




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
An overview of women's work and employment in India

*Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens,
Melanie Hughie-Williams, Nuria Ramos Martin*



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Contact: m.vanklaveren@uva.nl

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An overview of women's work and employment in India

**Decisions for Life MDG3 Project
Country Report no. 13**

Maarten van Klaveren

Kea Tijdens

Melanie Hughie-Williams

Nuria Ramos Martin

AIAS

University of Amsterdam

WP 10/90

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Management summary

This report provides information on India on behalf of the implementation of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project in that country. The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. It focuses on a gender analysis of work and employment.

History (2.1.1). After Independence, Prime Minister (PM) Nehru and the Congress Party pursued socialist-oriented economic policies. After Nehru's death (1964), policies changed from urban industrial to agricultural development, continuing under PM Indira Ghandi. From 1984 on, PM Rajiv Ghandi encouraged science and technology and started to depart from socialist policies. After his death in 1991, a liberalisation process was put in motion, which has been supported by various government coalitions. From 2003 on, the Indian economy has shown high macro-economic growth figures.

Governance (2.1.2). In spite of a democratic system of government, a progressive Constitution and many laws to protect women's rights, serious problems with compliance remain, especially in maintaining human and women's rights. The position of women in politics is weak, though at top level there were and are remarkable exceptions. With the 2009 elections, women representation in the lower house of parliament increased to 11%. In recent years many women have been confronted with domestic violence and sexual harassment.

Prospects (2.1.3). The global economic crisis has had a rather modest impact on India's economy, and the prospects for the country's rebound seem bright. Yet, in 2008-09 the decline in manufacturing exports has caused serious problems for in particular women.

Communication (2.2). Telephone use is rapidly switching from fixed line to cellular phone networks. In 2009, already 365 of each 1,000 in the population used a cell phone. Internet coverage is growing but still low, with one in 12 surfing on the Internet. Television is a popular medium: over half of all households have a TV set. Cable TV proves to have emancipatory force, especially for rural women.

The sectoral labour market structure – Population and employment (2.3.1). Being slightly below 36%, women's Labour Participation Rate (LPR) in 2008 was extremely low, whereas with 85% the male rate was high. LPRs hardly changed in the 2000s.

The sectoral labour market structure – Formal and informal employment (2.3.2) Less than 15% of all employed is currently working in the formal (in India: organised) sector, and less than 8% are formal (organised) workers. Just over half of the total labour force is self-employed. In 2008-09 about 50% of all employed worked in agriculture, 20% in manufacturing, and 30% in services.

The sectoral labour market structure – Unemployment (2.3.3). In recent years unemployment for women has gone up. Unemployment is highest among youngsters, with for girls and young women in 2006 official unemployment rates between 17 and 22%.

Legislation (2.4.1). India has ratified only four of eight core ILO Labour Conventions. In practice workers' rights are only legally protected for the small minority working in the organised sector. Even formally the freedom of association is limited. Strikes are prohibited in the public sector. Child labour is widespread, and the number of child labourers estimated at 55-60 million.

Labour relations and wage-setting (2.4.2). The trade union landscape in India is complex and diversified. The union movement opposed liberalisation taking place after 1991, in which period centralized collective bargaining declined. We found that union membership in the 2000s remained at about 6.5% of the labour force. On average the female share in membership and decision-making remains low. In contrast, strongholds of female organizing have emerged as responses to problems in informal labour.

The statutory minimum wage (2.5.1). There is a complex system of statutory minimum wages (MW) in place, with 1,232 occupational and sectoral minimum wage rates. In practice, only average wages in the manufacturing part of the organised sector are above the MW level. In 2004-05 80% of casual workers and 31% of regular salaried/wage workers did not receive the MW, with the proportions of females even larger. Innovative is the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), a combination of a minimum wage provision and a public employment scheme.

Poverty (2.5.2). For 2005, it has been estimated that 76% of the population lived under the poverty line of USD 2 a day, and that 42% had to make ends meet with an income below USD 1.25 a day. The poverty gap remains relatively large. In and through the nationwide liberalisation process, the seven states with the lowest incomes are lagging behind. In 2006, India ranked 132nd on the human development index (HDI), six places below its GDP per capita rank.

Population and fertility (2.6.1). For over two decades the population growth rate is falling, but further decrease seems to stagnate. For 2005-2010 the growth projection is 1.5% per year. Due to the preference for sons the country's sex ratio is 1.12 male/female. The total fertility rate (2.8-2.9 children per woman) and the adolescent fertility rate (90 per 1,000) are rather high. In 2006 the median age for women at first marriage was 17.8 years, and by then 42% of all Indian women aged 20-24 gave birth before age 20.

Health (2.6.2). In 2007, about 2.3 million Indians lived with HIV. Though HIV/AIDS is in India more a man's disease, there is a shift going on toward women and young people. The country's health disparities are large, also because of relatively low public expenditure on health.

Women's labour market share (2.6.3). With 19% the female share in the organised sector is low. In both manufacturing and in commercial services about one in six employees was female. The public sector is by far the largest employer in the formal sector, employing 70% of all women engaged in that sector.

Agriculture (2.6.4). It is estimated that about 60% of all agricultural operations are handled exclusively by women. Female hourly wage rates in agriculture vary from 50 to 75% of male rates, and are too low to overcome absolute poverty. Working conditions are often appalling. Young women living in cities and trying to make a career rarely can rely on a "fall-back scenario" in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

Mining and manufacturing (2.6.5). Since the early 1990s, informalisation and casualisation of employment and decreasing wage rates show up as main trends. Thus, manufacturing has become a less promising source of employment for women.

Services (2.6.6). In the last two decades the service sector share in total employment doubled, and in 2004-2008 employment and export growth have even speeded up. The motor of growth is the IT/BPO industry. Yet, at the same time informalisation has grown: currently over seven in ten service employees are in informal labour. Women may comprise less than one third of the IT/BPO workforce but their share may soon increase.

Government (2.6.7). In spite of a recent decline in public sector employment, the share of females are gradually increasing at central, regional and local state levels. Relatively high wages and maternity and sickness benefits may make the public service attractive for young women.

Literacy (2.7.1). The adult literacy rate—those age 15 and over that can read and write—was in 2007 66%, with a considerable gender gap: the female literacy was 54.5% and the male 77.1%. For 2007 the literacy rate for 15-24-year-olds was set at 82.1%, with a smaller gender difference: 77.1% for young females and 86.7% for young males.

Education of girls (2.7.2). Girls are lagging behind in enrollment rates for all educational types. For 2006, combined gross enrollment in education was 61%, with 57.4% for girls. For 2007, international sources set net enrollment in primary education at 90%: 88% for girls and 91% for boys, but the drop-out rates were quite high. In the same year, gross enrollment in secondary education was 57%: 52% for females and 61% for males. And in tertiary education, 13% of the 17-25 of age were enrolled: 11% of females and 16% of males.

Female skill levels (2.7.3). The gender gap in educational level of the labour force is immense. Whereas in 2004-05 60% of the female employed was illiterate and 3.7% was graduated, these shares for the males labour force were less than 28% and nearly 8% respectively. Nevertheless, the female shares of graduated were higher than the male shares in banking and finance; real estate and business services, and transport. Among the 15-29 of age, the gender gap was considerably smaller. We estimate the current size of the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE for India at about 1.8 million girls and young women 15-29 of age working in urban areas in commercial services.

Wages (2.8.1). We found for 2004-05 the very large gender pay gap of 57% in the formal (organised) sector. Comparisons with the unorganised sector showed that wages rates here were 20-30% of those in the organised sector, though wage rates varied widely across states and activities. Among casual workers, gender pay gaps showed up of 35-37%.

Working conditions (2.8.2). In 2000 female employees in the organised sector made longer hours than their male colleagues: an average working week of 48.1 hours against 46.3. Between 2000 and 2006, the average working week of females has been shortened by 1.3 hours, whereas the male working week has been prolonged by 0.5 hours.

1. Introduction: The Decisions for Life project

The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. The lifetime decisions adolescent women face, determine not only their individual future, but also that of society: their choices are key to the demographic and workforce development of the nation.

DECISIONS FOR LIFE is awarded a MDG3 grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of its strategy to support the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals no 3 (MDG3): "Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women". DECISIONS FOR LIFE more specifically focuses on MDG3.5: "Promoting formal employment and equal opportunities at the labour market", which is one of the four MDG3 priority areas identified in Ministry's MDG3 Fund. DECISIONS FOR LIFE runs from October 2008 until June 2011 (See www.wageindicator.org/main/projects/decisions-for-life).

DECISIONS FOR LIFE focuses on 14 developing countries, notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, the CIS countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the southern African countries Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Project partners are International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Union Network International (UNI), WageIndicator Foundation, and University of Amsterdam/AIAS.

This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. These Inventories and the underlying gender analyses are listed in the Table. All reports will be posted at the project website. In this country report on India the sequence of the sections differs from the table. The report covers mainly Activity nr 1.03, the Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions (or, as Chapter 2 is called here, work and employment). Partly included (in section 2.4.1) is Activity 1.01, Inventories of national legislation; partly the analysis of national legislation has resulted in a separate product, the DecentWorkCheck for India. Activity 1.02, Inventories of companies' regulations, will take place through a company survey. Preparations for Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses (Chapter 3). References can be found in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 gives more insight in the WageIndicator.

The authors would like to thank the Indian WageIndicator/Paycheck team for their valuable corrections and additions on an earlier draft of this country report. Of course, all errors remain ours.

Table 1. Activities for DECISIONS FOR LIFE by the University of Amsterdam

No	Inventories
1.01	Inventories of national legislation
1.02	Inventories of companies' regulations
1.03	Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions
1.03a	Gender analysis start-up design of off-line gender analyses inventory
1.03b	Gender analysis data-entry for off-line use inventories

2. Gender analysis regarding work and employment

2.1. Introduction: the general picture

2.1.1. History

India is, with about 1,170 million inhabitants, the second most populous country, the seventh-largest country by geographical area, and the most populous democracy in the world. Home to the Indus Valley Civilisation and a region of historic trade routes and vast empires, the Indian subcontinent was identified with its commercial and cultural wealth for much of its history. From the 16th century, European powers such as Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom established trading posts and later established colonies in the country. By the mid-19th century, most of India was under the control of the British East India Company. A major turning point in the colonial occupation occurred with the Indian-led Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 to 1858, which seriously threatened British rule and led to a marked shift in colonial attitudes and practices. Although the British made some legal and administrative adjustments to placate Indians, colonial attitudes toward Indians shifted from cultural engagement—albeit to change Indians with Western ideas and technology—to insularity and xenophobia. India was brought under the direct rule of the British Crown. In the 20th century, a nationwide struggle for independence was launched by the Indian National Congress (INC) and other political organisations. Mahatma Gandhi led millions of people in several national campaigns of non-violent civil disobedience. On 15 August 1947, India gained independence from British rule, but the Muslim-majority areas were partitioned to form a separate state, Pakistan. The partition and related violence displaced up to 12.5 million people in the former British Indian Empire, with estimates of loss of life varying from several hundred thousand to a million. On 26 January 1950, India became a republic and a new Constitution came into force. Jawaharlal Nehru became the country's first Prime Minister (PM) (wikipedia India; wikipedia History of the Republic of India; Metcalfe and Metcalfe 2006).

The British had left India with a rudimentary industrial and scientific base; tremendous poverty; social cleavages along caste and economic lines; and contentious territorial boundaries that led to armed conflicts with Pakistan (1947 to 1949, 1965, 1971), China (1962), and numerous insurgent groups. In spite of such difficulties, the nation can count a number of successes. With the exception of the state of emergency

from 1975 to 1977, India has maintained a democratic political system. Building on the British-established education system, India developed an educational infrastructure that has trained one of the world's largest scientific and technical populations. Using Green Revolution agricultural technologies, the country has become self-sufficient in food production (Library of Congress 2004). Especially since the mid-1990s, India shows impressive macro-economic growth figures, jointly with Brazil, Russia and China (the BRICs) taking a prominent place among the upcoming economic powers. However, poverty remains widespread, income and consumption inequalities are growing, and many lack the skills to participate in the expansion of modern services and manufacturing. We will return to such pros and cons of recent developments after having summarized political and economic change in the first forty years after Independence.

From 1950 to 1990, barring two brief periods, the INC enjoyed a federal parliamentary majority. The first national elections were held in 1952; INC won an overwhelming majority, and Nehru began a second term as PM. He also led the Congress to major election victories in 1957 and 1962. The Indian Union was reshaped as the States Reorganization Act was passed in 1956: old states were dissolved and new states created on the lines of shared linguistic and ethnic demographics. The Parliament also passed extensive reforms that increased the legal rights of women in Hindu society, and further legislated against caste discrimination and untouchability. Nehru and the Congress Party parliamentary majority advocated socialist-oriented economic policies: no taxation for farmers, a statutory minimum wage and benefits for blue-collar workers, and the nationalization of heavy industries such as steel, aviation, shipping, electricity and mining. The various Five-Year Plans were leading. A number of industrial sectors were reserved for state-owned companies alone. And though private firms were allowed to operate in other sectors, they had to take the central government's permission before activities being set up (OECD 2007; wikipedia History of the Republic of India).

After Jawaharlal Nehru's death in May 1964, under his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri economic policies changed from urban to agricultural development, including the procurement of food grains at above-market prices. Combined with subsidies for fertilizers, these price incentives sparked India's Green Revolution during the late 1960s and the 1970s. When Shastri died shortly afterwards, a leadership election resulted in the elevation of Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, as the third PM. She continued the political orientation towards the rural masses. Right-wing leader Morarji Desai entered Gandhi's government as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, and with senior Congress politicians attempted to constrain Gandhi's authority. She resuscitated her popular appeal by a major shift towards socialist policies. In 1971, Gandhi

and her own Congress (R) were returned to power with a massively increased majority. The nationalization of banks was carried out, and many other socialist-oriented economic and industrial policies enacted. In 1974-75 allegations of corruption caused increasing political unrest. The Allahabad High Court found Indira Gandhi guilty of misusing the government machinery for election purposes, and opposition parties conducted nationwide strikes and protests demanding her immediate resignation. In 1975, under pressure of Ms. Gandhi the President declared the state of emergency. Civil liberties were suspended, elections at national and state levels postponed, and opposition leaders and activists imprisoned. The 1977 elections were won by the Janata Party, an amalgamation of opposition parties, and Morarji Desai became the country's first non-Congress PM. Yet, Janata did not offer any leadership on solving India's growing problems, the coalition crumbled and the 1980 elections brought Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I) Party back in power. The early 1980s were characterized by communal violence and insurgencies in various Indian states. On 31 October 1984, the Prime Minister's own Sikh bodyguards killed her. The Congress party chose Rajiv Gandhi, Indira's older son, as the next PM. In the next elections Rajiv led the Congress party to its largest majority ever. Rajiv Gandhi initiated some economic reforms, lifting limitations to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). His encouragement of science and technology resulted in a major expansion of the telecom industry, sparking the first steps towards a domestic IT and software industry (wikipedia History of the Republic of India; Metcalfe and Metcalfe 2006; Nilekani 2008, 14, 21).

However, Rajiv Gandhi's departure from socialist policies –though carefully-- did not sit well with the masses, who did not benefit from the innovations. Moreover, his image as an honest politician was shattered by a corruption scandal. In 1989, a Janata Dal-led National Front coalition in alliance with the Left Front coalition won the elections, but in turn managed to stay in power for only two years. On 21 May 1991, while Rajiv Gandhi campaigned on behalf of Congress (I), a Tamil Tigers suicide bomber killed him and many others. Based on the election result, Congress (I) put together a coalition, returning to power under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao. This Congress-led government, which served a full 5-year term, initiated a gradual process of economic liberalisation and reform. Initially through external persuasion, India moved away from its *dirigiste* model. In August 1991, in an atmosphere of political uncertainty after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, shaking investor confidence and a severe balance of payments crisis, the government took refuge to unanticipated reform measures pressed by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) adjustment program. Direct tax rates were significantly reduced, pervasive government licensing of industrial activity was almost eliminated, and restrictions on investment by large companies were eased. In the 1990s,

the list of industries reserved for the public sector was reduced from 17 to six. The final months of the Rao-led government suffered the effects of several major political corruption scandals, which contributed to the worst electoral performance by the Congress Party in its history. The years 1996–1998 were a period of turmoil in the federal government with several short-lived alliances holding sway. In 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with several other parties and became the first non-Congress government to complete a full five-year term. In the 2004 elections, the INC won the largest number of seats in parliament and formed a government with a coalition called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), supported by various Left-leaning parties and members opposed to the BJP. The UPA again came into power after the 2009 general election; however, the representation of the Left leaning parties within the coalition has significantly reduced. Concerning economic policies, the process of reform basically has continued after 2000 with a further opening of India's economy to competition, rather irrespective of the ruling coalition. The number of industries reserved for very small firms has been significantly reduced, and foreign suppliers have been encouraged to enter the market by a progressive lowering of tariffs to an average of 10% in 2007. Yet, plans to privatise state enterprises have been largely stalled (wikipedia India; wikipedia History of the Republic of India; wikipedia Economic liberalisation in India; OECD 2007; Kapur 2008; Bhaumik and Kumbhakar 2008).

In the period 1978-2004, India's output grew by 5.4% average per year, speeding up in the second half of this period: whereas between 1978-1993 output growth was an average 4.5% yearly, between 1993-2004 this accelerated to 6.5%. However, as output per worker also accelerated, from 2.4% per year in 1978-1993 to 4.5% in 1993-2004, employment growth fell slightly, from an average 2.1% yearly in the first period to 1.9% in the second. Manufacturing industry and services showed rather similar employment growth rates per year, respectively on average 3.3% in 1978-1993 and 3.6% in 1993-2004 for manufacturing as against 3.8% and 3.7% for services. Remarkable enough employment in agriculture kept on growing too, with 1.4% yearly in 1978-1993 and 0.7% afterwards – though these rates hide growing underemployment, of many working hard but not earning sufficient incomes (Bosworth and Collins 2007).

In the 2000s, and especially from 2003 on, the Indian economy from year to year showed high growth figures. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth per person employed was 2.4% in 2000, 2.0% in 2001, 0.9% in 2002, 7.7% in 2003, 7.4% in 2004, 7.0% in 2005, 7.4% in 2006, and most recently 7.3% in 2007 and 5.4% in 2008 (UN MDG Indicators). Thus, the GDP growth rate per person employed for 2001-2006 averaged 5.4%, surpassed by an average growth of 7.0% for 2003-2008. Yet, as we will see the decline of

poverty has been low. Obviously growth has not benefited the poor, nor has new employment gone to them, mechanisms that have been recognized by the current administration. The Approach Paper to the Eleventh Plan (2007-2012) calls for more 'inclusive' growth and envisages employment as a central element of such growth. While a target of 58 million employment opportunities is proposed, the emphasis is on two aspects of employment: productivity and incomes to address the problem of the working poor, and improvement in the employability of the poor through a concerted and large-scale program for training and upgrading skills. The government has recognized that a massive skills mismatch is restricting the shift of employment from agriculture to industry and services. Various recent reports warn that limited skills and training are a major bottleneck for continuing growth (Dutz 2007; Papola 2008). The mismatch is aggravated by the brain drain on many of India's high-skilled potential. About 20 million people or about 2% of the country's population live and work abroad, where they earn the equivalent of two-thirds of India's GDP (Dutz 2007); their immense remittances, how advantageous for the home country they may be, cannot solve the skill problem.

In a global perspective, India is located in the lower ranks of medium human development, though currently the country is poised to cross the threshold to join the ranks of the world's middle-income countries. In 2006 its GDP per capita reached USD (PPP) 2,489, ranking no. 134 in the world. The estimated earned income for men was USD 3,698, and for women USD 1,185 (UNDP 2008), implying a women to men parity rate of 32%. As we will see, this extremely low rate is indicative for the position of Indian women in the field of work and employment.

2.1.2. Governance

India is a multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament and an active civil society. The Prime Minister (PM), appointed by the President, is the head of government and exercises most executive powers. The country has 28 states and seven union territories. States and union territories contain 601 districts that are further subdivided into townships containing from 200 to 600 villages. The division of power between the union and state governments can appear blurred and even chaotic at times, and relationships between some state governments and the union government have been contentious. However, the union government still exercises considerable influence on states. Since Independence, India has experienced a plethora of political successes and problems. The country maintains a democratic system of government with civil liberties that are often lacking in many poor, ethnically diverse societies. Its Constitution may be called progressive. India also has an impressive record of economic development and a demonstrable

commitment to correcting traditional social oppression (Library of Congress 2004; wikipedia). Manmohan Singh became PM following his Congress Party-led coalition's victory in the 2004 general elections, which were considered free and fair, despite scattered instances of violence. In May 2009, Singh began his second term. In recent years political parties could operate without restriction or outside interference. Serious internal conflicts affected the states of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as several states in North-East India. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, security forces occasionally acted independently of government authority during incidents of communal tensions in states such as Karnataka (US Dept of State 2009).

The US Dept of State (2009) over 2008 reported that, though the government generally respected the rights of its citizens; serious problems remained. Major problems included extrajudicial killings of persons in custody, disappearances, and torture and rape by police and other security forces. Investigations into individual abuses and legal punishment for perpetrators occurred, but for the majority of abuses, the lack of accountability created an atmosphere of impunity. Poor prison conditions and lengthy detentions during both pretrial and trial proceedings remained significant problems. Officials used special antiterrorism legislation to justify the excessive use of force. Corruption existed at all levels of government and police. The government applied restrictions to the travel and activities of visiting experts and scholars. Significant restrictions remained on the funding and activities of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). NGOs must secure approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs before organizing international conferences. In 2008 human rights groups contended that this provided the government with political control over the work of NGOs and restricted their freedom of assembly and association. NGOs alleged that some members from abroad were denied visas arbitrarily (US Dept of State 2009).

In 2008, increasing attacks against religious minorities and the promulgation of antireligious conversion laws were concerns. Violence associated with caste-based discrimination occurred. Domestic violence, child marriage, dowry-related deaths, honor crimes, female infanticide and feticide remain serious problems. Trafficking in persons and exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor were continuing problems. As in 2007, there were credible reports that police throughout the country failed to file required arrest reports for detained persons, resulting in hundreds of unresolved disappearances. Police usually denied these claims. Prison conditions in some states were life threatening and did not meet international standards. Prisons were severely overcrowded, and food and medical care were inadequate. The legal system was overburdened. The federal Ministry for Home Affairs controls most paramilitary forces, the internal intelligence bureaus,

and the nationwide police service, and provides training for senior police officers of the state-organized police forces. In 2008, according to the US Dept of State corruption in the police force was pervasive and acknowledged by many government officials. Officers at all levels acted with impunity and were rarely held accountable for illegal actions. Police routinely employed arbitrary and incommunicado detention and denied detainees, particularly the destitute, access to lawyers and medical attention to extract confessions. Lower-caste individuals were more likely to be illegally detained than others (US Dept of State 2009).

Unless all these observations, it has to be noted that according to the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators (WGI) India's comparative position in the 2000s is rather stable –be it at various levels-- on all six governance indicators: voice and accountability (in 2008 in the fifth percentile, indicating that 35-40% of countries worldwide have better ratings); political stability and absence of violence (in the ninth percentile in 2008, thus with about 80% of countries rated better); government effectiveness (in the fifth percentile); regulatory quality (in the sixth percentile); rule of law (in the fifth percentile); and control of corruption (in 2008 in the sixth percentile)(World Bank 2009c).

The position of women in politics is weak, although at top level there were and are remarkable exceptions. Since the 2009 elections, women occupy 9.1% of the seats (73 out of 784) in both chambers of parliament, of which 59 out of 543 in the lower house, Lok Sabha (10.9%). Earlier, this share never passed 10%; it stopped at 9.0% in 1999. However, there has been no change in the number of women candidates fielded by the major parties in recent elections, their number remaining under one in every 10 candidates. Most parties say women candidates are low on the “winnability” factor. But in the five Lok Sabha elections since 1996, the winnability of women candidates has been an average 12.5%, against 8.3% for men (Mishra 2009). In 2009 women made up 10% of those in ministerial positions. The constitution reserves 33% of seats for women in elected village councils (US Dept of State 2009). As said, women have occupied various top positions in Indian politics. In July 2007 Pratibha Patil became the country's first female president. In four periods, Miss Mayawati has been and is Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, the country's largest state with a population of 190 million. As already mentioned, Indira Gandhi was India's first female PM; Sonia Gandhi's involvement with Indian public life as president of Indian National Congress and chairperson of the ruling UPA in the Lok Sabha began after the assassination of her mother-in-law and her husband Rajiv's election as PM. Since 1998, the National Capital Territory of Delhi is ruled by the female Chief Minister Sheila Dixit.

Meira Kumar is the first woman Speaker in India (wikipedia; information Indian WageIndicator team).

India's government has promulgated many laws to protect women's rights. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is the nodal department on the issue of female employment. Within the Ministry of Labour and Employment, a separate Cell for women's labour was set up in 1975. Among other things, the Cell has the task to implement and evaluate the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976, and to undertake follow-up action on the Supreme Court judgements in matters of prevention of sexual harassment of women at their workplace. Moreover, the Cell is administering a grants-in-aid Scheme for providing financial assistance to civil society organizations (CSOs) (voluntary and non-government) for taking up action programmes and projects for the benefit of female employment (website Ministry of Labour and Employment).

In general, the application of laws concerning women's rights is weak. The legal framework has less influence on women's position than do the nation's religions. According to the 2001 Census, 80.5% of the population lives according to Hinduism and its customs and laws; by the time 13.4% of the population was Muslim (Office of the Registrar website, Census of India; CIA World Factbook). Indian women hold a moderate level of authority and status in relation to family matters. The authorities have fought against early marriage since the 19th century and have continually raised the legal marriage age – from 12 in 1891, to 14 in 1929, 15 in 1955 and finally to 18 in 1976 (OECD-SIGI website). However, we will show in section 2.6.1 that in practice marriage law is widely violated. Polygamy is legal for Muslim men, who are allowed to take up to four wives. It also exists to a lesser extent amongst Hindus, particularly in cases where the first wife has not given birth to any sons. Divorce by mutual consent is the legal practice but women who initiate divorce are condemned by public opinion; as a result, divorce remains very rare. Fathers alone have parental authority in both Hindu and Muslim families. If divorce does occur, the law assures some equality with regard to child custody, but any advantages granted to the mother are often disregarded (OECD-SIGI website).

