

# Federal-State Relationships in Agriculture

*By W. Robert Parks*

If each of us were asked to name the central problems which government in the field of agriculture must meet and solve, our lists would undoubtedly differ. But we would probably include the following: development of integrated agricultural policy and of programs of action which are coordinated with one another; development of nation-wide programs which are, or can be, adapted to the variety of local conditions in which they are carried out; obtaining democratic farmer participation in the development and administration of agricultural programs; recruiting and training a corps of professional agricultural workers who can properly administer those programs; and, finally, the development of federal-state-local administrative arrangements through which the energies and competencies of all levels of government can be productively joined together.

These central problems are inextricably interlaced. So intertwined are they that it is almost impossible to separate them, even in arbitrary fashion, for purposes of discussion. Particularly is this true of the problem of federal-state administrative relations in agriculture. Because it bisects and underlies every other major problem in agricultural administration, no other major administrative problem in agriculture can be realistically analyzed or appraised without taking into consideration this fundamental federal-state relationship.

The federal-state relationships which are developing in agriculture are the best case study that students of public administration can discover of the "new administrative federalism," which is gradually but surely developing in this country. For in agriculture one finds an administrative situation in which the national and state governments have each accepted a strong responsibility for promoting the welfare of the citizens in this large economic sector. Also, in the field of agriculture every state has developed, over the years, a strong state agency for carrying forward the state program. That is, this agency, the land-grant college, has had an opportunity during its long life to develop its own institutional personality, orientations, and strength.

Thus, we have in agriculture a situation in which both the national government and the states feel a responsibility for carrying on positive programs, and each has a well-developed and strong administrative agency for so doing. Our principal job is to study the most promising methods of gearing together the operations of federal and state agencies so that they can combine their peculiar competencies, energies, and resources in a common attack upon the large problems facing American agriculture.

In undertaking this job it is first necessary to review some of the highlights in the evolution of federal-state relations in agriculture. Many of the reasons for cooperation and occasions for friction can be understood only when viewed in this broad perspective.

#### **EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN AGRICULTURE**

The development of federal-state relations in agriculture has followed rather closely the broad pattern of evolving federal-state relations generally. Therefore, in order to gain the broad perspective needed, it might be well briefly to review the major trends which have characterized the changing national-state relationships in the American federal system. Three trends stand out. First, there has been a large increase in national government activities. Although one can hear many different theories on why national activities have so mushroomed over the years — including the popular “devil theory” that it is a simple case of power-grabbing by a President or a bunch of bureaucrats — there are some hard underlying facts which have made a large increase in national government activities very necessary. For example, a growing number of problems have had to be handled by the national government because of the simple matter of area or geography. Some problems — such as floods, crime, transportation, communications, plant and animal diseases — are no respecters of state lines. Therefore, the national government, which is the only government that has a territorial jurisdiction which comprehends the problems, has had to assume responsibility if such problems were to be handled at all adequately.

Another reason for the huge increase in national government activities lies in the fact that the national government has superior financial and other material resources. Finally, a large number of functions has been taken over by national government through default of the states. Whenever the states either cannot, or simply will not, take an action which is overwhelmingly desired by the public, the pressure for the national government to handle the job becomes so strong and widespread that the national government oftentimes winds up doing it.

A second major trend in American federalism over the years has been the increase in activities of state governments. Because this trend has been overshadowed by the proportionately larger increase in national activities, it has generally gone unnoticed. However, when measured by any one of the standards generally applied — amount of revenue collected, money spent, number of personnel, number and types of services performed — the activities of the states have definitely increased.

