

***NORTHEAST ASIAN DYNAMISM: TEN TOP IMPEDIMENTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES***

by
Bruce Henry Lambert
Working Paper No. 145

May 2002

Postal address: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Office address: Sveavägen 65
Telephone: +46 8 736 93 60 Telefax: +46 8 31 30 17 E-mail: japan@hhs.se Internet: <http://www.hhs.se/eijs>

Northeast Asian Dynamism: Ten Top Impediments and Countermeasures

by

Bruce Henry Lambert

European Institute of Japanese Studies

Stockholm School of Economics

P.O. Box 6501

S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

bruce@reorient.com

Abstract: Northeast Asia has had trouble developing regional interaction, cooperation and market synergies; this paper summarizes key impediments and proposes various countermeasures. Suggestions include improvements in administrative transparency and property law, building on EU and ASEAN organizing experiences through benchmarking, and offering free or low-cost land to boost migration & investment. A bilingual annotated appendix lists over fifty multilateral coordinating initiatives & key organizations involved with Northeast Asia regional development.

Key words: regionalism; cooperation; tradition; infrastructural development; rapprochement; bridging historical frictions; land rush; opportunity costs & competitiveness

JEL codes: F02, F22, K4, O1, H77, J18, P45

When compared to ASEAN, the EU, and NAFTA, the Northeast Asian region has lagged over the past fifty years in developing even low-level interaction and synergies among the constituent parts. Few people are accustomed at present to viewing Northeast Asia as having great potential for consolidation. Even among those who imagine immense latent possibilities, it is easy to grow discouraged at official inactivity, distrust and seeming stagnation. The slow evolution has numerous causes, and some problems are more tenacious and unyielding than others are. The region is perhaps best presently characterized by grudging coexistence rather than dynamic cooperation.

The aims for this paper are to be rooted in factual analysis while being forward-looking and provocative. A list of top ten impediments to Northeast Asian dynamism provides a solid basis for subsequent discussion. These are factors that need to be addressed or overcome in order for new initiatives to take root and to succeed; they are not ranked in order of importance:

1) Only bold or foolish observers are not intimidated by Northeast Asia's huge domain

Analyzing impediments to Northeast Asian dynamism has a major difficulty: the wide and multi-faceted domain involves culture, logistics, politics, etc. Research specialists in management, policy

studies and economics should not thereupon avoid the topic, thus ceding it completely to our bold geopolitical security colleagues. Cross-disciplinary teams might be constructed to focus on, and widely debate, topics such as regional & international economics, geopolitics, strategy, management & logistics, historical legacy, and how to bridge language & culture differentials.

2) **From poor regional definition to new development through boosting the rule of law**

There may be substantial debate as to what constitutes Northeast Asia. But with ample dynamism, the 'set of members' is not highly important. The general area has huge potential: some sections have rich and underexploited mineral, timber, energy and marine resources; the populations are hard-working and often well-educated: the region could be much more significant as a transshipment route between the Pacific Rim nations and Europe. But economic instability and legal uncertainty limit the area's appeal as a possible site for investment. This lack of confidence leads to fewer goods & services being available at market and higher costs for available items. Some lessons may be learned from the frontier development of North America in the 19th century. A basic flagrant problem was with lack of services, but such services developed alongside the introduction of law, deeds and property title. When asset values are captured to property title and deed, they can easily be transferred and are the underpinning of subsequent lending and capital accumulation (de Soto 2001). Use of risk capital is encouraged through legal safety mechanisms, providing redress from local irregularities and regulatory impediments. No doubt better legal systems and enhanced administrative transparency would improve conditions in Northeast Asia.

The European Union and ASEAN have achieved hard-fought developments in logistics, and in balancing different systems of governance. They've gone far in collaborative standard-setting and the development of consensus. Many lessons could be applied to help the countries of Northeast Asia grow closer together. In constructing the EU, for example, agreements often were deliberately constructed to gradually introduce multi-stage confidence building measures, time deadlines (artificially determined) and subroutine triggers; implementation was often scheduled years ahead, providing opportunity for less committed participants to backtrack or withdraw.

