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# Restaurant Prices and the Minimum Wage\*

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## Abstract

We examine the effect of the minimum wage on restaurant prices. For that purpose, we estimate a price rigidity model by exploiting a unique dataset of individual price quotes used to calculate the Consumer Price Index in France. We find a positive and significant impact of the minimum wage on prices. We obtain that the effect of the minimum wage on prices is very protracted. The aggregate impact estimated with our model takes more than a year to fully pass through to retail prices.

Keywords: Price stickiness, minimum wage, inflation, restaurant prices.

JEL Codes: E31, D43, L11

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# 1 Introduction

The economic effects of the minimum wage are at the heart of a long-lasting controversy. Recent and influential works by Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994) have revived this controversy. Focusing on US fast-food restaurants, in which employees paid at the minimum wage are a substantial part of the labor force, they find little evidence of an effect of the minimum wage on employment. Neumark and Wascher (2000) have disputed their result. Using payroll data, they found evidence of a negative employment effect. Card and Krueger (2000) have subsequently challenged this result by using the same payroll data. Although most of the controversy has focused on the impact of the minimum wage on employment (Brown, 1999), changes in the minimum wage may have an impact on prices as well. However, evidence on the price effect of the minimum wage is relatively scant for the moment (Lemos, 2008). In the case of fast-food restaurants, available evidence include Card and Krueger (1994) and McDonald and Aaronson (2006).

The present paper uses individual price quotes and a microeconomic approach to assess the impact of the minimum wage on prices in restaurants in France. The restaurant sector is, as in the US, well suited for assessing the effect of minimum wage increases since the proportion of employees paid at the minimum wage is high in this industry (around 40%). Moreover, wage setting is not affected by collective bargaining in restaurants, because collective agreements are very scarce in this industry composed of very small firms. Our price dataset is unique and consists of thousands of monthly price quotes collected in restaurants between 1994 and 2003 by the French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris) to compute the Consumer Price Index (see Baudry *et al.*, 2007, for an overall analysis of price stickiness using these data).

The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we provide new estimates of impact of minimum wage increases on prices by using microdata. This approach was introduced by Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994) who used a difference-in-differences estimation strategy.<sup>1</sup> More recent studies have used longer panel data. For instance, using BLS data,

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<sup>1</sup>Since the minimum wage in France is binding at the national level, all firms are equally concerned. Thus there is no possibility to apply a difference-in-differences methodology requiring the existence of a valid control group.

McDonald and Aaronson (2006) find a positive and fast impact of the minimum wage on prices. Using the same type of data, our econometric strategy is however different since we build a microeconomic non-linear model which accounts both for the infrequency of price adjustments and the size of price changes. This strategy allows us to better capture delayed effects of the minimum wage on prices and to analyze the aggregation of non-linear pricing rules adopted by heterogeneous agents.<sup>2</sup>

Our paper also adds to the empirical literature on price rigidity. Price rigidity is a crucial issue in macroeconomics. After a shock, macroeconomic dynamics typically depends on microeconomic features, like the firm's price-setting behaviour (see, for instance, Goodfriend and King, 1997). A recurrent challenge for economists is to understand the mechanisms underpinning the infrequency of price adjustments. In particular, price changes in the services sector are known to be rare. In the euro area and in the US, only 5.6% and 15% of service prices are respectively modified each month (compared with 15% and 25% for prices composing the overall CPI). Restaurant prices are a particularly sticky component of services, with respective frequencies of price changes of 4.7% and 9.0% (Bils and Klenow, 2004 and Dhyne *et al.*, 2006). Restaurant prices thus appear as an ideal item for assessing price rigidity models. In addition, industries with very sticky prices are of particular interest from a monetary policy perspective: Aoki (2001) shows that the optimal monetary policy should put more emphasis on stabilizing the inflation rate in the stickiest sectors. Some recent papers have looked at restaurant prices with a sticky price perspective. For instance, Gaiotti and Lippi (2005) and Hobijn, Ravenna and Tambalotti (2006) have proposed theoretical models to explain the pricing behaviour of restaurants during the euro cash changeover. Using microdata for European and Italian restaurants, they build and calibrate theoretical models to test different theoretical assumptions and provide some insights into the mechanisms underpinning the inflation peak at the euro cash changeover date. Goette, Minsch and Tyrann (2005) report some empirical evidence about the price adjustment of various

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<sup>2</sup>Another possibility is to use aggregate sectoral data. Adopting this approach, Lee and O'Roarke (1999) find a significant effect of the minimum wage on prices. Aaronson (2001) uses time-series reduced-form equations for estimating the reaction of the price subindices of the CPI (in the U.S. and Canada) to an increase of the minimum wage. He obtains some evidence of a lagged and positive impact of minimum wage increases on prices.

items sold in Swiss restaurants. They show that the size of price changes does not respond to inflation while the key variable in the variability of inflation seems to be the frequency of price changes. Our contribution is to estimate a microeconomic model that links restaurant prices to costs. By contrast, many empirical studies of price adjustment approximate marginal cost using a sectoral inflation rate (see, for instance, Cecchetti, 1986, and Fougère *et al.*, 2007) or an unobserved synthetic factor (Dhyne *et al.*, 2007). Here, the large proportion of workers paid the minimum wage in French restaurants motivates our focus on the minimum wage as a relevant measure of firms' marginal cost. We are then able to determine to what extent observed price stickiness in this industry may result from cost stickiness.

Our main findings are the following. The minimum wage has a positive and significant impact on prices in restaurants, in line with the weight of low-wage labor in total costs. However, contrary to other studies, we exhibit a protracted impact of the minimum wage on prices. Changes in the minimum wage can take more than a year to pass through to retail prices. As a result, stickiness in restaurant prices is not just the mere reflection of stickiness in its main determinants.

The next section presents the dataset used as well as the main features of restaurant price adjustments in France. Section 3 presents our econometric model of price rigidity. Estimation results and an assessment of the overall fit of the model are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we simulate the model to assess the aggregate effect of the minimum wage on prices. We compare the response obtained from these microsimulations with those obtained from a linear model estimated with aggregate data.

## **2 Data**

### **2.1 Restaurant prices**

#### **2.1.1 Data sources**

Our data are extracted from a longitudinal dataset of monthly price quotes collected by the French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris) from July 1994 to February 2003 to compute the

Consumer Price Index (CPI). Each observation is the price of a specific item (here a menu or a course) in a particular outlet (here a restaurant). Prices are inclusive of all taxes. Along with the price level, an individual product code (the outlet and the product category), the year and the month of the record are also available; they allow us to follow the price of a product through time. Prior to estimation, some specific data treatments have been done. Due to holidays, “missing” prices are quite frequent. The French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris) generally replaces them with the average price observed in other outlets in the same area. But this procedure may introduce some spurious price changes. Thus, we assume that the price does not change when the restaurant is temporarily closed. As the euro cash changeover is included in our observation period, we divide all prices recorded before 2002:1 by 6.55957, the official French franc/euro exchange rate. Details on data treatments are provided in Baudry *et al.* (2007) and Fougère *et al.* (2007).

Our analysis is focused on restaurant prices. We distinguish between traditional and fast-food restaurants, since the pricing strategy of these two types of outlets is markedly different, as shown below. Several types of items are observed in our dataset: hors d’œuvre, desserts, main course, wine, meals in traditional restaurants, and meals in fast-food restaurants. We choose to restrict our sample to full meals in traditional and fast-food restaurants since they are the most representative items, and because data on full meals are more systematically recorded in restaurants (while the other items may not be systematically reported). The meal in a traditional restaurant typically consists of a starter plus a main course or a main course plus a dessert. In fast-food restaurants, it consists of a hamburger, french fries and a soft drink. Prices in restaurants are always inclusive of service and value-added tax (VAT). Note that the VAT rate for take-away food is lower than for traditional restaurants (5.5% versus 19.6%). Our database contains 93,816 price quotes for the item “menu in a traditional restaurant”, corresponding to 2,948 different restaurants, and 10,726 observations for the item “menu in a fast-food restaurant”, corresponding to 448 different fast-food restaurants.

Figure 1 displays examples of actual price trajectories for a full meal price in traditional restaurants. Price changes do not occur continuously. This pattern is quite typical of sticky prices: long periods of price stability are interspersed with small or large price increases. In

the following section, we document the main characteristics of price rigidity in traditional and fast-food restaurants.

[Figure 1]

### 2.1.2 Patterns of price rigidity

The frequency of price changes is generally considered as a good indicator of price rigidity (e.g. Bils and Klenow, 2004, Dhyne *et al.*, 2006). In our sample, restaurant prices and, to a lesser extent, fast-food prices are very rigid. On average, around 4% of traditional restaurant prices and 9.4% of fast-food prices are modified each month in France, compared to around 19% on average for all CPI price quotes (Baudry *et al.*, 2007). As a result, the duration of a price spell is on average equal to two years in restaurants and to less than one year in fast-food restaurants (see Table 1). This result is quite consistent with previous findings in the US and in the euro area. Using US data, MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) find that around 13% of restaurant prices change every two months, implying a monthly frequency of price changes equal to 6.5%. For the euro area, Dhyne *et al.* (2006) report a frequency equal to 4.7%. Owing to this apparently high degree of stickiness, restaurant prices seem to be a good candidate for the estimation of price rigidity models.