In matters of inheritance, Hindu traditions privilege men as only sons are able to inherit from their parents. In theory, these traditions were abolished by law after Independence but many women, especially in Northern India, are still deprived of inheritance. Contrary to national laws, several states allow the exclusion of widows and daughters in land inheritance. The situation is more favourable for women in the South, where the national laws carry more weight. The Muslim population mostly follows strict inheritance guidelines set out in Shari'a law, which are also discriminatory: daughters, for example, inherit half as much as sons. This is commonly justified by the argument that women have no financial responsibility towards their husbands and children. Indian legislation supports the financial independence for women to a moder-

ate degree. Several laws guarantee women's access to land and access to property other than land, but these laws are often ignored in the North, as are those pertaining to women's access to bank loans. This is different in the South: recent surveys report that here 70 to 80% of women have equal access to land, property, and loans and credit. Women's civil liberty in India is relatively low, largely because of traditions and customs. Women's and girls' freedom of movement is limited particularly in village communities; amongst Muslim and Hindu communities in the North 80 to 85% of women have virtually no freedom of movement (OECD-SIGI website).

The Constitution of India prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, place of birth, or social status, and the government worked to enforce these provisions with varying degrees of success. The law provides for protection from all forms of abuse against women in the home, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, or economic abuse. Domestic violence includes actual abuse or the threat of abuse. The law recognizes the right of a woman to reside in a shared household with her spouse or partner while the dispute continues, although a woman can be provided with alternative accommodations, for which the spouse pays. The law also provides women with the right to police assistance, legal aid, shelter, and access to medical care. The law bans harassment by way of dowry demands and empowers magistrates to issue protection orders where needed. Dowry-related violence increased more than three-fold between 1990 and 2000; dowry deaths in that period rose by 38% and since then, about 6,000 to 7,000 women have been murdered each year. The law criminalizes spousal rape. Punishment ranges from jail terms of up to one year and/or a fine of approximately Rupees (INR or Rs.) 19,800 rupees (approximately USD 425)(US Dept of State 2009; OECD-SIGI website; Ruiz 2006). In section 2.6.2 we go into the huge problem of the preference for sons and the "missing women."

In practice rape and other violent attacks against women continued to be a serious problem in large parts of the country. There has been a dramatic increase in reported crimes against women, which credible sources stated was due to a growing sense of security in reporting such crimes. The 2005-06 National Family Health Survey (NFHS) reported that one-third of women aged 15 to 49 had experienced physical violence, and approximately one in 10 had been a victim of sexual violence. The survey also found that that only one in four abused women had ever sought help, and that 54% of women believed it was justified for a husband to beat his wife. NGOs asserted that rape by police, including custodial rape, was common. The law sets criminal penalties for rape, including spousal rape, but the government did not enforce the law effectively. Only 10% of rape cases were adjudicated fully by the courts, and police often failed to arrest

rapists, perpetuating a climate of impunity (US Dept of State 2009). Sexual harassment of women in the workplace included physical and verbal abuse from male supervisors, restricted use of toilets, and the denial of lunch breaks. In 2006 the Supreme Court instructed all state chief secretaries to comply with its mandate that all state departments and institutions with over 50 employees establish committees to deal with matters of sexual harassment. Earlier, the Court had recognized the absence of legal provisions in this field, and laid down the policy and procedure to deal with sexual harassment. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), over 4,500 cases of sexual harassment were filed in 2006. Like Brazil, India has started up all-women police stations as to address domestic violence against women. In 2005 India had 295 of such units (Ruiz 2006; US Dept of State 2008, 2009).

2.1.3. Prospects

In the short run, the global credit crunch had its effects on India's economy. Its GDP growth declined from 9.7% in 2006-07 to 6.1% in April-June 2009 (World Bank 2009d). Yet, compared to the US and Europe, India did not face a number of banking problems and weathered the global crisis relatively well. Its relatively small finance sector, still largely government-owned and functioning robust and prudently, avoided the excesses that marred American financial markets (cf. Stiglitz 2009). India's recovery has been remarkably strong. Although FDI inflows to India declined in 2009, estimated at USD 35 billion compared to USD 41 billion in 2008, the country remains one of the three developing country destinations for foreign investors (World Bank 2010; website World Bank). Already in mid-2009, high-ranking government officials predicted a return to a 9% growth rate (Mohan 2009); the World Bank (2009d) indeed expects 9.0% GDP growth to become the average outcome for 2008-09. Obviously they did and do not agree with the conclusions of a World Bank research note as of July 2009, stating: "The global economic crisis is exposing households in virtually all developing countries to increased risk of poverty and hardship", and adding "While in the short-run, the non-poor may be the most affected by the crisis, experience from past economic and financial crises suggests that the adverse impacts are likely to spread in the medium-term to poor households." This note ranked India among the 43 countries that would be highly exposed to the crisis, showing decelerating growth. It is rated in the category of countries with low fiscal capacity, meaning there is little or now tolerance for fiscal deficits as to counteract the poverty effects of the crisis (Cord et al 2009).

Most recently, international sources emphasize that, while most developing countries operate in a highly constrained fiscal environment, notably India and China were in a position to counteract the impact of the downturn through increased public spending and expansionary fiscal policies (cf. UNESCO 2010, 28). In-

deed, India in December 2008 and January 2009 launched two fiscal stimulus packages, together amounting to 3% of GDP and including additional public expenditure. The Reserve Bank of India Governor claims that these measures have been effective, also to have India's financial markets continuing to function orderly. Indeed, the World Bank (2010, 23) labels India's macro-economic management as "skillful." It helped, as the Governor argued, that the country has only to a certain part been integrated in the world economy and that consequently large parts of its economy remained insulated from the global downturn (Subbarao 2009). In spite of substantial increases, the shares of imports / exports and FDI in India's GDP remain relatively limited: by 2006 the imports / exports share was 24% (1985: 6%), and the FDI share 2% (1990: 0.1%)(OECD 2007; UNCTAD 2009). On economic globalization rankings India invariably scores low. For example, on the KOF Globalization Index 2010 the country ranked no. 122 of 141 countries, considerably lower than the other BRIC countries Brazil (no. 91), China (97), and Russia (92)(KOF Swiss Economic Institute 2010). In UNCTAD's Transnationality Index 2005 India got the lowest spot of 32 developing countries (UNCTAD 2008, 12).

In spite of the generally rather favourable picture, serious problems for Indian (women) workers have resulted from the decline in industrial production and exports, especially in manufacturing exports, in 2008-09. In 2008, the growth of industrial output decelerated to 2.4% (against 8.6% in 2007), followed by only 0.7% growth in the first five months of 2009 compared to the same period of 2008. In 2008, manufacturing output in food products, jute textiles and furniture fell by about 10% (ADB 2009b). In the second half of 2008, the country's manufacturing exports fell by about 20%, and exports in the first four months of 2009 were about 30% below the level seen a year earlier (ADB 2009c). In the first quarter of 2009 alone, over 500,000 jobs in the export-oriented formal sector were shed, mostly in the jewelry, civil aviation, automotive, textiles and garment industries. Women's jobs may have accounted for 40 to 50% of those that formally disappeared (cf. World Bank 2009e). There is evidence that large numbers of informal workers have lost jobs (NCEUS 2009a, 19). The indirect effects of the crisis on the informal sector may have even stronger hit women's work; these effects may have been more in terms of declining incomes and a decrease in available days of work. Though –understandably-- statistical information is lacking, there is evidence that besides women in homework in garments and handwork, female waste collectors and female construction workers have felt drops in income up to 50%, leading to increasing indebtedness and increasing use of child labour, taking children off school (SEWA 2009). Nevertheless, also for the poor the impact of the crisis has not been as strongly felt as in other Asian countries, most likely mainly thanks to the existing social safety nets:

a relatively robust social protection infrastructure; existing food security and social assistance programmes; the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA, see section 2.5.1), and the national midday meal scheme provision in primary schools (Jones and Holmes 2009).

The prospects for India's rebound from the crisis are broadly perceived as bright. In the 2009-2010 Global Competitiveness Report, India is ranked by a panel of leading economists as second, after Brazil, among countries according to their competitiveness prospect, with this position slightly positively affected by the crisis. India improved one place since 2008, ending up at rank no. 49 (of 133 countries). The country had the no. 54 ranking in the latest Global Competitiveness index on institutions, was lower ranked on the pillars infrastructure (no. 76), health and primary education (no. 101), higher education and training (no. 66), and technological readiness (no. 83), and higher on the pillars goods market efficiency (no. 48), financial market sophistication (no. 16), business sophistication (no. 27), innovation (no. 30), and of course on market size (no. 4) (Sala-I-Martin et al 2009). The most recent World Bank forecast predicts for India 6.0% real GDP growth in 2009, 7.5% in 2010 and 8.0% in 2011 (World Bank 2010). In spite of the generally rather favourable picture, the World Bank (2009d, 2010) emphasizes that the most binding constraints to pro-poor or inclusive growth will need to be addressed: improving infrastructure (power supply, roads, railways, ports and transportation systems); developing the small and medium enterprises (SME) sector; improving longer-term sustainability; improving the effectiveness of public services and social protection, especially to the poor; and building skills. In strategies to overcome these constraints, the prospects for India's girls and women need to be prioritized. As we will analyse in the next sections, much will depend on further political empowerment and progress of girls and women in employment, education and health.

2.2. Communication

Adequate communication facilities are absolutely essential for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project. India is witnessing a huge period of change in communications, with increasing shifts from government to private providers and greater public use of various technologies. Some basic telephone services were opened to private-sector competition in 1994, and portions of state-owned telecommunications services have been purchased by private entities (Library of Congress 2004). At first sight surprisingly, the number of fixed telephone lines is currently decreasing. Whereas in 2005 there were 4.55 fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in use, or 50.2 million, by 2007 this rate had fallen to 3.37 per 100 or 39.4 million lines (UN Data). With 37.5 millions, for 2009 the number of fixed main lines in use was estimated lower again (CIA

World Factbook). Yet, in India very clearly the future is on cellular telephone services, including possible access to mobile Internet. Cellular service, introduced in 1994, in the 2000s has grown extremely rapid. In 2005, there were in total 81.7 telephone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants, or 90 million users, exploding to 208 per 1,000 inhabitants or 240 million users in 2007 (UN MDG Indicators). In 2007-2009, the amount of cell phone users nearly doubled again, to 365.2 per 1,000 or over 427 million users in 2009 (CIA World Factbook).

Actually 14 million cell phones are added each month to India's total. Cell phone providers have discovered the countryside as a huge potential outlet. In rural areas mobile phones are offered for about USD 15, and subscriptions start with one-minute calls for USD 0.10. Notably text message information can be highly useful in daily life. For example, one of the largest Indian providers offers farmers text message services with weather forecasts, market prices, and other agricultural information (Van der Maten 2009)¹. In 2007 the average mobile phone use was 447 minutes per user per month, across countries quite long. With USD 2.50 per month, the price basket for mobile service was rather low, even lower than the price basket for residential fixed line service: USD 3.30 (UN MDG Indicators; World Bank 2009a). 90% of all mobile phone accounts are prepaid (Nilekani 2008, 112). Already in 2007 61% of the Indian population was covered by mobile cellular networks (World Bank 2009a). Currently, the mobile cellular service is organized into four metropolitan areas and 19 telecom circles, each with multiple private service providers and one or more state-owned providers. In recent years significant trunk capacity has been added in the form of fiber-optic cable and one of the world's largest domestic satellite systems, the Indian National Satellite system (INSAT), with six satellites supporting 33,000 very small aperture terminals (VSAT) (CIA World Factbook). Yet, a World Bank report argues that India's "connectivity" is still quite low compared to China, the US and EU countries, and that targeted subsidies for rolling out rural mobile and broadband should be increased (Dutz 2007).

Internet coverage is growing but still rather low. Currently about one in 12 Indians is regularly surfing on the Internet. For 2008, the CIA World Factbook set Internet coverage at 6.9%, implying a total of 81 million Internet users and nearly doubling the coverage rate of 2005 (3.8% or 42 million users). Yet, other sources have mentioned the 6.9 coverage rate already for 2007 (cf. ADB 2009a), or even mentioned a ratio of 7.2 for that year (World Bank 2009a). The (international) Internet infrastructure is still in its infancy; nevertheless, in 2007 23% of all Internet subscribers were fixed broadband subscribers. By 2009, the country had

1 The more specific impact of cell phone use on the empowerment of adolescent girls in developing countries is, as more generally with IT use, not systematically assessed; more research is needed (Donahue 2010, 22).

over 3.6 million Internet hosts, and by December 2008 a rather low 1.3 secure Internet servers per 1 million people (CIA World Factbook; World Bank 2009a). With USD 6.60 per month in 2007 the price basket for Internet service was low (World Bank 2009a). Several Indian companies have installed Internet community centres and kiosks, offering low-cost computing and networking services across villages (Nilekani 2008, 110; website Comat).

In response to cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism perpetrated by parties in both India and Pakistan, India passed the Information Technology Act of 2000, which allows Internet cafés and Internet users' homes to be searched without warrants at any time as part of criminal investigations. The Act also provides for censoring the Internet on public morality grounds and defines "unauthorized access to certain types of electronic information" as a crime. The government retained the right to limit access to the Internet, specifically information deemed detrimental to national security. The act requires Internet cafés to monitor Internet use and inform the authorities of offenses (Library of Congress 2004; US Dept of State 2009). The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and intercepting personal mail in cases of public emergency or "in the interest of the public safety or tranquility." The central government and state governments used these surveillance techniques during 2008. Although the Telegraph Act gives police the power to intercept telephonic conversations, such evidence is inadmissible in court (US Dept of State 2009).

While the incidence of personal computers (PCs) in 2005 was 1.54%, implying 17 million PCs, in 2007 this incidence had more than doubled, to 3.3% or 37 million PCs (UN MDG Indicators; World Bank 2009a). In 2008, PC sales in India rose by 12% (Farrell 2009). Consequently, in early 2009 personal computer coverage may have passed the 4% mark. In February 2009, India i.e. the University of Andhra Pradesh launched a prototype of the Sakshat, an ultra-cheap laptop that ultimately would cost RS 500 (USD 11.50) -- one of the many low-cost innovations the country has produced recently (Ramesh 2009).

By 2006, there were more than 312 radio and 562 TV stations in India (website Britannica Online Encyclopedia). Concerning radio, AM radio broadcasting remained a government monopoly (All India Radio). Private FM radio station ownership was legal, but licenses only authorized entertainment and educational content (US Dept of State 2009). Since its introduction in 1959, for over three decades television broadcasting in India was dominated by the government-owned Doordarshan network, till in the early 1990s CNN and STAR TV introduced the possibility of access to non-government programming via satellite. In the 2000s ownership of television sets has spread rapidly. By 2007, 53% of all households had a television set,

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whereas in 2000 this was only 30% (World Bank 2009a). Currently about three in five of those households has cable or satellite transmission; this penetration is even that high in poor rural states. Viewership of the government channel is extremely low among those with cable TV. Radio listening is being replaced by watching television, definitely among young people. In 1992-93 41% of the ever-married adolescent girls 15-19 of age listened to radio at least once a week, but this percentage fell to 28% in 2005-06, whereas in 1992-93 23% of this group watched TV at least once a week, a share that had nearly doubled to 40% in 2005-06. In urban areas, the 2005-06 share even was 73% (rural areas: 33%). Clearly, both media are important vehicles to reach adolescent women (Moore et al 2009). The most popular TV serials revolve around issues of family and gender, mostly taking place in urban settings. The emancipatory force of exposure to cable television seems considerable, notably in rural settings. Thorough research on the effects of the introduction of cable TV in villages shows that this introduction reduced preference for sons and fertility (see section 2.6.1), and increases women's autonomy and female school enrollment – despite there being little or no targeted appeals, such as explicitly socially-oriented programming (Jensen and Oster 2006).²

Article 19 of India's constitution ensures freedom of speech and expression, however, freedom of the press is not explicitly mentioned. In 2008 the government generally respected these rights in practice. Under the 1923 Official Secrets Act, the government may prosecute any person who publishes or communicates information that could be harmful to the state. However, no such cases were reported during 2008. The Press Council is a statutory body of journalists, publishers, academics, and politicians, with a government-appointed chairman, that investigates what it believes is irresponsible journalism and sets a code of conduct for publishers. Independent newspapers and magazines regularly published and television channels broadcast investigative reports, including allegations of government wrongdoing, and the press generally promoted human rights and criticized perceived government lapses. With the exception of radio, foreign media generally were allowed to operate freely (US Dept of State 2009). With 70.9 per 1,000 inhabitants in the mid-2000s, the registered newspaper circulation is rather low, though this rate looks underestimated³ (UN Data). By 2003, there were 5,600 daily newspapers and more than 46,000 non-daily newspapers. About ten newspapers had national coverage, the largest being the Times of India, in English with 13.3 million readers, followed by the Hindustan Times (English, 6.3 million) and The Hindu (English, 5.2 million). Yet, some newspapers in Hindi are much more widely read, notably Dainik Jagran (with 55.7 million readers) and Dainik Bhaskar (31.9 million) (Library of Congress 2004; website Press reference; Times of India website;

2 Another initiative was Same Language Subtitling (SLS), a technique with enormous potential to create literacy skill acquisition and improvement in reading (Kothari 1998).

3 Includes only newspapers which report to a governmental or national institution.

2009 Indian Readership Survey, cited in wikipedia). Since September 2008, printing local editions of foreign press is allowed; previously only scientific, technical, and specialty periodicals were allowed to be printed by foreign magazines (US Dept of State 2009).

2.3. The sectoral labour market structure

2.3.1. Population and employment

In this section we present a statistical picture of the development of employment in India, and of the working age and economically active population (labour force). Yet, it is far from easy to provide a reliable and up-to-date picture. Longer-term developments are difficult to trace, also because of changes over time of definitions and questioning in the country's censuses and other data sources (Pandey w.y.). Employment statistics allowing long-term and international comparison in the 2000s date back from 1999-2000 (National Sample Survey); newer statistics as from 2004-2005 (National Sample Survey and other sources⁴) are useful but grouped differently. These figures count only those who are considered to have "engaged in economically productive activity for 183 days or more." Moreover, international sources show varying outcomes for recent years. Due to these statistical problems and to the huge number of people that are behind the various Indian figures, we feel the need to first present –departing from other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports—an overview of the main facts and trends that are discernible.

The CIA World Factbook estimated for July 2009 India's population at 1,166 million, of which 31.3% 0-14 years, and 63.6% 15-64 years, and 5.3% 65 years and over. The amount of girls and young women aged 15-29 can be estimated at 160 million, or nearly 14% of the population. The adolescent girls 15-19 of age alone make up nearly 58 million (based on CIA World Factbook and ILO Laborsta EAPPEP simulations). Each year 8 to 9 million young people join the ranks of the (potential) labour force! It is an immense challenge to provide jobs for this legion and, before that, provide them with the necessary knowledge, skill and attitudes to offer them access to the labour market, notably to the better-paid jobs in skilled services and manufacturing (cf. World Bank website Secondary education in India). In 2005 the three states with the largest female adolescent population (Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh) together accounted for one-third of all adolescent girls in the country. Young women's marital and reproductive behaviour is conditioned by where they live, and most adolescents still live in rural areas. In 2005 fewer than three in ten

4 Information (EMI) of the Director General Employment & Training (DGET) of the Ministry of Labour and Employment for employment statistics relating to the organised or formal sector, and data on industries collected by India's Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) in the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) (NCEUS 2009a, 2009b).

women aged 15-19 (28%, or 15.7 million) resided in urban areas. The largest amounts of 15-19-year-old females lived in Uttar Pradesh (7.9 million, of which 26% on urban areas); Maharashtra (4.8 million, 44% in urban areas); Andhra Pradesh (3.9 million, 32% in urban areas); West Bengal (3.8 million, 29% in urban areas); Bihar (3.3 million, only 16% in urban areas), and Rajasthan (2.8 million, 26% in urban areas) (Moore et al 2009).

For our calculation of the Labour Participation Rate (LPR) or Employment-to-Population ratio (EPOP), we chose the CIA World Factbook estimates for 2008 as a point of departure. According to this source, India had an economically active population (labour force) of 523.5 million, in a working age population of 730 millions. This would imply an overall LPR (EPOP) of 71.7% (MDG indicator 1.5), among the 14 countries in our project a participation rate in the upper middle ranks. Yet, following the EAPEP population and employment simulations of the ILO India's working age population would amount to 750.1 millions in 2008. Combined with a much lower amount of 457.6 million men and women being economically active according to ILO EAPEP, this ends up in a LPR (EPOP) of just 61.0%, giving India a position in the lower middle ranks. The available "hard" Indian 2004-05 data do not offer a final solution. Because five different measures are in use as to compute the size of the labour force and labour force participation, the highest and lowest outcomes showing gaps of 11.4 million for men and 40.2 million for women. Use of the most robust measure according to Indian experts ("MCWS") leads to a labour force of 429.9 million by 2004-2005 (NCEUS 2009a, 36-7). Extrapolation of this figure would for 2008 bring about a labour force size close to the ILO EAPEP outcome. Against this backdrop, the CIA estimate seems unrealistically high. Therefore we stick to the ILO estimates, that also provide more detailed information by age and gender and in this respect allow for international comparison.

By gender ILO EAPEP estimates India's working age population in 2008 to amount to 388.6 million men and 361.5 million women. With 328.6 million men and 129.0 million women being economically active, this implies LPRs of respectively 84.6% for men and only 35.7% for women, leading to the total rate of 61.0% (MDG indicator 1.5).⁵ The 2008 female rate is only 42% of the male rate, and by far the lowest female rate across the 14 DECISIONS FOR LIFE countries. For 2000, the ILO estimates resulted in LPR's

5 As the internationally comparable LPR / EPOP only takes stock of the 15-64 of age, these figures leave out the 10-14-year-old children, which according to the 2001 Census had LPR's in the 8% range: girls 8.5%, boys 8.8%. They also leave out the 70-79-of age, in which cohort according to the Census in 2001 men still had a high LPR (49.3%) while that of women was 13.3%, as well as the 80 of age and over, among which still 34.6% of the men were employed, against 8.6% of the women stricken of years. The Census 2001 as presented in ILO Laborsta only contains LPR's for the 10-years' cohort of 60-69 of age: not directly comparable with the ILO EAPEP 5-years' cohorts. Following the Census, the LPR's for the 60-69 of age were: men 69.7%, women 26.3%, total 47.5%. Unfortunately, most Indian reports use the total population in the denominator in computing the overall LPR, instead of the 15-64 of age. As to compare with our figures, overall, male and female total LPR's from these reports have to be multiplied by 1.64.

of respectively 85.2% (men), 35.2% (women) and 61.1% (total) – thus, a very slightly higher total rate than in 2008, slightly lower for women and somewhat higher for men.⁶

Table 2 presents the LPR's by gender and 5-years' age group for 2000 and 2008, again following the ILO EAPPEP estimates.

Table 2. Labour participation rates by gender and by age group, India, 2000 and 2008

	2000			2008		
	all	women	men	all	women	men
15-19	35.9	23.1	47.6	33.4	20.6	45.0
20-24	58.3	30.9	83.6	57.8	29.3	82.3
25-29	67.3	36.4	95.7	68.0	37.7	95.9
30-34	71.0	41.6	97.8	71.1	42.9	97.1
35-39	72.2	44.4	97.6	73.8	47.9	97.7
40-44	72.4	45.1	97.4	72.3	46.3	96.5
45-49	71.2	43.2	96.8	71.9	45.8	96.3
50-54	67.5	39.9	93.8	67.4	39.6	93.4
55-59	61.6	34.8	87.9	60.5	35.4	84.8
60-64	42.2	10.6	74.7	39.9	7.8	72.7
Total 15-64	61.1	35.2	85.2	61.0	35.7	84.6
total 15-64 econom. active (x million)	387,1	107,1	279,9	457,6	129,0	328,6
total 15-64 working age (x million)	633,0	304,4	328,6	750,1	361,5	388,6

Source: ILO Laborsta (EAPPEP simulations, Table E5)

The table reveals that in no cohort the female LPRs were over half of the male rates, and repeatedly much lower, especially among the 20-24 and the 60-64 of age. As for trends, the table shows that between 2000-2008 the LPRs for the 15-19-year-olds have fallen for both genders by respectively 2.5% points for females and 2.6% points for males, most likely mainly because of higher school attendance. This fits in the longer-term trend to be derived from the National Sample Surveys, indicating a substantial fall of the LPR for the male 15-19 of age from 63.8% in 1983 to 48.1% in 2004-05, and, similarly, for the female 15-19-aged from 38.3% in 1983 to 27.3% in 2004-05. Between 2000-2008, the LPRs of the 20-24-aged cohort also fell for both genders, be it less. Again, this is quite in line with the National Sample Survey (NSS) outcomes, indicating a fall of the LPR for the males from 90.0% in 1983 to 84.8% in 2004-05 and a similar fall for the female 20-24-aged, from 42.5% in 1983 to 37.7% in 2004-05. According to our table, between 2000-2008

⁶ Another source, the UN MDG Indicators website, for 2000-2007 presents lower LPR's for both genders, with both also showing from 2003 on a decreasing trend. According to this source, the female LPR increased from 32.9% in 2000 to 33.3% in 2002 before falling to 32.3% in 2007, whereas the male LPR increased from 79.0% in 2000 to 80.3% in 2002 before falling to 77.2% in 2007. As a result, the total LPR grew from 56.8% in 2000 to 57.6% in 2002 before it fell to 55.4% in 2007. It should be noted that for 2004-05 these outcomes were even below the lowest National Sample Survey outcomes (cf. NCEUS 2009a, 37).

the LPRs for both genders aged 25-29 slightly went up; by contrast, the age-specific LPRs derived from the NSSs indicate between 1983 and 2004-05 a stable rate for males aged 25-29 at 97% level, and a slight decrease for females of the same age, from 47.7% in 1983 to 44.8% in 2004-05 (all data from NSSs in NCEUS 2009a, 48⁷). It is relevant to note that the 2004-05 figures indicate LPRs to be highest for urban males, with rural males slightly (1.6%point) behind. The LPR of urban females is by far lowest. Strikingly, the LPR of rural females nearly doubled the participation rate of urban females (NCEUS 2009a, 45). Consequently, the 2008 LPR for urban females has to be estimated at about 25%, against 46% for rural females.

