REBS Review of Economic & Business Studies

Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 25-37, June 2010
ISSN-1843-763X

CRISIS INVERSION STRATEGIES – THEORY OR REALITY IN ROMANIA OF 2009?

Ruxandra CIULU*

Abstract: *The world crisis has begun showing its effects in Romania in October 2008. Still, the immaturity of Romanian authorities in the political and economic fields, as well as the enthusiasm of economic development led to an unconscious state of mind regarding the crisis. Therefore, Romanian companies have not started preparing for the crisis until they began feeling its effects. Also, a large number of Romanian managers are not familiar with crisis inversion strategies and accept crisis as an invincible necessity. Still, in other economies we can find examples of managers who fight for saving their companies and even try gaining competitive advantage based on the crisis. We have tried to find out if Romanian managers belong to the second type. Mainly, the study focuses on strategies adopted by Romanian companies in order to counterbalance or, at least, ensure their survival during the world crisis.*

Keywords**:** *crisis, Romania, strategy, inversion*

JEL Codes*: E32, G01, L19*

ARGUMENT

Fluctuations in economy are natural phases of an economic cycle. Generally, economists agree that the main phases of a business cycle are expansion, prosperity, contraction, and recession (if recession is deep, it can be considered 'crisis'). Some argue that "an economic crisis is not a temporary weakness of the economy, but the economic expression of a wider issue, which raises questions about world philosophy and which influences all countries in the world" (Didier,

* Ruxandra Ciulu, PhD, Assitant Lecturer, Affiliation: „Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, ruxandra.ciulu@uaic.ro

1998). No matter how we define it, specialists are unanimous that companies react too late and too slow (Brilman, 1985). There may be several reasons for these reactions: anticipation that circumstances will be better; belated use of economical indicators; confusion between structural crisis and circumstacional evolution; absence of monthly calculated indicators; not enough exigency from managers and shareholders; accounting anesthesia; no correlation between company results and inflation rate; too optimistic budgets; inability to manage the crisis; intervention from authorities (Brilman, 1985).

In the 1960s, the historical existence of business cycles was perceived as the outcome of a lack of economic insight (Solomou, 1998). Business cycles were very long at the end of the 19th century (up to 20 years), they shrank to 5 years after World War II and they lengthened again after 1970 (up to 10 years).

The two latest notable crises (the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Argentine crisis of 2002) have offered important insight regarding misfunctionalities in the industry. Two factors are common to the two crises: quality of macroeconomic policy and ingenuity of markets (V'yugina, 2009).

The current world crisis is considered by some the most serious one the world has even experienced. Developed countries have been very cautious and prepared for the crisis at least a year in advance, while Central and Eastern European countries (in particular, Romania) have been mostly preoccupied by economic growth, internal market consumption and means to attract foreign investors instead of readjusting macroeconomic policies. The purpose of this paper was to analyze the situation of Romania and to try to identify strategies used by managers of Romanian companies in order to try overcome the crisis. The study was performed between March and July 2009.

WHY THE CRISIS?

The president of Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, believes that the current world financial crisis is the most severe one since the 1930s (Macovei, 2009). He supports the idea that the origins of the global economic decline can be found in the disfunctionalities of the commercial and capital balance in the years 1990s. Bernanke explained that the imbalance has been generated by the fact that, during a decade, emerging economies (e.g. Asian countries) benefited from capital coming from American or partner countries investors and, therefore, developed countries recorded important exports of financial capital.

Certain specialists tend to consider the current crisis as an inevitable, but not extraordinary accident, a consequence of the very low interest rates used in the past few years in the United States and in Europe (Daianu, 2008 III).

Still, an analysis of the crisis cannot exclude structural causes. The globalization of financial markets, as well as financial innovations, combined with weak or lack of regulations and with conflicts of interest became premises for the current crisis. But how was it possible that the same specialists who draw up economic policies ignored the strong warnings, the analyses and the conclusions of previous crises? Some specialists dare to consider that very important financial interests played a major part (Daianu, 2008 I).

In 2005, professor Nouriel Roubini[1] warned that home prices had created a wave which would sink the economy. At the time, he was considered a Cassandra and called "Dr. Doom". In September 2006, he warned the International Monetary Fund that the crisis was about to begin and that the United States would be confronted with a housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. By the end of 2008, most of its predictions were confirmed, while his descriptions of crisis causes and effects were proven correct.

