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## 2      **Toward a More General Economic Model of Fertility Determination: Endogenous Preferences and Natural Fertility**

Richard A. Easterlin, Robert A. Pollak,  
and Michael L. Wachter

This paper develops a general model of marital fertility, from which, with appropriate empirical restrictions, implications are drawn for research and welfare analysis. The model builds to a considerable extent on prior economic research, but it differs from much of the economic literature on fertility in its emphasis on endogenous preferences and natural fertility. We feel there is need for a formal statement of such a model to serve as an alternative to the “Chicago-Columbia” approach that dominates the current work on economics of fertility (e.g., Schultz 1974). Throughout the paper we shall frequently contrast our framework with this approach. The first section outlines our argument; the second presents a formal statement of the model; the third classifies fertility determination into four special subcases; the fourth discusses some of the general research implications; and finally, an outline of the welfare implications of our model is contrasted with those of the Chicago-Columbia approach.

### **2.1 Overview**

In section 2.2 we will present a general model of the determinants of marital fertility and completed family size. The determinants are seen as working through a family’s preferences for consumption, children, and fertility regulation, and through four constraints:

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1. a budget constraint that reflects the limitations implied by the market prices of goods and services, the wage rates of family members, any nonlabor income, and the time at the disposal of household members;

2. the household's technology, which enables it to convert market goods and the time of family members into the basic commodities that are the arguments of its utility function;

3. a "births function" or "fertility production function" that expresses the number of live births as a function of frequency of intercourse, reproductive span of the household, fertility regulation practices, and the commodities, goods, and practices that govern the probability of conception and the nonsusceptible period of the wife;

4. an "infant" mortality function that expresses infant and child mortality through adulthood as a function of such variables as health and nutrition. Subtracting mortality from fertility gives completed family size.

Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint, the household's technology, the births function, and the infant mortality function yields the optimal solution values for the household's decision variables. We denote the optimal solution values for births by  $b^0$  and for completed family size by  $N^0$ .

The model is presented (as in the Chicago-Columbia approach) in a single-period decision-making framework. Parents are viewed as making their basic fertility decisions at the beginning of the marriage and then not altering their behavior over their lifetimes. This requires, however, a distinction between results perceived or anticipated when the decisions are made and the actual outcomes. The distinction reflects the fact that families may not correctly perceive the constraints of the maximization problem. The theoretical model of section 2.2 is developed in terms of perceived magnitudes. Conceptually the model can be altered in a straightforward manner to deal with the actual results. This is an important consideration, since the empirical data are usually for the actual rather than the perceived concepts.

In developing a general model of fertility determination, we concentrate on two considerations that we believe are empirically important but that have been largely ignored in much of the economics literature. First, a family's utility function, whose arguments include a vector of commodities and completed family size, is viewed as endogenous to the society in which it lives. In our model this relationship is incorporated

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through an interdependent preference mechanism, which allows for the transmission of aspirations from one family to another and from one generation to another. Past behavior, whether in a "socialization" or a purely intrafamily framework, determines a family's tastes. Second, a family does not always understand or acknowledge the relationship between its fecundity and its consumption decisions because it lacks accurate information concerning the determinants of births and infant mortality. The composition of the consumption bundle has both a direct effect on utility and an indirect effect that operates through the births production function. When household decisions fail to recognize the fecundity effects, in part or in full, there is a problem of "unperceived jointness."

Interdependent preferences and the births and infant mortality functions, with a given level of unperceived jointness, enrich and complicate the optimal solution function. For example, as we shall see, maximizing the family's utility function subject to the appropriate constraints does not yield demand functions for completed family size (or births) as generally construed in the literature.

Needless to say, practical application of such a model is constrained by the limited amount of available data. On fairly reasonable assumptions, however, various subcases of the general model can be distinguished and estimated. Although they are not necessarily realized in pure form, we think these subcases may often constitute useful approximations to reality. In section 2.3 we develop this classification scheme and discuss its empirical relevance.

The concepts of desired fertility and natural fertility play a central role in our classification scheme. The concepts, although prominent in empirical demographic research, have received little attention from economists. We make these concepts an integral part of our analysis. Desired fertility,  $b^d$ , is defined as the number of births a family would choose in a situation termed by demographers a "perfect contraceptive society" (Bumpass and Westoff 1970); that is, one in which the family has access to a contraceptive technology with no economic costs and free of preference drawbacks.

Natural fertility,  $b^n$ , is defined as the number of births a family believes it would have if it made no deliberate attempt to influence its fertility. Natural fertility is less than the biological maximum and is consistent with the existence of "social controls" on fertility, such as an intercourse taboo. It constitutes uncontrolled fertility only in the sense that the family itself makes no *deliberate* effort to influence its fertility. Contraceptive devices are not utilized, and unperceived jointness or social taboos or both exclude other methods of deliberately influencing family size. If families did perceive the relationship between their consumption pattern and their fecundity, they would alter the former in

order to change their fertility. Conscious and deliberate variations by families in the level of their fertility, however, are not compatible with the concept of a *natural* level of fertility. From the standpoint of the family,  $b^n$  is constant and is independent of its family-size preferences.

Natural fertility may be greater than, less than, or equal to desired fertility; that is, a family's desires may range from more to fewer children than it thinks it could produce if its fertility were uncontrolled. If the solution for births is below the family's perceived natural fertility ( $b^0 < b^n$ ), then it practices deliberate fertility control. An optimal solution for births above the desired level ( $b^0 > b^d$ ) implies the existence of "excess" or "unwanted" fertility, as the term is used in the demographic literature.

We utilize our generalized fertility model and the associated concepts of natural and desired fertility to classify societies or populations within societies into several categories. The categorization is useful in that it implies restrictions on the coefficients of the variables that appear in the optimal solution functions. Some groups, especially in less developed countries, may be at or close to their natural fertility levels. These groups can be divided into two subcategories. First there are those that lack the motivation to practice fertility regulation because desired fertility is greater than or equal to the optimal solution. Second, there are those, again largely in less developed countries, where the economic costs or preference drawbacks of fertility regulation outweigh the potential gains. In both these cases, the determinants of fertility are largely independent of the preferences for children. "Demand models," with their emphasis on income and substitution effects, are not relevant. Although income might be a significant determinant of completed family size, its influence would be unintended and would work through improved nutrition and health, which would lead to increased fecundity and decreased infant mortality. Demand models tell a different story, typically suggesting that increases in income lead to an increase in the number of children demanded. For natural fertility societies, demand variables—correctly measured and interpreted—are insignificant.

At the other extreme are groups, largely in developed countries, that can be approximated by the perfect contraceptive society. In this case, births and infant mortality technology functions are not quantitatively important determinants of the level of fertility. The properly specified optimal solution function now contains the preference parameters related to children and may reflect endogenous tastes and household technology, including those aspects concerning child-rearing, as well as the budget constraint.

The general fertility model, which includes endogenous tastes and the births production function, has implications for a number of important demographic questions. We have already indicated its significance

for specifying the optimal solution function in different societies for different time periods. It is of particular importance that the parameters of this function vary systematically in quantitative importance as one moves along the continuum from less to more developed economies and/or lower to higher socioeconomic classes within a society. Hence, elasticities of births and completed family size with respect to their arguments will vary systematically both across and within societies. We shall also indicate the model's implications for the analysis of the "demographic transition," long-run fertility swings, secular trends in fertility in both less developed countries and developed countries, and the welfare benefits of various types of fertility-control programs in different societies.

At various points we contrast our analysis with the "Chicago-Columbia" approach, by which we mean the line of inquiry exemplified in two recent special issues of the *Journal of Political Economy*, since published as an NBER volume.<sup>1</sup> That there is a distinctive Chicago-Columbia approach to the economics of fertility hardly requires demonstration. In a review of the volume that brings together the *JPE* work, Allen Kelley observes that "the papers are . . . largely of one voice, showing a common perspective to the analysis of economic problems and to a certain extent a mild intolerance of other approaches to viewing the world of social and economic behavior" (Kelley 1976, p. 517). As examples of spokesmen for the approach, one may cite T. W. Schultz (in his editor's introduction to the *JPE* volume), Michael Keeley (in a reply to a critique by Leibenstein), and T. P. Schultz (in several survey articles).<sup>2</sup> We shall draw particularly on the last two in comparing our framework with the Chicago-Columbia approach, because these articles provide valuable general discussions of that viewpoint.<sup>3</sup>

The Chicago-Columbia approach is most simply characterized by what it emphasizes and deemphasizes. Particular emphasis is placed on cost factors and on the opportunity cost of a wife's time; little or no attention is given to taste factors and to the births production function (the latter relates to what T. P. Schultz calls "supply" factors). T. P. Schultz asserts that "cross-sectional studies of individual countries at all levels of development have confirmed the qualitative predictions of this rudimentary demand theory of fertility" (T. P. Schultz 1976, p. 98).<sup>4</sup>

Our main reservation about this line of work is that its deemphasis of tastes and "supply" factors severely limits its empirical relevance. For developed countries the model is of limited application because it ignores preference variables. This is most strikingly illustrated by the failure of the Chicago-Columbia approach to advance an explanation for the recent fertility swing in the United States.<sup>5</sup> For less developed countries, fitting a "demand" model to data for households whose fertility is largely uncontrolled leads to unwarranted inferences about "demand" elasticities.

Furthermore, the subordination of taste considerations lends itself to dubious conclusions about economic welfare and public policy. Minimizing the importance of tastes makes it easier to draw unambiguous inferences about the desirability of policies aimed at reducing “unwanted” fertility, but the lack of attention to tastes make such inferences questionable. At the same time, the approach is unlikely to be helpful to those directing family planning programs, who must make choices between attempting to alter preferences (for example, by allocating resources to advertising the benefits of small families) and simply providing contraceptive information or cheaper services. Hence, we believe that both the analysis of fertility behavior and of the welfare effect of government programs requires a more balanced approach, one in which economic research on preferences and natural fertility takes equal place with the usual concerns of the Chicago-Columbia approach.

## **2.2 The Formal Model**

In this section we develop a formal framework for analyzing marital fertility. We begin by summarizing the household production model, which provides the starting point for our analysis. In the three subsequent subsections we modify the household production model to incorporate a number of additional variables related to the determination of marital fertility and completed family size. In section 2.2.2 we incorporate the basic variables related to fertility into the household production model by adding two new “production” relations, a “births production function” and an infant mortality or “deaths function,” and then describe two extensions of this model, one incorporating unperceived jointness (section 2.2.3) and the other interdependent preferences (section 2.2.4).

By unperceived jointness we mean a situation in which the family does not correctly recognize the relationship between its fecundity and its consumption or life-style decisions. For example, an increase in non-labor income might cause an unintended and unanticipated increase in births through the following chain of causation: the increase in nonlabor income causes an increase in consumption of health care services or food, which leads to an improvement in health or nutrition; these in turn cause an increase in fecundity. The essence of unperceived jointness is that the decision to devote additional resources to improved health or nutrition rather than shelter or recreation is made without awareness of its implications for fertility.

By interdependent preferences we mean that the family’s tastes are influenced by the consumption and family-size decisions of other families. In the “socialization” version of the interdependent preferences

model the family's tastes are influenced by the observed behavior of other families in the society, perhaps those in a suitably restricted socio-economic group. In the "intrafamily" version, a family's aspirations for both commodity consumption and family size are influenced by the consumption and family-size patterns the husband and the wife experienced in childhood and adolescence.

Our model provides a framework for analyzing a number of important aspects of fertility behavior, but it neglects a number of others. First, we deal exclusively with marital fertility. Second, we do not attempt to explain the determination of age at marriage. Third, our analysis is based on a single-period planning model in which the family makes a once-and-for-all decision about its consumption and fertility at the time of marriage. Those aspects of fertility behavior that are best understood in terms of a sequential decision-making model—for example, the timing and spacing of children—are beyond the scope of the analysis, although in principle it could be extended this way. Fourth, our model treats average fertility outcomes as if they were certain to be realized by the "representative family." That is, we ignore both the discreteness of children and the randomness of the births and deaths functions and focus on the mean experience of a group of identical families. In general, randomness and discreteness have implications for the average fertility of families who are not risk-neutral and whose behavior is therefore sensitive to the variance as well as to the mean outcome. Finally, we ignore the fact that children come in two sexes and that parents may have preferences for the sex composition of their families. Such preferences could be incorporated into a sequential model of fertility that recognized the role of uncertainty. In such a model one would expect sex preferences to influence family size, but such preferences cannot be incorporated into a one-period planning model in any straightforward way.<sup>6</sup>

### 2.2.1 The Household Production Model

In this section we introduce the standard household production model that serves as the basis for our subsequent discussion of fertility. The model is one in which the household purchases "goods" on the market and combines them with time in a "household production function" to produce "commodities."<sup>7</sup> These commodities, rather than the goods, are the arguments of the household's preference ordering; market goods and time are desired not for their own sake, but only as inputs into the production of "commodities." The  $n$  market goods are denoted by  $X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , and the  $m$  commodities by  $Z = (z_1, \dots, z_m)$ , and the time allocation vector by  $t$ ; the vector  $t$  records how much time each family member devotes to market work and to each household activity. Let  $R$



denote the household's preference ordering over commodity vectors, and  $U(Z)$  the corresponding utility function.<sup>8</sup>

We represent the household's technology by a production set,  $T$ . Thus, the "input-output" vector  $(Z, X, t)$  belongs to the set  $T$ ,  $(Z, X, t) \in T$ , if and only if the commodity collection  $Z$  is producible from the goods collection  $X$  and the time-allocation vector  $t$ . We could distinguish those uses of time devoted to household production activities from those devoted to market work and include only the former as arguments of the household's technology, but it is harmless to include the entire vector, and we do so for notational convenience. Unless explicitly stated to the contrary, constant returns to scale and/or the absence of joint production are *not* assumed. If the household derives satisfaction or dissatisfaction from time spent at various household or market activities, the times devoted to these activities will appear as components of the vector  $Z$  as well as the vector  $t$ . Technically, this is a case of joint production, since, for example, time devoted to the activity "cooking" is both an input into the production of a "home cooked meal" and is itself one of the outputs of the activity "cooking"—an output that may yield a utility or disutility quite distinct from that associated with eating the meal itself. Because we have not ruled out joint production, there need not be a one-to-one correspondence between activities and commodities.

We let  $t_h$  denote the total time available to household member  $h$ , and  $t_{hs}$  the time which he (or she) allocates to activity  $s$ . Thus, the family's time constraint may be written as

$$\sum_{s=1}^S t_{hs} = \bar{t}_h \quad h = 1, \dots, H$$

where  $S$  is the total number of market and nonmarket activities and  $H$  the number of household members.

We distinguish between the set of market activities ( $M$ ) and the set of household production or nonmarket activities ( $T$ ). Thus, if  $w_h$  denotes the market wage rate of household member  $h$ , his earnings are given by  $\sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs}$  and the household's total earnings by  $\sum_{h=1}^H \sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs}$ .

We let  $\mu$  denote the household's nonlabor income, and write its budget constraint in the form

$$\sum_{k=1}^n p_k x_k \leq \mu + \sum_{h=1}^H \sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs} \quad ^9$$

"Optimal solution values" for the household's decision variables  $(Z, X, t)$  are found by maximizing the utility function  $U(Z)$  subject to the constraints

$$(Z, X, t) \in T$$

$$\sum_{s=1}^S t_{hs} = \bar{t}_h \quad h = 1, \dots, H$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^n p_k x_k \leq \mu + \sum_{h=1}^H \sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs}.$$

The optimal solution values are functions of the values of the variables the household takes as predetermined: goods prices,  $P$ ; wage rates,  $w$ ; nonlabor income,  $\mu$ ; and the household's technology,  $T$ . The "optimal solution" is optimal with respect to the household's own preferences, not necessarily with respect to any general social welfare criteria. The optimal solution function shows the relationship between the household's decision variables,  $(Z, X, t)$ , and the parameters it takes as given,  $(P, w, \mu; T)$ . The optimal solution function is not a demand function in the conventional sense, nor does it treat commodity consumption as a function of commodity shadow prices. Indeed, commodity consumption and the optimal values of the other decision variables are functions of the predetermined variables: goods prices, wage rates, nonlabor income, and the parameters of the household's technology. Commodity shadow prices (i.e., the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to commodities) have played an unduly prominent role in household production analysis. The difficulty with treating optimal commodity consumption as a function of commodity shadow prices is that commodity shadow prices reflect not only the constraints which the household faces, but also its preferences. With joint production, commodity shadow prices depend on the household's tastes as well as on goods prices and the household's technology. Our model of fertility builds on the household production model, but we reject the "commodity shadow price" version.<sup>10</sup>

### 2.2.2 The Simple Fertility Model

In this section we extend the standard household production model to include a number of variables related to fertility: children ever born ( $b$ ), infant and child deaths ( $d$ ), completed family size ( $N$ ), frequency of coitus ( $a$ ), the reproductive span of the household ( $\Lambda$ ), the length of time over which each fertility control technique is practiced ( $\theta$ ) and the "intensity" with which each is practiced ( $\tau$ ), and a vector of "practices," such as lactation ( $l$ ), which affect either the number of children born or their chances of survival.