A third important development in American federalism which, I think, can appropriately be called a trend is the rise and growth of a phenomenon which has sometimes been described as the “new federalism” or “cooperative federalism.” In essence, cooperative federalism rejects the old, legalistic, static, and rather sterile doctrine of completely separate, independent, and often competitive action by the national and state governments. Those who advocate cooperative federalism contend that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent such cooperation — and the courts have upheld this view. Further, they point out that the ends of both national and state governments in a democracy are the same — namely, the well-being of the individual — and the problems of society are so tremendous and complex that their solutions require the best combined efforts of both national and state governments. Therefore, they reason that we can no longer afford to dissipate our governmental energies in separate and competitive efforts by the state and national governments, nor in narrowly based defensive and jurisdictional haggling in terms of states’ rights or national rights. The idea of cooperative federalism is one that has been acted upon many times over the years. Its chief expression has been through the grant-in-aid programs which can be found in practically all fields of governmental activity.

With this broad picture of changing national-state relationships before us, let us now focus our attention on the evolution of federal-state relations in agriculture. The major developments in this relationship can best be shown by reference to particular periods:

(1) UP TO 1862. This might be called a period of "functionless federalism." Neither the national government nor the states were very much disturbed about agriculture. In round terms, neither was active. Such special services which agriculture received came mostly from local government. The national government's services for agriculture were confined chiefly to the providing of cheap western land and to sending the farmer a few seeds out of the agriculture division in the old Patent Office.

(2) FROM 1862 TO 1914. This was a period of "dual federalism." The year 1862 saw the creation of the United States Department of Agriculture and the passage of the first Morrill Act, which gave federal aid to the states in establishing land-grant colleges. Later in this period, the Hatch Act also provided financial aid to the states for experiment stations. Thus, it was during this period that the foundations were laid for agricultural activity by both the national government and the state. But during this period the idea of separateness of national and state functions was carefully preserved. However, toward the end of that period, conflicts, contacts, and cooperation between the two became more frequent.

(3) FROM 1914 TO NEW DEAL. "Cooperative federalism" became an officially accepted policy under the Smith-Lever Act of 1914. Under this Act, a new type of relation began to develop between the national and state agricultural agencies. The Smith-Lever Act provided: "This work shall be carried on in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon by the Secretary of Agriculture and the state agricultural college or colleges receiving the benefits of this act." Formal agreements, or memorandums of understanding, were signed by the USDA and the colleges, and the idea of a partnership between the national and state governments was fixed.

Actually, this new partnership established for extension work did not turn out to be a partnership of co-equals because the

states dominated the partnership. The national government was contributing more largely to state activities, but the states were the administrative agents. The national government, again in round terms, had no legal right to meet the farmer face to face in an administrative relationship.

(4) **NEW DEAL TO PRESENT.** During this period the old grant-in-aid relationships continued, but a new relationship pattern was added. Charged with the administration of the new "action" programs, the Department of Agriculture sought and accepted the cooperation of state colleges, but it did not channel its new programs to farmers directly through the colleges.

In contrast to the grant-in-aid procedure, the national government, in undertaking the agricultural action programs of the New Deal, established direct working relationships with the farming population. Thus, there was created a new type of administrative situation in which the national and the state government each had its own agents in the counties working upon the same or closely related problems, and usually working with the same farmers. This new administrative situation called for the development of a new type of federal-state collaboration, under which all of the enervating frictions and disputes which slow down work might be ironed out. More positively, the need was to develop common goals, standards, and procedures so that the agents of both national and state institutions could work productively together on a more or less joint enterprise.

That the public problems confronting the farming population are of such complexity and magnitude that they require for their solution or amelioration the combining of the resources and competencies of all levels of government is almost axiomatic. But it is far from axiomatic that such an administrative collaboration will be developed. The administrative relationships existing between federal and state agencies since the advent of the New Deal have been in a state of flux, which has been too often marked by fears, suspicions, misunderstandings, and consequently by friction, disputes, resistance, and even sabotage. Before we attempt to make any projections as to what may develop out of this flux in federal-state relations, it might be well to examine more closely the causes of the frictions.

## CAUSES OF FEDERAL-STATE FRICTIONS

Some degree of friction is a calculated feature of a federal system of government. Inherent in the theory of federalism is the belief that a certain amount of friction between the national and state wheels will have the beneficial result of preventing too hasty action on the part of either. But this minimum amount of friction does not have to be deliberately sought, for it will always be present. And certainly federalized machinery cannot operate at all efficiently if the friction becomes too intense.