Imagery from the 19th century North American frontier provides a provocative idea: Why not open at least part of the region to immigration - selected settlers from anywhere in the world might be granted land to live upon and to develop. Parts of Northeast Asia have the scope, possibly at first on a limited scale, to *revive the Land Rush*. This was the method where often thousands of people lined up on a border, and at a signal, could enter a territory and claim land for a home and farm. The land rush system has the benefit of populating an area quickly, with people bringing their own capital and

energies and seeking to survive as best they can. A limited land rush in Mongolia or the Russian Far East might involve pre-qualified participants or purchase of a license; the system might award land parcels (or choice of land parcels) through lottery; achievement of legal title could require settlers to take up residency on the property for a few years. Safeguards and details can be first arranged and tested on a limited scale. At minimum the plan should arouse in many people throughout the world a sense of curiosity and adventure.

In some respects the recent settlement of Oklahoma was the most remarkable thing of the present century. Unlike Rome, the city of Guthrie was built in a day. To be strictly accurate in the matter, it might be said that it was built in an afternoon. At twelve o'clock on Monday, April 22d, the resident population of Guthrie was nothing; before sundown it was at least ten thousand. In that time streets had been laid out, town lots staked off, and steps taken toward the formation of a municipal government. At twilight the camp-fires of ten thousand people gleamed on the grassy slopes of the Cimarron Valley, where, the night before, the coyote, the gray wolf, and the deer had roamed undisturbed. Never before in the history of the West has so large a number of people been concentrated in one place in so short a time. To the conservative Eastern man, who is wont to see cities grow by decades, the settlement of Guthrie was magical beyond belief; to the quick-acting resident of the West, it was merely a particularly lively town-site speculation." (Howard 1889 p.391)

Northeast Asia has a long history of revolution and change. The possibilities of a land rush can be a positive stimulus; a new wave of energizing *perestroika* and great strategic positioning. ***To welcome migrants and offer free land can be an important step to regional renewal and competitiveness, as such a system does not now exist elsewhere.***

3) WWII and the Cold War: a continuing legacy

Bitter memories of Japanese expansionism and WWII have yet to fully fade away. On top of such problems are ingrained habits and structural vestiges of the Cold War. Nations in the region still consider numerous issues unresolved, including a longstanding territorial dispute between Japan and Russia. The distrust remaining from WWII is evidenced by regional friction and complaints generated by the schoolbook authorization process of Japan's MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) and upon visits by Japanese government leaders to Yasukuni-jinja (which enshrines and memorializes the sacrifice of Japan's military war dead). The end of the Cold War has also left its mark around the region, with the decommissioning of missiles and military bases, the depopulation of certain defensive areas, and the rerouting of foreign aid and funds flows.

Substantial problems continue to exist within and between many parts of the region. China has chronic territorial problems, notably as involve Taiwan, in addition to frictions generated from thriving market forces conflicting with the ideological primacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Such anomalies may continue, or China may be forced, perhaps by outside forces, to reconcile key contradictions. North Korea's self-sufficient *juche* ideology often seems inherently divisive. There have been great changes with Russia and Mongolian relations over recent decades.

In addition to border disputes among various nations in the region, there is also unsettled sensitivity to terminology, such as the Sea of Japan vs. the East Sea (日本海 / 東海); the former is favored by Japan, and the latter by Korea. Government officials from both North & South Korea boycotted the Northeast Asia Economic Conference 2001 in Niigata Japan (run by Niigata area organizers & the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, ERINA 環日本海経済研究所) as the institute's Japanese name referred to the "Sea of Japan Rim" (環日本海; see Asia Pulse 2001).

Even so, it is clear that substantial goodwill exists in the region. There are many successful intra-regional investments and a widening market for intra-Asian tourism. There are a growing number of cross-border students, grass-root civic exchanges and international marriages. Friction still can erupt easily, however; politicians remain able to generate domestic media attention and gain personal leverage by denouncing their neighbor states' intentions.

