cooperation between government plans and funding goals. The new round of funding will be aimed at four objectives: shared education, children and young people, shared spaces and services,

³⁰ Ibid., 375.

³¹ Ibid., 375. For more on these organizations see their websites: <http://www.community-relations.org.uk/>; <http://www.cooperationireland.org/>; <http://www.communityfoundationni.org/>; <http://www.proteus-ni.org/>

and building positive relations at a local level.³² This programing aligns with political objectives as well. The Northern Ireland Executive Strategy “Together Building a United Community” is a new strategic plan aimed at focusing on: shared education, destruction of peace walls, employment and cross community programs.³³ Community organizations create programing that supports both of these new sets of objectives. PEACE IV content “has been agreed by the Northern Ireland Executive and the Irish Government.”³⁴ This shows that these efforts are still incorporating the high level international actors that the IFI was focused on bringing together. This is just one example of how the international bodies have created a structure capable of bridging the gap that divides experts in different fields from working together to the same goals.

While there are efforts to work together in the process, the agencies of these organizations have also been criticized for not always incorporating all groups into the process. Recently funding organizations have recognized the programming has missed incorporating loyalist youth and new rounds of funding are trying to address this issue.³⁵ The focus on elite level actors can provide programing that did not integrate the grassroots level. While the EU fund worked to incorporate middle and lower level actors, this process remained flawed. The different shifts in focus from each round of funding

³² “PEACE 2014-2020 Programme: Overview,” *Special EU Programmes Body*, n.d., http://www.seupb.eu/2014-2020FundingOpportunities/PEACEIV_Programme/PEACEIV_Overview.aspx.

³³ webmaster@ofmdfmi.gov.uk Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister, “Together: Building a United Community | Northern Ireland Executive,” Press release, (May 9, 2013), <http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/media-centre/executive-statements/statement-090513-together-building.htm>.

³⁴ “PEACE 2014-2020 Programme: Overview.”

³⁵ Henry McDonald et al., “EU Peace Fund to Target Young Northern Ireland Loyalists,” *The Guardian*, accessed March 26, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/31/eu-peace-fund-northern-ireland-loyalists>.

prove there is a continued effort to incorporate different initiatives important to the local community into the process.

Despite the fact that these organizations are not always successful at fostering inclusion, they continue to adapt to problems facing the community. The IFI and EU PEACE funds have changed their mission and their tactics in order to deal with these oversights. However, what is important is that these organizations provide a space for different sectors and levels of community members. Creating networks and collaborative spaces is crucial to the peace process. Multiple organizations have created different approaches that bring different actors from different sectors together to work towards the same goal.

Impact on the Peace Process

The previous chapter explained the differing structures of international funds that have incorporated third party and local actors into the peace process. The programs created through these organizations are very important to the peace process. I will explain how these projects have helped the Northern Irish community by working towards a shared and peaceful society. Then I will explain why these funds are important for international involvement. I will also discuss the issues with international aid.

Importance of Economic Aid

Scholars in peace studies find that economic aid is a beneficial tool to help sustain the peace process. Nicholas Sambanis explains, “International economic relief and productive jobs are the first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to truly disarm and take a chance on peaceful politics.”¹ In the process of gaining access to economic aid, members of society are encouraged to take steps to break down sectarianism. Madeleine Leonard finds that funding can create an environment that encourages members of different communities to interact and overcome sectarian beliefs while gaining access to resources and training.² In the case of Northern Ireland, the economic aid from PEACE programs and the IFI has led to positive changes in the affected communities. Both organizations have emphasized the need to support economic growth

¹ Nicholas Sambanis, “How Strategic Is UN Peacebuilding?,” in *Strategies of Peace:*

² Madeleine Leonard, “Bonding and Bridging Social Capital: Reflections from Belfast,” *Sociology* 38, no. 5 (December 1, 2004): 927–44.

and encourage cross-community participation in new infrastructure, trade, business and employment. One community leader from County Monaghan explained “the EU funding and the IFI have contributed enormously to improving the quality of life [and] the quality of infrastructure” in Northern Ireland.³ The funding has provided direct jobs for those working on peace programs and improved human capital generating indirect jobs in Northern Ireland. See Graph 4 for an example of direct and indirect jobs created by the IFI from 2006-2010.⁴ Another community leader from Belfast stated, “So there’s a couple of thousand people and more who have got their first qualification ever possibly through the availability of the peace programme, and I think it’s a very important contribution to economic development.”⁵ Sean Byrne and other scholars have researched the impact of the IFI and EU funding on the reduction of violence and sectarianism in Northern Ireland through interviews within the community. Overall, they found that the programs were “seen as successful in enabling peacebuilding projects to flourish and in reducing deeply held sectarian beliefs.”⁶ Respondents to interviews showed that the aid has provided an environment conducive for breaking down sectarianism and reducing suffering. Another study by Byrne discovered the positive role economic aid plays in bringing communities together. The key findings about how foreign assistance aided the peace process were: “cross-community relationship building; creation of public spaces

³ Sklarlato, Byrne, and Thiessen, “The Eu Peace II Fund and The International Fund For Ireland,” 100.

⁴ Deloitte, “External Review of the International Fund for Ireland” (International Fund for Ireland, December 2010), 24, <http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/deloitte-external-review>.

⁵ Ibid., 102.

⁶ Sean Byrne et al., “The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland,” *International Politics* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 233.

and a ‘common ground’; the development of shared values and goals; the development of cross-community networks; and engagement with youth.”⁷ Providing economic aid to the peace process has empowered the local communities by improving living conditions and presenting a new environment that encourages cross-community contact and promotes socio-economic development. These economic incentives helped promote the peace process. While the funding cannot always be directly stated to have caused these positive changes, it works alongside the other political, social and economic developments in Northern Ireland that encourage a stable society. The positive impact on the post-conflict region means that the creation and continued support of these bodies is a key component to the peace process.

Figure 4: Employment Impact of IFI from January 2006 to February 2010

| Strategy Areas | Direct Jobs | Indirect Jobs | Total Jobs |
|----------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| Building Foundations | 1334 | 430 | 1764 |
| Building Bridges | 143 | 4 | 147 |
| Building Integration | 40 | 1 | 41 |
| Legacy | 63 | 16 | 79 |
| Pre-2006 | 192 | 86 | 278 |
| Total | 1772 | 537 | 2309 |

** the data provided excludes Investment Companies and economic appraisal / technical assistance data
Source: International Fund for Ireland database – February 2010*

Role of International Community in Negotiations and Peace Building

⁷ Peter Karari et al., “The Role of External Economic Assistance in Nurturing Cross-Community Contact and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties,” *Community Development Journal*, November 20, 2012, 592.

As international funders, the U.S. and the EU play an important role when trying to negotiate for peace and when trying creating a peaceful society. Removed from the conflict, the U.S. had a unique opportunity to be an “honest broker” and tried to bring the different groups together using economics.⁸ President Clinton decided to try utilizing the power of economic incentive to bring the different communities together. Though the U.S. originally used political influence to bring the opposing communities together on economic issues, they used this leverage to encourage and progress negotiations on a peace agreement. The Portland Trust recognizes that the U.S. advanced their economic involvement and played a role as a third party negotiator in the peace process. Their report explains that allowing third parties like the U.S. to deal with complex issues (such as decommissioning) “allowed the parties in the conflict more flexibility in their negotiating positions.”⁹ The U.S. ultimately used economic aid and investment to promote goodwill with all participants in the conflict. During the talks for a peace agreement, the U.S. focused on top-tier actors such as leaders of the different political parties and paramilitaries who need to be a part of any agreement.¹⁰ The U.S. continued to play the role of bringing together different groups for negotiations in the post-conflict discussions. George Mitchell, Special Economic Adviser on Northern Ireland, chaired the

⁸ Joseph R. Rudolph Jr and William J. Lahneman, *From Mediation to Nation-Building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict* (Lexington Books, 2013).