Partly based on the NSS time series, the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) projected for 2007 the female labour force aged 15-29 to be 42.4 million, including for 2007-2012 a yearly net growth of about 700,000 girls and young women – which set for 2008 the size of the female labour force aged 15-29 at slightly over 43 million (NCEUS 2009b, 117). If we follow the ILO estimates, then by 2008 the economically active females aged 15-29 would have amounted to about 44 million, on a total female population in this age group of 157 million – implying a LPR of 28%. On behalf of estimating the size of the target group of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project, we depart from the average of both estimates, thus 43.5 million, as the number of girls and young women aged 15-29 in employment in 2008. Based on the rural / urban LPRs mentioned above and on the NCEUS projection for 2007, we assume that about 9 million of them in 2008 were employed in urban areas.

2.3.2. Formal and informal employment

Table 3 (next page) presents an overview of the development of employment in India between 1999-2000 and 2008 by type (employment status). Here, the statistical problems abound and our figures cannot be more than rough indications. Crucially important is the notion of formal and informal labour markets. The informal sector, in India mostly called the unorganised sector, is very large,⁸ but the statistical problems to grasp its development and to draw the line between “organised” and “unorganised” are immense (cf. Bhalla 2008). We already found that five different measures are in use to calculate the labour force. Nevertheless, according to every yardstick in the 2000s roughly 92-94% of all employed in India are informal / unorganised workers. Additionally, the matter is complicated as the informal / unorganised sector –following the most reliable method-- includes a relatively small number of formal / organised workers (1.4 million in

7 Comparison between the ILO 2008 age-specific rates and those of the 2004-05 NSS learns that the male LPRs of the latter were 1-3%points and the female rates 6-8%points higher per cohort.

8 As regards India, the informal economy is not similar to the shadow or hidden economy, measured through the relative size of unregistered or unrecorded economic activities. Across Asian countries, with 20% of the “official” GDP in 1994-95 the size of India’s shadow economy was in the middle field (Chaudhuri et al 2006).

2004-05), while the formal / organised sector includes a number of informal / unorganised workers. The latter amount is much larger, in 2004-05 it was set at 28.9 million of all 62.6 million workers in the formal sector (46%). Thus, in 2004-05 the formal / organised sector employed 62.6 million or 14.6% of all employed in India, but the amount of formal / organised workers was 35.0 million, or 7.7% of all employed (of which 33.7 million or 7.4% working in the formal sector -- NCEUS 2009a, 13). By using various methods, the number of formal workers in the formal sector in 2004-05 varied between 30 and 36 million, most likely increased in 2008 to 33-40 million. Of this group, 26.5 million (66-80%) have been included as “employees” in the ILO statistics (ILO-Laborsta). We used this last group for further statistical evidence in this report, as it allows more detailed analysis. Compared with the Indian 2004-05 statistics, the share of public services in ILO Laborsta is slightly higher: 69-70%, against 62-64%. Table 3 indicates that a majority (51%) of all employed in 2008 were self-employed, though their share is falling. Indeed, the category of enterprises in question (OAME⁹) already in the early 2000s performed on average badly, with turnover and earnings per worker declining (Majumder 2006). Contributing family members are also concentrated (though not fully) in this category. Thus, the proportion of all own-account and contributing family workers in total employment came in 2008 at 51%, in our estimate divided in 60% of the female employed and 47% of the male employed (MDG Indicator 1.7).

Table 3. Labour force participation and type of employment, India, 1999/2000-2008*)

		1999-2000	2008	
Labour force participation		61%	61%	
Unemployed in % of labour force		7%	9%	
Employed in % of labour force		92%	91%	
of which	regular paid employment (employees)	14%	12%	
	of which	formal (organised) worker	7%	8%
		informal (unorganised) worker	7%	5%
	casual wage workers	33%	36%	
	own-account workers (self-employed)	53%	51%	

Sources: authors' calculations based on Papola 2006, 2007; NCEUS 2009a, 2009b; Majumder 2006; Rajesh Raj 2009; Sakhtivel and Joddar 2006; ILO Laborsta

*) persons 15 years and over

9 OAME - Own Account Manufacturing Enterprise: a manufacturing enterprise operating with no hired worker employed on a fairly regular basis (Majumder 2006).

Following the MCWS method, it can be estimated that in 2008-09 of all employed in India (449 million according to this method) 223.6 million worked in agriculture (49.8%), 91.5 million in manufacturing industry (20.4%), and 133.9 million in services (29.8%). In 2004-05, the respective shares were 53.1%, 19.5% and 27.4%. Between 2004-05 and 2008-09, the amount of economically active in services grew most rapidly, by 23.9 million, followed by manufacturing with 13.5 million and agriculture with 10.5 million. Most of this growth was in informal labour: formal sector workers took only 0.8% of employment growth in agriculture, 18% of growth in manufacturing, and 12% of employment growth in services. As a result, formal sector workers in 2008-09 had an estimated share in agricultural employment of 2.3%, in manufacturing employment of 28.1%, and in services employment of 24.7% -- resulting in an overall share of formal sector workers of 14.2%, against the 14.6% mentioned earlier for 2004-05 (authors' calculations based on NCEUS 2009a, 18). According to the UN MDG Indicators, the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector has grown slowly but continuously: from 12.7% in 1990, via 16.6% in 2000, to 18.1% in 2005.

As announced, Table 4 (next page) shows the division of that part of the Indian labour force that is in paid employment (employees) in the formal / organised sector, for 2005 --the latest available year-- by industry and gender. The figures cover just over 5 million women and 21.5 million men. It should be noted that, even within the organised sector data on employment cause quite some headaches. For manufacturing, there is the Annual Survey of Industries, in 2004-05 covering nearly 8.5 million workers in manufacturing, of which 5.6 million in the organised sector and 2.9 million in unorganised labour. Outside manufacturing there is "a database chaos" (Bhalla 2008, 12) and no regular registration like a Business Register. As a result, the boundaries between organised and unorganised labour outside manufacturing also remain unclear. Estimates concerning amounts of enterprises and workers in especially the rural areas vary largely (Bhalla 2008).

The table reveals that the public sector is by far the largest employer in the organised sector, with 70% of all women and 58% of men employed, of which majorities in regional government. Second largest employer for both sexes is manufacturing, with nearly 19% of all females employed and 22% of all males. The third spot is for transport, storage and communication, though this applies for men, with over 12% of their organised employment against less than 4% for females. For females, with 7.5% finance, real estate and business services is the third largest employer. In the end the share of commercial services in organised sector employment is extremely limited: at least 7% among females and 10% among males, plus an unknown but

limited part of community, social and personal services. If public sector services are included, the service sector share increases to 68% for females (nearly 3.4 million employed) and 60% for men (12.9 million). More detailed breakdowns of female labour market shares will follow in section 2.6.3.

Table 4. Employment by industry and gender, employees (organised sector), India, 2005

		all		women		men		
		mln.	%	mln.	%	mln.	%	
agriculture, forestry, fishing		1,48	5.6	0,48	9.6	1,00	4.7	
mining		1,09	4.1	0,08	1.5	1,01	4.7	
manufacturing		5,62	21.3	0,94	18.7	4,78	22.2	
utilities		0,91	3.4	0,05	1.1	0,86	4.0	
construction		0,96	3.6	0,07	1.3	0,89	4.1	
transport, storage, communication		2,84	10.7	0,19	3.8	2,65	12.3	
wholesale, retail, restaurants, hotels		0,56	2.1	0,05	1.0	0,51	2.4	
finance, real estate, business services		1,93	7.3	0,30	6.0	1,63	7.6	
community, social, personal services		11,07	41.9	2,85	56.9	8,22	38.3	
Total		26,46	100	5,02	100	21,44	100	
of which	private sector	8,45	31.9	2,10	41.8	6,35	29.6	
	public sector	18,01	68.1	2,92	58.2	15,09	70.4	
	of which	central	6,22	23.5	0,61	12.2	5,61	26.2
		regional	9,67	36.6	1,73	34.4	7,93	37.0
		local	2,12	8.0	0,58	11.6	1,54	7.2

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

2.3.3. Unemployment

We now turn to unemployment. Between 2000-2006, the period for which detailed figures are available, official unemployment fluctuated between 39.3 million and 42.0 million; the 2006 average was 41,47 million unemployed of 14 years and older, making up approximately 9.5% of the economically active population, and that of 2008 39,11 million unemployed, or about 8.3% of the economically active population: 26,78 million men (about 7.9%) and 12,33 million women (about 9.4%). Whereas Table 5 (next page) shows nearly equal unemployment rates for females and males, also by age, the decrease in 2006-2008 was only advantageous for men: the amount of male unemployed decreased by 2,90 million while the number of female unemployed rose by nearly 550,000 (all data: ILO Laborsta).

Important for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project is, as the table reveals, that the categories by far most affected by unemployment were the young women and men aged 14-19 and 20-29. In 2006 the official unemployment rates for the girls aged 15-19 and the young women aged 20-29 were respectively 21 and 17%. In 2006 there were on average 8,21 million female unemployed 14 (!) to 29-year-olds, bringing their joint unemployment

rate at 18.0%. These young unemployed females accounted for 70% of all unemployed women and 20% of all unemployed (authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta).

Table 5. Unemployment rates by gender and by age group, India, 2006

shares	total	male	female
14-19*)	21.9	22.3	21.2
20-29	15.8	15.3	17.0
30-39	8.9	9.0	8.5
40-49	2.3	2.2	2.4
50-59	0.5	0.4	0.6
60+	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total*)	9.5	9.5	9.6

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta

**) estimate, as figures on economically active population use a different age division (10-14, 15-19 of age). The unemployment statistics also combine the 20-24- and 25-29-year-olds.*

2.4. National legislation and labour relations

2.4.1. Legislation

India has ratified only four of eight core ILO Labour Conventions, i.e. no's 29, 100, 105 and 111. India has a wide array of labour laws: by 2007-08 already 43 labour laws in the central sphere. Yet, coverage and compliance is another story. The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) was quite clear in its conclusion that "if we take the effectiveness of coverage of different labour regulations into consideration, the actual coverage of the labour regulations in India is very small: the laws themselves apply only to a small proportion of workforce and they are actually implemented in the case of even smaller segments" (NCEUS 2009a, 170). Somewhat later, it reads: "(...) there is hardly any regulation of conditions of work and no provision for social security of any kind for the workers working in establishments employing less than ten workers. And they constitute an overwhelming majority – 92% of all workers and 84% of all wage earners" (NCEUS 2009a, 180). In 1999-2000, legislation concerning working conditions "technically" (by definition) covered 2.5-3.9% of the total labour force; laws concerning wages and remuneration 5.2-10.5%, with the relatively positive exception of the Minimum Wages Act (38.1%), and laws concerning social security covered 2.2-3.7% of the labour force. The effective coverage is much lower, in particular that of the Minimum Wages Act (9.3%)(NCEUS 2009a, 187).

Over 2008, the ITUC (2009a) found that barriers to the organising of trade unions continued in law and practice, and that the government maintained strong restrictions on the right to strike. The law allows workers to form and join unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements. The 2001 Trade Union Act prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers, and employers can be penalized if they discriminate against employees engaged in union activity. The Trade Union Act and the Minimum Wages Act (see section 2.5.1) are in principle applicable to all workers. However, there is no legal obligation on employers to recognise a union or to engage in collective bargaining.¹⁰ Both the ITUC and the US Dept of State (2009) concluded that in practice workers' rights are only legally protected for the small minority of workers who work in the organised industrial sector. Here, according to the US Dept of State authorities generally prosecuted and punished those persons responsible for intimidation or suppression of legitimate trade union activities. Lack of legislation as such may not be the largest problem; the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms seems crucial. In the absence of such mechanisms, labour legislation in the unorganised sector has quite limited effectiveness. As we will discuss in the next section, under such conditions it is hard to encourage especially women workers to organize in trade unions.

The ITUC (2009a) notes that even formally the freedom of association is limited. Under the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2001, a union has to represent a minimum of 100 workers—which is excessive by international standards—or 10% of the workforce, whichever is less. The act also sets limits on the number of “outsiders” (those not employed at the enterprise) allowed to sit on a union executive committee and requires unions to submit their accounts for auditing. When parties cannot agree on equitable wages, the government may establish boards of union, management, and government representatives to make a determination. Specialized labour courts adjudicate labour disputes; however, in 2007 and 2008 there were long delays and a backlog of unresolved cases (US Dept of State 2008, 2009). The legislation makes a very clear distinction between civil servants and other workers. Public service employees have very limited organising and collective bargaining rights. The Central Civil Service Act (1964) stipulates that no government servant shall resort to, or in any way abet, any form of strike. The Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA) ena-

10 The central government has made some efforts through the Trade Union Act 1948, introducing two bills; the labour relations bill and the trade union bill in 1950; and proposing two industrial relations bills in 1978 and 1988, to bring out the central enactment of trade unions. However, these efforts did not take any concrete shape. Some states (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal) have legislated on the subject of recognition of trade unions for collective bargaining. For the rest of the country the criteria prescribed under the Code of Discipline adopted at the 16th session of the Indian Labour Conference, 1958 at Nainital, have been followed for the purpose of recognition for a number of years. There is some protection for workers in the informal sector. For example, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1971, does provide this category of workers with some minimal rights. However, the way this legislation has been formulated leaves quite some loopholes. The importance of legal rights is borne out by the fact that the Supreme Court has on many occasions upheld the right of informal workers to be made permanent in the face of employers' attempts to use casual or contract workers for permanent jobs (Hensman 2001, 6-7).

bles the government to ban strikes in any enterprise that provides public service, and demands arbitration in certain “essential” industries; according to the ITUC the Act does not define which these essential service are; interpretation therefore varies from state to state. In 2008, state and local authorities occasionally used their power to declare strikes illegal and force adjudication (US Dept of State 2009). In Export Processing Zones (EPZs) the law provides workers the right to join trade unions and bargain collectively. Yet, the Trade Union Act designates the EPZs as “public utilities”, requiring a 45-day strike notice period (ITUC 2009a; US Dept of State 2009).

The Bonded Labour System Abolition Act 1976 has abolished bonded labour, including by children, and those who violate will be punished. However, the US Dept of State concluded that in 2008 bonded labour practices remained widespread. The penalties include imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years and also with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000, but successful prosecutions were rare. Enforcement and compensation for victims were the responsibility of state and local governments; they varied in effectiveness due to inadequate resources and societal acceptance of bonded or forced labour. NGOs estimated that there were 20 to 65 million bonded labourers in the country, including a large number of children. There is no overall minimum age for child labour; however, according to the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act (1986) work by children under 14 is prohibited in 13 hazardous occupations and 57 processes. In occupations and processes in which child labour is permitted, work by children is permissible only for six hours between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m., with one day’s rest weekly. A ruling, effective 2006, prohibits children under the age of 14 from labour in the domestic sector and the hospitality industry, although child labour in some other non-hazardous industries is legally permissible. Estimates of the number of child labourers vary widely. The government’s 2004 national survey estimated the number of working children in the age group of five to 14 at 16.4 million. However, NGOs reported the number of child labourers was closer to 60 million (US Dept of State 2009). We calculated that currently about 55 million children under the age of 14 may not be in school (see section 2.7.2). A large majority of them is working in the informal sector, often in private homes, but also in many industries, not rarely exposed to hazardous working conditions (website CRY).¹¹

11 The NCEUS concluded to a lot of inconsistencies in Indian labour law. A striking example, relevant for our subject: according to child labour laws, a young person can be in the labour market from the age of 14 years on, but the Trade Unions Act denies the right of membership of a trade union to a worker below the age of 18 years and the right of being an office bearer until the age of 21 years (cf. NCEUS 2009a, 175).

India does not have a publicly funded social security scheme, with three exceptions. A small segment of the organised sector is covered by the Payment of Gratuity Act (1972). It applies to every factory, mine, plantation, port, railway, company, shop and establishment employing 10 or more persons. An employee who has completed a continuous service of not less than five years is entitled to a gratuity on termination of his employment. Second, also a small segment is covered by the Employees' Pension Scheme. Under this scheme pension is payable from the age of 58, provided 20 years of service was completed. The scheme provides for a widow's or widower's pension as well (website WageIndicator-Paycheck). The employees' provident funds (EPFs) make up the third exception: statutory forms of compulsory saving schemes that enable old and retiring workers to maintain their living standards in post-retirement years. Coverage differs hugely between the organised and unorganised sectors: in 1999-2000, EPF covered 84% of organised sector workers and only 2% of unorganised sector workers, bringing total coverage at 19%. Yet, EPF coverage among the poorest 20% workers of both sectors was just 5% (Sakhtivel and Joddar 2006).

Of particular relevance for the young female target group of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project is the following (lack of) labour legislation (website WageIndicator-Paycheck/DecentWorkCheck; ILO-Travail database; ILO-Natlex):

- (regular pay) The Payment of Wages Act (1936) regulates payment of employees in industries as a remedy against illegal deductions and/or unjustified delay in payment of wages.
- (maternity leave) Women working in factories, mines, plantations, performance establishments and shops with more than 10 employees are entitled to paid maternity leave according to the Maternity Benefit Act (1961). Female employees employed by the Central Government are entitled to maternity leave for a period of 90 days; mothers suffering from illness related to pregnancy, delivery or premature birth of child are entitled to additional leave for a maximum period of one month.
- (maternity benefit) The maternity benefit consists of payment at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of the actual absence. Workers covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act (1948) can claim a maternity benefit of 70 percent of their salary. During maternity leave government employees are paid equal to the pay drawn immediately before the leave period. The Central Government has a scheme under which all women workers can claim maternity benefit for their first two live born. For the unorganised and self-employed women workers, certain schemes have been introduced at the central, state and local levels. Under the Bidi and Cigar Workers Act (1966) maternity benefits are availa-

ble to home-based workers also. The schemes to benefit women agricultural workers are implemented in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Gujarat.

- (paid holidays) There is no general law stipulating a minimum paid leave for all workers. There is also no general law stipulating a paid leave on national and religious holidays for all workers. One does not have to work on public holidays, unless an agreement says one has to.
- (sickness benefit and sick leave) (Only) workers covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act 1948 can claim a sickness benefit. There is neither minimum income guaranteed nor special employment protection during sick leave.
- (equal pay) The Equal Remuneration Act applies to an extensive range of employment including the informal sector. The same work, or work of a similar nature, must be equally rewarded and under similar conditions of employment. This Act is supported by penal provisions. Appointed inspectors have powers of entry at the workplace and Advisory Committees can be established under the Act.
- (sexual harassment) Two sections of the Penal Code have been used in sexual harassment cases. The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act (1987) deals with the (forbidden) use of pornographic material, and art. 16 of the Constitution entails a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.
- (health and safety at work) Health and safety legislation is rare, except for the Factories Act (see section 2.8.2).

2.4.2. Labour relations and wage-setting

The trade union landscape in India is complex and diversified. Actually 11 confederations or Central Trade Union Organisations (CTUOs) are recognised by the Ministry of Labour and Employment (website). Besides, a huge number of other national union centres and (partly unaffiliated) unions at industry and company level are in existence. Though Indian unions perhaps have the most supportive institutional environment in Asia, overall union density remains rather low. Traditionally, the strong ties between unions and political parties have resulted in labour-friendly policies –that is to say, mainly for the organised sector-- both at central and at state level. The logic of industrial peace was strong: a complex legal framework was preoccupied with preventing and settling industrial disputes. However, the economic liberalisation of the 1990s has brought about a sea change in labour relations. Employers growingly resisted any negotiations with unions. The centralized industry or region-wide collective bargaining mechanisms declined; the dominance of company-level bargaining was established (Bhattacharjee 2001; Najaran 2007). In key industries and

firms union membership declined, not least because of employers' flexible staffing strategies, informalisation, subcontracting and the use of temporary workers (Kuruvilla et al 2002; Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002). Political alliances weakened as well. Virtually all political parties basically supported liberalisation, whereas the union movement opposed it. In the last decade union constituencies obviously mainly perceived communist parties as allies: the mere existence of such parties in a state facilitated unionisation significantly (Pal 2008).

Union density estimates for India are notoriously unreliable (Das 2000, cited in Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002, 397). According to the Ministry of Labour and Employment (website), total union membership increased from 12.3 million in 1989 to 24.6 million in 2002, implying a growth in density rates from 4.1% to 6.4% of the total labour force. For more recent years we had to rely on own counting based on often questionable sources (a.o. Global Union Directory, various confederation websites; news messages); our 2008 estimate in the end is about 31 million, implying a slight density rise to 6.7% of the labour force. If it is assumed that unions --with the exception of the SEWA (see below)-- only organise formal sector workers, union density can be estimated at 46%. Three of the national confederations are affiliated with the ITUC: Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS, with 5,745,000 reported members), the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC, 8.2 million members), and the Self-Employed Women's Association of India (SEWA, 1,123,000 members) (information ITUC). The figures mentioned would imply that the share of these three confederations in total membership of the Indian union movement increased from 32% in 2002 to 49% in 2008.

The stability, or even slight rise, in union density in the 2000s is remarkable in view of various authors' opinion that the Indian trade union movement since the turn of the century has been weakened, for example made visible in the decrease in the number of strikes compared to that of lockouts by employers, the declining frequency of industrial disputes, and in the weakening of enforcement of labour legislation (cf. Dhatta and Mill 2007). We indeed noted that, in the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms, currently in India labour legislation has limited effectiveness. For example, the Factories Act of 1948, the cornerstone of regulation in the industrial sector, is widely violated. Already in 1990, three in five manufacturing enterprises employing 10 or more workers did not fulfill their mandated registration, and the extent of under-registration is likely to have gone up sharply in the 1990s, as the enforcement of many legal provisions was given a go by under the liberal regime. Smaller factories usually do not have the presence of durable trade unions, given poor bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis their employers. Considering the poor record of enforcement, both by administration and the courts, and given the prevailing situation of abundant (sur-

plus) labour supply, notably unorganised sector workers have very little protection against non-compliance of contracts or labour laws. Mostly, an attempt to claim one's rights is an outright invitation for dismissal (Hensman 2001; Najaran 2007).

These constraints come on top of the fact that the majority of India's working women is engaged in jobs without clear employer-employee relationship. And there is more. Their subordinate position in Indian society at large and in workplaces and family life in particular further complicates organizing and activating women in trade unions. Most workplaces are characterized by strict job segregation and male supervision; "normally" union organisations reflect such power structures. Women need to go home after having worked mostly long hours (section 2.8.2) and tend to domestic chores, usually without any support from male family members (cf. Venkata Ratnam and Jain 2002). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the female share in membership and decision-making in the regular trade unions remains low. In the late 1990s, according to a survey of the ICFTU –predecessor of ITUC--, in 36 of 50 national union centres that responded the percentage of female members was less than 50%, as well as in 78 of 144 single unions (54%). Similarly, in 49 of 53 union centres (92%) and in 119 of 154 single unions (77%) women made up less than half in the highest decision-making body (cited in Venkata Ratnam and Jain 2002). In the early 2000s, two leading authors estimated the female membership share in most unions to vary between 5 and 20%. Women are mostly represented in separate women's wings. The authors at stake argued that traditionally the incidence of union membership and union leadership among women was higher in certain industries and occupations where they had a clear majority in the labour force. In garment workers' unions, for example, the female share could be up to 70%. In unions organizing plantations, hospitals, hotels, telecom and public service, women have occupied positions as joint secretary / secretary, and in teaching and nursing they were reported to hold even higher positions. However, women's participation in collective bargaining delegations turned out to be extremely low (Venkata Ratnam and Jain 2002).

In contrast, India has long taken the lead in the self-organisation of in particular women in the informal sector. We briefly treat here two of many examples of workers' responses to the specific labour market dynamics in India. Worldwide the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA), a combination of trade union and workers' co-operatives, is reckoned as an outstanding example of empowering self-employed women, that is to say home-based women workers and poor urban self-employed. The SEWA, founded by civil rights leader Ela Bhatt, grew out of the Textile Labour Association (TLA), India's oldest and largest textile workers' union. SEWA was registered as a trade union in 1972. Since then SEWA grew continuously,

even quicker after (in 1981) being expelled from the TLA. The growth of many new co-operatives, a more militant union and many supportive services (Bank, Academy, Research, Housing, ICT, newsletters and magazines, et cetera) has given SEWA a new shape and direction (website SEWA; wikipedia SEWA). In 1995 several organisations mobilizing men and women workers in casual, construction and contract jobs have established the National Centre for Labour (NCL). The mainstay of this social coalition is lobbying and pressurizing the state to secure labour rights and to comply with existing legislation. In recent years, under pressure of the successes of SEWA, NCL and other new forms of workers' organisation, most national union federations have begun co-operating with independent unions, NGOs, and other social movements in efforts to form social coalitions and leverage pro-poor public policies. The passing into law of, as examples, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA, see next section) and the Unorganised Workers' Social Security Bill 2008 has been regarded as important successes of this "new unionism" (Mohanty 2009).

