AMERICAN FARMERS AND WORLD AFFAIRS[1]

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I. INTRODUCTION

The American farmer is plagued with surpluses. Even if we suffered a crop failure, we in the United States would have enough wheat on hand to last us over two years. We would have enough corn to last us about half a year. And we would have enough cotton to last us nearly a year. But much of the world is suffering from agricultural shortages. Can't this dilemma be resolved?

The dual purpose of getting rid of farm surpluses and at the same time helping other countries with economic development gives the farmer a direct interest in foreign affairs. Perhaps we can better understand the farmer's interest in world affairs if we take a look at the goal of our foreign policy and alternatives for reaching this goal. But first of all let's take a look at some background information on this world in which we live.

II. HOW THE UNITED STATES FITS INTO THE PUZZLE OF TODAY'S WORLD

Foreign policy is a course of action that we in the United States adopt—a course of action which will have some influence on foreign people. If we as a nation must conceive of a policy with regard to other nations, we might do well to see just how our country fits into the total puzzle of today's world. So let's catch a glimpse of some of the major economic and political facts of today's world.

Figure 1[3] shows you each continent with its area in correct proportion to every other continent. For instance, Greenland isn't all out of size relative to Africa, as it is on some maps.

Now, let's put some data on this map. Let's see where you could go if you were traveling by train or auto (Figure 2). You could drive to Alaska, but you couldn't drive to Argentina. Of course, if you had an

[1]A Public Policy Workshop which has been tested in Michigan. A color filmstrip containing 26 visuals to accompany this workshop is available at a cost of $3.00 from Phillips Foster, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

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[3]The base map (Figure 1) appearing several times in this paper and Figures 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 are copyrighted by the Twentieth Century Fund and used here by permission.



Figure 1

SOURCE: Woytinsky and Woytinsky, *World Commerce and Governments, Trends and Outlook,* Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1955, p. 1.



Figure 2

SOURCE: *World Commerce and Governments,* p. 317.

amphibious jeep, you might make it (and you might also be able to make some money writing articles about your experiences).

Much of the world is without the kind of transportation that you and I take for granted. If you want to go overland from Ghana to Egypt, you have your choice of airplane, boat, or camel back. Look at the large desert areas of Central Asia, where non-mechanical means of transportation (camels, donkeys, people) still carry most of the goods.

We here in the United States think nothing of getting up in the morning and driving miles to an extension meeting, but if we lived in many parts of the world we couldn't do this—we'd have to walk.

Now, let's look at the world from the standpoint of population. Where do the people live? Here we have a map picturing each continent, not the same relative size as its area, but the same relative size as its population (Figure 3).



Figure 3

SOURCE: Woytinsky and Woytinsky, *World Population and Production, Trends and Outlook,* Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1953, lxxi.

The little country over on the left which looks like a midget United States *is* the United States. Population-wise, we are just "small stuff" by world standards. Latin America and Africa also have small populations by world standards, whereas Europe appears well populated. The biggest chunk of the world's population, however, lives in Asia. Just two Asian countries, China and India, contain one-third of the world's population.

Let's take another look at the world. This time let's make each country the same relative size as its income (Figure 4).



Figure 4

SOURCE: *World Commerce and Governments,* p. 1.

That big, pot-bellied country over on the left is "us." We have about 40 percent of the world's income. Latin America and Africa don't have much of the world's income, whereas Europe is rather well off. But in Asia, even when you multiply the vast numbers of people by the income per person, the total income doesn't amount to much by world standards. It seems that Europe and the United States have almost a monopoly on income. If you combined the income of these two areas, you would have about two-thirds of the world's income.

Two-thirds of the world's income on two continents—Europe and North America. One-third of the world's people in two countries—India and China. That's something to keep in mind.

Another way to look at world income figures would be to classify countries by per capita income. We might divide the countries of the world into classes as the sociologists divide the people in a community. Arbitrarily, we could call those countries with an annual per capita income over $500 upper class, those with an annual per capita income between $100 and $500 middle class, and those with an annual per capita income under $100 lower class (Figure 5).