⁹ “Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland” (The Portland Trust, May 2007), 29,

http://www.portlandtrust.org/sites/default/files/pubs/epm_northern_ireland.pdf.

¹⁰ The U.S. was responsible for being the mediator among the British, Irish governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland along with the paramilitaries. These top-level actors were the people involved in brokering peace and represented their own group in the negotiations. See: George Mitchell, *Making Peace* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012).

meetings that produced the GFA. His successor, Richard Haass, later chaired a panel in Northern Ireland to discuss an agreement to address remaining issues in Northern Ireland including dealing with flags, emblems, marches, protests and addressing the past.¹¹ The U.S. also employed economic incentives to promote the peace process. In 2006, U.S. investment accounted for about 10% of all jobs in Northern Ireland and has contributed to significant foreign direct investment.¹² Support also persisted in the form of foreign aid through the IFI. The IFI started as solely economic in its mission to improve society in Northern Ireland, but ultimately it used economic aid to also promote peace building. Bringing in a third party perspective, the U.S. used economic incentive in order to progress the peace negotiations. Eventually these talks progressed into serious discussion on a peace agreement, with the help of important third party actors, such as George Mitchell. The U.S. continues to play a part in the negotiations for further peace and people like Mitchell remain key figures in these discussions. Post-Agreement, the U.S. has used its economic influence to encourage the region to strive towards a peaceful solution and a better society. A proponent of investment in Northern Ireland, U.S. companies have provided \$1.1 billion in capital investment and generated 4,000 jobs between 2004 and 2007.¹³ The U.S. has used investment and the funding of programs through the IFI to support these goals.

¹¹ “The Northern Ireland Peace Process Today: Attempting to Deal with the Past,” March 11, 2014, 27, <http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=10141&groupid=106703&pgId=3bb1ca10-5582-4814-8068-bc1883a66df0&rsId=14B1E17E1EB>.

¹² “Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland,” 29–30.

¹³ Kristin Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 8, 2014, 16,

The EU involvement within the peace process varied, as it did not formally engage in the negotiations, rather economically supporting the peace and reconciliation programs and focusing on the lower-level actors.¹⁴ The PEACE program aimed to work directly with communities to tackle the remaining issues in Northern Ireland of sectarianism and community tensions. As Racioppi and O’Sullivan explain, the EU aimed to target grassroots peace building rather than the higher-level leaders:

[T]he EU initiative reflects the approach of conflict resolution theorists, such as Lederach and Saunders, who argue that in the long run, peace can be sustained only if the efforts of elite-level politicians and (para)military leaders are reinforced by the participation and integration of ordinary citizens in the reconciliation process.¹⁵

The EU aims to work directly with the community members to address the social, political, economic, and psychological vestiges of the Troubles. This difference in mission to reach out to the grassroots level shows how different interventionists can have an impact on the peace process in diverse ways. The EU has chosen a bottom-up approach that has always focused programming on the need for reconciliation between

<http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=10141&groupid=106703&pgId=7f4fdb2a-1c76-4919-add8-b29ba3a3cb0d>.

¹⁴ Though there was no formal role for the EU in the negotiation process, there were European leaders who played a part in the agreement. The Irish government requested that a Fin, Harri Holkeri participate as a member in the International Body on Decommissioning of weapons and later as independent chairmen of the peace talks. Other international leaders participated in the decommissioning and in the talks as well, including Canadian John de Chastelain who was chosen by the British. See: George J. Mitchell, *Making Peace* (Arrow, 2000), 27.

¹⁵ Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See, “Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention: The European Union’s Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” *Peace & Change* 32, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 361.

communities. On the other hand, the U.S. used a top-down approach to bring higher-level actors together for formal negotiations and focused primarily on the economic improvement in Northern Ireland. Over time, the U.S. altered the mission of the IFI to incorporate more community issues. Despite this change, having different funding sources worked well in Northern Ireland since they were able to work together to tackle several issues. The EU and U.S. programs complemented each other in that they both worked towards the same goals, but went about it in different ways.

Bringing Sectors Together

As the previous sections explained, the funding bodies focused on creating cooperation among diverse people from different sectors in Northern Ireland. The IFI has been most successful at uniting the political leaders from the international community, Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland. The PEACE funds were used to encourage the creation of networks that integrate all levels of society into the peace process. There are a few sectors essential to the peace process: politicians, academics, and practitioners. Often these experts in their respective fields do not coordinate and collaborate with others despite the potential for furthering their goals. This section will discuss how the funding bodies have encouraged these sectors to interact and brought them together to work towards common objectives.

Scholars have turned their attention towards researching these international funding bodies and their role as third party actors in Northern Ireland. Academics are interested in how international funds can promote the peace process and the success of these programs at stopping sectarian violence and bringing communities together. For example, the CRC produced a report entitled *Sustainable Peace? Research as a*

Contribution to Peace-Building in Northern Ireland. This report includes research conducted by academic experts who are trying to improve the process through providing insight to these programs.¹⁶ Other scholars from the International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE) have written numerous reports about the funding organizations and their role in the peace process, such as *The Story of Peace: Learning from EU PEACE funding in Northern Ireland*. The purpose of this report is to evaluate the success of the PEACE programs and provide insights for other peace programs.¹⁷ PEACE provides funding to INCORE and the researchers have contributed to shaping the programs. The report claims that INCORE researchers helped define reconciliation for PEACE III, develop evaluation frameworks and conduct evaluations.¹⁸ There have also been scholars from abroad that have researched and expanded the academic interest in international funding bodies. Many of these scholars have conducted interviews, polls, and spent time working with these programs in order to understand the peace program. Scholars such as Sean Byrne, and Olga Skarlato have contributed to this body of work. Byrne has conducted interviews with community group leaders, development officers, and individuals from different communities. Byrne explained his research is “aimed at the audience of peace builders, including but not limited to practitioners, scholars,

¹⁶ Nick Acheson et al., *A Sustainable Peace?: Research as a Contribution to Peace-Building in Northern Ireland*, ed. Libby Chapman and Jim Dennison (Northern Ireland Community Relations Council, 2008), 48.

¹⁷ Kenneth Bush and Kenneth Houston, “The Story of Peace: Learning from EU PEACE Funding in Northern Ireland and the Border Region” (INCORE, n.d.), http://www.seupb.eu/Libraries/Corporate_Documents/The_Story_Of_Peace.sflb.ashx.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

politicians, international funding agencies and students of conflict and peace.”¹⁹ Byrne has critiqued both funding bodies ability to empower local civic society to have agency in their programs; he suggests further efforts to facilitate local input to ensure the peace process is truly a grassroots effort.²⁰ Scholars have aided the peace process by providing valuable insights on the progress made and suggestions for the future. The funding bodies have created research organizations that encourage scholars to study and bring their expert skills to further improve the peace process.

Politicians have been actively involved in the peace process by creating policy and negotiating peace agreements; however, they are also very involved in the peace process, taking place through the thousands of programs across the region. A report by the Community Relations Council examines the role of politicians in the peace process through their participation in projects like “Politicians and Community Relations.” The program recognized “the importance of the potential role of politicians in contributing to the improvement of community relations” and asked politicians to discuss their views of community relations, what they believed their role to be in improving division and how they could support initiatives.²¹ Politicians from Northern Ireland also promote the work of the international funding bodies. During the negotiation for the PEACE IV funding, Northern Irish First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness along with Sinn Féin MEP Martina Anderson worked together to

¹⁹ Sklarlato, Byrne, and Thiessen, “The Eu Peace II Fund and The International Fund For Ireland,” 352.