Paul Krugman[2] is well-known for its criticism towards the Bush administration and towards Alan Greenspan, former president of Federal Reserve, whom he accuses of disregarding some warnings, of having blind confidence in the free market and of not reading the signs that the financial system created after the 1929-1933 crisis has outgrown defenses. Krugman supported the idea that Alan Greenspan is "like a man who suggests leaving the barn door ajar, and then – after the horse is gone – delivers a lecture on the importance of keeping your animals properly locked up" (Krugman, 2008).

If analyzing the situation of the past twelve months, as well as taking specialists' opinion into consideration, we can appreciate that the most troubling effect is massive unemployment. "The financial crisis may generate loss of 20 million more work places by the end of 2009", warned the General Manager of the

[1] Economics professor at Stern School of Business, New York University and president of RGE Monitor; following a PhD at Harvard University, he started his research and strategy draw up at Yale, while working for the International Monetary Fund, Federal Reserve, The World Bank and Bank of Israel

[2] Publicist for the "New York Times" and Nobel Prize winner for economics in 2008

International Labor Organization, Juan Somavia, in December 2008. He even added that “these numbers can be worse and cause a severe, long and global social crisis, based on the crisis impact on the real economy” (Leclerc, 2008).

THE CRISIS IN THE ROMANIAN CONTEXT

During the year 2008, Romania recorded the highest economic growth after 1990. The GDP grew by 7.1% (Mediafax, 2009) along the year 2008 and the predicted level had been 9.1%, should the effects of the crisis had not begun being felt in the fourth quarter. The Romanian authorities had estimated growth of 2.5% in 2009, but the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations were less optimistic. We expected at a decrease of 5.7% in GDP for the year 2009 (Comache, 2009) and we recorded a decrease of 6.6%.

The National Bank of Romania has been asked several times to explain its position regarding the fact that Romania would not be severely affected by the crisis. Apparently, the Romanian financial market is still primitive. For example, at the end of 2008, the percentage of financial intermediaries is 25% in Romania, compared to 80-90% in the developed economies of the European Union (Daianu, 2008 II). The country has felt the effect of turbulences caused by certain foreign investors, who decided to close their positions in Romania, similar to what happened in other neighboring economies (e.g. Hungary, Poland). In August 2008, Romania had not yet felt the effect of overheating in the economy. Specialists argued that the Romanian real estate market is not confronted with a crisis, as it is just beginning to grow and it would take about 20 years to become saturated. The real estate market was effectively blocked when the National Bank of Romania restricted the population access to bank loans.

During the fourth quarter of 2008, the National Bank seemed to be able to counterbalance the effects of the crisis and the governor, Mugur Isărescu, was very optimistic: “we have to be thankful that we have recorded GDP growth in the past ten years. We now have the change to overcome the world crisis. We can even consider our country a miracle, as the crisis has offered us some advantages” (Ziarul Financiar, 2008).

The manically depressive attitude of the Romanian government towards the crisis is awkward, to say the least (Chirovici, 2008). Authorities are in the situation of a medicine who, during one year, has assured a person (the national economy) that he/she is in good health and, all of the sudden, he has to inform him/her that he/she is going to die. At the end of the year 2007, when all Europe was concerned for the crisis, Romanian authorities were asked if they had performed a crisis impact study for Romania. Their answer was unimaginable: "what crisis?" At the EU and G8 level, the crisis was the main topic, while in Bucharest the environment was unrealistic: the economy developed, billions of Euros could not wait to enter the country and the country had no reason to worry. It is only at the end of 2008 that Romania entered the depressive phase: we were expecting a true economic cyclone, unemployment rate grew and specialists became less optimistic.

CRISIS INVERTION STRATEGIES

This type of strategies is used when a valuable business is in crisis. The main purpose is to block and inverse the sources of financial and competition weaknesses. The first step is to correctly diagnose problems and to identify the level (decision, implementation, execution or evaluation) at which they have appeared. The most frequent cases are (Ciobanu & Ciulu, 2005):

- ignoring interest compression effects generated by market forestall through aggressive price cuts;
- underused production capacity and, therefore, increase in fixed unitary costs;
- exclusive concentration on R&D efforts to improve position and profitability, followed by innovational failure;
- investment in expensive and long term absorptive technologies;
- frequent change of strategy;
- vassalage to competitive advantages of successful competitors.

