Labor Hoarding In Russia: Where Does It Come From?

By: Rouslan Koumakhov and Boris Najman

William Davidson Working Paper Number 394 October 2001

Labor Hoarding In Russia: Where Does It Come From?

Rouslan Koumakhov, Boris Najman¹

Rouslan Koumakhov Forum, Université Paris X-Nanterre, bat. K 200, avenue de la République, 92001 Nanterre Cedex

Tel.: 331 53 61 21 82 fax: 331 40 97 71 83

Boris Najman Delta-ENS 48, boul. Jourdan 75014 Paris

Tel.: 331 42 19 07 91 fax: 331 43 13 63 10

June, 2000

¹ Suggestions and comments are welcome: naiman@delta.ens.fr, rouslan.koumakhov@u-paris10.fr
We want to thank Mathilde Maurel, Georges de Ménil, Jean-François Nivet and Dominique Redor for their extensive help and devotion in this research. A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the Econometric Society world congress in Seattle in August 2000.

University of Nanterre Paris X; Delta, Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. This paper is financed through CNRS (ROSES University of Paris I, MSE, 106-112, bd. de l'Hôpital 75647 Paris cedex 13).

Abstract

The paper focuses on the labor "hoarding" problem in Russian. We studied two forms of "hoarding": unpaid leaves and short-time work. Our research is based on the *Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey* (RLMS) database. The paper exploits individual panel data between 1994 and 1996.

We show that unpaid leaves and short-time work do not represent a form of hidden unemployment. Both types of labor "hoarding" reflect the nature of employees' professional competencies. First, unpaid leaves concern primarily the employees with firm-specific knowledge, while short-time work affects strongly unskilled workers. Second, external mobility is mostly related to young people and unskilled blue-collar workers while employees with specific competencies do not change jobs so much.

The paper insists on significant internal adjustments which are taking place through unpaid leaves and short-time work. This explains why there has been no massive unemployment in Russia until now.

In conclusion, Russian labor market is characterized rather by internal flexibility than by labor "hoarding".

Key words: labor market, internal adjustments, flexibility, Russia, skills.

JEL classification: J2, C23, P23

Introduction

One of the surprises of the Post-Soviet transformation is the relationship between output and labor: in the context of dramatic output fall in 1991-1997 there was still no open mass unemployment and no large decrease in employment in Russia. To explain this puzzling result, different Russian and Western economists and sociologists draw our attention to the enterprise level, pointing out, in particular, "labor surplus", or "labor hoarding" as "guilty" practices which prevent reallocation and restructuring process in Post-Soviet economy. Two forms of labor "retaining", i.e. "administrative" (forced unpaid or partially paid) leave and short-time (reduced hours) work, are at the center of much of economic studies.

Two main problems arise from this reasoning.

First, the labor hoarding hypothesis seems to contradict the evidence of the high labor mobility in the enterprise data (Gimpelson et Lippoldt 1997) which is also stated in various survey studies (Smirnov 1998). The intensive labor rotation, which in itself points at the reallocation process, rejects the overhang idea: not only managers "hoard" labor by limiting employment reductions, but they try to replace separated workers by "outsiders".

Second, and more generally, we do not know why Russian enterprises should hoard labor.

Commander et al. (1995) insist on the social functions of the Russian firms: "And the decision to enforce severance may further be complicated because in a large number of cases firms are the source of a broad range of benefits and income supports for workers. Loss of employment likely implies loss of access to such benefits, frequently with no clear alternative suppliers" (p. 157-158). Layard and Richter (1994) evoke "paternalistic" behavior as one of the reasons for the job keeping.

This argument does not seem to be satisfactory.

First, social support cannot be considered as a reason of labor retaining, since we still do not understand the reasons of "paternalistic" commitment. Notice that the social support argument was advanced from the viewpoint of employees, but not from the viewpoint of firms. Why might managers keep social functions in the face of the drastic and continuous shocks to output? In other terms, explaining the patterns of "abnormal" behavior by another "abnormal" pattern which in turn has to be explained does not add a lot to our understanding.

Second, since hiring rates remain rather high managers cannot be committed only to "their" employees but to all workers they engage regularly from external labor market which does not seem very realistic.

1

¹ Between 1994 and 1996, labor macro data shows a decline of employment by 1.9 millions (3.1 % of the total employment), and similarly the unemployment (ILO definition) increased by about 1 million people (1.8 % of the labor force), (Russian Economic Trends, 1999).

Notice, that the "technological" solution proposed by Commander et al. (1995) can neither be considered as satisfactory: if technological rigidities restrain the amount of labor adjustment, employee-retaining is no more justified by "overhang" or "hoarding" ².

In this paper, we analyze two forms of labor "retaining": "administrative" leave and reduced hours. Focusing our attention on these issues is justified by two main reasons.

First, both forms are often treated, though not empirically analyzed, as an evidence of hidden unemployment. For instance, Commander et al. (1995) characterize Goskomstat figures and the World Bank survey data on involuntary leave or short-time work as "a crude measure of the current employment overhang": "we can see that releasing the marginally employed into unemployment would have raised the unemployment rate by at least 300 percent" (p. 157). In the same vein, Standing (1994, 1996, 1998) who considers reduced hours and unpaid leaves as hiding the "real" unemployment state, argues that employees put on "administrative" leave have "minimal or no prospect of being recalled" (Standing 1994, p. 37)³.

Second, the choice of issues as unpaid leaves and short-time work is linked to the data we have utilized.

The data source in this paper is a survey of individuals and households (Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS)⁴. We used and constructed variables on individuals and households (see appendix 4 and 5 for the definitions and measurement of variables) and enterprise characteristics, while focusing on the 1994-1996 sample in order to follow the same individuals all over the period. We studied people between 15 and 72 years old, the sample is composed 4607 persons.

One may say that the dataset which refers to individuals is not relevant to consider the issues of labor hoarding as, contrary to firm surveys, it does not contain information on enterprises.

We can counter-argue that the RLMS survey allows us to identify clearly a large set of variables related to the individual behavior within the enterprise and reflecting the firm policies towards their employees. This is, in particular, the case of unpaid leave and short-time work⁵ that can be directly measured from the RLMS database. After all, we have no evidence that information reported by employees on this issues is less valuable than data given by managers in the firm surveys.

Moreover, data provided by individuals could be more precise in some cases. For example, a lot of employment practices are not formally documented within a firm and/or applied on the workshop or team level. Therefore, managers (and especially top-managers,

3 Linz (1988) suggests also that unpaid leaves could be considered as a "signal of management's commitment to maintaining employment levels" (p. 15) without giving any explanation for the "job rights" keeping.

² See Fay and Medoff (1985) for the general argument and Clarke (1998) for the Russian case.

⁴ This survey stands as part of an international research project conducted jointly by the University of Chapel Hill (USA), the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Institute of Nutrition.

⁵ We have measured short-time work as the time spent on primary work under 120 hours per month. As for unpaid leave we used the results of explicit question on this subject.

i.e. those who respond usually to the firm survey) may count only "official" leaves or working-hours' reductions, thus seriously underestimating the extent of a real labor "retaining". As for an individual, he faces directly these practices, which allows measuring them more accurately in the corresponding questions.

Finally, a firm survey usually do not contain any information on the individuals after they quitted enterprise, it can only report data on hirings and separations. Thus, such issues as unemployment or job-to-job movements, crucial for our paper are ignored. On the contrary, the RLMS database allows us to highlight these issues, for it follows the same individuals inside and outside the firms.

In fact, from 1994 to 1996 Russian labor market face a large reallocation of workers through short-time work and unpaid leaves (see table 1). The survey data shows an important reduction in working time. For instance the number of days –about 50 days– on unpaid leaves correspond to a 20 % reduction in the total working days over a year⁶.

<u>Table 1</u>: Employment enterprise policies (in % of employed population)

	% of people on short-time work	% of people on unpaid leaves this	Average number of days on unpaid leaves*
		year	
1994	20.1	12.3	39
1995	18.9	6.6	58
1996	18.1	8.1	49

Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VII

The structure of this paper is as follows.

We start by testing the "hidden unemployment" hypothesis: do "administrative" leave and short-time work represent preliminary states of unemployment? (Section I). We analyze then the determinants of these two practices (Section II) and the relationship between job-to-job mobility and labor-retaining (Section III). Finally we discuss our findings and propose corresponding conclusions (Sections IV, V).

^{*} On average per person on "Unpaid leaves".

⁶ The total of working days in 1996 was about 250.

