

**Do Liberals Play Nice?
The Effects of Party and Political Ideology
in Public Goods and Trust Games**

By

Lisa Anderson
Department of Economics
College of William and Mary

Jennifer Mellor
Department of Economics
College of William and Mary

Jeffrey Milyo
Truman School of Public Affairs and
Department of Economics
University of Missouri

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Anderson, Mellor and Milyo

“Jesus was a liberal” — Alan Colmes, political commentator for Fox News¹

Introduction

Democrats and liberals are generally understood to be more caring and kind than Republicans and conservatives; for example, even conservative author and media personality Ben Wattenberg has acknowledged that “the word ‘conservative’ conjures up images of the miserly Ebenezer Scrooge, while ‘liberal’ brings to mind kindly Santa Claus.” (PBS Think-Tank, 1995). This perception of Democrats and liberals as more other-regarding, while not universal,² is pervasive enough that George W. Bush, while campaigning for the Republican nomination for president, adopted the moniker of a “compassionate conservative” to counter such stereotypes. But are left-leaning individuals really more generous and trusting?

We put conventional wisdom to the test by examining differences in the behavior of liberal versus conservative subjects in two classic experimental settings: the public goods game and the bilateral trust game. In the first set of experiments, we test whether Democrats or liberals are more likely to contribute to a group account when such actions are contrary to self-interest. In the latter set of experiments, we test whether Democrats and liberals choose to trust strangers or to behave in a trustworthy fashion, despite monetary incentives to the contrary. The

¹From a chapter heading in Colmes (2003).

²Some would argue that liberals are indeed generous, albeit with others’ money. This opposing view is most succinctly articulated by the conservative author and provocateur, Ann Coulter: “...there is only one thing wrong with liberals: They’re no good.” (Coulter, 2002).

question of whether political attributes influence behavior is interesting in itself, but also because experimental subjects are often drawn from a pool of atypically liberal college students. To the extent that political attitudes are an important determinant of behavior, experimental researchers must take added caution in applying findings to contexts outside the lab. Similar concerns regarding the “indoctrinating effect” of economic instruction received by the pool of likely experimental subjects have generated an extensive literature,³ but no previous published work systematically examines the effects of political party or ideology.⁴ Finally, our study complements recent experimental work on the validity of survey measures of trust (Glaeser, et al. 2000 and Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2004a), in that we test whether the self-proclaimed generosity of Democrats and liberals is just cheap talk.

While an experimental test of the proposition that liberals “play nice” has many advantages over non-experimental techniques, one drawback is that the true association between ideology and generosity may be a response to perceived inequities in the social environment. Therefore, liberals may not behave more compassionately in the artificially egalitarian setting of the laboratory. In order to address this concern, we induce inequality among subjects by manipulating the show-up fee paid to all participants.⁵ This experimental design allows us to test

³Findings on the “indoctrination effect” are quite mixed; for a recent review and novel evidence contra the existence of such an effect, see Frey and Meier (2003).

⁴There are only two related studies of which we are aware: Mestelman and Feeny (1988) report some suggestive evidence that political ideology influences free-riding in a public goods game, while Fehr et al. (2003) show that major party affiliation among experimental subjects in Germany is associated with trust and trustworthiness in a one-shot trust game. However, the latter study does not estimate the effects of left-leaning versus right-leaning party affiliation or ideology.

⁵Elsewhere, we have demonstrated that such manipulations influence contribution levels (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2004a and 2004b).

whether liberals play more nicely in non-egalitarian versus egalitarian settings.

In the next section we describe evidence from national surveys on the relationship between political attitudes and support for government spending and trust. In turn, we describe the study design, survey results and experimental results. In short, we find that despite conventional wisdom, Democrats and liberals do not play nice, at least no more so than Republicans or conservatives.

Political Party and Ideology: Evidence from National Surveys

The popular perception that Democrats and liberals are more kindhearted stems in part from the consistent finding in opinion surveys that left-leaning individuals tend to support increased public spending on social programs. Such associations in survey data are well known and are stock material in popular textbook accounts of American politics (e.g., Wilson and DiIulio 2004). However, it is less obvious that left-leaning individuals are more trusting, even though trust is often considered part and parcel with generosity. In fact, recent research shows that minorities, lower income individuals and women (i.e., the core constituency of the Democrat party) tend to exhibit less trusting attitudes (Alesina and La Ferrara 1999). On the other hand, generalized trust is also well known to be lowest in the South, a bastion of ideological conservatism (Putnam 2000). Consequently, survey evidence lends at best mixed support for the conventional view that Democrats and liberals are more trusting. As we will illustrate shortly, the patterns found in national survey data are also observed among our experimental subjects.