The national-state frictions in agriculture have not at any time been severe enough to bring the whole machinery to a grinding stall. But they have been sufficiently serious to make the total administrative machinery operate considerably below its optimum efficiency.

A basic cause of friction has been the land-grant colleges' deep-seated institutional fear of being swallowed up and assimilated by the ever-growing United States Department of Agriculture. As we have mentioned earlier, the state college had a separate institutional growth up until 1914. It was proud of this independence and fearful lest it somehow be compromised or taken away. This fear was clearly demonstrated by the land-grant colleges' reaction to the Smith-Lever Act, which placed the colleges and the USDA on a partnership basis. California would not sign the memorandum of understanding; Arizona debated for a long time before it signed; and Illinois signed but later "abrogated" its agreement.

Despite the colleges' original distrust of the new partnership arrangement, and despite the provisions for mild federal control in the Smith-Lever Act, the colleges soon discovered that rather than having their independence impaired, the states had actually gained strength through their domination of the partnership. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the land-grant colleges, the working arrangements under the grant-in-aid provisions of the Smith-Lever Act became pretty much the ideal *status quo*.

With the advent of the action programs, the great institutional fear of the land-grant college became the fear of the consequences of this new, direct USDA contact with the

farmers. It gave the Department of Agriculture direct and daily contact with the bases of political power in agricultural politics — the farmers. And it has often been observed, and substantiated, that a farmer associated with a particular program tends to become intensely partisan toward the program and the agency which administers it. There was a growing college fear that the USDA with its superior resources would swallow up all of the public jobs which needed to be done for the farmers. The colleges saw their role in the farmers' lives as dwindling into insignificance. They felt that they were being relegated to the back seat.

Some of the action agencies have certainly not devoted their best effort to allaying this fear by giving the colleges reliable assurance that they still have an important and honorable role to play in the agricultural programs of the future. Inspired by a pioneering zeal to get their new jobs done and conscious of their superior resources, the new action agencies sometimes rode "rough shod" into the counties. They sometimes accused the extension services of "dragging their feet." Particularly in the early days of the action programs the colleges frequently felt that they were ridden as a "free horse" in getting a program established and then were shoved aside.

The mutual and natural fear and distrust between the USDA and the land-grant colleges does not arise solely from bureaucratic self-interest or from the pressures of private interests. It arises out of a natural difference in viewpoint as to how various agricultural problems can best be solved. This difference in viewpoint grows partly out of the different backgrounds and vantage points of the state extension services and the USDA. Both the USDA and the extension services honestly feel that they have the facilities, competencies, and methods for carrying out agricultural programs. Such self-confidence is both natural and admirable, but it can, of course, frustrate productive cooperation if given a free rein.

In analyzing the various proposals of national and state agencies, and of their respective champions, for developing effective national-state relations in agriculture, the worker in agricultural policy must keep in mind these viewpoints and prejudices. But to weigh the merits of these proposals one needs more than an understanding of the background attitudes on which they are

based. One must also try to gain an objective understanding of the needs, advantages, and disadvantages of national and state administration, respectively.

### RESPONSIBILITY OF NATIONAL OR STATE AGENCIES FOR AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS

On two large counts the state agricultural agencies have found themselves unqualified or not in a position to solve single-handedly all the problems in agriculture for which government today has taken varying degrees of responsibility for alleviating. In the first place, as we mentioned earlier, the area of the state's jurisdiction is not always coterminous with the problems to be attacked. Certain agricultural problems are no respecters of state lines and cannot be confined within a state's boundaries. Frequently they are national in their scope.