2.5. Minimum wage and poverty

2.5.1. The statutory minimum wage

The Minimum Wages Act 1948 is considered to be one of the most important pieces of labour legislation in India. The Act provides for fixation and enforcement of minimum wages in respect of schedule employments to prevent sweating or exploitation of labour through payment of low wages. The system is complex: the Act requires "appropriate government" to fix minimum rates of wages in respect of employment specified in the schedule, and review and revise the minimum rates of wages at intervals not exceeding five years. Currently the number of scheduled employments (occupations and activities) in the central government is 45, and where state governments do the same at their level, this results in 1,232 occupational and sectoral minimum wage rates across the country.¹² The variation in these minimum rates is quite large. In September 2007, the National Floor Level Minimum Wage (NMW) was set at Rs. 80 (USD 1.72). In December 2009 this was, backdated 1 November 2009, increased to Rs. 100 (USD 2.15) per day. According to the Minimum Wages Act, the norms for fixing the NMW are the following: three consumption units per earner; minimum food requirement of 2,700 calories per average Indian adult; rent corresponding to the minimum area provided under the Government's Industrial Housing Scheme and fuel, lighting and other miscel-

12 The central government excludes domestic work from the NMW. Nonetheless, regional governments are allowed, with previous notification, to set minimum wages for additional (not listed) occupations; the states of Karnataka, Kerala, Andra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Rajasthan have done so for domestic work (ILO 2008, 53).

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laneous items of expenditure to constitute 20 % of the total NMW. Further, children education, medical requirement, minimum recreation including festivals/ceremonies and provision for old age, marriage etc. should constitute 25% of the total NMW (website WageIndicator/Paycheck – pages officialminimumwages and FAQs; ILO Travail database).

In practice, only average wages in the manufacturing part of the organised sector are above the NMW level (see section 2.8.1). Large shares of unorganised sector workers and even considerable shares of organised sector workers outside manufacturing receive incomes below the NMW. The NCEUS recently summarized the available evidence as follows: “Most studies that have examined the application of minimum wage legislation to workers in the unorganized sector show that the Act has not been used to protect the interests of the poor and the unorganized sector workers. Other limitations of the Act included infrequent revisions and inadequate cost of living adjustment leading to a fall in the real minimum wage over time” (NCEUS 2009a, 141). We already referred to the findings of the National Commission that in 1999-2000 the “technical” coverage of the Minimum Wages Act was 38.1% of the labour force, but the effective coverage only a fraction. The Commission computed for 2004-05 that 80% of the casual workers and 31% of the regular salaried/wage workers did not receive the NMW (by then Rs. 66 per day). Among the casual workers in rural areas, over 84% did not receive the NMW as against 57% in this category working in urban areas. The proportion of female casual workers receiving less than the required minimum was even 95%, as against 74% in the case of males. For regular salaried/wage employed, the shares below the NMW were 42% for rural areas and 25% for urban areas respectively, as well as 26% for males and 54% for females. The difference in the proportion of workers below the NMW in rural and urban areas was more marked for the non-agricultural workers, with urban workers being considerably worse-off. As for industries, the proportion of men below the NMW was highest in trade, where as among women in both rural and urban areas it was highest in manufacturing. Among casual workers, with 92% the largest share with wages below the NMW was found for rural workers in the tobacco industry – mainly women (NCEUS 2007, 44-47; 2009a, 39, 141). Taking into account the rise of consumer prices between 2004-05 and 2009 (cf. ILO Laborsta), it is unlikely that this picture since then will have essentially changed.

In an effort to alleviate rural poverty and mitigate migration to the cities, the government in 2005 initiated the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), an innovative combination of a minimum wage provision with a public employment annex rural development scheme. A similar system was already for many years in existence in the state of Maharashtra. The NREGA legally guarantees 100 days of un-

skilled manual work at statutory minimum wages to each rural household in a year. The Act was mainly targeted to benefit landless labourers, Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and women. Under the NREG scheme (NREGS), many projects have been undertaken to build sustainable and productive assets at village level. These include water conservation, irrigation to land owned by SC or ST members, rural connectivity, and land development. Formally a number of provisions can improve access for women; for example, conditions should be in place to allow women to undertake jobs in construction by providing water, child care facilities, and shade for children, as well as mandating that jobs should be within a certain distance from the women's dwellings. The initial results of NREGS were promising. Already during its first phase, in 2006-07, when the scheme was implemented in 200 districts (it has been extended to all 605 districts during 2007-08), it was reported to have provided employment to 18.7 million households at an average of 40 days per household. In May 2009, the scheme was reaching 49.4million households throughout the country. The participation rate of women workers in the scheme grew from 41% in 2006-07 to 47% in 2008-09. In the Southern states, notably in Kerala (86%) and Tamil Nadu (80%), in 2008-09 women's involvement in the scheme proves to be much higher than their overall labour participation. Exceptions to this rule are to be found in the North, though in the state of Rajasthan the female share in NREGS has reached 68%. An evaluation study in six Northern states learned that in agriculture the NREGA wage has raised the bar for the determination of wages. Women in particular were seen to favour NREGA because of social dignity involved in government sponsored employment. The study revealed that a majority of women collected their NREGA wages themselves and retained with them. Further, NREGA employment served as a primary wage earning opportunity for a large section of women (Papola 2007, 2008; Goparaju and Shome 2009; Antonopoulos 2009; NCEUS 2009a, 214-222; website Government of India / NREGA). In contrast, recently concerns have been raised that in some states the scheme is exacerbating gendered labour market discrimination (especially the gender pay gap) owing to high productivity norms and piece-rate payments based on outturn by men. Moreover, due to a lack of administrative commitment of lower authorities to invest in decent child care facilities, such facilities seem absent in the majority of NREGS worksites (Jones and Holmes 2009).

2.5.2. Inequality and poverty

In international perspective, India's income distribution is rather equal, though disquieting developments are going on. The Gini coefficient, a measure that rates 0 as perfect equality and 100 as perfect inequality, fluctuates over time between 0.30 and 0.36, with signs of rising inequality during the 1990s and early 2000s – both in urban and in rural areas (Datt and Ravallion 2009). From 0.35 (or, more precisely, 0.351) in 1981, the 'Gini' or income inequality fell to 0.31 (0.308) in 1993, as to rise to 0.33 (0.334) in 2004-05. As could be expected, urban inequality is larger: by 2004-05, the urban Gini coefficient stood at 0.38 (0.378) (Ravallion 2009; Belser and Amara 2009; World Bank 2008). In 2005, the share of the poorest 20% in the country's total household income was 8.1%, in international perspective a high figure and also pointing at a relatively egalitarian income distribution (MDG Indicator 1.3, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based on National Sample Survey (NSS) Round 61). Yet, the conclusion is defensible that between 1993-94 and 2004-05 inequalities in the distribution of income and consumption have grown considerably. The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) showed that in this period the share in the population of what they call the "poor and vulnerable" (below twice the poverty line) fell from 82 to 77%, but that their numbers increased from 733 million to 836 million. This 77% lived on an average consumption level of less than Rs. 20 per day. Moreover, the average increase of consumption of the poor and vulnerable group since 1993-94 had been less than 1% per year, against 4.3% respectively 6.8% yearly increases for the middle and high income groups. The poor segments consist predominantly of informal workers, among whom socially deprived groups and women are over-represented (NCEUS 2009a, 18-20).

As yet the Indian development and income distribution pattern is essentially that of "shared poverty". In general, economies with more equal income distributions can be expected to have lower shares of poor people, but this is not the case for India.¹³ In spite of its rather equal distribution and recent economic growth, poverty remains very widespread. The largely urban-based, heavily protected industrialisation process in the first forty years after Independence has not brought about lasting longer-terms gains for both the urban and rural poor. Obviously human resource development is a major precondition for pro-poor growth that has insufficiently been met in India. Compared to for example China, India's educational inequalities, and especially gender inequalities in school enrollment and literacy (see our sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2), have played a major role in hampering pro-poor development. Subsidies on food and fertilizers have been costly and inefficient, and the bulk of subsidies has failed to reach the poor (Panagariya 2001). Survey data for 2004-

13 Synchronous decreases over time of inequality and poverty are not self-evident, as the statistical relation between the two conceptions can be rather complex. The development of the Gini coefficient does not necessarily reflect how shifts in the income distribution impact on poverty.

05 indicate that the poorest 20% are the least likely to have access to subsidized goods and the wealthiest 20% the most likely (Ravallion and Datt 1999; Datt and Ravallion 2002; Ravallion 2009; Datt and Ravallion 2009). Import liberalization does not seem to have contributed to a decline of income inequality, and seems to have mainly had advantages for the wealthiest 10% or 20% of households too (Topalova 2005; Acharya 2006). Moreover, periods of high inflation have hurt India's poor (Ravallion and Datt 2002). Finally, the inter-state distribution of income per capita, governmental capital expenditure and FDI is extremely skewed (see section 2.5.2). The main positive conclusion may well be that since 1991 the non-farm sectors that use unskilled labour more intensively—notably trade, construction and the “unorganised” manufacturing sectors—have seen higher employment growth (Datt and Ravallion 2009). However, even that employment growth has its shadow side, as it has been accompanied by falling real wages of large groups of unorganised workers, notably between 1999 and 2004-05 in urban areas and for women (Kundu and Sarangi 2009).

For 2005, it was estimated that 75.6% of the Indian population—or 816 million people-- lived below the common UN income poverty yardstick of USD 2 a day (in PPP terms). Also for 2005 it was estimated that 41.6%—or 450 million people-- had to make ends meet with an income below USD 1.25 a day. This represents a significant decline in poverty from 60% in 1981 to below 42%.¹⁴ However, the “poverty gap” is still considerable. This gap is measured as the distance from USD 1.25 of the average income of persons living on less than USD 1.25 a day multiplied by the percentage of the population below the USD 1.25-a-day poverty line. The smaller the poverty gap, the easier it will be for countries to bring people above the USD 1.25-a-day threshold, but India has a relatively large poverty gap of 10.5% (ADB 2009a; UNDP 2008).

In 2004-05, the Planning Commission, using its own criteria, estimated that 27.5% of the population was living below the national poverty line: 28.3% in rural areas and 25.7% in urban areas.¹⁵ On the one hand this meant considerable progress, as the (fully comparable) overall rate came down from 51.3% in 1977–1978, and 36% in 1993-1994 (wikipedia Poverty in India). On the other hand, the available figures also clarify that the growth of the Indian economy over the last two decades has been uneven when comparing different social and economic groups, geographic regions, and notably rural and urban areas. The 1980s saw no rise in regional disparities, but from the late 1990s till recently the inter-state inequality in per capita income was steady on the increase. In 2004-05 over 35% of India's population lived below the poverty line in each of the seven states with the lowest incomes: Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,

14 Although the Rupee has decreased in value since then, while the official standard of Rs. 538/356 rupees per month has remained the same (wikipedia Poverty in India).

15 The source for this was the 61st round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) and the criterion used was monthly per capita consumption expenditure below Rs. 356.35 for rural areas and Rs. 538.60 for urban areas (wikipedia Poverty in India).

Chattisgarh, and Uttar Pradesh, with poverty rates in rural Orissa (43%) and rural Bihar (41%) remaining extremely high. These states recorded very low growth rates during the 1980s, which fell further in the 1990s (World Bank 2006; Kundu and Mohanan 2009; Kundu and Sarangi 2009).

The dynamics of moving in and out of poverty should not be overlooked. 15-country research, in India covering four states between 1995 and 2005, has shown that in this period 7 to 19% of the originally poor—depending on the state—succeeded to move out of poverty, while 3 – 8% fell (back) into poverty, resulting in net gains between 1.5% and 11% (World Bank India website, Moving Out of Poverty). State and regional development anti-poverty programmes can bring about such effects, but notably the relatively backward states encounter major problems in this respect. First, they experience the awkward combination of rapid demographic growth and low rates of economic growth, and second, they show an inability to initiate effective and strong anti-poverty programmes – partly because of organisational reasons, partly because of financial constraints. The devolution of resources to state governments via the central government has been inadequate in alleviating the budgetary deficits of the states with the lowest per capita incomes. Instead of increasing revenues through tax reforms, following the liberalization credo the central government massively reduced its capital expenditure: this capital expenditure declined steadily from 7% of GDP in 1986-87 to as low as 1.6% in 2006-07. Public investments in crucial areas such as agriculture, rural development, and infrastructure were scaled down. Fourth, the extremely skewed distribution of both domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) across states has also contributed to increased spatial disparities throughout India. Between 1991 and 2002, the top-10 states attracted more than 63% of total FDI in India, a share that increased to 81% between 2002 and 2007. In 2002-2007, the state of Maharashtra alone attracted nearly 25% of FDI inflows, whereas in both periods the bottom-10 states jointly attracted less than 1% respectively 1.2%. Finally, the most damaging impact was due to financial liberalisation and policies easing 'priority sector' lending norms for nationalized banks. Until the 1980s, these banks had obligations to fulfill priority sector lending targets, but the priority sector definition was widened to include more activities. As a consequence, most banks started avoiding small farmers and small-scale industries as they were perceived to be less credit-worthy customers. Particularly in backward regions this has contributed substantially to the persistence of inequality and poverty (Kundu and Sarangi 2009, 122-124).

In 2007 the share under the national poverty line is preliminary reported to have fallen to 19.3%, divided over 21.1% for rural areas and 15.1% for urban areas (website EconomyWatch). In spite of expectations of the contrary of quite some observers, the urban – rural gap seems to have widened again. Physical indicators

also point at both widespread poverty and persistent inequalities between urban and rural areas. Reconstruction programmes seem to have affected city dwellers mostly. Whereas in 1996 three of five in the urban population (60.8%) lived in slums, according to the official figures this proportion was pushed back to 55.5% in 2001 –when it concerned 158 million urban inhabitants—and even to just over one in three (34.8%) in 2005 – when 110 million urban inhabitants lived in slums (ADB 2009a; UN MDG Indicators). In 2006 only 28% of the Indian population had access to improved sanitation facilities, in spite of rapid progress (14% in 1990, 23% in 2000) still a low share in international perspective. In rural areas, the incidence of such access was only 18%, against 52% in urban areas (WHO 2009). By contrast, as regards access to a safe (in UN terms improved) water source, India has succeeded in largely eliminating the urban – rural gap: whereas in 1990 this gap was 25%points (65% access in rural areas, 90% in urban areas), in 2006 this was 10%: behind the 89% average lies 86% access in rural areas and 96% access in urban areas (WHO 2009).

On the human development index (HDI) India ranked in 2006 no. 132 on a total of 179 countries, with a score of 0.609, in the lower ranks of the countries with medium human development. The period 2000-2006 showed an increase in India's score of 0.048%-points on the HDI, and the longer term (1980-2006) the large improvement of 0.181%-points. Its relative position has increased too over time (compare to number 114 of 130 countries in 1990). The country's GDP per capita index was six places higher than its HDI index. India's relative position in the Gender-adjusted Development Index (GDI) was, with a no. 116 ranking among 157 countries, in 2006 about the same. Its GDI value was 97.1% of its HDI value (UNDP 2008). As said, the estimated earned income for men was in 2006 (PPP adjusted) USD 3,698, and for women USD 1,185, suggesting a women to men parity rate of 0.32.

For 2008 the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranked India no. 113 of 130 countries. For three of the four yardsticks used, quite low scores were attached to India: for the position of women in economic participation and opportunity, the country ranked 125th , for educational attainment 116th , for health and survival—with other countries—128th, while for political empowerment India could claim the 25th spot. The editors noted that while much work needs to be done across the board, in particular to close gender gaps in education, India is distinctive for performing above average in political empowerment (Hausmann et al 2008, 21). Finally, it is worth mentioning that the SIGI Gender Equality and Social Institutions (SIGI) Index ranked India 96th of 102 countries in 2008 (OECD-SIGI website; see also section 2.1.2).

2.6. Demographics and female labour force

2.6.1. Population and fertility

Here we underpin the earlier estimates of the working age population, the economically active and the unemployed by estimates of India's immense population. Again, these estimates vary, which largely reaches back on gaps in civil registration of births and deaths. For 2000-2007, the World Health Organization (WHO 2009) estimated India's civil registration coverage concerning births at 41% (though national sources argue that by the end of 2008 this figure has been lifted to about 55%¹⁶) and concerning deaths at less than 25%. For 2007, the WHO estimated India's population at 1,169 million, of which nearly 32% under age 15 and 8% over age 60. The median age was estimated at 24 years. The CIA World Factbook¹⁷ estimates are somewhat lower: its July 2009 population estimate of 1,166 million nearly equals that of WHO for 2007. The CIA Factbook 2009 estimates end up with somewhat lower share of India's population under age 15 (31.1%) and a higher median age (25.3 years, of which 24.9 years for males and 25.8 for females). Of course, the absolute figures remain huge. Following the CIA World Factbook by 2009 it regarded 190 million males and 172.8 million females of 0-14 years, and –as noted-- a working age population of 381.5 million males and 359.8 million females, totaling 741.3 million. Also by 2009 an estimated 5.3% of the population was 65 years and over: 29.3 million males and 32.6 million females. Again according to this source, in the current population at large the female share is 48.5%, or a sex ratio of 1.06 male/females: 565.2 million women, against 600.9 million men.

For India's future, the outcomes of population growth are of crucial importance, as are its projections. The experts agree as for the longer-term trends. Over 1997-2007, population grew with an estimated average of 1.6% yearly and over 2001-2009 with 1.4% yearly, a considerable slow-down compared to the periods 1987-1997 or 1981-1993, both witnessing an average 2.1% increase per year (WHO 2009; Ravallion 2009; own calculation based on Census 2001 and these sources). A further slow-down is expected, but to a more limited extent than a few years ago. The CIA World Factbook sets the 2009 growth rate at 1.55%, whereas the UN expects population growth for 2005-2010 to result in 1.5% per year (UN Data).

16 The standard definition includes the percentage of children less than five years of age who were registered at the moment of the survey. The numerator of this indicator includes children whose birth certificate was seen by the interviewer or whose mother or carer says the birth has been registered. According to the National Commission on Population, by the end of 2008 55% of national births were administered (US Dept of State 2009).

17 Or, as a matter of fact, the US Census Bureau.

Another source of population estimates is the ILO EAPPEP database. According to these simulations, by 2008 India counted 1,181 million inhabitants, an increase of 1.5% compared to the 1,165 millions of 2007. In this model, in 2008 31.7% was 0-14 of age: 32.0% of the male population and 31.4% of the female part. The relatively low share of 4.5% was 65 of age or older: 4.3% of all males and 4.8% of all females. According to EAPPEP from 2000-2008 the total population has grown by nearly 139 million or 13.3%, of which the male population by 13.0% and the female population by 13.7% (ILO Laborsta). One may wonder if the continuous preference for sons –see below-- is well covered in these figures.

India is only to a limited extent urbanised, with in 2007 officially 29.2% of the population living in urban areas (UN Data). Unlike in most other developing countries, including China, Indonesia and Brazil, the urbanisation rate has progressed rather slowly, from 26% in 1990 and 28% in 2000. Nevertheless, a number of Indian urban agglomerations are huge, the largest being Mumbai, with in 2007 nearly 19 million inhabitants, followed by Kolkata (Calcutta), New Delhi, Chennai (Madras), Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Ahmadabad. In a regional division, the West and South show the largest urban population concentrations; by 2005-06, 50% of the population in the Western states (Goa, Gujarat and Maharashtra) lived in urban areas, followed by the South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) with 40%; by contrast, Central (Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) with 26% living in urban areas and East (Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal) with 25% showed the most rural picture (Moore et al 2009). The UN predicts for 2005-2010 a population growth rate in the country's urban areas of 2.4% yearly, though there would also be growth in rural areas, at a predicted rate of 1.1% yearly (UN Data; WHO 2009).

The birth rate estimated for 2009 is 21.8 births per 1,000 of the population, the death rate 6.2 deaths per 1,000. The total fertility rate (TFR, the number of births a woman would have if she survived to age 50) for 2007 is estimated at 2.8 (UN Data) or 2.9 (Hausmann et al 2009). Though still high in international perspective, the TFR has shown a considerable decrease, dropping from 4.0 in 1990 via 3.3 in 2000 to the current level, estimated at 2.7 – 2.8. For 2009, the CIA World Factbook estimates the Indian TFR at 2.72, whereas for 2005-2010 the UN expects stabilisation at the 2.8 level (WHO 2009; UN Data). The regional differences are large. In 2005-06 the TFRs among women aged 15-49 varied between 1.88 in the South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) and 3.53 in Central India (Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh)(Moore et al 2009).

The preference for sons in India is well known. The country's sex ratio at birth is extremely skewed, and currently estimated at 1.12 male/female (CIA World Factbook; US Dept of State 2009). Already in 1992 Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argued that at the time there were 41 million "missing women" in India: girls and women who died prematurely due to, as he called it, mistreatment (Sen 1992, 2003). In the past two decades the male population bias even seems to have intensified, as sex selective abortion (female feticide) helped by prenatal sex determination techniques such as ultrasound technology has become more widely used to avoid female births. The trend towards masculinity has increased in urban areas, which have higher literacy rates and better coverage of vital registration and health services, suggesting this is due to female feticide. Here, son preference may even persist among educated women (Sudha and Rajan 1998; Das Gupta et al 2003; Jha et al 2006). With the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act of 1994, the government placed strict limits on the use of technology to determine the sex of the fetus, but sex-selective abortion practice obviously only has grown; indeed, governmental health officials confirm that the practice is prominent among educated and urban sections of society. Over 2008, female feticide was reported to be an acute problem in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. The states of Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, parts of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Karnataka reported particularly low female/male ratios (Moore et al 2009; US Dept of State 2009). It has been estimated that currently each year nearly half a million female fetuses are snuffed out (WHO, WageIndicator website).¹⁸ Older practices regulating the numbers of female children in a family, including female infanticide at birth, under-reporting of female births, abandonment or out-adoption of girls, and selective neglect of girl children leading to higher death rates among them, are still common in many parts of the country, predominantly in rural areas. For example, when children are ill, Indian fathers are more likely to pay for treatment for sons than for daughters (Sudha and Rajan 1998; US Dept of State 2008; OECD-SIGI website).

Life expectancy at birth has increased substantially, from 57 years in 1990, via 61 years in 2000 to 64.1 years in 2006, the latter figure divided in 65.7 years for females and 62.7 years for males (WHO 2009; UNDP 2008). For 2009, the CIA World Factbook estimates are considerable higher, with 72.6 years for females and 67.5 years for males, whereas for 2005-2010 the UN (UN Data) expects life expectancy for women to be 66.4 years and for men 63.2 years. For 2000-2005, the probability of not surviving to age 40 was estimated 16.8% of the relevant age cohort (UNDP 2008).

18 Efforts to combat feticide include a program by the Health and Family Welfare Ministry to target and apprehend those who carry out female feticide. In 2008, the central government also launched a "Save the Girl Child" campaign. The New Delhi municipal government sponsored a program that provided every girl born in a government hospital with a gift deposit of Rs. 5,000 (USD 114) that accumulated interest until cashed at the child's age of 18 (US Dept of State).

By contrast, child mortality is still considerable in India. In 2004 neonatal mortality (deaths during the first 28 days of life per 1000 live births) stood at 39 per 1,000 live births, in international comparison a rather high rate (WHO 2009). The infant mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1,000 live births) stood at 54 in 2007, yet considerable progress as the rate for 1990 was 84 and that for 2000 67. For 2005-2010 the UN expects stabilisation of the infant mortality rate at a level of 55 per 1,000. The Indian average for the under 5 mortality rate (probability of dying between by age 5 per 1,000 live births) was 72 by 2007, still one of the highest rates in Asia but coming down from 117 in 1990 and 91 in 2000 (ADB 2009a; WHO 2009; UN Data).

For an indication of the situation of our target group, the adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women 15-19 of age) is of special importance. For 2005-06 the Indian rate was set at 90, in international perspective a high figure.¹⁹ The overall rate came down from 116 in 1992-93. In 2005-06 over two in five Indian women aged 40 had by age 20 (49%) given birth – though twenty years earlier, in women that in 1992-93 aged 40, this proportion was even 58% (Singh 1998, 121-3). The adolescent fertility rate remained much lower in urban areas: the decrease between 1993 and 2006 was slightly larger in urban areas (24%) than in rural areas (20%). Yet, at the level of states neither the urbanisation levels nor the poverty rates were decisive per se, and regional habits and attitudes seem more important. In 2005-06 the adolescent fertility rate was lowest in Himachal Pradesh (27, with in 2005 only 9% of adolescent girls living in urban areas); Jammu and Kashmir (32, with 24% urban), and Kerala (35, with 25% urban), and highest in Bihar (128, with 17% urban); Jharkand (123, urbanisation rate unavailable); West Bengal (122, 29% urban), and Andhra Pradesh (99, 32% urban). Indeed, of the four poorest states Bihar figured on this list, while the rates in the three other poor states were high but not extreme: Rajasthan with 98, and Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh with both 96. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that these seven states with adolescent fertility rates over the nationwide average of 90 in 2005 jointly accounted for 23.3 million 15-19-year old women, or 46% of all 50.5 million adolescent women in India (Moore et al 2009, Appendix Tables 1 and 2).

As of 2006, according to the 2005-06 National Family Health Survey (NFHS) roughly 8% of all Indian women aged 20-24 became mothers before age 16, when the health risks are quite large (see our next section); 22% of this cohort already became mothers before age 18, and 42% before age 20. Though coming down 7%points from 1992-93, the percentage of 42 is still very high, and implies that each year over 3.3 million Indian adolescent girls give birth. In 2006, the share of those becoming mothers before age 20 was

19 Based on the National Family Health Survey 2005-2006 (Moore et al 2009; Macro International 2007a); it is not clear what source(s) WHO (2009) and ADB (2009) have relied on for their low and unlikely estimate of the Indian adolescent fertility rate (45 for 2006).