In order to provide a baseline for comparing the representativeness of the opinions of our experimental subjects, we examine the correlation of political party and ideology with support

for public goods and a common attitudinal measure of trust. For this exercise, we employ data from two national opinion surveys, the 1972-2002 General Social Survey (GSS) and the 2000 National Election Survey (NES).

We first consider the evidence from the GSS; this cumulated data set has the advantage that we can separately analyze the opinions of college-aged individuals (18 to 22 year-olds). We measure opinions about spending on public programs by constructing a count of the number of times an individual states that there is currently “too little government spending” on any of eight major programmatic areas (arms, education, foreign aid, health, social security, transportation and welfare); in a similar fashion, we also measure support for the subset of social spending categories (education, health, social security and welfare). The results presented in Table 1 are quite consistent with textbook accounts: Democrats and liberals are more supportive of government spending, particularly on social programs. These proclivities are likewise present among 18 to 22 year-olds.

Next, we follow Putnam (2000) and others in measuring trust by agreement with the statement “in general, most people can be trusted.” Contrary to common stereotypes, panel A of Table 1 shows that Republicans are more trusting of others, while Democrats are less so. In addition, there is a weak negative correlation between liberal ideology and trust. Panel B reveals that young Republicans are likewise more trusting, but in contrast to the general population, 18 to 22 year-olds tend to be more liberal, and liberalism among this group is associated with *increased* trust in others.

We attempt to resolve this inconsistent relationship between ideology and trust by adopting a more meaningful measure of self-rated ideology. Using the 2000 NES, we construct

an alternative ideological score that is simply the difference between a respondent's self-rating and their rating of George W. Bush. We prefer this measure since the meaning of the term "liberal" may be sensitive to context; for example, the "liberal" label may have more positive connotations among college-aged individuals than in the general population.

The results in Table 2 demonstrate that the 2000 NES respondents are somewhat more partisan and liberal than the 1972-2002 GSS respondents (this is understandable given the different time periods examined). In addition, Democrats and liberals (however defined) prefer increased government spending. Further, Republicans tend to be more trusting and Democrats less so. However, liberal ideology is only weakly and negatively associated with trust, while our alternative measure of liberal ideology is weakly and positively correlated with trust. We observe a broadly similar pattern for the subset of 18 to 22 year-olds in the NES, although the sample size is quite limited ($n=30$) so nearly all of these correlations are insignificant (not shown).

Taken together, these national survey results confirm that Democrats and liberals are more likely to favor spending on public programs, while Republicans are more likely to profess trust in others. However, the association between ideology and trust is more ambiguous, particularly when considering the college-aged population or our alternative measure of relative liberalism.

Study Design

Subjects participated in either a public goods experiment or a trust experiment. For each session a group of eight subjects was recruited from undergraduate classes at the College of William and Mary. The games, which are described below, were repeated for 30 rounds with

feedback about others' decisions provided at the end of each round. At the completion of the 30 rounds, one round was randomly chosen to determine earnings. Earnings average \$19.57 in the public goods game and \$22.21 in the trust game. Finally, at the end of each experimental session we administered a survey with 42 questions covering demographic characteristics, political attitudes and social capital measures.

We conducted six sessions of the public goods experiment designed by Marwell and Ames (1979). In particular each person in a group of eight was given ten tokens to divide between a private account and a group account (i.e., the public good). The private account earned a return of \$1 to the individual. Each token contributed to the group account earned \$0.25 for all eight members of the group. This public goods design is linear in the sense that the return to the group account is a linear function of the total number of tokens in that account. Note that it is individually optimal to put all tokens in the private account (since $\$1 > \0.25). Additionally, it is socially optimal for everyone to put all tokens in the public account (since $8 * \$0.25 = \$2 > \$1$), making this a prisoner's dilemma game.

