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Volume Author/Editor: Haitovsky, Yoel, George Treyz, and Vincent Su

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
Chapter Author: Yoel Haitovsky, George Treyz, Vincent Su

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4th Quarter, 1968

forecast (Naive 1)
adjustment
movement



6

The Decomposition of Forecasting Error: The OBE Model

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Here the OBE model is subjected to the same type of analysis we performed on the Wharton forecasts in the previous chapter. In addition, we compare the individual Wharton and OBE forecasts. This procedure allows us to explain macroeconomic forecasting errors in two different models for each quarter under consideration.

Description of the Models¹

The Office of Business Economics model has been used for forecasting since the beginning of 1966. However, some of the inputs used in the early forecasts—such as preliminary lagged variables, predicted exogenous variables, constant adjustments, and estimated parameters—were not well recorded. Since efforts to duplicate the forecasts prior to the second quarter of 1967 proved unsuccessful, we were forced to start our analysis of forecasting only with that quarter.

¹ For a complete description of the OBE models, see Chapter 2, pp. 35-42.

In general, the task of reproducing the OBE forecasts is complicated by the fact that the model has been continuously revised and different versions have been used in forecasting, necessitating respecification of equations and reestimation of parameters from time to time. Furthermore, each version contains several optional procedures for treating total fixed investment (*ISE*), housing starts (*HS*), and the price of government purchases (*PGG*). For instance, total fixed investment can be treated as endogenous or exogenous to the system, or it can be found by using one of two different equations that use anticipation variables.

In each quarter, forecasts are made on the basis of several different assumptions about monetary and fiscal policies over the forecasting period. Nevertheless, there is usually a preferred forecast. The forecasts we use for the second and third quarters of 1967 and for the first quarter of 1968 contain the set of exogenous values which, according to the recollection of OBE model builders, include those values for the exogenous variables that appeared to be the best estimate at the time the forecasts were made. There were several forecasts made in the fourth quarter of 1967, but only one was a "serious forecast"—the one we use. (The forecasts we use for the second quarter, 1968 through the third quarter, 1969 were designated as preferred forecasts internally by OBE but not identified as such publicly.)

The forecasting procedures employed here are similar to those we used for the Wharton model. Since there are nonlinearities in the model, the forecasting solution is obtained by using the structural form, not the reduced form, of the model. All endogenous variables are classified into three categories. The forecasts of endogenous variables that are a function of predetermined variables alone are obtained as soon as the judgmental guesses (or preliminary data) about the predetermined variables are established. For those endogenous variables that are determined by at least one other current endogenous variable, the forecasts are obtained by using the Gauss-Seidel iterative method. After these two types of endogenous variables are estimated, the forecasts of the endogenous variables determined by identities and not used elsewhere in the system are obtained.

Review of Types of Forecasts Used

The seven sets of forecasting errors² discussed here carry the same

² See Chapter 1.

The Decomposition of Forecasts

definitions as in the previous chapter. *AR*, *GG*, and *NO*) are generated, adjustments, and the last three set directly from data.

To review briefly: the *OR* forecast constant adjustments originally used *GG* forecasts are the model forecast described on p. 9; the *NO* forecast without the use of any constant adjustment the observed value in the jump-off quarter ahead, while the naive 2 method uses the quarter to predict the future change scheme uses four weighted lags to quarter. The implicit weights allocated determined by the regression of the values in the past four quarters.

Notes on Forecast versus Realization

These tables (see pp. 296–307) versus realization tables. They cover quarter, 1967 to the third quarter, 1968. OBE forecast for the second quarter, the four-quarters-ahead and one-year-ahead forecasts are blank in these tables. In Tables 6 and 7 (*FE*) is the difference between the average absolute forecasting error and the absolute forecasting errors made.

Comparing the four different kinds of forecasts in general, the *NO* forecast has a distinct advantage in the first two quarters of prediction. To three or four quarters ahead, the *AR* and *GG* errors for some variables indicate that mechanical constant adjustments for two quarters of forecast but of decision period is extended. However, the *OR* forecast has noticeably smaller errors (especially

³ The forecast versus realization tables

Producing the OBE forecasts is complicated and has been continuously revised and different forecasting, necessitating respecification of parameters from time to time. Furthermore, several optional procedures for treating total government starts (*HS*), and the price of government securities, total fixed investment can be treated as part of the system, or it can be found by using one of the methods to use anticipation variables.

Forecasts are made on the basis of several different sets of parameters and fiscal policies over the forecasting period. Usually a preferred forecast. The forecasts for the second and third quarters of 1967 and for the first quarter of 1968 are exogenous values which, according to the model builders, include those values for the second quarter, 1967, and are considered to be the best estimate at the time. There were several forecasts made in the fourth quarter of 1967, but only one was a "serious forecast"—the one we used for the second quarter, 1968 through the third quarter, 1968, designated as preferred forecasts internally and published publicly.)

The methods employed here are similar to those we used in the previous chapter. Since there are nonlinearities in the model, the forecasts are obtained by using the structural form, not the reduced form. The endogenous variables are classified into two groups: those of endogenous variables that are determined by the model alone are obtained as soon as the forecasts of the other endogenous variables that are determined by the model are obtained. For the other current endogenous variable, the Gauss-Seidel iterative method. After the forecasts of the other endogenous variables are estimated, the forecasts of the current endogenous variable are determined by identities and not used in the model.

Used

The errors² discussed here carry the same

definitions as in the previous chapter. The first four sets of forecasts (*OR*, *AR*, *GG*, and *NO*) are generated via different kinds of constant adjustments, and the last three sets (naive 1, naive 2, and *Auto*), directly from data.

To review briefly: the *OR* forecast is the model forecast with the constant adjustments originally used by the model builders; the *AR* and *GG* forecasts are the model forecasts with the mechanical adjustments described on p. 9; the *NO* forecast is the one produced by the model without the use of any constant adjustments; the naive 1 method uses the observed value in the jump-off quarter to forecast all four quarters ahead, while the naive 2 method uses the actual change in the jump-off quarter to predict the future change; and, finally, the autoregressive scheme uses four weighted lags to predict the variable in the current quarter. The implicit weights allocated to the various past values are determined by the regression of the current variable on its own lagged values in the past four quarters.

Notes on Forecast versus Realization Tables

These tables (see pp. 296–307) are similar to the Wharton forecast versus realization tables. They cover the OBE forecasts from the second quarter, 1967 to the third quarter, 1969. However, because the ex ante OBE forecast for the second quarter of 1967 covered only three quarters, the four-quarters-ahead and one-year-ahead forecasts for that quarter are blank in these tables. In Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, the forecasting error (*FE*) is the difference between the forecast and the realized data; the average absolute forecasting error (*AAFE*) is the arithmetic average of the absolute forecasting errors made in different quarters.³

Comparing the four different kinds of OBE forecasts, we find that, in general, the *NO* forecast has a distinctly larger *AAFE* than the other three in the first two quarters of prediction. As the forecasting span increases to three or four quarters ahead, the *NO AAFE* is almost as small as the *AR* and *GG* errors for some variables, and smaller for others. This indicates that mechanical constant adjustments are important in the first two quarters of forecast but of declining significance as the forecasting period is extended. However, the *OR* constant adjustments yield noticeably smaller errors (especially for the ex ante forecasts) than other

³ The forecast versus realization tables for twelve other variables are in the appendix.

adjustments in the early quarters and marginally smaller errors in the later quarters. This may indicate that judgmental insights play a positive role in forecasting.

In summary, the *OR* forecasts are better and the *NO* forecasts worse than the others for most variables; the *GG* method does as well as the *AR* method in the first two quarters but becomes worse than the *AR* method in the last two quarters of forecasting.

In general, the forecasts of naive 2 and the autoregressive method are almost as good as those generated by the econometric model. The naive 1 (no change) forecasts, however, contain the largest error among the errors shown for most variables. This illustrates that the economy was not stagnant during this period. The naive 2 method gives a relatively small forecasting error in the one-quarter-ahead forecasts. However, as the forecasting quarters extend, the naive 2 forecasts deteriorate because the economy is not growing at a constant rate. For those variables that are mainly trend-dominated, such as *GNP*, *PD*, and some elements in the consumption sector, the naive 2 forecasts are even better than the forecasts with the OBE econometric model. Nevertheless, the inferiority of the naive 2 method is apparent for those variables that fluctuate widely during this period, such as total investment and its components. The autoregressive scheme, on the other hand, predicts the investment sector fairly well, since it captures some of the turning points.

In ex post forecasts, with realized values used for exogenous variables, the forecasting errors for composite variables are due to the errors in the endogenous variables. The total error in *GNP* is the sum of errors in the first-order endogenous components of *GNP*—i.e., total consumption, total investment, and net foreign balance. The errors in total consumption and total investment are the corresponding sums of errors in the consumption and investment components. (However, a trifling difference may be found owing to rounding errors.) Note that in all naive methods the component forecasting errors do not add up to their total. This is so because the projections for aggregate variables are independent of the projections for their components.

The ex ante forecasts are generally better than the ex post forecasts if *OR* constant adjustments are used. The *OR* ex ante forecasts seem to be superior to the *OR* ex post forecasts in the first two quarters. However, with mechanical adjustments or no adjustments at all, the

superiority of ex ante forecasts in the general, the ex ante forecast *AAFES* post *AAFES*. Thus, the errors in g variables do not appear to contribute

6.2 DECOMPOSITION OF FIRST

In presenting a detailed analysis the OBE model we follow a pattern decomposition of Chapter 5.

The Second Quarter, 1968 Forecast

We begin our analysis with the because the information required for earlier forecasts. The U.S. economy quarter: current dollar *GNP* increased billion to \$850.7 billion, and constant rapid growth in *GNP* was mainly due ment sector. Judging from the change tory was accumulating at a \$10.9 investment (*IH*) up \$2.7 billion, decrease investment in plant and equipment a rate of 1.35 per cent a year—slight growth occurred in expenditures on services (*COD* and *CS*); but the and nondurables (*CA* and *CN*) were annually).

The detailed analysis of forecast quarter ahead is presented in Table arrangement as that of the corresponding. It reports on the forecasting errors methods. The first column for each equation residual, adjusted by the second column represents the error in the system through the multiplier for each variable is listed in the third

The ex post forecasting error

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is not growing at a constant rate. For
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sector, the naive 2 forecasts are even
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the projections for their components.
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t forecasts in the first two quarters.
stments or no adjustments at all, the

superiority of ex ante forecasts in the first two quarters disappears. In general, the ex ante forecast *AAFEs* are close to the corresponding ex post *AAFEs*. Thus, the errors in guessing values for the exogenous variables do not appear to contribute any significant net error.

6.2 DECOMPOSITION OF FIRST QUARTER ERROR

In presenting a detailed analysis of the origins of forecasting error in the OBE model we follow a pattern similar to that used in the Wharton decomposition of Chapter 5.