By now we're beginning to get a geographic picture of the location of the developed and underdeveloped areas. But we can plot other significant data on world maps. Let's look at exports (Figure 6).



Figure 5

Annual income per capita was estimated by dividing national income by population using standard exchange rates except where multiple rates exist.

SOURCE: United Nations, Le Comptes Economizues de la Tunisie, Royaume de Tunisie, Presidence du Conseil, Service des Statistique; Digest of Colonial Statistics, H M Stationery Office, as quoted in "Economic Development Assistance," Committee for Economic Development, 1957, pp. 8-9; National Industrial Conference Board, *Economic Almanac, 1956*, T. Y. Crowell, New York, 1957, p. 540; occasional extrapolations by Phillips Foster.



Figure 6

SOURCE: *World Commerce and Governments*, p. 61.

This map shows each country the same relative size as its exports in 1952. A map like this on imports would look essentially the same. The United States is a powerful country in terms of world trade.

In dollar value traded, wheat is the most important commodity entering international trade. Again, the United States is a powerful country. We're so powerful, in fact, that we can afford to give away or sell at discount large quantities of our agricultural surplus (Figure 7).



Figure 7

SOURCE: *World Commerce and Governments*, p. 140.

Now, let's begin to fit a few things together.

The Indo-China complex, Burma, and Thailand are the major rice exporters of Asia. They have a long history of trade with rice-deficient India and Japan. Rice is so important to Thailand that a saying in that country is, "When you destroy rice you destroy Thailand." The Thai Government earns much of its foreign exchange by selling rice to countries like Japan and India.

Both the Thai Government and the Thai people take a dim view of the competition that we give them in the world food market with our Public Law 480 program. We often forget that although we may feed some hungry people by selling wheat to India and Japan at discount prices, we may at the same time hurt the Thai peasant who needs to sell rice to India to keep up the price of rice in Thailand. Our friends in Canada, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand (major exporters of

wheat) are often resentful of the way we deal with our surplus wheat abroad.

The Thai rice farmer, the Canadian wheat farmer—these are the sorts of people we should also think of in our disposal of surpluses abroad, in addition to those who receive the food. Every country of the non-Communist world is important to us in some way. Can we afford to run the risk of antagonizing even the smallest of these?

Let's take one last look at the world—this time at a simplified map of world politics. We could crudely divide the world into three major blocs: (1) the Communists; (2) the highly industrialized Western democracies; and (3) the non-Communist underdeveloped nations (Figure 8).



Figure 8

The Communist bloc (led by Russia) and the Western bloc (led by the United States) are engaged in a courtship contest for the underdeveloped nations which, on the whole, can be considered as largely uncommitted. We have pacts with many of these nations, but a pact doesn't insure that they, with their different cultural heritage and low-income level, will not shortly prefer a pact with the Soviet Union if the Communist terms look more attractive.

The communications revolution, which has taken place during this twentieth century, has begun to make people of the underdeveloped world aware that poverty doesn't *have* to be. They are becoming *aware* of what we have—things like television, automobiles, mass education,

mass literacy, the ability to put sputniks up in the air—and they are starting to *want* what we have.

This new awareness and desire, this "revolution in rising expectations" plays an important role in today's cold war courtship. The underdeveloped nations know that both the United States and Russia have the sorts of material things they would like to have. We wonder, and Russia wonders, what method these nations will choose in order to attain their aspirations.

During the past fifteen years the West has been loosening its hold on the underdeveloped world. Twenty-one new nations have appeared in the wake of the seemingly inevitable trek of Western colonialism out of the underdeveloped world. During this same period, and seemingly just as inevitably, the Communist world has been expanding its influence persistently over the face of Asia.

Since the focus of the cold war courtship is on the underdeveloped, largely uncommitted world, let's concentrate for a while on this segment.

III. THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD

Only 21 percent of the world's population and 27 percent of the world's area can be classified as economically developed and outside of Communist domination. About 35 percent of the world's population living in about 26 percent of the world's area is under Communist domination. This leaves close to 50 percent of the world's people living in the underdeveloped and uncommitted areas (Table 1).