²⁰ Patlee Creary and Sean Byrne, “Peace with Strings Attached: Exploring Reflections of Structure and Agency in Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Funding,” *Peacebuilding* 2, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 64–82.

²¹ Acheson et al., *A Sustainable Peace?*, 47.

lobby for greater funds for the peace process.²² The Northern Ireland assembly also continues to apply the principle of power sharing, in which both communities must be a part of the decision making process. Politicians representing both communities must approve debates over sectarian issues that hinder the peace process, such as creating a shared education system. While the international funding organizations emphasize the need to promote shared education, it is politicians who are able to create policies that can support this system.²³ Politicians have become involved in sectarian issues through their involvement and interaction with the PEACE and IFI funding. They are influenced by the work of the programs and they also shape the peace process through participating in attempts to bring different sectors together.

Practitioners of peace and reconciliation process are actively involved in working with the funding agencies. Peace practitioners include the many community leaders that apply for funding from the IFI or PEACE. These practitioners also give testimonies about their opinions on the international funding bodies. They discuss the application process

²² Marc Hall, “Northern Ireland Peace Fund Faces EU Budget Uncertainty,” Text, *EurActiv | EU News & Policy Debates, across Languages*, (February 4, 2013), <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/northern-ireland-peace-fund-faces-eu-budget-uncertainty-263491>.

²³ The IFI has supported shared education and the NI Assembly has conducted reports on the matter. Therefore politicians are a part of the peace process. See: Department of Education Inspection Services Branch, *A Final Evaluation of the International Fund for Ireland’s Sharing in Education Programme | Education and Training Inspectorate*, Report (Inspection Services Branch, Department of Education, inspectionsservices@deni.gov.uk, November 28, 2013), <http://www.etini.gov.uk/international-fund-for-irelands-sharing-in-education-programme/a-final-evaluation-of-the-international-fund-for-irelands-sharing-in-education-programme.htm>; “Sharing in Education and Shared Education Programmes: International Fund for Ireland, ETI and UU,” accessed April 7, 2015, <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/official-report/committee-minutes-of-evidence/session-2013-2014/june-2014/sharing-in-education-and-shared-education-programmes-international-fund-for-ireland-eti-and-uu/>.

for funding, the progress of the peace process and the outcomes of the programs.²⁴ Working directly with the community puts the peace practitioners in an important position to report on the programs. They are able to see the lingering problems that face Northern Ireland post conflict, and continue to advocate for further funds to address these issues. Peace practitioners have expressed their hopes and fears for the future of the peace process and the role of the international funding bodies in this process.²⁵ Practitioners are in the middle of peace building as they participate in the process and help direct the work being done.

The PEACE and IFI brings together practitioners, politicians, and scholars in the peace process. These different sectors are no longer separated and have learned to collaborate. Through the creation of bodies such as INCORE or the Community Relations Council, different groups are able to discuss peace building practices and progress. They work together to find solutions to deal with the ongoing problems with the peace process. These international funding bodies create a network that provides a space for groups to come together and work towards the ultimate goal of sustained peace in Northern Ireland.

²⁴ Sean Byrne, Chuck Thiessen, and Eyob Fissuh, "Economic Assistance and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland," *Peace Research* 39, no. 1/2 (January 1, 2007): 7–22; Byrne et al., "The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland."

²⁵ Kawser Ahmed et al., "Civil Society Leaders' Perceptions of Hopes and Fears for the Future The Impact of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace III Fund in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties," *Humanity & Society* 37, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 5–34.

Problems with International Aid

While international funding is beneficial and the role of third-party actors can advance the peace process, these solutions require continued political and economic commitments from the international community. In order to maintain the peace process in Northern Ireland, each of the funding bodies must maintain support from the international community for projects in the region. This involves continued interests in current issues and the progress of Northern Irish peace. There also has to be substantial domestic political support for resources to be spent on continued peace processes. With the economic recession of 2007, the funding from these bodies decreased significantly, signaling a need to set aside funds in advance to prevent shocks from the domestic U.S. economy. Despite the reduction of money, necessary funding was maintained due to the multiple structures that support the peace process. This is a benefit of having multiple sources of input into economic aid, that if one organization decreases funding, there are other organizations to help offset the costs. While there have been great strides towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland, there are still lingering issues that face Northern Ireland, including protesting over sectarian issues and segregated communities. As funding from international bodies declines, there is decreased interest in the progress of Northern Ireland. Diplomat and former Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, Richard Haass explained, “there was some concern in the USA about recent tensions but given the problems elsewhere, Northern Ireland was not at the top of the US agenda.”²⁶ Interest in other critical regions pulls away international attention making the Northern Ireland

²⁶ “Richard Haass: Americans Thought NI Conflict ‘Was Resolved,’” *BBC News*, accessed April 26, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-24082782>.

peace programs not a major priority for the global community. Therefore maintaining continued support and attention, as well as including different sources of funding is important to the peace process in order to hedge the economic uncertainty.

U.S. support for the IFI and the Northern Ireland peace process has continued despite decreases in allocated funding. The Obama Administration continued to offer support to Northern Ireland and in a visit to the region in 2013 for the G8 summit; Obama declared the U.S would always “stand by” Northern Ireland.²⁷ In a speech in Belfast, Obama asserted the importance of the American-Northern Ireland relationship and continued support, especially economically of the peace process:

[Y]ou should know that so long as you are moving forward, America will always stand by you as you do. We will keep working closely with leaders in Stormont, Dublin and Westminster to support your political progress. We'll keep working to strengthen our economies, including through efforts like the broad economic initiative announced on Friday to unlock new opportunities for growth and investment between our two countries' businesses -- because jobs and opportunity are essential to peace.²⁸

The U.S. has also maintained an important investor to Northern Ireland. The U.S continued to foster a strong economic tie to the region by sending a special envoy and

²⁷ Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 15.

²⁸ “Remarks by President Obama and Mrs. Obama in Town Hall with Youth of Northern Ireland,” *The White House*, accessed April 26, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/node/220276>.

hosting economic conferences to promote U.S. foreign investment.²⁹ Continued strong support for the IFI by U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress have also been important to constant involvement economically. These measures have kept Northern Ireland a source of interest to the U.S., leading to continued congressional and presidential financial support to the region.³⁰ In a congressional hearing in 2014 held to discuss Northern Ireland, Representative William Keating declared, “The United States played a key role in brokering the Good Friday Agreement. We have a responsibility to continue to help the process move forward.”³¹ During the economic recession, there was a call to reduce or even stop funding to Northern Ireland. In 2011 the budget did not include a specific allocation for the IFI due to increased pressure; however, certain congressional members combined with the British, Irish and Northern Ireland governments called for continued support for the IFI. Therefore the budget in 2011 included \$2.5 million for the IFI, a dramatic decrease compared to the \$17 million provided in 2010.³² The overall support for Northern Ireland is still strong, but continuing economic aid to the region has many important components that must be maintained in order to sustain funding bodies.

²⁹ For further information on the current amount of capital investment and jobs created from U.S. investment see: Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 16.

³⁰ President Obama’s trip to Northern Ireland in 2013 showed the U.S. maintained a political interest in the events and condition of the region. The Congressional Research Service continues to write reports on Northern Ireland and the peace process. Congressional meetings continue to take pace on updates and concerns for Northern Ireland. See: Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process”; “The Northern Ireland Peace Process Today: Attempting to Deal with the Past.”