[Table 1] [Figure 3]

The infrequency of price changes is often explained by the existence of price adjustment costs. As noticed by Fisher and Konieczny (2006), these costs can be divided into three categories. First, some costs, called menu-costs, are associated with printing new menus or labels. The second category includes the costs of the decision-making process, e.g. collecting information, analyzing changes in the “optimal” nominal price in the absence of adjustment costs, and deciding the amount of the price change. The last type of costs could occur in the event of an unfavourable reaction from customers to price increases; these costs could be called “antagonization costs”. In restaurants, these three types of costs are likely to be at stake. Note that in traditional restaurants, managers may choose a decrease in quantity or quality of food in their

standard menu as a substitute to a price increase. This reaction would strengthen the case for antogonization costs with respect to price changes. Such a strategy is however not possible for standardized products like fast-food restaurant items, which may rationalize the higher degree of price stickiness in traditional restaurants.

Figure 3 displays the frequency of price changes over time for the two types of restaurants considered here. The frequency of price changes is quite stable over time, except in some specific months. In the case of traditional restaurants, the frequency of price changes has noticeable peaks in January and September, the frequency value being around 5% in these two months versus around 3% in other months.<sup>3</sup> In fast-food restaurants, the frequency of price changes displays less regular patterns. However, in January, February and July, around 10% of prices are modified, against less than 7% on average during the year.<sup>4</sup> Such seasonal price changes may result from the costs associated with the price-change decision. As documented by Zbaracki *et al.* (2004), adjusting prices is a long process which can last a whole year because managers have to collect information on competitors and monitor the cost developments. Moreover, as shown by Muller *et al.* (2006), the opportunity cost of adjusting prices may increase in some periods of the year in which managers face a higher store traffic (for example during holidays). So, managers may prefer revising their prices according to a discrete-time process (in specific periods of the year) rather than continuously (see Fisher and Konieczny, 2006, for some empirical evidence). In our case, January and September correspond to the re-opening of traditional restaurants after holidays. Price changes during these months would then be less costly.

### 2.1.3 The distribution of price changes

A specific feature of price changes in services is the low proportion of price decreases: 20% of price changes are decreases while this proportion is around 40% for the whole CPI (Baudry *et al.*, 2007). The degree of downward price rigidity is even higher in traditional restaurants: more than 90% of price changes are increases and only 10% are price decreases. Prices in fast-food

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<sup>3</sup>This calculation does not take account of years 2002 and 2003, which have very specific patterns due to the impact of the euro cash changeover.

<sup>4</sup>This calculation does not take account of years 2002 and 2003. See the previous footnote.



restaurants also exhibit, though to a lesser extent, some nominal downward rigidity. In fast-food restaurants, 24% of price changes are price decreases. Two interpretations for nominal downward rigidity can be invoked. First, marginal costs may rarely decrease. Second, it could also be a consequence of customer antagonization costs: Rotemberg (2005) develops a model in which consumers may react negatively to price changes and Zbaracki *et al.* (2004) show the empirical relevance of these antagonization costs. A restaurant manager may thus be reluctant to reduce the price immediately if he expects that the price will rise again in the future, which implies that the adjustment cost will have to be paid again. Although it is unlikely that a price decrease would entail customer anger, one can assume that the prospect of future antagonization costs could prevent current price decreases.

[Table 2] [Figure 4]

The distribution of price changes is represented in Figure 4. While a simple menu-cost framework would suggest that, as price changes are rare, the size of price changes should be rather large, we observe that the proportion of small price changes is substantial. Around 25% of the price increases are smaller than 1.6% in traditional restaurants and smaller than 1.3% in fast-food restaurants (Table 2). We also note that the average size of a price decrease is larger than the size of a price increase (Table 2). The distribution of price changes is also characterized by a noticeable proportion of large price changes: in traditional restaurants 10% of price increases are larger than 8% (while 10% of price decreases are smaller than -13%). One possible interpretation is that, although customers may react more strongly to a large price increase than to small repeated price increases, some firms may prefer implementing large price changes because of fixed costs associated with price changes.

To sum up, large price decreases are common and small price increases are not rare. MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) observe similar patterns for US restaurant prices: the price change distribution is asymmetric, the proportion of small price changes is important, 12% of price changes are large (above 10%), and the average size of price increases is smaller, in absolute value, than the average size of price decreases.

## 2.2 Determinants of price changes

Our aim is to investigate determinants of price changes. Following Cecchetti (1986) and Ratfai (2006), we assume that the price adjusts infrequently to an unobserved optimal “frictionless” price which depends on the structure of costs and demand. This optimal price is typically defined by a mark-up over marginal costs. Our starting point is that, in restaurants, labor costs and input costs (food prices) are the main elements of marginal costs.

### 2.2.1 Labor costs and the minimum wage

We expect labor costs to be a major element of costs in restaurants. According to national accounts, the share of total compensation in costs is around 40% in traditional restaurants and 33% in fast-food restaurants (on average between 1997 and 2002). For fast-food restaurants, we can also use Parsley and Wei (2007)’s cost function estimation for Big Mac hamburgers (a standardized product) as another benchmark. They find that labor costs represent around 46% of total costs.

In French restaurants, most of the labor costs consist of the wages of employees paid the minimum wage. In restaurants and hotels, more than 40% of employees are paid the minimum wage (DARES, 2003). This ratio is particularly high as compared to the national proportion of employees paid the minimum wage, which lies between 12% and 15% over the observation period. Moreover, minimum wage increases may spill over to wages of employees above the minimum wage. Koubi and Lhommeau (2006) find that the elasticity for restaurants and hotels is estimated at 0.7 for wages lower than 1.1 times the minimum wage. This implies that a minimum wage increase is expected to indirectly but rapidly affect a wider share of labor costs in restaurants.

In France, the minimum wage (SMIC, Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance) is set a national level. It applies to all employees and types of firms, and minimum wage increases are binding. The minimum wage is raised each year in July according to a legal rule, which is based on the partial indexation to past inflation and to past wage growth. Besides these indexation procedures, the government may decide on a discretionary basis to amplify the raise.

In these last 10 years the minimum wage was mostly changed in July, except in 1998 when it was also increased in May. We observe some variability among the minimum wage increases over the period: most of the minimum wage increases were in the interval +1.2% to +4% (see Figure 2). Over the period, the minimum wage increases were on average higher than the overall wage growth. In parallel, the successive French governments implemented policies that consisted in reducing employer social security contributions on low wages. For instance, the employer social security contribution rate at the level of the minimum wage was brought from 24.8% to 12.0% in September 1995 and to 4.2% in January 2003.<sup>5</sup> The index for the labor cost at the minimum wage level that we use hereafter takes into account this rate.

[Figure 2]

Measuring wages and costs in the restaurant industry raises specific issues, which could bias the estimated impact of the minimum wage on labor costs. First, it is known that a fraction of restaurant employees are hired on the black market.<sup>6</sup> But we can assume that the wage level on the black market is proportional to the minimum wage level. Second, tips are not reported in the available price quotes. Tips are however a limited concern since a service charge is included in restaurant prices; thus tips may contribute to the incomes of employees, but they do not affect restaurant cost functions. They may affect restaurant decisions only indirectly, through the opportunity to offer a lower wage against the payment of tips.<sup>7</sup> In addition, tips are optional and there is no standard convention or social norm in France as to their level. Our assessment is that tips are unlikely to bias our estimates.

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<sup>5</sup>Contribution rates are taken from OFCE (2003, table 1, page 230).

<sup>6</sup>Measuring the size of the blackmarket is extremely difficult. A recent study by the Central Agency of Social Security Organizations (ACOSS) estimates that illegal work accounts for around 12% of employees in hotels, cafés and restaurants in 2005.

<sup>7</sup>The minimum wage is still the legal lower bound for wages. Contrary to the United States, there is no tipped minimum wage in France for employees.

### 2.2.2 Other costs, demand and specific events

Another obvious cost consists of food inputs. For fast-food restaurants, Parsley and Wei (2007) find that food inputs represent 31.6% of costs to produce a Big Mac hamburger. In this study, we use an aggregate price index to approximate the price of inputs, namely the producer price index of food over the sample period. We also incorporate a control variable to represent the demand level. More precisely, we use the volume of total sales in traditional and fast-food restaurants. These two monthly series are published by the French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris).

Two changes in VAT rates occurred during the observation period. They may have had an impact on the pricing policy of restaurants. In August 1995, the standard VAT rate was raised from 18.6% to 20.6%, while in April 2000 it was lowered from 20.6% to 19.6%. We construct two dummy variables for these changes. These changes may have had non-trivial impact in presence of menu-costs. For instance, restaurants may cluster price changes planned otherwise at the time of the tax change. Consumers could also be more likely to accept a price rise at the time of a tax increase because the tax increase is a macro event observable by them. Note that the VAT rate for take-away food is 5.5%, so that fast-food restaurants are expected to be much less affected by changes in VAT. The standard fast-food restaurant policy is to post the same tax-included price for a given item, either for take-away or dine-in. In the case of fast-food restaurants, the relevant VAT rate is a weighted average of the regular and low rate.