The Second Quarter, 1968 Forecast as an Example

We begin our analysis with the second quarter, 1968 forecast because the information required for decomposition was not available for earlier forecasts. The U.S. economy experienced a rapid growth in this quarter: current dollar *GNP* increased by \$24.2 billion, from \$826.5 billion to \$850.7 billion, and constant dollar *GNP*, by \$12.8 billion. The rapid growth in *GNP* was mainly due to the fast increase in the investment sector. Judging from the change in business inventory (*I*), inventory was accumulating at a \$10.9 billion annual rate, with housing investment (*IH*) up \$2.7 billion, despite a slight drop in total domestic investment in plant and equipment (*ISE*). Consumption expanded at a rate of 1.35 per cent a year—slower than average. Relatively rapid growth occurred in expenditures on durables other than autos and on services (*COD* and *CS*); but the increases in expenditures on autos and nondurables (*CA* and *CN*) were trifling (lower than 0.6 per cent annually).

The detailed analysis of forecasting error in the prediction for one quarter ahead is presented in Table 6.4, which shows a similar arrangement as that of the corresponding table in Chapter 5 (Table 5.11). It reports on the forecasting errors of four different constant adjustment methods. The first column for each variety of adjustment is the structural equation residual, adjusted by the appropriate constant adjustment. The second column represents the error due to the reverberation of all errors in the system through the multiplier effect. Finally, total forecasting error for each variable is listed in the third column.

The ex post forecasting error of *GNP* (line 29) comes from two

nearly independent sources—the error in the real sector (line 25) and the error in prices (line 28). As discussed in the previous chapters, the errors in the real sectors are traced to structural equation residuals and their reverberation. Since all GNP components are measured in constant dollars, the *SERs* for the GNP components are given in constant dollars. In Table 6.4, most of the structural equation residuals in the consumption sector are positive for the equations without adjustment. This means that the forecast components of consumption, except *CA*, would have been too high even if the values of all other variables had been perfectly forecast. After offsetting, however, the net structural equation residual for GNP is only $-\$1.27$ billion (1958 dollars). Multiplying this by the correct price deflator gives the net *SER* on the product side of $-\$1.52$ billion.

The sum of the total error for the GNP components (-1.65) is the forecasting error for *GNP58*. This figure corresponds to the value (-1.50) in the forecasts versus realization table of *GNP58* (Table 6.2), but it does not agree precisely, for two reasons. First, the value in Table 6.4 was calculated by adding the errors in the components, and these are subject to rounding error. The second reason stems from the way the real values for the exogenous values of government spending and exports were calculated. The OBE model calculates these values on the basis of exogenously supplied values for prices and current dollar values of the variables. As explained in footnote 19 of Chapter 1 (p. 16), this method of calculating the realized value will lead to a value slightly different from the one obtained by working with the real series when all realized values are calculated by adding the revised change to preliminary values.

The calculated error in Table 6.4 does not include the discrepancy in the values used for the exogenous variables, even though it would be part of the component approach to finding the error in constant dollar GNP if we wanted to arrive at an exact value.

Since income has been used as an explanatory variable in the consumption functions, the *SER* in income will cause an error in GNP through the impact multiplier. In the OBE model presented in Chapter 2, the marginal propensity to consume is 0.464. A 1 billion dollar error in disposable income will yield a direct error of 0.464 billion in GNP before taking the multiplier effect into account. However, the *SER* on the income side is much more difficult to trace back, because logarithmic and

exponential functions have often been used. The endogenous components of disposable income are decomposed in the decomposition of error tables. Of course, *SIP* and personal taxes (*TPF* and *TA*) enter the income identity negatively.

The total wage bill (*W*) in the OBE model is a compound function of the income identity which includes several endogenous variables. Therefore, the 1968 value is found by looking at the lagged value of the third quarter. This was 0.79 and is used as a proxy for the desired value for two quarters. The value for the third quarter is slightly different from the second, it does not include the effect of the statistical discrepancy adjustment. In determining the *SER*, the *OTHER* errors are subtracted from the total error.

The endogenous variables are the errors in income (*PRI*) and dividend income (*DI*). The *OTHER* errors of these two variables are subtracted from the other GNP components. The difference between *TOTAL* and *OTHER* errors is relatively small. This method of calculation is used wherever feasible because it is simpler than the proxy system used for *W* above.

The only endogenous variable in the income identity (*TRP*) is the state employment in the private sector for *TRU* is in logarithmic form. The error in *TRP* is negligible. Therefore, we assume that the error is zero, which makes it possible to subtract -0.24 from the *SER*.

In the personal contributions to the total wage bill, old age insurance (*TSSW*) is an endogenous variable. It is contributed by employees, the *SER* in *TSSW* is contributed by employees, the *SER* in *TSSW*, and, since the *TSSW* error in the income identity (*TSSW*) is merely approximated, the error in *TSSW* (0.22) is merely approximated by cutting this approximation from the total error.

The federal and state and local income taxes are functions of the same tax base. The

error in the real sector (line 25) and the
 ssed in the previous chapters, the errors
 structural equation residuals and their
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 to trace back, because logarithmic and

exponential functions have often been used to define income elements. The endogenous components of disposable income are also listed in the decomposition of error tables. Of course, social security contributions (*SIP*) and personal taxes (*TPF* and *TPSL*) have negative signs, since they enter the income identity negatively.

The total wage bill (*W*) in the OBE model is also determined by an identity which includes several endogenous variables defined by a compound function. Therefore, the *SER* of *W* for the second quarter of 1968 is found by looking at the lagged *SERs* for the forecast made in the third quarter. This was 0.79 and is used as a proxy for the *SER* for *W*. It is a proxy for the desired value for two reasons: first, the data set for the third quarter is slightly different from that for the second quarter, and second, it does not include the effect of any adjustment due to the statistical discrepancy adjustment (see p. A36 in the appendix). After determining the *SER*, the *OTHER* error (3.85) is easily obtained by subtracting the *SER* from the total error in *W* in that quarter.

The endogenous variables enter the equations for proprietors' income (*PRI*) and dividend income (*DIV*) in a linear form. Thus, the *OTHER* errors of these two variables are calculated in the same way as for the other GNP components. The *SERs* are simply the difference between *TOTAL* and *OTHER* errors. Both of them are negative and relatively small. This method of calculation yields the desired value and is used wherever feasible because it does not involve the shortcomings of the proxy system used for *W* above.

The only endogenous variable in the identity of transfer payments (*TRP*) is the state employment insurance benefits (*TRU*). The equation for *TRU* is in logarithmic form. Fortunately, the *TOTAL* error in *TRU* is negligible. Therefore, we assume that the *OTHER* error of *TRP* is zero, which makes it possible to attribute the forecasting error of -0.24 to the *SER*.

In the personal contributions for social insurance (*SIP*) identity, only old age insurance (*TSSW*) is an endogenous variable. Since half of *TSSW* is contributed by employees, the *SER* of *SIP* is equal to half of the *SER* for *TSSW*, and, since the *TSSW* equation is in logarithmic form, the *SER* of *TSSW* (0.22) is merely approximated. Thus, the *SER* for *SIP* is obtained by cutting this approximate *SER* in half.

The federal and state and local personal taxes (*TPF* and *TPSL*) are functions of the same tax base. The three endogenous variables in this

base are labor income, proprietors' income, and dividends (*W*, *PRI*, and *DIV*). Summing the forecasting errors for these three variables and multiplying the sum by the appropriate parameters in the equations gives the *OTHER* error for *TPF* and *TPSL*—1.10 and 0.16. The *SER* is then obtained by subtracting the *OTHER* errors from *TOTAL* errors.

Since three of the seven income components are determined by identities, the exact constant adjustment used for each cannot be found. Therefore, we have to repeat the effort just described to find the accurate *SER - CON* for every adjustment forecast. It is obvious that the *SERs* on the income side are almost completely offset by each other. The total *SER* is only -0.02 for the *NO* case. This total *SER* of disposable income times the marginal propensity to consume (0.464) gives the net effect on GNP from the income side (-0.01). By adding up the net *SER* effects from the income side and the demand side, we obtain the total *SER* effect in GNP (-1.53). This *SER* effect produces additional effects on GNP through the multiplier. Since we did not have the resources to run simulations with the OBE model, we were not able to find the exact multipliers, and used multipliers found in another study as proxies.⁴ The approximate multiplier for exogenous disturbances is 1.16. Therefore, the total *SER* effect will produce an additional 16 per cent error, or -0.24 , in GNP. The total error in the real sector is the forecasting error in *GNP58* (-1.50) times the correct price deflator (1.21), or -1.82 . Thus, the residual (-0.05) is the error not decomposed by our analysis.

The forecasting error in GNP comes from the errors in forecasting real GNP and prices. The direct error due to incorrect price forecasts is the product of error in the GNP price deflator and in constant dollar GNP. The error in the GNP price deflator is obtained by subtracting the ratio of realized GNP to realized *GNP58* from the ratio of forecast GNP to forecast *GNP58*. This error is 0.015. Multiplying it by the realized *GNP58* gives the total price effect of \$3.47 billion. The error from the real sectors and the error from prices in the *NO* forecast carry opposite signs and therefore have an offsetting effect on each other; the total ex post error for GNP is only \$1.65 billion.

The *OR* constant adjustments used for the GNP components are so

⁴ See George Green, "Multiplier Paths and Business Cycles: A Simulation Approach," presented at the North American meetings of the Econometric Society, Evanston, Illinois, December 28, 1968.

well determined that they have great consumption and investment sectors — *CON* in GNP. The *GG* constant adjustments in reducing the *SER* — they have created offsetting errors constant adjustments is especially evident adjustments yield a large total *SER* offsetting effect does not extend to model.

It seems that none of the constant adjustments reducing the *SER* on the income side disposable income is larger than the application of any set of constant adjustments — *CON* on GNP are -1.53 , -2.69 , *NO*, *AR*, *GG*, and *OR* methods. The *NO* is inferior for this forecast, but the *GG* is larger undecomposed error (2.47). The "decomposed" is mainly due to the *GG* than product and income sectors. The constant adjustments perform poorly for the positive error offsets the large negative *CON*, and generates a small positive

In the price sector the constant adjustments significantly. Good results are found when applied. The errors in prices for *NO*, *AR*, and *GG* are -0.46 , 2.25, and 0.91, respectively.

However, the size of the total component errors as well as the net offsetting effect reduces total ex post predictions.

In this forecast the total error is substantial due to underestimation of exogenous variables. The error made in policy adjustments reverberating to a total error of -3.46 comes from the other exogenous error of -2.1 , and housing expenditure exogenous variables is reinforced from exogenous prices. Fortunately

rs' income, and dividends (*W*, *PRI*, and errors for these three variables and appropriate parameters in the equations gives *PSL*—1.10 and 0.16. The *SER* is then *SER* errors from *TOTAL* errors.