We conducted 12 sessions of the trust (investment) game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In the trust game one subject (the first mover) was given \$10 and offered the opportunity to pass some, all or none to a partner (the second mover). All passed money was tripled before being received by the second mover. Finally, the second mover had the opportunity to pass some, all or none of the money he received back to the first mover. Using backward induction, it is straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrium for this game is that no money will be passed in the first stage since second movers have no incentive to return

money in the second stage.⁶ Subjects were randomly assigned to be a first mover or a second mover in the game. Roles remained constant throughout the experimental session but subjects were randomly re-paired at the beginning of each new round.

The experimental design is described in Table 3. Note that each session was divided into three blocks of ten rounds. Each block represented a different distribution of fixed show-up payments.⁷ The purpose of this variation in fixed payments was to create a less egalitarian environment that would allow us to test whether the association between liberal ideology and support for public goods or trust is conditioned on the perceived fairness of the social environment.⁸ We considered two inequality treatments, which are described as “skewed” and “symmetric” in Table 3. Note that the average fixed payment is \$7.50 in all three treatments.

Survey Results

We next examine the correlations of measures of political party and ideology with attitudinal measures regarding spending and trust among subjects who participated in our public goods and trust experiments (n=144). Our survey included four questions pertaining to political ideology. The first asked subjects to indicate the political party to which they belong, and a follow-up question asked subjects to choose the political party that best represents their interests, where available responses included Democrat, Republican, other, and none. Because one-third

⁶This analysis applies to a one-shot game, but can also be extended to a repeated game with a known endpoint.

⁷ It is a standard practice to pay subjects a fixed fee for showing up for an experiment. This payment supplements what subjects earn based on their decisions and serves as a lower bound on their compensation for participating in the experiment.

⁸The behavioral effect of heterogeneity in the fixed payments is discussed in Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2004a and 2004b).

of the subjects did not report a response to the party membership question, we used the second question to define party interests. As shown in Table 4, 40.3% of respondents reported that the Democrat party best represents their interests, 37.5% reported Republican, and nontrivial fractions of respondents chose the other and no party categories. This formulation of party affinity is similar to questions about Democrat or Republican leanings in the GSS and NES. Compared to national opinion then, our experimental subjects were somewhat less partisan, but among party-leaners, slightly more Republican.

To measure political ideology, the survey first asked subjects to rate their ideological leanings on a scale from zero to 10, with zero defined as extreme conservative, five as moderate, and 10 as extreme liberal. Subjects averaged slightly “left” of moderate with a 5.46 on this scale. The survey next instructed subjects to rate President Bush in the same manner; subtracting this rating from the subject’s own rating yields our second measure of ideology. On average, subjects in our experiments perceived themselves as more liberal than President Bush. Our subjects were also more liberal than the average of all GSS respondents, but very comparable in this dimension to NES respondents and the subset of college-aged GSS respondents.

As shown in Table 4, the correlations between political party or ideology and variables representing public spending are generally similar to those reported for the GSS, and to a lesser extent, the NES. Alignment with the Democrat party was positively and significantly correlated with views that government spending overall and on social programs in particular is too low⁹.

⁹The survey question for government spending was phrased: “Use the following scale to indicate your opinion about government spending on each program (1=Too little, 2= About right, 3=Too much): National defense, foreign aid, welfare, education, transportation, Social Security, Medicare, police and prisons.” When looking at attitudes about social programs we used only the responses regarding welfare, education, Social Security, and Medicare.

Significant negative correlations exist between both measures of spending attitudes and subject affinity for the Republican party. Further, the sizes of the correlations between party and social program spending are almost identical to those reported in Table 2 using the NES respondents, a much more recent sample than the pooled GSS sample. The findings reported in Table 4 also indicate that being more liberal in either absolute terms or relative to Bush is positively associated with views that government spending is too low, as was the case in both the GSS and NES.

Consistent with the national surveys, we also find that Republicans are significantly more trusting, and that liberal attitudes negatively correlate with perceptions that most people can be trusted, although the latter are not statistically significant.¹⁰ Finally, Table 4 reports the correlations between political party and ideology and a question not examined in the GSS or NES -- self-reported trustworthiness.¹¹ While 92% of our subjects view themselves as trustworthy, there are positive and significant correlations between self-reported trustworthiness and both measures of liberal political leanings.

In summary, our survey of the opinions of our experimental subjects exhibits similar patterns to those found in national surveys. Consistent with popular belief, Democrats and liberals support increased spending on public programs. However, in contrast to popular

¹⁰ The survey reads “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” with available responses of “most people can be trusted”, “it depends” and “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people.” We formed a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for responses for “most people can be trusted” and 0 otherwise.