28% in urban areas, against still nearly half of all (48%) in rural areas. Young women were most likely to give birth as teenagers in Eastern states (54-58% in Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal), and the shares in question were lowest in Goa (11%), Himachal Pradesh (15%), and Kerala (16%). In the large central states the shares were 46-49% (Moore et al 2009; IIPS / Macro International 2007a).

There is a rather close link between adolescent fertility and marriage patterns. The interval between marriage and having the first birth remained overall 2.1-2.3 years between 1993-2006. For women aged 25-29, the median age at first marriage in 2005-06 was 17.8 years and the median age at first birth 19.9 years. These figures already indicate that the marriage age for females in India is still very low. In 2005-06 45% of women aged 20-24 married before the legal age of 18: 53% in rural and 28% in urban areas. The proportion marrying that early was as high as 60-61% in the states of Jharkhand and Bihar, and as low as 12% in Himachal Pradesh and Goa – the states with the lowest and highest educational levels, respectively, which suggest an inverse relationship between education and early marriage. There is quite some evidence that marriage before age 18 constrains adolescent women's opportunities to obtain higher education, and severely restricts their autonomy. The decline of this "early marriage rate" has been slow, with only 5% points from 50% of all Indian women in 1993 to 45% in 2006. State-level figures have converged. In some states a decline between 1993-2006 could be noted, like in Himachal Pradesh (from 24 to 12%) and Tamil Nadu (from 36 to 24%), but other states saw increases from low levels, like Goa (from 7 to 12%), Punjab (from 14 to 19%), and Gujarat (from 29 to 33%). In several large states the proportion marrying before age 18 remained basically unchanged. In the same period, the median age at first marriage at national level rose from 17.2 to 17.8 years, only a seven-month increase (Moore et al 2009; IIPS / Macro International 2007a). There is some evidence, be it rather anecdotal, that in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami pressure grew on girls to marry at an earlier age to much older husbands in response to the enormous family losses wrought by the disaster (Donahue 2010, 15-16).

More generally, the figures presented above have to be considered against the backdrop of the disadvantaged position of adolescent girls in India. Girls are still discriminated against in terms of health (nutrition, medical care and vaccination) and education (Jensen and Oster 2007; Moore et al 2009). Yet, promising initiatives are under way in India to delay early marriage or childbearing, recognized as essential barriers for women's labour participation and autonomy. For example, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in the state of Haryana is attempting to provide incentives for delayed marriage. The project aims to improve the nutritional and health status of adolescent girls between 11-18 years of age, to train and equip them to

improve home-based and vocational skills, to promote awareness of health hygiene, nutrition, home management, child care, and take all measures as to facilitate their marriage after attaining the age of 18 years and later (Vij 2010 ; website GoI - Haryana adolescent girls project).

2.6.2. Health

One of the major health risk factors for young people in India, though considerably less widespread than in the African countries we covered in other DECISIONS FOR LIFE reports, is HIV/AIDS. By 2007, according to revised estimates of the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO, the government agency responsible for monitoring HIV/AIDS), the HIV adult prevalence rate (of those aged 15-49) was 360 per 100,000, or 0.36%. By then, in India about 2.31 million people lived with the virus, of which 35% in the age group of 15-24 years. Be it not so outspoken like elsewhere in Asia, HIV in India is more a man's disease; about 40% or over 900,000 people of those suffering are female, though the female share was with about 30% lower among those with HIV/AIDS in the 15-29 years age group (UNAIDS 2007; CIA World Factbook; GoI 2008; ADB 2009a; WHO 2009). The economic consequences of HIV/AIDS may be serious. Unskilled labour-intensive industries like tourism will suffer losses of up to 18% and the annual GDP growth rate will fall by 1% in the next 14 years if the present rate of HIV infections continues, a 2006 study of the National Council of Applied Economic Research concluded (NN 2006). According to more recent evidence, the epidemic continues to shift toward women and young people. In 2004, it was estimated that 22% of new HIV cases in India were housewives in relationships with one partner. These women were infected by husbands who frequented sex workers, one of the major driving forces behind the spread of HIV into the non-high-risk population (Kodandapani and Alpert 2007).

Public knowledge of HIV/AIDS is rather limited, in line with the limited general knowledge of sex and reproduction – though adolescent women have on average good knowledge of modern contraceptive use (CEPA 2001; Moore et al 2009). The proportion of Indian males with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS was in 2000-2007 36%; with 20% the proportion of females with such knowledge was much lower (WHO 2009). Discrimination, stigmatization and denial are widespread. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), 70% of persons suffering from HIV/AIDS faced discrimination. Because of HIV/AIDS-related discrimination, appropriate policies and models of good practice remain underdeveloped. People living with HIV and AIDS continue to be burdened by poor care and inadequate services, whereas those with the power to help do little to make the situation better (Kodandapani and Alpert 2007). In 2008 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that many doctors refused to treat HIV-positive children

and that some schools expelled or segregated them because they or their parents were HIV-positive. Many orphanages and other residential institutions rejected HIV-positive children or denied them housing (US Dept of State 2009).

The Indian government in recent years seems to have shaken off the earlier rather slack approach of HIV/AIDS. Its National AIDS Control Program (NACP) III (2007-2011) has set ambitious targets to achieve the MDGs for HIV and AIDS before schedule. Compared to NACP II the national program budget has quadrupled, to around USD 2.5 billion. Almost 70% of the budget is earmarked for prevention (Claeson and Alexander 2008). In October 2009 the Ministry of Labour and Employment (2009b) issued a more offensive policy document, now departing from the viewpoint that HIV/AIDS “is a major threat to the world of work and that it has shown maximum impact on the most productive segment of the labour force”. The use of such “hard” economic arguments (see also Haacker 2009, and Das et al 2009) may help to push for more offensive government policies, also regarding health in general. It should be noted that currently a very low share of the country’s GDP –less than 1%-- is dedicated to public spending on all aspects of health, a level that has remained unchanged for the past decade and a half. As a result, roughly three-quarters of health services are provided by the private sector (Moore et al 2009, 20). A larger share of public expenditure on health would notably improve health conditions of the poor, like through more effective prevention and treatment of major infectious diseases (cf. WHO 2009; ADB 2009a). It would, in the end, bring down the persistent inequalities in health in India.

We already came across large inequalities in various fields in India; the country’s health disparities are also large. We limit ourselves here to two issues related to birth: the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel (a health professional), and the under 5 mortality rate. In 2005-06 the percentage of births attended by such personnel was 47%. This general share hides considerable differences across the urban/rural divide, regions, the income level of the family at stake, and the education level of the mother. The incidence of skilled health personnel attending birth was 38% in rural areas and nearly double that share (74%) in urban areas, whereas it was 19% among the lowest 20% in the income distribution and 89% among the wealthiest 20% (WHO 2009; ADB 2009a). Across India’s regions, with 81% in 2005-06 the proportion of births attended by skilled health staff was highest in the Southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu), followed by the West (Goa, Gujarat and Maharashtra) with 74%; with 33% the Central states (Chhattisgarh, Madya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) were worst off on this respect (Moore et al 2009). As said, the under 5 mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 5 per 1,000 live births)

by 2007 stood at an average 72, with a substantial spatial difference: 82 in rural areas against 52 in urban areas. However, the socio-economic difference was even larger: 101 under age 5 dying per 1,000 live births among the poorest 20% and only 34 among the 20% highest in the income distribution (WHO 2009; ADB 2009a). Health hazards for women working in agriculture and small-scale manufacture are mostly considerable: see notably section 2.6.4.

We found that early marriages and teenage pregnancy remain widespread. Early pregnancy goes along with considerable health risks. In terms of health, millions of adolescent girls in India are disadvantaged. Concerning food intake, access to health care, and growth patterns, they are worse off than their brothers. By the time they reach adolescence many are grossly underweight and stunted. Pregnancy at a young age further exacerbates their poor health (Jejeebhoy 1998; CEDPA 2001). Against this backdrop the outcome of the 2002-04 Household Survey does not surprise that pregnancy complications were highest among adolescent mothers. Similarly, any delivery and post delivery complications were highest among these mothers (IIPS 2005). There is clear evidence that the risk of maternal morbidity is highest in adolescents and further enhances the risk of maternal death. Moreover, peri-natal mortality rate is also high among infants of adolescent mothers. Combined with their already poor health status, these risks are especially large among the poor and illiterate (IIPS/Macro-International 2007a). According to a 2005 report from the Office of the Registrar General of India, 240 girls died every day due to pregnancy-related complications in early child marriages. Marital abuse and rape are also common problems in such marriages. In 2008 the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) concluded that those married under the age of 18 were twice as likely to be abused by their husbands compared with women married later; they were even three times more likely to report marital rape. ICRW reported that child brides often showed signs of child sexual abuse and post-traumatic stress (cited in US Dept of State 2009). Though there is a large number of small-scale initiatives and programs aiming at improving adolescent girls' reproductive health, growingly in combination with education, political intentions at national level still have to be translated in large-scale programs (Moore et al 2009, 20).

Health problems of boys encompass to a larger extent alcohol and drug addiction. A recent government report states that "The tentacles of drug have captured a substantial section of adolescents and youth" (GoI 2008, 59). It adds that the reported incidents of alcoholism, drug addiction and crime amongst adolescents have seen a rise. Most of the offenders were boys; a large number of them had only studied up to primary school level (41%) or were illiterate (20%); for a large part they were school drop-outs. Current government

programs mainly focus on building “life skills (...) as the abilities for adaptive and positive behaviour that enable individuals to deal effectively with the demands and changes of everyday life” (GoI 2008, 62).

2.6.3. Women’s labour market share

Table 6 presents an overview of the female employment shares by industry, for those in the organised sector, for 2005 – the latest year for which figures are available. One again has to be aware that these figures only cover a limited group: about 4% of India’s about 129 million economically active women.

Table 6. Female employment shares by industry, employees (organised sector), India, 2005

		x mln.	%
agriculture		0,48	32.7
mining		0,08	7.1
manufacturing		0,94	16.7
utilities		0,05	5.8
construction		0,07	7.0
transport, storage, communication		0,19	6.8
wholesale and retail		0,05	8.9
finance, real estate, business services		0,30	15.6
community, social, personal services		2,85	25.8
Total		5,02	19.0
of which	private sector	2,10	24.8
	public sector	2,92	16.2
	of which		
	central	0,61	9.8
	regional	1,73	17.9
	local	0,58	27.5

Source: authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta (Tables 2E and PS)

With 19.0% the female share in (the registered part of) the organised sector turns out to be low, definitely in international perspective. The table shows that female employees in 2005 nowhere formed a majority. With nearly one in three their largest share was in agriculture (organised, that means with more than 10 employees), followed by community, social and personal services with 26% -- obviously mainly in the commercial part of these services, as their share in the public sector (16%) remained much lower. In both manufacturing and in finance, real estate and (other) business services, about one in six employees was female. In the other industries the female share was below one in ten. Comparing 2005 with 2000, the total share of women in the organised sector showed some increase: by 2000 it was 17.6% (4,92 million women on 27,96 million employed), implying 1.4%points growth. The female share in the private sector grew by 0.9%point, but their share in the public sector rose more, by 1.4%points. With 1.8%points, the female share in regional

government showed the largest increase between 2000-2005 (all data: ILO Laborsta).

Table 7 specifies the female part of our Table 4, showing the shares of the respective industries in female employment. For an explanation, see section 2.3.2.

Table 7. Shares of industries in female employment, employees (organised sector), India, 2005

		x mln.	%
agriculture		0,48	9.6
mining		0,08	1.5
manufacturing		0,94	18.7
utilities		0,05	1.1
construction		0,07	1.3
transport, storage, communication		0,19	3.8
wholesale, retail, hotels, restaurants		0,05	1.0
finance, real estate, business services		0,30	6.0
community, social, personal services		2,85	56.9
Total		5,02	100.0
<i>of which</i>	private sector	2,10	41.8
	public sector	2,92	58.2
	central	0,61	12.2
	regional	1,73	34.4
	local	0,58	11.6

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

Below, we shortly describe developments in large sectors with –wherever possible– special attention to the position of women. Unlike in other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports, we have bundled the sections on commerce and services under the heading “services”. We did so in view of the importance of India’s services sector, notably its IT (Information Technology) annex BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) part, also for female employment.

2.6.4. Agriculture

In 2004-05, the surprisingly large share of 53% of the Indian labour force was still employed in agriculture, producing a little over one-fifth of the country’s GDP. An overwhelming majority was in informal labour. In formal labour, by then only nearly 5 million were employed (2.3%), against 208 million in informal labour. For 2008-09, these amounts were estimated at respectively slightly over 5 million (2.2%) and 218 million. Between 1978-2004, agriculture’s share in total employment fell by 14%points, and its share in the country’s value added halved to 22%. In this period, its output yearly grew by 2.5%, while employment rose by 1.1% yearly (NCEUS 2009a, 18). Between 1998 and 2004, underemployment in agriculture increased widely. In a number of agricultural areas, employment measured in hours declined by 20 to 77%. Around

47% of total land is cultivated, of which only about 30% irrigated. Cultivators (small land-holders) and their families form nearly one third of the rural workforce, agricultural labourers 27% and other workers 42%. In 1999-2000, 10.4% of rural households were female-headed; 97% of these households cultivated plots of two hectares or less. Women play major roles in agriculture. In the early 2000s, on average about 60% of all agricultural operations like sowing of seeds, transportation of sapling, winnowing, storage of grain, et cetera were handled exclusively by women. Currently many farmers seem to prefer women workers over males, but a large proportion of all women workers in agriculture continue to receive lower wages than men; female hourly wage rates vary from 50 to 75% of male rates. Working conditions are often appalling. Due to the use of agro-chemicals women are exposed to several health hazards such as gynecological infections, arthritis, intestinal and parasitic infections (Research Foundation Science & Technology 2005).

As mentioned, the growth in agricultural output in the 1970s and 1980s by which India changed from a net food importer to a food exporter (sugar, rice), was largely due to Green Revolution input such as high-yield seed varieties and fertilizers. However, the rate of output for several products may have peaked and problems with soil degradation, rural infrastructure and working conditions of agricultural workers urgently need to be addressed (Library of Congress 2004; Research Foundation Science & Technology 2005). Though with 2.5% yearly growth during in 1990-2005 India's agricultural output reached a much higher growth rate than in the previous two decades, it has been calculated that in this period agricultural output growth has gradually slowed down. Moreover, the 2.5% growth rate compares to 4.6% output increase per year in China. Both India and China benefited from the Green Revolution, but unlike India the Chinese agricultural sector was also aided by major institutional reforms and improved infrastructure (Nagaraj 2007; Bosworth and Collins 2007). Since the early 1980s, the real wage rates in India's agriculture have steadily risen, though with considerable interregional variation in the levels and growth rates. Yet the wage rates remain lower than the official minimum wages, and are too low to overcome absolute poverty. Moreover, while the agricultural wages have gone up, the proportion of permanent farm servants in rural areas has declined, suggesting that employment contracts have become less secure and casual (Nagaraj 2007). Under the prevailing conditions in Indian agriculture it is unlikely that many young women living in urban areas and trying to make a career can rely on a "fall-back scenario" in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

2.6.5. Mining and manufacturing

The secondary sector, or industry in its broad sense (mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities), employed in 2004-05 about 19% of India's total labour force and produced approximately 28% of India's GDP. Between 1978-2004, industry's share in total employment increased by 6%points, and so did its share in the country's value added. Nevertheless, by international comparisons both shares remain rather small. In this period, India's industrial output yearly grew by 5.9%, while employment rose by 3.4% per year. Exports were a major trigger for growth. Between 1995-2004 goods exports grew by 10.1% yearly. However, services exports grew twice as much and the share of goods in total exports fell from 82% in 1995 to 67% in 2004 (Bosworth and Collins 2007, authors' correction based on recent data from NCEUS 2009a). As critical obstacles for stronger expansion of India's manufacturing innovation, output and exports, tax and governance issues, labour regulation, lack of skilled labour and the country's crumbling infrastructure are mostly mentioned. These factors may lead to weak performance of labour-intensive industries (Gupta et al 2008). Some add problems of management succession in Indian firms, a large proportion of which are group-affiliated and family-owned (Bhaumik and Kumbhakar 2008). Lack of access to finance, related underinvestment and, of course, lack of economies of scale are mentioned as specific problems in the unorganised sector (Rajesh Raj 2009).

In 2004-05 over seven in ten industrial employed were in informal labour. In formal labour 23.2 million (29.7%) were employed, against 54.8 million in informal labour. For 2008-09, the most reliable estimates end up at respectively 25.7 million (28.1%) and 65.9 million employed in manufacturing, figures that point at growing informalisation. That may well be a continuation of the trend witnessed between 1983 and 2004, when most employment growth in manufacturing was in the unorganised sector, a trend widely ascribed to increasing hire of casual and contract workers and of informal regular low-wage workers. Exceptions were rare, the most prominent being the apparel, furniture, leather and refined petroleum industries, where in 1983-2004 the organised sector showed a larger employment growth than the unorganized sector (NCEUS 2009a, 172-173). Various authors have connected the general trend toward informalisation with the long-term fall of the real wage rate in manufacturing (Majumder 2006; Gupta et al 2008; NCEUS 2009a, IV, 18). Considering these developments, manufacturing has become a less promising source of employment for women.

2.6.6. Services

In the last two decades India's economy has opened up, favouring trade and commerce. Trade (exports plus imports) as percentage of GDP has increased from around 15 in 1980-81 to about 34 by 2005-06 (Papola 2008). Between 1978-2004, the service sector share in total employment increased by 9%points, but its share in the country's value added grew by 18%. In this period, India's services output yearly grew by 7.2%, while employment rose by 3.8% per year (Bosworth and Collins 2007, authors' correction based on recent data from NCEUS 2009a). More than agriculture and manufacturing, the Indian services sector has been the most powerful force in the development of the country (Ravallion 2009). The services sector employed in 2004-05 over 27% of India's total labour force and produced no less than about 50% of India's GDP. In 2004-05 over seven in ten service employees were in informal labour: in formal labour 30.4 million (27.6%) were employed, against 79.6 million in informal labour. Between 2004-05 and 2008-09, employment in services grew by nearly 22%, but surprisingly this growth has been nearly fully in informal labour. For 2008-09, the most reliable estimates end up at respectively 33.1 million employed formally (24.6%) and 100.9 million employed informally, figures clearly indicating at growing informalisation in the past four years (NCEUS 2009a, 18).

In the 1990s and 2000s the expansion of India's IT/BPO sector has been the cornerstone of the growth of the services sector at large. Back in 2005, Thomas Friedman in "The World is Flat" gave stunning examples of the possibilities of outsourcing sophisticated business activities from the US to India, like the outsourcing of market research activities, reading CAT scans to doctors in India, or "having your own personal remote executive assistant" in India. By then, he noted that 245,000 Indians were involved in call centre work: low-wage, low-prestige jobs in America, but when shifted to India high-wage, high-prestige jobs (Friedman 2005, 24, 31). Following earlier relocation within the UK, UK firms also offshored call centre activities to India: initially some of the most simplified and standardised workflows, later on more complex activities including skilled jobs (Bain and Taylor 2008). Yet, such FDI of mainly US- and UK-based multinationals cannot belittle the rise of a genuine Indian IT/BPO industry. In spite of quite some resistance from the government bureaucracy, the New Computer Policy (NCP) that was shaped from 1984 on under PM Rajiv Ghandi recognised software exports as a "delicensed industry", invested in infrastructure, and laid the foundation for the development of a world-class IT industry. Currently Indian IT firms like Infosys, Wipro, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and others are renowned in the global market, fuelled the growth of the domestic services sector, and changed the attitudes towards IT and computerisation of many

employers and employees (Nilekani 2008, 97- 109). IT industry leaders claim that the spread effects of this development are massive, and that India's IT innovations in banking, retail, education, telecom and commodities are creating truly mass access to IT facilities till in even the most remote rural villages, like through the text messages including weather forecasts and agricultural information cited earlier (cf. Nilekani 2008, 110-112). Others maintain that the IT industry is highly urban-centric and that the use of IT is confined to large and modern organisations in industry and services (cf. Papola 2008). Some years ago, various researchers regarded the employment outcomes of the IT/BPO boom as disappointing. They stressed that especially software services have the highest productivity levels but a small employment potential (cf. Banga 2006). Recently, such objections are hardly heard. Nevertheless, in a larger, macro-economic, context the contribution of the IT sector to India's development can still be questioned.

India's IT/BPO exports have skyrocketed from USD 105 million in 1989-1990, via 3.71 billion in 1999-2000 and 18.05 billion in 2004-05, to 50.41 billion in 2008-09; jointly with domestic turnover accounting for USD 22.98 billion, aggregate revenue was 73.39 billion. The software and services segment accounted for 40.61 billion, or 55% (website Centre for Development Informatics). The sector proved to be relatively resilient to the global crisis (World Bank 2010, 149). The importance of the domestic market is rapidly growing. In a recent Indian study domestic IT turnover in 2013 is rather conservatively estimated to be nearly USD 38 billion, but the Dutch economic information agency (EVD) already for 2012 predicts USD 50 billion. This agency also points at the trend to shift IT activities from Bangalore, the current "capital" of the Indian IT sector, to smaller urban centres (NN 2009; website EVD). The current government has announced promotion of IT as one of the five priorities of the country. The development of the Indian IT industry is closely linked with improvement of the country's (higher) education system, combining technical and analytical (mathematic) skills and English language abilities with relatively low labour costs. Currently the industry can boast that "over 120,000 IT professionals are being trained and added to the talent pool every year as compared to 25,000 IT professionals in the USA" (ESC 2009). Unfortunately, for the last four years reliable figures on the female employment share in India's IT sector are lacking. It is likely that women still comprise less than a third of those working in the sector, as earlier studies indicated (Donahue 2010). If so, this share may anyway increase in the years ahead. As females constitute about 40% of all students currently enrolled in institutions of higher education (see section 2.7.2), it may be estimated that yearly 40-50,000 of these "new" IT professionals will be female.

2.6.7. Government

The Indian civil service is notorious for its bureaucracy and inefficiency, with a proven record of resistance to change. Early efforts to bring in development dynamics merely shipwrecked (Van Klaveren 1969). As discussed, the beginning of the 1990s saw the initiation of economic reforms. Consequently, the public sector was no longer seen as an employment provider; it has, in fact, experienced an absolute decline in employment in recent years (Papola 2007). In spite of this decline and of real wage decreases in the organised manufacturing sector, earnings per employee in the public sector have grown at over 3% per year over the last three decades, partly representing a higher return for education, skill and experience, partly superior bargaining power of public servants (Nagaraj 2007).

Till very recently especially the federal civil service has been a male bulwark. As shown in Tables 4 and 6, in 2005 the total civil service in formal employment included slightly over 15 million employees, or 3.5% of all employed in India. The central public sector employed 5.6 million people, of which only 9.8% female, the regional public sector 7.9 million, of which nearly 18% female, whereas by then locally 1.5 million public servants operated, of which 27.5% female. We also noted some growth of the female shares between in the five preceding years, most pronounced in regional government. Especially for young women the public service may be an attractive employer, in particular in view of the benefits attached to be engaged here: maternity and sickness benefits, and for those in central government service also paid maternity leave (see section 2.4.1). Most likely, the best opportunities for young women applying for government jobs will be in regional and local government, especially where –supported by World Bank, NGOs, and others-- rural development and empowerment programmes take off.

2.7. Education and skill levels of the female labour force

2.7.1. Literacy

The adult literacy rate—those age 15 and over that can read and write—for India in 2006 was, according to the UNDP Human Development Indicators, 65.2%. The country has made major progress in this field, as the average literacy rate for the 1990-1999 period was only 48.2% (WHO 2009), while the 2004-05 NSSO Survey found 61.7% (GoI 2008). The figures suggest that the country's Total Literacy Campaign, under the auspices of the National Literacy Mission,²⁰ may be having an impact. Yet, India's remaining about 270 million adult illiterates make up over one third of this category in the world. And once again, the regional disparities are huge. Opposed to the high literacy rates in for example Kerala (91%), Chandigarh (87%) and Delhi (85%) were in 2004-05 the low rates of Bihar and Rajasthan (both 48%), Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh (both 52%), and Madhya Pradesh (55%) (GoI 2008). Through the eleventh five-year plan (2007-2012), the Total Literacy Campaign that was launched in 1988 has been revitalized. In 2009 the government also signaled a stronger focus on gender and equity, first by recasting the National Literacy Mission as the National Female Literacy Mission and then by announcing a strategy for targeting. Commitments have been made to ensure that 85% of targeted beneficiaries will be women (UNESCO 2010). There are ample reasons for such policies. In 2006 the female literacy rate of 53.4% was opposed to a male rate of 76.4%, resulting in 70% women to men parity (UNDP 2008). Based on 2004-05 figures, women lagged behind extremely in states with a low total literacy rate, in particular Rajasthan (29% female rate, 45% women to men parity), Bihar (32% female rate, 51% women to men parity), Jharkhand (35% rate, 51% parity), Uttar Pradesh (36% rate, 54% parity), and Madhya Pradesh (39% rate, 56% parity) (GoI 2008²¹). In spite of these remaining differences, the overall gender literacy gap has considerably decreased, as women to men parity grew from 49% in 1981, to 55% in 1993, 65% in 2001, and 68% in 2004-05. For 2007, India's overall literacy rate was estimated at 66.0%, indicating another 0.8% progress compared to the 2006 rate. Women to men parity improved slightly further, to nearly 71%, with the female literacy rate rising to 54.5% and the male to 77.1%

20 The National Literacy Mission aims at bridging gender and regional disparities in adult literacy levels by achieving 80% literacy by 2011-12 (GoI 2008).

21 47 districts in the country had a female literacy rate below 30%. Since most of these districts were located in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and Jharkhand, special government programmes for promoting female literacy were taken up in these states (GoI 2008, 69).

(GoI 2008; UIS website; UN MDG Indicators website).