Finally, a dummy variable for the euro cash changeover that occurred in January 2002, as well as two other dummies for the period just before and just after the introduction of the euro, are included. At the time of the euro cash changeover, all restaurants had to change their nominal price due to the currency conversion. As already noticed by Hobijn *et al.* (2006), who consider restaurants in the euro area, such an event forces firms to pay a menu cost, and then implies a clustering of price changes that would have taken place at other dates in the absence of the euro cash changeover. As a consequence many traditional restaurants choose to change their prices at this date or just before (see Figure 3). However, we can assume that the currency change did not affect the long-run price level in restaurants.

### 3 An econometric model of infrequent price changes

#### 3.1 Theoretical background

Menu-cost models are the most standard theoretical approach to rationalizing infrequent price changes. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) first showed that, in presence of menu-costs and of deterministic exogenous shock, the optimal price setting-behaviour of the firm has the form of an  $(S, s)$  rule. The essence of the  $(S, s)$  model is the existence of a “band of inaction”: firms tolerate some deviation from their optimal frictionless price as long as this deviation is not too large. Dixit (1991) and Hansen (1999) then extended this basic model to allow for non-deterministic shocks, and they proved that the optimal behaviour may still be represented by an  $(S, s)$  rule. Note however, as discussed by Attanasio (2000), that a  $(S, s)$  policy is a solution to an optimal pricing problem in specific cases only.

In  $(S, s)$  models, the frictionless price is generally the price level that would be observed in the absence of any costs of adjustment. It can be derived in a straightforward way under assumption of flexible prices. If we denote by  $P_{it}^*$  the optimal price set by a monopolistically competitive outlet  $i$  at date  $t$ , a standard result is that the optimal frictionless price is given by a markup over marginal costs  $MC_{it}$ :  $P_{it}^* = k_i MC_{it}$ . Assuming that the production function has two inputs, labor and food, maximizing profit under an isoelastic demand curve yields a log-linear expression for the optimal price, similar to that obtained for example by Rotemberg (1982) and Cecchetti (1986):

$$p_{it}^* = a_i + bw_t + cq_t + dy_t$$

where  $w_t$  and  $q_t$  are the logarithms of costs of labor and food, respectively, and  $y_t$  is the demand level.

In the presence of adjustment costs, firms trade off between the opportunity cost of deviating from the optimal price (i.e. the foregone profit) and the adjustment cost. Under some conditions shown to be of the  $(S, s)$  type, the optimal adjustment rule is then to adjust the price only if the difference between the optimal price  $p_{it}^*$  and the price  $p_{it-\tau}$  modified at period  $t - \tau$  (where  $\tau$  is the duration since the last price change), exceeds a certain positive threshold for price increases

and negative for decreases. We assume that when prices are reset they are set at the optimal frictionless price (up to a constant as in Tsiddon, 1993). If the price was changed  $\tau$  periods before, then  $p_{it-1} = p_{it-\tau} = p_{it-\tau}^*$ . The firm's pricing decision depends on the distance covered by  $p_{it}^*$  between dates  $t - \tau$  and  $t$  (the date of the price observation). We denote this variable by  $\Delta_\tau p_{it}^*$ . If it exceeds a certain threshold  $C$ , the price is changed.<sup>8</sup> Allowing for error terms in the optimal price, or in the size of the band, the probability of a price change will depend on the cumulative change in  $p_{it}^*$  since the last price change.

The  $(S, s)$  model puts strong restrictions on the patterns of price adjustments. For instance, in a standard menu-cost model, the size of the price change will be the same for all price changes equal to  $C$ . Moreover, a large adjustment cost would imply infrequent and large price changes. This prediction is at variance with the prevalence of infrequent but small price changes observed in the data (see Figure 1).

To capture this pattern, we allow for two deviations from the basic model. First, the threshold fluctuates over time and across firms: it can depend on specific events like seasonality or the euro cash changeover. These fluctuations of the threshold could be due to changes in the size of adjustment costs (for example, the euro cash changeover). Second, we relax the relation between the parameters of the band of inaction and the size of the price change. The flexible specification we use in particular allows to encompass the Calvo model, which assumes a constant probability of a price change and generates small price changes.

Overall, our approach is related to the adjustment hazard model elaborated by Caballero and Engel (1999). In such an approach, the probability of a price change is a function of the gap between a current price and a static frictionless optimal price. That gap is the relevant state variable, so that despite the fact that an optimization problem underlies the decision rule, no expectation term is explicitly present.

One additional specification issue is that, in restaurants, there could exist an alternative adjustment margin other than price. As noticed before, restaurants may choose to decrease

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<sup>8</sup>In theoretical models (see, for instance, Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977), this threshold is shown to be an increasing function of the menu cost. However, in a reduced-form approach like ours, the adjustment cost cannot be measured since this function depends on structural parameters that cannot be identified .

quality or quantity rather than increase their prices. The existence of such an adjustment margin is expected to lower the value of the parameter  $b$ , compared to a standard model in which this margin does not exist. Nevertheless, in our reduced-form approach, as far as  $w_t$ ,  $q_t$  and  $y_t$  are exogenous covariates, the overall impact of the minimum wage on nominal prices is consistently estimated.<sup>9</sup>

### 3.2 The econometric model

Our econometric model is designed to encompass the  $(S, s)$  specification. It is related to some empirical models that have been previously set forth in the literature. For instance, Attanasio (2000) has put forward a flexible econometric specification for estimating  $(S, s)$  models applied to consumption of durables. More recently, in a price-setting context, Ratfai (2006) has proposed to estimate  $(S, s)$  models by using a probit specification, while Dhyne *et al.* (2007) have introduced stochastic bands. On the methodological side, our distinctive feature is, with respect to the former, to estimate the size of the price change, and with respect to the latter, to allow for observed proxies of the marginal cost and potential asymmetry in the decision to change prices.<sup>10</sup>

Let us assume that  $p_{it}$  is the price posted by restaurant  $i$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ) at date  $t$ . Let us introduce an indicator process  $y_{it}$  which represents the price-change decision of restaurant  $i$  at date  $t$ . This process may take three values:  $-1$  when the price decreases,  $0$  when it is not modified, and  $+1$  when it increases. The probability of a price change in restaurant  $i$  at date  $t$  is assumed to be generated by a latent variable  $\Delta_\tau p_{it}^*$  defined as:

$$\Delta_\tau p_{it}^* = \Delta_\tau X_{1,t} \beta_1 + u_i + \varepsilon_{1,i,t}$$

where  $\Delta_\tau X_{1,t} = X_{1,t} - X_{1,t-\tau}$  is the variation of covariates  $X_{1,t}$  between dates  $t$  and  $t - \tau$  ( $\tau$  being the duration since the last price change).<sup>11</sup> The vector of covariates  $X_{1,t}$  includes variables

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<sup>9</sup>In our data, the statistical institute discontinues the series whenever the nature of the product changes significantly, which limits the empirical case for such an adjustment margin.

<sup>10</sup>Ratfai (2006) studies the price of meat in Hungary, Dhyne *et al.* (2007) a wide range of consumer goods in France and Belgium. See Sheshinski *et al.* (1981) for an early estimation of such models.

<sup>11</sup>Note the first date  $\tau$  is not observed so that the first spell is not usable for estimation. We expect however the selection bias resulting from this omission to be small since we observe repeated spells for each restaurant.

affecting the cost structure, especially the variation of the minimum wage level (our proxy for the variation of labor costs), of the food producer price index, of the aggregate demand either in traditional or fast-food restaurants, and of the VAT. All these variations are taken between dates  $t - \tau$  and  $t$ . The distribution of legal minimum wage changes, occurring each year in July, has a narrow support during the period we consider (see Figure 2). However, since in our model, duration  $\tau$  is spell-specific, the distribution of cumulated minimum wage increases has a much wider support and a higher dispersion (see Figure A1 in Appendix). This favors identification of the minimum wage effect on prices. The term  $u_i$  captures the time-invariant characteristics of the restaurant that may affect the probability of a price change, like differences in costs of price changes or in marginal costs.<sup>12</sup> It is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  $\sigma_u^2$ , and to be stochastically independent of the aggregate (macro) variations  $\Delta_\tau X_{1,t}$ . The random term  $\varepsilon_{1,i,t}$  is a normally distributed idiosyncratic shock (white noise) with mean 0 and variance 1 (for identifiability purposes). These shocks may be specific shocks on the price-change decision, such as specific shocks on menu costs (Dotsey *et al.*, 1999), or shocks on marginal costs.

Price changes are assumed to be generated by an ordered probit model. Thus, the probability of a price increase at date  $t$  is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(y_{i,t} = 1) &= \Pr(\Delta_\tau p_{i,t}^* > -C_1 - X_{2,t}\beta_2^+) \\ &= \Pr(\varepsilon_{1,i,t} > -\Delta_\tau X_{1,t}\beta_1 - u_i - C_1 - X_{2,t}\beta_2^+) \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where  $C_1 + X_{2,t}\beta_2^+$  is a time-varying threshold associated with price increases which depends on  $C_1$ , a constant parameter and on  $X_{2,t}$  a vector of time-dependent indicators, such as monthly dummies, euro cash changeover dummies and VAT change dummies. These covariates are incorporated because the costs associated with the price-change decision may vary over time. For instance, restaurant managers are more likely to revise their prices in January or September. Adjustment costs will then be lower during these months.<sup>13</sup> We also include in the vector  $X_{2,t}$

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<sup>12</sup>The random terms  $u_i$  could be correlated due to local or brand effects. Unfortunately, our data set contains no information on the location nor on the brand of restaurants.