Income components are determined by adjustment used for each cannot be found. effort just described to find the accurate nt forecast. It is obvious that the *SERs* completely offset by each other. The *NO* case. This total *SER* of disposable density to consume (0.464) gives the ome side (−0.01). By adding up the side and the demand side, we obtain 1.53). This *SER* effect produces addi- the multiplier. Since we did not have s with the OBE model, we were not rs, and used multipliers found in an- approximate multiplier for exogenous the total *SER* effect will produce an −0.24, in *GNP*. The total error in the or in *GNP58* (−1.50) times the cor- .82. Thus, the residual (−0.05) is the ilysis.

P comes from the errors in forecasting error due to incorrect price forecasts is ice deflator and in constant dollar *GNP*. or is obtained by subtracting the ratio of *B* from the ratio of forecast *GNP* to 0.015. Multiplying it by the realized ct of \$3.47 billion. The error from the rices in the *NO* forecast carry opposite tting effect on each other; the total ex billion.

s used for the *GNP* components are so

s and Business Cycles: A Simulation Approach," s of the Econometric Society, Evanston, Illinois.

well determined that they have greatly reduced the *SER* — *CON* in the consumption and investment sectors and produced a smaller total *SER* — *CON* in *GNP*. The *GG* constant adjustments are not as good as the *OR* adjustments in reducing the *SER* — *CONs* of the *GNP* components, but they have created offsetting errors. The offsetting effect of the *AR* constant adjustments is especially evident in total investment, but the *AR* adjustments yield a large total *SER* — *CON* in *GNP* because the offsetting effect does not extend to offsets among the sectors of the model.

It seems that none of the constant adjustment methods help in reducing the *SER* on the income side. The total *SER* — *CON* in disposable income is larger than it is for *NO* adjustment with the application of any set of constant adjustments. The total effects of *SER* — *CON* on *GNP* are −1.53, −2.69, −1.73, and −1.57 with respect to *NO*, *AR*, *GG*, and *OR* methods, respectively. The *AR* adjustment is inferior for this forecast, but the *OR* method produces a significantly larger undecomposed error (2.47). Since we know that the "error not decomposed" is mainly due to the *SER* of endogenous variables in other than product and income sectors, this indicates that the *OR* constant adjustments perform poorly for those variables. Nevertheless, this large positive error offsets the large negative error due to the total *SER* — *CON*, and generates a small positive error (0.65) in the real sector.

In the price sector the constant adjustments reduce the errors significantly. Good results are found when *AR* and *OR* adjustments are applied. The errors in prices for the four different methods are 3.47, −0.46, 2.25, and 0.91, respectively, for *NO*, *AR*, *GG*, and *OR*.

However, the size of the total error depends on offsetting among component errors as well as on the size of component errors. This offsetting effect reduces total ex post error for *GNP* in the *NO* and *GG* predictions.

In this forecast the total effect of judgmental error is quite substantial due to underestimation in all three categories of exogenous variables. The error made in policy variables is relatively small (−0.30), reverberating to a total error of −0.37 in *GNP*. The most severe error (−3.46) comes from the other exogenous variables. Total export has an error of −2.1, and housing expenditure (*CH*), of −0.46. The error in other exogenous variables is reinforced by another negative error of −1.79 from exogenous prices. Fortunately, the negative judgmental error is

partly offset by the positive total error in endogenous variables in the *NO*, *OR*, and *GG* forecasts. This brings the ex ante GNP errors for these three forecasts in line with each other. Nevertheless, the ex ante forecasting errors for the *AR* results are large and negative, since the errors in both the endogenous and exogenous sectors are negative. In this quarter, the absolute ex ante error for GNP is greater than the ex post error in absolute value in all four different forecasts.

This first quarter error decomposition can be compared with the Wharton results (Table 5.11). This comparison reveals that the similarity in the ex ante *OR* and *AR* errors for *GNP* (-4.08 versus -4.10 and -10.73 versus -9.34) is not reflected in similar ex post results where the *OR* error is 1.56 for OBE and -2.85 for Wharton. The *AR* values are -3.76 versus -9.53 . The *NO* error in Wharton is much larger for disposable income and for the net foreign balance sectors, but the Wharton performance is superior for the consumption and investment sectors.

The Third Quarter, 1968 Forecast

The U.S. economy followed a fairly rapid growth pattern in the third quarter of 1968: total consumption rose \$9.2 billion from its previous level, domestic investment increased \$1.0 billion, and exports expanded \$2.7 billion. GNP rose by 7.0 billion 1958 dollars, whereas the total GNP price deflator increased at a moderate 1.5 per cent annual rate.

In this quarter the OBE team used an anticipation version of the OBE model for forecasting. In Table 6.5, the ex post error in *GNP* is -15.44 if no constant adjustments are used. This large, negative error is due to simultaneous underestimation in both the real sector and prices. In the real sector, the large structural equation residuals came mainly from the product side. The total of the *SERs* for the GNP components in terms of current dollars is -8.38 . After reinforcement by the effect of -3.41 from the income side, there is a total *SER* effect of -9.96 . In the GNP components, the large *SERs* are found in auto and nondurables consumption (*CA* and *CN*). If single equations had been used during this quarter the OBE model would have underestimated the fast increase in automobile consumption by \$7.16 billion (1958 dollars) and overestimated the growth of nondurables consumption by \$3.89 billion (1958 dollars). This indicates that consumers changed

The Decomposition of Forecasting

their consumption pattern from nondurables. The effect of this shift is not fully reflected because of error cancellation. Although the effect in this quarter, reducing the growth rate, is evidently not reflected in reduced consumption, the underestimate of consumption also occurs in the price sector (as shown in Table 5.12.) The negative effect on the general price level was rising faster than the growth rate.

Errors from all sectors, excluding investment, were substantially reduced by constant adjustments improved the forecast of consumption. Reducing the ex post error in *GNP* to a level similar to that for *OR*, and the *GG* error to a level similar to the *AR* forecast has the largest error.

The ex ante forecasts in this quarter are similar to the ex post forecasts (Table 6.5), as the exogenous prices nearly counterbalance the errors in the endogenous and other exogenous variables. The nonlinearities of the model are not significant, although noticeable—at 0.43—in the *OR* results. The error is about equal to the nonlinear effect.

The Wharton and OBE first quarter 1968 show striking similarities. Both have large negative *SERs* in the investment sector, an underestimate of GNP. There is strong evidence that the response to the temporary surtax is regarded as permanent.

The Fourth Quarter, 1968 Forecast

Here the OBE forecasting team used a model that had treated total consumption as an endogenous variable for forecasting. Investment (*ISE*) was again composed of two variables. The inventory equations were changed into two parts: a change in inventory (*IINA*).

In this quarter the demand for

total error in endogenous variables in the *NO*, giving the ex ante GNP errors for these three. Nevertheless, the ex ante forecasting error is large and negative, since the errors in the endogenous sectors are negative. In this quarter the error for GNP is greater than the ex post error for our different forecasts.

This decomposition can be compared with the decomposition for *OR*. This comparison reveals that the similarity of errors for *GNP* (-4.08 versus -4.10 and -2.85 for Wharton). The *AR* values are reflected in similar ex post results where the *NO* error in Wharton is much larger for the net foreign balance sectors, but the error is smaller for the consumption and investment

Forecast

experienced a fairly rapid growth pattern in the third quarter. Consumption rose \$9.2 billion from its second quarter level, investment increased \$1.0 billion, and exports rose \$1.0 billion. GNP rose by 7.0 billion 1958 dollars, and the GNP deflator increased at a moderate 1.5 percent.

As in the first quarter, we have used an anticipation version of the model. In Table 6.5, the ex post error in *GNP* is -4.08 when the *NO* forecasts are used. This large, negative error is due to the overestimation in both the real sector and prices. The structural equation residuals came mainly from the *SERs* for the *GNP* components. The error for *GNP* is -8.38 . After reinforcement by the effect of the tax surcharge on the other side, there is a total *SER* effect of -4.30 . The large *SERs* are found in auto and *CN*. If single equations had been used, the *NO* model would have underestimated consumption by \$7.16 billion (1958 dollars). This indicates that consumers changed

their consumption pattern from nondurables to automobiles. The effect of this shift is not fully reflected in the total consumption error because of error cancellation. Although the tax surcharge took effect in this quarter, reducing the growth of disposable income, it was evidently not reflected in reduced consumption of automobiles. (This underestimate of consumption also occurs in the Wharton forecast, as shown in Table 5.12.) The negative total price effect indicates that the general price level was rising faster than expected.

Errors from all sectors, excluding the errors not decomposed, were substantially reduced by constant adjustments. In general, the *OR* adjustments improved the forecast over the *NO* adjustment case by reducing the ex post error in *GNP* to -8.61 . The *AR* result is very similar to that for *OR*, and the *GG* error is relatively bigger. However, the *AR* forecast has the largest error not decomposed.

The ex ante forecasts in this quarter are generally about the same as the ex post forecasts (Table 6.5), as the positive error caused by the exogenous prices nearly counterbalances the small errors made in policy and other exogenous variables. The discrepancies generated by the nonlinearity of the model are not significant in the *AR* and *GG* results, but noticeable—at 0.43—in the *OR* result. This surprisingly large difference is about equal to the nonlinear effect for the Wharton model (5.12).

The Wharton and OBE first quarter forecasts for the third quarter of 1968 show striking similarities. Both models, whether adjusted or not, have large negative *SERs* in the consumption sectors, causing an underestimate of GNP. There is strong evidence that consumers did not respond to the temporary surtax as they had in the past to tax changes regarded as permanent.

The Fourth Quarter, 1968 Forecast

Here the OBE forecasting team switched back to the version of their model that had treated total investment in plant and equipment as an endogenous variable for forecasting. Thus, nonresidential fixed investment (*ISE*) was again completely determined by predetermined variables. The inventory equations used for the model split the total inventory change into two parts: automobile (*I/A*) and nonautomobile (*I/NA*).

In this quarter the demand for all consumer goods was declining,

and so were exports and imports. However, current dollar GNP increased by 16.1 billion because of the fast expansion in investment and government expenditures. Total investment in plant and equipment rose \$2.72 billion, and inventory accumulated at a rate of \$10.5 billion per year. State and local government expenditures advanced a formidable \$3.1 billion, while federal government expenditure increased by \$0.9 billion.

The model underestimated all of the fast-growing sectors and significantly overestimated the consumption and import sectors. There was an ex post error of -7.33 in *GNP* where no constant adjustments were used. Among the individual structural equation residuals, large values were found in auto and nondurables consumption, nonresidential fixed investment, and imports (*CA*, *CN*, *ISE*, and *IMT*). The *SER* in disposable income was also relatively small and positive. The *SERs* in the income and demand sectors together had an effect of -5.03 before reverberating through the model. This effect, as well as the error not decomposed (1.98), and the price effect (-3.48) generated a -7.33 error in *GNP*.

All three types of constant adjustments improved the forecasting ability of the model. The most significant improvement was found in the *OR* results. The *AR* and *GG* results were similar, except for the price error, where the *AR* adjustments proved better, and the error in the real sectors, where the *GG* adjustments showed better results.

