# Mothers' Repartnering after a Nonmarital Birth 

Sharon Bzostek, Sara McLanahan and Marcia Carlson

April 2010


#### Abstract

This paper examines the prevalence, predictors and outcomes of unmarried mothers' repartnering patterns. Results indicate that five years after a nonmarital birth, over one-quarter of mothers have formed a co-resident relationship with a new partner, and many of these partners have greater economic capacities than their prior partner. Among mothers who were eligible to "trade up" in their partners' economic capacities over time, 73 percent did so in partners' incarceration status, 79 percent did so in partners' employment status, and 60 percent did so in partners' educational attainment. These proportions are much higher than the percentage of eligible mothers who "traded down." Our findings are consistent with the idea that unmarried mothers continue to search for 'good partners' after their children are born and suggest that many of these women are successful in their search.


Repartnering patterns are a crucial component of family formation processes in societies characterized by high rates of marital and (more recently) nonmarital union dissolution. Understanding these patterns is especially important in the U.S., where two-fifths of all births are to unmarried couples (Hamilton, Martin \& Ventura 2010) and where nonmarital unions are highly unstable (Carlson, McLahanan \& England 2004). Although a large body of literature has examined repartnering after a divorce, very few studies to date have examined the formation of new partnerships after a nonmarital birth.

This paper uses longitudinal data from a recent cohort of nonmarital births in large U.S. cities to examine the repartnering patterns of unmarried mothers. Previous research on repartnering has largely focused on stepfamilies formed through divorce and remarriage. The repartnering process may be different for mothers with a nonmarital birth, insofar as nonmarital unions are less institutionalized and less stable than marital unions, and unmarried couples generally have lower socioeconomic status than married couples. We focus on mothers' new partners because children typically live with their mothers after a union dissolution, and thus mothers' repartnering is likely to have a more direct effect on children than fathers' repartnering. We address three primary research questions. First, how common is mothers' repartnering after a nonmarital birth? Second, how do the economic capacities of mothers' new partners compare with the capacities of their former partners? And third, what factors predict whether mothers repartner and whether they "trade up" or "trade down" in terms of their partners' economic capacities? None of these questions has been adequately addressed by prior research, and each question has important implications for policy makers as well as researchers.

BACKGROUND

How prevalent is repartnering?

The prevalence of repartnering among women who give birth outside marriage is important because of the potential long-term consequences of repartnering for mothers and children. A large literature indicates that remarriage is stressful for divorced mothers and their children, and there are good reasons to believe that these findings may extend to unmarried mothers and children as well (Amato, 1994; Brown, 2004; Coleman, Ganong, \& Fine, 2000; Hetherington \& Jodl, 1994; Hofferth, 2006; Manning \& Lamb, 2003; Thomson, Hanson, \& McLanahan, 1994). Estimates based on data from the 1980s find that about $1 / 3$ of American children will live in a married or cohabiting stepfamily before age 18 (Bumpass, Raley \& Sweet 1995). More recent estimates indicate that between 9 and 18 percent of children will live with a married biological mother and stepfather before reaching adulthood (Björklund, Ginther and Sundstrom 2007), and fully 39 percent will live with their mother and a cohabiting partner by age 12 (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008). We would expect these percentages to be even higher for children born to unwed mothers, since nonmarital unions are very unstable (Graefe \& Lichter 1999; Osborne \& McLanahan 2007). Despite the importance of the question, however, we know very little about unmarried mothers' new coresidential partnerships.

Previous work either fails to distinguish between unions formed with the child's biological father after a baby's birth versus those formed with new partners, or focuses exclusively on new partnerships formed through marriage (thus missing the more-common cohabiting new partnerships). One study (Lundberg \& Rose 2003), for example, found that just over one-fifth of mothers with a nonmarital birth prior to 1993 had married a new partner by the time their child was five years old. However, this study did not include cohabiting unions with new partners, which are more common than marriages in this population. Another study found that just under a third of women who had a first birth outside marriage in the 1990s married
either their child's biological father or another man within five years of the birth (Lichter \& Graefe 2001). Because their data could not distinguish between marriages to the children's biological fathers and those to new partners, the authors attempted to omit marriages to the children's fathers by excluding the marriages that occurred within six months of the child's birth. This approach, however, is unlikely to exclude all marriages to the children's biological fathers. Thus, although previous empirical findings suggest that new cohabiting and marital partnerships are fairly common among women who have children outside marriage, there are no precise estimates of the actual prevalence of such partnerships after a nonmarital birth.

How do new partners' characteristics compare with former partners' characteristics?
In addition to documenting the prevalence of repartnering, scholars have sought to compare the characteristics of first and higher-order partners. New partners' characteristics are of interest for a number of reasons. From the perspective of the individuals involved, partners' economic and psycho-social characteristics are likely to have an important impact on a family's financial and material-as well as physical and emotional-well-being. Given the fact that union dissolution is often associated with changes in other arenas, particularly (but not only) financial security for women and children (Ananat \& Michaels 2008, McLanahan \& Sandefur 1994), partners' economic capacities are likely to be particularly important insofar as they indicate the potential for recouping some of the financial losses incurred through divorce or separation.

At a more theoretical level, scholars have studied assortative mating and partner characteristics in first and second marriages to test competing theories regarding whether higherorder marriages are better described by the learning hypothesis (the idea that people learn from their mistakes and choose "better" partners the second time around) or the marriage market hypothesis (the idea that the pool of potential mates and mothers' attractiveness to such mates
decline as mothers grow older, constraining them to settle for "worse" partners the second time around) (Gelissen 2004). In comparing partner characteristics, researchers (e.g., Whyte 1990) have emphasized the importance of using longitudinal data to avoid the potential selection bias in cross-sectional comparisons of women in first and higher order unions. For example, researchers have argued that some, but not all, of the marriage market disadvantage experienced by mothers following a nonmarital birth is due to mothers' own characteristics (selection) as opposed to the birth itself (Graefe \& Lichter 2007; Qian, Lichter, \& Mellott 2005).

Unfortunately, only a handful of studies have had access to the longitudinal data necessary to make within-woman partner comparisons over time. Based on this small literature, neither the learning nor the marriage market hypothesis has found consistent support. Dean \& Gurak (1978) compared levels of marital homogamy (in terms of age, education, and religious identification) in women's first and second marriages and found that women who had been married twice experienced low levels of homogamy in both marriages. Similarly, Mueller \& Pope (1980) and Jacobs \& Furstenberg (1986) compared the occupational status and educational attainment of women's first and second husbands and found no evidence that second husbands were significantly different from first husbands in these measures. In contrast, using longitudinal data from a sample drawn from the 1971 and 1981 British Censuses, Ni Brolchain (1988) found higher levels of both upward and downward socioeconomic mobility (in husbands' occupational status) among remarried women than among stably-married women. None of these studies focused explicitly on mothers.

To date, no study (to our knowledge) has used longitudinal data to compare the characteristics of mothers' new and former partners. However, cross-sectional comparisons suggest that, for the most part, married biological fathers have higher socioeconomic capacities
than mothers' new co-residential partners. For example, Hofferth and her colleagues found that married biological fathers had higher levels of education than married stepfathers and that married biological fathers worked more hours per week than cohabiting stepfathers (Hofferth 2006; Hofferth \& Anderson 2003). Married biological fathers also had significantly higher earnings than stepfathers (Hofferth 2006). On the other hand, Hofferth (2006) also found thatwithout controlling for any other factors-cohabiting biological fathers had lower levels of education than cohabiting and married stepfathers.

The few studies that have examined the characteristics of new partners for mothers with a nonmarital birth (but have not looked longitudinally at change in partners for the same mothers) offer a slightly more optimistic perspective. One recent study, which focused on the mid-life partners of mothers who had given birth outside of marriage, found that mothers in higher-order relationships had partners with slightly higher levels of education than mothers with fewer relationships (Graefe \& Lichter 2007). Although not focused specifically on partners’ socioeconomic attributes, two recent studies about parenting behaviors by unwed mothers' new partners found that new partners were, on average, at least as involved in parenting activities as biological fathers (Berger et al. 2008) and new partners' involvement was just as beneficial for children as biological father involvement in other families (Bzostek 2008). No research to date has longitidunally compared the characteristics of unwed mothers' new and former partners.

## What factors predict mothers' repartnering outcomes?

Although no study has specifically examined the factors that predict whether a mother forms a new partnership and whether her new partner represents a trade-up or a trade-down in terms of economic capacities, a good deal of previous research has documented the significant predictors of women's remarriage following divorce. Such studies consistently find that younger
divorced women are more likely to remarry than older women (Bramlett \& Mosher 2002; Bumpass, Sweet \& Martin 1990; Sweeney 1997; Wu 1994) and that minority women (particularly African Americans) are less likely to remarry than white women (Bramlett \& Mosher 2002). Most studies find that women with children are less likely to remarry than those without children (Buckle, Gallup \& Rodd 1996; Wu 1994), but the effect of children on women's remarriage may differ depending on the age of the child (Sweeney 1997) and on women's availability to participate in work and leisure activities (De Graaf \& Kalmijn 2003). Findings are mixed regarding the association between women's socioeconomic status (measured as educational attainment, occupational status and income) and remarriage (Bramlett \& Mosher 2002; De Graaf \& Kalmijn 2003; Shafer 2009; Smock 1990; Sweeney 1997; Wu 1994).