<sup>13</sup>Woodford (2003) writes that “the main benefit of infrequent price changes is not lower menu costs, but reduction of the costs associated with information collection and decisionmaking. Obtaining this benefit necessarily



the dummy variable indicating the euro cash changeover that occurred in January 2002. At this date, all firms had to change their prices from francs to euros, and were thus forced to pay the menu costs, which gave them an incentive to cluster price changes at that date (Hobijn *et al.*, 2006). Finally, we can also include in  $X_{2,t}$  dummy variables for VAT changes since customers may be less reluctant to face price changes after a VAT increase.

Then, given that a price increase is observed at date  $t$ , the size of this price increase is specified as:

$$\Delta_{\tau} p_{i,t}^{+} = \Delta_{\tau} X_{1,t} \gamma_1^{+} + \alpha^{+} u_i + \varepsilon_{2,i,t} \quad (2)$$

where  $\gamma_1^{+}$  and  $\alpha^{+}$  are slope parameters to be estimated and  $\varepsilon_{2,i,t}$  is a normally distributed random term with mean 0 and variance  $\sigma_{2+}^2$ , which corresponds to idiosyncratic shocks on the marginal costs. The covariance between idiosyncratic random terms  $\varepsilon_{1,i,t}$  and  $\varepsilon_{2,i,t}$  is set equal to  $(\rho_{+} \sigma_{2+})$ ,  $\forall i = 1, \dots, n$ , while  $\text{cov}(\varepsilon_{1,i,t}, \varepsilon_{2,j,t'}) = 0$ ,  $\forall j \neq i, \forall t \neq t'$ . Let us point out that covariates  $X_{2,t}$  are assumed to affect the occurrence of a price change,  $y_{i,t}$ , but not its amplitude ( $\Delta p_{i,t}^{+}$  for an increase,  $\Delta p_{i,t}^{-}$  for a decrease). This exclusion restriction helps to identify the econometric model without relying only on the distributional assumption on the vector of residuals.

The contribution to the likelihood function of a price increase in restaurant  $i$  at date  $t$ , given that its specific (random) characteristic is  $u_i$ , is thus:

$$\begin{aligned} l_{i,t}(u_i) &= \frac{1}{\sigma_{2+}} \phi \left( \frac{B_{i,t}^{+}}{\sigma_{2+}} \right) \times \Pr \left[ \varepsilon_{1,i,t} > -A_{i,\tau_{j+1}}^{+} \mid \varepsilon_{2,i,t} = B_{i,t}^{+} \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{\sigma_{2+}} \phi \left( \frac{B_{i,t}^{+}}{\sigma_{2+}} \right) \times \Phi \left( \frac{A_{i,t}^{+} + \frac{\rho_{+}}{\sigma_{2+}} B_{i,t}^{+}}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_{+}^2}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$A_{i,t}^{+} = C_1 + \Delta_{\tau} X_{1,t} \beta_1 + X_{2,t} \beta_2^{+} + u_i$$

and

$$B_{i,t}^{+} = \Delta_{\tau} p_{i,t}^{+} - \Delta_{\tau} X_{1,t} \gamma_1^{+} - \alpha^{+} u_i$$

$\phi$  and  $\Phi$  being the p.d.f and c.d.f of the Gaussian distribution.

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means that the timing of the occasions upon which prices are reconsidered is largely independent of current market conditions; for example, firms often reconsider pricing policy at a particular time of year."

The probability of a price decrease in restaurant  $i$  at date  $t$  can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(y_{i,t} = -1) &= \Pr(\Delta_\tau p_{i,t}^* < -C_2 - X_{2,t}\beta_2^-) \\ &= \Pr(\varepsilon_{1,i,t} < -\Delta_\tau X_{1,t}\beta_1 - u_i - C_2 - X_{2,t}\beta_2^-)\end{aligned}\quad (3)$$

where  $C_2$  is the latent threshold associated with a price decrease.<sup>14</sup> Price decreases are treated separately from price increases in order to take into account the asymmetry in price changes, which might reflect antagonization costs or other differences in the firm's pricing policy. Then, given that a price decrease is observed, the amplitude of this price decrease is specified as:

$$\Delta_\tau p_{i,t}^- = \Delta_\tau X_{1,t}\gamma_1^- + \alpha^- u_i + \varepsilon_{3,i,t}\quad (4)$$

The random terms  $\varepsilon_{1,i,t}$  and  $\varepsilon_{3,i,t}$  are assumed to be normally distributed, i.e.:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_{1,i,t} \\ \varepsilon_{3,i,t} \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left[ \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho_- \sigma_{2-} \\ \rho_- \sigma_{2-} & \sigma_{2-}^2 \end{pmatrix} \right]$$

The contribution to the likelihood function of a price decrease in restaurant  $i$  at date  $t$ , given that its specific (random) characteristic is  $u_i$ , is thus:

$$\begin{aligned}l_{i,t}(u_i) &= \frac{1}{\sigma_{2-}} \phi \left( \frac{B_{i,t}^-}{\sigma_{2+}} \right) \times \Pr \left[ \varepsilon_{1,i,t} < -A_{i,t}^- \mid \varepsilon_{3,i,t} = B_{i,t}^- \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{\sigma_{2-}} \phi \left( \frac{B_{i,t}^-}{\sigma_{2+}} \right) \times \Phi \left( \frac{-A_{i,t}^- - \frac{\rho_-}{\sigma_{2+}} B_{i,t}^-}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_-^2}} \right)\end{aligned}$$

where

$$A_{i,t}^- = C_2 + \Delta_\tau X_{1,t}\beta_1 + X_{2,t}\beta_2^- + u_i$$

and

$$B_{i,t}^- = \Delta_\tau p_{i,t}^- - \Delta_\tau X_{1,t}\gamma_1^- - \alpha^- u_i,$$

Imposing the constraint  $\beta_1 = \gamma_1^+ = \gamma_1^-$  would make our specification closer to that of an econometric  $(S, s)$  model. As discussed above, relaxing this assumption allows us to fit more

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<sup>14</sup>In traditional restaurants, price decreases are very scarce. For this type of outlet we pool the occurrences of price decreases with those of no-changes.

accurately the observed price changes, especially small price changes and asymmetry in the price-change decision.

The probability of the price in restaurant  $i$  not changing at date  $t$  is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(y_{it} = 0) &= \Pr(-X_{2t}\beta_2^- - C_2 < \Delta_\tau p_{it}^* < -X_{2t}\beta_2^+ - C_1) \\ &= \Pr(-A_{i,t}^- < \varepsilon_{1,i,t} < -A_{i,t}^+)\end{aligned}\tag{5}$$

The contribution to the likelihood function of the price invariability at date  $t$ , given that the specific (random) characteristic of restaurant  $i$  is  $u_i$ , is thus:

$$l_{it}(u_i) = \Phi(-A_{i,t}^+) - \Phi(-A_{i,t}^-)$$

The likelihood function for an i.i.d. sample of  $n$  restaurants is thus:

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^N \ln \left( \int \prod_{t=1}^T l_{it}(u_i) \frac{\phi(u_i)}{\sigma_u} du_i \right)$$

The maximization of this likelihood function is performed using the GAUSS software *maxlik* procedure. A Gauss-Hermite quadrature was used to approximate numerically the integral appearing in the log-likelihood function.<sup>15</sup>

## 4 Empirical results

Table 3 reports estimation results for menus in traditional restaurants while Table 4 reports those for menus in fast-food restaurants. Parameter estimates associated with the selection equations (1), (3) and (5) are displayed in Panel A, while those associated with the price-change equations (2) and (4) are displayed in Panel B. In the case of fast-food restaurants, each is divided into two columns, the first being related to price increases and the second to price decreases.

[Tables 3 & 4]

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<sup>15</sup>We use 40 points of integration on the interval  $[-10; 10]$ .

## 4.1 Minimum wage effect

The effect of the minimum wage on restaurant prices is significant for both traditional and fast-food restaurants. This effect is positive both on the price-change decision and on the size of the price change.

A minimum wage rise increases the probability of a price increase in both traditional and fast-food restaurants, but it decreases the probability of a price decrease in fast-food restaurants. This result is in line with theoretical results of state-dependent pricing models. The minimum wage thus triggers a selection effect in restaurants that change their prices, which influences the dynamics of the pass-through (see the next section). The effect of the minimum wage on the size of the price change is noticeable. In traditional restaurants, after a 1% minimum wage increase, prices that change are increased by 0.157%. In fast-food restaurants, the elasticity of price increases with respect to the minimum wage is quite similar, since it is equal to 0.139. Estimates are less precise than those obtained for traditional restaurants; this may be due to the sample size, which is substantially smaller for fast-food restaurants. We therefore cannot reject the assumption that the elasticity is the same in both types of outlets.