For 2007 the youth (15-24-year-olds) literacy rate was with 82.1% over 16%points higher than the overall rate, divided in 86.7% for young males and 77.1% for young females, implying a women to men parity ratio of 89%. This means that 15- to 24-year-old females are still about twice as likely to be illiterate as males in that group (MDG Indicator 2.3, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based on UNESCO data). As a category, girls and young women have made major strides in literacy, but many came from a situation of backwardness. Compared with 1991, when 15-24-years-old females had a literacy rate of only 49.3%, their progress was much larger than that of their male peers, by that time having reached the 77.1% mark (ADB 2009a).

2.7.2. Education of girls

In Article 15(1) the Constitution of India, on the right to equality, provides the basic policy framework that enshrines the vision of girls' education and the spirit in which their education is to be provided. Article 45 of the Constitution refers to "free and compulsory education for all children" up to 14 years but this 'directive principle' could not be enforced in court. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act adopted in 2009, however, now legally requires states to provide free education to children aged 6 to 14 and reserves 25% of private primary school places for disadvantaged children. Moreover, recently public funding has attached weight to poverty-related factors, including deficits in education. Before 2007, equity played only a limited role in allocating resources for education. A new formula attaches more weight to social indicators, including a district-level Education Development Index. In 2005-06 the differences in per child allocation between high and low Education Development Index districts were negligible, but in 2008-09 districts in the lowest 25% on the index received twice as much per child as those in the highest 25% (UNESCO 2010).

Combined gross enrolment in education in India was in 2006 overall 61.0%: females 57.4%, males 64.3% -- or a women to parity of 89% (UNDP 2008). At first sight India seems on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015, especially if one realises that India has come from far. Only about 55% of the population born between 1950 and 1970 attended primary school or higher (2005 website Huebler). According to the MICS 2000 survey, almost 27

million school-age children in India did not attend school, or one out of four; girls made up a majority of 57%. At the time, India's exclusion rate was 15%, meaning that this proportion of children would likely never attend school (UNICEF 2005). Against this backdrop, in 2001 the central government launched the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) program to provide elementary education for all of India's children. SSA is one of India's first major programs to cover upper primary education –grades 6-8—as well. The program aims to enroll all 6-14 year-olds in school by 2015, retain them in school, and provide them with quality education at least till grade 8 – a tougher requirement than meeting the MDG by 2015 as such (GoI 2008; World Bank website²²).

Most international comparative sources give a rather rosy picture of progress thus far. Because of a substantial increase in girls' net enrollment rate in primary education, the total net enrollment rate in primary education increased from 84.9% in 1991 (92.0% for boys and 77.1% for girls, resulting in 84% girls to boys parity) to an overall 88% over 2000-2007, divided into 90% for boys and 87% for girls, or 97% girls to boys parity (ADB 2009a; WHO 2009). The UN MDG Indicators even indicate for 2006 a net primary enrollment rate of 94.3%, divided into 96.1% for boys and 92.2% for girls (96% parity). For 2007, primary net enrollment was set at 90%: 91% for boys and 88% for girls, implying that nine of ten children of primary school age (6-10 years) attended primary school (UIS website).

Yet, there are two caveats. First, domestic sources suggest less reasons for optimism. The 2005-06 National Family Health Survey outcomes are a much lower primary net enrollment rate, namely 83%; 85% for boys and 81% for girls (95% girls to boys parity), as well as gaps between urban and rural areas (89% versus 82%²³), and especially between socio-economics groups, with 96% of children from the wealthiest 20% of the population attending primary school, versus only 69% of children from the poorest 20% families. Second, another important indicator concerning primary educational advancement is the primary completion rate, taking account of drop-outs and indicating which share of the children who have enrolled in the first grade of primary education can be expected to reach the last grade. This gives a more realistic picture of actual school attendance. Unless impressive progress in many educational fields, the Indian drop-out rates

22 On the World Bank India website impressive accounts can be found of activities in sub-programs under the SSA. See for example the account of Seema Bishnoi, teacher and warden of a residential primary school in one of the poorest parts of Rajasthan, for the huge difficulties to overcome in catering for 11-16-year-old daughters of poor illiterate parents who either dropped out of school or have never been to school at all, but also for the opportunities coming with learning these girls can be offered (teaching hygiene, playing with the computer, learning to bike, et cetera), bringing about positive behavioural changes (cf. Ravallion 2009, 22).

23 However, in a surprising result a more detailed (regression) analysis based on 2000 figures showed that rural children were as likely to be in school as urban children, all other variables being equal. The observed disparity in school attendance between urban and rural areas could be explained by other factors, such as household wealth or the parents' education. For example, 67% of all primary school-age children had mothers without any formal education; in contrast, 93% of out-of-school children had mothers without formal education (UNICEF 2005, 51).

are still comparatively high: in 2005-06 25.5% (girls: 21.5%) in primary schools (classes I-V), 48.7% (girls: 49.0%) in secondary schools (classes I-VIII), and 61.6% (girls: 63.6%) in secondary schools (classes I-X). Consequently, with 65.8% in 2005-06 the overall primary completion rate remained low, though girls' rate (65.3%) had hardly any gap left compared to boys' (66.2%) (GoI 2008; UIS website). For India, "the big challenge is keeping children in school once they enroll" (UNESCO 2010, 60).

The most recent UNESCO report (2010) concludes that India's wealth divides in education are among the largest in the world – and that they are reinforced by regional and gender disparities. The report states that in 2005 over three in 10 Indian females (30.7%) aged 17 to 22 were in "education poverty", meaning that they had fewer than four years of education, nearly double the proportion of males of the same age (15.6%). Another source concludes for 2005-06 that 37% of Indian females aged 15 to 19 had less than six years of education: 45% in the rural areas against 19% in the urban areas. In Bihar this share was even 61%, in Jharkhand 56%, and in Chhattisgarh and Uttar Pradesh both 45%. By contrast, in Kerala only 2% of all adolescent females had less than six years of education, in Himachal Pradesh 7%, in Goa 8%, in Tamil Nadu 12%, and in Maharashtra 17% (Moore et al 2009).

Living and health conditions of the poor are highly relevant here. Child malnutrition seriously hampers cognitive development. Drawing on unique research that tracks children in four developing countries --including India-- through their early years, marked nutrition-related disadvantages in test scores at age 4 to 5 have been revealed. By age 7 to 8, the malnutrition penalty is equivalent to the loss of a full term of schooling. And in India in 2000-07 nearly two in five children were stunted²⁴: many of them will carry a burden of disadvantage into primary school (UNESCO 2010, 43-4). Moreover, the available figures imply that 17% or 21 million children of primary school age in India were out of school in 2006. Compared to 2000, the number of such children had decreased by six million. Yet, the MDG UPE goal for 2015 can only be met if the increase in primary school attendance accelerates in the years to come, especially among the poor. It should be noted that in 2005 children from the poorest 20% were over three times more likely to be out of school than children from the richest 20%. Children with disabilities are heavily disadvantaged. According to a World Bank analysis of India's 2002 National Sample Survey, children with disabilities were 5.5 times more likely to be out of school. Almost three-quarters of children with severe impairments were out of school. The most likely to be excluded were children with mental illness (of which two-thirds of

24 Stunting, or low height for age, is caused by long-term insufficiency of nutrient intake and frequent infections. It generally occurs before the age of 2 and the effects are largely irreversible (UNESCO 2010).

whom never enroll in school) or blindness (of which over half never enroll) (UNICEF 2005; 2007 website Huebler; IIPS / Macro International 2007b; UNESCO 2010²⁵).

In 2007, the gross enrollment rate in secondary education was 57%, again considerable progress as this rate was in 1981 only 33%, in 1993 41%, in 1999 48% and in 2005-06 54% (Ravallion 2009; ADB 2009a; UIS website). Moreover, over these years girls of secondary school age (11-17 years) diminished the gender gap considerably. In 1991, women to men parity in secondary education was just 60%, which improved to 69% in 1999; in the 2000s the closing of the gender gap speeded up, with 83% parity in 2005-06 till in 2007 85% parity was reached, through gross enrollment rates of 61% for males and 52% for females (UIS website; 2008 website Huebler). Nevertheless, with both a relatively low gross enrollment rate and a relatively low women to men parity India does not compare favourably to other many Asian countries. Its results do not match the rule that Asian women study longer than Asian men, and its 2005-06 women to men parity ratio of 83% in secondary education was one of the lowest ratios of 41 Asian economies. Currently the composition of the 40 million children enrolled in secondary education is skewed towards the urban areas (64%, against 49% in rural areas) and even heavier towards children from the wealthier classes: 83% of children from the wealthiest 20% of the population attend secondary school, against only 29% of children from the poorest 20% families and 43% of children from the second poorest 20%. Also, secondary school enrollment varies widely across states, from 92% in Kerala to 22% in Bihar and only 4% in Jharkhand (2008 website Huebler; IIPS / Macro International 2007b). The World Bank (website Secondary education in India) argues that actually with larger numbers of children finishing primary school, the demand for secondary schooling—grades 9 to 12—is growing. Over the next decade an increasing share of these students will come from rural and lower income groups, who will be less able to afford private secondary education. Against this backdrop, the World Bank points at the risks of the situation that 60% of India's secondary school system is privately managed.

The Indian technical and vocational education (TVET) system is still in its infancy, and difficult to access for females. By 2005, in the group 15-29 of age 6.8 million males and 4.3 million females were receiving or had received formal vocational training. Another 14.2 million males and 8.1 million females (had) received informal training; as to be expected, this kind of training dominates in the unorganised sector. Jointly, the categories of formal and informal trained made up only about 11.5% of this age group in the labour force: 14% of the young males and 9% of the young females; for only the formally trained this

25 Following different yardsticks, the Government of India (2008) counted by March 2006 seven million children 6-13 years out of school.

share was 3.7% -- a level with which India compares poorly across countries (NCEUS 2009a, 2009c). The country's Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) and various craft centres are not accessible to the vast majority of the poor. Moreover, the gender disparities reported in TVET are large, with girls accounting for just 7% of enrollment at the secondary level and their courses concentrated in traditional areas such as nursing and sewing.²⁶ In general, the benefits of vocational training are not immediately apparent. Some 60% of graduates from ITIs are still unemployed three years later, also because they do not derive benefits in entry to higher technical education courses. Industrial apprentices are more likely to get work, but generally not in the trade for which they trained. The career paths of TVET teachers are uncertain and uninspiring, and public awareness of the potential of TVET is very limited. Governance problems have hampered India's efforts to strengthen vocational education. Duplication and fragmentation are widespread, there is little control over quality and the certification system is poorly understood by employers. Companies and employer organizations are only marginally involved, though efforts are being made to strengthen their engagement. Moreover, formal retraining of adult workers is virtually absent. Only 16% of Indian manufacturers offer in-service training compared to over 90% in China (Rajput 2009; NCEUS 2009a, 2009c; World Bank 2009d; UNESCO 2010).

The relative position of India's women is also lagging behind in tertiary education, where in 2006-07 the country's women to men enrollment ratio was 67%. It cannot be denied that in 1991, with a women / men ratio of 54%, the situation was even worse for girls and young women, but between 1991 and 2007 India's progress has remained comparatively limited (UIS website; ADB 2009a; UN MDG Indicators). In 2007, 13% of the 17-25 of age were enrolled in tertiary education: 16% of the young men of that age, and 11% of the young females (UIS website). Enrollment increases quickly. In 2006-07, the massive amount of 13,93 million students was enrolled in institutions of higher education, as against 11,78 million in 2005-06; 4,47 million were female, constituting 40.4% or a 67% women to men parity rate. In 2004-05 female Ph.D's, D.Sc's and D.Phil's made up 41% of this category; female MA's made up 47% of all MA's, and female MSc's 46% of all MSc's (website World Bank edstats; World Bank 2007).

As such, the growth of India's higher education system is impressive. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) outlines major expansion plans, including funding for 30 new Central Universities, five new Indian Institutes of Science, Education and Research, eight new Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT), seven

26 In 2004-05, 2,70 million males and 1,23 million females aged 15-29 were in VET institutes. The overall most popular field of formal VET was 'computer trades' (30% for both sexes). For males the next most popular fields were electrical and electronic engineering (18%), mechanical engineering (12%), driving and motor mechanic work (9%), and civil engineering and construction-related (5%). For females, after computer trades 'textile related' (22%) came next, followed by health and paramedical (10%), office and business work (6%), and beautician, hairdressing and related work (4%) (NCEUS 2009c, Table 3.7).

new Indian Institutes of Management and 20 new Indian Institutes of Information Technology. Qualitative progress is impressive too. The top students of the Indian Institutes for Technology, for example, are already not just globally competitive, in many ways they set the global standard – with many alumni careering in California’s Silicon Valley and elsewhere in the US (Friedman 2005, 104-5). Also, recent graduates of Indian Institutes of Management are so in demand that already in 2006 their very top salaries approached about USD 225,000 (wikipedia, Tertiary education in India; Bhatnagar 2010). Yet, besides praising such academic progress a World Bank Policy Review stressed the related societal contradictions. To cite just one example of many: “Delhi’s new metro is a 21st century marvel while rural roads in many states are in poor repair and often impassable” (World Bank 2006). Another World Bank report, regarding innovation in India, also emphasizes these striking societal disparities and contradictions. The report argues that inclusive innovation, and improved knowledge absorption, can play a critical role in lowering the costs of goods and services and in creating income-earning opportunities for the poor (Dutz 2007).

2.7.3. Female skill levels

The mean years of education of non-agricultural workers in India differ widely across gender, but not always and partly considerably more across the formal - informal and urban – rural divides. In 2004-05, with 10.1 years both urban males and females working in the formal sector had the highest average years of schooling, followed by rural males in the formal sector (7.6 years); urban males working in the informal sector (7.0); rural females in the formal sector (5.7), and rural males in the informal sector (5.1), and urban females in the informal sector (4.7). As to be expected, rural females working in the informal sector had by far the lowest educational level (average 2.9 years of schooling -- NCEUS 2009, 24).

In Table 8 we present a frequency division of educational levels for the total economically active population, based on the categories just mentioned.²⁷

27 Note that these levels indicate the educational/skill levels of the economically active, not the skills demanded in the workplace. We did not find Indian statistics concerning the latter, but it may well be that the gender gap in skills demanded and in job levels is considerably larger than Table 8 suggests.

Table 8. Total economically active population by highest level of education completed, by sector (urban/rural) and by gender, 2004-05

	all		women		men	
	women	men	urban	rural	urban	rural
illiterate (ISCED 0)	59.9	27.5	34.3	65.1	12.8	33.7
primary level (ISCED 1-2)	19.1	27.3	20.6	18.8	22.6	29.3
middle (ISCED 3)	9.4	18.4	12.1	8.9	19.3	18.0
secondary level and high school (ISCED 3-4)	7.9	18.9	17.0	6.0	28.0	15.0
graduate and above (ISCED 5-6)	3.7	7.9	16.1	1.2	17.2	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (x million)	150,8	316,0	25,7	125,1	94,0	222,0

Source: NCEUS 2009a (Tables 4.2 and 4.8).

The gender gap in educational level shows up as immense, and the largest of the 14 countries involved in the DECISION FOR LIFE project. In 2004-05, 60% of the female labour force was illiterate – an even larger proportion than in the population at large, where illiteracy at the same time was about 47% (section 2.7.1). By contrast, the share of illiterates in the male labour force was lower than 28%. Moreover, the decline of the illiterate share in the last two decades has been stronger among males. In 1983, the respective figures were 80.8% for females and 57.1% for males, implying a 26% decline for women against 39% for men. By contrast, the share of graduates and above (ISCED levels 5 - 6) among men more than doubled that among women: 7.9% against 3.7%, or 47% women to men parity.²⁸ The gender gap among urban workers is much smaller, especially at the top: 16.1% of all urban female workers was graduated and above, only 1.1% point behind urban males. On the other hand, in 2004-05 more than one in three females working in urban areas was still illiterate, as against one in eight males. The figures confirm that men in rural areas have a lower educational level than urban females. As we pointed out before presenting the table, males working in the formal sector may have attained a slightly higher educational level, but males in the informal rural sector lagged behind urban females. Again, the educational level of rural women is by far lowest of the four categories (all data: NCEUS 2009a).

The industry distribution of educational levels as of 2004-05 provides useful information for our project. This distribution is extremely skewed. As for female workers, the industries with the highest shares of graduates and above were, in this order, banking and finance (71%); real estate and business services (58%); education (48%); public administration and defence (27%); transport, storage and communication (23%), and health and social work (22%). It is interesting to note that these female shares were even higher than the

28 Projections for 2017 suggest that the shares of those graduated and above will increase to about 10% for men and 5% for women by then, implying about 50% women to men parity (NCEUS 2009a, Fig. 5.12).

male shares in three industries, banking and finance (males: 54%); real estate and business services (males: 44%), and, at a lower level, transport et cetera (males: 7%). In other industries employing many women, the shares of graduates and above were quite low in manufacturing (under 2%), wholesale and retail (4%), and hotels and restaurants (3%), and other community, social and personal services (4%). On the low end of the educational distribution, the highest proportions of illiterate women could be found in mining (90%); construction (74%), and other community, social and personal services (62%). In these industries, the share of illiterates among male workers was less than half of these female shares (NCEUS 2009a, Table 4.16).

A state-wise distribution of educational levels for 2004-05 reveals the largest proportion of least educated (illiterates and primary educated, Indian average 62.5%) in Rajasthan (75%); Chhattisgarh (74%), Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh (both 73%). Except Madhya Pradesh, with a quite segmented labour force, these states also showed low shares of graduates and above. With 33%, Kerala had the lowest share. On the positive side, the highest shares of graduates and above (Indian average 6.6%) were in 2004-05 in “other states” (including New Delhi, 23.6%), Maharashtra and Kerala (both 8.2%), Tamil Nadu (8.1%), and Haryana (7.8%). For the female labour force, with an Indian average of 3.7%, by far the highest share of graduates and above was in “other states” (28.6%), followed by Kerala (11.1%), Punjab (8.0%), and West Bengal (5.8%). The all-India average share of graduates and above in the male labour force in 2004-05 was 7.9%. However, “other states”, Kerala and Punjab had higher shares of female graduates and higher than males, most outspokenly in “other states” (5.9%points difference) and Kerala (4.6%points). The female share in Kerala was even higher than the male shares in all states except for “other states”. By contrast, in eight states the shares of male graduates and above still more than doubled those of females: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. For 2004-05 very low female rates of graduates and above were found in Bihar (1.2%), Rajasthan (1.5%), Andhra Pradesh (2.0%), Madhya Pradesh (2.2%) and Uttar Pradesh (2.3%)(NCEUS 2009a, Tables 4.11 and 4.7.18).

As noted above, the gender gap for those graduated and above in urban labour markets was in 2004-05 only 1.1% or 93% women to men parity, considerable progress compared to 1983 (3.3%points difference) and 1993-94 (2.4%points difference). In 2004-05 in all states the share of graduates and above in the female urban labour force was higher than 10%. The highest shares were in “other states” (34.7%), followed by Punjab (33.2%) and Assam (22.3%), and Himachal Pradesh (21.8%). This time, Kerala (21.4%), Haryana (21.3%), Maharashtra (19.3%) and West Bengal (18.9%), states with rather developed labour markets, followed. In the urban labour markets of all these seven states the shares of female graduates and above were

higher than those in the male labour force; this was also the case in Jammu and Kashmir. The most spectacular female advantage was in Punjab (19%points difference, more than double the male rate), followed by Jammu and Kashmir (9.6%points difference), “other states” (9.5%points), and Kerala (9.4%points) (NCEUS 2009a, Table 4.7.17). In the female rural labour force, the share of those at least graduated in 2004-05 was much lower. In 2004-05, 1.2% of all females in rural areas had reached that educational level, against 4.0% of all males, implying a 2.8%points gap or 30% women to men parity. 12 states had 1% or more graduates or above in their female rural labour force. Kerala was on top, with 7.9% female graduates or above, followed by “other states” (7.4%); Himachal Pradesh took the third spot (4.0%). “Other states” and Kerala were the only two with higher shares of female graduates and above in their rural labour forces than men (NCEUS 2009a, Table 4.7.16).

Table 9 (next page) shows a frequency division of educational levels of the total population (not only the labour force!) aged 15-29, thus including our target group. Unfortunately, the educational categories used in these statistics are not fully comparable with those presented earlier for the economically active of all ages. Yet, simple comparisons clarify India's educational progress. For example, among the females aged 15-29 in 2004-05 nearly 40% was illiterate (Table 9), against nearly 60% in the female labour force at large (Table 8). And whereas 29% of the females aged 15-29 had at least secondary education (Table 9), according to comparable statistics (not shown) this share in the female labour force at large was 18%. This is not to deny that for the 15-29 aged there remains a gender gap, in particular in the rural areas. Here, less than 20% of the young women had at least secondary education, against 30% of the young men. In urban areas gender differences have become much smaller: here, 51% of the young women had at least secondary education, compared with 55% among their male colleagues. These figure also confirm that men in rural areas are lower educated than urban females; especially the differences with those with high school and above are striking.

Table 9. Population aged 15-29 by highest level of education completed, by sector (urban/rural) and by gender, 2004-05

	all		women		men	
	women	men	urban	rural	urban	rural
illiterate (ISCED 0)	39.6	23.2	20.1	47.7	13.7	27.8
primary and middle level (ISCED 1-2)	33.6	41.8	33.2	33.8	37.6	43.9
secondary level (ISCED 3)	12.5	16.6	17.7	10.3	19.1	15.4
high school and above (ISCED 4-6)	14.3	18.4	29.0	8.1	29.6	12.9
technical (ISCED 3)	2.0	3.4	4.4	1.0	6.7	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (x million)	138.7	150.8	41.0	97.7	49.4	101.4

Source: NCEUS 2009a (Tables 8.1 and 8.2)

Partly based on earlier sections, we can now produce an estimate of the size of our target group for India, the girls and young women aged 15-29, working in urban areas in commercial services -- that is, wholesale and retail as well as commercial services more narrowly defined, like finance, insurance, and restaurants and hotels (tourism). In section 2.3.2 we estimated, along two lines of calculation, the size of the female labour force aged 15-29 at 43.5 million in 2008, of which 9 million in urban areas. Of this 9 million, approximately one in five or 1.8 million girls and young women can be estimated to belong to our target group as they worked in commercial services. We can also estimate that only about 250,000 of them worked as employees in the formal (organised) sector and that the other nearly 1.6 million had to be traced in the unorganised sector. Some 13 to 16 million (depending on the economic conditions) girls and young women will enter into employment in the next five years, of which 750,000 to 1 million in commercial services in urban areas.²⁹

29 The NCEUS projects India's labour force aged 15-29 for 2012 to become 177.4 million, of which 45.8 million females and 131.6 million males. To a considerable extent labour of young females is projected to remain rural: only 10.1 million employed females (22% of all) were located in urban areas, against 39.0 million (30%) males. Between 2012-17, the growth of the young cohorts in the labour force is projected to flatten, mainly because of higher enrollment in education. For 2017, the size of the labour force aged 15-29 is estimated at 184.8 million, of which 48.1 million females (of which 11.0 million or 23% in urban areas) and 136.7 million males (of which 40.6 million or 30% in urban areas) (NCEUS 2009b, 117-8). The figures confirm the much lower LPRs of young females in urban compared to rural areas we found in section 2.3.2. Obviously, the National Commission does not expect acceleration of rural-urban migration for our target group.

2.8. Wages and working conditions of the target group

2.8.1. Wages

Comprehensive and recent wage information from sources other than the WageIndicator is quite limited for India. The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI, CSO 2007) only provides non-detailed overviews (divided over employees and (manual) workers, workers divided over male, female, child and contract workers) in the “organised factory” sector, totaling nearly 8.5 million workers in 2004-05 – about 40% of total in the organised manufacturing sector. The latest publicly available ASI figures, those of 2004-05, indicate very large wage differentials. Whereas the average wage per “man day worked” for regular male workers was Rs. 212.30 (USD 4.60), for female workers that was only Rs. 91.00 (USD 1.96), implying a gender pay gap³⁰ of 57%. In 2000-01, with average wages of respectively Rs. 180.02 and 78.45, the gender gap was nearly the same (56%). In turn, workers in the organised sector earned on average much more than those in the unorganised sector. According to NCEUS calculations on 2004-05 NSS data, male casual workers employed in the formal sector earned on average Rs. 73.00 per day, whereas male casual workers in the informal sector earned an average Rs. 51.30; for female casual workers these amounts were respectively Rs. 47.40 and Rs. 32.40 (NCEUS 2009a, 24). Here, gender pay gaps show up of 35% in urban areas and 37% in rural areas. Because of the much lower productive days per year in many unorganised trades, the intersectoral distance measured in yearly earnings is mostly much larger.

Data for 2000 show that average yearly wages in the organised “factory sector” roughly more than tripled those of the various categories of wage earners in unorganised and small-scale manufacturing. The average yearly wage in the organised sector was Rs. 13,150, against Rs. 2,620 - 4,240 in the unorganised sector, depending on the category of enterprise – implying that wages in the unorganised sector were 20-30% of those in the organised sector. It should be added that wage rates in the unorganised sector vary substantially across states and activities, as well as across skills, occupations, and experience. In 2000 the textiles, textile products, chemicals, rubber & plastic, basic metals, and equipment sectors had higher wage rates compared to other manufacturing industries all throughout India. Also, consistently higher wages in the unorganised segment were observed in Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Punjab than in the other states (Majumder 2006; Nagaraj 2007).

³⁰ We use the international standard formula for the gender pay (or wage) gap: $((\text{wage men} - \text{wage women}) : \text{wage men}) \times 100$.

Some detailed analyses have combined ASI figures with NSS household survey data, like recently on the effects of international trade for the gender pay gap (Menon and Van der Meulen Rodgers 2009). However, as far as we know wage statistics covering services are lacking, even in the organised sector. Thus, we cannot yet give insight in wages and wage developments for our target group. This situation underlines the importance of the WageIndicator for India, though making a start with salary indications for industries and occupations is not easy under these conditions.