To simplify the notation we shall not introduce subscripts to distinguish among fertility regulation techniques, but the framework we develop is well suited for discussing choices among techniques. For exam-

ple, if one of the available techniques is a contraceptive pill that is to be taken daily,  $\theta$  might represent the number of months during which it is taken and  $\tau$  the ratio of the number of days on which the pill is taken to the number on which it is supposed to be taken.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, we do not use subscripts to distinguish among “practices”; formally, we interpret  $l$  as a vector, but we shall use “lactation” (i.e., the number of months of lactation following each birth) as an example of the type of variable we have in mind.

These variables are related to each other and the other variables in the household production model by two biological “production” relationships, a births function,  $B$ :  $b = B(a, Z, X, l, \theta, \tau, \Lambda)$ ; and a deaths function,  $D$ :  $d = D(b, Z, X, l)$ ; and by the identity defining completed family size:  $N = b - d$ .

The births function depends not only on frequency of coitus ( $a$ ) and the household’s fertility regulation practices ( $\theta$  and  $\tau$ ), but also on a number of other variables that are likely to vary systematically from one society to another and from one socioeconomic group to another within a society. To take account of the role of factors such as health and nutrition in determining fecundity, we include the household’s consumption of commodities ( $Z$ ) and its purchase of goods ( $X$ ) as arguments of the births function. Practices such as lactation that influence fecundity are also included; in the case of lactation, a longer interval of lactation following each birth will, *ceteris paribus*, imply fewer births, since lactation inhibits ovulation. The family’s reproductive span,  $\Lambda$ , depends on age at marriage and age at the onset of permanent sterility. The latter is almost certainly endogenously determined by variables such as health and nutrition, but for simplicity we treat the reproductive span as exogenous.

The child and infant mortality function depends not only on the population at risk ( $b$ ), but also on health and nutrition, which are reflected in the family’s consumption of commodities and its purchases of goods. A variety of “practices” that influence deaths are captured by the vector  $l$ , although the components of  $l$  that influence deaths need not be the same as those that influence births. The length of the lactation interval, however, will appear in the mortality function because—in many societies, at least—a longer lactation interval is associated with lower infant mortality.

Both the births function and the deaths function represent biological “production” relationships. The existence of these biological relationships is quite distinct from the question whether families in either developed or underdeveloped countries perceive these relationships accurately. In this subsection we proceed on the assumption that families are fully aware of the fertility and mortality implications of their behavior. In the

next subsection we drop this assumption of perfect knowledge and introduce the concept of unperceived jointness.

Preferences in the simple fertility model are relatively complicated. The utility function includes not only commodities ( $Z$ ) and completed family size ( $N$ ), but also infant mortality ( $d$ ), frequency of intercourse ( $a$ ), and the contraceptive variables ( $\theta$  and  $\tau$ ). If frequency of intercourse ( $a$ ) were not included in the utility function, then abstinence would be the dominant form of fertility regulation, since it is costless and completely effective. Similarly, if there were no disutility associated with infant and child mortality ( $d$ ), then infanticide might be the second-choice technique, since it also provides an inexpensive and effective method for limiting completed family size. That these techniques do not play a prominent role in most societies clearly reflects preference drawbacks rather than economic costs. But it is not only these extreme techniques of population control that entail preference consequences or drawbacks; the use of any currently available fertility regulation technique (for a particular length of time and with a particular intensity) is likely to entail preference effects that may play an important role in determining not only their time span and intensity of use, but also the number of births and completed family size. We denote the utility function by  $U(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau)$ .<sup>12</sup>

The budget constraint must also be modified to allow for the cost of fertility regulation. We assume that its cost is a function of  $\theta$  and  $\tau$  alone and denote it by  $\rho(\theta, \tau)$ .<sup>13</sup>

The optimal solution to the simple fertility model is the set of values of the decision variables ( $Z, X, t, b, N, a, l, \theta, \tau$ ) that maximize the utility function  $U(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau)$  subject to the constraints

$$\begin{aligned} (Z, X, t) &\in T \\ \sum_{s=1}^S t_{hs} &= \bar{t}_h \quad h = 1, \dots, H \\ \sum_{k=1}^n p_k x_k + \rho(\theta, \tau) &\leq \mu + \sum_{h=1}^H \sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs} \\ b &= B(a, Z, X, l, \theta, \tau, \Lambda) \\ d &= D(b, Z, X, l) \\ N &= b - d. \end{aligned}$$

The optimal solution values are functions of the variables the household takes as given: goods prices,  $P$ ; wage rates,  $w$ ; nonlabor income,  $\mu$ ; the household's technology,  $T$ ; the births function,  $B$ ; the deaths function,  $D$ ; the cost function for fertility regulation,  $\rho$ ; and the family's reproductive span,  $\Lambda$ .<sup>15</sup>

### 2.2.3 Unperceived Jointness

In this section we modify the simple fertility model by postulating that the household is not aware of all the ways its consumption and expenditure patterns affect fecundity and infant mortality. The resulting model is one in which consumption patterns affect realized fertility and mortality, but the effects are unintended. Consider, for example, a family that is not practicing fertility regulation: if it is unaware of the relationship between nutrition and fecundity, it will allocate its expenditure between food and other goods without taking account of the marginal impact of better nutrition on births. An increase in nonlabor income would lead to greater expenditures on food, and, *ceteris paribus*, through better nutrition to greater fecundity. But the effect on births would be an unintended consequence of the consumption pattern corresponding to a higher income; the household's allocation of expenditure between food and other goods had nothing to do with its desire for children. The family might regard the unintended increase in fertility as a blessing or a curse; in either case, however, the family could "do better" in terms of its own preferences if it knew the true relationship between nutrition and fecundity. If the family were aware of the true relationship it could allow for it in allocating its expenditure between food and other goods: a family that wanted more children would allocate more to food, while one that wanted fewer children would allocate less. We use the phrase "unperceived jointness" to describe a situation in which the family does not recognize the true relationship between its consumption pattern and its fertility or infant mortality.<sup>16</sup> In this section we formalize the concept of unperceived jointness and examine its implications for marital fertility and completed family size.

Although the definition of unperceived jointness does not formally presuppose a situation in which the family makes no deliberate use of fertility control, the concept is useful primarily in such cases. It is especially useful in the first two of the special cases we described briefly in section 2.1: that is, families who fail to recognize that their consumption and expenditure patterns have any effect on their fecundity and who do not employ deliberate fertility control techniques either because they expect to have fewer children than they desire or because, although they expect to have more children than they want, the economic costs and preference drawbacks of fertility regulation outweigh its advantages.

Unperceived jointness is a powerful concept with a wide range of potential applications to topics other than fertility. For example, health or various narrowly defined health states can be treated as commodities that are affected by many household activities, and it is plausible that the effects of many of these activities on health states are unknown to the household. The assumption that the household correctly perceives

the relationship between diet and health is an uncomfortable one, especially in cases where the experts do not agree on the nature of the relationship or have learned of it only recently. Unperceived jointness allows us to recognize that health is related to many aspects of a family's consumption pattern and life-style without assuming that the household is fully aware of these relationships. Although we apply the concept of unperceived jointness only to the births production function and the infant mortality function, it could be applied to the household's knowledge of other aspects of its technology. In the fertility context, we could apply it to the length of the reproductive span,  $\Lambda$ , but for simplicity we shall continue to treat the reproductive span as exogenous.

Unperceived jointness does not imply complete ignorance; families may know a great deal about the effects of their behavior on fertility and infant mortality. Indeed, unperceived jointness is consistent with any assumption about the family's knowledge other than the traditional assumption of perfect knowledge. If we view the family's knowledge of the relationships governing fertility and mortality as a point on a continuum from complete ignorance to perfect knowledge, then unperceived jointness is present everywhere except at the polar case of perfect knowledge.<sup>17</sup>

We denote the perceived births function by  $\hat{B}(a, Z, X, l, \theta, \tau, \Lambda)$  and the perceived deaths function by  $\hat{D}(b, Z, X, l)$ . The simplest specification of the perceived deaths function corresponds to the assumption of complete ignorance and is one in which the mortality rate is a constant, independent of the family's consumption and expenditure pattern  $(Z, X)$  and its practices  $(l)$ :  $\hat{D}(b, Z, X, l) = \delta b$ . For example, the family might believe that one out of every four (or one out of every four hundred) of its children will die, but it does not believe that its behavior can alter this mortality ratio. The family's perception of the mortality rate might depend on the experience of other families in the society, or on that of other families of similar socioeconomic status.

The simplest specification of the perceived births function is also one of complete ignorance, one in which births are independent of the family's decision variables, at least when the family is not practicing any of the fertility control techniques specified by  $(\theta, \tau)$ . This implies a perceived births function of the form  $\hat{B}(a, Z, X, l, O, O, \Lambda) = \bar{B}$ .<sup>18</sup> The family believes that (if it does not practice fertility regulation) its fertility will be exogenously determined and that  $\bar{B}$  children will be born to it. The family's estimate of  $\bar{B}$  might reflect its observations of the experience of other families in the society or that of other families of similar socioeconomic status.<sup>19</sup>

Completed family size is by definition the difference between births and deaths. In the polar case of complete ignorance, for a family not practicing fertility regulation, perceived completed family size is given

by  $(1 - \delta)B$ . Actual births, deaths, and family size may depart from these expected levels and are determined by the actual births and deaths functions; hence, the actual values of these variables depend on the family's consumption pattern and on other family decision variables such as those grouped together as "practices" and on frequency of intercourse.

Beyond the simplest case of complete ignorance, we must face the question of how families form expectations and adjust the perceived births and deaths functions in the light of experience and observation. Similar problems, however, arise in any version of the household production model unless we assume that the household has perfect knowledge of its technology. If a family recognizes that its consumption and expenditure patterns affect its fertility, it seems plausible that it would systematically revise the perceived births function to reduce any gap between observed and expected fertility corresponding to any consumption pattern. But such revisions are not possible within the confines of a one-period planning model.<sup>20</sup>

With unperceived jointness there are two analogues of the "optimal solution." The first, the "optimal perceived solution," which we denote by the superscript  $p$ , is the vector of decision variables obtained by maximizing the utility function subject to the perceived constraints. The optimal perceived solution corresponds to the values of the births and deaths functions the household expects, not the levels that would be generated by substituting the household's consumption and expenditure patterns into the true births and deaths functions. The second, the "realized solution," which we denote by the superscript  $r$ , is the vector of decision variables obtained from the optimal perceived solution by replacing the perceived values for births, deaths, and completed family size by the values of these variables that would be generated by the true births and deaths functions, evaluated at the optimal perceived values of the other variables. In the case of goods purchases and the commodity consumption pattern, the realized solution coincides with the optimal perceived solution.<sup>21</sup> But the realized solution for births and deaths typically differs from the optimal perceived solution when there is unperceived jointness.

Formally, the optimal perceived solution to the model with unperceived jointness is the set of values of the decision variables  $\{Z, X, t, b, d, N, a, l, \theta, \tau\}$  that maximize the utility function  $U(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau)$  subject to the constraints

$$(Z, X, t) \in T$$

$$\sum_{s=1}^S t_{hs} = \bar{t}_h \quad h = 1, \dots, H$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^n p_k X_k + \rho(\theta, \tau) \leq \mu + \sum_{h=1}^{\Pi} \sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs}$$

$$b = \hat{B}(a, Z, X, l, \theta, \tau, \Lambda)$$

$$d = \hat{D}(b, Z, X, l)$$

$$N = b - d.$$

We denote the optimal perceived solution values by  $\{Z^p, X^p, l^p, b^p, d^p, N^p, a^p, l^p, \theta^p, \tau^p\}$ ; these values are functions of the variables the household takes as given: goods prices,  $P$ ; wage rates,  $w$ ; nonlabor income,  $\mu$ ; the household's technology,  $T$ ; the perceived births function,  $\hat{B}$ ; the perceived deaths function,  $\hat{D}$ ; and the cost function for fertility regulation,  $\rho$ .

The realized solution coincides with the optimal perceived solution for the variables  $(Z, X, l, a, l, \theta, \tau)$ , but the realized solution for the demographic variables  $(b, d, N)$  is determined by substituting the optimal perceived solution values of the other variables into the true births and deaths functions:

$$b^r = B(a^p, Z^p, X^p, l^p, \theta^p, \tau^p, \Lambda)$$

$$d^r = D(b^r, Z^p, X^p, l^p)$$

$$N^r = b^r - d^r.$$

A fulfilled-expectations equilibrium is a solution in which the realized values of  $b$  and  $d$  coincide with the optimal perceived values. This does not imply that in a fulfilled-expectations equilibrium the family knows the true births and deaths functions—only that its predictions of  $b$  and  $d$  are correct. It need not know the effects of changes in  $X$  or  $Z$  on births or deaths, and it may even believe that  $b$  and  $\delta$  are exogenously given.<sup>22</sup> If births and deaths were truly exogenous, then equilibrium could be reached only through the revision of beliefs about the births and deaths functions. When they are not exogenous, the adjustment toward a fulfilled-expectations equilibrium involves both changes in perceptions and changes in behavior that change the realized levels of births and deaths. In equilibrium, observing the fertility and mortality experience of the family will not cause another family holding similar beliefs to revise its perceptions of these functions.<sup>23</sup>

#### 2.2.4 Taste Formation

In this section we introduce endogenous tastes into our model of marital fertility. Within our one-period planning model, interdependent preferences—that is, preferences that depend on the consumption and family-size decision of other families—are the only admissible specification of endogenous tastes.<sup>24</sup> Such preferences are endogenous to the



society, but not to the family itself. The model of interdependent preferences is greatly simplified when it is driven by the *past* rather than the current consumption and family-size decisions of other families; because the lagged specification is at least as plausible as the simultaneous one, we shall rely on it exclusively.<sup>25</sup>

Two versions of the lagged interdependent preferences model are of particular interest. The first is a model of "socialization," whose simplest specification is one in which each family's preferences depend on the average consumption and family size of all families in the previous generation or cohort. This specification can be modified by restricting the relevant group of families to those with a particular social or economic status, or by allowing consumption and family-size patterns in the more distant past to play a role in the formation of tastes. The second version, the "intrafamily" model, is one in which each family's preferences are determined by the consumption and family-size patterns the husband and wife experienced during their childhood and adolescence. The intrafamily version predicts that differences in consumption and family-size patterns within a group of families that are similar with respect to such economic variables as wage rates and nonlabor income as well as such variables as education, social status, and religion will be systematically related to differences in the consumption and family-size patterns experienced by husbands and wives during childhood and adolescence. The socialization version does not imply the existence of any systematic differences within such a group of similar families. The intrafamily specification is a version of interdependent preferences rather than habit formation, because tastes depend on the consumption and family-size decisions of the husband's parents and the wife's parents rather than on their own past consumption decisions. Within the context of lagged interdependent preferences, the socialization and the intrafamily specifications are competing hypotheses about whose past consumption and family-size patterns determine a family's tastes.

The socialization model of interdependent preferences is essentially that presented in Pollak (1976*b*) in a traditional demand analysis context. The intrafamily version has been put forward by Easterlin (1968, 1973) and by Wachter (1972*b*, 1975) as an explanation of the recent fertility and labor force participation rate swings in the United States. The intrafamily version is somewhat more complicated than the socialization model because its specification requires a notation that associates each family with the corresponding "parent families" in the previous generation. Rather than introduce such a notation, we shall discuss only the socialization specification.

We formalize interdependent preferences by postulating that each family's tastes depend on "normal levels" of commodity consumption ( $Z^*$ ) and family size ( $N^*$ ), and that these normal levels are related to

the past consumption and family-size decisions of other families. Normal levels can sometimes be interpreted as “aspiration levels” or “bliss points,” sometimes as “necessary” or “subsistence” levels. The essence is that the normal level of a variable is positively related to the family’s preference for the commodity in question or for children, so that, *ceteris paribus*, one would expect an increase in the normal level of a variable to increase its level in the optimal solution.

We shall not specify an explicit form for the family’s utility function, but we assume that its tastes for commodities and children are non-negatively related to the corresponding normal levels.<sup>26</sup> Since the family’s preferences depend on normal levels of consumption and family size, we denote its utility function by  $U(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau; Z^*, N^*)$ . The semicolon separating the normal levels of  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$  from the other variables is intended to indicate that this utility function corresponds to a preference ordering over the variables  $(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau)$ , which depends on the value of the normal variables, not to a preference ordering over the extended set of variables  $(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau, Z^*, N^*)$ . A preference ordering over the variables  $(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau)$  that depends on the values of the normal variables is called a “conditional preference ordering,” while a preference ordering over the extended set of variables is an “unconditional preference ordering.”<sup>27</sup> The distinction between conditional and unconditional preferences plays a crucial role in the analysis of welfare implications in section 2.5.