Intransigence and narrow-mindedness have held-up development in the region. I believe that the Japanese leadership in particular has been misguided in failing to settle the territorial dispute with Russia that has existed since 1945 (at least) over Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai islands. Even today (May 2002) a large central sign just outside Tokyo Station (Yaesu side) proclaims that "The Day the Northern Territories are Returned is the Day of Peace" (北方の領土 かえる日 平和の日). What is the cost of such insistence? One result is diplomatic gridlock between two key nations, with Japan losing initiative and the chance to greatly influence regional development. Demands for fairness and justice only polarize the region. Many islands could be created if all the blood-soaked earth of WWII was piled together.

The antithesis to bitterness and recrimination is an emphasis on the common feeling of many who have experienced war, and a possible campaign focus for Northeast Asian reinvigoration: ***we must make the most of peace while we've the chance.***

4) Central sclerosis limiting Russian regional development

Siberia and the Russian Far East are limited in their range of action because of controls from Moscow. This is a common situation: frontier areas often chafe under strictures set by far-away central seats of government (for example, Japan's southern Okinawa Prefecture would like easier and expanded contacts with Taiwan, and there's much local support in Hokkaido and elsewhere for increased trade and interaction with Russia). This case of Russia is special however, in that Siberia and the Russian Far East are huge building blocks to regional prosperity. The isolation of the Russian Far East could be alleviated with expanded regional contacts. Tourism holds huge potential, but it is

still quite difficult to gather basic information and plan travel logistics. Kamchatka, for example, presently has only one international flight per week (to and from Anchorage, Alaska USA to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky in the south). The area has rich natural beauty, much wildlife of possible interest, and many hot springs that should attract tourists. But it is far easier to travel to areas such as Southeast Asia that are better served by international airlines and do not require citizens of most nations to obtain advance visas for tourism. Such rules are decided in Moscow.

Russia's geopolitical interests often internally conflict. Russia's European and Asian strategies are often differently formulated, at least in part because of special efforts to develop new roles as relate to the European Union and with NATO (through initiatives such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace). Possibilities are slowly developing for new projects initiated within the eastern regions of the Russian Federation, but much is threatened by federal infighting.

Russia might gain increased international stature through bold development initiatives in Asia.

5) America's national and global interests are omnipresent but evolving

Today the USA is a key player in most regions of the world. Because US strategic interests abound, US strategists wish to be kept abreast of new developments, and dislike being shut out of deliberations. This is perhaps why the USA was at first (followed by Japan and Singapore) antagonistic towards Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's concept of an East Asian Economic Grouping (later dubbed the East Asia Economic Caucus EAEC). The area was encouraged instead to devote effort to wider multilateral agreements such as the GATT and WTO. But at the same time the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union were steadily under development. The group finally came together with ASEM (the Asia Europe Meeting initiative) as representatives of Asia vis-a-vis Europe. The grouping is now operational as ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3; the ten nations of ASEAN, plus Japan, China and South Korea), and their relationships and interaction have steadily become closer. The USA is monitoring developments.

Other collaborative self-help initiatives that excluded the USA were also semi-stifled, only later to be resurrected. The idea of an Asian Monetary Fund is becoming more substantial with the institution of Bilateral Swap Arrangements, where Asian area governments will shore-up financial markets in times of crisis (this Chiang Mai Initiative of ASEAN+3 was only belatedly endorsed by the IMF). Kaur (2001) writes that during the 1997-98 financial crisis in Asia, the USA "adamantly refused" Mahathir's efforts to monitor (and probably to limit) speculative funds flows, but now the USA urges similar monitoring so as to identify terrorist fund flows. Opening-up Northeast Asia with any degree of swiftness will involve major policy initiatives. It can be expected that the implications of such

policies may be often difficult to predict, and new internal coalitions might involve outside interests; the Asian Highway project, the trans-Afghan oil pipeline, the Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas), Tumen River Development and KEDO are some such projects.

The USA can be a difficult counterpart to ally with because promised joint consultation is not always accomplished. The US political leadership sometimes acts unilaterally before briefing allies; Japan is quite familiar with this problem. There are often US domestic political reasons for unilateralism, or secrecy might reflect wider strategic concerns. However US allies can easily confuse lack of prior communication with arrogance, so it may be worthwhile that the US expends substantive effort to avoid giving such an impression.