Characteristics that predict whether a woman enters a cohabiting partnership after divorce include younger age, being non-Hispanic white or Hispanic (versus black), and spending time in a single-parent family during childhood (Bramlett \& Mosher 2002). Previous research yields conflicting results about other factors, such as religious affiliation (e.g., Bramlett \& Mosher 2002 vs. Wu \& Balakrishnan 1994). Research on Canadian women finds that neither the number nor age of any children in the household is significantly related to formerly married or cohabiting women's chances of repartnering through either marriage or cohabitation (Wu \& Schimmele 2005).

Although studies of women's post-divorce repartnering often include the presence/number of children as control variables in their models, few studies to date have focused specifically on the repartnering behavior of mothers. There is, however, some evidence that the number of children from a previous marriage decreases mothers' chances of remarriage (Buckle et al. 1996), and that-consistent with the research about the predictors of remarriage
among all women-younger mothers and white mothers tend to remarry more rapidly than other groups of mothers (Lundberg \& Rose 2003). Researchers also find that divorced mothers with higher levels of educational attainment tend to remarry more rapidly than other mothers (Lundberg \& Rose 2003).

As noted regarding the literature comparing partner characteristics, most studies predicting which mothers repartner after a nonmarital birth have similarly failed to distinguish between partnerships formed with the child's biological father and those formed with other men. Only one study to date has examined the factors predicting marriage to a new partner following a nonmarital birth (Lundberg \& Rose 2003). This study-using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics about nonmarital births occurring prior to 1993 -found that white mothers, younger mothers, mothers with at least 12 years of education, and mothers of male children (marginally significant) were more likely than others to marry a new partner after a nonmarital birth. Birth parity was not found to be a significant predictor of marrying a new partner. This study was not able to identify mothers' new cohabiting partnerships, which are likely to be more common than marriages after a nonmarital birth.

Prior research has also identified a number of factors that are associated with family formation and stability more broadly and that are likely to be associated with repartnering among unmarried mothers (and hence are important to include as controls). These factors include mothers' attitudes toward marriage and gender relationships (Carlson et al., 2004b), nativity status, and child's health (Reichman, Corman \& Noonan 2004). City-level contextual variables such as welfare generosity and the strictness of the child support system have also been shown to be associated with family formation behaviors after a nonmarital birth (Carlson et al., 2004a;

Knab et al. 2008). Generous welfare benefits and reliable child support are expected to reduce single mothers' financial need for repartnering.

## Our Paper

In summary, although previous empirical findings suggest that new cohabiting and marital partnerships are likely common among women who have children outside marriage, there are no precise estimates of the actual prevalence of such partnerships after a nonmarital birth or studies of the correlates and outcomes of unwed mothers' repartnering behaviors. In this paper, we use recent longitudinal data about a cohort of nonmarital births (1) to examine unwed mothers' repartnering patterns, (2) to compare the characteristics of different partners of the same mothers over time, and (3) to examine the factors that predict new partnerships and whether mothers trade up or down. No previous research has considered these questions using longitudinal data about unmarried mothers. We use event history models to document mothers' repartnering patterns, utilizing two modeling strategies to address the alternative possibilities that mothers make decisions regarding whether and with whom simultaneously versus sequentially.

## Method

## Data

We use data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a longitudinal survey of 4,898 children ( 3,710 of whom were born to unwed parents) born in 20 large U.S. cities between 1998 and 2000. The survey interviewed children's biological mothers and fathers at the time of the child's birth and approximately one, three, and five years after the birth. When weighted, the data are nationally representative of all births as well as all unmarried births in
large cities between 1998 and 2000. (See Reichman et al. [2001] for more information about the survey design).

Our analyses are based on the sample of mothers with a nonmarital birth. To assess the prevalence of new partnerships, we use information on mothers' living arrangements at each of the survey waves. At each wave, we base our assessment on the full sample of unwed mothers who were living with their child and had valid information about their living arrangements (this includes 3,710 mothers in the baseline survey, 3,200 mothers one year after the birth, 3,079 mothers three years after the birth, and 2,999 mothers five years after the child's birth.) After describing all unwed mothers' living arrangements through the survey period, we then focus specifically on the sample of mothers who were not living with the focal child's biological father and were thus at-risk for forming a new partnership in at least one of the post-birth survey waves. Nineteen percent of this potential sample of 2,468 mothers was dropped from our models due to missing data on one or more of the independent variables, resulting in an analytic sample for the regression models of 2,016 mothers.

## Measures

New partnership status was measured using mothers' reports about their living arrangements at each of the post-baseline waves. We focus specifically on co-resident partnerships because these are the most likely to affect child and maternal well-being and because the Fragile Families study used biological parents' coresidence as the criterion for determining whether mothers would be asked about new partnerships. Additionally, although about one-third of unmarried parents are in 'visiting' relationships (romantically involved but living apart) at the time of their child's birth, the majority of these couples break up soon after the birth; thus, romantic relationships are far less stable than co-residential relationships. Mothers
who reported living with the child's biological father all, most or some of the time were considered to be co-resident with the child's father. Mothers who reported living in a cohabiting or marital partnership with another male partner were coded as living with a new partner, and mothers who reported living with neither the child's father nor a new male romantic partner were coded as not living with any partner. Based on ethnographic evidence that unwed mothers have particularly high standards for new marital (versus cohabiting) partnerships (Edin \& Kefalas 2005), our initial comparisons of new and former partners' economic capacities distinguished between cohabiting and married new partners. Because no significant differences were identified (and given small cell sizes), we then combined these groups into all new co-resident partners.

We consider three measures of partners' economic capacities: educational attainment (<HS diploma or GED only; high school diploma; and some college or more); employment status (whether he was working in the past week); and incarceration history (whether partner had ever been incarcerated). Education is the most fundamental measure of economic capacities, and is strongly linked with earnings and earnings capacity (Becker 1964). Employment status reflects one's current attachment to the labor market and hence ability to earn income. We consider incarceration history to be a measure of partners' economic capacities given its strong association with subsequent employment opportunities (particularly for minority populations), even net of the typically low education and skills of incarcerated men (Pager 2003).

Biological fathers' economic capacities were measured in two different ways: using the mother's report at the time of child's birth and the mother's report at the time she was first observed with a new partner (referred to as the "current wave"). We use biological fathers' own reports about additional schooling obtained since the child's birth, since mothers are not asked about the biological fathers' education after the baseline interview. To avoid potential problems
of reverse-causality, the covariates were measured (using mothers' reports) at the time of the child's birth or at the time of the survey wave immediately preceding the wave in which the outcome was measured. We also include robustness checks (in Appendix Table 1) in which we compare the mother's report about the biological father with the father's own report (when available), measured both at the time of the child's birth and at the time of mother's repartnering.

Mothers with missing data on partners' economic capacities were dropped from the models that predicted the particular characteristic that was missing, ranging from 11.5 percent of cases missing data about partners' incarceration history to 20 percent missing data about partners' employment status. Mothers were not asked about new partners' employment status at the one-year interview, but this information was available through the household roster for approximately three-quarters of mothers in new partnerships at the one year survey. Because the survey did not ask mothers about new partners' education at the one-year interview, the models predicting partner education use imputed data at that wave rather than dropping all these mothers from the analysis. These data were imputed through multiple regression techniques using the "proc mi" command in SAS. Because the data being imputed were (intentionally) not collected for any of the mothers in that wave, we assume that these data are 'missing at random' and can be appropriately imputed using multiple imputation techniques. We also estimated models that excluded the mothers who repartnered at one year and the results were similar.

Dummy variables for the survey wave (one, three or five years post-birth) were used to measure child's age (i.e., time elapsed since birth). Note that although many mothers did not live with the child's biological father at the time of the child's birth, risk of repartnering was assumed to begin one year after the child's birth because mothers were not asked about new partnerships in the baseline survey. Mothers' age was measured in years at the time of the child's birth.

Race/ethnicity was represented by a set of dummy variables for non-Hispanic white or other (mostly Asian), non-Hispanic black and Hispanic. Nativity status was measured as whether or not the mother was born outside the US. Mothers' health was measured as a dummy variable for whether her health was "fair or poor" versus "excellent, very good, or good." Child characteristics included indicators for the child being male, born at a low/very low birth weight (less than 2500 g ), and whether the focal child was the mother's first birth. Grandmothers' symptoms of depression were derived from the National Co-morbidity Survey (NCS), based on an adaptation by Ron Kessler to the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI). We used grandmothers' mental health rather than mothers' own mental health because the latter may be endogenous to mothers' repartnering decisions.

Measures of mothers' attitudes include whether the mother strongly agreed or agreed with the statements that "single mothers can raise children as well as two parents" and "men cannot be trusted to be faithful" (measured at the time of child's birth). Religiosity was measured as whether the mother attended religious services at least monthly (measured at the previous survey wave), and family structure background was measured as whether the mother lived with both of her biological parents at age 15. Mothers' economic characteristics included educational attainment (measured at the time of child's birth), an indicator for whether the mother obtained additional schooling after the child's birth, and whether the mother was employed in the preceding survey wave. Finally, state-level welfare generosity and child support enforcement were coded as high, moderate, or low. See Reichman et al. (2001) for more information about these definitions and the Fragile Families sampling design.