Among exogenous variables, a large error was found in policy variables. The OBE forecasters misjudged government expenditures by -1.4 , and transfer payments, by -1.0 . These judgmental errors alone generated a -2.93 error in the ex ante forecast of *GNP*. The error made in the other exogenous variables almost offsets the error in the exogenous prices. Therefore, the ex ante error in *GNP* is -10.30 in the *NO* forecast. The Wharton *NO* error (Table 5.12) is larger than OBE, as usual. The *OR* ex post results for *GNP* are similar (-2.93 for OBE versus -3.53 for Wharton), but the *OR* ex ante results for *GNP* are different (-6.03 for OBE versus -2.80 for Wharton). It is interesting to note that the incorrect guesses in the exogenous variables came from different sources in the forecasts.

The First Quarter, 1969 Forecast

In this quarter the general economy was still on a fast growth

course, but moved at a decreasing rate. The price level in dollars increased at the same rate in the previous quarter, but real GNP rose at a rate of 1.5% in the price level. This occurred because of a large increase in investment and fixed investment. Total investment gained half a billion dollars compared to the previous quarter. Fixed investment advanced \$2.1 billion, a moderate increase in consumer durables, and a billion increase in consumption. Total GNP rose only \$5.9 billion. Large increases in consumer durables other than autos and non-durable trade activities declined sharply with both exports and imports of the previous quarter. In the government budget, however, expenditures increased by \$3.7 billion.

In the forecast made in the previous quarter, the version of investment was used for the forecast. It performed well without constant adjustments. It underestimated auto consumption, overestimated nondurables consumption, and constant adjustments had been used for the decrease in inventory change. The forecast of the GNP components was on target. Consumption, nondurables consumption, and inventory investment (*CA*, *CN*, and *ISE*) were reduced in the structural equation residuals. This reduced the structural equation residuals in the forecasts. However, this set of adjustments reduced the opportunity cost of capital (*CONs*) in GNP components. The error in the forecast rose to -3.60 in the *OR* results. The forecast did not perform as well as the *OR* results, but significantly reduced the error.

On the income side, the forecast of the components of the wage identity, *SERs*, was adjusted by the marginal propensity to consume. The effect of the *SERs* was adjusted by the marginal propensity to consume constant adjustments, except the

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However, current dollar GNP increased fast expansion in investment and investment in plant and equipment rose multiplied at a rate of \$10.5 billion per expenditures advanced a formidable investment expenditure increased by \$0.9

all of the fast-growing sectors and consumption and import sectors. There GNP where no constant adjustments structural equation residuals, large durables consumption, nonresidential CA, CN, ISE, and IMT). The SER in relatively small and positive. The SERs together had an effect of -5.03 model. This effect, as well as the price effect (-3.48) generated

adjustments improved the forecasting significant improvement was found in the results were similar, except for the price improved better, and the error in the forecasts showed better results.

a large error was found in policy misjudged government expenditures by -1.0. These judgmental errors alone ex ante forecast of GNP. The error variables almost offsets the error in the ex ante error in GNP is -10.30 in error (Table 5.12) is larger than OBE. for GNP are similar (-2.93 for OBE the OR ex ante results for GNP are -2.80 for Wharton). It is interesting to the exogenous variables came from

at
economy was still on a fast growth

course, but moved at a decreasing growth rate. Gross national product in dollars increased at the same annual rate (16.2) as in the last quarter, but real GNP rose at a slower rate, producing a faster rise in the price level. This occurred mainly because the prices of housing investment and fixed investment went up rapidly. Housing investment gained half a billion dollars compared with the previous quarter, while fixed investment advanced \$2.1 billion, to a level of \$79.4 billion. The moderate increase in consumer prices was associated with a \$5.3 billion increase in consumption even though disposable income rose only \$5.9 billion. Large increases were found in expenditures on durables other than autos and on nondurables (COD and CN). Foreign trade activities declined sharply in this quarter due to a dock strike, with both exports and imports down over 3 billion dollars from the previous quarter. In the government sector, there was a \$0.3 billion cut in the federal budget. However, state and local government expenses increased by \$3.7 billion.

In the forecast made in the first quarter of 1969, the anticipation version of investment was used for the first quarter forecast. The model performed well without constant adjustments in general, but would have underestimated auto consumption (CA) by 5.5 billion dollars and overestimated nondurables consumption (CN) by 5.7 billion if no constant adjustments had been used. In addition, it failed to predict the decrease in inventory change. The total SER effect in current dollars in the GNP components was only 2.77. For three equations—auto consumption, nondurables consumption, and change in nonauto inventory investment (CA, CN, and IINA)—the OR constant adjustments reduced the structural equation residuals substantially and led to better forecasts. However, this set of adjustments overadjusted the import sector and reduced the opportunity to offset some of the negative SER - CONs in GNP components. Therefore, the total SER - CON effect rose to -3.60 in the OR results. The mechanical adjustments did not perform as well as the OR adjustments in the individual equations, but significantly reduced the SER - CON for GNP as a whole.

On the income side, there is a large negative SER in the components of the wage identity, but it is partially offset by other positive SERs. The effect of the SERs from the income side, after they are adjusted by the marginal propensity to consume, is only -0.31. All constant adjustments, except the AR adjustment, reduce the SERs.

However, offsetting is also increased by the *AR* adjustments. The total effects due to *SER* - *CONs* are 2.66, -0.26, 0.20, and -4.41 with respect to four different sets of adjustments. The errors in the real sector which cannot be traced back to their origins are quite small.

The judgmental errors made in policy variables are relatively large. The error in government expenditures (-1.1) and in transfer payments (-0.8) reverberate to a total of -2.31. The largest error occurs in the other exogenous variables, caused by the forecaster's incorrect guess that exports would increase by \$0.6 billion, when they actually decreased by \$3.0 billion (due to an unforeseen dock strike during this quarter). The import equations also reflect this in the adjusted forecasts, as do the import and export functions in the Wharton model (Table 5.14). Errors in other nonpolicy exogenous variables are responsible for a total induced error of 7.45 from the nonpolicy exogenous variables, but this is offset by an error in exogenous prices, leaving a net induced error of 3.58 due to the bad guesses on the exogenous variables. Since this net error is about equal to the net error in the import equations and both can be ascribed to the dock strike, this may explain why the ex ante *OR* forecast is superior to the ex post *OR* forecast in this case. The same explanation for the superior *OR* ex ante forecast for Wharton (Table 5.14) would not be valid because there both exports and imports are determined endogenously. It is interesting to note that the substantial negative *SERs* in the Wharton consumption and investment equations (Table 5.14) do not occur in the corresponding OBE equations.

The Second Quarter, 1969 Forecast

Symptoms of the so-called "growth recession" of 1970 first appeared in the second quarter of 1969. Current dollar GNP increased another 16 billion, but constant dollar GNP advanced only 3.6 billion. Prices in the private sector moved up 1.6 per cent, with large increases in services, nondurables, imports, and nonresidential structures (*PS*, *PN*, *PIM*, and *PIS*). High prices were accompanied by a lack of increase in the consumption sector. Total consumption climbed \$4.0 billion, while disposable income went up \$11.8 billion.

In the investment sector, housing investment started to fall, inventory change was negligible, and total fixed investment increased very slowly. In the foreign sector, after the strike slump, exports

The Decomposition of Forecast

increased 9.5 billion dollars and import expenditures in constant dollars showed a reduction in the federal budget.

In the second quarter, 1969 residuals for auto and nondurables but they have different signs. The investment (*ISE*) generates a huge *SER* gain in imports in this quarter was not entered the GNP error with a net *SER* of *ISE*. Total *SER* on the price method did very well in reducing to capture the large *SER* in nonwrong adjustment of durables exports in the consumption sector. In the adjustments would obviously not reduce adjustments are based on the price. Since the sudden increase in imports strike, it left no clues in the price also missed the *SER* of *ISE*, but

The total *SER* on the income by the mechanical adjustments but less, the error not decomposed is used than in the no adjustment case respect to the four forecasts are price sector, the model, even with underestimated the increase in price overadjusted for the price error, consistently for three quarters.

The judgmental errors in the in this forecast. In policy variables estimated transfer payments by government expenditures by \$0.2 of -1.34 in GNP as a whole after. The judgmental errors made in causing a \$3.30 billion error in the OBE group did very well: the sum of total judgmental error is port error in the *NO* and *OR*

increased by the *AR* adjustments. The total errors are 2.66, -0.26, 0.20, and -4.41 with the *OR* adjustments. The errors in the real sector are close to their origins are quite small. Errors in policy variables are relatively large. Errors in government expenditures (-1.1) and in transfer payments (-2.31). The largest error occurs in the real sector caused by the forecaster's incorrect guess of government expenditures (\$0.6 billion, when they actually decreased because of a dock strike during this quarter). The errors in the adjusted forecasts, as do the errors in the Wharton model (Table 5.14). Errors in policy variables are responsible for a total induced error of 3.58 due to errors in exogenous variables, but this is offset by errors in policy variables leaving a net induced error of 3.58 due to errors in policy variables. Since this net error is about the same as the error in the Wharton model, it can be ascribed to errors in the Wharton model. The same explanation for the Wharton forecast in this case. The same explanation for the Wharton forecast for Wharton (Table 5.14) would apply to the errors in exports and imports are determined by the errors in the Wharton model. It is to note that the substantial negative errors in the Wharton model in the consumption and investment equations (Table 5.14) are due to the corresponding OBE equations.

recast

The "growth recession" of 1970 first appeared in the second quarter of 1969. Current dollar GNP increased 1.6 per cent, with large increases in government expenditures, imports, and nonresidential structures. High prices were accompanied by a lack of growth in the real sector. Total consumption climbed 1.6 per cent, with some going up \$11.8 billion. Government expenditures started to fall, and total fixed investment increased 1.6 per cent. After the strike slump, exports

increased 9.5 billion dollars and imports increased 8.6 billion. Government expenditures in constant dollars fell by 0.4 billion as a result of the reduction in the federal budget.

In the second quarter, 1969 forecast, the structural equation residuals for auto and nondurables consumption (*CA* and *CN*) are large, but they have different signs. The endogenous equation for fixed investment (*ISE*) generates a huge *SER* (-8.9). However, since the rapid gain in imports in this quarter was missed by the model, and import error entered the GNP error with a negative sign, this offset the negative *SER* of *ISE*. Total *SER* on the product side was only 3.15. The *OR* method did very well in reducing the total *SER* even though it failed to capture the large *SER* in nondurables expenditure (*CN*), since a wrong adjustment of durables expenditure (*CD*) offset the *SER* of *CN* in the consumption sector. In the import sector, the *AR* and *GG* adjustments would obviously not reduce the *SER* because the mechanical adjustments are based on the *SERs* in the two previous quarters. Since the sudden increase in imports was due to the end of the dock strike, it left no clues in the previous residuals. The *GG* adjustment also missed the *SER* of *ISE*, but provided better offsets among *SERs*.