¹¹ This question is worded “Do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I am trustworthy?’”. For responses of “strongly agree” and “agree but not strongly,” we coded a trustworthiness indicator variable to 1; for responses of “uncertain, or it depends,” “disagree but not strongly,” and “strongly disagree,” we coded the indicator variable as 0.

wisdom (but consistent with evidence from national surveys), Republicans exhibit more trust and political ideology is only weakly and inconsistently associated with trust. We now turn to the question of whether party and ideology affect behavior in public goods and trust games.

Experimental Results

From the public goods experiment, we report mean values of the number of tokens contributed by subjects to the group account. This action is thought to reflect the value subjects place on the welfare of other subjects, much like the survey questions on government spending on social programs. From the trust experiments, we report mean amounts sent by first movers, a measure of the level of trust that player has in his or her randomly-matched partner. Finally, we also examine the mean ratio of amount returned to amount available among the second movers, which can be interpreted as the trustworthiness of these subjects. For each subject, we calculate the average decision over 30 rounds, and we then average those values over the 48 subjects that participated in that feature of the experiment. The means for the full sample are reported in Table 5, along with means by the subjects' party and ideology.

Unlike the survey responses on public spending, trust, and trustworthiness, the mean decisions of our subjects do not show marked differences by political party and ideology. For example, in the public goods experiment, subjects with Democratic leanings contributed an average of 2.8 tokens to the group account, and those with Republican leanings contributed only slightly less, or 2.6 tokens. This difference between Democrats and Republicans does not prove to be significant according to a Mann-Whitney test carried out in a sample of only those two groups. Moreover, in a series of Mann-Whitney tests we conducted for each party and ideology subgroup, we found no significant differences in group account contribution for any one group of

subjects relative to the remaining subjects. This same pattern of results is exhibited for both the amount sent decision and the return ratio decision. There is little discernable difference in trusting behavior between Democrats and Republicans (i.e., amounts sent average 4.52 and 4.51 respectively). While the differences between liberals and non-liberals are somewhat larger at 5.14 versus 4.85 tokens, or 5.49 versus 4.45 tokens, these are not significant according to Mann-Whitney tests. Trusting behavior is also higher among subjects with other party or no party interests compare to all others, but again those differences are not statistically significant. In the analysis of mean return ratio, conjectured to reflect the subject's trustworthiness, there is a clear tendency among all groups to return roughly one-third of the tokens available. Recall that in the experiment, tokens sent to the second mover were tripled before the return decision was made; thus, the return ratio is strongly associated with the multiplier used in the experimental design. The minor fluctuations by subgroup are not significant according to Mann-Whitney tests.

We next analyze subject decisions using OLS regression models; this allows us to control for the influence of subject race and gender in testing for the effects of political leanings. This approach also allows us to examine another feature of our experimental design. Because the effects of ideology may only be triggered by perceived inequities not visible in an egalitarian laboratory setting, we varied the payments that our subjects received within each session. As we described earlier, of the 30 decisions made by subjects in each game, ten were made in settings where all subjects received the same show-up fee of \$7.50, another ten were made in settings where show-up fees were symmetrically distributed around a mean of \$7.50, and ten decisions were made with show-up fees that were skewed (one subject received \$20, but the mean fee remained \$7.50). In both of the non-egalitarian settings, payments were randomly distributed

among the subjects. In the regression analyses that follows, we discuss how these inequality treatments affected subject decisions directly, and moreover, we discuss whether inequality affected the associations between political leanings and our subjects' behaviors.

Starting with our public goods experiments, we report results from OLS regressions of mean contributions to the group account in Table 6 (for political party) and Table 7 (for ideology). Model 1 in each table reports results from a regression controlling for subject gender and race and using a sample that includes one observation per subject. The omitted category in the party analysis is that of Republican. The OLS results are substantively similar to our descriptive statistics; that is, none of the political party or ideology measures has a significant association with mean contributions to the group account. In Model 2 of each table, we report results that take into account the unequal nature of the show-up fees. These models use a sample that includes three observations for each respondent; each observation is a ten-round average of group account contributions during a particular show-up fee distribution. We control for the type of distribution with a dummy variable set to one for the symmetric and skewed distribution, and zero for the egalitarian distribution.¹² In this model, we find that subjects contributed less to the public good in the presence of inequality, a result we also report in Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2004a and 2004b). In this specification as in Model 1, the measures of political party are not individually or jointly significantly associated with group account contributions, nor are the measures of political ideology.