## Analytic strategy

After describing mothers' living arrangements and conducting mean comparisons of new and former partners' capabilities, we model mothers' repartnering behaviors using two analytic strategies. First, we use a nested modeling approach based on the theoretical assumption that mothers first decide to repartner and then second, they choose a particular mate. For this strategy, we use discrete-time event history logistic regression to first model whether a mother forms a new partnership and then basic logistic regression to model whether she "trades up" or "trades down" (conditional on having repartnered). The discrete-time modeling strategy enables us to include mothers in the sample who were not interviewed in all survey waves and to incorporate both the child's age and the mother's duration of eligibility, as well as time-varying covariates, into the predictions of which mothers repartnered. Mothers were considered to have "traded up" if the child's biological father exhibited a negative characteristic (e.g., not employed) and the new partner exhibited a positive characteristic (e.g. employed). Similarly, mothers were considered to have "traded down" if the child's biological father exhibited a positive characteristic and the new partner exhibited the opposite characteristic. Note that it is possible that a mother could "trade up" on one partner characteristic and "trade down" on another. The standard errors in all models were adjusted for the city clustering in the Fragile Families data. The data for these analyses were transformed into person-waves, with mothers contributing one observation each survey wave they were at-risk for forming a first new partnership (i.e., were not living with the focal child's biological father and had not previously repartnered). Our sample of 2,016 individual mothers contributes a total of 4,030 person-year observations. Separate models were run for each outcome measure-educational attainment, employment and incarceration history.

Our second modeling strategy is based on the alternative assumption that mothers simultaneously decide whether and with whom to repartner. In this case, we use multinomial discrete-time logistic regression models to predict mothers trading up, trading down, or repartnering with a partner with the same characteristic as the child's father (all versus not repartnering at all). The multinomial discrete-time logit model has been used in previous research about assortative mating in remarriage (see, e.g., Shafer 2009), and is similar to a hazard analysis in which cases can "die" from multiple causes. (See Yamaguchi [1990] for a detailed discussion of this model. $)^{1}$ As with the first modeling strategy, the discrete-time modeling strategy has the advantage of allowing us to account for a mother's duration at-risk and to incorporate time-varying covariates, and the standard errors in the models were adjusted for city clustering in the data.

For each of the regression models predicting trading up and trading down in a given measure of partner's economic capacity (education, employment, incarceration history), the sample of mothers was first stratified by the biological fathers' economic capacities, essentially dividing the sample of mothers into two dichotomous groups: mothers who were first partnered with men with negative attributes (those eligible for trading up through repartnering) and mothers who were first partnered with men with positive attributes (those eligible for trading down through repartnering). This stratification strategy both aids in the interpretation of the results and reflects previous research (see, for example, Ananat \& Michaels 2008) demonstrating

[^0]that conclusions drawn from mean effects may blur important distinctions within the distribution of outcomes.

Comparing economic capacities of the same mothers' partners over time avoids selection bias in time-invariant maternal characteristics that may select particular groups of mothers into partnerships with certain types of men. While the models presented are not fixed effect models per se, they are similar in nature, since fixed maternal characteristics would equally affect mothers' original and new partnerships and therefore cannot be responsible for differences observed in mothers' sequential partnerships. Maternal characteristics that may change over time (such as mothers' health, employment and education), however, could still be problematic in these longitudinal models. The regression models control for such time-varying characteristics, using reports from the wave prior to the outcome to avoid potential reverse-causality.

## Results

Our first question asks about the prevalence of mothers' new partnerships following a nonmarital birth. Table 1 provides estimates of mothers' partnership status at each of the postbirth waves. One year after a nonmarital birth, five percent of mothers were living with a new partner, 53 percent were living with the focal child's biological father, and 43 percent were single (not living with a romantic partner). Three years after the birth, 12 percent of all mothers with unmarried births were living with a new partner, 45 percent were living with the focal child's biological father, and 43 percent were again single. Finally, five years after the birth, 22 percent of the mothers were living with a new partner, 38 percent were living with the focal child's biological father, and 41 percent were single. The table also indicates the proportion of mothers who ever lived with a new partner. Five percent of mothers had repartnered by their
child's first birthday, 14 percent had done so by the child's third birthday, and 27 percent had done so by the child's fifth birthday. Among mothers who were living apart from the child's biological father in at least one of the post-birth survey waves-and were thus truly at-risk for forming a new partnership (i.e., our analytic sample of 2,016 mothers)-just under two-fifths had ever repartnered with a new man (figure not shown in table).

## Marital versus cohabiting partnerships

As indicated in Table 1, cohabitation was more common than marriage in the years following a nonmarital birth, both for mothers living with the child's biological father and for those living with a new partner. Although the proportion of co-residential biological parents who were married increased across the survey waves, more than half of these couples were still unmarried at the child's fifth birthday. Less than one-quarter of the mothers living with new partners were married to these partners at each of the post-birth waves.

Two points about the data should be noted. First, because the data about mothers' partnerships were gathered at three snapshots in time after the child's birth rather than through exhaustive partnership histories, these data likely miss some partnerships that formed and dissolved between the survey waves. Thus, our estimates are a lower bound of the percentage of mothers repartnering soon after a nonmarital birth.

Second, approximately nine percent of mothers reported living with a "new partner" (i.e., a man other than the focal child's biological father) in more than one consecutive wave. Because it is unclear from the available information how many of these mothers were living with the same new partners at more than one wave and how many formed one new partnership and then broke up with that partner and formed another co-residential partnership, the analyses discussed
below focused exclusively on the first time a mother was observed in a new co-residential partnership after a nonmarital birth.

Table 2 presents descriptive results for the sample of mothers who were at-risk for forming a first new partnership by living away from the child's biological father in at least one of the post-baseline survey waves. Nearly two-thirds of these mothers were not living with their child's biological father at the time of the baby's birth. The majority of the sample ( 63 percent) was non-Hispanic black, 22 percent was Hispanic, and about 16 percent was non-Hispanic white and other (mostly Asian). Nearly half of the sample had either not finished high school or had only a GED, and approximately four-fifths were employed in the year prior to the focal child's birth.

## New partners' economic capacities

Our second research question asks how the economic capacities of mothers' new partners compare with those of their children's biological fathers (the mothers' former partners). Table 3 focuses on the sample of 791 mothers observed in a first new partnership, and presents means for partners' educational attainment, employment status, and incarceration history. The findings demonstrate that across all three measures, mothers' new partners compared favorably with former partners. For example, although less than one-fifth of new partners did not have a high school diploma, approximately half of mothers' former partners fell into this category. The percentage of new partners who were employed was between 11 and 26 percentage points higher (depending on whether we compare mothers' reports about the current partners with their reports about the child's father from the baseline interview or at the time of the mother's repartnering) than the equivalent percentage for former partners, and the proportion of new partners who had
never been incarcerated was between 27 and 45 percentage points higher than for original partners.

Since mothers' reports about their former partners tended to worsen over time (a point to which we return in the Discussion section), in order to minimize potential negative reporting bias, the remaining analyses in the paper used mothers' reports about the biological fathers taken from the earliest wave possible for employment status and incarceration history; in other words, this gave biological fathers the 'best chance' of a favorable comparison. Biological fathers' education was based on mothers' reports at the time of the child's birth and updated using the biological fathers' own current reports when available to account for the possibility that fathers returned to school after the child's birth (mothers were not asked to update their reports of the biological fathers' education after the child's birth).

The mean differences reported in Table 3 reflect how mothers' new and former partners compared overall, without providing information about the exact proportions of mothers who "traded up" or "traded down" when they repartnered. This descriptive information is presented in Table 4. In some cases, the totals presented in this figure are slightly different from the estimates presented in Table 3; this is because Table 3 provides overall proportions across groups and is not limited to cases in which reports were available about both new partners and biological fathers.

As shown in Table 4, slightly under half of mothers who repartnered did so with a man with more education than their child's biological father ("traded up" in partner's education). Among the 76 percent of mothers originally partnered with biological fathers with less than a college education (those who were truly "eligible" to trade up), 60 percent did so $((28.7+11.7+5.2) /(49.3+26.4))$. On the flipside, approximately one-fifth of mothers who
repartnered did so with a man with less education than their former partner. Among those eligible for trading down, 43 percent did so $((4.4+3.0+14.2) /(24.3+26.4))$. Around one-third of mothers repartnered with a man with the same level of education as the child's biological father.

About 61 percent of mothers who repartnered had employed partners at both times. Just under one-quarter of mothers who repartnered traded up in terms of partners' employment status. Among the 29 percent of mothers with non-working biological fathers, 79 percent traded-up when they repartnered. At the other end, 10 percent "traded down," moving from an employed biological father to a non-working new partner. Among those eligible for trading down, 15 percent did so.

Finally, thirty-five percent of mothers who repartnered "traded up" in partners' incarceration status (73 percent among those who were eligible to trade up). Nine percent of mothers "traded down" in partners" incarceration history when they repartnered (17 percent among those who were eligible to trade down). Less than half of the mothers who repartnered (43 percent) were with never-incarcerated men both times, and approximately 13 percent of the mothers were partnered with both biological fathers and new partners who had been incarcerated. Predicting mothers' repartnering and trading up/trading down

Our final research question asks which factors predict whether a mother repartners and which factors predict whether she trades up or trades down if she repartners. Tables 5 and 6 present the results from models first predicting which mothers repartnered and then, conditional on having repartnered, which mothers traded up and which traded down. These models are based on the assumption that mothers make sequential decisions about whether and with whom to repartner. Tables 7 and 8 then present results from the multinomial models based on the alternative assumption that mothers simultaneously decide to repartner and choose a mate.