We live in an unstable, inconstant world, and policy should adapt to changing circumstances. The USA is a major force in Northeast Asia in many ways, via accumulated goodwill, through corporate investments, and militarily. The latter status includes substantial naval power and forward bases in South Korea and Japan. Any search for Northeast Asian confidence building measures among affected nations should consider the perspective of the USA, recognizing that initial animus may evolve to ambivalence or accord.

6) Language and communications barriers

The use of English in Northeast Asia for discussions or conferences is reasonable in that it is not a native language of the area; all are equally disadvantaged. However the language barrier is substantial: it stifles confidence-building and limits wider mutual understanding, because many in the area are accustomed to seeing one or more of the other nations as a threatening enemy. That type of distrust is not easily circumvented nor quickly overcome, and substantial language barriers make it difficult to build a common sense of mutual tolerance and reciprocity. The region could turn inward and coalesce around the Japanese for their economic power, or around China for its huge population and potential. On the other hand, maybe the area might embrace English as a second language even more strongly to allow more widespread global competitiveness and reduce transaction costs when dealing with the rest of the world.

It is also easier to cater to ignorance and to cultivate historical enmity than to build and develop new cross-border initiatives or search for models of success. Demagogues and short-sighted patriots may be pleased that language barriers keep many uninformed or misinformed about their neighbor's lives and cultures. "Language barriers" is thus a convenient and value-free label for the continued existence of misunderstanding. While there is some indication that Western-derived youth culture,

even when inane, helps to bridge differences, the more classical arts and music are also often widely appreciated and go some way in smoothing differences.

7) **Korean partition**

The present condition of the divided Korean peninsula is a substantial irritant to most parties concerned. The USA has some 30,000 troops stationed in South Korea; other nations are also actively responsible for armistice monitoring. The maintaining of fortified borders and high levels of alert is very costly.

Korean people on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone have good reason to believe that reunification may be largely outside their bilateral capability. This is tragic. The recent tagging of the DPRK by the U.S. President as part of an 'axis of evil' gives further cause for alarm. *Increased interaction at both elite and grass-roots levels might help to defuse rhetoric, and identify enabling personnel who might help with rapprochement.* Regarding the DPRK society as a 'black box' permits added extremism from any front.

8) **Infrastructural challenges: climatic severity and scale of the wilderness**

One of the characteristics of Northeast Asia is severe winter cold. Many parts of the region have extensive flooding when snows melt; there are also large areas of desert. There are many mountains and in general a low percentage of arable land. Overall, large parts of Northeast Asia have very low population density and have yet to attract sufficient development resources. Many areas are isolated and in need of basic communications, transport, and other infrastructure.

The severity of the climate and the challenge of transport combine with political barriers in serving to preserve many resources that might otherwise have been greatly exploited. Major change is promised due to new collaborative possibilities between nations, assisted by energies and capital from the private sector. Even some physical barriers are being lowered. An advantage to the present trend of global warming is the possibility that for a few months each summer commercial shipping may soon be navigating the Northern Sea Route across the north of Russia. The opening up of that region to ordinary shipping is likely to engender territorial and security friction, counterbalanced by the promise of improved speed & lower cost via a one-third reduction of shipping distance between East Asia and Europe (MacKenzie 2002). Newly connected rail & highway links will further cut costs.

Capital to fuel infrastructural development might reasonably become available from Japan, Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan. Until now, opportunity costs for investment in Northeast Asia have been

high, as alternative investment areas such as Southeast Asia have promised better & faster returns. This pertains to manpower and talent flows as well: the highly skilled have found places elsewhere. This is changing in various ways as ASEAN develops: pioneers and early-adopters have made their fortunes or taken their losses; business is becoming more predictable and perhaps less exciting. But opportunity can migrate anywhere, but particularly to areas that have yet to catch-up to cutting-edge technology and organization. Development in Northeast Asian could boost all the Asian economies: lowering shipping costs in and out of the area, improving regional synergies, and possibly bringing a peace dividend with diminished security concerns. Small efforts can bring big cumulative causation benefits, where firms and clever individuals find it easier to join others operating in newly opened regions. As already noted, in the last few centuries the USA attracted pioneers from around the world; energetic, robust people flocked to the New World for adventure and opportunity. ***Pilot projects for new immigrants and new settlements in Northeast Asia should be undertaken. Tourism offers great potential and requires systematic promotion. Perhaps vigorous people can be enticed to Northeast Asia in spite of, or even because of, the rawness of nature.***