¹² All models that use multiple observations by subject also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second set of ten rounds (and zero otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third set of ten rounds (and zero otherwise); in addition, the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are adjusted for clustering by subject.

To allow the effects of political leaning to vary with the inequality treatment, we interact each political measure with the inequality indicator. These results are reported as Model 3 in our tables. We continue to find no effect of political party or ideology on public goods contributions, nor do we find evidence that such political measures interact with the inequality treatment. Finally, we include a set of indicator variables in Model 4 to adjust for session-specific effects on mean contributions to the group account. Here we find that the set of session dummies is jointly significant at the 0.10 level or better, depending on the choice of ideology measure. However, once again, there is no significant effect of political party or ideology on public goods contributions. In a series of tests of the joint significance of the party indicators, as well as the party indicators and their interactions, and the ideology indicators and their interactions, we do not find any evidence of statistically significant effects. We take these results, together with the correlations reported in Table 4, as striking evidence of the difference between our subjects' reported beliefs about public programs and their actual behaviors. While party and ideology are strongly associated with attitudes about spending on public programs, there is no evidence that political leanings explain subject behavior in our public goods sessions.

Turning to our series of trust experiments, we next examine the results of OLS regressions of mean amounts sent by the first mover. These results are reported in Table 8 (for political party) and Table 9 (for ideology). We examine the same set of four model specifications as we did in analyzing the public goods data. In Model 1, we use one observation per respondent, and use controls for subject gender and race in the regression. Results reported in Table 8 suggest that political party has no significant effect on trusting behavior; however, in the models reported in Table 9 we find that subjects who rate themselves as more liberal than

President Bush send significantly higher amounts to their randomly-matched partner. This result stands in sharp contrast to the correlations reported in Table 4, which reveal a significant negative correlation between liberal views and an attitudinal measure of trust. The significant effect of relative liberalism also persists in Model 2 of Table 9 which controls for inequality, and in Model 3. In the latter case, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the liberal measure and its interaction are jointly equal to zero. However, upon the addition of session fixed-effects in Model 4, we once again find that for political party and both of the political ideology measures, there is no evidence of a statistically significant association with trusting behavior. As in the public goods analysis, the session dummies in our Models 4 are jointly significant (at the 0.05 level or better), but there is no evidence that the party indicators and their interactions or the ideology variables and their interactions are jointly significant once session effects are added to the model.

Our final series of regressions examines the second-movers' decisions in the trust experiments. In Tables 10 and 11 we report the results of OLS models of mean return ratio, a behavioral measure analogous to trustworthiness. Recall that our analysis of survey responses shown in Table 4 found that both measures of liberal ideology were positively and significantly correlated with self-reports of trustworthiness. In contrast, the regression results provide no evidence that the political party measures, either individually or jointly, or interacted with inequality, are significantly associated with our behavioral measure of trustworthiness. Similarly, neither measure of political ideology is significant, either alone or when interacted with the inequality treatment. Finally, in this context, even the session dummies are not jointly significant. The only variable that shows a significant association with return ratio is the amount

sent by the first mover (coefficients not reported here).

Conclusion

There exists a common perception that Democrats and liberals are inherently more compassionate or other-regarding than Republicans or conservatives. Survey evidence on attitudes toward public spending and redistribution strongly support (and likely perpetuate) this stereotype, although survey evidence on generalized trust is not always consistent with the popular wisdom. However, despite the plethora of experimental research conducted using public goods and trust games, no previous published study explicitly tests whether liberals do indeed “play nice.” We address this lacuna in the scientific literature and put conventional wisdom to the test.

In general, we find that Democrats and liberals behave no differently than Republicans or conservatives in either experimental setting. The only exception occurs when we measure political ideology by an individual’s self-placement on an 11-point scale relative to President Bush; by this relative measure, liberals exhibit more trust by sending significantly more tokens to their unknown partners in the bilateral trust game. However, this finding is not robust to the inclusion of session fixed-effects as controls. Further, even ignoring the sensitivity of this particular result, it is difficult to interpret this behavior as evidence of other-regarding preferences, since this same measure is not significantly associated with either contributions in the public goods game (i.e., generosity), or return ratios in the trust game (i.e., trustworthiness). The absence of differential reciprocation may suggest that liberals are more risk-taking as senders in the trust game, but we leave this question for posterity.