The total *SER* on the income side is not really large; it was reduced by the mechanical adjustments but not the *OR* adjustments. Nevertheless, the error not decomposed is larger when constant adjustments are used than in the no adjustment case. The errors in the real sector with respect to the four forecasts are 2.60, 7.03, 6.11, and -0.09. In the price sector, the model, even with the subjective adjustments, again underestimated the increase in prices in this quarter. The *AR* method overadjusted for the price error, since price had been underestimated consistently for three quarters.

The judgmental errors in the exogenous variables are not serious in this forecast. In policy variables set, the OBE forecasters underestimated transfer payments by \$1.3 billion and overestimated government expenditures by \$0.2 billion, generating a negative error of -1.34 in GNP as a whole after reverberation through the system. The judgmental errors made in other exogenous variables were 2.70, causing a \$3.30 billion error in GNP. In predicting exogenous prices, the OBE group did very well: the total error in price is only -0.2. The sum of total judgmental error is 1.76. This offsets the negative export error in the *NO* and *OR* forecasts but reinforces the positive

ex post error in the *AR* and *GG* forecasts. Therefore, the ex ante errors are smaller than the ex post errors in the *NO* and *OR* forecasts, but not in the *AR* and *GG* forecasts.

The ex post *OR* errors for Wharton and OBE are nearly the same: -1.93 and -2.64 , respectively. In both cases the error not decomposed and the *SERs* in individual sectors (excluding the consumption and disposable income sectors) have the same signs. The *NO* adjustment error for Wharton is larger than for OBE. This is due to Wharton's sizable negative errors in the consumption sector, as well as the smaller offsetting error in the imports sector.

The Third Quarter, 1969 Forecast

Economic expansion came to a halt in the third quarter of 1969. Gross national product continued growing at a rate of \$18.0 billion per year owing to price increases. However, real consumption and overall investment increased only \$0.5 billion, and total government expenditures actually decreased \$0.8 billion from the level of the previous quarter. Business inventories rose at an annual rate of \$9.3 billion.

During this slow growth period the constant dollar gross national product was overestimated by the model. The sum of the single equation residuals for GNP is 5.78, and it is equal to 7.46 in current dollars (see Table 6.9). However, the model underestimated the income variables. The total *SER* of disposable income had an effect of -2.57 on total GNP. After offsets from the product side, the total effect of the *SERs* after reverberation was 5.17. Different constant adjustments did reduce the *SER* on both the product and the income side, the *OR* adjustments proving superior to the mechanical adjustments.

The model also underestimated the endogenous price sector. This underestimation was reduced by the constant adjustments. Due to the lack of cancellation, the *AR* and *GG* results are worse than that of *NO*. The *OR* result is superior to the other three.

The upward judgmental error in policy variables is due mainly to the overestimation of local and state government expenditures. The downward judgmental error in other exogenous variables stems from the -2.7 error made in exports. The forecasters also underpredicted the growth in

The Decomposition of Forecasts

exogenous price. On the whole, OBE significantly reduced the ex ante errors.

All of the first quarter OBE forecasts for 1969 were superior to their Wharton counterparts. The superior OBE performance can be seen in the inventory sector, especially the inventory errors. OBE errors amount to only a fraction of the Wharton errors.

6.3 FOUR-QUARTER FORECASTS

Our procedure in isolating the values for the lagged variables is that used in Chapter 5. However, the results at OBE are superior to those at Wharton and the difference between any two forecasts is smaller than in the case of Wharton.

The charts for multiperiod forecasts (see Table 6.35)—cover all of the forecasts to the fourth quarter of 1968. The charts in Chapter 5, show the *NO*, *AR*, and *OR* forecasts, the actual time path for each variable, and the residuals which are presented for comparison.

The first four charts illustrate the results of the four forecasts made from the second quarter of 1968. A detailed analysis of the results shows that we do not have the decomposition of the errors into tables covering this period. In general, the forecasts are relatively well for GNP, consumption, and investment forecasts. Since consumption and disposable income determines the time paths for each forecast, the forecasts produced by using different constants are very similar. In general, the *NO* forecasts are the lowest. The accumulated forecasting errors in the third quarter are larger than those in the first quarter.

forecasts. Therefore, the ex ante errors in the *NO* and *OR* forecasts,

Wharton and OBE are nearly the same. In both cases the error not individual sectors (excluding the consumption sectors) have the same signs. The error is larger than for OBE. This is due to the error in the consumption sector, as well as in the imports sector.

There was a halt in the third quarter of 1969. Real consumption was growing at a rate of \$18.0 billion per quarter. However, real consumption and real government expenditures were \$0.5 billion, and total government expenditures were \$0.8 billion from the level of the first quarter. Exports rose at an annual rate of \$9.3 billion.

Under the constant dollar gross national product model. The sum of the single errors is 8, and it is equal to 7.46 in current dollars. Under the model underestimated the income effect of disposable income had an effect of 5.17. Different constant adjustments on both the product and the income side are superior to the mechanical ad-

justments in the endogenous price sector. This is due to the constant adjustments. Due to the error in the *G* results are worse than that of *NO*. The error in the other three.

The error in policy variables is due mainly to the error in government expenditures. The downward bias in the endogenous variables stems from the -2.7 percentage points. The errors also underpredicted the growth in

exogenous price. On the whole, only the *OR* constant adjustment has significantly reduced the ex ante error of *GNP*.

All of the first quarter OBE forecasts made in the third quarter of 1969 were superior to their Wharton counterparts (Table 5.16). The superior OBE performance can be traced primarily to the investment sector, especially the inventory equations within that sector. Here the OBE errors amount to only a fraction of the underestimates by Wharton.

6.3 FOUR-QUARTER FORECASTS

Our procedure in isolating the error due to incorrectly predicted values for the lagged variables in multiperiod forecasts is similar to that used in Chapter 5. However, model changes were more frequent at OBE than at Wharton and therefore contributed more to the difference between any two forecasts of the same quarter than they did in the case of Wharton.

The charts for multiperiod forecasts—Charts 6.1–6.7 (pp. 329–335)—cover all of the forecasts from the second quarter of 1967 to the fourth quarter of 1968. The charts, arranged like those in Chapter 5, show the *NO*, *AR*, and *OR* ex post forecasts for nine variables, the actual time path for each variable, and the naive I forecasts, which are presented for comparison.

The first four charts illustrate the performance of the multiperiod forecasts made from the second quarter of 1967 through the first quarter of 1968. A detailed analysis of these four forecasts is omitted because we do not have the decomposition of the first quarter forecasting error tables covering this period. In general, the model forecasts performed relatively well for *GNP*, consumption, and income in these first four forecasts. Since consumption is the largest element of *GNP*, and disposable income determines consumption, there are some similarities in the time paths for each forecast of these variables. The forecast values produced by using different constant adjustments show some similarities. In general, the *NO* forecast has the highest values and the *OR* forecast, the lowest. The accumulation of lag effects is not significant in the forecasts for *GNP*, consumption, and disposable income. The forecasting errors in the third and fourth quarters are not necessarily larger than those in the first and second quarters. There are two

possibilities: one, that the effect of lags are not significant, and two, that it is possible that the effect of lags offset a part of the error from other sources.

None of the methods produce good predictions for investment variables. There is no resemblance among the time paths of the three different adjustment forecasts for total investment, mainly because none of the three captured the turning points in inventory change and plant and equipment investment. However, there is no significant error accumulation in the investment variables that can be traced to the effect of lags. The balance of foreign trade is the difference between imports and exports, the latter treated as exogenous to the system. The four-quarter OBE predictions of import variation are not very successful. This may be the reason why the sectors on inventory change, plant and equipment investment, and imports were often revised during this period.

We can compare the Wharton and OBE forecasts for the second quarter of 1967 by looking at the two relevant charts—Chart 5.4 for Wharton and Chart 6.1 for OBE. We see that both models tracked *GNP58* fairly well. The Wharton *NO* forecast is the only exception in the first quarter where the persistent underestimate of disposable income shows up. In the investment sector, the model forecasts correspond more to each other than to the realized data. In the third quarter, 1967 forecasts (Charts 5.5 and 6.2, respectively), the predictions for *GNP*, *GNP58*, and consumption are good. However, both models miss the downturn in inventory accumulation (in the first quarter of 1968) and in fixed investment (in the second quarter of 1968). The fourth quarter, 1967 forecast (Charts 5.6 and 6.3, respectively) again reveals a similarity in the behavior of the two models, except for the fourth quarter forecast of inventory accumulation, where Wharton shows a steep decline not predicted in the OBE forecast. The first quarter, 1968 forecast (Charts 5.7 and 6.4) shows this difference in the prediction of inventory change once again, but this time it has, of course, moved to the third quarter. This causes an erroneous prediction by the Wharton model of a sharp downturn in the last part of 1968, compared with an only moderately incorrect forecast by the OBE model of a small dip, during this period of continued expansion in the economy.

The Second Quarter, 1968 Forecast

The time shapes of the multiperiod forecasts generated by the *OR*, *AR*, and *NO* methods in the second quarter of 1968 are shown in Chart

The Decomposition of Forecast

6.5. While it is quite obvious that the forecast gets longer, we are unable to trace the effect of the lags by looking at the diagram. The OBE model estimated the growth of the economy (and the downturn in GNP in the third quarter of 1969), while the actual gross national product fell rapidly. The *OR* and *AR* methods forecast expenditures quite successfully, but for the first quarter of 1969, predicting a sharp downturn started too high in the first quarter of 1969. The OBE overestimate moderated the error in the growth of disposable personal income. The OBE and *AR* any predictions in the second and third quarter. The OBE forecasts predicted a downward turn in income when income was actually moving upward very poorly for the three investment variables. The OBE predict the fluctuations in inventory change and fixed investment. The third and fourth quarter forecasts of *GNP58*. The forecast of imports was close to the actual data. The upward turning point in the fourth quarter of 1968.

In order to detect the lag effect, the forecast made in this quarter is compared with the third quarter of 1968. The third quarter forecast is compared with the first quarter forecast of 1968, and the four-quarters-ahead forecast is compared with the first quarter forecast made in the first quarter of 1968. The difference between these ex post forecasts is shown in Chart 6.5.