2.8.2. Working conditions

Besides minimum wages, the state government also sets hours of work, and safety and health standards. The Factories Act mandates an eight-hour working day, a 48-hour working week, and safe working conditions, which include adequate provisions for rest rooms, canteens, medical facilities, and proper ventilation. The law mandates a minimum rest period of 30 minutes after every four hours of work and premium pay for overtime. Legislative provisions regulating the conditions of work and workplace to ensure safety as well as safeguards to prevent occupational diseases are in place in case of factories, mines and docks, which together account for less than 10% of the labour force. Provisions for compensation in case of injuries at work and sickness benefits also apply only to workers in these establishments. After the accident in the Bhopal plant of chemicals multinational Union Carbide (1985), which killed several thousand employees and others and debilitated many more, the judiciary, civil society organizations and unions renewed pressure on employers and government for strict enforcement of legal provisions and the right of workers to refuse work in unhealthy and hazardous conditions without adequate safeguards. In contrast, employers' associations have campaigned for doing away with the Labour Inspection and the introduction of a system of self-certification. The trade unions have strongly opposed these proposals (NCEUS 2009a, 177-178). The current state of affairs, however, is that legal provisions regulating conditions of work are mainly enforced in the organised industrial sector (Papola 2008; US Dept of State 2009). Studies by, among others, NCEUS (2007) prove that most workers in the unorganised sector work in very poor physical conditions in unhygienic, crowded and poorly lighted and ventilated workplaces. Many of them work in hazardous conditions and processes, but have no adequate safeguards and even first aid facilities available at the workplace. Even enforcement of health and safety standards in the organised sector may be questionable. Earlier, researchers doing fieldwork in Gujarat found that, among other things, factory inspectors were routinely paid off by employers, both in 1974 and 1998. It is quite unlikely that such practices remained and remain restricted to one state (Streefkerk 2001; Breman 2004).

There are hardly any adequate Indian statistics available concerning occupational health and safety. By necessity, the limited available information has to be distributed over the various categories of workers and sectors (cf. NCEUS 2007, for an excellent overview). Official reporting concentrates on occupational accidents but, except for mining, accidents seem grossly underreported (cf. Ministry of Labour and Employment 2009a). As, in contrast, Indian statistics –though a bit outdated and though overall data is missing– provide rather good evidence on working hours at industry level, we concentrate here on this major issue in working conditions. Table 10 (next page) presents average working week figures for employees detailed by industry and gender, for 2000 and 2006. The results are quite remarkable. Contrary to the international picture, in 2000 female employees in the Indian organised sector on average made longer hours than their male colleagues: an average working week of 48.1 hours against 46.3. Also in international perspective the working hours of notably female employees were quite long, community, social and personal services on top, with an average 48.9 hours. Between 2000 and 2006, the average working week of females has clearly been shortened, by 1.3 hours, whereas the male average working week has been prolonged by 0.5 hours, resulting in equal working hours for both sexes in 2006: on average 46.8 hours. In 2006, women worked shorter than men in two of the six large industries for which information is available (mining and manufacturing), in one sector they made equal hours (wholesale and retail), and in three sectors (utilities; transport et cetera, and community, social and personal services) they still worked longer hours than men. In 2006, for females working weeks were longest in community, social, personal services (47.6 hours on average³¹); for males the working weeks in notably construction and finance et cetera have been prolonged, to a quite long average 49.0 hours. Both averages even surpass the formal 48-hour working week.

31 Though sufficient 2006 data is lacking for notably finance et cetera, with an 48-hours week in 2000.

Table 10. Average working week (hours usually worked, employees, organised sector) by industry and gender, India, 2000 and 2006

		total		men		women	
		2000	2006	2000	2006	2000	2006
mining		47.5	45.4	46.7	46.1	47.6	41.6
manufacturing		47.2	46.9	46.5	46.9	47.8	46.7
<i>of which</i>	food, beverages, tobacco	46.5	46.7	46.5	46.7	46.4	46.5
	textile, apparel, leather	46.1	47.0	46.1	47.0	46.6	47.6
	wood(products), furnit.	46.4	46.6	46.4	46.6	46.8	46.4
	paper(products),printing	47.0	46.8	47.0	46.8	46.6	46.5
	chemicals, petroleum etc.	46.4	47.0	46.4	47.0	46.6	46.4
	non-mineral metal prod.	46.3	46.3	46.3	46.3	46.5	45.2
	basic metal industries	46.5	46.7	46.5	46.7	46.3	46.7
	fabricated metal, machinery, equipment	-	47.2	-	47.2	46.4	47.4
other manufacturing		-	47.2	-	47.2	46.6	47.2
utilities		47.5	46.4	47.0	46.4	48.0	46.5
construction		47.0	49.0	46.6	49.0	47.4	-
transport, storage, communication		46.3	45.0	45.2	44.9	47.4	46.5
wholesale and retail		46.7	46.7	46.0	46.7	47.4	46.7
finance, real estate, other business		45.7	49.0	43.5	49.0	48.0	-
community, social, personal services		46.6	46.9	45.3	46.8	48.9	47.6
Total organised sector*)		46.8	46.8	46.3	46.8	48.1	46.8

Source: ILO Laborsta (Total is authors' calculation)

*) excl. agriculture

3. Basic information for WageIndicator Questionnaire

3.1. Introduction

Preparations for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, grouped in this Chapter and to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses. This basic information can be used on-line, but if needed also off-line. The lists contain information on India's educational categories and ISCED levels (3.2), regions (3.3), ethnic groups (3.4.1) and languages (3.4.2).

3.2. List of educational categories and ISCED levels

Below, a full list of the educational categories used in India, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 11. List of educational categories in India (by 1/1/2009)

en_IN	Master label	Translation	ISCED
356190	IND No formal education	No formal education	0
356191	IND Below 10th standard	Below 10th standard	2
356192	IND Plus 2 or equivalent	Plus 2 or equivalent	3
356193	IND Three year degree (B.com, BBA, B.Sc, B.A. etc.)	Three year degree (B.com, BBA, B.Sc, B.A. etc.)	5
356194	IND CA/CS/ICWA or equivalent	CA/CS/ICWA or equivalent	6
356195	IND Four/five years degree (B.E., MBBS, B.Arch, B.Pharm, LLB, etc.)	Four/five years degree (B.E., MBBS, B.Arch, B.Pharm, LLB, etc.)	5
356196	IND Masters (arts, science, engineering, commerce, MBA/equivalent)	Masters (arts, science, engineering, commerce, MBA/equivalent)	5
356197	IND Advanced certificate/diplomas	Advanced certificate/diplomas	5
356198	IND ITI/other certificates	ITI/other certificates	3
356199	IND PhD or equivalent	PhD or equivalent	6
356200	IND Post Doctoral	Post Doctoral	6

1.1. List of regions

Below, a full draft list of the regions in India, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 12. List of regions in India (by 1/1/2009)

en_IN	en_IN	Source label	Source label	Translation	Translation
3560100000	3560100104	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U) Bamboo Flat	Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	Bamboo Flat
3560100000	3560100204	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U) Garacherama	Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	Garacherāma
3560100000	3560100331	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U) Port Blair	Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	Port Blair
3560100000	3560109704	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U) A village (less than 10,000)	Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	A village (less than 10,000)
3560100000	3560109805	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	IND Andaman and Nicobar islands (U) Rural area	Andaman and Nicobar islands (U)	Rural area
3560200000	3560200131	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Anantapur	Andhra Pradesh	Anantapur
3560200000	3560200231	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Gajuwaka	Andhra Pradesh	Gajuwaka
3560200000	3560200331	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Guntur	Andhra Pradesh	Guntūr
3560200000	3560200407	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad	Andhra Pradesh	Hyderābād
3560200000	3560200502	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh The suburbs of Hyderabad	Andhra Pradesh	The suburbs of Hyderābād
3560200000	3560200631	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Kakinada	Andhra Pradesh	Kākināda
3560200000	3560200731	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Karīm-nagar	Andhra Pradesh	Karīm-nagar
3560200000	3560200831	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Kukatpalle	Andhra Pradesh	Kukatpalle
3560200000	3560200931	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Kurnool	Andhra Pradesh	Kurnool
3560200000	3560201031	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Lالبahadur Nagar	Andhra Pradesh	Lالبahadur Nagar
3560200000	3560201131	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Nellore	Andhra Pradesh	Nellore
3560200000	3560201231	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Nizamabad	Andhra Pradesh	Nizāmābād
3560200000	3560201331	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Qutubul-lapur	Andhra Pradesh	Qutubullapur
3560200000	3560201431	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Rajahmundry	Andhra Pradesh	Rājahmundry
3560200000	3560201531	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Ramagundam	Andhra Pradesh	Rāmagundam
3560200000	3560201631	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Secunderabad Cantonment	Andhra Pradesh	Secunderābād Cantonment
3560200000	3560201731	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Tīrupati	Andhra Pradesh	Tīrupati
3560200000	3560201831	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Vijayawada	Andhra Pradesh	Vijayawāda
3560200000	3560201931	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam	Andhra Pradesh	Visākhapatnam
3560200000	3560202031	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Warangal	Andhra Pradesh	Warangal
3560200000	3560209531	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Andhra Pradesh	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3560200000	3560209632	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Andhra Pradesh	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560200000	3560209704	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh A village (less than 10,000)	Andhra Pradesh	A village (less than 10,000)
3560200000	3560209805	IND Andhra Pradesh	IND Andhra Pradesh Rural area	Andhra Pradesh	Rural area
3560300000	3560300132	IND Arunachal Pradesh	IND Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar	Arunachal Pradesh	Itānagar
3560300000	3560300232	IND Arunachal Pradesh	IND Arunachal Pradesh Naharlagun	Arunachal Pradesh	Naharlagun

3560300000	3560300332	IND Arunachal Pradesh	IND Arunachal Pradesh Pasighat	Arunachal Pradesh	Päsighāt
3560300000	3560309632	IND Arunachal Pradesh	IND Arunachal Pradesh Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Arunachal Pradesh	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560300000	3560309704	IND Arunachal Pradesh	IND Arunachal Pradesh A village (less than 10,000)	Arunachal Pradesh	A village (less than 10,000)
3560300000	3560309805	IND Arunachal Pradesh	IND Arunachal Pradesh Rural area	Arunachal Pradesh	Rural area
3560400000	3560400132	IND Assam	IND Assam Bongaigaon	Assam	Bongaigaon
3560400000	3560400232	IND Assam	IND Assam Dhubri	Assam	Dhubri
3560400000	3560400331	IND Assam	IND Assam Dibrugarh	Assam	Dibrugarh
3560400000	3560400432	IND Assam	IND Assam Diphu	Assam	Diphu
3560400000	3560400531	IND Assam	IND Assam Guwahati	Assam	Guwāhātī
3560400000	3560400632	IND Assam	IND Assam Jorhat	Assam	Jorhāt
3560400000	3560400732	IND Assam	IND Assam Karimganj	Assam	Karīmganj
3560400000	3560400831	IND Assam	IND Assam Nagaon (Nowgong)	Assam	Nagaon (Nowgong)
3560400000	3560400932	IND Assam	IND Assam North Lakhimpur	Assam	North Lakhimpur
3560400000	3560401032	IND Assam	IND Assam Sibsagar	Assam	Sibsāgar
3560400000	3560401131	IND Assam	IND Assam Silchar	Assam	Silchar
3560400000	3560401232	IND Assam	IND Assam Tezpur	Assam	Tezpur
3560400000	3560401332	IND Assam	IND Assam Tinsukia	Assam	Tinsukia
3560400000	3560409632	IND Assam	IND Assam Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Assam	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560400000	3560409704	IND Assam	IND Assam A village (less than 10,000)	Assam	A village (less than 10,000)
3560400000	3560409805	IND Assam	IND Assam Rural area	Assam	Rural area
3560500000	3560500131	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Ara (Arrah)	Bihar	Ara (Arrah)
3560500000	3560500231	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Bhagalpur	Bihar	Bhāgalpur
3560500000	3560500331	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Bihar Sharif	Bihar	Bihār Sharīf
3560500000	3560500431	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Chapra	Bihar	Chāpra
3560500000	3560500531	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Darbhanga	Bihar	Darbhanga
3560500000	3560500631	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Gaya	Bihar	Gaya
3560500000	3560500731	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Katihar	Bihar	Katihār
3560500000	3560500831	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Munger (Monghyr)	Bihar	Munger (Monghyr)
3560500000	3560500931	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Muzaffarpur	Bihar	Muzaffarpur
3560500000	3560501001	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Patna	Bihar	Patna
3560500000	3560501102	IND Bihar	IND Bihar The suburbs of Patna	Bihar	The suburbs of Patna
3560500000	3560501231	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Purnia (Purnea)	Bihar	Pūrnīa (Purnea)
3560500000	3560509531	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Bihar	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3560500000	3560509632	IND Bihar	IND Bihar A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Bihar	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560500000	3560509704	IND Bihar	IND Bihar A village (less than 10,000)	Bihar	A village (less than 10,000)
3560500000	3560509805	IND Bihar	IND Bihar Rural area	Bihar	Rural area
3560600000	3560600131	IND Chandigarh (U)	IND Chandigarh (U) Chandigarh	Chandigarh (U)	Chandīgarh
3560600000	3560609632	IND Chandigarh (U)	IND Chandigarh (U) A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Chandigarh (U)	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560600000	3560609704	IND Chandigarh (U)	IND Chandigarh (U) A village (less than 10,000)	Chandigarh (U)	A village (less than 10,000)
3560600000	3560609805	IND Chandigarh (U)	IND Chandigarh (U) Rural area	Chandigarh (U)	Rural area

3560700000	3560700131	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Bhilai (Bhilai Nagar)	Chhattisgarh	Bhilai (Bhilai Nagar)
3560700000	3560700231	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Bilaspur	Chhattisgarh	Bilāspur
3560700000	3560700331	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Durg	Chhattisgarh	Durg
3560700000	3560700431	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Korba	Chhattisgarh	Korba
3560700000	3560700531	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Raigarh	Chhattisgarh	Raigarh
3560700000	3560700631	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Raipur	Chhattisgarh	Raipur
3560700000	3560700731	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Raj Nandgaon {Raj Nandgaon}	Chhattisgarh	Rāj Nāndgaon {Raj Nandgaon}
3560700000	3560709531	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Chhattisgarh	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3560700000	3560709632	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Chhattisgarh	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560700000	3560709704	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh A village (less than 10,000)	Chhattisgarh	A village (less than 10,000)
3560700000	3560709805	IND Chhattisgarh	IND Chhattisgarh Rural area	Chhattisgarh	Rural area
3560800000	3560800132	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U) amlī	Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	Āmlī
3560800000	3560800232	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U) Silvassa	Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	Silvassa
3560800000	3560809632	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U) Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3560800000	3560809704	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U) A village (less than 10,000)	Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	A village (less than 10,000)
3560800000	3560809805	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	IND Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U) Rural area	Dadra and Nagar Haveli (U)	Rural area
3560900000	3560900132	IND Daman and Diu (U)	IND Daman and Diu (U) Daman	Daman and Diu (U)	Damān
3560900000	3560900232	IND Daman and Diu (U)	IND Daman and Diu (U) Diu	Daman and Diu (U)	Diu
3560900000	3560909704	IND Daman and Diu (U)	IND Daman and Diu (U) A village (less than 10,000)	Daman and Diu (U)	A village (less than 10,000)
3560900000	3560909805	IND Daman and Diu (U)	IND Daman and Diu (U) Rural area	Daman and Diu (U)	Rural area
3561000000	3561000131	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Bhalswa Jahangirpur	Delhi	Bhalswa Jahangirpur
3561000000	3561000231	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Dallo Pura	Delhi	Dallo Pura
3561000000	3561000307	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Delhi	Delhi	Delhi
3561000000	3561000402	IND Delhi	IND Delhi The suburbs of Delhi	Delhi	The suburbs of Delhi
3561000000	3561000531	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Delhi Cantonment	Delhi	Delhi Cantonment
3561000000	3561000631	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Deoli	Delhi	Deoli
3561000000	3561000731	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Karawal Nagar	Delhi	Karawal Nagar
3561000000	3561000831	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Kirari Suleman Nagar	Delhi	Kirari Suleman Nagar
3561000000	3561000931	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Nangloi Jat {Nangloi Jat}	Delhi	Nāngloi Jāt {Nangloi Jat}
3561000000	3561001031	IND Delhi	IND Delhi New Delhi	Delhi	New Delhi
3561000000	3561001131	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Sultanpur Majra	Delhi	Sultanpur Majra
3561000000	3561009632	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Delhi	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561000000	3561009704	IND Delhi	IND Delhi A village (less than 10,000)	Delhi	A village (less than 10,000)
3561000000	3561009805	IND Delhi	IND Delhi Rural area	Delhi	Rural area

3561100000	3561100132	IND Goa	IND Goa Curchorem Cacora	Goa	Curchorem Cacora
3561100000	3561100232	IND Goa	IND Goa Mapuca (Mapusa)	Goa	Māpuca (Mapusa)
3561100000	3561100332	IND Goa	IND Goa Margao (Madgaon)	Goa	Margao (Madgaon)
3561100000	3561100431	IND Goa	IND Goa Mormugao	Goa	Mormugao
3561100000	3561100532	IND Goa	IND Goa Panaji (Panjim)	Goa	Panaji (Panjim)
3561100000	3561109632	IND Goa	IND Goa Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Goa	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561100000	3561109704	IND Goa	IND Goa A village (less than 10,000)	Goa	A village (less than 10,000)
3561100000	3561109805	IND Goa	IND Goa Rural area	Goa	Rural area
3561200000	3561200107	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Ahmadabad	Gujarat	Ahmadābād
3561200000	3561200202	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat The suburbs of Ahmadabad	Gujarat	The suburbs of Ahmadābād
3561200000	3561200331	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Bhavnagar	Gujarat	Bhāvnagar
3561200000	3561200431	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Gandhinagar	Gujarat	Gāndhinagar
3561200000	3561200531	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Jamnagar	Gujarat	Jamnagar
3561200000	3561200602	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Rajkot	Gujarat	Rājkot
3561200000	3561200707	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Surat	Gujarat	Sūrāt
3561200000	3561200802	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat The suburbs of Surat	Gujarat	The suburbs of Sūrāt
3561200000	3561200901	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Vadodara (Baroda)	Gujarat	Vadodara (Baroda)
3561200000	3561201002	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat The suburbs of Vadodara	Gujarat	The suburbs of Vadodara
3561200000	3561209531	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Gujarat	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3561200000	3561209632	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Gujarat	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561200000	3561209704	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat A village (less than 10,000)	Gujarat	A village (less than 10,000)
3561200000	3561209805	IND Gujarat	IND Gujarat Rural area	Gujarat	Rural area
3561300000	3561300131	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Bhiwani	Haryana	Bhiwāni
3561300000	3561300201	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Farīdabad (New Township)	Haryana	Farīdābād (New Township)
3561300000	3561300302	IND Haryana	IND Haryana The suburbs of Farīdabad	Haryana	The suburbs of Farīdābād
3561300000	3561300431	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Gurgaon	Haryana	Gurgaon
3561300000	3561300531	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Hisar	Haryana	Hisār
3561300000	3561300631	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Karnal	Haryana	Karnāl
3561300000	3561300731	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Panīpat	Haryana	Pānīpat
3561300000	3561300831	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Rohtak	Haryana	Rohtak
3561300000	3561300931	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Sirsa	Haryana	Sirsa
3561300000	3561301031	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Sonīpat	Haryana	Sonīpat
3561300000	3561301131	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Yamunanagar	Haryana	Yamunānagar
3561300000	3561309531	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Haryana	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3561300000	3561309632	IND Haryana	IND Haryana A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Haryana	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561300000	3561309704	IND Haryana	IND Haryana A village (less than 10,000)	Haryana	A village (less than 10,000)
3561300000	3561309805	IND Haryana	IND Haryana Rural area	Haryana	Rural area
3561400000	3561400132	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh Mandi	Himachal Pradesh	Mandi

3561400000	3561400232	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh Nahan	Himachal Pradesh	Nāhan
3561400000	3561400331	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh Shimla	Himachal Pradesh	Shimla
3561400000	3561400432	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh Solan	Himachal Pradesh	Solan
3561400000	3561409632	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Himachal Pradesh	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561400000	3561409704	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh A village (less than 10,000)	Himachal Pradesh	A village (less than 10,000)
3561400000	3561409805	IND Himachal Pradesh	IND Himachal Pradesh Rural area	Himachal Pradesh	Rural area
3561500000	3561500132	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Anantnag	Jammu and Kashmir	Anantnāg
3561500000	3561500232	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Baramula	Jammu and Kashmir	Bāramūla
3561500000	3561500331	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Jammu	Jammu and Kashmir	Jammu
3561500000	3561500432	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Kathua	Jammu and Kashmir	Kathua
3561500000	3561500532	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Sopore	Jammu and Kashmir	Sopore
3561500000	3561500631	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Srinagar	Jammu and Kashmir	Srīnagar
3561500000	3561500732	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Udhampur	Jammu and Kashmir	Udhampur
3561500000	3561509632	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Jammu and Kashmir	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561500000	3561509704	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir A village (less than 10,000)	Jammu and Kashmir	A village (less than 10,000)
3561500000	3561509805	IND Jammu and Kashmir	IND Jammu and Kashmir Rural area	Jammu and Kashmir	Rural area
3561600000	3561600131	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Adityapur	Jharkhand	Adityapur
3561600000	3561600231	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Bokaro Steel City	Jharkhand	Bokāro Steel City
3561600000	3561600331	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Dhanbad	Jharkhand	Dhanbād
3561600000	3561600431	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Hazaribag	Jharkhand	Hazārībāg
3561600000	3561600531	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Jamshedpur	Jharkhand	Jamshedpur
3561600000	3561600631	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Mango	Jharkhand	Mango
3561600000	3561600731	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Ranchi	Jharkhand	Rānchi
3561600000	3561609531	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Jharkhand	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3561600000	3561609632	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Jharkhand	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561600000	3561609704	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand A village (less than 10,000)	Jharkhand	A village (less than 10,000)
3561600000	3561609805	IND Jharkhand	IND Jharkhand Rural area	Jharkhand	Rural area
3561700000	3561700107	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Bangalore	Karnataka	Bangalore
3561700000	3561700202	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka The suburbs of Bangalore	Karnataka	The suburbs of Bangalore
3561700000	3561700331	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Belgaum	Karnataka	Belgaum
3561700000	3561700431	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Bellary	Karnataka	Bellary
3561700000	3561700531	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Bijapur	Karnataka	Bijāpur
3561700000	3561700631	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Bommanahalli	Karnataka	Bommanahalli
3561700000	3561700731	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Dasarahalli	Karnataka	Dasarahalli
3561700000	3561700831	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Davanagere	Karnataka	Dāvanagere
3561700000	3561700931	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Gulbarga	Karnataka	Gulbarga

3561700000	3561701031	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Hubli-Dharwar	Karnataka	Hubli-Dhārwar
3561700000	3561701131	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Mangalore	Karnataka	Mangalore
3561700000	3561701231	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Mysore	Karnataka	Mysore
3561700000	3561701331	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Raichur	Karnataka	Rāichūr
3561700000	3561701431	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Shimoga	Karnataka	Shimoga
3561700000	3561701531	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Tumkur	Karnataka	Tumkūr
3561700000	3561709531	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Karnataka	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3561700000	3561709632	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Karnataka	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561700000	3561709704	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka A village (less than 10,000)	Karnataka	A village (less than 10,000)
3561700000	3561709805	IND Karnataka	IND Karnataka Rural area	Karnataka	Rural area
3561800000	3561800131	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Alappuzha (Alleppey)	Kerala	Alappuzha (Alleppey)
3561800000	3561800231	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Kochi (Cochin)	Kerala	Kochi (Cochin)
3561800000	3561800331	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Kollam (Quilon)	Kerala	Kollam (Quilon)
3561800000	3561800431	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Kozhikode (Calicut)	Kerala	Kozhikode (Calicut)
3561800000	3561800531	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Palakkad (Palghat)	Kerala	Palakkad (Pālghāt)
3561800000	3561800631	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum)	Kerala	Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum)
3561800000	3561800731	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Thrissur (Trichur)	Kerala	Thrissur (Trichūr)
3561800000	3561809531	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Kerala	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3561800000	3561809632	IND Kerala	IND Kerala A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kerala	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3561800000	3561809704	IND Kerala	IND Kerala A village (less than 10,000)	Kerala	A village (less than 10,000)
3561800000	3561809805	IND Kerala	IND Kerala Rural area	Kerala	Rural area
3561900000	3561900104	IND Lakshadweep (U)	IND Lakshadweep (U) Amini	Lakshadweep (U)	Amini
3561900000	3561900232	IND Lakshadweep (U)	IND Lakshadweep (U) Kavaratti	Lakshadweep (U)	Kavaratti
3561900000	3561900332	IND Lakshadweep (U)	IND Lakshadweep (U) Minicoy	Lakshadweep (U)	Minicoy
3561900000	3561909704	IND Lakshadweep (U)	IND Lakshadweep (U) A village (less than 10,000)	Lakshadweep (U)	A village (less than 10,000)
3561900000	3561909805	IND Lakshadweep (U)	IND Lakshadweep (U) Rural area	Lakshadweep (U)	Rural area
3562000000	3562000101	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Bhopal	Madhya Pradesh	Bhopāl
3562000000	3562000202	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh The suburbs of Bhopal	Madhya Pradesh	The suburbs of Bhopāl
3562000000	3562000331	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Gwalior	Madhya Pradesh	Gwalior
3562000000	3562000401	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Indore	Madhya Pradesh	Indore
3562000000	3562000502	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh The suburbs of Indore	Madhya Pradesh	The suburbs of Indore
3562000000	3562000601	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur	Madhya Pradesh	Jabalpur
3562000000	3562000702	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh The suburbs of Jabalpur	Madhya Pradesh	The suburbs of Jabalpur
3562000000	3562000831	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Ujjain	Madhya Pradesh	Ujjain
3562000000	3562009531	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Madhya Pradesh	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)