³¹ “The Northern Ireland Peace Process Today: Attempting to Deal with the Past,” 4.

³² Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 17.

The PEACE programs try to encourage the Northern Irish and international communities to be involved in the peace process through funding projects and being aware of the issues in the region. One leader believed the international funding made a statement to the politicians in Northern Ireland, explaining: “the funding has been a good demonstration from international government to people in general that peace is here.” Raccioppi and O’Sullivan agree: “The willingness to provide large amounts of ‘peace’ money serves to solidify and entrench the peace process in the minds of Northern Ireland residents as well as its political leaders.”³³ Part of the EU goal was not only to provide funding, but also to make the Irish and British government interested in the peace process by including them in the organization as funders. Though the EU provides most of the funding, they demanded that both the Irish and British governments would contribute to the PEACE Programme.³⁴ Despite the success of the PEACE funds there has been criticism regarding the potential destructive influence of international aid.³⁵ EU commissioner Johannes Hahn did not listen to the criticism, instead he confirmed that the proposed 150 million euro PEACE fund in Northern Ireland would focus on the continuing conflicts in the communities. After the “flags protests” broke out in 2013 attention was drawn to the rising unrest of Loyalist youth.³⁶ Therefore the future EU

³³ Byrne et al., “The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland,” 233–234.

³⁴ Raccioppi and O’Sullivan See, “Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention,” 372.

³⁵ Byrne et al., “The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland,” 233–243.

³⁶ Loyalist youth protested in the winter of 2012 and into 2013 over the government decision to only fly the Union Jack over Stormont only a certain number of days each year. For more on the “flags protests” see Ch. 1 and the section on Peace and the Day After.

funding would be directed “to train and educate young working-class loyalists who are politically and socially alienated from the peace process.”³⁷ Hahn expressed his committed support: “If there are dedicated programmes from the region that need support that will definitely improve the situation of these young people, particularly men, then they will get support. We have to create the opportunities to improve their personal situation.”³⁸ Bringing awareness of the current issues in Belfast and pledging continued support makes the peace process in Northern Ireland a relevant topic for the EU and global community. This support is essential when it comes to deflecting and fending off the attacks to stop funding altogether when a new round must be negotiated. Despite support for the Northern Irish peace process there were still disagreements over continuing funding and the amount of money that would be spent on a new round of PEACE funding. Opponents to funding delayed the EU from committing to PEACE IV. Debates in April 2013 among EU heads of state in Brussels showed there was opposition to the continuation of the program.³⁹ Targeted by member states of the EU for cuts, there were those who opposed giving further funding to Northern Ireland. Eventually, the EU established a budget for the programs, but this is evidence of the contentious nature of EU funding.

Sustainability

³⁷ Henry McDonald et al., “EU Peace Fund to Target Young Northern Ireland Loyalists,” *The Guardian*, accessed March 26, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/31/eu-peace-fund-northern-ireland-loyalists>.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Hall, “Northern Ireland Peace Fund Faces EU Budget Uncertainty.”

This leads to the second problem with international aid, which is that it is not meant to be permanent. As one of the main questions of those international funding bodies, the lifespan of these organizations must be determined for when funding is no longer needed. International leaders must set goals, requiring approval by the public or establishing an end date to these programs. Of course the peace process is a long and ongoing journey that will require constant work by communities in Northern Ireland. Eventually however, funding to peace building programs must end. These funding bodies are not meant to create lasting dependence on the need for foreign aid in order to address local issues. As described earlier, there was doubt within the U.S. for continued funding for the IFI, with some suggesting “the IFI was never intended to continue in perpetuity.”⁴⁰ In 2006 the Bush Administration did not request funding for the IFI in the president’s annual budget signaling a desire to wrap up and conclude IFI funding. Despite the missing request, Congress continued to appropriate funds to the IFI to show sustained commitment to the peace process.⁴¹ However, the act of not including the IFI in the budget is a symbolic gesture that implies U.S. intent to no longer provide funding in the future. As Representative Keating explained in the congressional hearings, “some Members of Congress have acted too hastily in pressing the administration to cut funding for the International Fund for Ireland and the Mitchell Scholarship.” He believes “zeroing out U.S. funding sends exactly the wrong message at a pivotal moment in the Northern

⁴⁰ Archick, “Northern Ireland: The Peace Process,” 17.

⁴¹ While both Bush and Obama have supported the efforts of the IFI, there has been a call for “winding down” the organization. See: Ibid.

Ireland peace process.”⁴² Yet the desire for a decrease and ultimately cessation of funding remains of interest to certain Members of the U.S. Congress. The sustainability of foreign aid and the decline of funding is a major issue to these programs. Therefore, the EU PEACE funds have emphasized a need to create a sustainable process. The extensive work of Byrne, Standish, Arnold, Fissuh and Irvin found that the challenges and importance of sustainable programming was a key aspect of the peace process. Community leaders find it a struggle when funding cycles cause programs to abruptly end: “They’re at it for two years and then the funding is pulled...because the funding period ended.”⁴³ Programs should aim to be sustainable and self-sufficient after funding cycles end, but when these services are offered to marginalized and economically deprived communities they are unable to pay for these services themselves. As PEACE IV begins there will be seven more years of EU funding in Northern Ireland. When the funding cycle comes to an end, there will be another discussion about whether or not the region needs another round of economic aid. As Sean Byrne and other scholars explain:

While some programmes will be taken over by the government, and become sustainable due to taxation, many other programmes doing good work will not be so fortunate. Although some programmes will survive with alternative funding, the majority will disappear; and in many

⁴² This statement, made in 2014 at a congressional hearing, refers to a “pivotal moment” as this time in which the “flags protests” and a particularly difficult marching season has caused alarm for rising tension in the region at the same time as funding sources, such as EU PEACE IV were being negotiated. See: “The Northern Ireland Peace Process Today: Attempting to Deal with the Past,” 4.

⁴³ Sean Byrne et al., “Economic Aid: The End of Phase II and the Impact on Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 3 (November 2009): 352.

communities in Northern Ireland the end of IFI and the PEACE [programmes] will affect everyone.⁴⁴

This constant concern for those involved in the peace process means sustainability of programs and importance of maintaining international support is key to the peace process. Scholars have given suggestions for how to take these programs and reincorporate them into the public sector that will allow the Northern Irish government to take over responsibilities. In the future this will become a growing concern for peace practitioners, scholars, government officials, and those leading the funding bodies. The long-term commitment of the U.S. and EU in the form of aid may end, but they will continue to support the work towards a sustainable peaceful society. That support will come in different forms as the peace process changes in Northern Ireland.