The incorrect lags in the two-quarter forecast performance of the second quarter of 1968 increased the forecast error for *IS* and *GNP58*. The OBE improved the average accuracy in the prediction of the positive effect of lags on disposable income. However, the errors in the consumption sector are large. However, the value that appears in the forecast for nondurables consumption expenditure is close to a substantial downward data point in the first quarter of 1968. The overall effect of inventory change on *GNP58* by 0.96.

of lags are not significant, and two, of lags offset a part of the error

to produce good predictions for investment among the time paths of the three total investment, mainly because none of the points in inventory change and plant investment. However, there is no significant error in the variables that can be traced to the effect of the trade is the difference between imports and exports as exogenous to the system. The forecasts of import variation are not very successful. The forecasts on inventory change, plant and investment were often revised during this period. The Wharton and OBE forecasts for the second and third quarters are shown in the two relevant charts—Chart 5.4 for the second quarter. We see that both models tracked the actual data. The *NO* forecast is the only exception in the first quarter, underestimating disposable income. In the second quarter, the model forecasts correspond more closely to the actual data. In the third quarter, 1967 (respectively), the predictions for *GNP*, *GNP* (respectively). However, both models miss the actual data in the first quarter of 1968 and in the second quarter of 1968). The fourth quarter, 1968 (respectively) again reveals a similarity between the two models, except for the fourth quarter forecast. The Wharton model shows a steep decline not seen in the first quarter, 1968 forecast (Charts 5.4 and 5.5) in the prediction of inventory change. The Wharton model, of course, moved to the third quarter. The Wharton model prediction by the Wharton model of a sharp decline in the fourth quarter, compared with an only moderately negative prediction of a small dip, during this period of recession.

cast

period forecasts generated by the *OR*, and the first quarter of 1968 are shown in Chart

6.5. While it is quite obvious that the forecasting errors increase as the forecast gets longer, we are unable to judge just how large the effects of the lags are by looking at the diagram. In general, the model underestimated the growth of the economy. All of the forecasts predicted a downturn in *GNP* in the third quarter of forecast (or the first quarter of 1969), while the actual gross national product continued growing rapidly. The *OR* and *AR* methods forecast the first quarter's consumption expenditures quite successfully, but failed to capture the rapid growth in the first quarter of 1969, predicting a decline instead. The *NO* forecast started too high in the first quarter of forecast for consumption, and this overestimate moderated the error in the following quarters. The fast growth of disposable personal income (*DPI*) was not forecast well by any predictions in the second and third quarters of forecast. All three forecasts predicted a downward turning point in the fourth quarter, when income was actually moving upward. All forecasts performed very poorly for the three investment components. They failed to predict the fluctuations in inventory changes, and completely missed the rapid growth in nonresidential fixed investment (*ISE*). As a result, the third and fourth quarter forecasts of total investment were off track. The forecast of imports was close in the first three quarters, but the upward turning point in the fourth quarter was missed.

In order to detect the lag effect, the two-quarters-ahead forecast made in this quarter is compared with the first quarter forecast made in the third quarter of 1968. The three-quarters-ahead forecast is compared with the first quarter forecast made in the fourth quarter of 1968, and the four-quarters-ahead forecast is compared with the first quarter forecast made in the first quarter of 1969. The differences between these ex post forecasts are listed in Table 6.10.

The incorrect lags in the two-quarters-ahead forecast did not hurt the forecast performance of the second quarter, 1968 model. Their effect increased the forecast error for *ISE* by -1.73 in the *NO* forecast, but improved the average accuracy in the consumption sector. The huge positive effect of lags on disposable income (6.66) should have caused the errors in the consumption sector to show a positive tendency. However, the value that appears in the column on the effect of lags for nondurables consumption expenditure (*CN*) is -2.72 . This is due to a substantial downward data revision of the *CN* series in July 1968. The overall effect of incorrect lags reduced the error in *GNP58* by 0.96.

The effect of lags in the *OR* forecast was to improve the forecasting performance of the model in general. The positive effect of lags in disposable income generated positive effects in most consumption components. The small negative effect in auto expenditures (*CA*) is probably a result of data revision of other determinants of *CA*. The total effect on *GNP58* offset the forecasting error by 3.14.

The effect of lags in the *GG* forecast is not really very significant as far as the GNP error is concerned. The forecasts in the consumption sector are improved but those in the investment sector impaired by the effect of lags. The overall effect on GNP after offsetting is only 0.72, and the effect on disposable income is only 1.83. The *AR* forecast is damaged by the incorrect lags and the continuing constant adjustments.

Consumption behavior in the third quarter of 1968 is predicted better by this second quarter forecast via *OR*, *NO*, and *GG* methods than by the same methods in the forecasts actually made in the third quarter because the effect of lags in these three predictions creates an error that offsets a part of forecasting error from other sources.

The effects of lags in the prediction for three quarters ahead made in the second quarter, 1968 forecast are shown in the center part of Table 6.10. They represent the cumulated effects of the errors made in the first two quarters of forecasting. It is evident in Table 6.10 that the effects of these lags in the consumption sector, except *CN*, are smaller than those in the second quarter of this forecast where no constant adjustments were used. It is likely that there were offsetting effects of incorrect lags from the first to the second quarter, which, however, disappeared when constant adjustments were used. In the investment sector, the lag effects are cumulative. The *OR* adjustment reduces the lag effect in *IH* and *ISE*, but the effects of lags are bigger if the *AR* adjustment is used. Since all lag effects are negative, the total effect due to lags in GNP is -13.00. This negative error reinforced the negative error due to the *SERs* in the second quarter, 1968 forecast.

In general, all variables, except those in the consumption sector, were underestimated in the three-quarters-ahead forecast, which generated negative effects for lags in the four-quarters-ahead forecast. As a result, the underestimation was even more serious in the four-quarters-ahead forecast. The effect of incorrect lags built up to -37.76 in the *NO* forecast. The *OR* adjustment reduced the lag effects slightly, but the *AR*

adjustment increased them significantly. Lags in the *GG* forecast were similar to

The Wharton *OR* and *AR* forecast for the third quarter of 1968 are inferior to the OBE forecast, but show an upturn later than the OBE forecast by the fourth quarter. The main reason is that the Wharton model predicts the deceleration of accumulation two quarters earlier than the OBE, Wharton shows accumulation two quarters earlier than the OBE, but for Wharton it is on the upturn of the OBE.

The differences between the forecasts are caused by the incorrect values of the constants. The effects of these differences are shown in Table 6.11. The OBE forecasters underpredicted the growth in the first two quarters. While this increased the section in the later quarters offset more of the forecasting error, the OBE forecast error smaller than the ex post

The Third Quarter, 1968 Forecast

The multiperiod forecast made in the second quarter of 1968 predicts the path of the economy in the first two quarters of 1969. Chart 6.6 shows the actual path of the economy. Generally speaking, the U.S. economy followed the forecast for these four quarters. Underestimation of the growth rate of most variables, started in the first quarter of 1969, was mainly due to the negative effect of lags in the multiperiod forecast through lags. The underestimation in the first quarter was mainly due to the negative effect of lags in the first quarter. The model predicted a smooth path for most variables were moving up. A sharp decline in the noninvestment variable was predicted in the opposite direction with none of the forecast values even in the first forecast. The constant adjustments were in the correct direction, and the *OR*

forecast was to improve the forecasting general. The positive effect of lags in positive effects in most consumption effect in auto expenditures (*CA*) is of other determinants of *CA*. The total forecasting error by 3.14.

forecast is not really very significant as ed. The forecasts in the consumption the investment sector impaired by the in GNP after offsetting is only 0.72, and is only 1.83. The *AR* forecast is dam- the continuing constant adjustments. he third quarter of 1968 is predicted cast via *OR*, *NO*, and *GG* methods than casts actually made in the third quarter a three predictions creates an error that from other sources.

fiction for three quarters ahead made in t are shown in the center part of Table ed effects of the errors made in the first evident in Table 6.10 that the effects n sector, except *CN*, are smaller than of this forecast where no constant ely that there were offsetting effects o the second quarter, which, however, ustments were used. In the invest- i cumulative. The *OR* adjustment re- *SE*, but the effects of lags are bigger ince all lag effects are negative, the is -13.00. This negative error rein- to the *SERs* in the second quarter.

cept those in the consumption sector, -quarters-ahead forecast, which gener- the four-quarters-ahead forecast. As a ven more serious in the four-quarters- rrect lags built up to -37.76 in the *NO* ced the lag effects slightly, but the *AR*

adjustment increased them significantly. In most variables, the effects of lags in the *GG* forecast were similar to those in the *NO* forecast.

The Wharton *OR* and *AR* forecasts (Chart 5.8) made in the second quarter of 1968 are inferior to the OBE forecasts in the second quarter of forecast, but show an upturn later that makes them superior to the OBE forecast by the fourth quarter. The main difference in the forecast is that the Wharton model predicts the deceleration of the rate of inventory accumulation two quarters earlier than OBE. By the third and fourth quarters, Wharton shows accumulation at about the same rate as that of OBE, but for Wharton it is on the upgrade, whereas it is declining for OBE.

The differences between the ex ante and ex post OBE predictions are caused by the incorrect values for the exogenous variables. The effects of these differences are shown in the last column of Table 6.10. The OBE forecasters underpredicted exogenous variables in the last two quarters. While this increased the second quarter errors, the overprediction in the later quarters offset model errors and made the ex ante forecast error smaller than the ex post error.

The Third Quarter, 1968 Forecast

The multiperiod forecast made in this quarter was designed to predict the path of the economy in the two last quarters of 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969. Chart 6.6 shows that it was not very accurate. Generally speaking, the U.S. economy moved ahead very rapidly during these four quarters. Underestimation in the forecast, found in most variables, started in the first quarter of forecast and became more serious as the forecasting period went on due to a snowballing effect in the multiperiod forecast through lags. The underestimation of the first quarter was mainly due to the negative *SER* - *CONs* shown in Table 6.5. The model predicted a smooth declining path over this year, when most variables were moving up. A false downward turning point was predicted in the noninvestment variables by all model forecasts in the third quarter. In the investment sector, the growth trend of every variable was predicted in the opposite direction of the actual outcome, with none of the forecast values even close to the actual values after the first forecast. The constant adjustments, however, were made in the correct direction, and the *OR* and *AR* forecasts were closer to

reality than the *NO* forecast but still far from successful.

Looking at Table 6.11, it is obvious that the failure of the multiperiod forecast was caused by the cumulated negative effect of lags. This accumulation moved at a faster rate in the second and third quarters than in the fourth quarter. In the second and third quarters of forecast, all constant adjustments reduced the effects of lags in *GNP*, *GNP58*, and disposable income (*DIS*); in the fourth quarter, only the *OR* adjustment reduced the lag effects in these variables.

The errors contributed by the incorrect values of the exogenous variables were positive for all types of adjustments. They offset the negative errors from the incorrect lags in the model and improved the ex ante forecasts.

A glance at the Wharton ex post forecast for the comparable quarter (Chart 5.9) reveals the same underprediction of *GNP* and *GNP58* that we find in the OBE prediction. While the forecasts for consumption are too low in both models, only the OBE forecast shows a steep decline in the investment sector. This underprediction of investment, combined with the other underestimates, explains OBE's forecast of a serious recession, in contrast to the slight dip in *GNP58* predicted by Wharton. Thus, in this period of continued economic expansion, the Wharton performance was superior to the OBE record.

The Fourth Quarter, 1968 Forecast

On the whole, this multiperiod forecast, although still too low, made better predictions than those of the two previous quarters. The model missed the fast growth in *GNP* and *CS* in the second quarter of forecast, but recaptured their growth trends in the third and fourth quarters, as shown in Chart 6.7. The forecasts of *GNP58* were very poor; the false turning point predicted for the second quarter forced the forecast trend away from the actual one. It is obvious from this diagram that the forecasting errors in residential investment and disposable income (*IHS* and *DPIS*) were due mostly to consistent bias. While the path of the forecasts have the appropriate shape, they are all below the actual values.