There are five ways of approaching crisis inversion strategies (Hofer, 1980):

1. *strategy revision* involves rebuilding competitive position, adjustment of internal and functional area strategies, rethinking strategy following a merger or acquisition based on new company strengths or concentration on a customer or product area. Before taking action, it is necessary to perform a SWOT analysis. A successful business recovery must always be based on strengths and attractive development opportunities;
2. *fast income growth* targets sales improvement by cost cuts, promotional activities, fast product and after-sales improvement. If demand is not price sensitive, prices should be increased, not diminished. This type of strategy is useful when operating budget is limited and the company is confronted with overcapacity. The grouped offer involves selling separable products and

services to consumers in packages. For example, IBM grouped software, hardware and service, which created economies of scale, pushed them up the learning curve generated network economies and salespeople productivity increase. These are all levers for cost cuts. Therefore, package price is lower than the sum of its constituents. Moreover, grouped offer allows the company to differentiate by selling only some package components. Cross-subvention implies deliberate sales of a basic product for a low profit or even without profit in order to sell more profitable products. It is the case of Gillette, who successfully applied the 'razor and safety razor' strategy. The safety razor was sold with no profit, while the razors are extremely profitable.

3. *cost cuts* are made possible by strict cost control, elimination of unuseful positions and activities, productivity growth by using modern production equipments and postponing investments.
4. *sales of assets* (Heany, 1985) are used when business winding is a critical issue and can be solved by sales of equipments (patents, machines, land, profitable subunits) or by reorganization for economic purposes (eliminating low-profitability products, selling or closing old capacities, reducing work force); many times, money saved in these ways is reinvested to consolidate the main activity.
5. *combined efforts* (Finkin, 1985) generally involve changing the management team; the new management has the freedom to operate any changes it considers necessary. The more difficult the problems which need to be solved, the more necessary their multiple approach at all company levels.

The crisis inversion strategies are risky and often fail due to bad choice of acquisition moment or due to early drain of financial resources or necessary businessman talents.

Also, it is important to evaluate the most frequent causes of bankruptcy, now and thirty years ago in order to identify changes in environment and in company behavior. A statistics published in 1977 by the French 'Caisse Nationale des Marchés de l'État' (CNME) identified nine main causes of bankruptcy (Brilman, 1985): customer weaknesses (21%); overstocking (11%); bank pressures (11%); illness or death of the business initiator (10%); over dimensioned personnel expenses (10%); accounting mistakes; failure to price product correctly (9%); decrease of sales (8%); expropriations (8%); inadequate management (6%).

In 2009, eleven causes of bankruptcy can be identified, as following (Mason, 2009): choosing a business that isn't very profitable; inadequate cash reserves; failure to clearly define and understand your market, your customers, and your customers' buying habits; failure to price your product or service correctly; failure to adequately anticipate cash flow; failure to anticipate or react to competition, technology, or other changes in the marketplace; overgeneralization; overdependence on a single customer; uncontrolled growth; believing you can do everything yourself; putting up with inadequate management. Two of these causes (failure to price product correctly and inadequate management) are maintained in the top causes of bankruptcy, while several others overlap, due to environmental changes.

THE ROMANIAN REALITY – CASE STUDY

Based on the economic situation of Romania and on the very late reaction of Romanian authorities, we decided to perform a study among companies which are active on the Romanian market. The main purpose of this study is to identify managerial perspective on the crisis and the actions they have taken in order to ensure survival by the end of the crisis. By choosing two different domains, the banking system and the distribution/production of pharmaceutical products and sanitary materials, we have intended to give a full picture of crisis effects and crisis inversion strategies used by companies. The sample was chosen based on the number of companies acting in each domain. The list of banks approved by the National Bank of Romania includes 40 banks, while the number of distributors in the pharmaceutical and sanitary field includes about 70 companies. Also, I approached 5 of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in terms of sales value in Romania (4 multinational, 1 local). Questionnaires were sent and filled in during the month of March 2009. Response rates are included in Table 1:

Table 1 *Response rates to questionnaires*

Field	Number of questionnaires sent	Number of questionnaires received	Percentage
Bank services	20	16	80%
Distributor of pharmaceutical products or sanitary materials	35	21	60%
Pharmaceutical products manufacturers	5	5	100%
TOTAL	60	42	

The distribution of respondents by field is presented in Figure 1.