TABLE 1. WORLD POPULATION AND AREA

Bloc	Percent of World's Population	Percent of World's Area
West	21	27
Communist	35	26
Underdeveloped	44	47
United States	6	7

SOURCE: "Great Decisions 1959," Fact Sheet 2, Foreign Policy Association, Inc., New York, 1958; Edward B. Espenshade, Editor, *Goode's World Atlas,* Rand McNally, Chicago, 1953.

About half of the United States' trade is with these underdeveloped areas (Table 2). We obtain from them not only the rubber, tin, manganese, and other strategic minerals that are required to keep our industrial complex functioning, but also the spices and other consumer goods that help to make up our high level of living. We indeed have a stake in their well-being.

TABLE 2. UNITED STATES TRADE WITH UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

Trade	Percent
Exports	45
Imports	52

SOURCE: Department of Commerce by International Economic Analysis Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce from basic data of the Bureau of the Census, July 1958, as quoted in *The World Almanac 1959,* New York World-Telegram, New York, 1959, p. 675.

Measured in calories, the food supply of economically underdeveloped countries is 17 percent less than is necessary for minimum health and perhaps a third less than in the more advanced countries (Table 3). But when a count is taken of the needs of the human body for the relatively expensive protective foods, such as milk and meat, the disparity in nutrition is very much greater.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE DIET IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS COMPARED WITH MINIMUM HEALTH STANDARD

Area	Calories
Underdeveloped countries	2,200
United States	3,100
Minimum (Health Standard of FAO)	2,650

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Production Yearbook, 1958,* and *The State of Food and Agriculture, 1957.*

The average life expectancy in economically underdeveloped countries is only 36 years compared with 67 years in the developed countries. Parents must expect to lose a large proportion of their children at birth or in infancy.

Only 35 percent of these people can read and write, compared with 95 percent in developed areas. The opportunity to attend school is still limited to less than half of the children of school age (Table 4).

TABLE 4. LIFE EXPECTANCY AND LITERACY

Area	Life Expectancy	Literacy
	Years	*Percent*
Developed areas	67	95
Underdeveloped Areas	36	35

SOURCE: Fact Sheet, Committee for International Economic Growth, Washington, D. C.

Although income cannot be compared accurately dollarwise, indications are that each person in the underdeveloped areas averages only

the equivalent of about $126 income per year. In Western Europe the income is about $1,400 per person and in the United States about $2,000 (Table 5).

TABLE 5. AVERAGE INCOME PER PERSON PER YEAR IN DEVELOPED AND UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

Area	Income
United States	$2,000
Western Europe	1,400
Latin America	190
Middle East	158
Southeast Asia	125
Africa	85
South Asia	74

SOURCE: Same as for Figure 5.

In most of the underdeveloped areas, at least two out of three people, and sometimes as many as 85 percent, are engaged in farming (Table 6). It is ironic that the *more* people engaged in farming in a country, the *less* the people have to eat.

TABLE 6. PERCENT OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE IN AGRICULTURE

Area	Percent	Area	Percent
Belgian Congo	85	Mexico	58
Thailand	85	U.S.S.R.	52
Bolivia	72	Argentina	25
India	71	Western Europe	22
Pakistan	65	United States	11
Brazil	58		

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Production Yearbook, 1958,* Vol. 12, pp. 19-21.

Why is it that two-thirds of the world's income is in the Western bloc and most of the world's population is elsewhere? What is the history of the development of the major cultural differences on this earth?

IV. HOW DID WE GET THIS WAY?

Although the world can conveniently be divided into three major blocs as we have been doing so far—the Western, Communist, and Underdeveloped—dividing the world into several major cultural areas or realms might be helpful and more accurate (Figure 9).

We are already familiar with the generalized outline of Western and Russian culture. Dividing the rest of the world into broad cultural areas would probably require recognition of at least these additional major



Figure 9

SOURCE: Bruce Smith, *International and Intercultural Communication: A Theoretical Model,* Manuscript for a forthcoming book; and Russell and Kniffen, *Culture Worlds,* Macmillan, New York, 1951.

cultures: Latin American, Negro African, Arabian, Hindu, Chinese, Japanese, and Southeast Asian.