## Modeling strategy I: Sequential decisions

Table 5 displays odds ratios from a discrete-time logit model predicting which mothers formed a new co-residential partnership within five years after a nonmarital birth. Each column in the table represents a separate model, and in every model the omitted outcome category is the new partner having the same attribute as the child's biological father. The results suggest that child's age and the number of waves a mother was at risk of repartnering were both significantly and positively associated with the odds of repartnering in the five years after a nonmarital birth. Consistent with previous research predicting women's repartnering behaviors, the results also show that white mothers and younger mothers had significantly higher odds of repartnering. The odds of being in a new partnership were more than thirty percent higher for white mothers than for Hispanic and non-Hispanic black mothers, and each additional year of maternal age was associated with a reduction of eight percent in the odds of repartnering.

Although mothers' baseline educational attainment was not significantly related to repartnering, the odds of repartnering were approximately 30 percent lower for mothers who obtained additional education after the child's birth. Mothers for whom the focal child's birth was their first birth had odds of repartnering that were 35 percent lower than mothers with higher-order births. Finally, mothers living in areas with highly generous welfare benefits had odds of repartnering that were about three-quarters those of mothers living in areas with low welfare generosity. All three of these findings (lower odds of repartnering for mothers going back to school, those with no prior children, and those living in areas with relatively generous welfare benefits) suggest that economic considerations were likely an important factor in mothers' decisions, since these mothers presumably faced fewer financial burdens-and thus less financial pressure to repartner-than their counterparts. None of the other variables-including
the child's characteristics, mother's background characteristics, and the mothers' relationship attitudes-significantly predicted repartnering in the years after a nonmarital birth.

Table 6 displays the results from the models predicting trading up and trading down in partners' economic capacities among the mothers who repartnered. In terms of partners' college (but not high school) education, the results suggest that mothers who repartnered early were significantly less likely to trade down than mothers who repartnered late. The timing of repartnering was not significantly related to trading up/down in partners' employment status. Mothers who waited longer to repartner were less likely to trade down and more likely to trade up in partners' incarceration history. Although the model predicting repartnering indicated that older mothers were less likely to repartner, the models predicting trading up/down suggested that when older mothers did repartner, they were significantly more likely to trade up in partners' college education and marginally less likely to trade down in partners' employment status.

In terms of the mother's race/ethnicity, Hispanic mothers were less likely than other mothers to be partnered with a man with at least a high school diploma, regardless of the biological father's educational attainment, and black mothers were significantly more likely than white mothers to trade down in partners' college education. Black mothers were also marginally more likely than white mothers to trade down in partners' employment status. Finally, Black mothers were more likely than white mothers to trade down and less likely to trade up in partners' incarceration status, and Hispanic mothers were marginally more likely to trade down. Given high rates of racial homogamy in romantic relationships and high levels of incarceration among minority (especially black) men, this finding likely reflects racial disparities in the available pool of never-incarcerated men.

Mothers who reported fair or poor health were significantly more likely to trade down in partners' employment status and incarceration history, and mothers who reported a family history of mental illness were consistently more likely to trade down (and sometimes less likely to trade up) in partners' college attendance, employment status and incarceration history. The coefficients for maternal attitudinal factors were either not significant or inconsistent across outcomes.

Although the model predicting repartnering found that mothers who returned to school were less likely to repartner, the results predicting trading up/trading down indicated that mothers who obtained additional education after the child's birth and then repartnered tended to do so with better-educated men. Mothers who were employed were significantly less likely to repartner with a previously-incarcerated man, regardless of the biological fathers' incarceration history. These mothers were also marginally more likely to trade up in partners' employment status.

Finally, although the model predicting repartnering found that mothers living in areas with more generous welfare benefits were less likely to repartner, the results in Table 6 suggest that when such mothers did repartner, they were more likely than other mothers to repartner with never-incarcerated men.

## Modeling strategy II: Simultaneous decisions

The results from the multinomial models (presented in Tables 7 and 8) largely confirmed the results from the nested models. As before, the multinomial models identified certain groups of mothers (older mothers, non-white mothers, mothers with first births, and mothers who obtained additional education) as less likely than other mothers to repartner (as indicated by relative risk ratios below one across all of the columns in the table for a particular outcome).

Both modeling strategies also demonstrated that mothers who waited longer to repartner tended to do so with men with better attributes. In a few cases, however, the two modeling strategies provided different information. The nested models showed that although older mothers, mothers who obtained additional education, and mothers living in areas with generous welfare benefits were less likely to repartner, when they did so, they tended to repartner with relatively "attractive" men. These findings were much less clear in the multinomial models.

## DISCUSSION

The dramatic increase in nonmarital childbearing in recent decades signifies a shift in the sequence of family formation patterns for many individuals-particularly among minority and lower socioeconomic groups-from marriage followed by childbearing to having children first and then continuing to search for a partner/spouse (Bumpass 1990; Cherlin 2009; Ellwood \& Jencks 2004). Rising rates of maternal employment and increased normative acceptance of single motherhood have reduced some of the costs and stigma to unwed mothers of remaining single longer. At the same time, unwed mothers' opportunities for repartnering may be constrained by increasing employment instability and declining wages at the bottom of the male wage distribution (Blank 1997; Oppenheimer 1998, 2000; Wilson 1987), which have likely reduced the pool of men that single mothers deem good partners. Research also suggests that nonmarital births disadvantage mothers on the relationship market (Qian et al. 2005; Graefe \& Lichter 2007).

Previous empirical research provides relatively little information about mothers' repartnering behaviors after a nonmarital birth. This paper used longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study to document the prevalence of mothers' new coresidential partnerships, to compare the economic capacities of mothers' new and former
partners, and to predict which mothers are the most likely to repartner and to "trade up" or "trade down" in partners' economic capacities. We found that that 27 percent of unwed mothers formed cohabiting or marital partnerships with new partners by their child's fifth birthday, and that around two-fifths of the mothers who were single in at least one survey wave (and therefore at risk for forming a new partnership) repartnered. As expected, cohabiting new partnerships were more common than marital partnerships for this demographic group.

On average, mothers who repartnered tended to do so with men with higher economic capacities relative to their former partners. Among mothers who were eligible to "trade up," 60 percent did so in partners' educational attainment, 79 percent did so in partners' employment status, and 73 percent did so in partners' incarceration status. These proportions are much higher than the percentage of eligible mothers who "traded down," suggesting that the patterns we observe are not simply regression to the mean. These findings are in line with ethnographic work by Edin and colleagues (Edin \& Kefalas 2005; Gibson-Davis, Edin, \& McLanahan 2005) which suggests that unwed mothers have high standards for their new partners and may choose to remain single unless/until they find partners who meet these expectations.

Our models predicting which groups of mothers repartnered also confirmed findings from previous research suggesting that younger women and white women (and mothers specifically) are more likely than their counterparts to repartner (Bramlett \& Mosher 2002; Lundberg \& Rose 2003; Sweeney 1997; Wu 1994). Taken together, the factors found to predict repartnering provide fairly strong support for the argument that economic need and independence are driving factors in mothers' repartnering decisions. In particular, mothers having a first birth, mothers who returned to school after their child's birth, and mothers living in areas with generous welfare benefits had significantly lower odds of repartnering. All of these factors increase mothers’
economic independence (relative to other mothers) and reduce the need to find a new partner (Oppenheimer 1988).

At a more theoretical level, our research confirms the relevance of both the marriage market and learning hypotheses for this sample of women and suggests that the two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many of the mothers who repartnered traded up in their partners' economic capacities, which is clear support for the learning hypothesis. At the same time, the mothers who were the most likely to repartner were those who were relatively "attractive" to potential mates and those who could afford to be more "choosey" in searching for and selecting a new mate, which is consistent with the marriage market hypothesis. Although the women's prospects may be more limited due, at least in part, to their nonmarital birth (Qian et al. 2005), increased selectivity following a nonmarital birth may be leading to a situation in which fewer women are repartnering; indeed, the majority of the mothers "at risk" for repartnering did not form a new co-residential partnership in the five years after the focal child's birth. Thus, although when women do repartner by the child's fifth year they tend to do so with a highercapacity man, overall, "trading up" with a new partner is experienced by the minority of all women who have a nonmarital birth (approximately 17 percent among all unwed mothers at the five-year interview).

## Limitations

There are several limitations to this research. As previously noted, because the Fragile Families Study collected information about mothers' partnerships at several points in time rather than exhaustive partnership histories, our analyses are likely missing some (relatively shortlived) partnerships that formed and dissolved in between survey waves. For this reason, our estimates represent a lower bound of the prevalence of mothers' repartnering after a nonmarital
birth, and the partnerships we observe may be the longest-lasting with partners with the "best" economic capacities. However, less than three percent of mothers not living with the child's biological father at the five-year interview reported that they had lived with more than one new partner since the previous interview.