9) Lack of ideas: the mire of traditional thinking

Northeast Asia may be poised on the brink of greatness, but narrow thinking and inertia can still prevail. One trend that can be distinguished is that many people are abandoning rural areas for life in larger cities. Many, given the chance, will emigrate to foreign lands for greater opportunity. But is the region prepared for further inward or outward migration? Japan particularly has been extremely wary of immigrants, and many important social mechanisms promote harmony via homogeneity. The danger of being different is summarized in the Japanese proverb "the nail that sticks up gets pounded down" (出る杭[釘]は打たれる *deru kui [kugi] wa utareru*) - which encourages harmony regardless of right or wrong. Fresh ideas and energies from outside might rather be a positive catalyst. Positive change can be promoted by policies that include feedback loops and monitoring, along with providing sufficient time for local adaptation.

There has been little to motivate leadership in the Northeast Asian region. Japanese government initiatives face particular difficulty, as internal enmity and external opposition have both to be overcome. Japan is already part of the G-8. There is some choice in whether to remain on the sidelines as an already-wealthy nation, or to grasp new opportunity. There should at least be room for some Japanese people as individuals to seek out new horizons in continental Asia. The lands where their distant forebears once lived can flourish anew with multiethnic pluralist communities.

A weak domestic economy and local hardship can leave a population listless and lacking in initiative; but hardship sometimes stimulates motivation and generates change. People respond differently to adversity - as well as to opportunity! Nonetheless, there are ways to stimulate and reward creative thought, new ideas, improvements in policy, etc. Any community that successfully develops such ideas and such innovative people builds a good foundation for its future. There is great freedom and some hope for unilateral action by nations or sub-regions for demonstrative leadership that avoids chauvinism. *The good example might motivate more-sluggish neighbors.*

10) **Establishing a coordinating focal organization has thus far been unsuccessful**

Many major powers are involved in the Northeast Asian region. Both China and Russia are permanent (non-elected) members of the UN Security Council. Japan has the largest economy by far. The USA is not a geographic member of the region but has forward military bases, multiple interests, and the potential to destabilize agreements. There are also, of course, major industries both from the area and from elsewhere that are poised to prosper from consumer spending and/or government procurement (including some that would welcome military alert and hostilities).

Investment projects by the private sector must consider potential risk, expected turn-around time and return on investment. Early investors and public works contractors may generate windfall profits. Favorable terms can be agreed with less-sophisticated local or regional governments that are poorly briefed on full-cost calculations (for example, in cases of pollution) or that as yet are unconcerned about resource extraction being unsustainable. Private sector dynamism has both positive and negative effects.

There are important links between geopolitics and regional economic competitiveness. Supranational alliances take time to formulate, to debug, and to institutionalize. While political and economic leaders argue over the steps to putting key factors together, corporate interests, both domestic and international, add to the din through lobbying and public affairs efforts, and with concrete operational investments. Innovative projects may take unforeseen turns, and collaboration may be designed to satisfy multiple goals (Europe, for example, now welcomes other nations using euro reserves to counterbalance the US dollar). The citizenry waits or works for positive change: homes, jobs, peace and prosperity. No one should hold their breath expecting quick major transformation in Northeast Asia, yet we can steadily promote building blocks for future prosperity.

Bringing together a diverse group of nations poses various logistical problems as well as a need to overcome distrust. Some form of development driver is critical for stimulating mutuality and

communications improvement. In the Cold War (and in many previous wars) visions of a mutual enemy provided reasons to circumvent both historical enmity and entrenched indifference. What might be the driver(s) for bringing together Northeast Asia, and for promoting peace, prosperity and growth in coming decades? Regional synergies, increased transparency among governments, infrastructural development, and a dynamic private sector promise to boost economic competitiveness. But such promise may not be enough to overturn the present complacency. Vision and sustained efforts that focus and draw together diverse energies are greatly needed.