From a formal standpoint, normal levels are simply parameters that influence preferences in a nonnegative way toward the variables in question. In some cases (e.g., the linear expenditure system) we can interpret them as “necessary” or “subsistence” levels, while in others (e.g., the additive quadratic utility function) they have plausible interpretations as “bliss points,” “target levels,” or “aspiration levels.” However, there are some situations in which neither interpretation is appropriate.<sup>28</sup>

To complete the socialization version of the interdependent preferences model, we must specify how the normal levels  $N^*$  and  $Z^*$  are determined by past levels. We shall present only the simplest specification, one relating normal levels to average levels in the previous generation. That is, we let  $\bar{Z}$  and  $\bar{N}$  denote average levels of  $Z$  and  $N$  in the previous generation and postulate that  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$  are given by  $Z^* = E^Z(\bar{Z})$  and  $N^* = E^N(\bar{N})$ . The short-run behavior implied by the interdependent preferences model differs from that implied by the model with constant tastes described in section 2.2.3 in that average past consumption and family size,  $\bar{N}$  and  $\bar{Z}$ , operate through the normal levels  $N^*$  and  $Z^*$  to determine preferences. The analysis of the effects of changes in prices, wages, nonlabor income, or the household’s technology presents no new issues. By hypothesis, an increase in a particular  $\bar{z}_i$  increases  $z_i^*$ , and one would expect this to cause an increase in the

optimal solution value of  $z_i$ ; similarly, an increase in  $N$  will increase  $N^*$ , and one would expect a corresponding increase in the optimal solution level of  $N$ .

The “optimal solution” to the endogenous tastes model is a set of values of the decision variables  $(Z, X, t, b, d, N, a, l, \theta, \tau)$  that maximizes the utility function  $U(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau; Z^*, N^*)$  where

$$\begin{aligned} Z^* &= E^Z(\bar{Z}) \\ N^* &= E^N(\bar{N}), \end{aligned}$$

subject to the constraints

$$\begin{aligned} (Z, X, t) &\in T \\ \sum_{s=1}^g t_{hs} &= \bar{t}_h \quad h = 1, \dots, H \\ \sum_{k=1}^n p_k x_k + \rho(\theta, \tau) &\leq \mu + \sum_{h=1}^H \sum_{s \in M} w_h t_{hs} \\ b &= B(a, Z, X, l, \theta, \tau, \Lambda) \\ d &= D(b, Z, X, l) \\ N &= b - d. \end{aligned}$$

The optimal solution values are functions of the values of the variables the household takes as given: goods prices,  $P$ ; wage rates,  $w$ ; nonlabor income,  $\mu$ ; the household’s technology,  $T$ ; the births function,  $B$ ; the deaths function,  $D$ ; the cost function for fertility regulation,  $\rho$ ; the variables that determine the normal values for commodities and family size,  $\bar{Z}$  and  $\bar{N}$ ; and the family’s reproductive span,  $\Lambda$ .

### 2.3 Special Cases

The framework we have sketched views fertility as the outcome of maximizing a utility function subject to four constraints: the budget constraint, the household’s technology, the births production function, and the infant mortality function. Needless to say, empirical application of such a model is constrained by the limited amount of available data. On certain assumptions, however, subcases of the general model can be identified, some of which are much simpler than the complete model. In section 2.3.1 we develop a classification scheme distinguishing four special cases of fertility determination. We show that under certain assumptions the preferences for children may play no role in explaining fertility; under others, the births production function and infant mortality function may play no essential role, and completed family size is governed largely or wholly by the utility function, budget constraint, and

household technology—that is, by the variables traditionally emphasized in economic analyses of fertility. Section 2.3.2 takes up the empirical relevance of the proposed classification scheme. The evidence presented suggests that in the typical less developed country, observed fertility for the bulk of the population may depend on the simple model in which preferences for children play no essential role in determining completed family size, but that in developed countries the situation tends increasingly toward one in which preferences play a central role and the births production function and the infant mortality function play no essential role. In section 2.3.3 we develop some implications of this scheme for research on cross-sectional differentials and time-series trends in fertility.

### 2.3.1 Special Cases of the General Model

Two concepts, prominent in the demographic literature, are of central importance in the development of our classification scheme—desired fertility,  $b^d$ , and natural fertility,  $b^n$ .

The definition of desired fertility involves another notion common in the literature, that of the “perfect contraceptive society” (Bumpass and Westoff 1970). In terms of our framework this is a situation characterized by a contraceptive technology with no economic costs and free of preference drawbacks (that is,  $\rho(\theta, \tau) = 0$  and  $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \theta} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial \tau} = 0$ ). The term “perfect contraceptive technology” is sometimes used in the literature interchangeably with “perfect contraceptive society.” We prefer the latter, because the former conveys the notion of a situation involving only technological aspects of fertility regulation, whereas clearly subjective preferences are also involved.

Desired fertility,  $b^d$ , is defined as the number of births a family would choose in a perfect contraceptive society. Desired fertility is independent of the births production function, but it does not depend solely on preferences: other constraints facing the household, its budget constraint, its technology, and its infant mortality function will all influence desired fertility. Although there is no real-world perfect contraceptive society, we believe there are families in a number of societies that effectively approximate such a situation in that further reductions in the economic costs and preference drawbacks of fertility control would have no effect on their fertility behavior.

Natural fertility,  $b^n$ , is defined as the number of births a family believes it would have if it made no deliberate attempt to influence its fertility. It is the value of the births function when its arguments are determined without regard to preferences concerning family size.

The natural fertility case thus assumes that unperceived jointness or social taboos or both essentially fix all the arguments of the births pro-

duction function except the fertility control variables relating to contraception and induced abortion, which take on zero values. As in the case of the perfect contraceptive society, we do not argue that the pure case of natural fertility is often observed; instead, we argue that it is a useful empirical approximation.

Natural fertility, as we have defined it, is quite different from a biological maximum level of fertility. Natural fertility will almost certainly fall below the maximum value of the births function because a household's consumption pattern involves deficient health or nutrition or because there are social practices (e.g., with regard to nursing children) that restrict the output of children. In addition, natural fertility is influenced by many facets of the family's behavior. For example, the level of natural fertility may reflect such factors as observance of an intercourse taboo, coital frequency, and the consumption bundle chosen by the family. The central point, however, is that natural fertility is independent of the household's preferences for children; although its preferences for commodities and practices play a major role in determining the values of the arguments of the births production function, the relevant decisions are made without regard for their effect on fertility.

Both behavioral and biological factors shape natural fertility. The issue with regard to behavioral influences is whether the behavior is consciously motivated, at least in part, by considerations of its effect on fertility. If it is not, then such behavioral influences are consistent with natural fertility. The question of the household's motivation is clearly important for predicting the likely response to a policy intervention. If, for example, a family has no motivation to regulate its fertility, there is little reason to suppose that establishing a government family planning program would elicit a response from the population.<sup>29</sup>

We also assume for empirical purposes a constant level of infant mortality that is independent of preferences. This is more troublesome than the comparable assumption applied to the births function, because households are likely to realize that they have some control over infant mortality through their expenditures on children's food and health care. Our assumption is that the degree of social control over these variables is great enough that individual family discretion is not empirically important in altering fertility or completed family size. On this assumption,  $N^n$ , the natural level of completed family size, as well as  $b^n$ , natural fertility, is independent of family preferences.

The concepts of desired and natural fertility can be used to identify four special cases of fertility determination. Natural fertility may be greater than, less than, or equal to desired fertility; that is, a family's desires may range from more to fewer children than it thinks it could produce if its fertility were uncontrolled. An optimal solution for births below the family's perceived natural fertility ( $b^o < b^n$ ) implies a moti-

vation to practice deliberate fertility regulation. An optimal solution for births above the desired level ( $b^o > b^d$ ) implies the existence of “excess” or “unwanted” fertility, as these terms are used in the demographic literature. Using these concepts of deliberate fertility control and excess fertility, households can be classified into four groups on the basis of the determinants of their fertility:

|           | <i>Excess or<br/>Unwanted Fertility</i> |                | <i>Practice of Deliberate<br/>Fertility Control</i> |             |
|-----------|---|----------------|---|-------------|
| Group I   | No                                      | $b^o \leq b^d$ | No  | $b^o = b^n$ |
| Group II  | Yes                                     | $b^o > b^d$    | No  | $b^o = b^n$ |
| Group III | Yes                                     | $b^o > b^d$    | Yes   | $b^o < b^n$ |
| Group IV  | No                                      | $b^o = b^d$    | Yes   | $b^o < b^n$ |

For those in group I, natural fertility is less than or equal to desired fertility. In this “deficit fertility” situation there is no motivation to limit fertility, and hence actual fertility will depend on the determinants of natural fertility.

In contrast, all households in groups II, III, and IV have a motivation to regulate fertility because their natural (or “uncontrolled”) fertility would result in a greater number of births than desired ( $b^n > b^d$ ). Whether these families practice fertility control depends on the economic costs and preference drawbacks of control relative to its anticipated benefits.

For those in group II the economic costs and preference drawbacks of fertility control outweigh the benefits, and no deliberate control is practiced. For this group, then, as for group I, actual fertility equals natural fertility. Families in group II differ from those in group I, however, in that natural fertility is greater than desired fertility; hence, families in the two groups will respond differently to changes in the economic costs or preference drawbacks of fertility regulation.

Households in both group I and group II do not deliberately attempt to influence their fertility—group I, because of lack of motivation; group II, because the economic costs or preference drawbacks outweigh the incentive. In both cases, therefore, observed fertility behavior corresponds to the natural fertility level and is independent of preferences for births.

For group III the benefits of fertility regulation outweigh the economic costs and preference drawbacks, and these families practice fertility control. But the economic costs and preference drawbacks of fertility control are such that these families have “excess fertility” in the sense that the number of children called for by the optimal solution exceeds desired fertility. Hence, for families in group III:  $b^n > b^o > b^d$ . For this group, preferences for commodities and children and all of the constraints—the births production function, the infant mortality func-

tion, the budget constraint and the household's technology—enter into the determination of actual fertility. The identification of the factors that distinguish families in group III from those in group II is of substantial interest, since these are the factors that push households across the threshold of fertility regulation and cause them to adopt deliberate fertility control.

For group IV the economic costs and preference drawbacks of fertility control are so low relative to motivation for control that the group regulates its fertility to the point where actual births are equal to desired births. Thus, for group IV we have  $b^n > b^o = b^d$ . Strictly defined, no individual families are in group IV because no perfect contraceptive society exists. However, we believe that a sizable number of families in developed economies are close enough to this case that it provides a useful empirical approximation.<sup>30</sup> For such families the level of fertility is independent of the births production function.

A simple illustration may clarify our classification scheme. Consider a population of households identical in all respects except for nonlabor income and the preference drawbacks of fertility control. Suppose that there is only a single composite commodity,  $z$ , one unit of which is produced from each unit of market goods. Consider the indifference map of economic theory with  $b$  measured along the horizontal axis and  $z$  along the vertical axis. The curve labeled  $b^d$  in figure 2.1 is the “expansion path” or “income-consumption curve” of consumer demand theory,




Fig. 2.1 Illustration of four-group classification scheme.

showing the amount of  $z$  and  $b$  that would be demanded as nonlabor income varied, given tastes and prices. Each point on the curve is obtained from the tangency of an indifference curve and perceived feasible set. One may think of the values of  $b$  for various assumed levels of nonlabor income, thus derived, as the “Engel curve” for births—that is, how births would change with the level of nonlabor income. As drawn, the curve shows the number of births increasing with nonlabor income, implying that births are a normal good.

Let us now consider how the ability of households to produce live births might vary with the level of nonlabor income if no deliberate attempt were made to regulate fertility. If nonlabor income were extremely low, then health and nutrition might be so poor that a household would be effectively sterile, that is,  $b = 0$ . Higher levels of nonlabor income (implying higher input values of health and nutrition in the births production function) would, up to some limit, imply increasing numbers of births. The  $b^n$  curve of figure 2.1 traces the path that the potential output of births is assumed to take as nonlabor income grows; that is, it shows how natural fertility might vary with income.

Consider now households whose income is so low as to place them to the left of point  $m$ . For these households, desired fertility,  $b^d$ , is greater than their reproductive ability,  $b^n$ . Hence they would have as many births as they could, and their actual fertility would correspond to natural fertility. These are our group I households; observations for this group would fall along the  $b^n$  curve, as shown by the “c” values in the figure.

All households to the right of point  $m$  are in an “excess supply” situation; their reproductive potential,  $b^n$ , exceeds their desired fertility,  $b^d$ . Differences in the actual fertility of these households would arise only from differences in their nonlabor income and the size of the drawbacks they attach to fertility control, because all other factors are assumed to be the same for all households. Households that perceive the drawbacks as so great that they do not practice deliberate fertility control will have observed fertility equal to natural fertility; such households are in our group II, and the observations for this group fall along the  $b^n$  curve, as illustrated by the “x” values in figure 2.1. For households who view the preference drawbacks as negligible, observed fertility will equal desired fertility; these households are in our group IV, and the observations for them all along the  $b^d$  curve (illustrated by the “v” values in fig. 2.1). Finally, households that practice some deliberate control, but for whom the drawbacks are so great as to result in some excess fertility, will fall in the shaded area between the  $b^d$  and  $b^n$  curves; these are the group III households.

For some populations the entire  $b^n$  curve could lie to the left of the  $b^d$  curve, in which case all households would fall in group I, with ob-



served fertility equal to natural fertility. For other populations, the relevant part of the  $b^n$  curve might lie wholly to the right of the  $b^d$  curve, and if obstacles to fertility control were negligible, all households might fall in group IV, with observed fertility equal to desired fertility. Typically, however, one would expect most societies to include a distribution of households ranging from group I through group IV. When this is so, if one plotted the observations for the population as a whole, one would obtain a scatter of points corresponding to the  $c$ ,  $x$ , and  $v$  values as well as some that fall in the shaded area.

If all fertility-determining functions were known, there would be no difficulty in explaining variations among households in observed fertility. When full information is lacking, we suggest using survey response data to divide the population into four groups based on the concepts of natural and desired fertility. For those falling in groups I and II a births production function can be estimated, reflecting the effect of income changes on natural fertility. For those in group IV, it is appropriate to ignore the births production function. For those in group III, we require a model involving preferences for children and fertility control as well as the births production function and infant mortality function.

### 2.3.2 Some Evidence

Within our general model of fertility determination we have identified four special cases. The empirical evidence currently available, although limited, suggests that it is analytically useful to emphasize these special cases.

The most important evidence relates to the distinction between socially controlled and family controlled fertility (groups I and II versus groups III and IV). For demographers and sociologists, the absence of deliberate family control of fertility is unlikely to raise serious questions, because most noneconomists think of premodern populations as primarily "natural fertility" regimes. Economists, however, are predisposed toward viewing behavior, including reproductive behavior, as a matter of conscious choice. For example, in work on agricultural production behavior in peasant societies, the trend of research has been toward establishing the applicability of rational decision-making models. Thus it has been shown that an unfavorable price movement for a product influences production decisions and causes a contraction in the acreage of the crop planted, in a manner consistent with the predictions of decision-making models (Behrman 1968). By the same token, one might suppose that a decrease in the returns from child labor might lead to curtailment of the output of children.

Reproductive behavior, however, differs from production behavior in an important respect. Babies, since they are a product of sexual intercourse, tend to be produced whether or not they are wanted, whereas

rice and wheat do not. Hence, a decision to limit fertility typically requires conscious action, such as abstinence, contraception, or induced abortion. If reproductive behavior is a matter of deliberate choice, then one would expect to find evidence of deliberate practice of fertility control. In fact, the evidence points to the general absence, rather than presence, of deliberate fertility control in less developed countries.

The evidence available is of two types—survey data in which households report on their knowledge and use of fertility control, and census or other data on actual age-specific marital fertility rates.<sup>31</sup> The former come mostly from what are known as “KAP” surveys—surveys of the knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practice of fertility control—which have been conducted in a number of countries since World War II.<sup>32</sup> The other body of data relating to the presence or absence of consciously controlled fertility is quite different; here one draws inferences from the actual fertility behavior of the population, instead of relying on subjective responses. The procedure requires brief exposition, although the essential idea is a simple one.