Secondly, the material resources of a state are often inadequate to deal with the agricultural problems of the state. The fact that the states with the greatest agricultural problems are generally the states with the most limited resources makes the state need for national material assistance all the more pressing. When national money is poured into the solving of a particular agricultural problem of a state, social justice to the citizens of other states from which the money is drawn demands that the national government have authority for insuring that such money is responsibly, equitably, and efficiently used. The fact that much of the resources which the national government diverts to the solving of such problems is drawn from the wealthier states to be used in the poorer states, whose contribution to the national government is much smaller, serves to emphasize the national government's interest in the effective use of those funds.

For these two large reasons, some sort of a minimum national program is required for many of the activities of government in agriculture. This is a fact accepted by the state colleges, and is an underlying assumption in all of their proposals for reallocating federal and state responsibilities in the new programs. Disagreement between the states and the national government has come in: (1) defining what the minimum national program must be and (2) determining what authority and responsibility the USDA must have and what functions it must perform to insure that such a minimum national program will be carried out.



What a minimum national program must be depends, of course, upon the nature of the function undertaken. Sometimes the minimum national program required may only be the development, establishment, and maintenance of nation-wide areas of uniformly high standards of activity. For example, national insistence upon uniformly high standards of activity might be considered the only minimum national program necessary in the matter of technical assistance for soil conservation.

On the other hand, the nature of an operation may be such that there must be a timed development of nationally integrated activity for its successful accomplishment. Take, for example, production controls and price-support programs. Here something more than a national program of uniformly high nation-wide standards is required. Since the competition for agricultural markets is intersectional and international, national production control and price-support programs must be nicely timed and integrated in the interest of both efficiency of program operation and equity among nation-wide commodity producing groups.

In attempting to reach any conclusions as to how much national or state programming and administration is needed for carrying out each of the variety of governmental activities in agriculture, we must set up a series of criteria, which are best stated in the form of questions. Because most of us here come from the land-grant colleges, let us first ask the questions which seemingly reveal the need for a large degree of national programming. But it must be pointed out that these questions are legitimate and objective criteria which have been agreed upon as significant by impartial students of public administration and intergovernmental relations.

(1) Can the activity be carried out at all in any area if it is not programmed on a national basis? For example, John D. Black has pointed out that marketing services — such as market news, market grades, inspection, and warehouse certification — are types of activities which cannot be confined wholly within state boundaries and performed solely by state market departments.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>John D. Black, "Federal-State-Local Relations in Agriculture," National Planning Association, 1948 (mimeo.), p. 18.

(2) Can the function be carried out, or the service be distributed equitably or justly to all citizens, if it is not programmed on a very uniform nation-wide basis? This question is particularly pertinent in connection with agricultural credit programs, rehabilitation loans, and conservation payments. In these programs involving nationally financed benefits for the nation's farmers, could equity of treatment be maintained if program development were broken down into 48 different jurisdictions?

(3) Will a vital national interest be jeopardized if a program of relatively equal vigor and effectiveness is not developed for all areas of the country where the problem exists? The need for national programming in soil conservation might be weighed by this criterion. One school of thought holds that the soil is a basic national resource, that its conservation is vital to our national prosperity, welfare, and strength, and that this national resource is in danger of destruction. If this line of thought is accepted, it follows that the nation cannot afford to permit the soil to be eroded away in certain communities, counties, or states and that there should be a national soil conservation program which insures that conservation will be carried out where it is needed.

(4) Is the nature of the function such that there will be strong particularistic local or sectional pressures which will seek the development of a program which serves their special ends at the expense of the broader general interest? In the field of pressure politics, it has often been demonstrated that a particular intrastate pressure may be too great for a state to withstand. As John D. Black has put it:

One needs not submit evidence beyond some already cited that the federal government, whether it is its legislative or the executive branch, may submit to powerful special-interest pressure groups. But it is less likely to submit to them than is state government, because (a) more opposing interests are likely to appear and they may be equally powerful, and because (b) it can say "no" with greater impunity.<sup>2</sup>

(5) Does the pressure of time demand national programming? A surplus of a perishable commodity, such as butter, must

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<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 19.

be handled in a matter of weeks. In such cases governmental action must be immediate and complete. Even in the field of soil conservation, the time element has been an important argument for national programming. It is entirely possible that some soil conservation spokesmen have been unduly alarmed by the spectre of a "plundered planet," and have, therefore, made soil conservation appear as a greater national emergency than may actually be the case. But if one agrees that an element of strong national urgency is present, then the national interest in preserving the soil resources cannot permit the states to jog along carrying on soil conserving activities in their own sweet time. Therefore, if nation-wide soil conservation is to be accomplished with sufficient speed, there may be need for a national force to press with equal emphasis in all communities, states, and regions for speedy local accomplishments.