Our results clearly demonstrate that the mothers who repartnered after a nonmarital birth tended to do so with relatively attractive men (in terms of their economic capacities, at least). However, because all of the information about their partners was, by necessity, taken from mothers who were in relationships with new partners, it is not possible to draw broader conclusions about how the mothers who did not repartner would have fared in terms of partners' economic capacities had they repartnered.

The relative advantage of new partners' economic capacities could conceivably result from new partners being older than the biological fathers at the time of partnership formation and having had, as a result, more time to complete their education and obtain employment. Although it is true that mothers' new partners were, on average, older than the children's biological fathers were at the time of the child's birth, this is not a likely explanation for the finding that new partners' economic capacities were often better than those of the children's fathers. As shown in Appendix Table 1 (in which we test the robustness of our results to comparisons using biological fathers' own reports about their economic capacities), even when new partners' education was compared with biological fathers' own reports about their education from the current interview, the significant differences identified always favored the new partners. And both mothers and the biological fathers themselves reported lower levels of employment among biological fathers at the current interview (i.e., when they were older) than at the time of the child's birth. Finally, the
proportion of biological fathers who had never been incarcerated could logically only decrease over time.

It is also possible that Table 3 "compared apples and oranges," since we were comparing the economic capacities of co-resident new partners with those of biological fathers, regardless of whether the fathers ever lived with the child's mother. If mothers are particularly selective in choosing co-residential mates, then a more appropriate comparison would be between mothers' new co-resident partners and formerly-co-resident biological fathers. Results from such comparisons (not shown) confirmed both the hypothesis that mothers are more selective in choosing co-resident partners (i.e., the reports about the previously-co-resident biological fathers were often better than those for the total sample of biological fathers) as well as the patterns identified in Table 3. Even limiting the sample to mothers who co-resided with the child's biological father, new partners compared favorably in all domains-although the magnitude of the differences were sometimes smaller in this case.

Finally, with the exception of the biological father's education, the primary analyses rely on mothers' reports about both the biological fathers' and new partners' economic capacities. Although not ideal, this was necessary since new partners were not interviewed directly in the Fragile Families study. The results in Appendix Table 1 suggest that although the magnitude of the difference between new partners' and biological fathers' economic capacities varies depending on the reporter, the substantive conclusions do not. Because mothers' reports about the biological fathers tended to worsen over time (possibly due to under-reporting of negative capacities at the initial interview, new knowledge gained after the biological parents broke up, or acrimony in the dissolution process), the analyses presented in the paper used mother's reports
about the biological father from the earliest wave possible to minimize the risk of negative maternal reporting bias.

Despite these limitations, our analyses represent an important step forward in understanding unwed mothers' post-birth repartnering behaviors. The results confirm qualitative evidence suggesting that unmarried mothers care a great deal about finding a good mate for themselves and a potential father-figure for their children (Edin \& Kefalas 2005), and many will remain single unless or until they meet a mate who meets their high standards. Future waves of data collection will provide important new information about how many of the mothers who remained single will eventually move in with new partners and the economic capacities of such men. For the mothers who do repartner, higher levels of economic capacities among their partners may translate into greater economic security and perhaps better outcomes for themselves and their children. On the other hand, even though the mothers' new partners generally have higher economic capacities than the children's fathers, the average levels of economic capacities in this population remain low and may not be high enough to translate into financial stability and improved wellbeing for families. Although we did not have the data necessary to examine the stability of mothers' new partnerships in this analysis, it will be important to use future waves of data to assess whether these new partnerships are characterized by the high rates of instability that previous research has documented among relatively disadvantaged populations.

Amato, P. (1994). The implications of research findings on children in stepfamilies. In A. Booth \& J. Dunn (Eds.), Stepfamilies: Who benefits? Who does not? (pp. 81-87). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Ananat, E., \& Michaels, G. (2008). The effect of marital breakup on the income distribution of women with children. Journal of Human Resources, 43, 611-629.

Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic Research.

Berger, L., Carlson, M., Bzostek, S., \& Osborne, C. (2008). Parenting practices of resident fathers: The role of marital and biological ties. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 625-639.

Björklund, A., Ginther, D.K., \& Sundstrom, M. (2007). Family structure and child outcomes in the USA and Sweden. J. Popul. Econ, 20, 183-201.

Blank, R.M. (1997). It takes a nation: A new agenda for fighting poverty. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, and Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bramlett, M., \& Mosher, W. (2002). Cohabitation, marriage, divorce, and remarriage in the United States. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Vital and Health Statistics Reports, 23.

Brown, S. (2004). Family structure and child well-being: The significance of parental cohabitation. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66, 351-367.

Buckle, L., Gallup Jr., G., \& Rodd, Z. (1996). Marriage as a reproductive contract: Patterns of marriage, divorce and remarriage. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17, 363-377.

Bumpass, L. (1990). What's happening to the family? Interactions between demographic and institutional change. Demography, 27, 483-498.

Bumpass, L., Raley, K., \& Sweet, J. (1995). The changing character of stepfamilies: Implications of cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing. Demography, 32, 425-436.

Bumpass, L., Sweet, J., \& Martin, T. (1990). Changing patterns of remarriage. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 52, 747-56.

Bzostek, S. (2008). Social fathers and child well-being. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 950-961.

Carlson, M., Garfinkel, I., McLanahan, S., Mincy, R., \& Primus, W. (2004a). The effects of welfare and child support policies on union formation. Population Research and Policy Review, 23, 513-542.

Carlson, M., McLanahan, S., \& England, P. (2004b). Union formation in fragile families. Demography, 41, 237-262.

Cherlin, A. (2009). The marriage-go-round: The state of marriage and the family in America today. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Coleman, M., Ganong, L., \& Fine, M. (2000). Reinvestigating remarriage: Another decade of progress. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62, 1288-1307.

Dean, G., \& Gurak, D. (1978). Marital homogamy the second time around. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 40, 559-570.

De Graaf, P., \& Kalmijn, M. (2003). Alternative routes in the remarriage market: Competing-risk analysis of union formation after divorce. Social Forces, 81, 1459-1498.

Edin, K., \& Kefalas, M. (2005). Promises I can keep: Why poor women put motherhood before marriage. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Ellwood, D., \& Jencks, C. (2004). The spread of single-parent families in the United States since 1960. Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series, RWP04-008.

Gelissen, J. (2004). Assortative mating after divorce: A test of two competing hypotheses using marginal models. Social Science Research, 33, 361-384.

Gibson-Davis, C., Edin, K., \& McLanahan, S. (2005). High hopes but even higherexpectations: The retreat from marriage among low-income couples. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 67, 1301-1312.

Graefe, D., \& Lichter, D. (1999). Life course transitions of American children: Parental cohabitation, marriage and single motherhood. Demography, 36, 205-217.
------. (2007). When unwed mothers marry: The marital and cohabiting partners of midlife women. Journal of Family Issues, 28, 595-622.

Hamilton, B., Martin, J., \& Ventura, S. "Births: Preliminary data for 2008." National vital statistics reports web release; vol 58 no 16. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics. Released April, 2010.

Hetherington, E., \& Jodl, K. (1994). Stepfamilies as settings for child development. In A. Booth \& J. Dunn (Eds.) Stepfamilies: Who benefits? Who does not? (pp 55-79). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Hofferth, S. (2006). Residential father family type and child well-being: Investment versus selection. Demography, 43, 53-77.

Hofferth, S., \& Anderson, K. (2003). Are all dads equal? Biology versus marriage as a basis for paternal investment. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 65, 213-232.

Jacobs, J., \& Furstenberg, F. (1986). Changing places: Conjugal careers and women's marital mobility. Social Forces, 64, 714-732.

Kennedy, S., \& Bumpass, L. (2008). Cohabitation and children's living arrangements: New estimates from the United States. Demographic Research, 19, 1663-1692.

Knab, J., Garfinkel, I., McLanahan, S., Moiduddin, E., \& Osborne, C. (2008). The effects of welfare and child support policies on the incidence of marriage following a nonmarital birth. Center for Research on Child Wellbeing Working Paper 2007-10-FF.

Lichter, D., \& Graefe, D. (2001). Finding a mate? The marital and cohabitation histories of unwed mothers. In L. Wu \& B. Wolfe (Eds.), Out of wedlock: Causes and consequences of nonmarital fertility (pp. 317-343). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lundberg, S., \& Rose, E. (2003). Child gender and the transition to marriage. Demography, 40, 333-349.

Manning, W., \& Lamb, K. (2003). Adolescent well-being in cohabiting, married and single-parent families. Journal of Marriage and Family, 65, 876-893.

McLanahan, S., \& Sandefur, G. (1994). Growing up with a single parent: What hurts, what helps. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mueller, C., \& Pope, H. (1980). Divorce and female remarriage mobility: Data on marriage matches after divorce for White women. Social Forces, 58, 726-738.

Ni Brolchain, M. (1988). Changing partners: A longitudinal study of remarriage. Population Trends, 53, 27-34.

Oppenheimer, V. (1988). A theory of marriage timing. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 563-591.
------. (2000). The continuing importance of men's economic position in marriage formation. In L. Waite (Ed.), The ties that bind: Perspectives on marriage and cohabitation (pp. 283301). New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Osborne, C., \& McLanahan, S. (2007). Partnership instability and child wellbeing. Journal of Marriage and Family, 69, 1065-1083.