In fast-food restaurants, the elasticity of price decreases is positive, but smaller and statistically non-significant. It turns out that none of the cost indicators has a statistically significant influence on the size of price decreases. In addition, the correlation between the residual affecting the size of price decreases and that affecting the decision equation (0.464) is lower than for price increases. This suggests that price decreases are driven by other elements than marginal cost or menu cost, such as for example sales policy.

Using aggregate data for France, we are able to compare these results with benchmark estimates obtained from a proxy of the share of compensations of workers paid at the minimum wage in total restaurant costs (Table 5). According to available sources, the share of these labor costs in restaurant total costs lies between 33% and 46% in fast-food restaurants and is equal to 40% in traditional restaurants. The share of minimum wage compensations in the wage bill is approximately 32% in fast-food restaurants and 31% in traditional restaurants. Computing the effect of the minimum wage on costs as the product of these numbers, we find an elasticity

between 0.10 and 0.15 for fast-foods and equal to 0.12 for traditional restaurants. Taking into account the share of black market labor (estimated to be 12%, see above), the range is lowered to values comprised between 0.09 and 0.13. If we now take into account potential spillover from minimum wage increases to other wages, we obtain 0.15 for traditional restaurants and a range of estimates between 0.13 and 0.18 for fast-food restaurants. Our econometric results are quite consistent with these benchmark estimates.

[Table 5]

The estimated effects we obtain are somewhat higher than those found in previous studies on US data by Aaronson (2001), MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) or Aaronson and French (2007). These studies show that the cumulated effect of a 1% increase in the minimum wage on restaurant prices lies between 0.04% and 0.08%. Using US input-output data, Lee and O’Roark (1999) find higher elasticities, between 0.08 and 0.12. This gap is explained by the lower share of labor costs in restaurants’s total costs in the US (31% in full-service restaurants and 25% in limited-service restaurants (Aaronson and French, 2007) versus 40% in traditional restaurants and 33% in fast-food restaurants in France) and the lower share of minimum wage compensations in the wage bill in the US (17% versus more than 30% in France; see Aaronson and French, 2007).<sup>16</sup>

## 4.2 Effects of input prices and demand

As expected, food input prices have a significant and positive effect both on the probability and on the size of price changes. The elasticities of restaurant prices with respect to input prices (conditional on a price change) are quite different for traditional and fast-food restaurants. They stand around 0.3 and 0.5 for traditional restaurants and fast-foods restaurants respectively. Parsley and Wei (2007) find that the share of food input costs in total costs is around 32% for Big Mac hamburgers. Using national accounts, the share of intermediate consumption (which

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<sup>16</sup>This is partly explained by the lower share of employees paid at the minimum wage in the United States (23% versus more than 40% in France; see Aaronson and French, 2007)

include food inputs) in total costs is around 60% in the restaurant industry. Our estimation results appear to fall in the range of these benchmark estimates.

We find that demand has a positive impact both on the size and the probability of a price change in the case of fast-food restaurants, and a negative effect in the case of traditional restaurants. In the latter case this might reflect a counter-cyclical mark-up. Bills (1987) shows empirically that mark-ups could be counter-cyclical. Portier (1995) and Chatterjee *et al.* (1993) propose models of procyclical entry in which the addition of new firms during booms causes mark-ups to fall (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999).

In traditional restaurants, the effect of a change in the VAT rate on the decision to change prices is asymmetrical.<sup>17</sup> A VAT increase has a strong effect on the probability of a price increase, but a VAT decrease has a negative but smaller (in absolute terms) effect on the probability of a price decrease. This could mean that restaurant owners consider the VAT increase as a favorable opportunity to change their prices, because customers generally expect that this increase will pass through to prices. However, when the VAT decreases, in the logic of an adjustment cost model, they may prefer not to change their price, because they anticipate a future cost increase. A possible interpretation is that they prefer to postpone a price increase and to modify their prices just once, rather than reduce their prices today. The effect of changes in VAT rates on the size of price changes is also asymmetrical: the 2% increase in the VAT rate in 1995 is estimated to have triggered a price increase of 3.9%, whereas after the 1% reduction in the VAT rate in 2000, prices that were modified decreased by 1.2%.

### 4.3 Seasonality and the euro

Let us now discuss the effects of the variables that are assumed to affect the decision of to revise prices, although not the target price level. These variables are dummy variables for specific months of the year and the euro cash changeover.

The effect of month dummies is quite consistent with the descriptive evidence that we have

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<sup>17</sup>Because the standard VAT rate is only marginally relevant in the case of fast-food restaurants we do not include it in the model. When including dummies for VAT changes, results were unaffected and these dummies were statistically non-significant.

previously reported. In traditional restaurants, the probability of a price change is significantly higher in January, and to a lesser extent in September, than in other months, all other things being equal. In fast-food restaurants, managers are less likely to increase their prices in March, April, May, and at the end of the year. This might reflect the discrete-time nature of the price revision process in restaurants: specific periods of the year are more likely to be devoted to price-change decisions, because, during these periods, managers have more time to collect information or think about the “optimal” price change.

The effect of the euro cash-changeover is quite different for the two different items. Descriptive statistics show that, in traditional restaurants, price decreases are rarely observed during the euro cash changeover, while many prices increased just before and just after January 2002. Our estimation confirms this insight. For fast-food restaurants, the frequency of price changes increased in January 2002, but neither before nor after. Hobijn *et al.* (2006) propose a menu cost interpretation for the inflationary effect of the euro cash changeover in restaurants that can rationalize such a pattern. With fast-food restaurants data, the estimated effect on the frequency of price changes is symmetrical. Our estimates show that the probabilities of price increases and decreases rose simultaneously in January 2002, implying no overall inflationary effect.

#### 4.4 Overall fit of the model

We now test the goodness of fit of our model by assessing its ability to match some aggregate moments of the data. More specifically, we compute three groups of indicators from the estimated model: the frequency of price changes, the size of price changes and the inflation rate. For this purpose, we run Monte Carlo simulations on the basis of our parameter estimates. Explanatory variables are taken at their sample values. More specifically, we simulate price trajectories and compare the aggregate results obtained with those observed. To obtain standard errors for simulated moments, we repeat the simulation exercise a number of times by drawing several sets of parameters from their estimated asymptotic distribution.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>The Monte Carlo experiments are described in more detail in section 5.1.

[Table 6]

Results are presented in Table 6. The frequencies of price changes are slightly overestimated. For traditional restaurants, we obtain an overall frequency of 4.5%, whereas the frequency of price changes is only 4.2% in the data; for fast-food restaurants, the simulated frequency of price changes is equal to 10.6%, versus 9.4% in the sample. Standard deviations are quite small: around 0.1 percentage point for traditional restaurants and 0.3 percentage point for fast-food restaurants. For fast-food menus, the overestimation is mainly due to an overestimation of the frequency of price decreases (3.6% versus 2.3%); this reflects the weak explanatory power of the model for price decreases.

The average sizes of price changes are well replicated. The average size of price increases in fast-food restaurants estimated with our model is equal to 3.2%, versus 3.3% in the sample. However, for price decreases in fast-food restaurants and price increases in traditional restaurants, the model overestimates the size of price changes. Figure 5 displays the simulated and actual distributions of price changes for both items. First, the model captures the asymmetry of both distributions. However, our model, reflecting its similarity with a menu-cost model, fails to fully account for the share of small price changes observed in the data, especially price decreases in fast-food restaurants and price increases in traditional restaurants. One rationalization for small price changes has been put forward by Midrigan (2007) and relies on price setting behavior by a multiproduct firm. Assuming that a restaurant faces a fixed cost of reprinting the menu, any large deviation from the optimal price for one single item gives rise to a free opportunity to reset price for all items in the menu. In such circumstances, one may observe small price changes of several items. Our model cannot capture such a rationalization for small price changes since we have sampled one item (the main menu) in each outlet. However the degree of within-outlet synchronization in price changes across items appears to be quite limited in our data which suggests that the multiproduct argument does not fully rationalize the occurrence of small price changes here.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>For instance, among the restaurants for which the prices of three items are collected, the monthly frequency of a single price change is 4.8%; the frequency of two simultaneous price changes is 1.9%, and 1.0% for three simultaneous price changes.



[Figure 5]

The estimated inflation rate, which is obtained by averaging price changes at each date, is imperfectly reproduced by our model. In traditional restaurants the average simulated monthly inflation rate is 0.195%, while the observed rate is 0.134%. In fast-food restaurants, the estimated rate (0.07%) is lower than the one observed in the sample (0.135%). The difference is mainly due to the overestimation of the price decrease probability.

However, our empirical specification seems to reproduce satisfactorily the salient features of the data: the downward price rigidity, as well as the frequency and the size of price increases. Replicating the pattern of price decreases is more challenging.

## 5 Aggregate implications of the model

Our estimates are now used to examine the aggregate effects of minimum wage changes on the price level in restaurants. Due to the non-linearity of our model as well as the heterogeneity incorporated in our specification, the aggregate dynamics following a shock are non-trivial. We thus investigate them through simulations. We illustrate the implications of our model by comparing them with the predictions of a simpler, partial-adjustment linear model, which is fitted to aggregate data.