The questionnaire includes 11 questions, among which 10 strictly refer to the crisis and one is meant to obtain general information about companies. Out of the ten questions, 4 are meant to identify problems with which companies are confronted and 6 aim at identifying strategies used in their attempt to counterbalance crisis effects.



Figure 1 *Percentage of filled-in questionnaires by field*

Answers provided by distributors and manufacturers are rather similar, but fairly different from those provided by banks. Since the crisis began showing its effects in Romania (in September-October 2008) until March 2009, distributors and manufacturers recorded stagnation or even growth in sales, benefits, market value, customer fidelity, possibility to implement company strategy, new business opportunities, ability to invest in new businesses, in mergers/acquisitions or even in entering new markets. On the other side, banks reported stagnation or weaker results in all the above-mentioned fields. The only two fields on which all respondents agreed upon were liquidity level and ability to access capital, for which they all report drawbacks.

Regarding sales for the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to the fourth quarter of 2007, banks recorded declines of 1% to 20%, even though some banks reported increase of 1% to 20%. The crisis did not have a major impact on distributors and manufacturers by the end of 2008, as demand for their products increased during the same period and some even improved their production capacity in order to meet demand. Obviously, all companies were affected by payment delays, increase in costs of finance and cuts of general operating expenses. In order to try counterbalance crisis effects, most companies resorted to cuts of administrative expenses, rent renegotiations, improvement of operational efficiency of the company, reevaluation of profitability lines of products / customer segments.

In 2009, the main points of interest were cost cuts, maintaining market share, development of new products/services, risk management, management of public relations and personnel cutbacks.

In terms of planning, most companies established their budgets based on the national currency / Euro parity. During October 2008 – March 2009, the national currency was devaluated from 3.5 lei/Euro to 4.3 lei/Euro and some specialists estimated an exchange rate of 4.8-4.9 lei/Euro by the end of 2009. This situation forced companies to reevaluate their budgets and to take into account an average exchange rate of 4.2-4.4 lei/Euro for the year 2009. By the end of 2009, the average exchange rate reached 4.2373 lei/Euro. In order to try protecting their business, most companies resorted to daily transactions and used several currencies in their activity.

Manufacturers and distributors were rather optimistic in terms of profit for the year 2009, while banks were less optimistic.

The main purpose of the questionnaire was to identify the crisis inversion strategies used by companies present in Romania since the fourth quarter 2008 until the first quarter 2009. Most companies used strategy revision, cost cuts and combined efforts. On the contrary, none of the companies included in this study had the intention to use sales of assets as strategy.

WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS?

The experience of national and regional crises in the past decades allows specialists to identify key indicators which need to be monitored in order to try forecasting crises. These are (V'yugina, 2009): commercial sector cost erosion; pyramidal nature of national debt; interest coverage ratio; return on bank assets; rapid growth of credit portfolio; contraction of deposits; non-performing loans (NPL) ratio; growth and maturity of credits to foreign banks; "bubble" asset price.

Due to the financial aspects of the crisis, specialists support the idea that the world will not be able to overcome this crisis without a systemic reform of the banking system. Banks must be forced to consolidate their balances, not to use special vehicles (SPVs, different "conduits"), to considerably improve the internal precautions of banks and to analyze relationship between shareholders and management (Daianu, 2008 II).

Also, it is extremely important for certain people to understand that the "free market" is not the same as "deregulated market" (Daianu, 2008 II). If we are unable to regulate markets, inevitable consequences are market misfunctionalities, which implies important costs for most participants in the market economy. The thesis that markets function perfectly, that they are effective in no matter what circumstances is considered nowadays a fantasy, this being especially true for financial markets. Therefore, the crisis does not have only cyclic reasons, but also structural ones, which caused lack of transparence in financial markets due to globalization of transactions, regulation problems, multitude of conflicts of interest, use of inadequate quantitative methods, etc.

The financial innovation of the past decades encouraged financial intermediations, but reduced transparency of financial markets, which is rather worrying. Without financial transparency, without possibilities to realistically evaluate the risk of a transaction, without trying to overcome major conflicts of interest, confidence in financial markets and, finally, in the economy, are lost.