Pager, D. (2003). The mark of a criminal record. American Journal of Sociology, 108, 937-975.
Qian, Z., Lichter, D., \& Mellott, L. (2005). Out of wedlock childbearing, marital prospects and mate selection. Social Forces, 84, 473-491.

Reichman, N. E., Corman, H., \& Noonan, K. (2004). Effects of child health on parents' relationship status. Demography, 41, 569-584.

Reichman, N., Teitler, J., Garfinkel, I., \& McLanahan, S. (2001). Fragile families: Sample and design. Children and Youth Services Review, 23, 303-326.

Shafer, K. (2009). Gender differences in remarriage: Marriage formation and assortative mating after divorce. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University.

Smock, P. (1990). Remarriage patterns of Black and White women: Reassessing the role of educational attainment. Demography, 27, 467-473.

Sweeney, M. (1997). Remarriage of women and men after divorce: The role of socioeconomic prospects. Journal of Family Issues, 18, 479-502.

Thomson, E., Hanson, T., \& McLanahan, S. (1994). Family structure and child wellbeing: Economic resources vs. parental behaviors. Social Forces, 73, 221-242.

Whyte, M. (1990). Dating, mating and marriage. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Wilson, W.J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Wu, Z. (1994). Remarriage in Canada: A social exchange perspective. Journal of Divorce and Remarriage, 21, 191-224.

Wu, Z., \& Balakrishnan, T. (1994). Cohabitation after marital disruption in Canada. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 36, 723-34.

Wu, Z., \& Schimmele, C. (2005). Repartnering after first union disruption. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 67, 27-36.

Yamaguchi, K. (1990). Logit and multinomial logit models for discrete-time event-history analysis: A causal analysis of interdependent discrete-state processes. Quality and Quantity, 24, 323-341.

Table 1. Mothers' romantic relationships following a nonmarital birth ${ }^{\mathrm{a}}$

|  | Baseline | One year | Three years | Five years |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Living with focal child's biological father (\%) | 51.2 | 52.9 | 44.7 | 37.6 |
| Married | 0.0 | 11.0 | 15.5 | 16.6 |
| Cohabiting | 51.2 | 41.9 | 29.2 | 21.0 |
| Living with new partner (\%) | NA | 4.7 | 12.3 | 21.6 |
| Married | NA | 1.1 | 1.2 | 4.9 |
| Cohabiting | NA | 3.6 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
| Not living with partner (\%) ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 48.8 | 42.5 | 43.0 | 40.8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Ever repartnered by survey wave (\%) | NA | 4.7 | 13.8 | 26.6 |
| Unweighted N | 3,710 | 3,200 | 3,079 | 2,999 |
| Weighted N | 2,366 | 2,055 | 1,960 | 1,899 |

Notes: NA: Not available. Percentages are weighted by national sampling weights.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ The sample includes all unwed mothers living with the focal child at least half-time.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Since mothers were not asked about romantic relationships with new partners at baseline, some of the women included in this category could be in romantic relationships with new partners. Information from the household roster at baseline suggests that between 3 and $20 \%$ of the $18 \%$ of mothers not romantically involved with the biological father could be living with a new male partner.

## Table 2. Baseline Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Mothers Ever Eigible for Forming First

 New Partnership ( $\mathrm{N}=2,016$ )
## Not co-resident with focal child's biological father at time of child's birth 63.2

Number of waves 'eligible' for first new partnership (living away from biological father)
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { One survey wave } & 35.5\end{array}$
Two survey waves 33.1
Three survey waves 31.5
Mother and child's socio-demographic and background characteristics
Mother's age (in years) 23.5

Mother's race/ethnicity
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Non-Hispanic white and other } & 15.5\end{array}$
Non-Hispanic black $\quad 62.5$
Hispanic 22.0
Mother born in the United States 92.2
Focal child is male 53.8
Focal child born at low/very low birth weight 11.3
Focal child is mother's first birth 41.0
Mother reported fair/poor health at child's birth 7.7
Focal child's grandmother exhibited symptoms of depression/anxiety 29.2
Mother's attitudinal and cultural factors
Believes single mothers can raise children as well as two parents 86.1
Believes men cannot be trusted to be faithful 25.0
Attended religious services at least monthly at time of child's birth 34.6
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Lived with both biological parents at age } 15 & 32.9\end{array}$
Mother's economic characteristics
Educational attainment at child's birth <HS/GED 45.3
High school diploma 28.6
Some college or more 26.1
Employed in the year preceding child's birth 79.7

## City-level contextual factors

Welfare generosity
High benefits 37.5
Moderate benefits 29.0
Low benefits 33.5
Child support enforcement
Strict 54.3
Moderate 12.3
Lenient 33.4
Note: The sample is limited to mothers with unmarried births who lived with the focal child, did not live with the child's biological father, and had not previously been observed in a new partnership in at least one of the post-birth survey waves. All characteristics were measured at the time of the child's birth, except for the number of waves the mother was eligible for a new partnership.

Table 3. Economic capacities of mothers' new and former partners (mother-reported), $\mathrm{n}=791^{\mathrm{a}}$

| Subject | First-time new partner | Focal child's biological father |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Survey wave of report | Current wave | Child's birth | Current wave |
| Partner's economic capacities |  |  |  |
| Educational attainment ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |  |  |  |
| <HS/GED | 16.5 | 47.8* | - |
| High School Diploma | 59.1 | 32.4* | - |
| Some college or more | 24.4 | 19.8* | - |
| Employed | 81.3 | 70.2* | 55.1* |
| Never incarcerated ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 79.1 | 51.7* | 34.2* |

Note: The sample is limited to mothers observed in a first new partnership 1,3 or 5 years after the focal child's birth. Estimates are unweighted. Statistically significant differences between new partners' and biological fathers' characteristics: *p<. 05
${ }^{\mathrm{a}}$ This represents the total number of mothers in first new partnerships. Sample sizes for particular outcomes vary due to item non-response.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Mothers are asked about the biological father's educational attainment only at the baseline interview, and they are asked about new partners' education only at years three and five. Our subsequent analyses update mothers' reports of biological father's education with the father's own report at the time of the mother's repartnering, if available, to allow for the possibility that fathers obtained more schooling after the child's birth. See Appendix Table 1 for more information about biological fathers' self-reported characteristics.
${ }^{\text {c }}$ Because mothers were not asked about the biological father's incarceration history at the baseline survey, information about "child's birth" is drawn from the one-year interview.

Table 4. Within-mother comparisons of new partners' and biological fathers' educational attainment, employment status, and incarceration history

| Educational Attainment $(\mathbf{N}=\mathbf{6 9 6})^{\mathbf{a}}$ |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | New Partner |  |  |  |
| Biological Father | <HS/GED | HS Diploma | Some College+ | Total |
| <HS/GED | 8.9 | 28.7 | 11.7 | 49.3 |
| HS Diploma | 4.4 | 16.9 | 5.2 | 26.4 |
| Some College+ | 3.0 | 14.2 | 7.1 | 24.3 |
| Total | 16.3 | 59.7 | 24.0 | 100.0 |

Employment Status ( $\mathrm{N}=622$ )

|  | New Partner |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Biological Father | Not employed | Employed | Total |
| Not employed | 6.1 | 23.0 | 29.1 |
| Employed | 10.3 | 60.6 | 70.9 |
| Total | 16.4 | 83.6 | 100.0 |

Incarceration History ( $\mathrm{N}=670$ )

|  | New Partner |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Biological Father | Ever incarcerated | Never incarcerated | Total |
| Ever incarcerated | 12.8 | 35.1 | 47.9 |
| Never incarcerated | 9.0 | 43.1 | 52.1 |
| Total | 21.8 | 78.2 | 100.0 |

Note: The sample is limited to mothers observed in a first new partnership 1,3 or 5 years after the focal child's birth with valid information about both current and former partners' characteristics. Estimates are unweighted.
${ }^{\text {abiological fathers' education is updated using the father's own current report if available }}$ since mothers are not asked to update their baseline reports of biological fathers' education. New partners' education at one year is imputed (see text for more details).