The *OR* method gives the highest forecast values for most variables, while the *NO* method yields the lowest values. Learning from the experience of underestimation in the past several quarters, the OBE team was able to use the *OR* adjustments in an appropriate direction. The *AR*

The Decomposition of Forecast

results were also better than the *NO* results in the two previous forecasts generated in this quarter that shifted all forecasts upward.

Table 6.12 shows that the lag effects were not cumulative in this multiperiod forecast. In most of the variables the lag effects in the second quarter were smaller than in the second quarter. However, the *DIS* were accumulating as the forecast moved us to suspect that serious lag effects were present.

The effects of lags in all variables were reduced using the *OR* adjustment, but the *AR* method performed very well. The *AR* method had the least price effects in *GNP* and *DIS* as the forecast moved. The *AR* forecast has the least price effects.

Most of the effects due to judgment were positive and small in the second quarter. The negative errors in ex post forecasts are much larger than the ex ante forecasts.

The Wharton and OBE forecasts were quite similar (Charts 5.10 and 6.7). Both show a slight dip in economic activity in the second quarter but then show a resumption of growth.

The First Quarter, 1969 Forecast

The multiperiod forecast made better predictions than those of the two previous quarters. The *CS*, and *DIS* were quite accurate. The upward trend in nonresidential fixed investment was captured. The *NO* forecasts started at a lower price level due to the effects of the *SER* (the slightly declining trend in *IHS*), the slightly declining trend in *DPIS* and the slightly increasing trend. However, the first quarter reduced the forecast errors. The forecasting errors in inventory were attributed to the structural equation. The behavior of the forecasts on imports was improved. The *AR* method reduced those errors.

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it is obvious that the failure of the sed by the cumulated negative effect of d at a faster rate in the second and third arter. In the second and third quarters of ents reduced the effects of lags in *GNP*, *p (DIS)*; in the fourth quarter, only the *OR* ffects in these variables.

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x post forecast for the comparable quarter nderprediction of *GNP* and *GNP58* that While the forecasts for consumption are e OBE forecast shows a steep decline in nderprediction of investment, combined s, explains OBE's forecast of a serious ight dip in *GNP58* predicted by Wharton. ued economic expansion, the Wharton e OBE record.

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ghest forecast values for most variables. he lowest values. Learning from the the past several quarters, the OBE team nts in an appropriate direction. The *AR*

results were also better than the *NO* results, because the negative *SERs* in the two previous forecasts generated positive constant adjustments in this quarter that shifted all forecasts upward.

Table 6.12 shows that the lag errors in all constant dollar variables were not cumulative in this multiperiod forecast. Instead, the effect of lags in most of the variables was smaller in the third quarter of forecast than in the second quarter. However, the effects of lags in *GNP* and *DIS* were accumulating as the forecasting quarters wore on, leading us to suspect that serious lag effects exist in the price sector.

The effects of lags in all variables were considerably reduced by using the *OR* adjustment, but the *AR* and *GG* adjustments did not perform very well. The *AR* method has a tendency to generate large lag effects in *GNP* and *DIS* as the forecasting period lengthens, although the *AR* forecast has the least price effect in the first quarter.

Most of the effects due to judgmental errors in the exogenous variables were positive and small in this forecast. They offset a part of the negative errors in ex post forecasts and improved the performance of the ex ante forecasts.

The Wharton and OBE forecasts of the fourth quarter, 1968 are quite similar (Charts 5.10 and 6.7, respectively). Both err in showing a slight dip in economic activity in the first two quarters of forecast, but then show a resumption of growth for the last quarters.

The First Quarter, 1969 Forecast (Three Quarters)

The multiperiod forecast made in the first quarter of 1969 is carried for only three quarters in this study. Forecasts of *GNP*, *GNP58*, *C\$*, and *DIS* were quite accurate (Table 6.13). They captured the upward trend in nonresidential fixed investment (*ISE\$*), but the *AR* and *NO* forecasts started at a lower point in the first quarter of forecast due to the effects of the *SER - CONs*. In residential investment (*IHS*), the slightly declining trend was mistakenly predicted as a slightly increasing trend. However, the effects of underestimation in the first quarter reduced the forecasting error in succeeding quarters. The forecasting errors in inventory change were large, and can be attributed to the structural equation residuals. As to the strange behavior of the forecasts on imports, we cannot determine the sources of those errors.

Table 6.13 shows that the effects of lags were not serious in this multiperiod forecast. The large lag effect in *ISE\$* (7.78) helped to offset the error from other sources and was not carried to the next quarter. The effects of lags in *GNP* and *DI\$* were all negative, probably because of the large negative price effect in the first quarter. The Wharton forecast (Table 5.27) paralleled the OBE forecast for all sectors except fixed investment, where Wharton incorrectly predicted a decline in the second and third quarters of forecast.

The lag effects of the judgmental errors made in exogenous variables were not large. Since they offset the errors in ex post forecasts, the errors in ex ante are slightly smaller than those in the ex post forecasts.

The Second Quarter, 1969 Forecast (Two Quarters)

It is quite difficult to evaluate the performance of the multiperiod forecast made in this quarter, since the forecast is cut off at the third quarter of forecast in our study. Table 6.14 shows that the trends in most major variables are correctly predicted. However, the second quarter forecasts of inventory changes contain large errors. These errors can be attributed mainly to the lag effects, since the first quarter forecasts are quite accurate. The largest error exists in the imports forecast, reflecting the cessation of the first quarter's dock strike.

The effects of lags in the second quarter forecasts are presented in Table 6.14. It is apparent that the lag effects in the investment sector were much larger than those in the consumption sector. In general, the constant adjustments reduced the effects of lags.

The errors due to bad guesses in the exogenous variables were relatively small, and most of them offset other errors in the ex post forecasts. Therefore, the ex ante forecasts were slightly better than the ex post forecasts. The Wharton ex post prediction (Table 5.28) is similar to the OBE forecast, except for the repetition of the incorrectly predicted dip in fixed investment we saw in Wharton's first quarter, 1969 forecast.

6.4 DECOMPOSITION OF FIRST PERIOD AND MULTIPERIOD ERROR: GENERALIZATIONS

The error decomposition presented above has traced the forecast errors back to their sources for the OBE model forecasts from the second

quarter of 1968 through the third quarter of 1969. This allows us to make a number of observations.

To determine the sector of the errors, one should first investigate the automobile consumption function shift in the durable goods consumption residuals, while the nondurable goods consumption residuals are positive structural equation residuals through the third quarter of 1969. This indicates a shift in the economy. Consumers changed from nondurables to automobiles. The income tax surtax was instituted in the third quarter to explain why the surtax should be shifted from *CN* to *CA*. It is clear, nevertheless, that the two equations in the OBE model are not identical in the third quarter.

The constant adjustment is made in the third quarter. The perfect way to determine the constant adjustment is to equal to the *SER*. Since, unfortunately, the errors in the forecasting quarter are unknown, a first-order constant adjustment. The smaller the constant adjustment (between the constant adjustment and the *SER* for the *NO* adjustment) and the *SER* for the *NO* adjustment. The consistent over- and under-forecasting in the variables enabled the OBE model forecasts relatively successfully. On the other hand, the model which uses the average of two previous forecasts, also performed well in the third quarter of 1969. The *GG* adjustment, which uses the serial correlation coefficients of the errors, did not perform as well as the *GG* adjustment. The correlation coefficients in these two models are very similar.

Fortunately, the large *SERs* in the first and second quarters of opposite signs and tend to cancel each other out. The error on total consumption is very small. The errors in the consumption sector stem mainly from the errors in the first quarter, reduced by the use of constant adjustments. The errors are not observed.

The *SER* of the plant and equipment

effects of lags were not serious in this effect in $ISE\$$ (7.78) helped to offset was not carried to the next quarter. The were all negative, probably because of the first quarter. The Wharton forecast forecast for all sectors except fixed correctly predicted a decline in the sec-

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cast (Two Quarters)

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sented above has traced the forecast OBE model forecasts from the second

quarter of 1968 through the third quarter of 1969. This analysis enables us to make a number of observations.

To determine the sector of the model primarily responsible for the errors, one should first investigate the structural equation residuals. The automobile consumption function shows large negative structural equation residuals, while the nondurables consumption function shows large positive structural equation residuals from the third quarter of 1968 through the third quarter of 1969. This indicates a structural change in the economy. Consumers changed their consumption pattern by shifting from nondurables to automobiles. We know that the surcharge on income taxes was instituted in the third quarter of 1968, but it is difficult to explain why the surtax should have shifted consumer expenditures from *CN* to *CA*. It is clear, nevertheless, that the structures of these two equations in the OBE model were not appropriate after that quarter.

The constant adjustment is mainly used to counterbalance the *SER*. The perfect way to determine the constant adjustment would be to set it equal to the *SER*. Since, unfortunately, the *SERs* of the equations in the forecasting quarter are unknown, a forecast of the future *SER* is used as a constant adjustment. The smaller the difference that prevails ex post between the constant adjustment (the predicted *SER* without adjustment) and the *SER* for the *NO* adjustment equation, the better the forecast. The consistent over- and underestimation in the *CN* and *CA* variables enabled the OBE model builders to estimate the *OR* adjustments relatively successfully. On the other hand, the *AR* adjustment, which uses the average of two previous *SERs* to adjust the *SER* in the current forecast, also performed well during the first three quarters of 1969. The *GG* adjustment, which uses the previous *SER* weighted by the serial correlation coefficients of the equation to adjust the current *SER*, did not perform as well as the *AR* adjustment, because the serial correlation coefficients in these two equations are not very large.

Fortunately, the large *SERs* in the *CA* and *CN* equations carry opposite signs and tend to cancel each other. Therefore, their net effect on total consumption is very small. The forecasting errors in the consumption sector stem mainly from *SERs*, which were significantly reduced by the use of constant adjustments in the forecast period we observed.

The *SER* of the plant and equipment investment equation is large

whenever the endogenous version of nonresidential fixed investment (*ISE*) is used for the OBE model. This leads us to suspect that the specification of this equation is invalid. A large *SER* is also found in the inventory change equation, even though the equation has been revised several times. This large *SER* has different signs in different quarters, indicating that the *SER* of inventory changes has a large variance. Therefore, none of the constant adjustments can be very successful in improving performance. The sum of *SERs* in total investment is very large in the second and fourth quarters of 1968 and in the second quarter of 1969 because there is little offsetting among the investment component errors. However, all types of constant adjustments reduce the *SER* – *CONs* to a certain extent during these three quarters.

From the second quarter of 1968 through the third quarter of 1969 the *SERs* in the equation for merchandise imports are also large and positive. The specification of this equation should be examined.

On the income side, the *SER* of the wage bill equation becomes large and is negative after the third quarter of 1968. This means that the model consistently underestimates the wage bill. Since wages are the product of the wage rate and employment, and both are determined by stochastic equations, the goodness of fit of these two equations could be inspected. However, this task is not of primary urgency because the errors in GNP come mainly from the *SERs* in the components of GNP, and the effects of the *SERs* from the income side are relatively insignificant.