I. Do "administrative" leave and reduced hours represent preliminary states of unemployment?

There can be two-fold relationship between the forms of labor "hoarding" and unemployment. First, if workers put on unpaid leave or short-time work have "minimal or no project of being recalled", one should find a higher probability of becoming unemployed for these workers. In order to measure unemployment, we choose the data on self-reported unemployment. This definition is voluntary large in order into account all forms of unemployment. We did not want to underestimate the unemployment phenomenon. Second, the high risk of unemployment that both forms of labor "retaining" are supposed to "hide" should be reflected in corresponding subjective perception of the current job position. Such perception is an important characteristic of individual behavior with respect to unemployment. For instance, people that have few job opportunities are obviously more likely to accept various employment policies, in terms of work disciplining or labor adjustment. We measure this "subjective" characteristic using the RLMS data which contained two following questions⁷: "Are you afraid of losing your job?" and "How certain are you that you will be able to find a work, no worse than your present job?" We start by a general picture of the unemployment threat without any relation with the problem of labor hoarding. Table 2 gives corresponding percentages – of subjective perceptions and unemployment – for the total sample of individuals between 1994 and 1996 (on the basis of the RLMS data). One may see that while the rate of unemployment (ILO definition) is rather low, especially in 1994-1995, the "subjective" perception of unemployment risk is high. People in general are very concerned about job losing and of not

<u>Table 2:</u> employment expectations of the employees (in % of employed people) and unemployment (in % of the labor force, ILO definition)

finding another one. This result suggests that at least a large part of employees could be subject to a permanent and strong pressure on behalf of managers who are able to impose

	% of people very concerned about job losing	% of people absolutely uncertain to find a new job	% of people unemployed (ILO definition)
1994	41.0	37.8	6.4
1995	39.9	37.2	6.1
1996	41.2	38.9	7.9

Sources: RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII

them different "precarious" employment practices.

We study now actual and perceived risks of unemployment in relation with unpaid leaves and reduced hours. We examine the ordered *probit* (Greene, 1993, p.672-676) of "subjective" variables and the simple *probit* (Greene, 1993, p. 643-655) for unemployment controlling for all our individual, households and enterprise variables.

There are four main results emerging from regressions in Tables 3 and 4:

- (i) Employees who had experience with unpaid leaves are more afraid of losing their job and not to find a new job corresponding to their specialization, in case of eventual job loss.
 - (ii) For the short-time experience, the "subjective" perception is quite on the opposite.
- (iii) There is no evidence that inflows in unemployment in 1996 are related to having been put on unpaid leaves in 1995.

⁷ In the questionnaire, the evaluation of these "subjective" perceptions is marked from 1 to 5. In table 2, we present only the worse perceptions i.e. when the variables are equal to 5.

(iv) By contrast, there is a strong positive relation between short-time-working in 1995 and becoming unemployed in 1996.

Given these results, we can try to answer the main question of this section: can we state that both forms of employment practices, i.e. "administrative" leave and short-time work, represent preliminary states of unemployment? As for unpaid leaves, the answer is No: even if unpaid-leave-workers feel more vulnerable regarding their job opportunities, there is no proof that in reality these workers are facing higher risk of unemployment than other groups of workers. As for the practice of reduced hours, contrary to "administrative" leaves, the preliminary answer is Yes: short-time work may represent a preliminary stage of the unemployment.

We will now shadow these conclusions since the results of the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 provide us one more important finding. Both forms of employment practices studied here imply a kind of internal paradox. Workers who experience first form, unpaid leaves, are rather afraid of losing their job, but in reality few of them are likely to become unemployed. Workers who experience the second form, short-time work, are more likely to become unemployed but they are far more optimistic regarding their future job opportunities.

In the following considerations we try to propose a comprehensive understanding of this double paradox.

(i) Consider workers who experienced unpaid leaves. Their fear of unemployment provides a part of explanation why a large part of workers accept this "precarious" state of employment. Unpaid leaves could be, therefore, used as a means of pressure by managers. However, this instrument of disciplining is not likely to be utilized in actual managerial strategies. Otherwise, the outflows from "administrative" leaves into unemployment would be much more intensive. Hence, this form of employment policies, and *only* this form, i.e. unpaid leaves, is consistent with the generalization made by Commander et al (1995): "In short, managers appear to have discretionary powers with respect to wages and employment, but they evidently choose not to exert them to enforce large employment separations or restructuring" (p. 178).

We suggest that the workers' "attachment" to the firm could be largely due to their firm-specific skills. On one hand, those who accept unpaid or partially paid leaves are afraid of not finding a workplace that conforms to their professional competencies outside the borders of their "enterprise of origin". On the other hand, firms in general are neither interested in releasing those employees whom they select for this practice and who accept it. It seems that managers are not sure, that they could easily replace specialized workers through the market, therefore, these workers are been kept within the firms. Thus, unpaid leaves translate *via* the role of firm-specific skills the process of mutual "attachment" between corresponding workers and enterprises.

We can, therefore, formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: the practice of putting employees on unpaid leaves is closely related to the firm-specific skills of these workers.

(ii) Consider short-time workers now. If unemployment risk appear to be a real threat for this group of workers in general, it is somewhat shadowed by the "subjective" perception of this risk: short-time workers are not afraid of losing job or of not finding another job. Notice, that in general, the determinants of "subjective" variables seem to correspond rather accurately to the reality⁹. The relative "optimism" of short-time workers suggests that at least a part of them may experience good opportunities on the labor market. This in itself does not

⁹ Thus, the perception concerning losing or finding a job is fare better for people involved in informal activities. Is also better for male, for inhabitants urban settlements, and especially for the one from Moscow and really worse for those with low level of expenditures per capita.

⁸ This seems to be a more coherent explanation of why employees stay within firms than a "personal identity" argument suggested by Layard and Richter (1994).

seem surprisingly given the above-mentioned high inter-firm mobility in Russia. As Clarke (1998) pointed out, "the result of the very high rate of hiring is that redundancy and unemployment are not the threat that they would otherwise be" (p 45). This seems to indicate that short-time-workers behavior is strongly heterogeneous and that the heterogeneity is in accordance with employment opportunities.

We can, therefore, propose a second hypothesis:

H2: Short-time workers differ by professional segments which translate different outside job options.

In order to corroborate these hypotheses, we address two issues.

First, we need to study more deeply the characteristics of workers who were faced with administrative leaves or short-time work. In Section II we examine the determinants of both practices, controlling for professional qualifications which we consider as an indicator of skill specificity.

Second, if unemployment risk differs by professional segments of employees, it is necessary to analyze the likely relationship between job opportunities and labor segmentation. Section III focuses on the characteristics of the job-to-job mobility with respect to unpaid leaves and reduced hours. As before, the role of firm-specific skills is directly addressed.

<u>Table 3</u>: Probability to be certain of losing job or not to be able to find one in 1995 (Ordered probit regression)

		ned are you that lose your job?	How certain are you that you will be able to find work?		
Variables in 1995	Coef.	Standard	Coef.	Standard	
		error		error	
Gender	-0.265**	0.060	-0.522**	0.060	
Age	0.002	0.002	0.012**	0.002	
Education (year)	-0.019	0.014	-0.015	0.014	
Couple	0.037	0.063	0.013	0.064	
Plots	-0.039	0.058	0.108*	0.059	
Informal Activity	-0.205*	0.106	-0.260**	0.105	
Manager	-0.406**	0.133	-0.517**	0.138	
Intelligentsia	-0.260**	0.109	-0.471**	0.111	
Engineer	0.016	0.134	-0.041	0.138	
State servant	-0.156	0.156	-0.302*	0.157	
Trader-financier	0.068	0.135	-0.292*	0.137	
Technician Technician	0.063	0.106	-0.305**	0.107	
Workman	0.020	0.095	-0.207*	0.097	
Farmer	0.051	0.133	-0.107	0.137	
Elementary job	-0.066	0.108	-0.258**	0.109	
In the forces	-0.079	0.251	0.163	0.256	
Driver	-0.108	0.128	-0.155	0.130	
Foreign	-0.108	0.147	-0.240	0.149	
Public	-0.124*	0.070	-0.051	0.070	
Private	-0.162*	0.082	-0.102	0.083	
# Workers<100	-0.162	0.082	-0.102	0.074	
# Workers>500	-0.002	0.073	-0.174**	0.072	
Duration. arrears		0.071		0.072	
	-0.006		0.023*		
Am. Arrears	-0.001	0.003	-0.003	0.003	
Unpaid leaves	0.361**	0.104	0.367**	0.104	
Short-time work	-0.168**	0.063	-0.152**	0.064	
In kind remuneration	-0.041	0.090	0.082	0.091	
# of child in the household.	0.033	0.028	-0.024	0.028	
# of elderly in the household	-0.016	0.044	0.044	0.044	
Low hh. expenditure per capita	0.227**	0.055	0.241**	0.055	
Medium hh. expenditure per capita	-0.039	0.069	0.096	0.069	
Moscow-St Petersburg	-0.378**	0.116	-0.415**	0.118	
Northwest	-0.134	0.120	-0.111	0.122	
Center	-0.096	0.095	-0.043	0.096	
Volga	0.082	0.095	-0.028	0.096	
Caucasus	-0.110	0.106	-0.220*	0.108	
Urals	-0.005	0.098	-0.061	0.099	
Or. Siberia	0.255*	0.115	0.039	0.115	
Semi-urban	0.458**	0.103	0.474**	0.102	
Rural	0.214**	0.071	0.350**	0.072	
u(1)	-1.430**	0.250	-1.452**	0.253	
u(2)	-0.860**	0.249	-0.914**	0.251	
u(3)	-0.583**	0.249	-0.515*	0.251	
ω(4)	0.009	0.249	0.223	0.251	
Log Likelihood		3151		167	
Number of Observations		2190		167	
Chi² (39)		200.9		51.6	
Prob. >chi2		.0000		0000	
Pseudo R ²		0.03	0.	056	