### 5.1 Assessing the impact of a minimum wage increase

The dynamic effect of a minimum wage increase on prices is assessed by conducting the following simulation experiment. First, as in section 4.4, we simulate individual price trajectories by inserting our estimates in the system of equations (1)-(5). Shocks are drawn from the bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix equal to the estimated covariance matrix. Paths for covariates are identical to their sample trajectories. To obtain more accurate and smoother response functions, we simulate 40 trajectories for each actual sample trajectory. We then aggregate all these individual price trajectories to compute a single path for the price level. Second, we reiterate the experiment with the same set of random shocks, but now assume that the minimum wage is permanently above its baseline trajectory as from July 1998. Three different

scenarios are considered, corresponding to increases of 1%, 2% and 5% respectively. Finally, we compare the alternative scenarios by computing differences in aggregate price levels between the benchmark and each alternative scenario. This exercise provides only partial equilibrium results, since we assume the exogeneity of the minimum wage with respect to restaurant prices, and we assume other covariates (producer prices, demand) to be unaffected by the shock on the minimum wage. We view these assumptions as reasonable approximations.<sup>20</sup>

[Table 7]

The main results of our simulation exercise are gathered in Table 7, as well as in Figures 6 and 7. Taking as a benchmark the case of a 1% increase, we observe that the long-run impact of the shock on the minimum wage is to raise the price level by 0.20% in fast-food restaurants and by 0.17% in traditional restaurants. Note that, due to individual effects and correlation terms of the model, the simulated long-run impact differs somewhat from the parameter value  $\gamma_1$ . There appears a mild non-linearity, since the impact of a 5% shock is slightly lower than five times the impact of a 1% shock. The long-run impact of a minimum wage increase on restaurant prices is also in line with the one that we would recover using a simple benchmarking exercise based on different French statistics (see subsection 4.1).

[Figure 6 ]

A striking result is that the impact of the minimum wage change on restaurant prices is very protracted. For traditional restaurants, after 14 months, only half of the long-run response has been materialized. After two years, only 75% of the long-run effect is completed. In the case of fast-food restaurants, adjustment is faster but still very slow: the half-life of the shock is 6 months, and after 12 months, 75% of the effect has been materialized. This protracted adjustment means that, each month, only a small fraction of restaurants decides to revise their prices. Part of the adjustment operates at the extensive margin, a point illustrated by Figure 6.

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<sup>20</sup>As a crude test, we run Granger causality tests and we reject that monthly inflation in restaurants causes overall monthly inflation and minimum wage changes. We also reject that minimum wage causes food input inflation. Non-causality between demand and restaurant prices cannot be fully rejected.

After a shock, the fraction of restaurants revising their price rises. By contrast, in Calvo’s model, this fraction is constant. Since, here, the fraction of restaurants revising their price depends on covariates, the speed of adjustment varies with the size of the shock. Indeed, with a 5% shock on the minimum wage, the share of restaurants adjusting their prices rises by one percentage point in the first month, against 0.2 percentage point with a 1% shock (see Figures 6). However the incidence on the timing of adjustment is limited. For instance, in the case of traditional restaurants, the half-life of the effect is reached after 12 months for a 5% shock, compared with 14 months in the case of a 1% shock (see Table 7).

## 5.2 Comparison with linear aggregate models

We compare the results obtained above with those resulting from a linear time series model fitted to our aggregate data. One motivation for this exercise is provided by the methodology and results proposed by Aaronson (2001), who estimates a linear model of restaurant price indices to assess the impact of lagged, present and future values of the minimum wage on prices.<sup>21</sup> He finds a significant and rapid impact of the minimum wage on the prices set by different types of restaurants in the US and Canada.<sup>22</sup>

Tables 8 and 9 report the estimates of various autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models for fast-food and traditional restaurants respectively. The general specification is the following:

$$\overline{\Delta p}_t = c + \sum_{k=-F}^K \alpha_k \Delta w_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^L \theta_k \overline{\Delta p}_{t-k} + \sum_{j=1}^J \mu_j z_{j,t} + \varepsilon_t$$

where  $\overline{\Delta p}_t$  is the sectoral inflation rate (computed as a simple average of individual price changes) and  $z_{j,t}$  is a set of covariates (seasonal dummies, dummy variables for the euro cash changeover period, the growth rate of demand and of food producer prices). We investigate various specifications, with and without seasonal dummies, and with various lags and leads of the minimum wage. In the case of traditional restaurants, results reported in Table 8 show that these covariates are often significant: the dummy variables corresponding to the VAT increase and to the

<sup>21</sup>Wolfson and Belman (2004) use comparable time-series analysis at the industry level and find no significant effect of the minimum wage on employment in the US.

<sup>22</sup>The relation between the minimum wage and the overall CPI in France has been analyzed by L’Horty and Rault (2004) who estimate a VAR model.

euro area changeover period, as well as autoregressive terms, are systematically significant. The results are sensitive to the inclusion of seasonal dummies. The impact of the minimum wage is not clear-cut: only the second lag is systematically significant (see Table 8). The long-run effect of a permanent 1% increase in the minimum wage is estimated to be comprised between 0.015 and 0.148, i.e. somewhat lower than the effects obtained in the previous subsection by aggregating microeconomic behaviors.

Results for fast-food restaurants are reported in Table 9. Only few variables appear to explain changes in the aggregate price level. When seasonal dummies are included, the contemporary effect of the minimum wage increase is significant but its lag has a negative sign. Overall, the estimated long-run impact of a variation in the minimum wage is very small. It is even negative under some specifications.

[Figure 7 ]

Thus, the predictions of the linear model are, especially in the latter case, rather at variance with those obtained in previous microsimulations. To understand these differences, it should first be noted that the linear model does not disentangle strong seasonality effects from the effect of a change in the minimum wage (an expected problem since most changes in the minimum wage level occur in July). Unlike what happens with US data (Aaronson, 2001) there are in France no geographical or within-year variations in the timing of minimum wage changes that would help for identification. Moreover, the above results illustrate the fact that a linear aggregate model may not adequately capture the protracted adjustment resulting from individual lumpy behaviors, a property analyzed by Caballero and Engel (2003). Micro estimates tend to point to slower adjustment than what macro estimates show. This is clearly suggested by the graphs in Figure 7. These graphs compare the impulse responses of a shock on the minimum wage for the two estimated models. For fast-food restaurants, the linear model predicts an immediate adjustment (to a long-run target close to zero). In the case of traditional restaurants, the aggregate linear model indicates that full adjustment is essentially complete (90%) after 20 months, while reaching the same relative adjustment requires 35 months according to the aggregate micro process (see Table 7).

The analytical results obtained by Caballero and Engel (2003) help provide an understanding of our results. These authors examine the performance of a partial adjustment model fitted to aggregated data for measuring the speed of adjustment, when micro-level data are actually governed by a simple lumpy adjustment model, namely a constant hazard (Calvo-type) process. They show that the aggregate model is asymptotically able to capture the probability of adjustment embodied in the Calvo process (namely, when the number of firms  $N$  is large and the sample period  $T$  is long). However, when  $N$  and  $T$  are small or moderate, the speed of adjustment is overestimated by a linear aggregate model. In addition, the approximation provided by the linear partial adjustment model is particularly poor when the probability of adjustment is low. All these mechanisms appear to be present here, especially in the case of traditional restaurants, for which the probability of a price change is close to 5%.

Our empirical model is somewhat more complex than the analytical framework considered by Caballero and Engel (2003). For instance, our model contains an additional element of non-linearity. More precisely, our specification for the probability of a price change is able to respond to a deviation from the target variable (see equations (1)-(3)). Moreover, we have introduced several covariates as well as unobserved heterogeneity. As a consequence, the analytical results obtained by Caballero and Engel (2003) may not give a full picture of the mechanisms operating here. To further illustrate the relationship between lumpy adjustments at the individual level and aggregate dynamics in our set-up, we perform the following Monte Carlo experiment. We again use the model (1)-(5) as a data-generating process (DGP). We complete this DGP by estimating simple autoregressive processes for covariates, namely the demand variable as well as the producer price index for food. We also design a DGP for minimum wage changes in the following way: every month of July, the minimum wage increase is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution with support  $[2\% - 5\%]$ . This mimics the actual process for changes in the minimum wage. With this complete DGP, we are able to simulate trajectories of individual and aggregate prices for an arbitrary number of economic units  $N$  and time periods  $T$ . We then simulate trajectories both for the size of our sample ( $T = 105$ ,  $N = 2,948$  for traditional restaurants and  $N = 448$  for fast-food restaurants) and for “large”  $T$  and  $N$  ( $T = 1,000$ ,  $N = 10,000$ ). In a further step, we use the artificial data thus generated to compute an aggregate

price index, and use artificial aggregate data to estimate a linear model. This exercise, which is in the spirit of that conducted by Attanasio (2000), provides us with the asymptotic predictions of a linear approximated model when the DGP is given by the individual lumpy adjustment process.<sup>23</sup>

Results are provided in Tables 10 and 11. First, these experiments confirm that, with a small sample, it is difficult to recover the effects of a minimum wage increase when using the linear aggregate specification.<sup>24</sup> For instance, for fast-food restaurants, the mean of the estimated long-run impact is 0.127 (to be compared with the “true” long-run impact of 0.200, which is implicit in the DGP used for the microsimulations (Table 7)), with a standard error of 0.176. For traditional restaurants, the simulated mean impact (0.162) is quite consistent with the DGP parameters but these estimates are associated with very high standard deviations. The pseudo-true values derived with a large sample ( $T = 1,000$  and  $N = 10,000$ ) are, however, closer to the true elasticity: for instance, in traditional restaurants, the long-term elasticity estimated with the linear model is equal to 0.203 (to be compared with the value of 0.170 obtained in the DGP microsimulation reported in Table 7).