History of Major Cultural Differences

Going back to man's emergence from the Stone Age and following the development of his cultures through time, we find that Chinese, Hindu, pre-Babylonic, and Egyptian civilizations were the first to appear and that two of these civilizations are still with us. The Arabian, Japanese, Southeast Asian, and Negro African cultural boundaries were fairly well determined before the emergence of the Western World as we know it. Most recent to make their appearance are Russian, Latin American, and Western cultures.

Being old and powerful, the Hindu and Chinese cultures have, over the centuries, found ways of crowding many people into their particular corners of the earth. These people, for instance, have developed many leguminous crops (field beans, soybeans, cowpeas, and others) to furnish protein in their diets. Thus, they can get along without the luxury of using land to raise animals for protein. They have developed religions which have helped them to be happy with the few material possessions they have had. They have developed settlement patterns which concentrate the people into villages and save the majority of the land for cultivation.

During the past thousand years, the Hindu and Chinese cultures have been repeatedly harassed by younger and more vigorous neighboring cultures: Moslem, Mongolian, Western, and now Russian. The history of the rapid expansion of these neighboring cultures has been linked with advancing technology and important messages.

The Mongols, with the technology of skillful horsemanship and improved organization under the leadership of Genghis Khan, swiftly conquered most of Asia. But their conquest was short-lived—perhaps for lack of a message which the Moslems had. Where the Moslems went, they tended to stay. They had not only technology but also the message of a new monotheistic religion.

During its period of great expansion the West had such technologies as improved navigation and gunpowder. It also had the messages of the Renaissance and the Reformation. These technologies and messages, plus the industrial revolution and the challenge of new land, helped the West to accomplish its four-or-five-hundred-year "great leap forward."

Now Russian Communism, with its technology equal to that of the West, is expanding and carrying with it yet another message, "Follow us. We will show you how to get economic development in a hurry!" That the message has truth in it has been demonstrated in the test plot of Russia. It is getting another demonstration in China. The message is not only powerful, but it is one that the underdeveloped peoples of the world find particularly enticing during this period of the revolution of rising expectations.

The presence of this vigorous expanding Communist culture, together with its powerful technology and powerful message, is one of the major challenges to the United States' foreign policy.

V. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE, ALTERNATIVES, TOOLS

Objective

The late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles once explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "The interests of the United States, which our foreign policy would safeguard and promote, include: the lives and homes of our people, their confidence and peace of mind, their economic well-being, and their ideals." Dulles pointed out that because the greatest threat to these interests is war, which today might mean the destruction of civilization itself, the primary objective of the United States' policy is to assure a just and lasting peace.

History records the conflict between cultures. Today we find ourselves involved in just one moment of a long, drawn out, or protracted

conflict between cultures. This conflict provides the reason for a foreign policy. It threatens the very existence of our culture.

Hence our number one foreign policy goal might be crystallized in one word—*survival.* This includes not only our lives, but survival of our culture, including such things as our ideals, our well-being, and our ability to progress. The founders of our government included all this in the expression, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Alternatives

This "passing moment" in the protracted conflict is different from others in the world's history. The conflict is now global. The conflict is between highly civilized cultures. Space age technology makes violence in cultural conflict so dangerous it would seem incredible that war is considered a possibility. But in a world of people hungry for power, for well-being, for self-determination, or just plain hungry, the world is a powder keg, and the world's leaders are playing with matches that might at any moment light the fuse.

In order to achieve our foreign policy goal we have, in a broad sense, several possible courses of action: (1) attempt to preserve the *status quo;* (2) initiate a revolutionary offensive; (3) try to roll back Communism; (4) any combination of these courses of action.

If we decide that *preserving the status quo* is in our best interest, we will probably want to:

a. Strive to contain Communism in its present area.
b. Insist on the integrity of national boundaries as they exist today.
c. Support existing governments, regardless of their ideologies.
d. Preserve the world balance of power as it now stands in the hope that it will prevent an all-out war.
e. Sweat out the evolution of the Communist society in the hope that it will evolve into something less threatening.