Notes: Dependent variable

Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita, Occidental Siberia and Urban

y=1 if the person is not concerned at all by losing job in 1995 y=2 if the person is not very concerned by losing job in 1995

y=3 if the person is both yes and no

y=4 if the person is a little concerned by losing job in 1995

y=5 if the person is very concerned by losing job in 1995

y=1 if the person is absolutely certain to find in 1995

y=2 if the person is fairly certain to find in 1995

y=3 if the person is both yes and no to find in 1995

y=4 if the person is fairly uncertain to find in 1995

y=5 if the person is absolutely uncertain to find in 1995

<u>Table 4</u>: Probability to be unemployed (Self reported) in 1996 (probit regression)

Variables in 1996/1995	Coef.	Standard error
Gender	0.133	0.138
Age	-0.029**	0.006
Education (year)	-0.079**	0.034
Couple	0.027	0.148
Plots	-0.021	0.126
Informal Activity	0.765**	0.147
Manager in 95	0.416	0.310
Intelligentsia in 95	-0.810*	0.448
Engineer in 95	0.439	0.326
State servant in 95	-0.767	0.708
Trader-financier in 95	0.480*	0.271
Technician in 95	-0.010	0.268
Workman in 95	0.250	0.228
Farmer in 95	0.579*	0.270
Elementary job in 95	-0.089	0.263
In the forces in 95	0.529	0.490
Driver in 95	0.368	0.269
Foreign in 95	0.309	0.351
Public in 95	0.317*	0.180
Private in 95	0.511**	0.193
# Workers<100 in 95	0.099	0.177
# Workers>500 in 95	0.004	0.175
Duration. arrears in 95	0.018	0.018
Am. arrears in 95	0.009	0.005
Unpaid leaves in 95 Short-time work in 95	-0.337 0.413**	0.259 0.134
In kind remuneration	-0.240	0.197
# of child in the household	0.036	0.060
# of elderly in the household.	-0.057	0.099
Low hh expenditure per capita	0.263*	0.141
Medium hh expenditure per capita	0.166	0.163
Moscow-St Petersburg	-0.269	0.312
Northwest	-0.355	0.317
Center	0.215	0.214
Volga	0.005	0.216
Caucasus	0.270	0.230
Urals	0.095	0.222
Or. Siberia	-0.019	0.253
Semi-urban	-0.186	0.254
Rural	0.114	0.149
Constant	-0.784	0.599
		_
Log Likelihood	-33	
Number of Observations	220	06
Chi ² (39)	160).9
Prob. >chi2	0.00	000
Pseudo R ²	0.1	

Notes: Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII
Dependent variable: Legend:

y=1 if the person is unemployed in 1996 (self reported)

=0 if not

*= statistically significant at the 5% level **= statistically significant at the 1% level

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita, Occidental Siberia and Urban Settlement.

II. Determinants of "administrative" leave and short-time work.

II.1. Detail analysis of the results.

We start this Section by analyzing the probability to be put on unpaid leaves and on short-time work controlling for all individual, household and enterprise variables. For this purpose we use simple *probit* model (Greene, 1993, p.646-655).

Table 5 provides regression results. First of all, we found out some common determinants of both employment policies: the probability to be put on short-time work or unpaid leaves is higher for female worker and for those involved in informal activities.

Other basic results are the following.

- (i) Duration of wage arrears has a positive impact on the probability of being concerned by the "administrative" leave during the current year and no impact on the probability of being on short-time work.
- (ii) Education influence is negative for "administrative" leave and has no impact on short-time work.
- (iii) Young age increases the probability to have a reduced-hours work and does not play any role for the "administrative" leaves.
- (iv) Particular professions increase or decrease both probabilities. For instance, elementary job without any qualification and belonging to intelligentsia increase the probability of short-time work while being a farmer plays in the opposite sense. Other professions, workmen and engineers, increase the probability to be on "administrative" leaves.
 - (v) Employment in small firms is negatively correlated with "administrative" leaves.

Table 5: Probability to be on Short-time work job or on Unpaid leaves in 1996 (probit regression)

_	Short-tin	ne work Job	Unpaid leaves		
Variables in 1996	Coef.	Standard error	Coef.	Standard error	
Gender	-0.212**	0.085	-0.355**	0.105	
Age	-0.007*	0.003	0.001	0.004	
Education (year)	-0.011	0.020	-0.058*	0.026	
Couple	0.036	0.088	0.120	0.113	
Plots	0.187*	0.087	0.201*	0.103	
Informal Activity	0.249*	0.138	0.205	0.161	
Manager	-0.382	0.336	-0.079	0.460	
Intelligentsia	0.418**	0.150	-0.039	0.212	
Engineer	0.100	0.200	0.840**	0.219	
State servant	0.226	0.215	0.232	0.269	
Frader-financier	0.116	0.177	-0.206	0.249	
Technician Technician	0.089	0.153	0.038	0.200	
Workman	0.043	0.146	0.438**	0.177	
Farmer	-0.721**	0.275	-0.443	0.334	
Elementary job	0.468**	0.156	-0.172	0.219	
In the forces	-0.448	0.504	0.237	0.520	
Driver	-0.218	0.244	0.094	0.276	
Foreign	-0.449*	0.259	-0.062	0.248	
Public	-0.005	0.112	-0.302**	0.119	
Private	0.071	0.126	0.066	0.133	
# Workers<100	0.036	0.104	-0.267*	0.134	
# Workers>500	-0.013	0.104	0.042	0.121	
Duration. arrears	0.018	0.013	0.040**	0.013	
Am. arrears	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.003	
In kind remuneration	-0.092	0.123	-0.020	0.140	
# of child in the household	-0.064	0.044	-0.010	0.054	
of elderly in the household	-0.036	0.066	0.075	0.078	
Low hh expenditure per capita	0.041	0.087	0.282**	0.111	
Medium hh expenditure per cap.	0.075	0.100	0.272*	0.126	
Moscow-St Petersburg	0.143	0.165	0.296	0.210	
Northwest	0.228	0.177	-0.575*	0.302	
Center	0.101	0.145	-0.014	0.185	
	-0.069	0.147	0.038	0.187	
Volga	-0.237	0.163	0.477**	0.193	
Caucasus					
Urals	-0.006 0.160	0.147	0.163	0.183	
Or. Siberia	0.169	0.170	0.053	0.229	
Semi-urban	0.008	0.150	0.276	0.168	
Rural	-0.009 0.688*	0.111	-0.272* 1 139**	0.145	
Constant	-0.688*	0.366	-1.138**	0.466	
Log Likelihood	-8	342.9	-5	24.0	
Number of Observations		922		205	
		95.5		48.7	
h12(3/)	7	, , , ,	1.	TU./	
Chi²(37) Prob. >chi2		0000	0.0	0000	

Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds VII

Notes: Dependent variable:

y=1 if the person is on short-time work or unpaid leaves in 1996

y=0 if not

Legend: *= statistically significant at the 5% level **= statistically significant at the 1% level

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita, Occidental Siberia and Urban Settlement

II.2. Preliminary conclusions.

(i) We can observe some distinct signs of the segmentation of employees. However, this segmentation is not reduced to conventional division blue collars vs. white collars or low skills vs. high skills. The probability of short-time work is important for elementary professions, but for the intellectuals as well 10 . Both workmen and engineers are likely to be concerned by the practice of unpaid leaves. In other words, if one considers both policies – unpaid leaves and short-time work – as "precarious" states for the employees, there is no evidence that the blue-collar workers are a particularly disgraced group.

Not only these findings corroborate heavily the hypothesis (H2) formulated in the previous section but they even extend it: labor segmentation according to professional qualification is not limited to the division within the pool of short-time workers but characterizes those employees who faced unpaid leaves as well.

(ii) The relation between elementary qualification and short-time work suggests that both forms of employment practices are rather different and even opposite regarding the reasons of labor "retaining". Elementary workers are less qualified, most of them do not have any specific skills while it is just the opposite for the basic characteristics of the employees who had been put on "administrative" leave. The fact that the probability to be on unpaid leaves is higher for engineers and workmen seems to be related to their specific competencies within the firm, while short-time workers do not have any firm-attachment in terms of skills.