If no conscious effort were made to limit family size, the age pattern of marital fertility would be governed largely by fecundity and would show a slow decline from ages 20–24 through 35–39, then drop sharply thereafter. If couples were consciously limiting family size, the age pattern of fertility would tend, as age rises, to diverge increasingly in a negative direction from the natural fertility pattern. This is because when a young couple is at the start of the family-building process, there is little incentive to regulate fertility, and hence actual fertility would tend to coincide with natural fertility. However, as a couple ages and family-size grows, approaching or exceeding the desired level, the incentive for deliberate action to restrict family size increases, and correspondingly so does the incentive to adopt deliberate control measures; if such measures are adopted, one would observe the gap between actual fertility and natural fertility increasing over time.

Building on this notion, deriving from Louis Henry’s work, that deliberate control involves behavior affecting fertility that is modified as parity increases, Ansley Coale has recently developed a summary index of fertility control, “m,” that measures the extent to which an observed age pattern of fertility departs from that believed to characterize a natural fertility regime. An important advantage of the Coale measure (defined in the note to table 2.2) is that it rests on observed behavior, not subjective responses to an interviewer. Moreover, Coale’s index would reflect any technique of deliberate control, including abstinence, withdrawal, lactation practices, and induced abortion. In this respect, it avoids two possible problems in the survey data—the possibility that some techniques of deliberate control may have been omitted from the survey, and the possibility of misrepresentation in the responses.<sup>33</sup> A

disadvantage is that the Coale measure, unlike survey data, would fail to register a growth in deliberate control if it occurred uniformly at all reproductive ages, for the measure is premised on the assumption that when deliberate control is common, the fertility of older married women is especially low relative to the fertility of younger women. Both a priori reasoning and experience suggest that this is usually true, but the full empirical significance of this qualification remains to be established.<sup>34</sup>

Clearly, one may have doubts about either body of evidence—household surveys of fertility control or inferences from observed fertility behavior—as an adequate indicator of the extent of deliberate fertility control. However, if the results from the two sources are mutually consistent, this would significantly enhance the credibility of each. In fact, as comparison of tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows, this proves true.

Both sets of data show quite limited practice of fertility control in most countries at a premodern or early modern stage of development. In table 2.1 the proportion of the population in such areas reporting that they have ever attempted to control fertility is often about 10% or less. In table 2.2 the index of fertility control, which can range from values about zero (virtual absence of fertility control) to about 2.0, is usually about 0.25 or less.<sup>35</sup> In contrast, in contemporary developed countries, both measures show substantial practice of deliberate control.<sup>36</sup>

The two sets of data also show similar results with regard to rural-urban differences in fertility control. Uniformly, the practice of fertility control is higher in urban than in rural areas.

Finally, for the one case, Taiwan, for which data were readily available for a comparison of the changes over time in the two measures, they show a quite similar trend. In figure 2.2, Coale's index of fertility control is plotted for three dates, 1956, 1965, and 1973. The 1956 value is just about zero, which means that the age pattern of fertility in Taiwan at that date was almost identical with that of a natural fertility regime. Subsequently the index rises sharply to 1965 and again to 1973, implying the rapid adoption and spread of deliberate control. For the last two dates we can compare this pattern with the results of KAP surveys. At each date the survey value is approximately one-half that of "m," and the trend (broken line) lies very close to that shown by the Coale index. Although this is a very simple comparison and the female populations covered by the two measures are not identical, the closeness of the trends indicated by the two measures is encouraging.

Thus we have two bodies of evidence that are mutually confirming—one drawn from personal reports on the knowledge and practice of fertility control and the other based on inferences from observed behavior. It appears that households are, in fact, behaving as they say they are. In most less developed countries, this means that a large proportion of

**Table 2.1**                      **Percentage of Married Women of Reproductive Age Currently Using Contraception, Developed and Developing Countries, Recent Dates**

| Country                        | Date    | National | Rural           | Urban           |
|--------------------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <i>A. Developed Countries</i>  |         |          |                 |                 |
| Australia                      | 1971    | 66       |                 |                 |
| Belgium                        | 1966    | 76       | 70              | 77              |
| Czechoslovakia                 | 1970    | 66       | 59              | 69              |
| Denmark                        | 1970    | 67       | 64              | 69              |
| England and Wales              | 1967    | 69       |                 |                 |
| Finland                        | 1971    | 77       | 79              | 76              |
| France                         | 1972    | 64       | 59              | 65              |
| Hungary                        | 1966    | 64       | 64              | 65              |
| Netherlands                    | 1969    | 59       | 43              | 64              |
| Poland                         | 1972    | 57       | 51              | 62              |
| Yugoslavia                     | 1970    | 59       | 54              | 69              |
| USA                            | 1965    | 64       |                 |                 |
| <i>B. Developing Countries</i> |         |          |                 |                 |
| <i>Africa</i>                  |         |          |                 |                 |
| Egypt                          | 1975    | 21       |                 |                 |
| Ghana                          | 1976    | 2        |                 |                 |
| Kenya                          | 1971    | 2        |                 |                 |
| Mauritius                      | 1971    | 25       |                 |                 |
| Morocco                        | 1969    | 1        |                 |                 |
| Tunisia                        | 1971    | 12       |                 |                 |
| <i>Asia</i>                    |         |          |                 |                 |
| Bangladesh                     | 1976    | 5        |                 |                 |
| India                          | 1969    | 7-8      |                 |                 |
| Indonesia                      | 1971    | 0.5      |                 |                 |
| Iran                           | 1969    | 3        |                 |                 |
| Korea                          | 1972    | 30       |                 |                 |
| Malaysia                       | 1969    | 6        |                 |                 |
| Nepal                          | 1971    | 3        |                 |                 |
| Pakistan                       | 1968-69 | 6        | 4               | 10              |
| Philippines                    | 1972    | 8        |                 |                 |
| Taiwan                         | 1971    | 44       |                 |                 |
| Thailand                       | 1969-70 |          | 13              | 42              |
| Turkey                         | 1968    | 35       | 25              | 65              |
| <i>Latin America</i>           |         |          |                 |                 |
| Colombia                       | 1974    | 31       | 19 <sup>a</sup> | 35 <sup>a</sup> |
| Costa Rica                     | 1976    | 34       |                 |                 |
| Dominican Republic             | 1976    | 24       |                 |                 |
| Ecuador                        | 1974    | 3        |                 |                 |
| El Salvador                    | 1976    | 10       |                 |                 |
| Guatemala                      | 1974    | 4        |                 |                 |
| Haiti                          | 1976    | 5        |                 |                 |
| Mexico                         | 1973    | 13       |                 |                 |
| Paraguay                       | 1975    | 10       |                 |                 |
| Trinidad and Tobago            | 1971    | 44       |                 |                 |

Source: Nortman (1977), tables 2 and 7.

<sup>a</sup>1969. Data are for those ever using contraception.

**Table 2.2**

**Coale Index of Fertility Control, *m*, for Females 20–49, Contemporary and Historical Western Populations and Asian Populations by Place of Residence, Specified Dates**

| Population                                 | Date      | National |                 | Rural Urban |          | Total Urban or Provincial | Large Cities or Capital |
|--|-----------|----------|-----------------|-------------|----------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
|  |           | <i>m</i> | Date            | <i>m</i>    | <i>m</i> | <i>m</i>                  | <i>m</i>                |
| <i>A. Contemporary Western Populations</i> |           |          |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Bulgaria                                   | 1956      | 1.67     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Denmark                                    | 1963      | 1.51     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Finland                                    | 1960      | 1.22     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Norway                                     | 1960      | 1.02     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Sweden                                     | 1963      | 1.33     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Australia                                  | 1961      | 1.20     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| <i>B. Historical Western Populations</i>   |           |          |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Bulgaria                                   | 1901–5    | .02      |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Denmark                                    | ca. 1865  | .26      | ca. 1865        | .24         | .25      |                           | .56                     |
| Finland                                    | 1871–80   | .24      |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Norway                                     | 1871–75   | –.05     | 1910–11         | .31         | .86      |                           |                         |
| Sweden                                     | 1751–1800 | .23      |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| 6 north French villages                    |           |          | 17th–18th cent. | .00         |          |                           |                         |
| 7 south and central French villages        |           |          | 17th–18th cent. | .02         |          |                           |                         |
| 14 northwest French villages               |           |          | 17th–18th cent. | .03         |          |                           |                         |
| 8 Germanic villages                        |           |          | 17th–18th cent. | –.00        |          |                           |                         |
| 1 Swedish village                          |           |          | 1745–1820       | .13         |          |                           |                         |
| Quebec                                     |           |          | 17th cent.      | –.06        |          |                           |                         |
| <i>C. Asian Populations</i>                |           |          |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Japan                                      | 1925      | .21      |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Korea                                      | 1961      | .03      | 1960            | .01         | .36      |                           |                         |
| Malaysia                                   | 1957      | .25      |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Pakistan                                   | 1963–65   | –.24     |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Philippines                                | 1963–67   | .19      | 1963–67         |             |          |                           | .69                     |
| Sri Lanka                                  | 1953      | .44      |                 |             |          |                           |                         |
| Taiwan                                     | 1956      | –.02     | 1961            | .16         | .29      |                           | .66                     |
| Thailand                                   | 1960      | .11      | 1968–70         | .15         | .47      |                           | .58                     |
| Indonesia                                  |           |          | 1965–70         | .17         | .28      |                           |                         |
| Mysore, India                              |           |          | 1952            | .26         | .16      |                           | .56                     |
| West Malaysia                              |           |          | 1967            | .27         | .32      |                           | .97                     |
| China (rural)                              |           |          | 1930            | .06         |          |                           |                         |
| Comilla (Bangladesh)                       |           |          | 1963–64         | .13         |          |                           |                         |
| 4 Japanese villages                        |           |          | 17th–19th cent. | .18         |          |                           |                         |
| Hong Kong                                  |           |          | 1961            |             |          |                           | .61                     |
| Singapore                                  |           |          | 1957            |             |          |                           | .30                     |

households are not deliberately regulating their fertility and thus fall in groups I and II of our classification scheme.

The discussion so far relates to evidence of the division of the population between groups I and II versus groups III and IV. There are no published data that permit the classification of a population into our four groups—a cross-classification based on the practice of fertility control and absence or presence of excess fertility—and hence judgments on empirical importance of the individual groups must be more tentative. However, in the case of Taiwan, for which the availability of unpublished data permit us to derive at least an illustrative distribution of the population among all four groups, the results suggest that all four groups were important in 1965.

The data contain various biases, such as inadequate recall and a tendency after the fact to adjust one's view of desired fertility to realized fertility. Nevertheless, the results shown in table 2.3 may provide a rough idea of orders of magnitude of the four groups at that time. In 1965, the population is divided fairly evenly among the four. For 30% (group I), the number of children was less than or equal to that desired, and consequently, there was no incentive to practice fertility control.<sup>37</sup> Another 26% (group II), although in an excess fertility situation, had not resorted to fertility control, presumably because the costs or preference drawbacks of such control exceeded its benefits. The total of these two groups together amounts to 56%, a majority of the population. The observed fertility behavior of this segment of the population reflects the operation of social controls but not of deliberate family control of fertility; its fertility behavior is independent of preferences for children. The remaining 44% of the population had resorted to deliberate control. This group was almost equally divided between those who had excess fertility (group III), 21%, and those who had not (group IV), 23%.

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*Source:* A, unpublished data kindly provided by Ansley J. Coale; B and C, Knodel (1977, tables 1 and 2), except 1960 data for Korea, which were also provided by Coale.

*Note:* The index of fertility control,  $m$ , is calculated from a comparison of the age-specific marital fertility schedule in the subject population with that presumed to characterize a natural fertility regime according to the following formula:

$$r(a) = M \times n(a) \times e^{m \cdot v(a)},$$

where

$a$  stands for age (from 20–24 through 40–49)


$n(a)$  is an empirically derived natural fertility schedule

$r(a)$  is the marital fertility schedule of the subject populations

$M$  is a scale factor equal to the ratio of  $r(a)$  to  $n(a)$  at ages 20–24, and

$v(a)$  is an empirically derived function expressing the typical age pattern of voluntary control of fertility.

See Coale and Trussell (1974, p. 187) and Knodel (1977, n. 12).



**Fig. 2.2** Coale index of fertility control, “*m*”, and survey responses on deliberate control, Taiwan, 1956–73. Index values from Knodel (1977, fig. 5). Survey data from KAP 1 and KAP 4 surveys (cf. table 2.3).

In sum, these data suggest that all four groups in our classification scheme may be empirically important at certain times and places. What stands out most clearly is the importance of social as opposed to deliberate family control of fertility in many less developed countries. Evidence of a pervasive lack of knowledge and use of deliberate fertility control relates especially to rural areas in less developed countries. Since the rural sector typically comprises such a large proportion of a less developed country’s population, this means that the behavior over time of the national average of fertility may be largely dominated by the behavior of a natural fertility population. The evidence does not indicate a total absence of deliberate family control of fertility, but it does suggest that such control is usually very limited among premodern and early modern populations.

### 2.3.3 Research Implications

Our four-group classification scheme, to the extent it has empirical relevance, has important implications for research. First, it implies that for cross-sectional analyses the population should be subdivided based on survey questions regarding deliberate fertility control and excess fertility, and the resulting groups should be analyzed separately. For

households in groups I and II, natural fertility models stressing the births production function and ignoring preferences for children are appropriate. For those in groups III and IV, preferences play a crucial role, and we view hypotheses regarding tastes as a high priority area for future research. Our viewpoint is illustrated below in regard to the analysis of fertility differentials and trends.

### *Fertility Differentials*

Our classification scheme suggests that the cross-sectional pattern of fertility differentials by socioeconomic status for a national population is a weighted average of the patterns for the component groups. Pooling the data for all groups is unlikely to lead to correct identification of the underlying relationships. On the other hand, disaggregation of the data into the component groups and separate analysis of each should clarify the basic relationships.

Let us illustrate in terms of a hypothetical example. Suppose that for households in groups I and II, those whose behavior is governed by natural fertility conditions, there would typically be a mild positive relation between socioeconomic status and fertility around a fairly high

**Table 2.3      Percentage Distribution by Practice of Fertility Control and Deficit or Excess Fertility, Wives Aged 35–39 of Unbroken Marriage, Taiwan, 1965**

|       | Practice of Deliberate Fertility Control |  |                                      |                                       |                                     |    |    |
|-------|--|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----|----|
|       | Never Practiced                          |  |                                      | Ever Practiced                        |                                     |    |    |
|       | Total                                    | Desired Family Size                                |                                      | Total                                 | Desired Family Size                 |    |    |
|       |  | Greater Than<br>or Equal to<br>Actual<br>(group I) | Less<br>Than<br>Actual<br>(group II) | Less<br>Than<br>Actual<br>(group III) | Equal<br>to<br>Actual<br>(group IV) |    |    |
| Total | 100                                      | 56   | 30                                   | 26                                    | 44                                  | 21 | 23 |


*Source:* KAP 1 and KAP 4 surveys. We are grateful to Ming-cheng Chang, Ronald Freedman, and Albert Hermalin for making these data available to us and for help in interpreting them. The specific basis for classification is:

1. Excess fertility: the excess for each respondent of living children over the ideal number of living children.
2. Practice of fertility control: based on replies to the question whether the respondent "ever used any birth control."

Because our concern is with marital fertility, the data shown refer to wives, not to all women, and, in order to eliminate the effect on fertility of marital disruption, to wives whose marriage has not been broken. For those who are at an early stage of the reproduction process, one would expect that desired fertility would exceed natural fertility. Hence the data are for women aged 35–39 (the oldest age group available), whose fertility is virtually completed.



average level of fertility.<sup>38</sup> Such a pattern might result from the impact of higher income and better health working through the births function. This is illustrated by the groups I–II curve in figure 2.3. Assume further that for households approximating the conditions of a perfect contraceptive society (group IV) there would be a zero correlation between fertility and socioeconomic status around a low average level of fertility—perhaps because systematic variations in taste or cost factors offset a positive income effect. This pattern is suggested by some data on desired family size in the United States. This is shown by the group IV curve in figure 2.3. Finally, let us suppose that for households in group III the pattern of fertility differentials is dominated by differences in the adoption of fertility regulation practices, which are perceived by those in higher socioeconomic status groups to involve fewer preference drawbacks. Then for this group we have a relation between socioeconomic status and fertility given by the group III curve in figure 2.3.<sup>39</sup> The overall pattern of socioeconomic status-fertility differentials would in these circumstances be a weighted average of the patterns for the component groups. By appropriate variations in the underlying assumptions one could produce a great variety of fertility-socioeconomic status patterns.



**Fig. 2.3**

Hypothetical fertility differentials by socioeconomic status.

*Fertility Trends*


In this area, the most important research questions relate to the demographic transition—the factors behind the shift from high to low fertility during socioeconomic development—and to the long-term outlook for fertility in now-developed countries.