Now let us set out criteria, or questions, which the state colleges have felt indicate the need for state responsibility in the development of nation-wide agricultural programs.

(6) Is the nature of an activity such that the suitability of a program demands that it be tailored to a variety of special local needs and circumstances? For example, a nation-wide soil conservation program must have almost endless local adaptations to fit the wide variations in topography, soil types, vegetation, climate, agricultural economy, and rural society present in so vast a land area.

The USDA has argued that a national agency, working through its local farmer committees, can give a program those local variations necessary to meet varying local circumstances. The colleges, in their turn, have contended that real state authority in programming is necessary actually to insure such variations. As the Land-Grant College Association's committee on postwar policy put it:

Instead of attempting to impose arbitrary national programs on localities—in effect demanding that all feet be fitted into the same size and style of shoe—we need, first of all, programs designed to fit states and counties. If the most feasible solutions call for action crossing state lines, then so far as possible they should represent a synthesis of state and local programs, the reverse of planning nationally and making adjustments locally.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Postwar Agricultural Policy, Report of the Committee on Postwar Agricultural Policy for the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, October 1944, p. 59.

(7) Can policy coordination of all agricultural programs and the overlapping and duplication in program activities best be achieved through national or state programming? One of the chief reasons advanced by the colleges for turning a larger responsibility in programming over to the states is the argument that if national programs were channeled down to the farmer through the state colleges, they would reach the farmer as a single comprehensive harmonious program. That is, the college would act as a funnel in which all programs were synthesized and integrated.

In turn, the USDA administrators have maintained that complete agricultural policy coordination is impossible to achieve in the real world. They point out that the nature of the American political process is such that inconsistencies in statutory policy goals are inevitable. Inconsistencies in legislative policy mean that conflicts and duplications must develop in program administration. Further, because of the vast size and the complicated and interdependent nature of the activities government has undertaken in agriculture, some duplication and overlapping is to be expected. The USDA has believed that it is in the best position to iron out policy and program conflicts among its agencies. Moreover, it has contended that the remedy of the correlation of national programs on a state-local axis would create even more serious policy discrepancies than those which now exist. It points out that the result would not only be 48 different sets of policies but that state programming would not insure policy coordination of the national programs even within a single state.

These, then, are the questions which should be asked before determining what the nature of a minimum national program for a given agricultural activity must be and the degree to which programming for such an activity should be a national or state responsibility. But even if a common understanding between the USDA and the colleges were reached on these two questions, the \$64 question still remains. What sort of national administrative control is necessary to insure the carrying out of the national agency's responsibility for the program? What functions must the national agency perform? Shall national or state agents carry the program to the farmer?

There is a wide gradation in the thinking of the 48 state colleges concerning which activities it is desirable and feasible for the state colleges to administer. However, the center of gravity in college thinking revolves around a belief that, except in crisis situations, agricultural programs can best be administered under the traditional grant-in-aid arrangement. That is, the national government is to make outlays of material resources to the states, who, in turn, will actually administer the programs. The colleges, of course, as stated earlier, accept the need for some minimum national programming and control. But they believe this can be had under the grant-in-aid. They visualize the national agencies as having a role similar to that of the Federal Extension Service.