This confirms our first hypothesis (H1) related to the relationship between the forms of labor "retaining" and the nature of employees' competencies.

(iii) Thus, the forms of labor "retaining" appear as forms of internal adjustment, which affect differently workers according to their profession. If this is the case, labor demand of Russian firms differs by professional competencies, which gives us a new argument to suggest that the external the mobility of employees will probably be linked to their profession.

We need now to investigate the mobility itself in order to find the impact of our two proxies of labor "hoarding" on job-to-job mobility.

_

¹⁰ However intellectual professions are usually working outside the enterprise, they are probably on short time not because of the enterprise employment policy but rather because of their own activity, as teacher for instance.

III. Labor "retaining" policies and job-to-job mobility.

III. 1. Three measures of external mobility

Until now, we have considered exits from enterprises as being mainly limited to inflows in unemployment, which is only one component of external labor mobility. We shall consider now another component of this mobility: movement across the jobs.

Measuring this component using the RLMS database is not evident. Thus, labor turnover defined as hiring plus separations could not be calculated using households' or individual data. Earle and Sabrianova (1999) argue that the RLMS data does not allow us to estimate (external) labor mobility because of "ambiguity in the explicit question on job-changing" (p. 11). In fact, with this question 11 we actually could not distinguish individuals staying within the enterprise from individuals moving outside.

Nevertheless, measuring external mobility on the basis of the RLMS survey is possible by using three types of variables. We have searched to measure more precisely *job to job* mobility. In our paper, it differs from the *activity to activity* mobility ¹²; and is restricted to primary wage-earning job.

First, we "filtered" the information provided by the "ambivalent" question mentioned above with the data on professional mobility and we constructed on this basis a dummy variable "New job". This approach appeared as justified, as we have found out in the regression that "New job" depended positively on some variables that usually characterize the labor turnover in Russia (see III.2).

Second, using the RLMS data we can define the date of entry in the firm as an information of mobility. We constructed dummy variables "Change job" for people changing firm between 1994 and 1995, between 1995 and 1996 as well as over the all period (1994-1996)¹³. We checked that these people did really work the year before they changed job¹⁴.

Third, we defined another variable measuring the tenure of a person within a firm. We constructed two dummies of less than one year of tenure and less than three years (see table 6). The interest of the "Tenure" variable is double. First, it allows measuring external mobility. Second, as a measure of firm-specific competencies, it allows us to directly test the stated above conclusions on the importance of the firm-specific skills.

The "New job" and the "Change job" dummies are explained by lagged independent variables, while the "Tenure" dummies are explained by contemporary independent variables. "Backward" and "forward" analysis could be conducted using these dummies in a simple

_

¹¹ The question is "tell me, please, did you change your place of work or profession by comparison with December of last year?"

¹² See B.Najman, A. Pailhé (2000) where the external labor mobility in Russia is defined as "activity to activity" movement which includes formal employment, informal and individual activities, plots, and multi-activity.

¹³ Workers changing enterprise either in 1995 or in 1996.

¹⁴ We also checked that in every year chronology of entrance in the enterprise is coherent. For example in 1996 round the date of entry could not be reported before the date of entry reported in 1994 round.

probit model (Greene, 1993, p.646-655). All dummies reflect employees' behavior in relation with their skills. The more workers stay within "their" firm the more they get firm-specific competencies.

The following table (6) presents the extent of the job-to-job mobility (in terms of percentage and number of people) according to RLMS data. We observe a high percentage of people with low tenure (12-15 % with less than one year and 34-35% with less than three years). This suggests a high job-to-job mobility. The variables "Change job" and "New job" reflect somehow these results. We should stress that RLMS data probably largely underestimate the labor mobility because in the panel data we are following people which are not moving geographically.

Table 6: Job to Job Mobility in Russian Firms (in number of people and %)

	YES	Yes (as a % of total)	NO
Changed Job			
Between 1994 and 1995	262	11.5%	2013
Changed Job Between 1995 and 1996	284	12.3%	2014
Changed Job			
Between 1994 and 1996 ¹⁵	500	20.1%	1984
New job in 1996	342	12.9%	2315
Tenure less than 1 year in 1994	420	15.0%	2376
Tenare less than I year in 1991	120	13.070	2370
Tenure less than 3 years in 1994	981	35.1%	1884
T 1 1 1 1 1 1000	222	12 20/	2200
Tenure less than 1 year in 1996	322	12.3%	2289
Tenure less than 3 years in 1996	883	33.8%	1536

Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VII

III. 2. Results

The regression results are presented in Tables 8-11 and summarized in Table 7.

(i) The determinants of "New job" are closely related to the main characteristics of the labor mobility rotation in Russia. For instance, it follows from the Goskomstat data and the case studies (Gimpelson and Lippoldt 1997, Smirnov 1998) that young men with no qualification are the bulk of Russian high mobility. It is the same for our study: having a new job in 1996 is negatively correlated with age (young people have more chances), and positively with one profession, elementary workers. Moreover, the "New job" movement is

-

 $^{^{\}rm 15}$ The person changed job either between 1994 and 1995 or between 1995 and 1996

linked to the other signs of extreme labor mobility in Russia, such as working in the small, private or foreign firms and living in particular regions like Moscow and St-Petersburg.

Notice also the positive correlation of the "New job" variable with the substitution of remuneration "in kind" (goods or services) for the pay in money 16.

- (ii) The key determinants of the "Change job" variable are close to those of "New job", thus confirming most of characteristics of external mobility revealed by analyzing the latter variable. The probability of moving across jobs is higher for young, male, and elementary workers. In 1995-1996, changing job is highly probable for the inhabitants of Moscow and St-Petersburg for employees in foreign firms and those accepting In kind remuneration in lieu of wage pay.
- (iii) Both variables of tenure in 1996, less than one year and less than three year, are positively correlated with "traditional" determinants of mobility (being young, male, and elementary worker) and being employed in private firm. Tenure is negatively correlated with the amount of wage arrears and experience of unpaid leaves and positively to the "demonetisations" of remuneration. Tenure of less than three years is negatively correlated with intelligentsia, and positively with employment in a small or private firm. Tenure of less than one year is positively correlated with living in Moscow-St Petersburg.

For 1994, the determinants of both tenure variables are largely similar. The main differences are related to the appearance of negative correlation between being engineer and having a tenure of less than three years.

_

¹⁶ Russian firms generalize more and more the practice of offering goods or services instead of regular wage pays. The RLMS survey contained an explicit question on this subject.

<u>Table 7</u>. The main determinants of the job-to-job mobility (see tables 8, 9, 10, and 11)

New job	Change job	Short Tenure (in 1994)	Short Tenure (in 1996)
+young and male	+young and male	+young and male	+young and male
		-unpaid leaves	-unpaid leaves
+elementary job	+elementary job	+elementary job	+elementary job
		-intelligentsia ³	-intelligentsia ³
		-engineer ³	-driver
+small firm		+small firm ³	+small firm ³
+private firm		+private firm	+private firm ³
+foreign firm	+foreign firm***	+public firm	
		-duration of arrears ¹	-amount of arrears
+In kind remuneration	+In kind remuneration***		+In kind remuneration
+Moscow-St-Petersburg	+Moscow-St-Petersburg***		
			+Moscow-St-Petersburg ¹

Here "+" and "-" indicate the sign of the correlation

III.3. Conclusions.

(i) The positive relation between moving from job to job and elementary workers provides an explanation to why at least one group of short-time workers is not afraid of losing their workplace (see Section I). Being always prepared for job-changing, elementary workers feel secure, since they do not actually face a direct threat of unemployment.

Notice that not all short-timers are prepared to quit the firm as elementary workers. For instance, being female increases the probability of reduced-hours experience, but it is not consistent with the status of a male worker mostly related to external mobility.

Thus, the hypothesis (H2) related to the segmentation of the short-time workers is confirmed regarding outside job options.

(ii) If H1 is correct, that is if it is true that unpaid leaves are related to specific skills, one should expect a positive correlation between unpaid leaves and longer tenure. Our regression results show that this is actually the case for all four tenure variables (in 1994 and in 1996).

¹less than 1 year

³less than 3 years

^{***}Only between 1995 and 1996

- (iii) In the same vein, professional structure of external mobility largely confirms this relationship between the nature of employees' skills and the forms of labor "retaining". Our findings show that quits are strongly related to the absence of firm-specific competencies (elementary professions). On the contrary, despite the fact that we have already established the link between staying within a firm and having specific skills (see previous point (ii) on longer tenure and unpaid leaves), the negative correlation between some of the short-tenure variables and employees with specific knowledge (engineers, drivers) still holds. The Hypothesis 1 is again confirmed.
- (iv) The wage arrears appear to produce a coherent effect. The duration and the amount of arrears are likely to increase the tenure. We propose a following explanation of this result. Accepting wage arrears is primarily related to the limited job opportunities. Specific skills could play an important role in employees' "tolerant" attitude. Thus, staying in firms with wage debts or accepting to be put on unpaid leaves have the same reasons: this type of employees wish to retain their jobs since they are not sure to utilize their knowledge elsewhere. The positive correlation between the duration of arrears and probability of being on unpaid leaves (see Table 5) seems to support this suggestion.