"Developing countries are hit by successive shocks; at the same time, developed countries are in recession and banks have limited loans. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are most threatened", argued Robert Zoellick, president of The World Bank (Şerbănescu, 2009). There is a simple explanation. In Central and Eastern Europe, private foreign capital has caused a real chaos in the past twenty years. This was an ideal territory for strong and fast expansion. The reason was to transform the region into a consumption market for western products.

Situation in the European Union is fairly serious. In all EU and also in Romania, the index of economic confidence has decreased since September 2008 until March 2009, while afterwards it recorded growth (BT Asset Management, 2009). Notable exceptions are retail sales and managers, who are more optimistic, due to the fact that May was the fourth consecutive month when the index records growth (BT Asset Management, 2009). During the past few months, Romanian consumers have been more pessimistic than the rest of the EU regarding the evolution of the economy.

There are businessmen who argue that Romania has a unique occasion to develop even during the crisis, if the country has the ability to attract foreign capitals and companies who relocate from other countries (Bloombiz, 2008). Also, it is absolutely necessary to stimulate consumption, demand, and loans as they are the only means to overcome recession.

Recently, Romania has recorded a new concern regarding its competitive capacity. Based on a statistics published by Deloitte, Romania has only 30 out of the first 500 companies in Central Europe in terms of revenues in 2007, 50% of those detained by Czech Republic and Hungary and 16% of those detained by Poland (Ziarul Financiar, 2008). Another statistics shows that only 5% of Romanian small and medium size enterprises (SME) are competitive on the European market (Balea & Sava, 2008). If Romania does not change strategy, the post-crisis situation can become even more worrying.

CONCLUSIONS

Romania is just a drop in the ocean of the world economy, but it is 'our drop' and everything that goes right or wrong affects our everyday lives. We have not prepared for this crisis, instead we preferred to ignore it and consider that it will have effect only beyond our borders. The same mentality influenced many managers in Romania, who are now in difficult positions and need to justify misfunctionalities in their companies.

The study reveals that all companies seem to be influenced by liquidity levels, ability to access capital, by payment delays and cuts of general operating expenses. Companies are forced to renegotiate rent, improve operational efficiency of the company and re-evaluate lines of products / customer segments profitability. These are all realities of nowadays world economy and most companies need to address these issues.

What makes the difference and draws the line between successful and unsuccessful companies are the way they address these issues and, more exactly, strategies used by management. Most respondents reported use of strategy revision, cost cuts and combined efforts. On the contrary, none of them has been using or has the intention to use sales of assets as a strategy. This proves conservationism and, maybe, a typical Romanian mentality, originating from the communist era ('just keep it – you don't know when you are going to need it').

Unfortunately, we have not identified any organization whose managers are able to use the crisis for growth, when many competitors encounter problems in maintaining their level of sales or even their market share. Instead, they are all going for the ‘classical’ approach, trying to reduce costs and ensure survival until the end of the crisis.

A possible continuation of this research would be a regional study on strategies used by managers in Central and Eastern Europe in order to overcome the crisis and, after the crisis ends, to evaluate the results they obtained.