Second, we confirm that the aggregate model dramatically overestimates the adjustment speed, as can be inferred for example from the sum of the autoregressive parameters. For fast-food restaurants, the sum of the AR parameters is equal to 0.40 in the model fitted to actual data and to 0.676 in the Monte Carlo “small sample” case. By contrast, in the Caballero-Engel set-up, we would expect this parameter to be close to  $1 - \lambda$ , where  $\lambda$  is the frequency of price change. For fast-food restaurants, the frequency is around 0.10 (see Table 6). Note that the bias partly vanishes in the asymptotic simulations, where the sum of the autoregressive parameters is equal to 0.86.

In sum, this exercise illustrates that a linear aggregate model is bound to be a poor ap-

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<sup>23</sup>In accordance with the econometrics of misspecified models, the probability limits of the parameters can be labeled “pseudo-true values”.

<sup>24</sup>The poor performance partly reflects the restriction to one specific class of time series models, namely ARDL models. As suggested by Caballero and Engel (2003), the performance of an aggregate model may be improved by incorporating, say, moving average terms in the model. We stick to the ARDL since it is the class of models used in the empirical studies of price pass-through.

proximation. Although the source of the imprecision is the non-linearity and the heterogeneity present in the underlying process, it is amplified by the limited size of the available sample.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have used a unique dataset of individual price quotes to assess the impact of the minimum wage on prices both in traditional and fast-food restaurants. Given that, in this sector, price changes are scarce, we have adopted an empirical model that features lumpy adjustment. Using this framework, we provide arguably better identified estimates of the impact of the minimum wage on prices.

We find that the minimum wage has a positive and significant impact on prices in traditional and fast-food restaurants. The estimated elasticity of prices with respect to the minimum wage is around 0.15 for both types of outlets. This impact is consistent with the share of minimum-wage compensations in total costs that can be estimated with macroeconomic data. This elasticity is higher than that found by MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) or Lee and O’Roarke (1999) for the US. This could result from the lower fraction of workers paid the minimum wage in U.S. restaurants (25% in the U.S. versus more than 40% in France).

Taking into account lumpiness in the microeconomic adjustment of prices, we exhibit a protracted impact of the minimum wage on aggregate prices. The aggregate impact estimated with our model typically takes more than a year to pass through to retail prices. We show that such protracted impact is difficult to capture using aggregate data. In terms of price rigidity, our results indicate that, although one main reason for restaurant price stickiness is that one important determinant of the cost (namely, the minimum wage) changes infrequently, there is also a substantial degree of “intrinsic” stickiness. Price stickiness is not a mere reflection of cost stickiness. In addition, our results point to the crucial role of non-linearity and individual heterogeneity in inflation dynamics.

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## 8 Tables and figures

**Table 1: Monthly frequency of price changes (%)**

	Sample size	Price changes	Price increases	Price decreases	Implied average price duration
Traditional restaurants	93,816	4.16	3.80	0.36	24.04
Fast-food restaurants	10,726	9.41	7.07	2.34	10.63

Note: the implied average price duration (in months) is calculated as the inverse of the monthly proportion of price changes.

**Table 2: Size of price changes (%)**

	Sample size	$\Delta p_{90}$	$\Delta p_{75}$	$\Delta p_{50}$	$\Delta p_{25}$	$\Delta p_{10}$	$\Delta p_{av}$	
Traditional restaurants	$\Delta p^-$	340	-13.36	-8.54	-3.95	-1.30	-0.26	-6.09
	$\Delta p^+$	3,909	8.00	5.25	3.18	1.65	0.30	4.34
Fast-food restaurants	$\Delta p^-$	269	-7.55	-5.09	-2.78	-0.95	-0.55	-3.74
	$\Delta p^+$	844	5.88	3.66	2.82	1.29	0.34	3.35

Note: In the calculations, price changes equal to zero are not taken into account. Price increases  $\Delta p^+$  and decreases  $\Delta p^-$  are considered separately.  $\Delta p_{90}$  is the 90th percentile of the distribution;  $\Delta p_{75}$  is the 75th percentile of the distribution;  $\Delta p_{50}$  is the median of the distribution;  $\Delta p_{25}$  is the 25th percentile of the distribution;  $\Delta p_{10}$  is the 10th percentile of the distribution;  $\Delta p_{av}$  is the average price change.

**Table 3: Parameter estimates (traditional restaurants)**

		Panel A (decision)	Panel B (size)
$\beta_1$	Constant	-2.011 (0.013)	$\gamma_1$ -11.372 (0.332)
	Food PPI	0.044 (0.005)	0.331 (0.034)
	Min. wage	0.022 (0.003)	0.157 (0.018)
	Demand	-0.027 (0.003)	-0.257 (0.020)
VAT increase		0.728 (0.049)	3.912 (0.368)
VAT decrease		-0.164 (0.054)	-1.243 (0.411)
$\beta_2$	January	0.096 (0.017)	
	September	0.040 (0.013)	
	Pre Euro	0.177 (0.020)	
	Euro	0.590 (0.044)	
	Post Euro	0.227 (0.019)	
$\sigma_u$		0.416 (0.007)	$\alpha$ 5.087 (0.254)
			$\sigma_\varepsilon$ 6.776 (0.129)
			$\rho$ 0.992 (0.001)
Log-likelihood = -5.13534			
Sample size: 93,816			

**Table 4: Parameter estimates (fast-food restaurants)**

		Panel A (decision)		Panel B (size)		
		$\Delta p^+$	$\Delta p^-$	$\Delta p^+$	$\Delta p^-$	
$\beta_1$	Constant	-1.670 (0.025)	1.871 (0.038)	$\gamma_1$	-7.873 (0.394)	-0.665 (1.126)
	Food PPI		0.096 (0.013)		0.518 (0.068)	-0.083 (0.155)
	Min. wage		0.034 (0.006)		0.139 (0.033)	0.040 (0.049)
	Demand		0.028 (0.009)		0.224 (0.049)	-0.278 (0.113)
$\beta_2$	January	-	-0.158 (0.102)			
	March	-0.114 (0.028)	-			
	April	-0.078 (0.027)	-			
	May	-0.068 (0.027)	-			
	October	-0.186 (0.028)	0.186 (0.110)			
	November	-0.063 (0.038)	0.430 (0.143)			
	Euro	0.275 (0.056)	-1.311 (0.151)			
$\sigma_u$			0.404 (0.015)	$\alpha$	3.512 (0.263)	1.968 (0.711)
				$\sigma_\varepsilon$	5.305 (0.181)	3.013 (0.226)
				$\rho$	0.999 (0.001)	0.464 (0.142)

Log-likelihood = -11.2493

Sample size 10,726

**Table 5: Effects of a 1% minimum wage increase on prices:  
benchmark estimates**

Firm size	Wage level	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Traditional restaurants	Min. wage	0.12	0.40	0.31	1	0.11	0.11
	1.1 × Min. wage	0.12	0.40	0.17	0.7	0.04	0.15
Fast-food restaurants (Assumption 1)	Min. wage	0.12	0.33	0.32	0.7	0.09	0.09
	1.1 × Min. wage	0.12	0.33	0.17	1	0.03	0.13
Fast-food restaurants (Assumption 2)	Min. wage	0.12	0.46	0.32	0.7	0.13	0.13
	1.1 × Min. wage	0.12	0.46	0.17	0.7	0.05	0.18

Note: Column (1) reports the share of workers in the black market for hotels and restaurants (ACOSS, 2006). Column (2) reports the share of labor cost in total cost (Assumption 1: French national sectoral accounts (1997-2002); Assumption 2: Parsley and Wei, 2007). Column (3) reports the share of the minimum wage compensations in the wage bill (DARES and French national sectoral accounts (1997-2002)). Column (4) gives the elasticity of wages just above the minimum wage with respect to minimum wage increases (Koubi and Lhommeau, 2006). Column (5) gives the effect of the minimum wage increase on total cost, *i.e.*  $\text{col.}(5) = (1 - \text{col.}(1)) \times \text{col.}(2) \times \text{col.}(3) \times \text{col.}(4)$ . Column (6) sums the effect of the minimum wage increase on total cost over the wage levels.