There is no evidence in the survey that social benefits play a substantial role in the workers' attachment to the firms with "wage problems". On the other hand, "demonetisation" of the employment relationship (goods and services instead of monetary wages) provokes immediately separations that, therefore, seem to be voluntary quits.

<u>Table 8:</u> Probability to Have a New Job in 1996 (probit regression)

Variables in 1996 except	New Job	
for labor "retaining" wage arrears and In kind remuneration in 1995	Coef.	Standard error
Gender	0.270**	0.102
	-0.015**	0.102
Age Education (year)		0.026
The state of the s	0.020 -0.086	0.107
Couple Plots	-0.284**	0.107
Informal Activity	0.253	0.110
•	-0.119	0.350
Manager Intelligentsia	0.119	0.330 0.195
Engineer	-0.252	0.193
State servant	-0.252 -0.010	0.288
State servant Trader-financier		0.215
Trader-financier Technician	0.348* 0.099	0.213 0.194
Workman	0.099 0.166	0.194 0.180
workman Farmer		0.180 0.261
Farmer Elementary job	-0.230 0.534**	0.201 0.192
In the forces	*****	0.192
Driver	-0.101 0.028	0.263
	0.416*	0.203
Foreign		
Public	0.002	0.130
Private	0.327*	0.145
# Workers<100	0.281*	0.129
# Workers>500	0.043	0.129
Duration. Arrears in 1995	0.005	0.019
Am. arrears in 1995	0.004	0.007
Unpaid leaves in 1995	-0.041	0.177
Short-time work in 1995	0.087	0.110
In kind remuneration in 1995	0.372**	0.144
# of child in the household	-0.067	0.050
# of elderly in the household	0.000	0.077
Low hh expenditure per capita in 1995	0.194*	0.095
Medium hh expenditure per capita in 1995	-0.134	0.132
Moscow-St Petersburg	0.603**	0.198
Northwest	0.495**	0.204
Center	0.177	0.181
Volga	0.069	0.184
Caucasus	-0.037	0.214
Urals	0.287	0.181
Or. Siberia	0.296	0.205
Semi-urban	0.011	0.183
Rural	0.075	0.130
Constant	-1.597**	0.451
Log Likelihood		568.5
Number of Observations		1975
Chi ² (39)		27.1
Prob. >chi2		.0000
Pseudo R ²		0.10

Notes: Dependent variable

 $\overline{y=1}$ if the person has a new job in 1996

y=0 if the person had no new job in 1996

Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII

Legend:

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, High household expenditures per capita, Occidental Siberia and Urban Settlement

^{*=} statistically significant at the 5% level

^{**=} statistically significant at the 1% level

<u>Table 9</u>: Probability to Have Tenure Under 1 or 3 years in 1994 (probit regression)

		Less Than Year	Tenure Less Than Three Years		
Variables in 1994	Coef.	Standard error	Coef.	Standard error	
				0.1.01	
Gender	0.380**	0.090	0.500**	0.075	
Age	-0.027**	0.004	-0.031	0.003	
Education (year)	0.002	0.022	0.020	0.018	
Couple	-0.059	0.096	-0.082	0.080	
Plots	0.035	0.128	-0.165	0.103	
Informal Activity	-0.115	0.141	0.115	0.114	
Manager	0.046	0.270	0.008	0.221	
Intelligentsia	-0.232	0.172	-0.284*	0.137	
Engineer	-0.103	0.214	-0.384*	0.171	
State servant	-0.251	0.237	0.044	0.187	
Trader-financier	0.211	0.186	0.141	0.158	
Technician	0.027	0.155	-0.091	0.126	
Workman	0.051	0.149	-0.178	0.122	
Farmer	-0.046	0.210	-0.115	0.168	
Elementary job	0.563**	0.163	0.592**	0.138	
In the forces	-0.821	0.542	-0.638*	0.377	
Driver	-0.237	0.213	-0.259	0.170	
Foreign	0.257	0.234	0.269	0.192	
Public	0.267*	0.113	0.174*	0.087	
Private	0.450**	0.127	0.320**	0.101	
# Workers<100	0.114	0.099	0.241**	0.082	
# Workers>500	-0.127	0.102	-0.024	0.083	
Duration. arrears	-0.088**	0.030	-0.031*	0.019	
Am. Arrears	-0.003	0.011	-0.011	0.008	
Unpaid leaves	-0.804**	0.176	-0.549**	0.108	
Short-time work	-0.126	0.099	0.012	0.078	
In kind remuneration	0.127	0.139	0.081	0.114	
# of child in the household	-0.021	0.042	-0.083**	0.035	
# of elderly in the household	-0.052	0.070	-0.047	0.057	
Low hh. expenditure per capita	0.009	0.092	-0.153*	0.075	
Medium hh. expenditure per capita	0.011	0.103	-0.063	0.084	
Constant	-0.170	0.369	0.607*	0.308	
Log Likelihood	-786	5.0	-1234	.0	
Number of Observations	219		2190		
Chi ² (41)	217		351.		
Prob. >chi2	0.00		0.000		
Pseudo R ²	0.1		0.12		

Notes: Dependent variable:

Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds VI, VII

y=1 if the person had less than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1994 y=0 if the person had more than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1994

Regression is run with regional dummies and settlement type dummies.

Legend:

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, Occidental Siberia and Urban Settlement, high level of household expenditures per capita.

^{*=} statistically significant at the 5% level

^{**=} statistically significant at the 1% level

<u>Table 10</u>: Probability to Have Tenure Under 1 or 3 years in 1996 (probit regression)

		Less Than Year	Tenure Less Than Three Years		
Variables in 1996	Coef.	Standard error	Coef.	Standard error	
Gender	0.255**	0.097	0.334**	0.078	
Age	-0.022**	0.004	-0.027**	0.003	
Education (year)	0.001	0.024	0.014	0.019	
Couple	-0.173*	0.099	-0.149*	0.081	
Plots	-0.171	0.109	-0.144*	0.081	
Informal Activity	0.391**	0.151	0.242*	0.131	
Manager	-0.213	0.325	-0.245	0.255	
Intelligentsia	-0.158	0.174	-0.294/	0.141	
Engineer	-0.383	0.253	-0.134	0.180	
State servant	-0.401	0.277	0.020	0.195	
Trader-financier	0.017	0.188	0.010	0.161	
Technician	-0.253	0.177	-0.125	0.139	
Workman	-0.187	0.160	-0.105	0.128	
Farmer	-0.193	0.237	-0.039	0.185	
Elementary job	0.319*	0.169	0.527**	0.144	
In the forces	-0.359	0.570	-0.020	0.346	
Driver	-0.702**	0.291	-0.371*	0.203	
Foreign	0.215	0.240	0.184	0.193	
Public	0.080	0.136	0.022	0.100	
Private	0.401**	0.147	0.387**	0.112	
# Workers<100	0.011	0.125	0.147	0.095	
# Workers>500	0.000	0.122	-0.024	0.094	
Duration. Arrears	0.001	0.018	-0.020	0.014	
Am. Arrears	-0.017**	0.005	-0.008**	0.003	
Unpaid leaves	-0.408*	0.200	-0.356**	0.137	
Short-time work	0.071	0.105	-0.030	0.086	
In kind remuneration	0.346**	0.131	0.199*	0.107	
# of child in the household	0.041	0.049	-0.047	0.039	
# of elderly in the household	0.022	0.075	0.018	0.060	
Low hh expenditure per capita	0.174*	0.102	0.002	0.079	
Medium hh expenditure per capita	0.098	0.119	0.030	0.092	
Semi-urban	-0.116	0.196	-0.265*	0.144	
Rural	-0.053	0.134	-0.106	0.102	
Constant	-0.468	0.415	0.590*	0.334	
Log Likelihood	-616	5.7	-106	7.0	
Number of Observations	188	36	188	36	
Chi ² (41)	177		276		
Prob. >chi2	0.00		0.00		
Pseudo R ²	0.12	40	0.1	1	

Notes: Dependent variable:

Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII

y=1 if the person had less than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1996

y=0 if the person had more than (1 or 3) year of tenure in 1996

Regression is run with regional dummies

Legend:

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, Occidental Siberia and Urban Settlement, high level of household expenditures per capita