One concern with the experimental approach taken here is that the generosity of left-

leaning individuals may be a response to perceived inequities in the social environment, whereas in the artificial egalitarian setting of the experimental lab, this motivation is absent. In order to address this potential criticism, we induced inequality among experimental subjects by varying the fixed show-up fee paid to all subjects for participation in the experiment. Elsewhere, we have shown that such induced inequality does influence subject behavior in public goods experiments (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2004b); however, we do not observe any significant differences in the generosity of Democrats or liberals vis-a-vis Republicans and conservatives across these treatments. Consequently, we do not attribute our null findings on the importance of political attributes to this phenomenon. Instead, the weight of evidence presented here suggests that political preferences are simply not associated with an inherent affinity for the well-being of others, as least as measured by such behaviors in two classic experimental games.

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Table 1. Correlations in Survey Responses in General Social Survey, 1972-2002

	Mean	Number of 8 programs with “too little” government spending	Number of 4 social programs with “too little” government spending	Agree that “most people can be trusted”
<i>Panel A: All respondents (n = 24,198)</i>				
Democrat or Democrat leaning	0.49	0.08***	0.10***	-0.04***
Republican or Republican leaning	0.36	-0.09***	-0.11***	0.08***
Independent	0.13	0.01*	0.01*	-0.05***
Liberal (normalized to 0-10 point scale)	5.08	0.07***	0.11***	-0.01*
<i>Panel B: 18 to 22 year-olds only (n = 1,555)</i>				
Democrat or Democrat leaning	0.45	0.06**	0.09***	0.00
Republican or Republican leaning	0.36	-0.06**	-0.08***	0.04**
Independent	0.18	0.01	0.02	-0.05**
Liberal (normalized to 0-10 point scale)	5.60	0.03	0.08***	0.06**

Notes: Significant correlations between variables indicated by *** for $p < 0.001$, ** for $p < 0.05$, * for $p < 0.10$.

Table 2. Correlations in Survey Responses in National Election Study, 2000

(n=686)	Mean	Agree that “Government should increase spending and services”	Agree that “most people can be trusted”
Democrat or Democrat leaning	0.51	0.39***	-0.07**
Republican or Republican leaning	0.40	-0.43***	0.08**
Independent	0.09	0.03	0.01
Liberal (normalized range is 0 to 10 points)	6.28	0.21***	-0.05
Liberal relative to Bush (normalized range is -10 to +10)	2.69	0.16***	0.01

Notes: Significant correlations between variables indicated by *** for $p < 0.001$, ** for $p < 0.05$, * for $p < 0.10$.

Table 3. Experimental Design

Session	Experiment	Block 1 (10 rounds)	Block 2 (10 rounds)	Block 3 (10 rounds)	Number of Subjects
1-2	Public Goods	Egalitarian	Skewed	Symmetric	16
3-4	Public Goods	Skewed	Symmetric	Egalitarian	16
5-6	Public Goods	Symmetric	Egalitarian	Skewed	16
<i>Total Subjects in the Public Goods Experiment</i>					48
7-10	Trust	Egalitarian	Skewed	Symmetric	32
11-14	Trust	Skewed	Symmetric	Egalitarian	32
15-18	Trust	Symmetric	Egalitarian	Skewed	32
<i>Total Subjects in the Trust Experiment</i>					96

Notes: Egalitarian show-up payments = (8 @ \$7.50)

Skewed show-up payments = (1 @ \$20, 4 @ \$7, 3 @ \$4)

Symmetric show-up payments = (3 @ \$10, 2 @ \$7.50, 3 @ \$5)

Table 4. Correlations in Survey Responses among Subjects in Public Goods and Trust Experiments