3562000000	3562009632	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Madhya Pradesh	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562000000	3562009704	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh A village (less than 10,000)	Madhya Pradesh	A village (less than 10,000)
3562000000	3562009805	IND Madhya Pradesh	IND Madhya Pradesh Rural area	Madhya Pradesh	Rural area
3562100000	3562100131	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Aurangabad (Shambajinagar)	Maharashtra	Aurangābād (Shambajinagar)
3562100000	3562100201	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Kalyan (-Dombivali)	Maharashtra	Kalyān (-Dombivali)
3562100000	3562100307	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Mumbai [Bombay]	Maharashtra	Mumbai [Bombay]
3562100000	3562100402	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra The suburbs of Mumbai	Maharashtra	The suburbs of Mumbai
3562100000	3562100507	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Nagpur	Maharashtra	Nāgpur
3562100000	3562100602	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra The suburbs of Nagpur	Maharashtra	The suburbs of Nāgpur
3562100000	3562100701	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Nashik	Maharashtra	Nāshik
3562100000	3562100802	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra The suburbs of Nashik	Maharashtra	The suburbs of Nāshik
3562100000	3562100931	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Navi Mumbai (New Bombay)	Maharashtra	Navi Mumbai (New Bombay)
3562100000	3562101001	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Pimpri-Chinchwad	Maharashtra	Pimpri-Chinchwad
3562100000	3562101107	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Pune	Maharashtra	Pune
3562100000	3562101231	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Solapur	Maharashtra	Solāpur
3562100000	3562101301	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Thana	Maharashtra	Thāna
3562100000	3562101402	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra The suburbs of Pune	Maharashtra	The suburbs of Pune
3562100000	3562109531	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Maharashtra	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3562100000	3562109632	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Maharashtra	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562100000	3562109704	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra A village (less than 10,000)	Maharashtra	A village (less than 10,000)
3562100000	3562109805	IND Maharashtra	IND Maharashtra Rural area	Maharashtra	Rural area
3562200000	3562200131	IND Manipur	IND Manipur Imphal	Manipur	Imphāl
3562200000	3562200232	IND Manipur	IND Manipur Kakching	Manipur	Kakching
3562200000	3562200332	IND Manipur	IND Manipur Mayang Imphal	Manipur	Māyāng Imphāl
3562200000	3562200432	IND Manipur	IND Manipur Thoubal	Manipur	Thoubāl
3562200000	3562209632	IND Manipur	IND Manipur Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Manipur	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562200000	3562209704	IND Manipur	IND Manipur A village (less than 10,000)	Manipur	A village (less than 10,000)
3562200000	3562209805	IND Manipur	IND Manipur Rural area	Manipur	Rural area
3562300000	3562300132	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Jowai	Meghalaya	Jowai
3562300000	3562300232	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Mawlai	Meghalaya	Mawlai
3562300000	3562300332	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Nongstoin	Meghalaya	Nongstoin
3562300000	3562300432	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Nongthymmai	Meghalaya	Nongthymmai
3562300000	3562300532	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Pynthorumkhrach	Meghalaya	Pynthorumkhrach
3562300000	3562300631	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Shillong	Meghalaya	Shillong
3562300000	3562300732	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Tura	Meghalaya	Tura
3562300000	3562309632	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Meghalaya	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562300000	3562309704	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya A village (less than 10,000)	Meghalaya	A village (less than 10,000)

3562300000	3562309805	IND Meghalaya	IND Meghalaya Rural area	Meghalaya	Rural area
3562400000	3562400131	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram aizawl	Mizoram	Aizawl
3562400000	3562400232	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram Champhai	Mizoram	Champhai
3562400000	3562400332	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram Kolosib	Mizoram	Kolosib
3562400000	3562400432	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram Lunglei	Mizoram	Lunglei
3562400000	3562400532	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram Saiha	Mizoram	Saiha
3562400000	3562409632	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Mizoram	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562400000	3562409704	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram A village (less than 10,000)	Mizoram	A village (less than 10,000)
3562400000	3562409805	IND Mizoram	IND Mizoram Rural area	Mizoram	Rural area
3562500000	3562500131	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Dimapur	Nagaland	Dimapur
3562500000	3562500232	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Kohima	Nagaland	Kohima
3562500000	3562500332	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Mokokchung	Nagaland	Mokokchung
3562500000	3562500432	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Tuensang	Nagaland	Tuensang
3562500000	3562500532	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Wokha	Nagaland	Wokha
3562500000	3562500632	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Zunheboto	Nagaland	Zunheboto
3562500000	3562509632	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Nagaland	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562500000	3562509704	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland A village (less than 10,000)	Nagaland	A village (less than 10,000)
3562500000	3562509805	IND Nagaland	IND Nagaland Rural area	Nagaland	Rural area
3562600000	3562600131	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Baleshwar (Balasore)	Orissa	Baleshwar (Balasore)
3562600000	3562600231	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Bhubaneswar	Orissa	Bhubaneswar
3562600000	3562600331	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Brahmapur	Orissa	Brahmapur
3562600000	3562600431	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Cuttack	Orissa	Cuttack
3562600000	3562600531	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Puri	Orissa	Puri
3562600000	3562600631	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Raurkela	Orissa	Raurkela
3562600000	3562600731	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Sambalpur	Orissa	Sambalpur
3562600000	3562609531	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Orissa	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3562600000	3562609632	IND Orissa	IND Orissa A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Orissa	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562600000	3562609704	IND Orissa	IND Orissa A village (less than 10,000)	Orissa	A village (less than 10,000)
3562600000	3562609805	IND Orissa	IND Orissa Rural area	Orissa	Rural area
3562700000	3562700132	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Karaikal	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Karaikal
3562700000	3562700232	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Mahe	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Mahe
3562700000	3562700331	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Ozhukarai	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Ozhukarai
3562700000	3562700431	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Puducherry (Pondicherry)
3562700000	3562700532	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Yanam	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Yanam
3562700000	3562709632	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562700000	3562709704	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) A village (less than 10,000)	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	A village (less than 10,000)
3562700000	3562709805	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry)	IND Puducherry (Pondicherry) Rural area	Puducherry (Pondicherry)	Rural area
3562800000	3562800102	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Amritsar	Punjab	Amritsar
3562800000	3562800231	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Bathinda	Punjab	Bathinda

3562800000	3562800331	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Jalandhar	Punjab	Jalandhar
3562800000	3562800401	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Ludhiana	Punjab	Ludhiāna
3562800000	3562800502	IND Punjab	IND Punjab The suburbs of Ludhiana	Punjab	The suburbs of Ludhiāna
3562800000	3562800631	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Patiala	Punjab	Patīāla
3562800000	3562809531	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Punjab	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3562800000	3562809632	IND Punjab	IND Punjab A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Punjab	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562800000	3562809704	IND Punjab	IND Punjab A village (less than 10,000)	Punjab	A village (less than 10,000)
3562800000	3562809805	IND Punjab	IND Punjab Rural area	Punjab	Rural area
3562900000	3562900131	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Ajmer	Rajasthan	Ajmer
3562900000	3562900231	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Alwar	Rajasthan	Alwar
3562900000	3562900331	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Bharatpur	Rajasthan	Bharatpur
3562900000	3562900431	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Bhilwara	Rajasthan	Bhilwāra
3562900000	3562900531	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Bikaner	Rajasthan	Bikāner
3562900000	3562900631	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Ganganagar	Rajasthan	Gangānagar
3562900000	3562900707	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Jaipur	Rajasthan	Jaipur
3562900000	3562900802	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan The suburbs of Jaipur	Rajasthan	The suburbs of Jaipur
3562900000	3562900931	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Jodhpur	Rajasthan	Jodhpur
3562900000	3562901031	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Kota	Rajasthan	Kota
3562900000	3562901131	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Udaipur	Rajasthan	Udaipur
3562900000	3562909531	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Rajasthan	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3562900000	3562909632	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Rajasthan	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3562900000	3562909704	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan A village (less than 10,000)	Rajasthan	A village (less than 10,000)
3562900000	3562909805	IND Rajasthan	IND Rajasthan Rural area	Rajasthan	Rural area
3563000000	3563000132	IND Sikkim	IND Sikkim Gangtok	Sikkim	Gangtok
3563000000	3563000232	IND Sikkim	IND Sikkim Upper Tadong	Sikkim	Upper Tādong
3563000000	3563009632	IND Sikkim	IND Sikkim Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sikkim	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3563000000	3563009704	IND Sikkim	IND Sikkim A village (less than 10,000)	Sikkim	A village (less than 10,000)
3563000000	3563009805	IND Sikkim	IND Sikkim Rural area	Sikkim	Rural area
3563100000	3563100131	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Ambattur	Tamil Nadu	Ambattur
3563100000	3563100231	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Avadi	Tamil Nadu	Avadi
3563100000	3563100307	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Chennai [Madras]	Tamil Nadu	Chennai [Madras]
3563100000	3563100402	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu The suburbs of Chennai	Tamil Nadu	The suburbs of Chennai
3563100000	3563100531	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Coimbatore	Tamil Nadu	Coimbatore
3563100000	3563100631	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Madurai	Tamil Nadu	Madurai
3563100000	3563100731	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Nagercoil	Tamil Nadu	Nāgercoil
3563100000	3563100831	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Salem	Tamil Nadu	Salem
3563100000	3563100931	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Thanjavur	Tamil Nadu	Thanjavūr
3563100000	3563101031	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Thoothukkudi (Tuticorin)	Tamil Nadu	Thoothukkudi (Tuticorin)
3563100000	3563101131	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Tiruchirappalli	Tamil Nadu	Tiruchirāppalli
3563100000	3563101231	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Tirunelveli	Tamil Nadu	Tirunelveli
3563100000	3563101331	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Tiruppur	Tamil Nadu	Tiruppūr
3563100000	3563101431	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Tiruvottiyur	Tamil Nadu	Tirūvottiyūr

3563100000	3563109531	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Tamil Nadu	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3563100000	3563109632	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Tamil Nadu	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3563100000	3563109704	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu A village (less than 10,000)	Tamil Nadu	A village (less than 10,000)
3563100000	3563109805	IND Tamil Nadu	IND Tamil Nadu Rural area	Tamil Nadu	Rural area
3563200000	3563200131	IND Tripura	IND Tripura Agartala	Tripura	Agartala
3563200000	3563200232	IND Tripura	IND Tripura Badharghat	Tripura	Badharghat
3563200000	3563200332	IND Tripura	IND Tripura Dharmanagar	Tripura	Dharmanagar
3563200000	3563200432	IND Tripura	IND Tripura Jogendranagar	Tripura	Jogendranagar
3563200000	3563209632	IND Tripura	IND Tripura Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Tripura	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3563200000	3563209704	IND Tripura	IND Tripura A village (less than 10,000)	Tripura	A village (less than 10,000)
3563200000	3563209805	IND Tripura	IND Tripura Rural area	Tripura	Rural area
3563400000	3563400101	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh agra	Uttar Pradesh	Āgra
3563400000	3563400202	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh The suburbs of agra	Uttar Pradesh	The suburbs of Āgra
3563400000	3563400331	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Aligarh	Uttar Pradesh	Aligarh
3563400000	3563400402	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Allahabad	Uttar Pradesh	Allahābād
3563400000	3563400531	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Bareilly	Uttar Pradesh	Bareilly
3563400000	3563400602	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Ghaziabad	Uttar Pradesh	Ghāziābād
3563400000	3563400731	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Gorakhpur	Uttar Pradesh	Gorakhpur
3563400000	3563400831	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Jhansi	Uttar Pradesh	Jhānsi
3563400000	3563400907	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Kanpur	Uttar Pradesh	Kānpur
3563400000	3563401002	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh The suburbs of Kanpur	Uttar Pradesh	The suburbs of Kānpur
3563400000	3563401107	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Lucknow	Uttar Pradesh	Lucknow
3563400000	3563401202	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh The suburbs of Lucknow	Uttar Pradesh	The suburbs of Lucknow
3563400000	3563401301	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Meerut	Uttar Pradesh	Meerut
3563400000	3563401402	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh The suburbs of Meerut	Uttar Pradesh	The suburbs of Meerut
3563400000	3563401531	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Moradabad	Uttar Pradesh	Morādābād
3563400000	3563401631	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Saharanpur	Uttar Pradesh	Sahāranpur
3563400000	3563401701	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Varanasi [Benares]	Uttar Pradesh	Vārānasi [Benares]
3563400000	3563401802	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh The suburbs of Varanasi	Uttar Pradesh	The suburbs of Vārānasi
3563400000	3563409531	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	Uttar Pradesh	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3563400000	3563409632	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Uttar Pradesh	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3563400000	3563409704	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh A village (less than 10,000)	Uttar Pradesh	A village (less than 10,000)
3563400000	3563409805	IND Uttar Pradesh	IND Uttar Pradesh Rural area	Uttar Pradesh	Rural area
3563300000	3563300131	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Dehra Dun	Uttarakhand	Dehra Dūn
3563300000	3563300231	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Haldwani	Uttarakhand	Haldwāni
3563300000	3563300331	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Hardwar	Uttarakhand	Hardwār
3563300000	3563300432	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Kashipur	Uttarakhand	Kāshipur
3563300000	3563300531	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Roorkee	Uttarakhand	Roorkee
3563300000	3563300632	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Rudrapur	Uttarakhand	Rudrapur

3563300000	3563309632	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Uttarakhand	Another small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3563300000	3563309704	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand A village (less than 10,000)	Uttarakhand	A village (less than 10,000)
3563300000	3563309805	IND Uttarakhand	IND Uttarakhand Rural area	Uttarakhand	Rural area
3563500000	3563500131	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Asansol	West Bengal	Asansol
3563500000	3563500231	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Bhatpara	West Bengal	Bhātpāra
3563500000	3563500331	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Durgapur	West Bengal	Durgāpur
3563500000	3563500401	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Haora (Howrah)	West Bengal	Hāora (Howrah)
3563500000	3563500502	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal The suburbs of Haora	West Bengal	The suburbs of Hāora
3563500000	3563500631	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Kamarhati	West Bengal	Kamarhati
3563500000	3563500707	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Kolkata [Calcutta]	West Bengal	Kolkata [Calcutta]
3563500000	3563500802	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal The suburbs of Kolkata	West Bengal	The suburbs of Kolkata
3563500000	3563500931	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Maheshtala	West Bengal	Maheshtala
3563500000	3563501031	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Panihati	West Bengal	Pānihāti
3563500000	3563501131	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Rajpur Sonarpur	West Bengal	Rājpur Sonārpur
3563500000	3563501231	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal South Dum Dum	West Bengal	South Dum Dum
3563500000	3563509531	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Another town (100,000 - 1 million)	West Bengal	Another town (100,000 - 1 million)
3563500000	3563509632	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	West Bengal	A small city (10,000 - 100,000)
3563500000	3563509704	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal A village (less than 10,000)	West Bengal	A village (less than 10,000)
3563500000	3563509805	IND West Bengal	IND West Bengal Rural area	West Bengal	Rural area

3.3. List of ethnic groups and languages

3.3.1. Ethnic groups

Below, a list of the main ethnic groups distinguished in India and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found (ST = Scheduled Tribe; SC = Scheduled Caste; OBC = Other Backward Caste).

Table 13. List of ethnic groups in India (by 1/1/2009)

en_IN	Master label	Translation
356001	IND SC	SC
356002	IND ST	ST
356003	IND OBC	OBC
356099	IND Other	Other

3.3.2. Languages

Hindi is the official language and the most commonly spoken (about 40% of the population), but not all dialects are mutually comprehensible. English also has official status and is widely used in business and politics, although knowledge of English varies much. The teaching of Hindi and English is compulsory in most states and union territories. Twenty-two languages are legally recognized by the constitution for various political, educational, and other purposes (Library of Congress 2004; wikipedia). Below, a list of the main languages distinguished in India and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 14. List of languages in India (by 1/1/2009)

en_IN	Master label	Translation
356001	IND Hindi	Hindi
356002	IND Bengali	Bengali
356003	IND Telugu	Telugu
356004	IND Marathi	Marathi
356005	IND Tamil	Tamil
356006	IND Urdu	Urdu
356007	IND Gujarati	Gujarati
356008	IND Kannada	Kannada
356009	IND Malayalam	Malayalam
356010	IND English	English
356998	IND Local dialect	Local dialect
356999	IND Other language	Other language

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What is WageIndicator?

WageIndicator has websites in 50 countries. In every country, a national website has a free Salary Check. This Check provides detailed information about the wages, on average earned in a wide range of occupations, taken into account personal characteristics, such as tenure/age, education, supervisory position, region and alike.

Apart from the Salary Check, the websites in many countries have attractive web-tools, such as Minimum Wage Checks, DecentWorkCheck, Gross-Net Earnings Check, and alike. In addition, most websites have content about wages, working conditions, labor standards and related topics. Each country has at least one website. Multilingual countries have two or more websites. In addition, many countries have websites for target groups, for example women or youth. The project website is www.wageindicator.org.

Worldwide, the national WageIndicator websites attract large numbers of web-visitors. The websites are consulted by workers for their job mobility decisions, annual performance talks or wage negotiations. They are consulted by school pupils, students or re-entrant women facing occupational choices, or by employers in small and medium sized companies when recruiting staff or negotiating wages with their employees.

In return for all free information provided, the web-visitors are encouraged to complete a web-survey, which takes 10 to 20 minutes. The survey has detailed questions about earnings, benefits, working conditions, employment contract, training, as well as questions about education, occupation, industry, and household characteristics. This web-survey is comparable across all countries. The web-survey is continuously posted at all WageIndicator websites, of course in the national language(s) and adapted to country-specific issues, where needed. The data from the web-survey are used for the calculations, underlying the Salary Check. For occupations with at least 50 observations in the national database a salary indication can be calculated. The Salary Checks are updated annually.

The project started in 2000 in the Netherlands with a large-scale, paper-based survey to collect data on women's wages. In 2001 the first WageIndicator website with a Salary Check and a web-survey was launched. Since 2004, websites were launched in European countries, in North and South America, in South-Africa, and in countries in Asia. All large economies of the world currently have a WageIndicator website, among which the USA, the Russian Federation, China, India and Brazil. From 2009 onwards, websites are being launched in more African countries, as well as in Indonesia and in a number of post-soviet countries. More information about the WageIndicator Foundation and its activities can be found at www.wageindicator.org.

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- 09-74 Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship? The uncertain relevance of flexicurity policies for segmented labour markets and residual welfare regimes
2009 - Aliko Mouriki (guest at AIAS from October 2008 - March 2009)
- 09-73 Education, inequality, and active citizenship tensions in a differentiated schooling system
2009 - Herman van de Werfhorst
- 09-72 An analysis of firm support for active labor market policies in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands
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- 08-71 The Dutch minimum wage radical reduction shifts main focus to part-time jobs
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- 08-70 Parallele innovatie als een vorm van beleidsleren: Het voorbeeld van de keten van werk en inkomen
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- 08-69 Balancing roles - bridging the divide between HRM, employee participation and learning in the Dutch knowledge economy
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- 08-68 From policy to practice: Assessing sectoral flexicurity in the Netherlands
October 2008 - Hesther Houwing / Trudie Schils
- 08-67 The first part-time economy in the world. Does it work?
Republication August 2008 - Jelle Visser
- 08-66 Gender equality in the Netherlands: an example of Europeanisation of social law and policy
May 2008 - Nuria E.Ramos-Martin
- 07-65 Activating social policy and the preventive approach for the unemployed in the Netherlands
January 2008 - Minna van Gerven
- 07-64 Struggling for a proper job: Recent immigrants in the Netherlands
January 2008 - Aslan Zorlu
- 07-63 Marktwerking en arbeidsvoorwaarden – de casus van het openbaar vervoer, de energiebedrijven en de thuiszorg
July 2007 - Marc van der Meer, Marian Schaapman & Monique Aerts
- 07-62 Vocational education and active citizenship behaviour in cross-national perspective
November 2007 - Herman G. van der Werfhorst
- 07-61 The state in industrial relations: The politics of the minimum wage in Turkey and the USA
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- 07-60 Sample bias, weights and efficiency of weights in a continuous web voluntary survey
September 2007 - Pablo de Pedraza, Kea Tijdens & Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo
- 07-59 Globalization and working time: Work-Place hours and flexibility in Germany
October 2007 - Brian Burgoon & Damian Raess
- 07-58 Determinants of subjective job insecurity in 5 European countries
August 2007 - Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo & Pablo de Pedraza
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May 2007 - Paul de Beer & Trudie Schils
- 07-56 Employment protection in dutch collective labour agreements
April 2007 - Trudie Schils

- 07-54 [Temporary agency work in the Netherlands](#)
February 2007 - Kea Tijdens, Maarten van Klaveren, Hester Houwing, Marc van der Meer & Marieke van Essen
- 07-53 [Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy](#)
Country report: Belgium
January 2007 - Johan de Deken
- 07-52 [Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy](#)
Country report: Germany
January 2007 - Bernard Ebbinghaus & Werner Eichhorst
- 07-51 [Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy](#)
Country report: Denmark
January 2007 - Per Kongshøj Madsen
- 07-50 [Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy](#)
Country report: The United Kingdom
January 2007 - Jochen Clasen
- 07-49 [Distribution of responsibility for social security and labour market policy](#)
Country report: The Netherlands
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- 04-27 [Female income, the ego effect and the divorce decision: evidence from micro data](#)
March 2004 - Randy Kesselring (Professor of Economics at Arkansas State University, USA) was guest at AIAS in April and May 2003
- 04-26 [Economische effecten van Immigratie – Ontwikkeling van een Databestand en eerste analyses](#)
Januari 2004 - Joop Hartog & Aslan Zorlu
- 03-25 [Wage Indicator – Dataset Loonwijzer](#)
Januari 2004 - Kea Tijdens
- 03-24 [Codeboek DUCADAM dataset](#)
December 2003 - Killian Schreuder & Kea Tijdens
- 03-23 [Household consumption and savings around the time of births and the role of education](#)
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- 03-22 [A panel data analysis of the effects of wages, standard hours and unionisation on paid overtime work in Britain](#)
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- 03-20 *Individuals' unemployment durations over the business cycle*
June 2003 - Adriaan Kalwei
- 03-19 *Een onderzoek naar CAO-afspraken op basis van de FNV cao-databank en de AWWN-database*
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- 03-17 *Working women's choices for domestic help*
October 2003 - Kea Tijdens, Tanja van der Lippe & Esther de Ruijter
- 03-16 *De invloed van de Wet arbeid en zorg op verlofregelingen in CAO's*
October 2003 - Marieke van Essen
- 03-15 *Flexibility and social protection*
August 2003 - Ton Wilthagen
- 03-14 *Top incomes in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century*
September 2003 - A.B. Atkinson & dr. W. Salverda
- 03-13 *Tax evasion in Albania: An institutional vacuum*
April 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
- 03-12 *Politico-economic institutions and the informal sector in Albania*
May 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
- 03-11 *Tax evasion and the source of income: An experimental study in Albania and the Netherlands*
May 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
- 03-10 *Chances and limitations of "benchmarking" in the reform of welfare state structures - the case of pension policy*
May 2003 - Martin Schludi
- 03-09 *Dealing with the "flexibility-security-nexus: Institutions, strategies, opportunities and barriers*
May 2003 - Ton Wilthagen & Frank Tros
- 03-08 *Tax evasion in transition: Outcome of an institutional clash - Testing Feige's conjecture*
March 2003 - Klarita Gërxhani
- 03-07 *Teleworking policies of organisations- The Dutch experience*
February 2003 - Kea Tijdens & Maarten van Klaveren
- 03-06 *Flexible work - Arrangements and the quality of life*
February 2003 - Cees Nierop
- 01-05 *Employer's and employees' preferences for working time reduction and working time differentiation – A study of the 36 hours working week in the Dutch banking industry*
2001 - Kea Tijdens
- 01-04 *Pattern persistence in european trade union density*
October 2001 - Danielle Checchi & Jelle Visser
- 01-03 *Negotiated flexibility in working time and labour market transitions – The case of the Netherlands*
2001 - Jelle Visser

01-02 Substitution or segregation: Explaining the gender composition in Dutch manufacturing industry
1899 – 1998

June 2001 - Maarten van Klaveren & Kea Tijdens

00-01 The first part-time economy in the world. Does it work?

June 2000 - Jelle Visser


Information about AIAS

AIAS is a young interdisciplinary institute, established in 1998, aiming to become the leading expert centre in the Netherlands for research on industrial relations, organisation of work, wage formation and labour market inequalities. As a network organisation, AIAS brings together high-level expertise at the University of Amsterdam from five disciplines:

- Law
- Economics
- Sociology
- Psychology
- Health and safety studies

AIAS provides both teaching and research. On the teaching side it offers a Masters in Comparative Labour and Organisation Studies and one in Human Resource Management. In addition, it organizes special courses in co-operation with other organisations such as the Netherlands Centre for Social Innovation (NCSI), the Netherlands Institute for Small and Medium-sized Companies (MKB-Nederland), the National Centre for Industrial Relations 'De Burcht', the National Institute for Co-determination (GBIO), and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. AIAS has an extensive research program (2004-2008) on Institutions, Inequalities and Internationalisation, building on the research performed by its member scholars. Current research themes effectively include:

- Wage formation, social policy and industrial relations
- The cycles of policy learning and mimicking in labour market reforms in Europe
- The distribution of responsibility between the state and the market in social security
- The wage-indicator and world-wide comparison of employment conditions
- The projects of the LoWER network



Amsterdam Institute for Advanced labour Studies

University of Amsterdam

Plantage Muidersgracht 12 • 1018 TV Amsterdam • The Netherlands

Tel +31 20 525 4199 • Fax +31 20 525 4301

aias@uva.nl • www.uva-aias.net