^{*=} statistically significant at the 5% level

^{**=} statistically significant at the 1% level

<u>Table 11</u>: Probability to change enterprise, between 1994 and 1996 (probit regression)

		ged Job 1994-1995		ged Job 1995-1996	Changed Job Between 1994-1996	
Variables (are lagged, t-1)	Coef.	Standard error	Coef.	Standard error	Coef.	Standard error
Gender	0.227*	0.104	0.261**	0.101	0.300**	0.087
Age	-0.020**	0.004	-0.011**	0.004	-0.019**	0.004
Age Education (year)	0.077**	0.027	0.022	0.026	0.050*	0.022
Couple	-0.054	0.112	-0.185*	0.105	-0.148	0.022
Plots	0.045	0.112	-0.185**	0.103	-0.148 -0.071	0.128
		0.131	0.334*	0.155	0.239*	0.128 0.127
Informal Activity	0.168 -0.140			0.133		0.127
Manager		0.326	0.176		-0.254	
Intelligentsia	-0.240	0.198	0.061	0.193	-0.201	0.163
Engineer	-0.048	0.232	-0.291	0.255	-0.128	0.195
State servant	-0.280	0.277	-0.218	0.298	-0.325	0.229
Frader-financier	-0.017	0.239	0.208	0.227	0.049	0.194
Гесhnician	-0.132	0.191	-0.004	0.188	-0.106	0.155
Workman	0.054	0.177	0.075	0.168	-0.001	0.145
Farmer	0.324	0.234	-0.158	0.243	0.101	0.198
Elementary job	0.359*	0.201	0.372*	0.184	0.369*	0.166
n the forces	-	-	-0.283	0.527	-0.473	0.467
Oriver	0.264	0.233	0.034	0.223	0.124	0.197
Foreign	0.218	0.253	0.419*	0.219	0.137	0.216
Public	0.121	0.122	-0.064	0.120	0.071	0.101
Private	0.242*	0.140	0.129	0.137	0.167	0.117
Workers<100	0.010	0.113	0.208	0.128	0.145	0.097
# Workers>500	-0.169	0.114	-0.003	0.127	-0.056	0.098
Ouration. arrears	0.025	0.026	0.023	0.015	0.028	0.022
Am. arrears	-0.008	0.013	-0.001	0.007	-0.015	0.012
Unpaid leaves	-0.023	0.136	0.109	0.158	0.021	0.112
Short-time work	-0.036	0.109	0.151	0.105	-0.075	0.093
n kind remuneration	0.007	0.157	0.300*	0.138	-0.051	0.139
of child in the household	-0.016	0.050	0.013	0.048	0.015	0.042
of elderly in the household	0.001	0.081	0.109	0.074	0.012	0.066
Low hh. expenditure per capita	0.088	0.106	0.076	0.094	0.060	0.089
Medium hh. expenditure per capita	-0.040	0.122	-0.121	0.124	-0.024	0.101
Moscow-St Petersburg	0.066	0.122	0.467**	0.185	0.213	0.162
Northwest	-0.250	0.208	0.407	0.196	-0.123	0.171
		0.208		0.167		0.171
Center	-0.002 0.255		0.020		-0.080	
Volga	-0.255	0.166	0.019	0.167	-0.168	0.139
Caucasus	0.026	0.176	-0.247	0.203	-0.115	0.152
Urals	-0.300*	0.170	0.067	0.170	-0.291*	0.142
Or. Siberia	0.177	0.191	0.106	0.195	0.017	0.166
Semi-urban	0.082	0.158	-0.406*	0.205	-0.128	0.144
Rural	-0.362**	0.140	-0.055	0.126	-0.204*	0.113
Constant	-1.453**	0.439	-1.352**	0.432	-0.784*	0.368
Log Likelihood	-5	74.2	-60)1.5	-85	54.0
Number of Observations	1	825	18	353	19	002
Chi ² (39)		3.6		2.5		07
Prob. >chi2		0000		0000		000
Pseudo R ²		068		078)59
r scuuu K-	0.	000	0.0		: Panel data fron	

Sources: Panel data from RLMS, Rounds V, VI, VII

Notes: Dependent variable

y=1 if the person changed enterprise during the period

y=0 if the person did not change enterprise during the period

Legend:

Reference variables: Clerk; Semi-public, # of employees between 100 and 500, Occidental Siberia and Urban Settlement, high level of household expenditures per capita.

^{*=} statistically significant at the 5% level **= statistically significant at the 1% level

IV. Discussion.

We can conclude that labor "retaining" mechanism is not homogeneous. Firm's behavior in this domain is linked to the labor segmentation. Each segment is composed by a large group of employees whose characteristics determine the specificity of employment policies. We can thus distinguish two major policies corresponding to different groups of workers (see scheme 1).

- (i) "Administrative"-leave-policies reflect firms' efforts to keep employees with specific skills. Most of these workers have no choice since firm-specific competencies are not likely to be employed elsewhere. "Administrative" leaves represent a form of internal flexibility and they have only a secondary effect on external mobility: keeping firm-specific workers favors pushing elementary workers outside the borders of the firm.
- (ii) Short-time work reflects another form of internal flexibility, which is especially, related to continuous, though not always regular demand for elementary professions. Contrary to the employees endowed with specific competencies, most of elementary workers are not integrated into the enterprise, they can easily quit it, thus playing an important role in the connection between internal mobility (participating in the reduced hours practices) and external mobility (job-to-job changing across the firms).

Finally, the role of wage arrears in the internal labor adjustment is similar to unpaid leaves practices. Wage arrears for both amount and duration of arrears, are likely to be related to long tenure. For employees who have few external opportunities and, therefore, are "locked" within their firm there is practically no other solution than to accept wage arrears. In this case, managers utilize wage arrears as an additional means of internal adjustment. The fact that the probability to be on unpaid leaves is positively correlated with the duration of arrears supports this interpretation. However, there could be also a problem of wage arrears definition, since employees sent on "administrative" leaves often consider themselves as suffering from wage debts even if formally firms do not owe them any wages.

These results are consistent with the evidence provided by much of case studies (Koshman, 1995; Samara Research Group, 1996): enterprises continue to experience labor shortages when they have to meet orders. Facing extreme uncertainty on the product market managers' reaction consists in using various forms of internal flexibility. Therefore the rational behavior is to create and keep a permanent reserve of human resources every time a firm (or one of its departments or workshops) has to meet a sudden increase in demand.

The question is: in what kind of human resources are Russian enterprises interested? The outlined results allow us to test the "technological" argument (Commander et al. 1995). This argument points out firm-specific nature of human resources and hence the extremely complementary characteristics of labor-capital relation (Grosfeld et al., 1999). Our results show that keeping firm-specific competencies as a part of the firms' strategies represents a form of internal flexibility, i.e. labor adjustment, which explains relative employment stability. The distinction between blue collar and white collar employees seems to be undetermined in this context since the firm-specific competencies concern more diversified groups of employees, including in particular engineers and most of workers.

Nevertheless, the firm-specific explanation provides only a part, though important, of understanding relative employment stability.


The results show also that the second form of labor adjustment is related to the evident need to hire "labor in general". In other words, in the context of continuing degradation of physical capital stock, labor tends to substitute capital which is necessary to face the extreme product market uncertainty. This evidence is also in accordance with the results of different case studies (Donova, 1996). Investment fall in Russian economy creates permanent needs in unskilled workers (or former skilled employees who accept to work as unskilled workers) which firms try to meet by the recourse to the internal mobility (reduced-hours policy) or to the external labor market.

V. Conclusion

- First, what is usually qualified, as labor hoarding seems to represent particular forms of labor adjustment and internal flexibility. Two forms have been investigated in this paper: unpaid leaves and short-time work work.
- Second, unpaid leaves and short-time work correspond to different segments of labor. However, this segmentation is not reduced to a simplified opposition blue collar versus white collar.
- Third, at least these two forms of labor adjustment provide us a robust explanation of labor-output Russian paradox. Both of them stimulate internal labor reallocation.

Scheme 1: Internal Flexibility and External Mobility

Enterprise A



REFERENCES

Clarke S. (1998), "Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lessons from Russia", in S. Clarke (ed.), *Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lessons from Russia*, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 9-86.

Commander S., J. McHale and R. Yemtsov (1995), "Russia", *in* S. Commander and F. Coricelli (eds.), *Unemployment, restructuring and the labor market in Eastern Europe and Russia*, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, pp. 147-191.

Donova I. (1996), "A Miner's Town: From the Problem of Employment to the Problem of Personnel Management", in Clarke S. (ed.), *Labor Relations in Transition: Wages, employment and industrial conflict in Russia*, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 160-176.

Earle J.S. and K.Z. Sabrianova (1999), "Understanding wage arrears in Russia", - *SITE Working Paper n. 139*, Stockholm, January, 56 p.

Fay J.A. and J.L. Medoff (1985), "Labor and Output Over the Business Cycle: Some Direct Evidence", - *American Economic Review*, vol. 75, n.4 (September) pp. 638-655.