If we decide that our best interest is served by embarking on a *revolutionary offensive,* this might involve:

a. Promoting economic and social development the world over.
b. Using power as an agent of policy.
c. Working toward freedom for the development of diverse cultures, interests, and convictions as long as these do not impair the same freedom for others.
d. Striving to extend democratic institutions and freedom concepts over the whole of the earth.

If we decide to follow a policy of *rolling back Communism* we might:

a. Play the "volunteer" game against the Communists.

b. Intensify our propaganda efforts behind the Communist borders.

c. Get ready to strike the first blow against the Communists, instead of waiting for them to be the aggressor.

Tools

The protracted conflict is carried on with a variety of tools. Among these are hot wars, cold wars, propaganda wars, diplomacy, treaties, and alliances. Additional tools are technological aid, grants, economic development, trade agreements, subversive infiltration, and cultural and educational exchange.

We could not possibly analyze all of the economic, social, and political consequences of each of our foreign policy alternatives. But let us at least examine *one* current foreign policy program as a case study and see how it squares with the two alternatives described as "preserving the *status quo*" and as "a revolutionary offensive." Let's look at our Mutual Security Program.

VI. A LOOK AT MUTUAL SECURITY

Mutual Security is a multibranched action program which uses a variety of foreign policy tools.

The Mutual Security idea is based on the knowledge that the very real Russian threat cannot be resisted by any one nation single-handedly—not even by the strongest nation in the non-Communist world. Even the United States with its vast resources doesn't have enough to "go it alone." Imports are vitally necessary to our industry. We import all of our tin and more than half of such strategic minerals as bauxite, cobalt, and tungsten (Table 7).

TABLE 7. IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS ESSENTIAL TO UNITED STATES INDUSTRY

Commodity	Percent Imported	Commodity	Percent Imported
Natural rubber	100	Antimony	89
Tin	100	Bauxite	85
Industrial diamonds	100	Manganese ore	85
Graphite	100	Cobalt	81
Platinum metals	97	Tungsten	64
Chromite	93	Mercury	56

SOURCE: Department of State, Defense, and International Cooperation Administration, *Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year 1960, A Summary Presentation,* 1959, p. 9.

The mutual security of the non-Communist world depends on keeping enough of the world's productive resources outside of Communist control to protect ourselves against a Soviet economic stranglehold. Mutual security depends on other things too, of course, but this is certainly a basic requirement.

The balance of the world's known resources lies largely with the nations other than the Communist bloc or the United States (Table 8).

TABLE 8. WORLD BALANCE OF RESOURCES

Resource	United States	Rest of non-Communist World	Communist Bloc
		Percent of World's Supply	
Population	6	59	35
Area	7	67	26
Steel	29	42	29
Coal	20	39	41
Crude petroleum	37	49	14
Primary aluminum	41	39	20
Electric power	39	42	19
Merchant fleet	22	75	3

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. 18.

These nations are largely the uncommitted nations of the underdeveloped world, the "courted" nations of today's cold-war courtship. We reason that our security depends on keeping the non-Communist nations outside of the Iron Curtain, in other words, containing Communism. This is the logic of Mutual Security.

Our Present Mutual Security Program

The suggested 1960 Mutual Security Budget of 3.9 billion dollars represents about 5 percent of the total United States Government budget. This amount is less than 1 percent of our nation's income (Gross National Product).

By far the largest chunk, 41 percent, of 1960 Mutual Security funds goes for direct military assistance (Table 9).

TABLE 9. SUGGESTED MUTUAL SECURITY APPROPRIATION FOR 1960

Purpose	Millions	Percent
Military assistance and defense support	$2,435	62
Development Loan Fund	700	18
Special assistance, contingency fund, and other	584	15
Technical cooperation	211	5
Total	$3,930	100

SOURCE: *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

Military assistance consists of: (1) military equipment, (2) training in the proper use of this equipment, and (3) supplies and services furnished directly to foreign military forces.