Our classification scheme is compatible with, although it does not require, a view of the demographic transition as a shift from a primarily natural fertility regime (groups I and II) to one eventually largely comprising a “perfect contraceptive society” (group IV), an interpretation consonant with much of the demographic literature. An illustration is provided in figure 2.4, which shows some hypothetical trends during “modernization” (i.e., the transition from a premodern to a modern society) in the levels of natural fertility, desired fertility, and the optimal solution. In the diagram, the process of economic and social modernization is assumed to be correlated with increasing family income and corresponds to a movement to the right along the horizontal axis. The diagram represents only the general nature of the possible relationships during modernization; no implication is intended regarding specific magnitudes.

Natural fertility is assumed to increase during social and economic development, then to level off. This reflects the effect of, for example, increasing income on the health and nutrition of mothers and children, which operates through the births function to increase fertility. Desired family size is assumed to trend downward during the demographic transition, owing perhaps to a change in tastes or to a relative increase in the prices of the inputs required for child-rearing. As drawn, the diagram implies that in premodern societies natural fertility is less than desired fertility (that is, most households are in group I), but the analysis would be essentially the same if most households were in group II. The main point is that initially there is no deliberate practice of fertility regulation.

Consider the trend in the optimal solution implied by our assumptions about natural fertility and desired fertility. At points to the left of  $m$ , the optimal solution coincides with natural fertility: parents would have no motivation to practice fertility regulation even if it were free of economic costs and preference drawbacks. At points to the right of  $m$ , desired fertility is less than natural fertility, and families would practice fertility regulation if it were available without economic costs or preference drawbacks.

Since fertility control has economic costs and preference drawbacks, we anticipate that initially, as natural fertility edges above desired fertility, the benefits of fertility control would not be great enough to offset



**Fig. 2.4** Hypothetical trends in fertility variables associated with economic and social modernization.

its costs, and the optimal solution continues to coincide with natural fertility. As the movement to the right continues, excess fertility and the welfare loss to the family associated with it becomes larger, and a point is reached at which the benefit of fertility control exceeds its economic costs and preference drawbacks. At this point, the “threshold” of fertility regulation, labeled  $h$  in the diagram, the family adopts fertility control. Beyond  $h$ , the optimal solution no longer coincides with the natural fertility curve; instead, the optimal solution curve turns downward in the direction of the desired births curve, and, eventually, beyond point  $p$ , merges with it.

In terms of the previous classification of the population, the situation to the left of point  $m$  corresponds to a group I situation—no unwanted fertility and no practice of fertility control—as shown in the space beneath the diagram. Between points  $m$  and  $h$  there is a group II situation—excess fertility but no practice of fertility control. Between points  $h$  and  $p$  there is a group III situation, and to the right of point  $p$ , a group IV situation. Thus, one might think of the fertility transition as an evolution from a group I situation to a group IV situation. Actually, as we

have seen, at any given time the households in a population are distributed among groups I through IV. More realistically, therefore, one might say that in the course of modernization a society gradually shifts from a predominantly group I (and/or group II) situation to a predominantly group IV situation. The main point is that there is a shift in the nature of fertility determination from one where natural fertility factors are largely or wholly dominant and preferences regarding fertility play virtually no role to one in which the influence of natural fertility disappears and conscious choice plays the dominant role.<sup>40</sup>

## **2.4 Research Implications**

Although the four cases identified in section 2.3 depend on special assumptions, a number of other research implications follow from our general model. In this section we discuss the use of preferences as explanatory variables; some issues involving the births and household production functions; and the estimation of elasticities of births and family size with respect to income variables and the wife's wage rate. Our discussion does not depend on the special cases of section 2.3, although it is sometimes explicated more easily by reference to them. To bring out the distinctive features of our approach, we contrast it with the Chicago-Columbia view.

### **2.4.1 The Role of Preferences as Explanatory Variables**

The arguments in section 2.3 regarding the prevalence of unperceived jointness and social taboos suggest that the role of preferences for children in determining observed fertility is smaller in less developed than in more developed countries. Hence, a section devoted to preferences must emphasize issues more relevant to the latter.

In the interplay between preferences and constraints, the Chicago-Columbia approach assumes that systematic variations in fertility are due largely if not entirely to differences in the constraints. Preferences are assumed to be constant across households in cross-sectional studies and over time. Partisans of the Chicago-Columbia approach are generally opposed to investigating taste formation. An example is provided by Michael and Becker (1973, p. 380): "For economists to rest a large part of their theory of choice on differences in tastes is disturbing since they admittedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes." Going further, Keeley (1975, p. 462) argues that "the household production model lessens the reliance on tastes by incorporating socioeconomic variables in the technology of household production and thus provides a framework where the effects of socioeconomic variables on the shadow prices of home-produced commodities can be systematically analyzed."

A related view is that of T. P. Schultz, who asserts that “however conceptualized and quantified, the influence of these ‘taste’ factors can be properly assessed only *after* the tangible pecuniary returns have also been isolated and taken into account” (Schultz 1976, p. 95, n. 3; emphasis added). But unless one works exclusively with subsamples in which all households have identical tastes, the attempt to isolate “pecuniary returns” must fail. Since one cannot perform controlled experiments, there is no way to segregate the effects of price and income changes from the effects of habits or other types of endogenous taste formation if these phenomena are actually taking place. Hence, estimates of price and income effects obtained from a specification that presupposes fixed tastes are conditional on the maintained hypothesis of fixed tastes. In demand analysis, for example, introduction of habit-formation not only improves  $R^2$  but also changes the estimates of price elasticities, income elasticities, and marginal budget shares.<sup>41</sup>

The notion that economists have an acceptable theory of systematic differences in household technology, but do not have a definitive theory of taste formation, is hardly a justification for excluding or neglecting hypotheses related to tastes.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, economists do not have very satisfactory theories of systematic differences in technologies available to firms in different regions, and the problems posed by household technologies are substantially more difficult because the outputs are often not measured directly. In any case, the testing of alternative models should be left to the empirical arena and not settled by a priori arguments about the proper scope of economics, demography, or other social sciences.

We advocate research on the effect of tastes along with other determinants of variations in fertility. For example, our own work suggests that models incorporating systematic changes in tastes are capable of providing an explanation of recent fertility swings in the United States and some other developed countries.<sup>43</sup> The Chicago-Columbia approach, on the other hand, has been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of this experience. The Chicago-Columbia approach emphasizes that children are “time intensive in household production.” Continuing advances in female education continue to raise the real wage of the wife and consequently the opportunity cost of child-rearing. In this framework, fertility in developed economies should then trend monotonically downward once a regime of low infant mortality is established. Important swings in fertility rates are not anticipated or explained.

In contrast, an endogenous preference mechanism leads to different implications for the long-term outlook in developed countries. Over the long term, it is possible that income growth may be fertility-neutral in the sense that shifts in the budget constraint favoring children are offset by an endogenous preference mechanism functioning as a lagged result

of income growth that disfavors children. (This is suggested in fig. 2.4 by the leveling off of the  $b^d$  curve, once, say, a low infant mortality regime is established.) These two influences however, may differ in their timing effect and consequently generate longer-term fluctuations in fertility. In this view, recent observations of total fertility rates below the zero population growth level in the United States may be a low point on a long-swings cycle rather than the continuation of a secular decline owing, for example, to increasing female wage rates that increase the cost of child care.<sup>44</sup>

A framework that incorporates research on taste formation along with other social and economic variables will extend the range of empirical problems potentially amenable to treatment. In addition, it may forestall possibly biased results in analyses that omit taste consideration. For if preference variations enter into the determination of fertility variations along with variations in included variables such as wage rates, then failure to take simultaneous account of taste factors will lead to biased estimates of the effects of changes in the included variables.

#### 2.4.2 The Technology of Child-rearing

Central to the Chicago-Columbia approach is the assumption that, as a technological datum, child-rearing is time intensive. Despite its importance, however, there has been little research on the technology of child-rearing. The lack of progress in this area may be due to two factors: the lack of measurable outputs that can be associated with child-rearing and the difficulties of distinguishing between the effects of technology and those of tastes in child-rearing behavior.

We would argue that while children today may be time intensive, especially in their early years, this results from the interplay of tastes, technology, and the budget constraint. There is little evidence to support the notion that the technology requires child-rearing to be time intensive, independent of prices and tastes.

An analysis of the child day-care industry could highlight some of these factors. Has the growth of day-care centers been solely due to a shift in techniques of child care resulting from an increase in the opportunity cost of the wife's time, or has the development of this industry also been due to a change in attitudes toward child-rearing and the role of women? Taking these factors into account, one could develop a number of scenarios in which child-rearing might cease to be a time-intensive activity for the household. For example, if the day-care industry were at an "infant" industry stage (no pun intended), its development, viewed as a dynamic process, could lead to a substantial reduction in the price of child care outside the home. This would lead to a substitution in favor of day-care centers and a decline in household time devoted to child care, but it would be independent of changes in the

wife's wage rate. Similarly, a change in preferences in favor of day-care centers as a desirable way to rear children would lead to a decline in household time devoted to child-rearing, although the change might be unrelated to any changes in market prices or wage rates. In these situations it is far from certain that fertility rates would continue to decline, or even remain low, as income and female wages trended upward.

When dealing with the technology of child-rearing, the Chicago-Columbia school tends to treat commonly used socioeconomic variables such as education as proxies for inputs of the household technology. For example, Michael (1973) assumes that differences in education among individuals cause differences in household efficiency but have no effect on tastes. In this framework, the anticipated relationship between education and family size depends upon the relative gains in efficiency in consuming different "commodities" including children. Since the model does not lead to a priori restrictions on the sign of the coefficients, it cannot be separately identified from the preference effects that include education.<sup>45</sup> Is it not possible that education operates through both preferences and technology?

#### 2.4.3 Births Production Function

Another important line of research suggested by our general model is the investigation of the births production function. This is especially important for less developed countries where observed behavior for a substantial share of the population is typically governed by a natural fertility regime. Research on the births production function might be of interest for developed countries, but it would be more difficult because of the smaller proportion of direct observations available.

Suppressing the fertility regulation variables  $\theta$  and  $\tau$ , the births production function used in section 2.2 is of the form  $b = B(a, Z, X, I, \Lambda)$ . Since observations on frequency of intercourse,  $a$ , are usually not available, and taking the reproductive period,  $\Lambda$ , as given in an analysis of marital fertility (i.e., focusing on women with the same age at marriage), one would focus on the second and third terms of the relationship, the vectors  $Z$  and  $I$ . A number of suggestions on relevant empirical variables are available in the literature. Perhaps best known is the line of research stimulated by Rose Frisch (1975), which hypothesizes a positive relation between nutrition and fertility. To date, the most thoroughgoing attempt to test this notion in a context of less developed countries is that of Anderson and McCabe, who find supporting evidence for a biological relationship between nutrition and fertility among younger women in Kinshasa, Zaire (Anderson and McCabe 1975). Another fundamental factor that often receives attention is health conditions. Romaniuc, for example, in a study of data for districts of the Congo,

concluded: "the evidence points definitely to the existence of a sequence of events one would logically expect to occur. The birth rate is low because of the high incidence of sterility; the latter is caused by venereal disease, the incidence of which varies with the degree of sexual promiscuity" (Romaniuc 1968, p. 233). In Ceylon, malaria eradication appears to have had a positive effect on births (Barlow 1967). Among other factors (not necessarily independent) that figure in the literature as determinants of natural fertility are lactation practices (Jain and Sun 1972), cultural norms such as intercourse taboos (Leridon 1977), occupational circumstances (e.g., fishing or a nomadic life) (Chen et al. 1974; Romaniuc 1974; Henin 1972), and altitude above sea level (Heer 1967; James 1966).

What is needed in the study of the births production function is an approach analogous to that employed in studying mortality (Auster, Leveson, and Sarachek 1969). Such work would embrace a variety of input variables—nutrition, health, and others of the types just mentioned—that determine fertility as an output. This approach could ascertain the roles of these variables both singly and in conjunction with others as determinants of fertility variations.<sup>46</sup>

As has been noted, in the Chicago-Columbia approach, the prevailing view is that "demand" models of the type used for empirical research on developed countries are, with the addition of a child mortality function, a satisfactory point of departure for empirical research on less developed countries. (Advocates of a demand approach are not confined to those working in the Chicago-Columbia tradition.) When discussed—which is rarely—the need for research relating to the births production function is not emphasized. Thus, T. P. Schultz, in defending the demand model and the disregard of the births production function, argues that:

If, as seems intuitively reasonable, exogenous differences in a woman's expected fecundity are not usually correlated with exogenous factors affecting her demand for births, proxies for exogenous biological fecundity may be omitted from the demand model of fertility determination and, if this is true, pose no estimation problems [Schultz 1976, p. 93].

We argue that the typical Chicago-Columbia demand model poses a serious misspecification for less developed economies and that Schultz's attempt at salvaging the model does not work.<sup>47</sup> Most troublesome for the demand model advocates is that the "demand" variables, properly interpreted, may simply not be relevant in many less developed countries, except for explaining family size *desires* as distinct from behavior. A prerequisite for a preference model is evidence that the deliberate



practice of fertility control is linked to variations in observed fertility. In fact, as discussed above, evidence relating both to age patterns of fertility and to survey responses suggests an absence of deliberate control among much of the population in a typical less developed country.<sup>48</sup> Variables such as income that economists usually interpret as demand variables may, however, be significant in a statistical sense because of their effect on births through the births production function. The variables “fit,” but for the wrong reasons. The Schultz argument that the explanatory variables in the demand and supply models are different, so that the demand variable coefficients are uncontaminated, is dubious for the same reason; a woman’s fecundity is likely to be positively correlated with income, a factor that also affects her demand for children.

#### 2.4.4 Estimating the Optimal Solution Functions

The empirical fertility literature focuses on estimating the effects on births and completed family size of certain key explanatory variables such as nonlabor income and the wife’s wage rate. In the Chicago-Columbia approach, the problem is often treated as one of estimating elasticities (assumed to be constant), and these elasticities are assumed to correspond to the traditional income and substitution effects that would be present in a model in which preferences and the techniques of household production were unchanged.<sup>49</sup>

In our general model, the effects on births and completed family size of changes in nonlabor income and the wife’s wage rate operate through at least three distinct lines of causation. Because we are not simply maximizing a utility function subject to a budget constraint, the optimal solution function is not directly comparable to a demand function.

To see this, consider the effect of an increase in the family’s nonlabor income. First, the budget constraint shifts out so that the new budget line is parallel to the old one, indicating that the family faces a larger feasible set in the goods space, but that the relative prices of goods are unchanged. This is a possible analogue of the “income effect” of traditional demand theory, although it is not the only possible one. The outward shift in the budget set in the goods space implies a corresponding outward shift in the feasible set in the commodity space. If the household’s technology exhibits constant returns to scale, then the new feasible set in the commodity space will be a radial blowup of the old feasible set. Second, if the household’s preferences are not homothetic, it may choose to consume commodities in different proportions than before; if this is the case, and if the household’s technology exhibits joint production, then the commodity shadow prices at the new equilibrium commodity consumption pattern will differ from those at the old equilibrium, and the change will correspond to a change in the technique

of production used by the household. The change in the household's commodity consumption pattern may affect the household's fecundity, even though the household is unaware of the relationship between its consumption pattern and its fertility. Unperceived jointness may operate on the side of infant and child mortality as well as of fecundity, and their net effect will determine completed family size. Third, in the long run, the increase in nonlabor income may lead to an endogenous change in preferences. In the relative income model, for example, an increase in income will in the long run alter aspirations and lead to taste-induced changes in fertility and the participation rate of married women.<sup>50</sup>

In the general model, a change in nonlabor income will affect fertility through all three of the mechanisms described above. Disentangling these separate effects and estimating the underlying structural parameters is a difficult task given the usual limitations on data and our lack of a priori knowledge of technology and tastes. This lack of information, however, does not permit us to assume that induced changes in techniques of production or in tastes are quantitatively unimportant relative to the traditional income and substitution effects. Indeed, we believe the available data suggest that the effects that operate through changing techniques and changing tastes are significant, and that their relative importance varies systematically across societies and across groups within a given society. Our suggestion in section 2.3 that populations be divided into four groups whose fertility behavior should be analyzed separately is our response to this problem. Whether or not one adopts the assumptions necessary to classify populations strictly into these four special cases, the evidence on the practice of deliberate control suggests that for many less developed societies the response of births to changes in nonlabor income and wage rates will operate largely through unperceived effects of consumption patterns on the births and infant mortality functions and that preferences for children will not play a quantitatively important role. For developed economies, on the other hand, response to changes in nonlabor income and wage rates will reflect preferences for children (which may be endogenous) and the household's child-rearing technology as well as the traditional income and substitution effects of the Chicago-Columbia school.

Regressing wage rates and nonlabor income on fertility does not yield sensible estimates of the impact of these variables. The bias would be greater in less developed than in more developed societies, and greater for lower than for higher socioeconomic groups within a society. One way to minimize these biases is to divide the population into groups on the basis of survey responses or income levels and to estimate the parameters separately for each group. In our four special cases, parameters related to preferences for children can be omitted for groups I and II, and those related to the births technology can be omitted for group IV.