	Mean	Number of 8 government programs in which spending is “too little”	Number of 4 social programs in which spending is “too little”	Agrees that “most people can be trusted”	Describes oneself as “trust-worthy”
Democratic Party Best Represents Interests	0.403	0.33 ^{***}	0.38 ^{***}	-0.07	0.02
Republican Party Best Represents Interests	0.375	-0.36 ^{***}	-0.44 ^{***}	0.18 ^{**}	-0.05
Other Party Best Represents Interests	0.069	0.24 ^{***}	0.26 ^{***}	0.06	0.08
No Party Best Represents Interests	0.153	-0.13	-0.11	-0.19 ^{**}	-0.02
11-point Ideology Scale (0=extreme conservative, 10=extreme liberal)	5.46	0.45 ^{***}	0.55 ^{***}	-0.08	0.14 [*]
Ideology Difference (own rating less Bush rating)	2.51	0.45 ^{***}	0.53 ^{***}	-0.12	0.20 ^{**}
	Mean:	3.09	2.37	0.30	0.92

Notes: Sample means and correlations are based on 144 subjects, except for three variables with a few missing values: spending preferences for government and social programs (n=140 and 141, respectively) and ideological difference with President Bush (n=143). Significant correlations between variables indicated by ^{***} for p<0.01, ^{**} for p<0.05, ^{*} for p<0.10.

Table 5. Mean Subject Decisions in Public Goods and Trust Experiments, By Political Party and Ideology

	Public Goods Experiment	Trust Experiment	
	Mean Group Account Contribution	Mean Tokens Sent to Second Mover	Mean Ratio of Tokens Returned to First Mover to Tokens Available
All Subjects	2.75 (1.58) n=48	4.97 (2.60) n=48	0.35 (0.17) n=48
Democratic Party Best Represents Interests	2.78 (1.57) n=18	4.52 (2.20) n=15	0.35 (0.17) n=25
Republican Party Best Represents Interests	2.60 (1.55) n=21	4.51 (2.71) n=18	0.35 (0.19) n=15
Other Party Best Represents Interests	3.12 (0.45) n=2	6.40 (2.77) n=4	0.33 (0.10) n=4
No Party Best Represents Interests	3.01 (2.10) n=7	5.82 (2.83) n=11	0.38 (0.28) n=4
Liberal (Equal to 1 for values of 6 or higher on 11-point scale, 0 otherwise)	2.62 (1.51) n=19	5.14 (2.76) n=20	0.34 (0.17) n=32
More Liberal Than Bush (Equal to 1 if ideology difference exceeds sample mean, 0 otherwise)	2.74 (1.53) n=20	5.49 (2.46) n=24	0.33 (0.17) n=27

Notes: Mean values of subject choices taken over 30 decision making periods in the experiment.

Table 6. Effects of Political Party on Mean Group Account Contributions

	Model 1 (n=144)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
Democratic Party	0.361 (0.65)	0.361 (0.65)	0.406 (0.64)	-0.039 (0.05)
Other Party	0.521 (0.43)	0.521 (1.56)	1.852* (1.67)	2.163** (2.28)
No Party	0.399 (0.56)	0.399 (0.49)	0.772 (0.60)	0.062 (0.04)
Unequal Treatment		-0.386* (1.68)	-0.197 (0.66)	-0.197 (0.65)
Unequal*Democratic Party			-0.067 (0.17)	-0.067 (0.17)
Unequal*Other Party			-1.997 (1.25)	-1.997 (1.23)
Unequal* No Party			-0.559 (0.44)	-0.559 (0.44)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. Models 2, 3, and 4 also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second block of rounds (and 0 otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third block of rounds (and 0 otherwise). In Models 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Statistical significance indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level.

Table 7. Effects of Political Ideology on Mean Group Account Contributions

<i>PANEL A: Ideology Scale</i>				
	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
11-point Ideology Scale (0=extreme conservative, 10=extreme liberal)	-0.012 (0.09)	-0.012 (0.10)	0.019 (0.13)	-0.089 (0.58)
Unequal Treatment		-0.386* (1.70)	-0.151 (0.26)	-0.151 (0.26)
Unequal*Ideology Scale			-0.046 (0.45)	-0.046 (0.44)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
<i>PANEL B: Ideology Difference</i>				
	Model 1 (n=47)	Model 2 (n=141)	Model 3 (n=141)	Model 4 (n=141)
Ideology Difference (own rating less Bush rating)	-0.042 (0.41)	-0.042 (0.50)	-0.016 (0.14)	-0.096 (0.84)
Unequal Treatment		-0.400* (1.73)	-0.317 (1.05)	-0.317 (1.03)
Unequal*Ideology Difference			-0.040 (0.46)	-0.040 (0.45)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. Models 2, 3, and 4 also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second block of rounds (and 0 otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third block of rounds (and 0 otherwise). In Models 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Statistical significance indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level.