Domestic bureaucrats too often overlook the fact that their jobs have global ramifications; involvement in such new areas may seem too divorced from their key domestic constituency. For example, critics see foreign travel by bureaucrats as mere junket, an unwise use of taxpayer's resources. However, *good management and governance should be concerned with looking for benchmarks and best practices, and for ways to aid development. Official travel might thus be encouraged.* Building synergies among areas that have long harbored mistrust might allow the dismantling of expensive defense measures and the reallocation of critical resources, improving the attractiveness of a region for new external investments. Much dynamism is generated by the private sector, but collaboration and competition among public initiatives can also effectively trigger change.

There are many possible paths forward for Northeast Asia. There is every reason to continue with developing grass-roots initiatives and multilateral associations such as exist in academia, environmental awareness, transportation, etc. *A major way forward may be if some nations in the region fear being left behind by the others.* India and Australia are for the most part eager to cooperate with regional alliances. Why not include them? Should all interested parties, including non-contiguous states such as the USA and Australia, be allowed to fully participate in future projects? Will the initiative focus first around questions of security, defense, and non-proliferation, or will it first be easier to institute organizational and social changes, or maybe concentration should be centered on more basic needs? These are questions to be debated and resolved.

Northeast Asia is sure to be a huge source of opportunity at some point in time. Many are working hard that this growth comes soon. We might imagine that by the close of this century, the Northeast Asian region could be at least as dynamic as today's Eastern seaboard of the United States.

Some key coordinating initiatives & organizations involving the Northeast Asia region:

(background attached for lesser-known initiatives; not meant to be a comprehensive list!)

- Academic Forum for Northeast Asia, 環日本海アカデミックフォーラム
appears almost wholly to be a Japanese activity; the Japanese name uses 'Sea of Japan Rim'
<http://www.joho-kyoto.or.jp/~acdfo/home.html>
- Arctic Council, 北極圏協議会
- ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN+3, 東アジア (日中韓ASEAN首脳会議, 日中韓ASEAN経済大臣会合)
- ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF, 東南アジア諸国連合地域フォーラム
- Asia - Europe Meeting, ASEM, アジア欧州会合
- Asian Development Bank, ADB, アジア開発銀行
- Asian Highway, AH, アジアハイウェイ
- Asian Monetary Fund initiative, AMF (proposed), アジア通貨基金
- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, APEC, アジア太平洋経済協力
- Association of North East Asia Regional Governments, 北東アジア地域自治体連合
36 local authorities from China, Japan, Mongolia, Korea & Russia; meeting from 1993, established 1996
<http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/kokusai/english/nearindexe.htm>
- Bilateral Swap Arrangement, BSI, 二国間スワップ取極
- Chiang Mai Initiative, CMI, チェンマイ・イニシアティブ
- Committee for Promotion of International Highway Project, 国際ハイウェイプロジェクト推進委員会
- Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, CSCAP, アジア太平洋安全保障協力会議
- East Asian Economic Grouping, EAEG, 東アジア経済グループ
- East Asia Economic Caucus, EAEC, 東アジア経済協議体
EAEG and EAEC were groupings unsuccessfully proposed in 1990 by Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad, now operational as ASEAN Plus Three (the ten nations of ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea)
- East Asian Vision Group, EAVG, 東アジア・ヴィジョン・グループ
reported to ASEAN+3 2001 Summit on the future of East Asia (Prof. Sung-Joo Han, Chairman)
- East Asia Study Group, EASG, 東アジア・スタディ・グループ
responsible to ASEAN+3 for assessing the EAVG recommendations and the idea of an East Asian Summit
<http://www.aseansummit2001.org.bn/org/as2001/bp211-2.htm>
- Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, ERINA, 環日本海経済研究所, Niigata
Japanese name, 'Sea of Japan Rim Economic Research Institute,' led to Korean boycott (*Asia Pulse* 2001)
- Eurasian Land-Bridge, ユーラシア陸橋
New Eurasian Continental Bridge
- Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, FEB RAS, ロシア科学アカデミー極東支部, Vladivostok
- Fukuda Doctrine, 福田ドクトリン
1977 policy speech in Manila pledging to build trust and "heart to heart" communication between Japan & ASEAN
- G-8 (France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, European Community, Russia)
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, ガット (関税及び貿易に関する一般協定)
- Hokkaido Government, Trade and Economic Exchange Division, 北海道経済部貿易経済交流課
impressive for multilingual communications (Japanese, Chinese, Russian, English)
<http://www.pref.hokkaido.jp/keizai/kz-bkkry/index-e.html>
- Institute For Northeast Asia Study, INAS, 環日本海総合研究機構
(the Japanese name in this case uses 'Sea of Japan Rim' but seems not yet to have caused a problem)
office in Tokyo also hosts Kanamori Committee; <http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~nbc/kanamoriinkai.html>
- International Highway Construction Corporation, IHCC, 国際ハイウェイ建設事業団
<http://www.ijnet.or.jp/IHCC/prj.html>
- International Monetary Fund, IMF, 国際通貨基金
- Japan External Trade Organization, JETRO, ジェトロ, 日本貿易振興会
- Japan-Korea Tunnel, 日韓トンネル
<http://www.ijnet.or.jp/IHCC/sougou.html>
- Japan Sea Network Ltd., ジャパンシーネットワーク
assisting contacts; offices in Niigata, Japan and Vladivostok, Russia; http://www.jsn.co.jp/guide_kigyou.html
- Jilin University, 吉林大学, Northeast Asia Studies College, Jilin, China
- Kanamori Committee, 北東アジア経済協力に関する金森委員会, 金森委員会
office in Tokyo; <http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~nbc/kanamoriinkai.html>
- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO, 朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構
- Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, KOTRA 大韓貿易投資振興公社
operate Korea Trade Centers around the world
- Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA, 多数国間投資保証機関
- National Institute for Research Advancement, NIRA, 総合研究開発機構, Tokyo