## 2.5 Welfare Implications

Our emphasis on unperceived jointness and endogenous tastes requires substantial modifications in the usual formulation of welfare arguments. But even without unperceived jointness and endogenous tastes, our stress on the preference drawbacks as well as the economic costs of fertility regulation as a determinant of fertility control has important implications for evaluation of the welfare effects of policies aimed at reducing “excess” or “unwanted” fertility. These issues are taken up in order below.

### 2.5.1 Endogenous Preferences

Any type of endogenous tastes considerably complicates welfare analysis. In section 2.2 we discussed a model of interdependent preferences in which a family’s tastes depend on the consumption and family-size decisions of others. More specifically, we assumed that each family’s preference ordering over its decision variables—vectors of the form  $(Z, X, b, d, N, a, l, \theta, \tau)$ —depend on the “normal values” of  $Z$  and  $N$ , which we denote by  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$ . These normal values might depend on the consumption and family-size patterns it observes in the surrounding society (in the socialization version) or on the levels of  $Z$  and  $N$  experienced by the husband and wife in childhood (in the intrafamily version). In section 2.2 we described the preference ordering over the decision variables as “conditional” on the values of  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$  and indicated this by writing the utility function as  $U(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau; Z^*, N^*)$ , with the semicolon separating the normal levels  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$  from the other variables. We did this to distinguish between an “unconditional” preference ordering over the extended set of variables  $(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau, Z^*, N^*)$  and a “conditional” preference ordering over the decision variables  $(Z, N, d, a, l, \theta, \tau)$  that depends on the levels of the normal variables  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$ .

A conditional preference ordering captures the notion that families with different consumption and family-size experiences may have different tastes and may make different decisions, but it does not permit us to compare situations that correspond to different normal values,  $Z^*$  and  $N^*$ .<sup>51</sup> Such comparisons must be based on the unconditional preference ordering over the extended set of variables  $(Z, X, b, d, a, l, \theta, \tau, Z^*, N^*)$ . To see this, suppose that preferences for children are determined by the number of children in the wife’s family, independent of the commodity consumption pattern of that family, in the following very simple way: regardless of other considerations, the family attempts to have the same number of children as were present in the family in which the wife grew up, and it is unwilling to trade off children against commodities in at-

tempting to accomplish this. In such a world, the size of the family in which the wife grew up uniquely determines the number of children she will have, but there is no way to use this information to compare the welfare level of women with one sibling with that of women with two siblings. Notice that the woman with one sibling is observed to choose two children rather than three, while the woman with two siblings is observed to choose three children rather than two.<sup>52</sup>

The welfare implications of a model of interdependent preferences must be derived from the unconditional preference ordering, but these preferences are not revealed by the family's choices of the decision variables. Thus the conceptual basis for welfare evaluation in such a model must be quite different from the "revealed preference" approach usually employed by economists. We see two possible bases for welfare evaluation with endogenous preferences. The first is based on direct comparisons of the well-being of different families as reflected by their responses to survey questions which ask them directly about their "happiness" or "well-being."<sup>53</sup> The second approach relies on a different type of interpersonal comparison. Sen (1973, p. 14) discusses this approach:

If I say "I would prefer to be person *A* rather than person *B* in this situation," I am indulging in an interpersonal comparison. While we do not really have the opportunity (or perhaps the misfortune, as the case may be) of in fact becoming *A* or *B*, we can think quite systematically about such a choice, and indeed we seem to make such comparisons frequently.

Representing  $(x,i)$  as being individual *i* (with his tastes and mental qualities as well) in social state *x*, a preference relation *R* defined over all such pairs provides an "ordinal" structure of interpersonal comparisons.

In the case of interdependent preferences, one would ask a family whether it would rather be in the position of family *A*, which experienced the consumption–family-size pattern  $\alpha$  during adolescence, or of family *B* which experienced the consumption–family-size pattern  $\beta$  during adolescence, but it is possible that the family's choice between the alternatives  $(A,\alpha)$  and  $(B,\beta)$  will depend on its own consumption–family-size experiences during adolescence. If individuals are unable to abstract from their own backgrounds and upbringing in making choices of this type, there is little chance of extracting an unconditional preference ordering from responses to such questions. If this is the case, welfare evaluations must rest on direct comparisons of "happiness" or "well-being" reflected either by responses to survey questions or by an appeal to general (and often questionable) assumptions about "human nature."<sup>54</sup>

### 2.5.2 Unperceived Jointness

Even without interdependent preferences, unperceived jointness complicates welfare evaluation. Economists are accustomed to asserting that if a family chooses alternative  $A$  when it could have chosen  $B$ , then  $A$  is at least as good as  $B$  according to the family's preferences.<sup>55</sup> The analogous correct version of this assertion is the following: If the family intends to choose  $A$  when it believes it could have chosen  $B$ , then  $A$  is at least as good as  $B$  (according to the family's preferences). Unperceived jointness breaks the automatic link between observed consumption and intended choice, since the family that intends to choose  $A$  may be observed with  $A'$  (e.g., a larger number of children, because of the effect of better nutrition on fertility). Similarly, with unperceived jointness the household's perception of the set of feasible alternatives may be quite different from the true feasible set, and inferences about preferences must be based on the perceived rather than the actual feasible set. These difficulties of inferring preferences from observed choices in the presence of unperceived jointness are not restricted to situations involving nutrition and fertility but apply equally to choices involving diet and health or transportation and safety, or any other context in which unperceived jointness is present.

Welfare inferences—even welfare inferences based on the family's preferences—are difficult to make in the unperceived jointness model because it is difficult to infer the family's preferences from its observed choices. This is clearly true in the short run, when the number of births or deaths realized by the family is different from the numbers it expected on the basis of the perceived births and deaths functions. But it is also true in the long run, when realized and perceived births and deaths coincide. The difficulty with revealed preference-type inferences based on the fulfilled expectations solution is that even in such an equilibrium the family's perception of its feasible set of alternatives is inaccurate.

### 2.5.3 Unwanted Fertility

We have defined "excess" or "unwanted" fertility as the difference between optimal and desired fertility; that is,  $b^o - b^d$ . We are concerned with two general causes of unwanted fertility, the economic costs and the preference drawbacks of fertility regulation.<sup>56</sup> A reduction in the economic costs of fertility regulation (e.g., a reduction in the price of condoms, diaphragms, or pills) represents a clear welfare gain to those whose excess fertility is reduced. The introduction of a new fertility-regulation technique (e.g., the pill) also represents a clear welfare gain for those who choose to use it. However, the welfare evaluation of a reduction in unwanted fertility due to an increase in the use of contraceptives because of a change in the family's attitudes toward their use

is more complex. Evaluated in terms of the family's new preferences, the change is an improvement, but evaluated in terms of its old preferences it is not. Thus the evaluation of the welfare impact of a government program that operates by changing tastes so as to reduce the preference drawbacks of fertility regulation is necessarily ambiguous.<sup>57</sup>

The view is common in the demographic literature that reduction or elimination of unwanted fertility through public policy would increase welfare. The Chicago-Columbia version of the economics of fertility lends itself to this view because it minimizes the role of preferences in determining contraceptive usage and emphasizes the importance of access to information and efficient use of a contraceptive technique. Thus Becker (1960) attributed the high completed family size of poor families to contraceptive failure owing to inadequate information. Similarly, Michael and Willis (1976) show that in the United States higher levels of formal education are related to lower contraceptive failure rates. If this reflects the greater efficiency of these families in fertility regulation, then a decrease in excess fertility would imply an improvement in the welfare of a family.

We do not assert that government-sponsored programs to control fertility cannot be valuable. But we do insist on distinguishing between benefits that accrue to the families whose excess fertility is reduced and benefits that accrue to others in the society.<sup>58</sup> In evaluating the benefits to the families whose excess fertility is reduced, it is important to understand the mechanisms through which such programs operate. To the extent that such programs operate by changing the preferences of the families whose excess fertility is reduced, there is no clear way to determine whether the families in question have benefited.<sup>59</sup>

A government-sponsored program that reduced unwanted fertility by lowering the economic costs of fertility regulation clearly benefits families whose excess fertility is reduced, provided the costs of the program are paid by others (i.e., by other groups within the society or by outside groups such as the United Nations). If the costs of the program are paid by taxes levied in part on the group whose unwanted fertility is reduced, then the question whether their welfare is increased depends on the balance between the benefits of lower-cost fertility regulation and the costs in the form of higher taxes; there is no presumption that the benefits outweigh the costs.

The strongest case for economic benefits can be made on the grounds of market failure. The argument for the existence of market failure is generally based on the fact that information collection and dissemination is a public or quasi-public good. A governmental unit can internalize both the information costs and the direct costs of establishing a market, whereas individual families cannot. The information-market-failure argument for government intervention presupposes an absence

of knowledge on the part of families that particular techniques of fertility regulation are available, a situation that is more likely to exist in less developed countries than in advanced industrial societies.<sup>60</sup>

When the reduction in excess fertility is the result of government proselytizing for the acceptability of contraception in order to reduce its preference drawbacks, we cannot infer that the reduction in excess fertility implies a welfare gain to the family. Even when the fertility control program is associated with a reduction in the economic costs of fertility regulation (e.g., by the free provision of fertility control devices and associated medical care not financed by taxes levied on those who practice fertility regulation), welfare gains cannot be inferred if tastes are changed at the same time.

In evaluating the welfare impact of family planning programs one must distinguish between developed and less developed countries. Preference drawbacks and economic costs underlie excess fertility in both areas, but economic costs are likely to be more significant in less developed countries, whereas preference drawbacks are likely to predominate in developed countries. Family planning programs designed to change preferences regarding the use of fertility regulation may be justified in terms of their benefit to society as a whole, but it is difficult to argue that such programs improve the welfare of the families whose tastes they change and whose excess fertility they thereby reduce. The benefits to families whose excess fertility is reduced by a government program that reduced the economic costs of fertility regulation are likely to be considerably smaller in developed countries than in less developed countries because the costs of access to information are typically much lower in developed countries. Most parents know of the existence, availability, and method of use of "reliable" techniques of fertility regulation (i.e., techniques with low theoretical failure rates). Many, however, continue to report unwanted fertility. Since the economic costs, including information access costs, are low in developed countries, the preference drawbacks must be decisive. Hence the main elements in unwanted fertility in developed countries appear to involve preference and motivation and not the economic costs or lack of information about fertility control.

## 2.6 Conclusion

Although there have been important advances in the analysis of fertility since the pathbreaking work of Becker (1960) and Leibenstein (1974a), the subject has become increasingly fettered by a narrowing view of the determinants of fertility. The framework laid out in this paper is intended to reverse this tendency by emphasizing a number of neglected determinants of fertility that deserve further exploration. Some of the principal views we have advanced are the following:

1. To come to grips with the variety of real-world fertility behavior, models of fertility determination must be expanded to include preferences and the biological production relationships. We propose a framework that includes such considerations in section 2.2, where we emphasize the role of “interdependent preferences” and the “births production function.”

2. This model of section 2.2, although rich in analytical potential, is complicated, and practical application is limited by the lack of data. On fairly reasonable assumptions, however, special cases of the model can be distinguished, ranging from one in which fertility is independent of preferences for children to one in which the births production function becomes irrelevant and preferences for children—perhaps endogenously determined—play a crucial role. These special cases are discussed in section 2.3.1.

3. Evidence both from household surveys of fertility control practices and from census and other data relating to actual fertility behavior show that in many less developed countries deliberate efforts by individual families to regulate their fertility are rare. Hence the fertility of the bulk of the population is determined by its “natural fertility.” For such countries, time-series and cross-sectional fertility variations may primarily reflect determinants of natural fertility rather than desired family size (see section 2.3.2).

4. Survey data make it possible to subdivide a population into those who practice deliberate fertility regulation and those who do not. We believe the analysis of fertility requires that these groups be treated in different ways. To explain the behavior of those who do not deliberately control their fertility, models stressing “natural fertility” and ignoring preferences for children are appropriate. For those who deliberately control their fertility, models emphasizing preferences for children and the effects of prices and income on desired family size are appropriate. Attempting to analyze the fertility behavior of an entire population without distinguishing between those who deliberately regulate their fertility and those who do not may result in biased estimates of the likely response of fertility to changes in incomes or to wider access to modern techniques of fertility regulation (sections 2.3.3, 2.3.4).

5. There is a need for further research in three relatively unexplored areas: preferences (sections 2.2.4, 2.4.1), the births production function (section 2.4.3), and unperceived jointness. Research on preferences could include both the endogenous formation of preferences for children and the role of the preference drawbacks of fertility regulation as a determinant of observed fertility. The investigation of the births production function should clarify the effect on fertility of practices such as lactation as well as such variables as health and nutrition. Of particular importance in evaluating the births production function is the role of



unperceived jointness. In this case the family does not fully incorporate into its behavior the relationship between its fecundity and its consumption decisions. Unperceived jointness is a pervasive problem in economics because individuals are often maximizing without taking account of the full interrelationships among constraints and between constraints and preferences.

6. Because our framework embraces a wider range of fertility determinants than the Chicago-Columbia approach, it is consistent with a greater variety of hypotheses regarding the factors that shape fertility trends and differentials. For example, it is consistent with an explanation of the demographic transition in which, in the early stages, an upsurge in fertility occurs owing to natural fertility factors. It is also consistent with the possibility that there will be substantial long-term fluctuations in fertility in developed countries rather than a monotonic downward trend. The framework also suggests a more cautious approach in evaluating the welfare effect of reducing "unwanted fertility," since its reduction may reflect a change in tastes (e.g., a reduced aversion toward the use of certain fertility regulation techniques) rather than a movement to higher indifference curves on an unchanging indifference map (section 2.5).

## Notes

1. See Schultz (1974). No single designation for this approach is fully satisfactory. Here we adopt the term used by one of its advocates, Keeley (1975).

2. See Schultz (1974); Keeley (1975), Leibenstein (1974*b*), and Schultz (1976).

3. T. Paul Schultz's article, although published in 1976, was originally prepared for a 1973 conference. Inevitably, there are differences among members of a "school" on particular points, and injustice may be done to one or another individual in a general discussion. Moreover, there are indications that several of the leading workers may be venturing in directions we advocate. A recent paper by Michael and Willis, for example, departs strikingly from the usual Chicago-Columbia model, and introduces a "natural fertility" concept (Michael and Willis 1976). T. Paul Schultz has encouraged work on natural fertility at the Rand Corporation and has recently given more attention to "biological factors" in a discussion of the relation between infant mortality and fertility. Ben-Porath, whose identification with the Chicago-Columbia approach is in any event uncertain, has explored the issue of intergenerational taste influences (Ben-Porath 1975).

4. T. W. Schultz, on the other hand, is markedly restrained in commenting on the relevance of the Chicago-Columbia approach to less developed countries: "Turning to fertility behavior in low income countries the [Chicago-Columbia] household model as it now stands has not been developed to treat the particular classes of circumstances that constrain the household in these countries. These are countries in which illiteracy abounds, human time is cheap, and the income oppor-

tunities that women have outside the home are mainly not jobs in the labor market. Furthermore, infant mortality is high, life expectancy is low, debilitation during the adult years is substantial for reasons of inadequate nutrition and endemic diseases, and the availability of modern contraceptive techniques, including information about them, is, in general, wanting. These classes of circumstances are not yet at home in the household model" (Schultz 1974, p. 20).

5. This failure is admitted by both Keeley (1975, p. 466) and Schultz (1976, p. 94). Curiously, although the value of a relative income model in explaining this movement is generously acknowledged by these writers, they are not led to reconsider their general stance against research on preferences.

6. For a discussion of the role of sex preferences in determining family size, see Ben-Porath and Welch (1976).

7. The seminal paper in the household production literature is Becker (1965). In Lancaster's model (Lancaster 1966*a,b*, 1971) goods possess "characteristics" that are often identified with Becker's "commodities," and the "technology" is linear. Becker often uses fixed coefficient production functions as an expositional device, but linear technology is not an integral part of his model. For a recent sympathetic statement of the household production approach, see Michael and Becker (1973). For a discussion of some of its limitations, see Pollak and Wachter (1975).

8. It is customary to assume that the household's preferences over the commodity space are well behaved in the sense that they can be represented by a continuous utility function that is strictly quasi-concave and nondecreasing in its arguments. If the feasible set in the commodity space is convex, these assumptions guarantee that the utility maximizing collection of commodities is unique.