Table 8. Effects of Political Party on Mean Tokens Sent

	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
Democratic Party	0.276 (0.29)	0.276 (0.29)	-0.050 (0.05)	0.226 (0.22)
Other Party	2.172 (1.46)	2.172 (1.30)	1.882 (1.09)	-0.185 (0.12)
No Party	1.587 (1.54)	1.587* (1.67)	1.223 (1.12)	0.892 (0.77)
Unequal Treatment		-0.345 (1.16)	-0.659 (1.11)	-0.659 (1.06)
Unequal*Democratic Party			0.489 (0.69)	0.489 (0.66)
Unequal*Other Party			0.436 (0.49)	0.436 (0.46)
Unequal* No Party			0.545 (0.67)	0.545 (0.65)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. Models 2, 3, and 4 also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second block of rounds (and 0 otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third block of rounds (and 0 otherwise). In Models 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Statistical significance indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level.

Table 9. Effects of Political Ideology on Mean Tokens Sent

<i>PANEL A: Ideology Scale</i>				
	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
11-point Ideology Scale (0=extreme conservative, 10=extreme liberal)	0.277 (1.58)	0.277 (1.54)	0.205 (1.01)	0.080 (0.41)
Unequal Treatment		-0.345 (1.17)	-0.912 (0.85)	-0.912 (0.81)
Unequal*Ideology Scale			0.108 (0.65)	0.108 (0.59)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
<i>PANEL B: Ideology Difference</i>				
	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
Ideology Difference (own rating less Bush rating)	0.206* (1.89)	0.206** (2.32)	0.143 (1.19)	-0.0004 (0.003)
Unequal Treatment		-0.345 (1.17)	-0.576 (1.11)	-0.576 (1.06)
Unequal*Ideology Difference			0.094 (0.74)	0.094 (0.71)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. Models 2, 3, and 4 also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second block of rounds (and 0 otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third block of rounds (and 0 otherwise). In Models 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Statistical significance indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level.

Table 10. Effects of Political Party on Mean Return Ratio

	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
Democratic Party	0.026 (0.45)	0.020 (0.35)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.021 (0.29)
Other Party	-0.039 (0.40)	-0.045 (0.79)	-0.047 (0.70)	-0.127 (1.24)
No Party	-0.010 (0.10)	-0.039 (0.30)	0.029 (0.21)	-0.006 (0.03)
Unequal Treatment		-0.009 (0.57)	-0.018 (0.57)	-0.014 (0.42)
Unequal*Democratic Party			0.032 (0.84)	0.031 (0.75)
Unequal*Other Party			0.002 (0.05)	0.001 (0.02)
Unequal* No Party			-0.101 (1.39)	-0.106 (1.39)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. Models 2, 3, and 4 also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second block of rounds (and 0 otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third block of rounds (and 0 otherwise). In Models 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Statistical significance indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level.

Table 11. Effects of Political Ideology on Mean Return Ratio

<i>PANEL A: Ideology Scale</i>				
	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
11-point Ideology Scale (0=extreme conservative, 10=extreme liberal)	0.003 (0.23)	0.002 (0.20)	-0.004 (0.31)	-0.014 (0.88)
Unequal Treatment		-0.010 (0.60)	-0.061 (1.03)	-0.056 (0.85)
Unequal*Ideology Scale			0.009 (0.99)	0.008 (0.86)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
<i>PANEL B: Ideology Difference</i>				
	Model 1 (n=48)	Model 2 (n=144)	Model 3 (n=144)	Model 4 (n=144)
Ideology Difference (own rating less Bush rating)	-0.003 (0.38)	-0.001 (0.13)	-0.007 (0.68)	-0.015 (1.21)
Unequal Treatment		-0.010 (0.60)	-0.035 (1.09)	-0.029 (0.88)
Unequal*Ideology Difference			0.008 (1.07)	0.008 (0.96)
Includes Session Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models reported, with absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. All models include controls for the race and gender of the subject. Models 2, 3, and 4 also include a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the second block of rounds (and 0 otherwise) and a dummy variable equal to one if the mean contribution pertained to the third block of rounds (and 0 otherwise). In Models 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Statistical significance indicated by: *** for the 0.01 level, ** for the 0.05 level, and * for the 0.10 level.