Gimpelson V. and D. Lippoldt (1997), "Labor Turnover in the Russian Economy", in Labor Market Dynamics in the Russian Federation, OECD Proceedings, Paris, pp. 17-56.

Gimpelson V. and D. Lippoldt (1999), Labor Turnover in Russia: Evidence from the Administrative Reporting of Enterprises in Four Regions, Transition Economic Series, n. 4, IHS, Vienne.

Greene, W. H. (1993), Econometric Analysis, Macmillan, second edition, New York.

Grosfeld I, Senik-Leygonie C., Verdier T., Kolenikov S., Paltseva E., (1999), "Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labor Market. A Segmentation Model", *Delta working paper*, n°1999-03, Paris.

Kabalina V.I., I.M. Kozina and I.V. Donova (1996), "Restrukturirovaniye zaniatosti na predpriyatiyakh i razvitiye rynka trouda v Rossii", - *Obchestvo i ekonomika*, n. 9-10, pp. 112-142.

Koshman M.V. (1995), "Zavod spetsialnogo oborudovania", - In: Gertchikov V.I. et Kochman M.V. (éds.), Sobstvennost' i trudovye otnochenia : varianty transformatsii. Sbornik keisov, IEiOPP, Novosibirsk, pp. 71-104.

Layard R. and A. Richter (1995), "How much unemployment is needed for restructuring: the Russian experience", - *Economics of transition*, vol. 3, n. 1, pp. 39-58.

Linz S.J. (1998), "Job Rights in Russian Firms: Endangered or Extinct Institution?" - *Comparative Economic Studies*, n. 4 (Winter), pp. 1-32.

Najman B. and A. Pailhé (2000), External Labor Mobility in Russia: *from Jobs to Plots*, paper presented at the 48th. IAES Conference in Montreal, June, 48 p.

Russian Economic Trends (1999), various issues.

Samara Research Group (1996), "Two military-industrial giants", - In: Clarke S. (ed.), The Russian enterprise in transition. Case Studies, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Brookfield, pp. 248-332.

Smirnov P. (1998), "The economic development of industrial enterprises and the dynamics and structure of employment", in S. Clarke (ed.), *Structural Adjustment without Mass Unemployment? Lessons from Russia*, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 186-199.

Standing G. (1994), "Why Measured Unemployment in Russia Is So Low: The Net With Many Holes", - *Journal of European Social Policy*, 4 (1), pp. 35-49.

Standing G. (1996), "Reviving Lost Souls: Russian Enterprise Restructuring", ILO, Geneva

Standing G. (1998), "Reviving Lost Souls: Russian Enterprise Restructuring", *in* S. Clarke (ed.), *Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lessons from Russia*, Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 147-185.

Appendix

APPENDIX 1: Job Tenure average by professions in 1996

	Tenure less than 1 year (In % of the total)	Tenure less than 3 years (In % of the total)	Tenure		N With Tenure
			Average	Standard	
			years	error	
Total	24 %	41%	8.7	9.3	2711
engineer	18%	31%	12.0	10.6	130
intelligentsia	21%	34%	10.4	10.1	372
workman	23%	39%	9.8	10.0	742
farmer	23%	41%	9.7	10.1	198
technician	19%	37%	9.3	9.2	292
driver	19%	32%	8.8	8.3	125
clerk	26%	40%	8.1	8.6	242
manager	24%	51%	7.0	8.9	46
state servant	21%	48%	6.6	7.1	100
in the forces	12 %	40 %	5.8	4.2	26
trader-financier	34%	56%	5.3	6.5	170
elementary job	40%	60 %	4.6	5.9	268

Sources: RLMS, round VII

APPENDIX 2: Tenure within individual and household characteristics in 1996

	Tenure less than 1 year	Tenure less than 3 years	Tenure		N With Tenure
	(In % of the total)	(In % of the total)	2 7-141 0		
			Average years	Standard error	
Gender					
Male	26%	45%	8.5	9.5	1209
Female	23%	38%	8.9	9.1	1404
Age					
Less than 25	56%	80%	1.9	2.3	207
25-40	26%	44%	5.9	5.4	1075
40-55/60	19%	33%	11.5	10.2	1093
Over 55/60	16%	29%	15.0	13.6	238
Education					
Primary	17%	34%	11.1	11.1	102
Secondary	25%	43%	8.5	9.1	1261
University	24%	40%	8.8	9.3	1250
Type of Settlement					
Rural	20%	37%	9.0	9.4	616
Semi-urban	17%	36%	8.5	8.8	179
Urban	27%	43%	8.8	9.3	1818
Household Expenditures ¹					
High	23%	42%	8.8	9.4	781
Medium	26%	44%	8.9	9.8	539
Low	24%	40%	8.6	9.1	1293
Work on Plots					
No	27%	45%	7.9	8.6	1851
Yes	18%	33%	10.7	10.5	762
Informal Activities					
No	24%	41%	8.7	9.3	2447
Yes	30%	43%	8.2	9.2	166

Sources: RLMS, round VII

 1 The households expenditures are per capita, and adjusted by the oxford scale (here 0.5 for child, and 0.75 for elderly people)

APPENDIX 3: Tenure within enterprise characteristics and employment policy in 1996

	Tenure less than 1 year (In % of the total)	Tenure less than 3 years (In % of the total)	Tenure		N With Tenure
			Average	Standard	
			years	error	
Firm size					
<20	30%	50%	7.2	8.8	341
21-100	26%	41%	8.4	8.9	594
100-200	17%	31%	10.1	9.6	211
201-500	24%	43%	9	9.5	236
Over 500	13%	26%	12.1	10.1	341
Ownership					
State	22%	39%	8.9	9.3	1580
Semi-public or Partnership	19%	37%	10.1	9.8	458
Private	32%	48%	7.6	9.0	557
On Short-time work					
No	23%	40%	8.7	9.2	2207
Yes	30%	44%	8.7	9.7	406
On unpaid leaves					
No	25%	43%	8.5	9.2	2373
Yes	16%	27%	11.8	10.2	215

Sources: RLMS, round VII

APPENDIX 4: Definition of variables

Variable	Definition
Gender	Equals 1 if the person is a man, else 0
Age	Age of the person
Education	Education number of years
Couple	Equals 1 if the person lives as a couple, else 0
Plots	Equals 1 if the person worked on a <i>plots</i> , else 0
Informal Activity	Equals 1 if the person worked in an <i>Informal Activity</i> , else 0
Unemployment self-rep.	Equals 1 if the person reported it self as unemployed, else 0
Tenure	Number of years of tenure
Tenure less then 1 year	Equals 1 if the tenure of the person is 1 year or less, else 0
Tenure less than 3 years	Equals 1 if the tenure of the person is 3 year or less, else 0
Change job	Equals 1 if the person changed job during the period, else 0
# children	Number of children in the family (respondent excluded)
# elderly	Number of elderly in the family (respondent excluded)
Low hh expenditure 94	Equals 1 if the person bellows to low per capita expenditure (real) category in 1994, else 0
Medium expenditure 94	Equals 1 if the person bellows to medium per capita expenditure (real) category in 1994, else 0
Low expenditure 95	Equals 1 if the person bellows to low per capita expenditure (real) category in 1995, else 0
Medium expenditure 95	Equals 1 if the person bellows to medium per capita expenditure (real) category in 1995, else 0
Center	Equals 1 if the person lives in Central Russia, else 0
Northwest	Equals 1 if the person lives in Northwest Russia, else 0
Volga	Equals 1 if the person lives in Volga, else 0
Caucasus	Equals 1 if the person lives in Caucasus, else 0
Urals	Equals 1 if the person lives in Urals, else 0
Occ. Siberia	Equals 1 if the person lives in Occidental Siberia, else 0
Or. Siberia	Equals 1 if the person lives in Oriental Siberia, else 0
Manager	Equals 1 if the person is a manager, else 0
Intelligentsia	Equals 1 if the person belongs to intelligentsia, else 0
Engineer	Equals 1 if the person is an engineer, else 0
State servant	Equals 1 if the person is a state servant, else 0
Trader-financier	Equals 1 if the person works in trade or finance, else 0
Technician	Equals 1 if the person is a technician, else 0
Clerk	Equals 1 if the person is a clerk, else 0
Workman	Equals 1 if the person is a workman, else 0
Farmer	Equals 1 if the person is a farmer, else 0
Elementary job	Equals 1 if the person has an elementary job, else 0
In the forces	Equals 1 if the person is in the army, else 0
Driver	Equals 1 if the person is a driver, else 0
# workers<100	Equals 1 if the person works in an enterprise of less than 100 employees, else 0
# workers>500	Equals 1 if the person works in an enterprise of more than 500 employees, else 0
Private	Equals 1 if the person works in a private establishment, else 0
Public	Equals 1 if the person works in a state-run establishment, else 0
Foreign	Equals 1 if the person works in a firm with foreign share, else 0
Newjob 96	Equals 1 if the person found a new job since December 1995, else 0
Short-time work 94	Equals 1 if the person works 120 hours by month and less in 1994, else 0
Short-time work 95	Equals 1 if the person works 120 hours by month and less in 1995, else 0
Short-time work 96	Equals 1 if the person works 120 hours by month and less in 1996, else 0
Unpaid leaves 94	Equals 1 if the person has been sent on compulsory unpaid leaves in 1994
Unpaid leaves 95	Equals 1 if the person has been sent on compulsory unpaid leaves in 1995
Unpaid leaves 96	Equals 1 if the person has been sent on compulsory unpaid leaves in 1996
Am. arrears 94	Total amount of money not been paid to worker in 1994 (*100000)
Am. arrears 95	Total amount of money not been paid to worker in 1995 (*100000)
Duration arrears 94	Wage arrears duration in months in 1994
Duration arrears 95	Wage arrears duration in months in 1995
In kind remuneration 96	Equals 1 if the person has been paid in goods or services in 1996, else 0

Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VI

APPENDIX 5: Number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and

maximum of all variables in 1996, 1995 and 1994

maxin	num of all va	riables in 19	996, 1995 and 199	94	
Variable	Nb. of Obs.	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	4607	0.43	0.50	0	1
Age in 1996	4607	44.67	15.46	16	72
Education in 1996	4607	10.94	2.76	0	15
Couple in 1996	4607	0.70	0.46	0	1
Plots in 1996	4607	0.34	0.47	0	1
Informal Activity in 1996	4607	0.07	0.25	0	1
Unemployment self reported 96	4607	0.08	0.27	0	1
Tenure less then 1 year in 1996	2611	0.12	0.33	0	1
Tenure less than 3 years in 1996	2611	0.34	0.47	0	1
Tenure in 1996	2611	9.67	9.20	1	55
Tenure in 1995	2747	9.57	9.21	1	54
Change job between 96 & 95	2298	0.12	0.33	0	1
Change job between 95 & 94	2275	0.12	0.32	0	1
Change job in 1996 or 1995	2484	0.20	0.40	0	1
Urban	4607	0.65	0.48	0	1
semi-urban	4607	0.06	0.24	0	1
Rural	4607	0.28	0.45	0	1
# Children	4607	0.84	0.98	0	8
# Elderly	4607	0.38	0.59	0	3
Low expenditure 96	4605	0.56	0.50	0	1
Medium expenditure 96	4605	0.18	0.39	0	1
High expenditure 96	4605	0.26	0.44	0	1
Center	4607	0.21	0.40	0	1
Volga	4607	0.19	0.40	0	1
Caucasus	4607	0.13	0.34	0	1
Urals	4607	0.16	0.36	0	1
Or. Siberia	4607	0.09	0.28	0	1
Occ. Siberia	4607	0.10	0.30	0	1
Northwest	4607	0.06	0.24	0	1
Moscow-St Pe	4607	0.06	0.24	0	1
Manager	4607	0.01	0.10	0	1
Intelligentsia	4607	0.08	0.27	0	1
Engineer	4607	0.03	0.17	0	1
State servant	4607	0.02	0.14	0	1
Clerk	4607	0.05	0.22	0	1
Workman	4607	0.04	0.19	0	1
Trader-financier	4607	0.06	0.24	0	1
Technician	4607	0.16	0.37	0	1
Farmer	4607	0.04	0.20	0	1
In the forces	4607	0.06	0.23	0	1
Driver	4607	0.01	0.07	0	1
Elementary job	4607	0.03	0.16	0	1
# workers<100	2668	0.38	0.48	0	1
# workers>500	2668	0.47	0.50	0	1
Private in 1996	2668	0.20	0.40	0	1
Foreign in 1996	2668	0.03	0.17	0	1
Public in 1996	2668	0.60	0.49	0	1
Am. arrears 96/100000	2287	8.87	15.12	0	240
Duration. arrears 96	2501	2.32	3.81	0	36
Short-time work 94	2782	0.12	0.33	0	1
Short-time work 95	2769	0.07	0.25	0	1
Short-time work 96	2643	0.08	0.27	0	1
Unpaid leaves 94	2461	0.20	0.40	0	1
Unpaid leaves 95	2425	0.19	0.39	0	1
Unpaid leaves 96	2283	0.18	0.39	0	1
In kind remuneration in 94	2781	0.09	0.29	0	1
In kind remuneration in 95	2764	0.09	0.28	0	1
In kind remuneration in 96	2641	0.13	0.33	0	1

Sources: RLMS, rounds V, VI, VII

DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu

CURRENT AS OF 10/25/01

Publication	Authors	Date
No. 394: Labor Hoarding in Russia: Where Does it Come from?	Rouslan Koumakhov amd Boris Najman	June 2000
No. 393: Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value:	Michael Lemmons and Karl Lins	Apr. 2001
Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis		
No. 392: Marshall and Labour Demand in Russia: Going Back to Basics	Jozef Konings and Hartmut	Aug. 2001
	Lehmann	
No. 391: Economic Transition and Elections in Poland	John E. Jackson, Jacek Klich, and	June 2001
	Krystyna Poznańska	
No. 390: Effects of Bank Insolvency and Strategic Uncertainty on	Christa Hainz	Aug. 2001
Corporate Restructuring in Transition Economies		
No. 389: Mark-Up Pricing In Bulgarian Manufacturing	Rumen Dobrinsky, Boyko Nikolov, and Nikolay Markov	June 2001
No. 388 Globalization and Firms' Financing Choices: Evidence from Emerging Economies	Sergio Schmukler and Esteban Vesperoni	May 2001
No. 387 The Distributional Impacts of Indonesia's Financial Crisis on	Jed Friedman and James	Sept. 2001
Household Welfare: A "Rapid Response" Methodology	Levinsohn	
No. 386 Corporate Financial Policies and Performance Prior to Currency Crises	Arturo Bris, Yrjö Koskinen, and Vicente Pons	June 2001
No. 385 Ownership and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from Estonia	Derek C. Jones and Niels Mygind	Aug. 2001
No. 384 Forthcoming in: <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> ,	Tito Boeri and Katherine Terrell	June 2001
"Institutional Determinants of Labor Reallocation in Transition" Vol.	The Both and Ratherme Terren	June 2001
16, No. 2, Feb. 2002.		
No. 383 Deindustrialisation and Structural Change During the Post-	Tomasz Mickiewicz and Anna	June 2001
Communist Transition	Zalewska	
No. 382 Markets and Growth	Štěpán Jurajda and Janet Mitchell	July 2001
No. 381 Labor Market Discrimination During Post-Communist	Robert S. Chase	Sept. 2000
Transition: A Monopsony Approach to the Status of Latvia's Russian		1
Minority		
No. 380 Dollarization of Liabilities in Non-tradable Goods Sector	Frédéric Chabellard	June 2001
No. 379 Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft	Enrico Perotti	Mar. 2001
Legal Constraints		
No. 378 Effective Tax Rates in Transition	Vlad Ivanenko	May 2001
No. 377 Some Explanations for Changes in the Distribution of	Thesia Garner and Katherine	May 2001
Household Income in Slovakia: 1988 and 1996	Terrell	
No. 376 Competition and Enterprise Performance in Transition	Wendy Carlin, Steven Fries,	May 2001
Economies: Evidence from a Cross-country Survey	Mark Schaffer and Paul Seabright	
	With Schaffer and Fadi Scastight	
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's	Yasheng Huang	May 2001
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI	Yasheng Huang	J
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China	Yasheng Huang Yasheng Huang	May 2001
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the	Yasheng Huang	,
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the Past Decade and Cross-National Comparison	Yasheng Huang Yasheng Huang Jiri Vecernik	May 2001 May 2001
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the	Yasheng Huang Yasheng Huang	May 2001
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the Past Decade and Cross-National Comparison No. 372 Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-	Yasheng Huang Yasheng Huang Jiri Vecernik	May 2001 May 2001
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the Past Decade and Cross-National Comparison No. 372 Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-Communist Transition No. 371 Do Multinational Enterprises Substitute Parent Jobs for Foreign Ones? Evidence from Firm Level Panel Data No. 370 From Needs to the Market: Changing Inequality of Household	Yasheng Huang Yasheng Huang Jiri Vecernik Jan Fidrmuc	May 2001 May 2001 Mar. 2001
No. 375 Why More is Actually Less: New Interpretations of China's Labor-Intensive FDI No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the Past Decade and Cross-National Comparison No. 372 Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-Communist Transition No. 371 Do Multinational Enterprises Substitute Parent Jobs for Foreign Ones? Evidence from Firm Level Panel Data	Yasheng Huang Yasheng Huang Jiri Vecernik Jan Fidrmuc Jozef Konings and Alan Murphye	May 2001 May 2001 Mar. 2001 Apr. 2001