Discussion

The purpose of international aid is to help the Northern Irish society rebuild in order to create a lasting peace. The aid has a positive impact on the community by reducing sectarianism and violence as well as bringing communities together and forging relationships. In forming international funds for Northern Ireland, other actors have played a role in both bringing about and sustaining peace. Involvement in the IFI and in economic issues in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought the U.S. into the political negotiations for peace. The special role the U.S. played is centered on its involvement in the peace talks, but it is its foreign investment that continues to keep the U.S. interested in the issues of Northern Ireland. The EU became involved in the Northern Irish conflict

⁴⁴ Ibid.

through the creation of PEACE funds and has continued to monitor the status of the progress in order to further the goal of promoting a peaceful Europe. While Northern Ireland is no longer considered a top international concern, there is still significant interest in sustaining peace. Now fifteen years after the GFA, the IFI and PEACE organizations still exist. Each round of funds has attempted to adapt to the needs of the community and tried to improve services to address the lingering issues preventing peace. There was never a guarantee that the IFI and EU funds would continue for successive rounds, but the international community recognized the ongoing need for these funds and for international intervention. The IFI and PEACE programs utilized different missions and tactics in order to complement each other's work rather than create a repetitive process. Their continued financial support has given life to new programs. It has kept the international community concerned and kept active participants in the peace process. And it is important that even as financial support wanes, the role of the international community in the peace process remains strong. The U.S. and EU will continue to press for progress in human rights issues through supporting programs that address the continued segregated society that prevents shared education. In 2014 Richard Haass chaired talks to discuss lingering human rights issues in Northern Ireland and issues preventing peace. His report encouraged Northern Ireland to start a new initiative for dealing with historical injustices and resolving the issue of flags and marches. Continuing to participate in the peace process with financial and political support, the international community shows a lasting commitment to the peace process. The intervention from these third party actors has encouraged agreements, provided economic incentive, and positively impacted communities to reconcile after conflict. The future of these programs

and their lasting influence depends on continued interest from the international community.

Conclusion: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Examining the IFI and EU PEACE funds has highlighted general themes about creating and maintaining international support. In this last chapter I will examine the overall findings of this research and why it is a relevant case to investigate. I start by assessing important lesson from Northern Ireland and the relevance for future cases. Then I give recommendations for the case of an Israeli and Palestinian peace process.

Key Takeaways

A few elements of a successful peace process shown by the case of Northern Ireland include: using multiple strategies, targeting programs effectively, and ensuring the stability of the peace process.

First, the use of multiple international funding bodies was effectively implemented in Northern Ireland. Between the IFI and the PEACE funding, there were two different organizations using different strategies to tackle post-conflict issues. While both bodies adapted over time, they continued to work on creating change in the community. Programs funded under each organization varied in their approach to solving issues, but they worked toward the same goal of promoting peace and reconciliation. In order to create multiple funding bodies, there must be international interest in the peace process. It is therefore important to incorporate international actors in reaching an agreement and encouraging cooperation in funding the transition out of violent conflict.

Having a variety of funding organizations also creates a system that is not dependent on only one source of money and support.

Second, it is crucial to ensure that funds are going to target programming and that support is equitably distributed to each group to encourage their participation. This requires constant communication and consultation between the funding agencies and the grassroots organizations and local leaders who deliver programs. Collaboration among these groups ensures effective programming and makes the process more efficient. Community feedback and constantly adapting to the needs of the participants of programs shows the interest of the funding body in local concerns. The EU PEACE organization was structured to encourage a devolved process by creating Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs). The funding by both the IFI and PEACE created networks among those involved in the peace process to promote cooperation and dialogue in order to produce programming that best served the community. It is also important that these programs incorporate all members of society. As the “flags protest” in 2013 showed, there are Loyalist youth who believe they have been left out of the peace process. It is essential that funding bodies target all marginalized groups in order to reach members of each community that could create an opposition to the peace process.

Third, the need to create a process that can be sustained by international funding for a length of time and continued long after is an essential part of the peace process. The international community must create endowments in order to ensure the organizations will be funded for long periods of time. External international economic funding bodies must strive to create networks and institutions that will continue even after the termination of these organizations. As the PEACE fund shows, creating structures such as

District Partnerships and Intermediary Funding Bodies has encouraged cooperation among local partners and contributed to sustainable programs. The IFI brings together leaders from different governments in order to establish strong relationships between leaders who will work together on future issues in the region. Both these funds have brought together actors in different sectors and from different levels to promote cooperation and lasting connections that will continue beyond the lifetime of the PEACE and IFI organizations. Equally important is ensuring there is support from all parties involved, especially the local government and local community members. Without the interest of those in power and those affected by the conflict, there is little the peace process can do in order to create lasting change. Encouraging government officials and community members to get involved in the peace process will inspire individual actors to commit to reconciliation in the long run and find ways to support these programs and initiatives even after funding ends.

Relevance for Future Cases

Examining the international funds in Northern Ireland is important because it shows how to create organizations that are not based on international initiatives. Roger Mac Ginty explains the danger of third party actors in creating and implementing a peace model “whereby the vision of peace is made off-site, shipped to a foreign location, and reconstructed according to a pre-arranged plan.”¹ The liberal democratic peace model Mac Ginty refers to can often prevent a lasting peace by removing local actors from

¹ Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 39.

participating in forming the solution. In order to combat this threat, Mac Ginty suggests hybrid models that require the participation of local actors in creating and taking ownership of the peace and reconciliation process. Looking at the Northern Ireland case can help explain how to implement a hybrid model and provide suggestions for establishing the role of international and transnational actors.

Though no two conflicts are the same, key elements of a successful peace model structured after Northern Ireland can contribute to improving peace and reconciliation efforts taken in other regions affected by violence due to ethno-political conflict. While scholars have debated if the Northern Irish lessons can be transferred to other regions, using this case to provide insights to future endeavors in peace building will only provide guidance rather than implement the same programming and structures in another region.² Of particular interest to peace scholars and practitioners is how the lessons of Northern Ireland can apply to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Several pieces of scholarship already relate the cases of Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine and examine them in relation to one another.³ There are even research institutes trying to analyze the role of economics in

² James Hughes, "Paying for Peace: Comparing the EU's Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo," *Ethnopolitics* 84, no. 3–4 (2009): 275–85; Timothy Murithi, *The Ethics of Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Robin Wilson, *The Northern Ireland Experience of Conflict and Agreement: A Model for Export?* (Manchester ; New York: Manchester University Press, 2010).

³ Colin Knox, Padraic Quirk, and Robert O. Matthews, "Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, Israel & South Africa: Transition, Transformation & Reconciliation," *International Journal* 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 718; Shulamit Ramon et al., "The Impact of Political Conflict on Social Work: Experiences from Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine," *British Journal of Social Work* 36, no. 3 (April 1, 2006): 435–50; Guy Ben-Porat, *Global Liberalism, Local Populism: Peace And Conflict in Israel/palestine And Northern Ireland* (Syracuse University Press, 2006); Sean Byrne, "Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa at a Crossroads: Understanding Intergroup Conflict, Peace-

the Northern Irish case to apply its lessons to the Middle East. Foundations such as The Portland Trust are “committed to encouraging peace and stability between Palestinians and Israelis through economic development” and have produced studies on how international involvement in economic initiatives and mediation worked in Northern Ireland. The Trust “hope[s] that some of these lessons prove useful in the Middle East.”⁴ While this scholarship provides information on certain elements of the peace process and suggestions for the Middle East, this paper aims to provide insight specifically on the creation of international funding bodies that play a role in the peace process.

Before giving suggestions to the conflict in Israel and Palestine, it is important to note the differences between a peace agreement and process that started in the 1990s from one that would take place today. One of the biggest differences is the explosion of international aid and involvement in conflict regions. While there were international actors in Northern Ireland, there were no major international organizations working within the region involved in the peace process.⁵ However, the disputed territories of Israel and Palestine all have a significant presence of international NGOs, business, and international governmental aid. Therefore there are more invested and interested parties in the peace process. This causes more opportunities for funding, but also more opportunities for conflict between foreign actors. The more funding bodies, the bigger the risk of implementing programs that are not initiated by the local community, but rather

Building, and Conflict Resolution,” *International Journal of Group Tensions* 28, no. 3–4 (December 1, 1999): 231–53.

⁴ “Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland” (The Portland Trust, May 2007), 4.