Table 5. Odds Ratios from Discrete-Time Logit Model of Mother's First New Partnership ( $\mathrm{n}=\mathbf{4 , 0 3 0 \text { ) }}$

| Duration of eligibility for forming first new partnership (v. one survey wave) |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Two survey waves | 1.23 |
| Three survey waves | 1.36 * |
| Focal child's age (vs. 1 year) |  |
| 3 years | 1.30 \# |
| 5 years | 1.64 ** |
| Mother and child's socio-demographic and background characteristics |  |
| Mother's age at focal child's birth | 0.92 ** |
| Mother's race/ethnicity (vs. white and other, non-Hispanic) |  |
| Black, non-Hispanic | 0.63 ** |
| Hispanic | 0.68 ** |
| Mother born in United states | 0.85 |
| Focal child is male | 1.07 |
| Focal child born at low/very low birth weight | 1.04 |
| Focal child is mother's first birth | 0.65 ** |
| Mother reported fair/poor health (preceding wave) | 1.10 |
| Focal child's grandmother exhibited symptoms of depression/anxiety | $1.14{ }^{\text {\# }}$ |
| Mother's attitudinal and cultural factors |  |
| Believes single moms can raise children as well as two parents (child's birth) | 1.02 |
| Believes men cannot be trusted to be faithful (child's birth) | 0.96 |
| Attended religious services at least monthly (preceding wave) | 0.92 |
| Lived with both biological parents at age 15 | 0.99 |
| Mother's economic characteristics |  |
| Educational attainment at child's birth (vs. some college or more) |  |
| <HS/GED | 1.07 |
| High school diploma | 1.15 |
| Obtained additional schooling since child's birth (preceding wave) | 0.71 ** |
| Employed (preceding wave) | 0.94 |
| City-level contextual factors |  |
| Welfare generosity (vs. low benefits) |  |
| High benefits | 0.77 * |
| Moderate benefits | 1.15 |
| Child support enforcement (vs. lenient) |  |
| Strict | 1.03 |
| Moderate | 1.11 |
| ${ }^{\#} \mathrm{p}<.1$, * $\mathrm{p}<.05$, ** $\mathrm{p}<.01$. <br> Note: The sample is limited to mothers with unwed births who had not been observed in a new partnership in a previous survey wave, were not currently co-residing with the focal child's biological father, and were currently living at least half-time with the focal child. |  |
|  |  |
| The dataset is arranged by person-years, with mothers contributing one observation each survey wave they are eligible for a first new partnership. 2,016 mothers contributed a total of 4,030 person-years. Standard errors are adjusted for city-level clustering in the Fragile Families sample. |  |

Table 6. Odds ratios from logistic regressions predicting trading up or trading down in partners' characteristics among mothers in first new partnerships ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | HS Completion |  | Some College or More |  | Employment |  | Incarceration |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Traded Down | Traded Up | Traded Down | Traded Up | Traded Down | Traded Up | Traded Down | Traded Up |
| Duration of eligibility at first new partnership (vs. 1 survey wave) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Two survey waves | 0.59 | 1.79 | 0.51 | 0.77 | 0.61 | 0.6 | 0.31 ** | 1.18 |
| Three survey waves | 0.27 | 1.7 | 0.27 | 0.80 | 0.97 | 1.75 | 0.22 * | 1.42 |
| Focal child's age at first new partnership (vs. 1 year) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 years | 0.22 | 1.82 | 1.58 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.98 | 2.09 | 2.45 \# |
| 5 years | 0.45 | 1.75 | 9.04 * | 0.80 | 0.72 | 1.48 | 1.92 | 3.38 * |
| Mother and child's socio-demographic/background characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mother's age at focal child's birth | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.1 | 1.10 ** | 0.93 \# | 1.03 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Mother's race/ethnicity (vs. white and other, non-Hisp.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black, non-Hispanic | 1.08 | 0.49 | 3.7 * | 0.85 | 2.27 \# | 0.32 | 4.94 ** | 0.39 ** |
| Hispanic | 3.39 \# | 0.25 ** | 1.74 | 0.81 | 1.61 | 0.34 | 3.79 \# | 0.67 |
| Mother born in United states | 1.38 | 1.05 | 1.34 | 5.98 | 2.04 | 1.33 | 2.44 | 0.84 |
| Child is male | 1.70 | 1.53 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 1.13 | 1.16 | 1.02 | 0.89 |
| Child was low/very low birth weight | 0.87 | 0.8 | 0.65 | 0.86 | 0.56 | 0.76 | 0.27 \# | 0.71 |
| Child is mother's first birth | 1.42 | 0.81 | 1.77 | 1.6 \# | 0.96 | 1.58 | 1.03 | 0.81 |
| Mother reported fair/poor health (preceding wave) | 0.96 | 1.03 | 0.92 | 1.19 | 2.7 ** | 1.09 | 3.55 ** | 0.79 |
| Child's grandmother exhibited symptoms of depr./anxiety | 2.06 | 0.71 | 4.05 * | 0.66 | 1.9 * | 0.51 \# | 2.53 ** | 0.59 * |
| Mother's attitudinal and cultural factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Believes single moms can raise children as well as two parents | 0.97 | 0.39 \# | 0.78 | 0.98 | 0.73 | 1.17 | 0.6 | 2.79 ** |
| Believes men cannot be trusted to be faithful | 0.57 | 0.63 | 0.84 | 0.95 | 1.26 | 1.02 | 1.88 \# | 1.33 |
| Attended religious services at least monthly (prec. wave) | 0.84 | 1.25 | 0.61 | 1.12 | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.98 | 0.93 |
| Lived with both biological parents at age 15 | 0.29 | 0.92 | 1.36 | 0.69 | 0.66 | 1.32 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| Mother's economic characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Educational attainment at child's birth (vs. some college+) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <HS/GED | 1.89 | 1.16 | 3.58 * | 0.75 | 0.47 \# | 0.76 | 0.86 | 1.28 |
| High school diploma | 1.54 | 1.23 | 4.08 * | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.47 | 1.23 | 0.89 |
| Obtained additional schooling since child's birth (prec. wave) | 0.95 | 2.74 * | 0.67 | 1.61 * | 1.39 | 0.58 | 1.25 | 0.85 |
| Employed (preceding wave) | 0.54 | 0.84 | 1.18 | 1.17 | 0.78 | 2.73 \# | 0.42 * | 2.28 ** |
| City-level contextual factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Welfare generosity (vs. low benefits) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| High benefits | 0.44 | 1.6 | 0.93 | 1.17 | 1.4 | 0.96 | 0.46 | 2.55 ** |
| Moderate benefits | 0.74 | 1.64 | 1.16 | 1.14 | 0.75 | 2.37 | 0.31 ** | 2.19 ** |
| Child support enforcement (vs. lenient) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strict | 1.15 | 0.77 | 0.82 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.58 | 0.86 | 0.97 |
| Moderate | 1.26 | 0.74 | 0.39 | 1.08 | 1.03 | 0.4 | 1.21 | 1.85 |
| N | 303 | 297 | 147 | 453 | 392 | 151 | 317 | 281 |

Note: The sample is limited to mothers in a first new partnership. Standard errors are adjusted for city-level clustering. ${ }^{\#} \mathrm{p}<.1,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<.05$, ** $\mathrm{p}<.01$.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Each column represents a separate logistic regression model. The models labeled "traded down" use the sample of mothers originally partnered with biological fathers with positive attributes, and predict "trading down" versus re-partnering with a man who also had the positive attribute. The models labeled "traded up" use the sample of mothers originally partnered with biological fathers with negative attributes, and predict "trading up" versus re-partnering with a man who also had the negative attribute. Total sample sizes vary across outcomes due to missing data about biological fathers' and/or new partners' economic capacities.

Table 7. Relative risk ratios from discrete-time multinomial logit models predicting "trading up" and "trading down," versus not re-partnering, in partner's educational attainment ${ }^{\text {a }}$ $\qquad$
$\qquad$

| Partners' college attendance |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 | Mod |
| Bio. father at least some college | Bio. father |


| Model 1 |  | Model 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bio. father ha | HS diploma | Bio. father no HS diploma |
| Traded down (vs. no partner) | Same as bio. (vs. no partner) | Traded up Same as bio. <br> (vs. no partner) (vs. no partner) |



| Duration of eligibility (ws. 1 survey wave) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Two survey waves | 0.82 | 1.3 | 1.17 | 0.73 | 1.42 | 2.23 | 0.85 |
| Three survey waves | 0.33 | 1.39 | 1.14 | 0.79 | 1.31 | 3.66 | 0.76 |
| Focal child's age (vs. 1 year) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 years | 0.49 | 1.44 | 1.84 ** | 0.87 | 1.25 | 0.79 | 1.37 |
| 5 years | 0.96 | 1.45 | 1.79 \# | 1.01 | 2.01 * | 0.38 | 1.37 |
| Mother and child's socio-demographic/background characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mother's age at focal child's birth | 0.85 \# | 0.92 ** | 0.93 ** | 0.91 * | 0.92 * | 0.85 ** | 1 |
| Mother's race/ethnicity (vs. white and other, non-Hisp.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black, non-Hispanic | 0.68 | 0.63 * | 0.58 ** | 0.87 | 0.7 | 0.23 ** | 0.55 * |
| Hispanic | 2.07 | 0.72 | 0.45 ** | 1.52 | 1.01 | 0.48 | 0.54 |
| Mother born in United states | 0.62 | 0.49 * | 1.25 | 1.48 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 4.1 |
| Focal child is male | 1.99 \# | 1.13 | 0.91 | 0.59 * | 1.46 \# | 1.84 | 0.87 |
| Child was low/very low birth weight | 0.88 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.24 | 0.95 | 0.97 | 0.85 |
| Child is mother's first birth | 0.69 | 0.55 ** | 0.69 * | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.45 \# | 0.96 |
| Mother reported fair/poor health (preceding wave) | 0.88 | 0.9 | 1.31 | 1.51 | 0.91 | 0.73 | 1.31 |
| Child's grandmother exhibited symptoms of depr./anxiety | 2.26 * | 1.14 | 1.04 | 1.22 | 1.34 | 0.49 \# | 0.83 |
| Mother's attitudinal and cultural factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Believes single moms can raise children as well as two parents | 0.89 | 0.94 | 1 | 2.43 | 0.98 | 1.08 | 1.01 |
| Believes men cannot be trusted to be faithful (child's birth) | 0.7 | 0.75 | 0.98 | 1.43 | 0.95 | 1.06 | 0.82 |
| Attended religious services at least monthly (preceding wave) | 0.72 | 0.89 | 0.9 | 0.78 | 0.68 \# | 0.78 | 1 |
| Lived with both biological parents at age 15 | 0.26 \# | 0.97 | 1.01 | 1.11 | 0.81 | 0.77 | 0.71 |
| Mother's economic characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Educational attainment at child's birth (vs. some college or more) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <HS/GED | 1.66 | 0.99 | 0.82 | 0.63 | 1.75 \# | 0.69 | 0.68 |
| High school diploma | 1.57 | 1.11 | 0.96 | 0.73 | 2.45 ** | 1.03 | 0.74 |
| Obtained additional schooling since child's birth (preceding wave) | 0.79 | 0.8 | 0.78 \# | 0.3 ** | 0.82 | 1.04 | 1.07 |
| Employed (preceding wave) | 0.71 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.97 | 1.07 | 0.97 | 0.98 |
| City-level contextual factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Welfare generosity (vs. low benefits) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| High benefits | 0.49 \# | 0.83 | 0.94 | 0.49 \# | 0.83 | 0.6 | 0.89 |
| Moderate benefits | 0.8 | 1.14 | 1.52 \# | 0.89 | 1.18 | 1.09 | 1.28 |
| Child support enforcement (vs. lenient) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strict | 1.95 | 1.34 | 0.7 * | 0.89 | 1.46 | 1.68 | 0.96 |
| Moderate | 1.92 | 1.26 | 0.79 | 1.39 | 1.26 | 2.66 * | 0.58 * |
| N | 1920 |  | 1539 |  | 922 |  |  |