Defense support takes another sizable chunk of the Mutual Security funds (21 percent). Defense support may include costs of feeding, clothing, housing, moving, and paying troops. It may also include the cost of building defense communications, military roads, harbors, and airfields.

Another sizable amount of the 1960 appropriation request (18 percent) is for the Development Loan Fund which is used to encourage economic development abroad by providing loans.

Five percent of the 1960 Mutual Security Program will go for technical cooperation—popularly known as Point 4. By providing know-how, Point 4 teaches the people of "friendly governments" the basic technical skills needed for economic development.

Fifteen percent of the funds are for several other aspects of the Mutual Security Program which are neither clearly developmental nor military in nature. These include special assistance, the contingency fund, and other programs.

Russia's Bid for the Uncommitted Nations

While the Communist bloc of nations has occasionally used grants of arms in its attempts to win uncommitted nations to its side, it has relied more heavily on trade, development loans, technical assistance, and anti-Western propaganda.

Russia's economic and technical assistance program has been aimed mainly toward non-Communist Asia and the Near East. In the crucial rim of Asia, the Russians have emphasized economic aid to a far greater degree than military aid. Only about 20 percent of their credit and grant agreements have been military.

The Communist propaganda offensive is directed mainly to the common people of the world. The Communist bloc seems to be taking advantage of the fact that any society tends to divide itself into an elite group (which controls much of the power), one or more counter-elite groups (which are trying to seize the power from the elite), and the majority of the people (the common people or the masses who follow) (Figure 10).

The Communists appear to be sacrificing the immediate cooperation of the ruling elites in many countries in the hope that Communist propaganda may eventually persuade the counter-elites and masses to



Figure 10

join the Communist camp against the elites. The United States, on the other hand, has tended to cooperate with non-Communist elite groups whether such groups are supported by the mass of their people or not.

What Policy Does Mutual Security Stress?

The Mutual Security Program uses chiefly the foreign policy tools of military assistance, economic assistance, and exchange of people through technical assistance. Although it contains some hints of the revolutionary offensive, a look at the allocation of its funds seems to indicate that the Mutual Security Program is being used primarily to preserve the *status quo.*

It seeks to contain Communism largely through maintaining the world balance of military power. In this process it extends aid and prestige to existing governments, some of whose ideals are far from freedom and democracy.

These same tools which presently emphasize maintenance of the *status quo* could be used in an over-all program for a revolutionary offensive. The amounts would need to be increased to make the tools a more effective force, and their use would have to be directed more intensively toward extending democratic institutions and concepts.

Similarly, these same tools could be used as part of a policy of roll-back.

VII. THE POLICY ISSUE

As you examine some of our other foreign policies and programs, such as Public Law 480, our national defense expenditure, our China recognition policy, you may find in them also a *status quo* tendency.

The big question in foreign policy today is, "Which of the broad foreign policy alternatives should we lean toward," or stated another way, "How much *status quo,* how much revolutionary offensive, and how much roll back?" What combination is best suited to a nation involved in a protracted conflict? What combination is best suited to an era fraught with its own revolutions—the technological revolution, the organizational revolution, and the revolution of rising expectations? The decision that you and your neighbors make about which pole to lean toward on this basic issue in foreign policy may well be one of the most important decisions you will ever make.

It will influence the character of future surplus disposal programs abroad and thus affect the market for some of your products. But more important and far-reaching, it will influence how your government uses your tax dollars in military spending and other phases of foreign policy. It will influence the future of your family, of your way of life.

Too often the big decisions by big government in a big democracy are made as a result of pressure by some small group motivated by its own selfish interest. The pressure group often wins its case largely because no one else is concerned with the particular issue at stake.

Foreign policy concerns every one of us vitally, yet few of us are vitally concerned about foreign policy. Can we run the risk of leaving the big decisions on foreign policy in the hands of a few, such as big business, big labor, big agriculture, the military, or even the college professors?

Our ultimate position of survival or extinction during the protracted conflict yet to take place will depend largely on the seriousness of our concern, of everyone's concern, with foreign policy.