⁵ There were a few NGOs and charities involved in Northern Ireland, but none aimed at ending the conflict or in creating a shared community.

by international actors who are applying a liberal democratic peace model. A quick glance at a site such as Peace NGO Forum lists over 50 organizations working on conflict resolution and dialogue alone; many of these organizations involve international actors as funders and peace practitioners.⁶ One example of an inter-governmental initiative focusing on economic development is the creation of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan, Egypt, and Palestine. Established by the U.S. in 1997, the QIZs form free trade zones to encourage economic cooperation in order to create stability in the region.⁷ While these differences make the Israel/Palestine issue more complex, looking to how Northern Ireland was able to incorporate international actors into the peace process can provide guidance to these existing organizations and examples for future models.

Based on the Northern Irish case, we can envision a number of case-relevant measures. Suggestions include: creating international cooperation, establishing flexible institutions, and evaluating the work of these funding bodies.

1) Create international cooperation- With several third-party actors interested in the peace process, it is important to capitalize on their interest by combining like parties into one funding source to simplify the procedure. For example, several countries interested in supporting the peace programs all provided funding for the International Fund for Ireland. It is also equally important to have a main funder within the group that can help lead the overall direction of the organization, as the U.S. has done for the IFI. Though the EU created their own organization to approach problems differently (from a bottom-up perspective), it is important to remember these organizations worked in conjunction with

⁶ "Peace NGO Forum," <http://www.peacengo.org/en/ListOfOrganizations>.

⁷ Galia Press-Barnathan, *The Political Economy of Transitions to Peace* (University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2009).

each other. They created a balanced structure that utilized different strategies and missions to work towards the same goal.

2) Establish flexible institutions- In order to adapt to the changing situations of the peace process and the demands of the community, funding bodies must have a flexible structure that encourages change over time. Determining strategic plans and goals for a limited amount of time urges the organization to reevaluate their work and adjust to suit the needs of the region. For example, when the IFI eventually created a new plan for focusing on community reconciliation they showed that their organization was capable of change and focused on what would best promote the peace process. This also means creating institutions that can fit the personalities and work styles of the local community members and peace practitioners. The EU PEACE structure that created the IFBs placed a great amount of control in the hands of local community members rather than international actors. Establishing a structure of these organizations but allowing it to adapt is ultimately the best way to create a funding body that will best serve the peace process.

3) Evaluate the funding bodies- In order to understand the effect of the IFI and EU PEACE programs on the peace process; research must be conducted that provides evidence of a positive impact on the community. Thanks to external evaluation, the funding bodies can look at reviews of all their programs, collect feedback from participants, and receive suggestions from outside consultants. This not only helps the funding bodies work more efficiently, but also provides confirmation of their success and progress. Encouraging scholars to conduct interviews and write about these funds also bolsters international awareness and support for the peace process.

The Northern Irish peace process remains relevant today because of the lessons it can provide for future cases, such as ones emerging in the Middle East. The Alliance for Middle East Peace is a network of over 70 organizations have called for an International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace in order to support grassroots peace-building efforts. Inspired by the IFI, this organization believes this international economic aid will “bring an expert, strategic approach to grassroots peace-building targeting funding on joint economic development and civil society projects.”⁸ This call for a similar organization shows that the case of Northern Ireland is relevant and provides recommendations for those working towards peace in the Middle East. While there is no exact model that can be directly transferred to another region, there are overarching themes that prove to be important in creating international funding bodies. The IFI and EU PEACE funds played an important role in peace building after the Troubles and therefore provide an excellent example of how to establish, structure and sustain international funding bodies. In learning from these organizations, peace practitioners and international actors can better prepare for future cases of post-conflict work.

Conclusion

Upon returning from Belfast in the fall of 2013, I was suddenly drawn to the peace between Palestinians and Israelis. In my classes and in my discussion with peers, I realized all attention was on the terms of the agreement. Suddenly I understood that not enough emphasis is placed on the structures established to help support and maintain the

⁸ “Alliance for Middle East Peace,”
http://www.allmep.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=10

peace. Having just spent time in Northern Ireland, I realized that the challenge was not simply in negotiating for peace, but in creating a sustainable peace after violence comes to an end. What happens the day after a peace agreement is signed? I imagined a historical day in which both sides posed for photos and announced that at last, there was peace in the Middle East. Yet, I knew that would not be the end of the story, in fact it would be the beginning of a new chapter. The important steps would be taken after an agreement. The peace process would formally begin and there would be heightened international awareness and interest in supporting the new peace. This would most likely translate into pledging aid to the region. Economic incentives and assistance to the peace process are sure to play an important role in negotiations. I realized that the case of Northern Ireland could provide valuable insights regarding the creation and sustaining of international funding bodies. This thought is what sparked my idea for this paper and has continued to show me the relevance of looking to Northern Ireland.

I have also stayed in touch with friends and colleagues from Belfast and tried to stay up to date with any new developments in the region. I still believe the peace process has a long way to go, but I am also hopeful for the local communities to start taking strides in owning the peace process completely international funding wanes. This transition will also have valuable lessons to share, making the continued exploration of the Northern Ireland peace process relevant. I support those working in the community in their continual efforts to create a shared society that will remain peaceful and prosperous for all members. I hope one day to return to Belfast and hear that the issues that once marked the community have given way to understanding and respect for one another. It is

only through continued efforts that this future can be reached and I hope my work has contributed in some slight way to the ongoing peace process.

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Appendix 1

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) Key Points:¹

Confidence-Building

- Parties commit to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences over political issues.

Constitutional

- British and Irish governments recognize the right of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their constitutional status
- The Irish Constitutional claim to Northern Ireland is removed

Strand One

- The Assembly is granted extensive legislative and executive powers
- Assembly members are required to designate themselves as “unionist” or “nationalist” or “other”

Strand Two

- A North-South Ministerial Council is created to exchange information, coordinate policies, and agree on common policies

Strand Three

- A British-Irish Council is created

Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity

- Human Rights Commission and Equality Commission is established
- Commitments are made to promote reconciliation and provide required services to the victims of violence

Decommissioning

- Parties commit to achieve decommissioning of all paramilitaries within two years of the agreement by referendum

Security

- The British government commits to normalizing its security posture

Policing and Justice

- Commissions are created to make recommendations for reform

Prisoners

- The British and Irish governments agree to put in place a scheme for the early release of politically motivated prisoners convicted of paramilitary offenses

¹ Stephen Farry, “Northern Ireland: Prospects for Progress in 2006?,” *United States*

Appendix 2

The Following graph details the type of projects supported by the International Fund for Ireland from January 2006 to February 2010. Please Note: CBESR stands for Community-based Economic and Social Regeneration.²

| Programme | No. of projects | % of total | Amount Approved (£) | % of total |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------|------------|
| CBESR | 82 | 24.6 | 20.8m | 23.2 |
| Community Bridges | 73 | 21.9 | 15.0m | 16.7 |
| Integrating Community Organisations | 35 | 10.5 | 3.8m | 4.2 |
| Legacy | 17 | 5.1 | 14.5m | 16.2 |
| Education | 13 | 3.9 | 12.3m | 13.7 |
| Youth - Wider Horizons | 9 | 2.7 | 3.8m | 4.2 |
| Community Leadership | 6 | 1.8 | 2.0m | 2.2 |
| Youth – LET | 2 | 0.6 | 2.8m | 3.1 |
| Youth – KEY / KEY START | 2 | 0.6 | 4.3m | 4.8 |
| Youth - GRIT | 2 | 0.6 | 0.4m | 0.4 |
| Communities in Transition | 2 | 0.6 | 2.2m | 2.5 |
| Shared Future Neighbourhood | 1 | 0.3 | 0.7m | 0.8 |
| Integrating Housing | 1 | 0.3 | 0.8m | 0.9 |
| Pre-2006 | 89 | 26.6 | 6.2m | 6.9 |
| Rural Development | 6 | 1.8 | 0.3m | 0.3 |
| Business Enterprise | 12 | 3.6 | 0.9m | 1.0 |
| CRISP | 24 | 7.2 | 0.3m | 0.3 |
| Police | 1 | 0.3 | 0.2m | 0.2 |
| Special Projects ²⁴ | 17 | 5.1 | 2.6m | 2.9 |
| Tourism | 10 | 3.0 | 0.7m | 0.8 |
| Urban Development | 17 | 5.1 | 0.9m | 1.0 |
| Border Towns | 2 | 0.6 | 0.3m | 0.3 |
| Total | 334 | 100 | 89.6m | 100 |

* the data provided excludes Investment Companies and economic appraisal / technical assistance data
Source: International Fund for Ireland database – February 2010

² Deloitte, “External Review of the International Fund for Ireland” (International Fund for Ireland, December 2010), 21, <http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/deloitte-external-review>.