The USDA, on the other hand, has—at least until the advent of the present administration, whose views on how federal-state relationships should be reorganized have not yet been clarified—maintained that only by the national government's having its agents work directly with farmers can it insure that the responsibilities given it by Congress are effectively carried out. It is pointed out by the advocates of direct federal administration that the colleges have never permitted the Federal Extension Service to assume any real national leadership or control. The implication is that any federal agency with a role similar to that of the Federal Extension Service would be powerless to develop and enforce a minimum national program.

Whether or not a nation-wide agricultural activity can be effectively carried out under the grant-in-aid, like the problem of minimum programming, depends upon the nature of the activity. That the state colleges have recognized this fact is testified to in their efforts to distinguish between "education" and "action" and to draw jurisdictional lines according to such definitions. The defining of "education" and "action," however, generally becomes a frustrating exercise in semantics. Therefore, a more rewarding line of analysis than that of attempting to categorize public activity according to whether it is education or action is an examination of administrative requirements necessary for the effective carrying out of each type of public activity.

Some of the questions asked in connection with determining the need for national programming must again be asked here in

attempting to set guidelines for evaluating the suitability of national or state execution of programs.

First, are the economic rewards involved in the activity so great that it would be difficult for 48 state agencies to distribute them with equity and justice among the agricultural population within a state and as between the citizens of different states? Could a national supervisory agency, such as the Federal Extension Service, enforce state conformance to nationally set standards of equity? Federal administrators feared that if the AAA were carved into 48 state jurisdictions, there would have been a real danger that such state entities might not be "disposed to act in real conformance with policies and procedures even laid down in the Act."<sup>4</sup> The inference is that they would have been even less likely to have met standards and procedures laid down by a mere national administrative agency. Nor would local pressures for disregarding or reinterpreting national standards be confined to the setting of acreage allotments, marketing quotas, etc. The same pressures could be expected to develop against national standards upon which payments and technical assistance for farm conservation work were to be based.

In other activities, the timing requirement is critical in the effective carrying out of a program. Can relatively autonomous state units be depended upon to carry out national directives with sufficient speed for the successful accomplishment of a program objective? According to the colleges' definition of their jurisdiction, most of them do not seek to administer the action phases of the federal programs. However, since they advocate that these phases be handled by some other state agency, it is necessary that the above questions be asked.

Another important question is: To what extent does the successful accomplishment of a program depend upon the expenditure of farmer energies and resources? For example, the requirements in material resources and human labor for bringing under conservation 400 million acres of cropland and 600 million acres of other kinds of farm land are so gigantic that a

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<sup>4</sup>Black, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

large part of these outlays must be made by farmers themselves. Under the Soil Conservation Districts program it is estimated that the farmer spends three to five times as much in labor and material to conserve each acre of his land than does the government. It is agreed by both the USDA and the colleges that to persuade farmers to contribute materially to a program they must be given some hand in the development and carrying out of the program. The USDA has maintained that it has enlisted such farmer cooperation through its local farmer committee systems. But the state colleges contend that they are better equipped to harness farmer support.

Two final questions must be asked in attempting to set guidelines for determining the relative suitability of national or state administration of agricultural programs. What agency is best equipped in terms of personnel and facilities for carrying out the different programs? In regard to personnel, questions must be asked concerning its professional competence, its background attitudes, the groups it is accustomed to serving, and the types of activities it is equipped to perform. The agency's equipment in such facilities as radio, press, organization, farmer contacts, and established working processes must also be weighed.

Such factors in measuring the administrative capacity of a particular agency are difficult to weigh. One complicating factor is that when we consider state administration of a nation-wide program, we have to think in terms of the fitness, not of just one state, but of all 48 states. There is a wide variation in organizational capacity and efficiency among the states. Because of these differences, a few land-grant colleges might perform better than a national agency a function which might be badly mis-handled by other colleges.

If state agencies other than the land-grant colleges — for example, state departments of agriculture — are to be used to administer national programs, the problem of capability of personnel may be acute. For the personnel of state departments of agriculture — chosen as it oftentimes is on a patronage basis — is generally inferior to the personnel of the land-grant colleges, which is chosen on the basis of professional standards.