- North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, 北米自由貿易協定
- Northeast Asia Development Bank (proposed), 北東アジア開発銀行
- Northeast Asia Economic Conference, 北東アジア経済会議
- Northeast Asia Economic Forum, NEAEF, 北東アジア経済フォーラム
Secretariat at East-West Center, Honolulu
- Northeast Asia Intellectuals' Solidarity forum, NAIS, 北東アジア知識人連帯運動
Incheon Declaration 2001; <http://www.naismovement.net/index.htm>
- Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation, 環日本海環境協力会議
(the Japanese name in this case uses 'Sea of Japan Rim' but seems not yet to have caused a problem)
http://www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/neac_j.html
- Northeast Asian Development Forum, 北東アジア地域開発フォーラム
promoting Northeast Asian Highway and Japan-Korea Tunnel via International Highway Construction Corp.;
webpage reference to Reverend Sun Myung Moon as being supportive
<http://www.ijjnet.or.jp/IHCC/real.html>
- Northeast Asian Highway, 東アジアハイウェイ
<http://www.ijjnet.or.jp/IHCC/sougou.html>
- Northeast Asia Project Development Center, NBC, 北東アジア・ビジネス協力センター
Secretariat in Osaka; <http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~nbc/>
- Northern Forum, 北方圏フォーラム
- Northwest Pacific Region Trade Center, 環日本海貿易交流センター
project of Toyama Prefecture, Japan (another case where the Japanese name uses 'Sea of Japan Rim')
<http://www.pref.toyama.jp/sections/1302/kannihon/>
- Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies), Honolulu, CSISパシフィックフォーラム
- Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, DPRK, 羅新-先鋒自由経済貿易地帯
- Regional Initiative -Russian Far East (U.S. State Department-sponsored program)
<http://www.ri.sakhalin.ru/>
- Shanghai Organization of Cooperation, SOC, 上海協力機構
signed 2001-06-15 in Shanghai; pledging extensive cooperation and consultation in many fields
between China, Russian Federation, Kyrgyz Republic, and Republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
http://www.president.kz/articles/state/state_container.asp?lng=en&art=shanh_decl2001
- Siberian Continental Bridge
Trans-Siberian Railway, シベリア横断鉄道
- Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, 中露善隣友好協力条約
signed 2001-07-16 between Pres. Jiang Zemin of the PRC and Pres. Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/15722.html>
- Tumen River Area Development Programme, TRADP, 図們江地域開発計画
Tumen Secretariat, Beijing
- United Nations Development Program, UNDP, 国連開発計画
- UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia & the Pacific, UNESCAP, 国連アジア太平洋経済社会委員会
- World Bank, 世界銀行
- World Trade Organization, WTO, 世界貿易機構