Appendix 3

The following chart is a detailed description of the PEACE program from PACE I to PEACE III.³

| Theme | Peace I Programme | Peace II Programme | Peace II Extension Programme | Peace III Programme |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Period | 1995-1999 | 2000 - 2004 | 2004 - 2006 | 2007-2013 |
| Allocation | EU Contribution €500m National Contribution €167m Total: €667m | EU Contribution €531m National Contribution €304m Total: €835m | EU Contribution €78m National Contribution €82m Total: €160m | EU Contribution €225m National Contribution €108m Total: €333m |
| Eligible Area | Northern Ireland & Border Areas, 6 counties of NI and 6 border counties of IRL, 25,691sq km | Northern Ireland & Border Areas, 6 counties of NI and 6 border counties of IRL | Northern Ireland & Border Areas, 6 counties of NI and 6 border counties of IRL | Northern Ireland & Border Areas, 6 counties of NI and 6 border counties of IRL |
| Funding | ERDF, ESF, EAGGF, FIGG | ERDF, ESF, EAGGF, FIGG | ERDF, ESF | ERDF |
| Delivery Structure | DFP/DPER (formerly Dept. of Finance, DoF) | SEUPB | | SEUPB |
| Local Dimension | 64 Implementing Bodies - 20 Government Departments - 12 Intermediary Funding Mechanisms (IFMs) (i.e. 8 Intermediary Funding bodies (IFBs) and 4 sectoral partners) | 56 Implementing Bodies - 12 Government Departments - 12 IFBs | | Accountable Departments: NI – DFP, OFMDFM, DSD, IRL – DECLG, DPER 2 Implementing Bodies: JTS and the Consortium (CRC and Pobal) |
| Advisory | - 32 local delivery structures (26 District Partnerships in NI and 6 County Council Led Taskforces (CCTF) in Border Region) | - 32 local delivery structures (26 Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs) and 6 CCTFs) | | 14 local delivery structures (7 Peace Clusters and a standalone Belfast Peace Partnership in NI and 6 County Council Lead Partnerships in the Border Region) |
| Target Groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultative Forum • Management Committee - representatives of the EC, consultative forum (advisory role) & implementing bodies. • Monitoring Committee • Northern Ireland Partnership Board | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North/South Ministerial Council • Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group • Monitoring Committee • Distinctiveness Working Group • Project Selection Panels • Regional Partnership Board | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North/South Ministerial Council • Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group • Monitoring Committee • Steering Committee | |
| Aim | Targeting actions on the most vulnerable groups and deprived. Directed towards the creation of jobs and also recognised the importance of those who benefit from the creation of those jobs, with a particular emphasis on reducing disadvantage. | Victims of the conflict; Ex-prisoners and their families; Displaced persons; Former members of the security and ancillary services; Young people, women and older workers insofar as they have been prevented from fulfilling their potential. | Victims of the Conflict; Displaced Persons; Women; Children; Older People; Minority Communities; Ex-prisoners and their families; Former members of the security and ancillary services; Public Organisation; Community & Voluntary Organisation; and Private Organisation | Victims of the Conflict; Displaced Persons; Women; Children; Older People; Minority Communities; Ex-prisoners and their families; Former members of the security and ancillary services; Public Organisation; Community & Voluntary Organisation; and Private Organisation |
| | To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation by increasing economic development and employment, promoting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-border co-operation and extending social inclusion. | To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective 1: Addressing the Legacy of the Conflict • Objective 2: Taking Opportunities Arising from Peace • Sub-objective: Promoting actions that will 'pave the way to reconciliation'. | To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society, To promote reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region | To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society, To promote reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region |

| Theme | Peace I Programme | Peace II Programme | Peace II Extension Programme | Peace III Programme |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Programme Structure | 6 Priorities, 8 Sub Programmes, 32 Measures Priorities: 1. Employment 2. Urban Regeneration 3. Rural Regeneration 4. Cross border development 5. Social inclusion 6. Productive investment and industrial development | 6 Priorities, 34 measures & 22 Sub-measures Priorities: 1. Economic renewal 2. Social integration, inclusion and reconciliation 3. Locally based regeneration and development 4. Outward and forward looking region 5. Cross-border co-operation 6. Technical Assistance | | 2 Priorities & 4 Themes 1. Reconciling communities • Building positive relations at a local level • Acknowledging and dealing with the past 2. Contributing to a shared society • Creating shared public spaces • Develop key institutional capabilities for a shared society. |
| Horizontal / Cross-cutting Themes | 6 Principles (Additionality, Targeting, Partnership, Bottom-up approach, Complementarity, Equity & Balance) | Originally 10 Horizontal Principles - reduced to 5 Horizontal Principals & 5 Guiding Principles (reduced complexity of selection process) | | Five Cross-Cutting Themes: Cross-Border Cooperation; Equality of Opportunity; Sustainable Development; Impact on Poverty; and Partnership |
| Application Process | Two-stage appraisal process, particularly for medium and larger grant applications. Larger grant applications were often subject to external appraisal. | Part A and Part B of the Peace II Application Form were designed to facilitate the completion of applications electronically. The length of the application form was reduced. Rejections followed up with letter and debrief. Approvals were scored and appraised where applicable before letter of offer. NB. Economic appraisal applicable for projects over €250,000. Measuring distinctiveness became a feature of Peace II and projects were asked to demonstrate how they would contribute to 'building reconciliation'. However, this was not given high prominence in the programme and it wasn't until the Peace II Extension that a definition of 'reconciliation' was agreed. The weighting for reconciliation in the project selection process was increased from 6% in Peace II to 20% in the Peace II Extension. On average, it took just over five months to process an application in the Peace I Programme, those subject to an economic appraisal nine months | | Stage 1 – Basic eligibility check consisting of eligibility criterion. Stage 2 – Full appraisal and scoring. Economic appraisal applicable for projects over €1m (raised from €500,000 in November 2012). Unsuccessful applicants can request a de-briefing. Peace III projects are selected and awarded funding based firstly on of meeting the programme, priority and theme specific objectives (60% weighting) which are directly linked to 'reconciliation' and secondly on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness and will have due regard to the cross-cutting themes (40%). The average application processing time across all themes is 56 weeks, above the EC's recommended 39 weeks. The length of assessment time is dependent on the level of approval required and whether the relevant accountable department (Ref. Section 4.3.1). |

³ Sarah McCarthy, “Special EU Programmes Body: Mid-Term Evaluative Study of the Experiences of the Peace III Programme to Date Including Implications for a Peace IV Programme” (SJ Cartmin, June 2013).