**Table 6: Goodness of fit**

	Inflation	Size of price changes		Frequency of price changes		
		Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease	Total
<b>Traditional restaurants</b>						
Simulated	0.195 (0.004)	4.547 (0.048)	-0.446 (0.034)	4.338 (0.090)	0.128 (0.015)	4.462 (0.091)
Observed	0.134	4.336	-6.086	3.797	0.363	4.160
<b>Fast-food restaurants</b>						
Simulated	0.072 (0.018)	3.156 (0.073)	-4.363 (0.224)	7.005 (0.272)	3.629 (0.251)	10.633 (0.328)
Observed	0.135	3.346	-3.739	7.070	2.335	9.405

Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations.

**Table 7: Simulation results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Traditional restaurants</b>	1%	0.170 (0.018)	14	26	35
	2%	0.337 (0.035)	13	26	34
	5%	0.817 (0.082)	12	24	33
<b>Fast-food restaurants</b>	1%	0.200 (0.040)	6	12	19
	2%	0.392 (0.076)	6	12	19
	5%	0.929 (0.169)	6	12	19

Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations. Column (1) is the size of the shock on the minimum wage at  $t$ . Column (2) reports the cumulated impact after 57 months. Column (3) reports the duration (in months) corresponding to half of the total cumulated impact. Column (4) reports the duration (in months) corresponding to 75% of the total cumulated impact. Column (5) reports the duration (in months) corresponding to 90% of the total cumulated impact.

**Table 8: Linear model estimated with aggregate data (traditional restaurants)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	0.124**	0.052**	0.044**	0.094**	-0.008	0.044
Min. wage <sub>t+3</sub>			-0.007*			0.002
Min. wage <sub>t+2</sub>			0.003			-0.080
Min. wage <sub>t+1</sub>			-0.005			0.015
Min. wage <sub>t</sub>	-0.011**	-0.009**	0.004	-0.009	-0.003	-0.003
Min. wage <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.002	0.001	0.000	-0.003	0.003	0.012
Min. wage <sub>t-2</sub>	0.014**	0.017**	0.020**	0.013**	0.019**	0.008
Min. wage <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.012
Min. wage <sub>t-4</sub>	0.000	-0.003	-0.004	0.009	0.008	-0.043**
Min. wage <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.009
Min. wage <sub>t-6</sub>	0.013**	0.014**	0.011**	0.005	0.005	-0.011
Inflation <sub>t-1</sub>		0.130*	0.127*		0.198**	0.171**
Inflation <sub>t-2</sub>		0.263**	0.268**		0.217**	0.240**
Inflation <sub>t-3</sub>		0.202**	0.216**		0.331**	0.216**
Producer prices	0.009	0.005	0.019	0.007	0.001	0.016
Demand	0.004	0.005	0.007**	0.006	0.003	0.008
VAT increase	0.059	0.066	0.110	0.074	0.114**	0.115**
VAT decrease	-0.015	-0.049	-0.033	0.011	-0.004	-0.015
Pre Euro	0.139**	0.091**	0.100**	0.156**	0.088**	0.141**
Euro	0.662**	0.573**	0.597**	0.581**	0.453**	0.545**
Post Euro	0.021	-0.153**	-0.152**	0.034	-0.183**	-0.140**
Month dummies	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.653	0.720	0.786	0.733	0.826	0.856
Long-term impact	0.012	0.043	0.049	0.016	0.118	0.148

Note: statistical significance levels: \*\*: 5%, \*: 10%.

**Table 9: Linear model estimated with aggregate data (fast-food restaurants)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	0.136**	0.088**	0.090**	0.130	0.046	0.002
Min. wage <sub>t+3</sub>			0.000			0.007
Min. wage <sub>t+2</sub>			-0.016			-0.019
Min. wage <sub>t+1</sub>			-0.014			-0.008
Min. wage <sub>t</sub>	0.031*	0.036**	0.039**	0.035*	0.040**	0.044*
Min. wage <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.032**	-0.036**	-0.046**	-0.037*	-0.041**	-0.062**
Min. wage <sub>t-2</sub>	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.010	0.010
Mini. wage <sub>t-3</sub>	0.015	0.023	0.020	0.005	0.017	0.015
Inflation <sub>t-1</sub>		0.164	0.168		0.189*	0.198*
Inflation <sub>t-2</sub>		0.182*	0.178*		0.199*	0.201*
Producer prices	0.051	0.045	0.057	0.079	0.070	0.069
Demand	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.013	0.003	-0.007
Euro	-0.091	-0.055	-0.051	-0.170	-0.157	-0.149
Month dummies	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.109	0.176	0.201	0.176	0.254	0.291
Long-term impact	0.015	0.039	-0.020	0.009	0.044	-0.023

Note: statistical significance levels: \*\*: 5%, \*: 10%.

**Table 10: Aggregate results with simulated data  
(traditional restaurants)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Min. wage <sub>t</sub>	-0.003 (0.005)	0.011 (0.014)	0.011	0.005
Min. wage <sub>t-1</sub>	0.003 (0.004)	0.006 (0.013)	0.009	0.006
Min. wage <sub>t-2</sub>	0.019 (0.005)	0.002 (0.012)	0.002	0.004
Mini. wage <sub>t-3</sub>	0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.014)	0.002	0.005
Min. wage <sub>t-4</sub>	0.009 (0.005)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.001	0.003
Min. wage <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.015)	0.002	0.003
Min. wage <sub>t-6</sub>	0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.015)	0.000	0.005
Inflation <sub>t-1</sub>	0.174 (0.080)	0.470 (0.104)	0.684	0.317
Inflation <sub>t-2</sub>	0.194 (0.088)	0.186 (0.112)	0.168	0.262
Inflation <sub>t-3</sub>	0.298 (0.095)	0.117 (0.116)	-0.039	0.092
Inflation <sub>t-4</sub>	0.101 (0.075)	0.063 (0.099)	0.073	0.218
Month dummies	Y	Y	Y	N
Long-term impact	0.137	0.162 (0.236)	0.203	0.287


Note: Column (1) reports the OLS estimates obtained with actual aggregate data. Column (2) reports the OLS estimates obtained with aggregate simulated data and a small sample size ( $T = 105$ ,  $N = 2,948$ ). Here the probability of a price change is endogenous. Columns (3) and (4) report the OLS estimates with aggregate simulated data. and a large sample size ( $T = 1,000$ ,  $N = 10,000$ ). In column (3), the probability of a price change is endogenous. In column (4), this probability is exogenous.

**Table 11: Aggregate results with simulated data  
(fast-food restaurants)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Min. wage <sub>t</sub>	0.040 (0.019)	0.025 (0.036)	0.029	0.010
Min. wage <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.040 (0.020)	0.010 (0.033)	0.003	0.005
Min. wage <sub>t-2</sub>	0.010 (0.024)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.002	0.001
Min. wage <sub>t-3</sub>	0.016 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.034)	-0.005	0.001
Inflation <sub>t-1</sub>	0.184 (0.112)	0.302 (0.101)	0.670	0.367
Inflation <sub>t-2</sub>	0.194 (0.115)	0.203 (0.114)	0.165	0.264
Inflation <sub>t-3</sub>	0.022 (0.110)	0.171 (0.095)	0.026	0.190
Month dummies	Y	Y	Y	N
Long-term impact	0.043	0.127 (0.176)	0.179	0.094


Note: Column (1) reports the OLS estimates obtained with actual aggregate data. Column (2) reports the OLS estimates obtained with aggregate simulated data and a small sample size ( $T = 105$ ,  $N = 448$ ). Here the probability of a price change is endogenous. Columns (3) and (4) report the OLS estimates with aggregate simulated data. and a large sample size ( $T = 1,000$ ,  $N = 10,000$ ). In column (3), the probability of a price change is endogenous. In column (4), this probability is exogenous.

**Figure 1: Examples of price trajectories**



Note: each line corresponds to a price trajectory for a menu in a restaurant, prices are expressed in euros.

**Figure 2: Inflation in restaurants and fast-foods and minimum wage increases**



Note: Solid line, left scale: monthly inflation in restaurants. Dashed line, left scale: monthly inflation in fast-food restaurants. Bars, right scale: monthly minimum wage increases.

Figure 3a: Frequency of price changes in traditional restaurants






Figure 3b: Frequency of price changes in fast-food restaurants



Note: Solid line: Frequency of price changes. Dashed line: Frequency of price increases. Dotted line: Frequency of price decreases


Figure 4: Distribution of price changes



Note: Price changes equal to zero are not taken into account.



Figure 5: Actual versus simulated price change distributions




Notes: Black bars: simulated price change distribution. Dashed bars: actual price change distribution.

**Figure 6a: Impact of a minimum wage increase on the frequency of price changes in traditional restaurants**




**Figure 6b: Impact of a minimum wage increase on the frequency of price changes in fast-food restaurants**



Note: Solid line: 1% increase. Dotted line: 2% increase. Dashed line: 5% increase


**Figure 7a: Aggregate response to a minimum wage increase**

**(traditional restaurants)**



**Figure 7b: Aggregate response to a minimum wage increase**


**(fast-food restaurants)**



Note: Solid line: simulated average aggregate response. Dotted line: bounds of the 95% confidence interval. Dashed line: response derived from the linear model estimated with aggregate data.

## Appendix

Figure A1: Distributions of the cumulated minimum wage increase since the last price change



Note: black bars for traditional restaurants, dashed bars for fast-food restaurants. Decreases in employers' social contributions are included in labor cost at minimum wage.