REFERENCES

1. Balea, M., D. Sava, (2008), *Cinci IMM-uri dintr-o sută, competitive în UE*, http://www.standard.ro/articol_53134/cinci_imm_uri_dintr_o_suta__competitive_in_ue.html (accessed March 2009)
2. Brilman, J., (1985), *Gestion de crise et redressement d’entreprises*, Ed. Hommes et Techniques, Paris
3. BT Asset Management, (2009), *Asteptari cu privire la evolutia economiei in martie 2009*, http://www.btassetmanagement.ro/index/619/228.html (accessed March 2009);
4. BT Asset Management, (2009), *Asteptari cu privire la evolutia economiei in mai 2009*, http://www.btassetmanagement.ro/uploads/Asteptari%20evolutie%20economica%20(Mar%2009).pdf (accessed May 2009)
5. Hofer, C.W., *Turnaround Strategies*, (1980), Journal of Business Strategy, vol. 1, no. 1, summer 1980, p. 19
6. Chirovici, E.O., *De ce nu a avut Romania un plan B?*, (2008), 13 November 2008, http://bloombiz.ro/finante/de-ce-nu-a-avut-romania-un-plan-b- (accessed March 2009)
7. Ciobanu, Ioan, Ruxandra Ciulu, *Strategiile competitive ale firmei*, Ed. Polirom, Iasi, 2005, p. 98
8. Comache, D., (2009), *Moody’s estimeaza ca economia Romaniei va scadea cu 5,7% in 2009*, http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-finante_banci-5936206-moodys-estimeaza-economia-romaniei-scadea-5-7-2009.htm (accessed June 2009)
9. Bloombiz, *Criza internationala, sansa Romaniei*, (2008), http://bloombiz.ro/finante/patriciu-criza-internationala-sansa-romaniei (accessed March 2009)
10. Dăianu, D., (2008 I), *What this financial crisis teaches us*, European Voice, 9 May 2008, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/05/0511/what-this-financial-crisis-teaches-us/60702.aspx (accessed April 2009)
11. Dăianu, D., (2008 II), *Criza financiara internationala (II) – revenirea cu picioarele pe pamant!*, Revista 22, 2008, http://www.revista22.ro/criza-financiara-internationala-ii-revenirea-cu-picioarele-pe-pamant-4457.html (accessed April 2009)
12. Dăianu, D., (2008 III), *Criza financiara internationala: sunt necesare reglementari riguroase pe piete financiare*, 14 ianuarie 2008, http://www.zf.ro/opinii/daniel-daianu-criza-financiara-internationala-sunt-necesare-reglementari-riguroase-pe-piete-financiare-3054446/ (accessed April 2009)
13. Didier, M., (1998), *Economia: regulile jocului*, Lumina Lex, Bucharest
14. Finkin, E., (1985), *Company Turnaround,* Journal of Business Strategy, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 14
15. Heany, D.F., (1985), *Business in Profit Trouble,* Journal of Business Strategy, vol. 5, nr. 4

16. Hofer, C.W., (1980), *Turnaround Strategies,* Journal of Business Strategy, vol. 1, no. 1, summer 1980, p. 19
17. Krugman, P., (2008), *Greenspan lectures again*, New York Times, 16 March 2008, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/greenspan-lectures-us-again/ (accessed April 2009)
18. Leclerc, Y., (2008), *Développer sur fonds de crise…*, Journal Réseaux, vol. 1, no. 3, December 2008, www.journal-reseaux.ca (accessed April 2009)
19. Macovei, D., (2009), *Seful Fed: Lumea se confrunta cu cea mai grea criza financiara din anii '30 incoace*, 12 March 2009, http://www.zf.ro/business-international/seful-fed-lumea-se-confrunta-cu-cea-mai-grea-criza-financiara-din-anii-30-incoace-4040478/ (accessed March 2009)
20. Mason, M.K., (2009), What Causes Small Businesses to Fail?, http://www.moyak.com/papers/small-business-failure.html (accesed October 2009)
21. MEDIAFAX, (2009), *Creştere economică de 7,1% în 2008*, 4 March 2009, http://www.financiarul.com/articol_22871/crestere-economica-de-71-in-2008.html (accessed March 2009)
22. *Sa ne facem cruce ca am avut crestere economica in ultimii zece ani*, Ziarul Financiar, 24 September 2008, http://www.zf.ro/banci-si-asigurari/isarescu-sa-ne-facem-cruce-ca-am-avut-crestere-economica-in-ultimii-zece-ani-3219635/ (accessed April 2009)
23. Solomou, Solomos, (1998), *Economic Cycles*. *Long cycles and business cycles since 1870*,http://books.google.ro/books?id=2RYNAQAAIAAJ&dq=economic+cycles&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=hBxOkAZEqn&sig=ChO4rmZMeVJlixzIaEfo738nJsc&hl=ro&ei=CzNXSr0NkYP8Bq3N3J0J&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4 (accessed May 2009)
24. Şerbănescu, I., (2009), *De ce Europa de Est este in fruntea crizei?*, 29 April 2009, http://www.bloombiz.ro/finante/de-ce-europa-de-est-este-in-fruntea-crizei (accessed May 2009)
25. V'yugina, I. I., (2009), *Some Features of Economic and Financial Crises in the Course of Global Integration*, Studies on Russian Economic Development, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 292-296
26. Ziarul Financiar, 11 September 2008