| Theme | Peace I Programme | Peace II Programme | Peace II Extension Programme | Peace III Programme |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Outputs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Of the 31,000 applications, 15,000 received funding and over 60% was awarded to disadvantaged areas. Over 5,000 had a social inclusion remit reaching over 800,000 participants or almost 38% of the population in NI and the Border Region of Ireland Almost one-third of all grants awarded in Northern Ireland and over one-quarter awarded in the Border Region were small grants (£3,000 or less). While this represented only 2% of the overall programme expenditure (c18,000 grants) small grants played an important role in helping a wide variety of marginalised groups access funding for the first time. Two-thirds of all projects were cross-community and over 50,000 participants engaged in cross-border activities for the first time. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peace II Projects supported – 7,100 Programme participants - 868,420 Individuals participating in cross-border activities - 161,559 Individuals participating in Reconciliation projects - 42,772 Number of groups involved in Reconciliation Projects - 1,638 Individuals gaining qualifications - 100,767 Individuals entering or progressing in employment, education and training - 77,652 | | <p>On completion of the programme Peace III will have supported around 400, mostly large scale, strategic projects. 214 projects funded to date (31st December 2012).</p> <p>Achievements against output indicators: (to be verified):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programmes developed and implemented - 2,031, Target 34 Participants at events that address sectarianism and racism or deal with conflict resolution – 308,214, Target 92,742 People in receipt of trauma counselling 7,164, Target 5,645 Participants at events assisting victims and survivors 35,229, Target 28,552 Conflict resolution workshops 1,966, Target 1,393 Participants at conflict resolution workshops 23,144, Target 12,732 |
| Benefits/Impacts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Between 60-70% of participants in training and development projects achieved a positive outcome, measured by progression to employment, further/higher education or training. The total net job creation outcome for the Programme is estimated to have been in the region of 7-8,000 jobs. The community and voluntary sector received an employment boost of over 6,000 posts Just over 13% of the projects said that they had created new cross border linkages or networks. These projects also claimed that they had enabled over 50,000 participants to engage in cross-border activities for the first time. Increased awareness of the need for reconciliation. Opportunity to support macro-level political developments through a variety of initiatives at local/community level. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Many thousands of people received qualifications through new training About 2,000 jobs were created Supported activities in areas, sectors and groups affected by the conflict Contribution towards building peace and reconciliation A greater understanding of the legacy of the conflict A greater sense of community pride Positive health and social well-being Development of cross-community contacts Provision of enhanced levels of community capacity and infrastructure Town centre regeneration Increased awareness of tourism potential Increased cross-border travel Facilitation of cross border development New ways of working together Promotion of innovation Catalyst for development Improved levels of social capital Improved relations between stakeholders in local economic development Greater cultural awareness Revitalisation of communities Enhanced opportunities for integration through children's activities and sport Increased confidence in smaller communities | | <p>Achievements against impact indicators (31 Dec 2012):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in the percentage of adults who think relations between Protestants and Catholics are better than they were 5 years ago (2005: 52%; 2009: 60%; 2010: 62%) Increase in the percentage of people who think that there are less Loyalist murals and flags on display these days than there were 5 years ago (2005: 17%; 2009: 34%; 2010: 36%) Increase in the percentage of people who think there are less Republican murals and flags on display these days than there were 5 years ago (2005: 23%; 2009: 40%; 2010: 40%) Percentage of people who think the neighbourhood where they live is a neutral space (Always/ Sometimes 2005: 88%, 2009: 89%, 2010: 86%) |
| Theme | Peace I Programme | Peace II Programme | Peace II Extension Programme | Peace III Programme |
| Monitoring | The evaluation model had three key elements: The conceptual model, providing an overarching route-map for analysis of the programme; Descriptive indicators framework, identifying the data requirements for the evaluation; and Quantitative and qualitative performance indicators | Monitoring and evaluation framework. Implementing bodies were required to complete distinctiveness reports, examining progress towards peace building and identifying impact A range of indicators (Programme, Priority, Measure and Context Indicators) were developed. Recognition of further work required to develop the indicators. A key experience gained from Peace I was that aims and objectives and performance / impact indicators should be developed to reflect these objectives in advance of commencement of a programme. | | Aid for Peace Approach |

Appendix 4

The following table describes the relevant stakeholders and interest of those involved in the PEACE fund. In particular note the inclusion of the UK and Irish governments and different local groups.⁴

| ACTOR | SUB-ACTOR | STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| European Union | Council of Ministers | Broad imperative to make a practical contribution to a peace process that had commenced within a member state of the Union |
| | European Parliament | Desire to foster awareness of the practical benefits of European integration, to make a practical – and visible – gesture of European solidarity |
| | European Commission | Local level participation and empowerment; precedent setting co-operative and management structures |
| | Funds | Within the structural funding system, different funds had different strategic objectives; sustainability |
| | ESF | European Social Fund: Concerned to improve disparities in employment throughout the EU with a focus on underdeveloped regions through training and capacity building |
| | ERDF | Concerned to strengthen economic cohesion in the EU by correcting imbalances between its regions, including direct aid to investments in SMEs, infrastructure, research, financial instruments, etc., towards the goal of 'convergence' |
| | EAGGF | European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund now replaced by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund EAGF and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development EAFRD in 2007 - was concerned with the development of and investment in agricultural holdings, modernisation, aid for start-up, compensation, processing and marketing, improving rural areas |
| UK Government | | Political motivation to embed the peace process by drawing on EU Structural Funding both as a 'peace dividend' and as an additional funding source for economic development and to incentivise peace |
| Irish Government | | Political motivation to embed the peace process by drawing on EU Structural Funding as a 'peace dividend' AND the bolstering of EU structural funding within the jurisdiction |
| State Bureaucracies | UK & Irish | The strategic objectives of the state bureaucracies is the effective dissemination of structural funds to projects it considers pertinent to the consolidation of both the peace process and state administration |
| Intermediate Funding Bodies | | Set up by PEACE Programmes as means to deliver the Programme. Strategically concerned with the effective distribution of structural funding to the Community and Voluntary sector in order to realise social inclusion objectives |
| Community Voluntary Sector | | The Community and Voluntary Sector (CV) is composed of a wide range of perspectives and strategic objectives. Objectives are specific to the mobilising imperatives of each CV group (e.g. women, youth, employment, etc). We can discern two broad objectives: (i) poverty alleviation and (ii) peace and reconciliation: (see below) |

⁴ Kenneth Bush and Kenneth Houston, "The Story of Peace: Learning from EU PEACE Funding in Northern Ireland and the Border Region" (INCORE, n.d.), 27–28, http://www.seupb.eu/Libraries/Corporate_Documents/The_Story_Of_Peace.sflb.ashx.

| ACTOR | SUB-ACTOR | STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | (i) Anti-Poverty | Concerned with the need for long-term investment in visibly deprived areas and in community development among particular sections of society largely marginalised from the economy |
| | (ii) Peace and Reconciliation | Concerned with directly engaging in the socio-cultural cleavage evident throughout the region, particularly in Northern Ireland. |
| Border Regional Authority | | Concerned to enhance the socio-economic development of the region under its remit |
| Corporate/ Business Sector | | Concerned to enhance investment in infrastructure and venture capital investment, as well as to foster direct investment in enterprise |
| Unions | | Concerned to enhance employment and training opportunities, and to protect and promote the interests of its members |
| District Partnerships/ LSPs | | Concerned to ensure optimum investment in <i>localised</i> initiatives of benefit to specific geographical and administrative areas |
| Local Authorities | | As above |