Note: The sample is limited to mothers eligible for a first new partnership, with individual mothers contributing one observation each survey wave they were eligible. Standard errors are adjusted clustering. \# p<.1, * $\mathrm{p}<.05,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<.01$.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ The models labeled "traded down" use the sample of mothers originally partnered with biological fathers with positive attributes, and predict "trading down" or repartnering with a man who als positive attribute, both versus not repartnering at all. The models labeled "traded up" use the sample of mothers originally partnered with biological fathers with negative attributes, and predict repartnering with a man who also had the negative attribute, both versus not repartnering at all. Sample sizes vary across outcomes due to missing data about biological fathers' and/or new partı capacities.

| Partners' employment status |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 | Model 2 |
| Bio. father employed | Bio. father not employed |
| Traded down Same as bio. (vs. no partner) (vs. no partner) | Traded up Same as bio. (vs. no partner) (vs. no partner) |


| Partners' incarceration history |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Model 1 Model 2 |  |



| Duration of eligibility (vs. 1 survey wave) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Two survey waves | 0.76 | 1.21 | 1.39 | 1.87 | 0.54 | 1.45 * | 1.12 | 0.79 |
| Three survey waves | 1.07 | 1.3 | 2.02 * | 1.1 | 0.31 * | 1.63 * | 1.65 | 0.98 |
| Focal child's age (vs. 1 year) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 years | 1.57 | 1.72 * | 2.22 \# | 1.49 | 2.72 * | 1.2 | 1.89 * | 1.09 |
| 5 years | 1.82 | 2.17 ** | 1.78 | 1.71 | 3.65 ** | 1.59 * | 1.93 * | 0.88 |
| Mother and child's socio-demographic/background characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mother's age at focal child's birth | 0.86 ** | 0.93 ** | 0.93 | 0.87 | 0.92 \# | 0.93 ** | 0.91 ** | 0.91 * |
| Mother's race/ethnicity (vs. white and other, non-Hisp.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Black, non-Hispanic | 0.95 | 0.46 ** | 0.59 | 1.36 | 1.15 | 0.38 ** | 0.62 * | 1.41 |
| Hispanic | 0.77 | 0.52 * | 0.82 | 1.82 | 1.41 | 0.52 \# | 0.73 | 1.06 |
| Mother born in United states | 1.5 | 0.65 | 0.61 | 0.67 | 3.13 \# | 0.94 | 0.62 | 0.7 |
| Child is male | 1.31 | 1.05 | 0.94 | 1.03 | 1.57 | 1.28 \# | 0.91 | 1.04 |
| Child was low/very low birth weight | 0.65 | 1.04 | 1.55 | 1.97 * | 0.43 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.48 |
| Child is mother's first birth | 0.68 | 0.64 ** | 0.75 | 0.42 \# | 0.72 \# | 0.7 * | 0.53 ** | 0.61 \# |
| Mother reported fair/poor health (preceding wave) | 1.99 * | 0.86 | 1.64 | 1.13 | 1.78 | 0.77 | 1.05 | 1.5 |
| Child's grandmother exhibited symptoms of depr./anxiety | 2.16 ** | 1.1 | 0.67 \# | 1.45 | 2.22 ** | 1 | 0.99 | 1.49 |
| Mother's attitudinal and cultural factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Believes single moms can raise children as well as two parents | 0.89 | 1.24 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.81 | 1.12 | 1.32 | 0.55 ** |
| Believes men cannot be trusted to be faithful | 1.08 | 0.92 | 0.77 | 0.8 | 1.72 | 0.9 | 0.99 | 0.84 |
| Attended religious services at least monthly (prec. wave) | 0.8 | 0.88 | 0.95 | 0.93 | 0.82 | 0.89 | 0.94 | 0.96 |
| Lived with both biological parents at age 15 | 0.65 | 1.02 | 1.21 | 1.2 | 0.91 | 1.09 | 0.98 | 0.75 |
| Mother's economic characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Educational attainment at child's birth (vs. some college+) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <HS/GED | 0.61 | 1.11 | 1.13 | 1.2 | 1.14 | 1.24 | 1.06 | 0.76 |
| High school diploma | 0.86 | 1.05 | 1.08 | 1.95 | 1.09 | 0.96 | 1.24 | 1.26 |
| Obtained additional schooling since child's birth (prec. wave) | 0.9 | 0.72 * | 0.54 ** | 0.76 | 0.77 | 0.61 ** | 0.65 ** | 0.69 |
| Employed (preceding wave) | 0.82 | 1.01 | 1.07 | 0.47 * | 0.71 | 1.37 * | 1 | 0.45 * |
| City-level contextual factors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Welfare generosity (vs. low benefits) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| High benefits | 1.07 | 0.73 ** | 0.92 | 1.03 | 0.48 * | 0.84 | 1.08 | 0.37 ** |
| Moderate benefits | 1 | 1.25 \# | 1.54 * | 0.95 | 0.55 * | 1.8 ** | 1.42 * | 0.67 * |
| Child support enforcement (vs. lenient) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Strict | 1.08 | 1.14 | 0.72 | 0.85 | 1.02 | 1.32 * | 1.08 | 1.17 |
| Moderate | 0.95 | 0.97 | 1.07 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.21 | 1.4 \# | 0.87 |
| N |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

N
2300
854
1845
1470
Note: The sample is limited to mothers eligible for a first new partnership, with individual mothers contributing one observation each survey wave they were eligible. Sample sizes vary across outcomes due to missing data about biological fathers' and/or new partners' economic capacities. Standard errors are adjusted for city-level clustering. \# p $<.1$, * p $<.05$, ** $\mathrm{p}<01$.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ The models labeled "traded down" use the sample of mothers originally partnered with biological fathers with positive attributes, and predict "trading down" or repartnering with a man who also had the positive attribute, versus not repartnering at all. The models labeled "traded up" predict "trading up" or repartnering with a man who also had the negative attribute, both versus not repartnering.

| Subject | First-time new partner | Focal child's biological father |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Reporter <br> Survey wave of report | Mother <br> Current wave | Mother Child's birth | Father Child's birth | Mother Current wave | Father <br> Current wave |
| Column $\mathrm{n}^{\text {a }}$ | 791 | 791 | 541 | 791 | 417 |
| \% interviewed (of possible) | - | - | 68.4 | - | 52.7 |
| Partner's characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |
| Educational attainment ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| <HS/GED | 16.5 | 47.8* | 52.3* | - | 48.5* |
| High School Diploma | 59.1 | 32.4* | 27.3* | - | 26.0* |
| Some college or more | 24.4 | 19.8* | $20.4{ }^{\text {\# }}$ | - | 25.5 |
| Employed | 81.3 | 70.2* | 71.7* | 55.1* | 65.4* |
| Never incarcerated ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 79.1 | 51.7* | 66.1* | 34.2* | 56.4* |

[^1]
[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Although multinomial logistic regressions are helpful in allowing simultaneous modeling of multiple processes, they are also subject to the Assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (often referred to as Assumption IIA), in which the probability of one outcome occurring must be independent of the other alternatives available. In the models we present, Hausman tests of Assumption IIA were run to determine whether this assumption held for these data, which it did in every case.

[^1]:    Note: The sample is limited to mothers observed in a first new partnership 1,3 or 5 years after the focal child's birth. Estimates are unweighted. Statistically significant differences between new partners' and biological fathers' characteristics: ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<.05,{ }^{\#} \mathrm{p}<.1$.
    ${ }^{a}$ This represents the total sample size in each column. Sample sizes for particular outcomes vary due to item non-response.
    ${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Mothers are asked about the biological father's educational attainment only at the baseline interview, and they are asked about new partners' education only at years three and five.
    ${ }^{c}$ Because mothers and fathers are not asked about the biological father's incarceration history at the baseline survey, information about "child's birth" is drawn from the one-year interviews.