Further readings and references:

Asia Pulse (anonymous author). (2001) "International interest grows in inter-Korean rail links." (via Yonhap News Service; 12 Feb 2001) *Asia Pulse*.

de Soto, Hernando. (2001) "The poor are the solution, not the problem." (July/Aug 2001) *Religion & Liberty*. Vol 11:4.

de Soto, Hernando. (2002) "Those who cannot participate in Globalization: the lack of standardized law." (21 Feb 2002 speech at "Towards a Global Society" conference, Stockholm, Sweden); notes.

Edström, Bert (ed.). (2001) *Interdependence in the Asia Pacific*. (Conference Papers 28) Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet / The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

ERINA. (2002) "Outline of the results of the 2002 Northeast Asia Economic Conference in Niigata." (undated document; conference held 27-29 Jan 2002) Niigata, Japan: Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia; online as of 23 March 2002 at:
<http://www.erina.or.jp/Forum/Forum2002/eresult.htm>

- Far Eastern Economic Review (eds.) (2001) *Asia 2002 Yearbook*. HK: Review Publishing Co. Ltd.
- Guéguen, Daniel. (1992) *A Practical Guide to the EEC Labyrinth*. Rennes, France: Éditions Apogée.
- Heiskanen, Markku. (2001) "The role of the EU in Northeast Asia." (1 May 2001) *Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report*; online as of 23 March 2002 at:
http://www.nautilus.org/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/eu_role_in_nea.txt
- Howard, William Willard. (1889) "The Rush to Oklahoma." (18 May 1889) *Harper's Weekly*. Vol 33, p.391-94; online as of 23 March 2002 at:
<http://www.library.cornell.edu/Reps/DOCS/landrush.htm>
- Hutzler, Charles. (2001) "U.N. extends strained Asia trade project." (2 April 2001) *Wall Street Journal*.
- International Monetary Fund. (2000) "Excerpted remarks on regional initiatives in Asia by Mr. Horst Köhler, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund." (2 June 2000) *IMF News Brief* No. 00/36.
- Katz, S. Stanley. (1999) "The role of a Northeast Asian Development Bank in Northeast Asia's future development." Proceedings of the Ninth Meeting of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum (26-29 October 1999) Tianjin, China; online as of 23 March 2002 at:
<http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/misc/Katz1099.htm>
- Kaur, Hardev. (2001) "About-turn in US position." (20 Oct 2001) *New Straits Times*, p.10.
- Korea Times (anonymous author). (2001) "Japan invited to Tumen River Development Project." (7 April 2001) *Korea Times*.
- MacKenzie, Debora. (2002) "Arctic meltdown." in *New Scientist*. (2 March 2002) Vol 173 No 2332, p. 5.
- Nam, D.W. (1999) "Why is a Northeast Asian Development Bank needed? Summary of discussions in the Northeast Asia Economic Forum." (August 1999); online as of 23 March 2002 at:
http://www.dwnam.pe.kr/emain01_8.html
- Nation, The (anonymous author). (2002) "East Asian unity: 25 years later, Japan acts." (16 January 2002) Bangkok: *The Nation*.
- Ramos, Fidel V. (2002) "Toward an East Asian Economic Grouping." (7 March 2002 "Asia Economic Summit" speech, Kuala Lumpur) published 15 March 2002, *Manila Bulletin*.
- Shinwa Bussan Kaisha Ltd. & Toyo Engineering Corp. (1996) *The Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone: Guide for Investors*. (September 1996; in collaboration with the Committee for Promotion of External Economic Cooperation, DPRK).
- Tagore, Rabindranath. [1991] *Nationalism*. (first published 1917) New Delhi: Rupa & Co.
- Wheatley, Alan & Yoko Nishikawa. (2002) "Asian currency safety net takes shape - slowly." (10 March 2002) *Reuters News Service*.
- Xinhua News Agency (anonymous author). (2001) "Siberian continental bridge expecting second boom." (21 Oct 2001) *Xinhua News Agency Bulletin*.