Finally, we must ask the question: What would be the effect upon the state colleges themselves if a national program were

turned over to them? This would, of course, depend very largely upon what the program was. As an institution dedicated to the purpose of education, the land-grant college cannot afford to jeopardize the performance of its educational role by assuming any program, or part thereof, which is not strictly educational in character. Balanced and objective appraisal is one of the foundation blocks in a genuine educational program. Therefore, the assumption of responsibility for administering a non-educational program is very likely to distort the balance and objectivity of the college's over-all educational program.

### **GEARING FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES INTO A WORKING PARTNERSHIP**

Because the national agricultural administration felt that the grant-in-aid relationship was not adequate for carrying out the newer types of agricultural programs, it has sought to work out procedures for productive national-state collaboration in a situation in which the agents of both the nation and the state work side-by-side on the local firing line. A careful appraisal of these techniques would be of value because, in the foreseeable future, it does not seem probable that the federal government is going to relinquish the direct administration of its action programs to the states.

Such an appraisal is too ambitious an undertaking for this paper. It would require an objective and intimate knowledge of successes and failures of these techniques in operation in all 48 states. However, it might be well to classify several different types of techniques and to comment briefly upon them.

(1) **DEFINITION AND DELINEATION OF JURISDICTIONS.** This includes such methods of allocating and fixing the precise authority and responsibility of federal and state agencies through memorandums of understanding, joint policy statements, and project statements or agreements, which are jointly agreed upon by the federal and state agency. These attempts to define jurisdictions by no means guarantee honest to goodness cooperation, but they are quite necessary when both federal and state agricultural agencies have men on the firing line.

(2) **USE OF JOINT COUNCILS MADE UP OF FEDERAL AND STATE WORKERS** to mark out immediate and long-term substantive and administrative policies. Many different variations of



the joint council device have been used in agriculture with varying results in the several states. The Land-Use Planning Committee Program, which was based on the Mount Weather Agreement of 1938, was the most sophisticated and far-flung effort in this direction. The State Soil Conservation Committee, which typically includes the extension service and experiment station directors, is another example. On the local level, there are the County Professional Agricultural Workers' Councils. The list of experiments along this line could easily be extended.

Generalizations as to the success or failure of this method in obtaining productive federal-state cooperation are, of course, dangerous. Gleanings from reported experience indicate that they can be useful. On the other hand, they can degenerate into a glorified debating society, or simply into a pleasant social gathering. As one student has observed, the interagency council may become a place where the agency representatives go already convinced of the correctness of their own agency's position and leave more convinced than ever that they were right in the first place.

(3) **JOINT EMPLOYEES.** The use of employees who are jointly financed by, and responsible to, a state and federal agency is potentially one of the most fruitful techniques for collaboration. The joint employee has been widely used in both the action and research fields. He can be valuable in bringing about mutual understanding between his superiors. In the field of agricultural research he has perhaps proved most helpful in facilitating integrated research on a regional basis.

(4) **COMMON PROCEDURES AND WORK GUIDES.** Procedural coordination of federal and state effort can be had, to an extent at least, through the joint development and common adherence to procedures and work guides. Conflict and duplication are not attributable solely to separateness of organization. They are more likely to occur because of divergence and disagreement in working procedures followed. In some fields where federal and state employees are working on the same or similar problems, such as soil conservation, a considerable amount of experimentation has gone on in the development and usage of common work guides. The common use of jointly agreed upon technical guides in conservation, land-use capabilities maps and procedures, and

even the farm plan itself are potentially promising ways of reducing conflicts and gearing federal and state efforts together.

None of these techniques individually, or even collectively, is a panacea. All of them need a great deal of refinement. In order to undertake this refining job in intelligent fashion, we badly need more objective research of the administrative case-study type.

In conclusion, it might be well to remind ourselves of the sobering truism that no new and fancy reorganization chart, no ingenious recasting of working procedures can bring about the most productive federal-state cooperation, unless there is basically the will to cooperate on the part of both parties.