9. The "cost function,"  $C(P,w,Z;T)$ , is defined as the minimum cost of producing the commodity bundle  $Z$  with the technology  $T$  at goods prices  $P$  and wage rates  $w$ . That is,

$$C(P,w,Z;T) = \min \sum_{k=1}^n p_k x_k + \sum_{h=1}^H \sum_{s \in T} w_h t_{hs},$$

subject to  $(Z,X,T) \in T$ . We can use the cost function to translate the budget constraint from the goods space into the commodity space. The translation of the constraint is the requirement that  $C(P,w,Z;T)$  not exceed the family's "full income" (i.e., the household's total earnings if it devoted all of its time to market work):

$$C(P,w,Z;T) \leq \mu + \sum_{h=1}^H w_h \bar{t}_h.$$

10. These issues are discussed in Pollak and Wachter (1975), where it is argued that joint production is pervasive in household production situations, especially when the role of time is recognized. For further discussion, see Barnett (1977) and the reply by Pollak and Wachter (1977).

11. Formally, it would be possible to treat the same fertility-regulation technique practiced with different intensities as different techniques. Our formulation is more consistent with ordinary usage and is capable of casting some light on the question why some population groups have higher "failure rates" than others using the same technique.

12. We take the family (more specifically, the parents) rather than the individual to be the basic unit of analysis. The assumption that the family (i.e., the husband and wife collectively) has well-defined preferences begs the issue of aggregating the separate preferences of the husband and wife into a collective preference ordering. Samuelson (1956) provides a classic statement of the problem; Nerlove

(1974, p. S 204) describes the resolution of these problems by postulating a "family utility function" as the "Samuelson finesse."

13. If the total cost of fertility can be decomposed into a fixed cost,  $\rho_0(\tau)$ , and a variable cost,  $\rho_1(\tau)\theta$ , the cost function takes the form

$$\rho(\theta, \tau) = \rho_0(\tau)k + \rho_1(\tau)\theta,$$

where

$$k = 0 \text{ if } \theta = 0 \text{ and } k = 1 \text{ if } \theta > 0.$$

The cost of fertility regulation might also depend on the fecundity of the family, which may in turn depend on its goods purchases and commodity consumption; abortion is an example of a technique whose cost depends on fecundity.

14. The earnings of children could be incorporated into the model either by expanding it to include an "earnings function" or by interpreting vector  $t$  to include the allocation of the time of children. We implicitly adopt the latter course to avoid additional notation.

15. Existence of a solution poses no real problems, but uniqueness is a different matter. We have not ruled out the possibility of multiple solutions. The usual uniqueness argument rests on the assumptions that feasible sets are convex and preferred sets are strictly convex. But some of our variables have no "natural" units of measurement, and there are no market units we could adopt by convention. For example, given any index of the intensity of use of a particular fertility regulation technique, any increasing transformation of that index would serve equally well. But such transformations can alter the convexity properties of feasible sets and preferred sets, so that the usual type of uniqueness argument cannot be made. Of course, the uniqueness of the solution cannot be altered by such transformations, and uniqueness is assured if there exist any units of measurement in which the feasible sets and the preferred sets are both convex and one or the other is strictly convex. Since we cannot establish uniqueness, we cannot guarantee that the optimal solutions are continuous in the variables the family takes as exogenous.

16. The term "unperceived jointness" is motivated by viewing the household as having a single production technology instead of three distinct technologies, one producing births, another infant mortality, and the third the other commodities. We call this single technology the household's "generalized technology." This treatment avoids treating births, deaths, and fertility regulation as distinct from the other commodities by extending the notion of commodities to include all of the arguments of the family's utility function; we refer to these variables as "generalized commodities." The generalized technology exhibits joint production because the same inputs affect the output of more than one generalized commodity: for example, purchased food inputs produce the generalized commodity "nutrition," which is desired for its own sake, but they also influence the output of the generalized commodities "births" and "deaths." The assumption that the family is not fully aware of the relationship between nutrition and births (or deaths) implies that the jointness in the household's generalized technology is at least in part "unperceived."

17. The polar cases here are the extreme points on the continuum from ignorance to knowledge; they do not coincide with the special cases of the classification scheme described in section 2.1. Indeed, that discussion assumed "complete ignorance" in order to define "natural fertility."

18. Since the family's reproductive span,  $\Lambda$ , is not a decision variable for the family, this constant specification is equivalent to  $\hat{B}(a, Z, X, l, 0, 0, \Lambda) = \beta^\Lambda$  where the family believes that the ratio  $\beta$  is not affected by its decisions. If the reproduc-

tive span were made a decision variable, then the two specifications would no longer be equivalent, and age at marriage would become a possible mechanism of conscious and deliberate fertility regulation.

19. For example,  $\bar{B}$  might be equal to the average fertility of the most recent cohort to have completed its reproductive span, or a weighted average of the experience of such recent cohorts, perhaps restricted to families of similar socioeconomic status. A more complicated specification might make use of the experience of families who had not yet completed their reproductive spans. This would be legitimate even in our one-period planning model, but it would not be legitimate to use the family's own experience or that of other families of its cohort as a basis for prediction.

20. A one-period planning model cannot capture the behavior of a family that did not intend to practice fertility regulation, has more children than it expected, and then begins to practice fertility regulation. Inability to reflect this type of period behavior is a serious drawback of one-period planning models. Two points should be made. First, this defect is relevant only for families that have knowledge of fertility-regulation techniques they would utilize if they knew their true fecundity. Second, the difficulty of incorporating unperceived jointness into the one-period planning model is a point against the one-period planning model, not against unperceived jointness.

21. There is a conceptual difficulty here, again reflecting the confines of the one-period planning model. Presumably, the eventual allocation of expenditure among goods is determined by realized rather than perceived family size: a family that expects two children and has four will buy more "child goods" and fewer "adult goods" than it planned. One can imagine a two-period model in which the consumption pattern in period one determines realized family size, and realized family size determines the consumption pattern in period two. In a multiperiod model, births and mortality in each period would depend on consumption patterns in previous periods, and consumption patterns in each period would depend on actual family size and composition in that period.

22. Similarly, in a Cournot duopoly equilibrium each firm correctly predicts the output of the other firm without perceiving the reaction function that generates that output.

23. Notice that perceived and realized completed family size could be equal even if  $b^p \neq b^r$  and  $d^p \neq d^r$ , if there are offsetting errors, but this is not a fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We have defined an equilibrium in terms of births and deaths rather than completed family size because a divergence between perceived and realized births will cause a revision of expectations about the births function and a revision of plans.

24. It might be thought that a model of habit formation in which a family's own past consumption levels influenced its taste for goods would be appropriate, but such a specification cannot be developed within the structure of a one-period planning model. For the family's own past consumption experience to play a role, we need a sequential model in which the family makes decisions at more than a single decision point.

25. The simultaneous specification in which each family's preferences depend on everyone else's current decisions is analytically intractable because the preferences of each family in a particular cohort are determined by variables whose values depend on the behavior of all families in that cohort. In the lagged specification the preferences of each family in a particular cohort depend on the behavior of families in earlier cohorts, and hence the model has a recursive rather

than a simultaneous structure. With the lagged specification it is only in a "steady state" equilibrium that the full effects of interdependent preferences manifest themselves.

26. The notation of a nonnegative relationship between normal levels and preferences can be formalized as in Pollak (1977, n. 8).

27. This terminology is used in Pollak (1977) to distinguish preferences over goods ( $X$ ) that depend on prices ( $P$ )—"conditional preferences"—from preferences over alternative goods-vector-price vector situations ( $X,P$ )—"unconditional preferences." The nomenclature is analogous to that used for conditional probability.

28. The "necessary" level interpretation works for the linear expenditure system, provided that certain parameters assume nonnegative values; but there is no a priori reason to believe that these parameters are nonnegative. For a discussion of both of these systems and references to the literature, see Pollak (1970, 1971).

29. A word is necessary also on the distinction between "socially controlled" and "family controlled" fertility. By "family controlled" or "family regulated" fertility we mean deliberate efforts by individual households to influence their fertility. From this point of view, natural fertility is socially controlled but not family controlled. For example, an intercourse taboo observed as a matter of custom is a social control that affects the level of natural fertility. It does not, however, imply controlled fertility in our sense, since observance of the taboo by individual households is not geared to family-size concerns. For a contrary view, see T. Paul Schultz (1976, p. 92). It should be noted also that while the present concept of natural fertility reflects social controls, such controls are only one of a number of societal conditions that affect natural fertility. War, for example, may reduce natural fertility by separating spouses, but it would not be viewed as a social control on fertility.

30. The focus of our approach is on groups or collections of families rather than on individual families or on society as a whole. This is to avoid both the problems associated with random or stochastic elements in the births and infant mortality functions and the discreteness of children. This allows us to interpret our model as applying to the mean experience of a group of identical families. We do not assume that all families in a particular society belong to the same group—quite to the contrary, important aspects of demographic behavior can be captured only by recognizing the changing balance among the groups we have described.

31. A possible third type of evidence comes from studies in which an attempt is made to formulate and test hypotheses that distinguish between "behavioral" and "biological" determinants of fertility. As explained in the preceding section, a finding in favor of behavioral influences does not necessarily imply controlled fertility in our sense, since the actual issue relates to whether the behavior is motivated by its possible fertility effect. On the other hand, a finding in favor of biological influences can be viewed as support for uncontrolled fertility in our sense. Without pretending to do a systematic survey, our impression is that the results of a number of these studies lean toward the importance of biological factors. (Cf., e.g., Anderson and McCabe [1977], Chowdhury et al. [1976], and Taylor et al. [1976].)

32. A useful early summary report on some of these surveys is Mauldin (1965); a recent review is given in Nortman (1977).

33. Some surveys aim explicitly for comprehensive coverage of possible methods. For example, a recent survey in Nigeria asked specifically about traditional methods, the practice of abstinence, and possible use of extended lactation as ways of limiting family size (Caldwell and Igun 1972).

34. A useful discussion of some of the shortcomings of the Henry concept is given in David and Sanderson (1976, pp. 143 ff.).

35. The index value can actually take on mildly negative values. This is because the "standard" age pattern for a natural fertility regime is an average of schedules for ten cases, and a given situation might actually involve a relationship between the age-specific fertility of older and younger women that is higher than the standard natural fertility case.

36. See also Knodel (1977). Knodel's paper is especially pertinent to the present discussion, for it concludes, from calculations of  $m$ , that "modern family limitation (i.e., parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular fertility decline in both Europe and Asia" (Knodel 1977, abstract).

37. Some additional data may be noted bearing on the prevalence of "excess demand" situations. Survey data for rural Morocco (1966), West Malaysia (1967), and Kenya (1966) indicate that among wives 35-49 the proportion who want more children is substantial, ranging between about one-fourth and one-half. A recent survey in an area of rural Indonesia states that "despite relatively high levels of ideal family size (average 4.5) . . . , women in Mojaleña give birth to an average of only 3.9 children; moreover, owing to high rates of mortality, completed family size averages 2.7 children" (Singarimbun and Manning 1976, p. 175). On the other hand, in Potharam (1964) the proportion was only a tenth or less. The Morocco data are from Lapham (1970); Kenya, from Heisel (1968); and West Malaysia, from Palmore (1969). The figures for Kenya include those for whom the "desire for children" was not ascertained or "up to God," a category that in rural Morocco accounted for only about 4-6% of the respondents. Indonesian data are from Singarimbun and Manning (1976); the Potharam data, from Peng (1965). See also Tabbarah (1971).

38. This is a pattern suggested by the data for rural Mysore (United Nations 1961, chap. 10) and more recently by work on Indonesia (Hull and Hull 1977) and Iran (Ajami 1976).

39. As drawn, this curve lies below that for groups I and II, but one can imagine conditions under which it might lie above it. Clearly, for all of the groups, identification of typical patterns is itself a research issue.

40. One might imagine a corresponding trend in fertility differentials by socioeconomic status as the nature of the underlying determinants changed. Suppose, for example, that the demographic transition involved simply a shift from an initial group I-group II situation through group III to a wholly group IV situation. Then the initial pattern of socioeconomic status-fertility differentials for the population as a whole might be given by the positively inclined  $b_n$  curve of figure 2.3 above, reflecting the effect of natural fertility factors. When the society was in the group III situation, the negatively inclined curve would prevail, and in group IV the horizontal curve. Thus one might hypothesize a trend in fertility differentials by socioeconomic status from positive through zero to negative and back to zero again. However, this is only one possibility. The point is that the expected pattern of fertility differentials would shift as the underlying determinants of fertility changed.

41. See, for example, Pollak and Wales (1969), Wales (1971), and Howe, Pollak, and Wales (1977).

42. Taste differences, like differences in technology, can be and often are used as a *deus ex machina* when other explanations fail. But the fact that specifications involving taste differences (or technological differences) can be misused is not a justification for ignoring them.

43. See, for example, Easterlin (1973) and Wachter (1975). For other work on taste formation in a time series context, see Leibenstein (1974*b*), Lee (1976, 1977), and Lindert (1978). For the application of the relative income model to the related question of labor force participation behavior, see Wachter (1972*b*, 1974).

44. See Easterlin (1973), Lee (1975 *a,b*), and Wachter (1972*b*, 1974).

45. Indeed, some empirical work suggests that the *ceteris paribus* relationship between education and family size is U-shaped. See, for example, Yoram Ben-Porath (1973).

46. Work at the level of intermediate variables, represented by what are known as "renewal models," seeks to account for fertility through factors such as age at sexual union, frequency of intercourse, probability of conception, length of the nonsusceptible period, and duration of reproductive union. So far as the present framework is concerned, this research is of interest primarily for the guidance it may provide into more fundamental causal factors at work. For example, if the nonsusceptible period (NSP) is an important source of fertility variation between two societies, one may be led to inquire into lactation practices, a seemingly important determinant of NSP and, in turn, into the determinants of these practices. However, the proximate components of fertility do not each depend uniquely on different causal factors—for example, a number of the intermediate variables might be affected by nutrition. An excellent concise presentation of renewal models is given by Keyfitz (1971). Economists who have followed this lead in recent work include Michael and Willis (1976), David and Sanderson (1976), and Crafts and Ireland (1976). Leridon (1977) has recently completed a valuable comprehensive survey of the field, which makes accessible in English the pioneering work of the French demographers, led by Henry and Bourgeois-Pichat.

47. We have avoided here the terminology of "demand" and "supply" models. As the optimal solution function illustrates, there are no demand and supply functions in the traditional sense.

48. If one disregards Puerto Rico and Chile, which are uncertain representatives of less developed countries' experience even for Latin America, the studies cited by Schultz as empirical support for the relevance of the Chicago-Columbia type of demand approach to less developed areas are: Egypt 1960, Philippines 1968, Thailand 1960, and Taiwan 1964–69. With the exception of Taiwan, the available evidence indicates extremely low levels of deliberate fertility control in these countries at the times studied. Table 2.3 shows very low indexes of fertility control for the Philippines and for Thailand. In Egypt in 1960 the proportion of married women of reproductive age who had practiced family planning was, in rural areas, 1.5%; semiurban, 12.0%; and urban, 17.0% (Mauldin 1965, p. 9). (The rural proportion of the population in 1960 in Egypt was 62.0%.) Even in regard to Taiwan, as shown in table 2.1 above, in 1965 less than half of married females aged 35–39 had practiced deliberate control. These observations suggest that in the studies cited by Schultz a substantial share of the population, and in some cases almost all the population, is in a natural fertility situation.

49. A good concise exposition is provided in Schultz's appendix (Schultz 1976).

50. See Easterlin (1968) and Wachter (1972*b*).

51. A similar point is made in Pollak (1976*b*) in the context of interdependent preferences, and in Pollak (1977) in the context of price-dependent preferences.

52. Our example assumes a lexicographic preference for family size, but this is not crucial. Notice that, because the relevant utility functions are conditional rather than unconditional, we could multiply the utility function of the woman with one sibling by 100 while leaving the conditional utility function of the woman with two siblings unchanged; such transformations have no effect on the behavior

implied by the utility functions, but the admissibility of such transformations shows that the level of utility cannot be used to compare the satisfaction or well-being in such cases.

53. See Easterlin (1975) for a survey of results of this type.

54. A third approach, based on the long-run behavior implied by the endogenous taste model, makes use of the "long-run" utility function. This approach was proposed by von Weiszäcker (1971) and criticized on conceptual and technical grounds by El-Safty (1976*a,b*), Hammond (1976), and Pollak (1976*a*).

55. Strictly speaking, the assertion in the text should refer to an individual rather than a family, but we assume that families, like individuals, have well-defined preferences.

56. There is a third source of excess fertility. No fertility regulation technique (excluding abstinence) is technically perfect even under ideal conditions. Associated with each method of fertility control is a minimum failure rate, termed the "theoretical" failure rate (Leridon 1977, p. 122).

57. A fertility control program which changes preferences for children may reduce fertility without reducing excess fertility. This is not an unlikely result.

58. Those whose fertility is unaffected might benefit from a reduction in the fertility of other groups in the society if the tax and transfer structure caused them to pay a portion of the cost of the unwanted children.

59. For a more detailed exposition of this argument, see Wachter (1972*a*).

60. Costs of fixed information and costs of access to fertility control may be sizable in many less developed countries today. Where modern medicine is not readily available, the costs of acquiring modern contraceptive techniques can be prohibitive. For example, parents in a rural village that has neither a doctor nor a clinic could not import modern contraceptive techniques and associated medical care except at a very high initial or fixed cost. For these families, the traditional methods of abstinence and withdrawal may be the only forms of regulation that can be adopted without violating the budget constraint. To the extent that excess fertility prevails, the fact that these methods are often not utilized attests to their significant preference drawbacks. As development occurs, an increasing proportion of households in less developed countries have the motivation to practice fertility control, but the economic costs are too high for modern techniques and the preference drawbacks too high for traditional fertility regulation. At this stage these areas offer at least the potential of large economic benefits if the government were to organize the necessary infrastructure for dispensing contraceptive information and techniques. The government is in effect capturing an externality by establishing a market for modern contraceptive devices.

## Comment      Harvey Leibenstein

This is an unusually stimulating paper on a very difficult subject. Its main features, as I see them, are as follows: (1) It emphasizes and employs a demographic view of economic development. (2) It contains a taste-shift factor that is unique for models of this type. (3) It develops

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an interesting concept in the notion of “unperceived jointness.” (4) It separates the demand for children and the demand for controls. (5) In one sense the model is conventional in that it assumes the maximization of utility.

Among the clearly desirable features of the model are its introduction of the taste-shift factor and its use of a demand for controls equation.

It is very difficult to assess the purely demographic view of economic development. Demographic behavior appears to hang in a void unconnected to economic and social trends. An alternative that might have been considered is to connect the theory to reasonably uniform patterns of development of the type studied by Kuznets, Chenery, and others. For example, fairly specific things can be said about shifts of labor toward urban areas, increases in education, and shifts in broad occupational categories, which usually accompany economic development. A model more explicitly connected with persistent patterns of change would add a feeling of realism, but it is impossible to say at this point if it would have greater explanatory power.

An interesting feature of the model is its use of the concept of natural fertility within marriage as an anchoring point for the predevelopment situation. The difficulty with this approach is that it omits the marriage age as a control variable. The view I am espousing is that there are wide variety of social controls of population even in developing countries, and, furthermore, that the social controls are *substitutes* for private controls. The view emphasized is that we must not underestimate the significance of the *substitution* of some controls for others as part of the process of demographic change.

It may help to keep in mind the following list of *population* controls:

- a. Nonmarriage of women—spinsterhood
- b. Late marriage
- c. Celibacy rules for some professions
- d. Taboos on widow remarriage
- e. Periods of noncohabitation
- f. Infanticide
- g. Neglect leading to infanticide
- h. Long lactation periods
- i. Ritual taboos on intercourse
- j. Abortions
- k. Contraceptive means
- l. Outmigration

We should note that the word used is population rather than fertility. All population controls are to some degree substitutes for each other. Some of these controls are social controls, others are individual controls within the power of family members. But the individual controls are

substitutes for social controls. Hence, if we consider only fertility within marriage, we may lose some sense of the capacity for substitution between various types of controls. While the use of the demand for fertility control in the Easterlin model strikes me as an excellent idea, in some contexts fertility controls are likely to be substitutes for existing population controls, and hence a sense of the degree of substitution may help us assess the *net* demand for some specific fertility controls.

The concept of unperceived jointness seems extremely useful and is likely to take care of observed anomalies in the analysis of specific situations. There is some danger in a concept of this sort, since it is unlikely to be observable, in that it may be tempting to use it as a rationalization of any deviation between the results of empirical research and the predictions from a specific model.

It is understandable that Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter should use a utility-maximizing model, since this is the conventional approach among economists. But this seems to me to be a questionable procedure. First, it leaves out frequently observed characteristics of behavior—repetitive behavior and inertia. Second, and most important, it leaves out changes in degree of rationality as an explanatory factor. In criticizing the maximization assumption, a question that frequently arises is whether there is any alternative. In the pages that follow, I shall present the bare bones of a nonmaximizing model and suggest, albeit quickly and necessarily vaguely, how this model might be used to handle some of the concepts of the Easterlin/Pollak/Wachter model or related models. Below, a brief comparison is made between the standard theory and the one I propose, which I shall refer to as general X-efficiency theory. (For a detailed exposition of these ideas, see Leibenstein (1976, chaps. 5–10.)

| <i>Postulates and Basic Variables</i> | <i>Conventional Micro-theory</i> | <i>General X-Efficiency Theory</i> |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Behavioral postulate               | 1. Maximization or minimization  | 1. Selective rationality           |
| 2. Units                              | 2. Households and firms          | 2. Individuals                     |
| 3. Efforts                            | 3. Assumed given                 | 3. Discretionary variable          |
| 4. Interpersonal interactions         | 4. None                          | 4. Some                            |
| 5. Inert areas                        | 5. None                          | 5. Important variable              |
| 6. Agent-principal relationship       | 6. Identity of interests         | 6. Differential interests          |
| 7. Motivation as an output            | 7. Assumed given                 | 7. Significant variable            |

The basic assumption behind my theory is that people work out a compromise between the way they would like to behave, in the absence of constraints, and the way they would like to see themselves behave in terms of their standards of behavior, or superego. Under selective rationality, individuals do not pursue opportunities for gain to the maximum degree given the constraints, nor do they optimize the pursuit of information. In other words, they select the degree of constraint concern their personalities dictate.

The cost of ignoring constraints is a feeling of pressure. This pressure may be in part the result of ignoring consequences and one's desires to behave in accordance with one's internalized standards (superego). Thus, individuals "choose" a compromise position between *pressures* and *a degree of constraint concern* to operate at a psychologically comfortable level. This implies, first, that individuals do not necessarily or usually pursue gains to be obtained from an opportunity to a maximum degree; and, second, *maximizing behavior is a special case in this system*. The specific compromise an individual makes between the competing demands of his id (unconstrained desires), and his superego (standards), on the average, may be viewed as an index of his personality. If he yields too much to his superego, he will feel pressure to behave in terms of less constraint, and if he behaves with too little constraint he will feel the pressure of his conscience. Thus personality and context select, so to speak, the degree of rationality that will control an individual's decision-making (and performing) behavior. The context may contain strong countervailing pressures to increase the degree to which an individual approaches maximizing behavior.

Since motivation is extremely important in determining behavior, we have to take into account interpersonal interactions and especially peer group interactions that determine the system of approval and disapproval, which in its turn influences choices. At the same time, the distinction between principals and agent is extremely important in such contexts, since if effort is a variable there is no reason to presume that the interests of the agent and the principal are identical. Many choices are carried out by agents, but there is no reason to assume that the agent puts forth the same degree of effort that the principal would in similar circumstances.

An important element in our system of analysis is the concept of inert areas. As its name suggests, this is akin to the notion of inertia. Individuals are presumed to choose effort positions (a set of related effort options) in interpreting their jobs or roles in specific contexts. The basic idea is that once an effort position exists for some time period, an individual may not shift to a new position even though a gain may be achieved thereby, because the cost of moving from one effort position

to another is larger than the perceived gain. Thus, individuals may find themselves stuck within inert areas even though, apart from the cost of moving, superior effort positions may exist even from the individual's viewpoint.

In what follows, the idea of inert areas will be used to examine some of the basic notions in the Easterlin/Pollak/Wachter paper in order to illustrate how they could fit into a nonmaximizing framework. Given the space constraints, we can only vaguely suggest how it all works out. Now inert areas are made up of two components: a segment that expresses some aspects of selective rationality (e.g., ignoring very careful calculation), and another segment that involves the cost of moving from one position to another.

### Natural Fertility

We may visualize natural fertility as being based on routine behavior patterns utilizing a traditional mix of population controls. These routine behavior patterns are presumed to operate within an inert area. They do not change unless pressure is exerted beyond some minimum level. Thus, natural fertility would not be interpreted here to imply some maximal level of fertility, nor would it imply a complete lack of population controls, including nonmechanical means of contraception (e.g., coitus interruptus); rather, it would imply a situation before the introduction of modern contraceptive means. Thus a situation frequently found in developing countries before sustained fertility decline could be fitted into the natural fertility idea. The transition between the natural fertility state and the partially controlled state would then be observed as pressure increases sufficiently to induce some people to adopt additional controls.

### Tastes

The concept of the transmission of taste from one generation to another can also be interpreted in terms of the inert area principle. Up to a point, the inherited taste pattern would persist, but as modernization creates pressures for new tastes and consequent consumption patterns that compete significantly with children, we would expect the old tastes to yield to some degree. Furthermore, we would expect the existing tastes at any one time to be the product of inherited tastes as well as peer-group influences, to the degree that peers adopt modern consumption standards. As fertility declines, a conflict is created between the inherited tastes and the peer group influences, and the rate at which there is a shift from one to the other would be determined by the size of the inert areas.

### Techniques of Control

Like the above, techniques of control could also be interpreted through the inert area framework. Namely, the set of controls normally used would be surrounded by inert areas; but, as sufficient pressure is generated and new techniques are introduced, the new techniques gradually become part of the option set of the techniques available. Those with the narrowest inert areas are likely to become the initial adopters. (For an innovation adoption model along these lines, see Leibenstein [1976, pp. 234–39].) One could visualize a variety of stages between old techniques and new ones, representing different degrees of knowledge and confidence. We would not expect that the new techniques to become part of the demand for control until they become noticed, generally known, and tried.

### Rationality Increase as a Factor in Fertility Determination

The existing theory does not allow for changes in degrees of rationality in determining eventual fertility decline. Clearly, if a maximizing model is used, this forecloses any increase in rationality. But the degree of rationality may depend on the diffusion of responsibility within which the nuclear family finds itself. Thus, if the nuclear family is part of an extended family in which there is considerable diffusion of responsibility for children and for economic well-being of household members, then there will be little pressure toward a high degree of rationality. As we obtain a shift toward the nuclear family as a separate independent unit and responsibility for economic welfare of the household becomes concentrated, then there is likely to be increased pressure for rational behavior. Exogenous influences, such as the gradual spread of secularization through modern education, will also result in an increase in rationality. In particular, as nuclear families become more responsible for their own welfare, the inert areas that surround their critical choice variables become narrower, and hence they respond to pressure with less inertia.

### Comment Warren C. Sanderson

Economic theory teaches us that competition among producers usually benefits consumers. Competition among producers of economic models of fertility behavior is no different. Even though the market is dominated

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by two large producers, the Pennsylvania school and the "Chicago-Columbia" school, the contest to produce a model that more economists would buy has resulted not only in a substantial improvement in the models themselves, but in a number of valuable "spinoff" developments as well.<sup>1</sup> This essay by Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter is the formal presentation of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model with a full description of all its novel features and a discussion of why it is superior to what the competition has to offer.

The paper focuses on three features of the new model: "endogenous preferences," supply side factors, and consideration of behavior under imperfect information. I shall comment briefly on each of the three.

"Endogenous preferences" is not a new feature of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model. Quite the contrary, it has been standard equipment on Pennsylvania school models since 1966.<sup>2</sup> What motivates its discussion in the paper, then, is not its novelty, but the manner in which the competition has reacted to its introduction. The members of the Chicago-Columbia school not only have refused to incorporate this feature into their own models, they have positively rejected it as being dangerous to the health of economic theory.

Before continuing the discussion of the "endogenous preferences" specification, it is useful to note that the contending models are not nearly so different as their producers might lead us to suppose. First of all, in the context of a single generation, preferences are just as *exogenous* in the 1976 Pennsylvania school model as they are in any of the Chicago-Columbia school models. Current preferences and behavior are not simultaneously determined in the models of either large producer.

There is a difference between the two types of models when dealing with fertility change over the course of several generations. In the Pennsylvania school models since 1966, preferences change generation by generation in a manner determined within the model. Until recently this stood in sharp contrast to the Chicago-Columbia school models, which maintained that preferences were invariant over time. With the publication of Stigler and Becker (1977) even this difference narrowed. Stigler and Becker argued that tastes are truly invariant, but that household production structures vary over time and space. Therefore consumers now seem to have a choice between a model that deals with intergenerational fertility changes within a framework in which preferences vary and the household production structure does not, and a framework in which the household production structure varies and preferences do not.

That preferences vary both across time and across cultures is plausible enough. Certainly, as the authors argue, this view should not be discarded on theoretical grounds. The same can be said, however, with regard to household production structures. Perhaps one day a combination model will be produced.

The second aspect of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model featured in the paper is concern with the biological aspects of fertility behavior. In section 2.2 a births function and a deaths function are introduced into a formal economic model of fertility, and in section 2.3 the concepts of natural fertility and the difference between desired and achieved fertility are incorporated into an economic framework. Again, the best context in which to understand these contributions is that of the competition between the two rival schools of economists. Scholars have produced substantial bodies of literature on the biological determinants of fertility and on the biological and behavioral correlates of infant mortality. These go far beyond anything found in this paper. One contribution of the 1976 model, then, is the integration of past demographic findings into an economic context. Demographers may find little new here, but in the competition between the two large producers, the Pennsylvania school has scored a success in aligning itself somewhat more closely with the results of previous demographic research.

In the same vein, section 2.3 can best be read as criticism of the competition for not incorporating the biological aspects of fertility behavior into their formal model. Without this perspective, a substantial portion of that section may seem rather puzzling. For example, a long argument is made to demonstrate that there are indeed some contemporary cultures in which the volitional practice of fertility control is virtually absent; but there are very few social scientists, if there are any at all, who would contest this point. The rationale of the argument becomes clear when it is viewed as a warning to economists not to use other models in those contexts where the biological aspects of fertility are likely to be important.

The third aspect of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model highlighted in the paper is the notion of behavior under imperfect information. Each couple is viewed as choosing a pattern of goods consumption, time allocation, fertility, and infant mortality that, subject to resource and technology constraints, maximizes their utility. The problem with adopting this view naively, as the authors point out, is that people are often ignorant of the consequences on fertility and infant mortality of various seemingly unrelated aspects of their behavior. To make their model more realistic, the authors suggest that couples be treated as if they maximized their utility subject to their resources, household technology, and possibly incorrect beliefs about the determinants of their experience of fertility and infant mortality. These couples are then assumed to maintain all other aspects of their behavior invariant even though the resulting family size is different from the one they anticipated.

This specification has two serious drawbacks. The first, mentioned by the authors in a note, is that consumption and time allocation should

depend on actual family size as opposed to a hypothetical family size that never materializes. The second problem is more technical in nature. Since the family's consumption alternatives may depend on the earnings of children, it may not be possible to hold all other aspects of behavior constant when the actual family size is substantially below the anticipated one. In economic argot, the procedure proposed in the paper to deal with the problem of imperfect information is not guaranteed to result in feasible solutions. New models often have bugs in them, and I am confident that future technological advances will result in a preferable treatment of behavior under imperfect information.

My final comments concern the formal economic model presented in section 2.2 and its relationship to the arguments made in the other sections of the paper. It is important to note here that although the authors present an economic model of fertility behavior, they never use the model in the framework of a comparative statics analysis. This is a bit like creating an intriguing piece of machinery one never intends to use. The art in creating microeconomic behavioral models is in abstracting from all but the most important factors in a given problem so that the analysis of the model results in falsifiable implications. The model in section 2.2 is not constructed on this principle. Instead, it is specified so generally that in its present form it has no unambiguous implications when any of the exogenous variables are altered one at a time.

Since the model is consistent with almost any kind of behavior, it offers no guidance on what is plausible and what is not. For example, in section 2.3 there are three graphs concerning desired fertility—one in which it is drawn as an increasing function of nonlabor income, one in which it is drawn as invariant with respect to socioeconomic status, and one in which it is drawn as either a constant or a decreasing function of social and economic development. The model is certainly consistent with all three graphs. Indeed, the model is consistent with desired fertility being a *decreasing* function of nonlabor income (even if desired fertility is a "normal" good), a *sinusoidal* function of socioeconomic status, and an *inverted U-shaped* function of social and economic development. In other words, the model in section 2.2 has less substantive connection with what is said in the other parts of the paper than one might wish.

In conclusion, then, I reiterate that this paper is the product of a competitive struggle between two rival producers of economic models of fertility behavior. It contains not only explicit criticisms of alternative models, but numerous implicit criticisms. Although some of the arguments may seem either arcane or pointless to the nonspecialist, they are all aimed at perceived weaknesses in the Chicago-Columbia school's product lines.



Will the 1976 Pennsylvania school model come to dominate the market? It is not clear. After all, different people have different tastes/production functions (choose one or both) when it comes to the formulation and use of economic models of fertility behavior.

### Notes

1. For example, Easterlin (1974), Sanderson (1974), and Stigler and Becker (1977).
2. Endogenous preferences were first introduced into the Pennsylvania school's models in Easterlin (1966).

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