Since the third quarter of 1968, the price effects have been negative where no constant adjustments are used due to the start of a serious inflation at that point. All constant adjustments reduce price error quite efficiently. Among them, the *AR* adjustments perform best. According to these empirical findings, it is evident that the price sector in the OBE model has not succeeded in capturing the fast growth path of inflation since the third quarter of 1968. Perhaps the equations in this sector should be restructured as an alternative to the reliance on constant adjustments.

The errors not decomposed in these five forecasts are relatively small. None of the constant adjustments function very well in reducing this type of error. We are unable to isolate their sources. (Possibly the error may be caused by any of the factors we have not included in our decomposition; see page 141.)

The Decomposition of Forecasting Error

The ex post error in GNP comes from the *SERs* in the real sector and the *SERs* in the price sector. The price sector is affected by both the size of these errors and the correlation between them. The large ex post errors of the second and fourth quarters of 1968 are due to simultaneous errors in the real and price sectors.

The difference between ex ante and ex post errors about exogenous variables and judgmental errors about exogenous variables. If the ex ante error offsets the ex post error, the ex ante error is a post forecast; conversely, of course, if the ex ante error reinforces the ex post error, the ex ante error is an ante forecast. In a period of rapid expansion, ex ante forecasters may underpredict the economic growth that happened in the period from the second quarter of 1968. Noticing the underprediction in the second quarter, model forecasters may overestimate the economic growth to compensate for the underprediction made in the first quarter. This explains why the ex ante forecasts generated in the first two quarters of 1969 are better than the ex post forecasts. The superiority of the first quarter's ex ante forecast might also be explained by the dock strike which increased the exogenous value while the strike-induced error in the import equation.

In the multiperiod forecasts discussed above, the errors do not show a pronounced tendency to be positive in the lagging period. However, a large error in the first quarter has large lag effects in the subsequent quarters. Large errors in lags may offset a part of other errors. Constant adjustments reduce the lag effects in the first four forecasts beginning with the first quarter. The *NO* results have the largest forecast errors. This means that the constant adjustments are forecasting a trend downward. However, in the second quarter of 1968 through the third quarter of 1968, the forecasting trend is upward. There are the lowest forecast values for this later period.

version of nonresidential fixed investment model. This leads us to suspect that the model is invalid. A large *SER* is also found in the model even though the equation has been revised. The *SER* has different signs in different quarters, and the variance of inventory changes has a large variance. Constant adjustments can be very successful in reducing the sum of *SERs* in total investment is very large in the first two quarters of 1968 and in the second quarter of 1969. The offsetting among the investment component and the constant adjustments reduce the *SER* in the first three quarters.

The error of 1968 through the third quarter of 1969 for merchandise imports are also large and the variance of this equation should be examined. The *SER* of the wage bill equation becomes very large in the third quarter of 1968. This means that the model overestimates the wage bill. Since wages are the determinant of employment, and both are determined by the goodness of fit of these two equations could be questioned in not of primary urgency because the errors from the *SERs* in the components of GNP, and the *SERs* from the income side are relatively

of 1968, the price effects have been neglected. Constant adjustments are used due to the start of a period. All constant adjustments reduce price effects. Among them, the *AR* adjustments perform better. In light of empirical findings, it is evident that the price effects have not succeeded in capturing the fast growth in the third quarter of 1968. Perhaps the equation should be restructured as an alternative to the current model.

The constant adjustments used in these five forecasts are relatively successful. The constant adjustments function very well in reducing the errors. It is possible to isolate their sources. (Possibly the errors from the factors we have not included in our model.)

The ex post error in GNP comes from two different sources: the *SERs* in the real sector and the *SERs* in the price sector. The error in GNP is affected by both the size of these errors and the extent of offsets between them. The large ex post errors of GNP in the third and fourth quarters of 1968 are due to simultaneous underprediction in both the real and price sectors.

The difference between ex ante and ex post forecasts is due to judgmental errors about exogenous variables. If the effect of judgmental error offsets the ex post error, the ex ante forecast is better than the ex post forecast; conversely, of course, if the effect of judgmental error reinforces the ex post error, the ex ante is worse than the ex post forecast. In a period of rapid expansion, both the model and the forecasters may underpredict the economy's growth. This is what happened in the period from the second through the fourth quarter of 1968. Noticing the underprediction in the past several quarters, the model forecasters may overestimate the exogenous variables in order to compensate for the underprediction made by the model. This would explain why the ex ante forecasts generated by the *OR* and *NO* methods in the first two quarters of 1969 are better than the ex post forecasts. The superiority of the first quarter's ex ante over the ex post forecast might also be explained by the dock strike, which reduced the ex post exogenous value while the strike-induced underprediction remained in the import equation.

In the multiperiod forecasts discussed above, the effects of lags do not show a pronounced tendency to accumulate over the forecasting period. However, a large error in the first quarter tends to generate large lag effects in the subsequent quarters. Sometimes the effect of errors in lags may offset a part of other errors. In general, constant adjustments reduce the lag effects in the forecasts examined here. In the first four forecasts beginning with the second quarter of 1967, the *NO* results have the largest forecast values for most of the variables. This means that the constant adjustments have shifted the forecasting trend downward. However, from the second quarter of 1968 through the third quarter of 1969 the constant adjustments shift the forecasting trend upward. Therefore, the *NO* results have the lowest forecast values for this later period.

GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS FOR THE OBE TABLES

Note: Figures are in billions of dollars unless otherwise noted.

C	Personal consumption expenditures
CA	Personal consumption expenditures, autos and parts
CD	Personal consumption expenditures, durables other than autos and parts
CN	Personal consumption expenditures, housing
CS	Personal consumption expenditures, services except housing
DI	Personal disposable income
DIV	Dividends
IH	Fixed investment, residential structures
IIA	Change in auto inventory, domestic new cars
IINA	Change in nonauto inventory
IMS	Imports, other nonmilitary (mainly services)
IMT	Imports, merchandise
ISE	Fixed investment, nonresidential
NFB	Net foreign balance
PRI	Proprietors' income
SIP	Social insurance, personal contributions
TPF	Personal tax and nontax payments, federal
TPSL	Personal tax and nontax payments, state and local
UNRATE	Unemployment rate, per cent
W	Wages and salaries plus other labor income

y Macroeconometric Models

ILS FOR THE OBE TABLES

ars unless otherwise noted.

penditures

penditures, autos and parts

penditures, durables other than autos

penditures, housing

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al contributions

payments, federal

payments, state and local

cent

other labor income

TABLE
GNP in Current Dollars, Forecasts

Date of Forecast	OR		AR		GG	
	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
	<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>					
2nd Q 1967	0.60	0.80	6.00	6.30	2.40	2.70
3rd Q 1967	-5.60	0.30	-4.50	1.30	-0.20	5.70
4th Q 1967	-3.80	-1.20	-6.40	-3.40	2.40	5.60
1st Q 1968	7.90	0.90	4.60	-2.40	7.80	0.90
2nd Q 1968	1.60	-4.10	-3.80	-9.30	0.80	-4.80
3rd Q 1968	-8.60	-7.80	-9.10	-8.70	-11.70	-11.40
4th Q 1968	-6.00	-2.70	-8.00	-5.10	-9.40	-4.50
1st Q 1969	-6.40	-2.80	-2.20	1.50	-2.80	0.80
2nd Q 1969	-2.60	-0.50	7.90	9.80	4.40	6.60
3rd Q 1969	0.40	-0.10	4.00	3.50	-3.90	-4.30
AAFE	4.35	2.12	5.65	5.13	4.58	4.73
	<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>					
2nd Q 1967	-6.40	-1.40	-0.50	4.30	-1.60	3.40
3rd Q 1967	-9.90	4.70	-7.70	6.70	1.00	15.80
4th Q 1967	8.30	2.80	-4.20	-8.50	10.10	6.00
1st Q 1968	-0.70	-14.60	1.30	-12.70	5.90	-8.10
2nd Q 1968	-2.80	-8.10	-13.40	-18.70	-5.00	-10.40
3rd Q 1968	-21.40	-15.80	-26.80	-22.30	-29.30	-24.80
4th Q 1968	-18.70	-11.90	-22.80	-15.70	-25.60	-17.60
1st Q 1969	-4.80	-7.50	2.20	-0.50	-2.10	-6.50
2nd Q 1969	-5.80	-3.60	13.00	14.60	-2.70	-0.40
AAFE	8.76	7.82	10.21	11.56	9.26	10.33

6.1
versus Realization for OBE

NO			Naive 1 Error
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error		
	<i>First Quarter</i>		
	3.50	3.80	-9.00
	5.40	11.40	-16.90
	9.30	12.80	-15.70
	13.50	5.30	-19.20
	1.70	-4.00	-23.40
	-15.40	-15.10	-17.70
	-10.30	-7.30	-16.10
	-2.40	1.20	-16.20
	-2.10	-0.30	-16.10
	-0.80	-1.40	-18.00
	6.44	6.26	16.83
	<i>Second Quarter</i>		
	-1.50	3.40	-25.90
	9.10	24.10	-32.60
	19.60	16.00	-34.90
	13.00	-2.90	-42.60
	-5.70	-11.10	-41.10
	-33.00	-28.40	-33.80
	-26.30	-20.00	-32.30
	-3.30	-6.20	-32.30
	-12.50	-11.00	-34.10
	13.78	13.68	34.40

(Continued)

TABLE
GNP in Current Dollars, Forecasts

AR		GG	
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>			
6.00	6.30	2.40	2.70
-4.50	1.30	-0.20	5.70
-6.40	-3.40	2.40	5.60
4.60	-2.40	7.80	0.90
-3.80	-9.30	0.80	-4.80
-9.10	-8.70	-11.70	-11.40
-8.00	-5.10	-9.40	-4.50
-2.20	1.50	-2.80	0.80
7.90	9.80	4.40	6.60
4.00	3.50	-3.90	-4.30
5.65	5.13	4.58	4.73
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-0.50	4.30	-1.60	3.40
-7.70	6.70	1.00	15.80
-4.20	-8.50	10.10	6.00
1.30	-12.70	5.90	-8.10
-13.40	-18.70	-5.00	-10.40
-26.80	-22.30	-29.30	-24.80
-22.80	-15.70	-25.60	-17.60
2.20	-0.50	-2.10	-6.50
13.00	14.60	-2.70	-0.40
10.21	11.56	9.26	10.33

6.1
versus Realization for OBE

NO		Naive 1 Error	Autoregr. Error	Naive 2 Error	Realized Data
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error				
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>					
3.50	3.80	-9.00	1.62	-5.20	773.30
5.40	11.40	-16.90	-2.97	-7.90	792.00
9.30	12.80	-15.70	3.33	1.20	805.90
13.50	5.30	-19.20	-1.71	-3.50	826.50
1.70	-4.00	-23.40	-5.14	-4.20	850.70
-15.40	-15.10	-17.70	2.86	5.70	868.70
-10.30	-7.30	-16.10	1.64	1.60	887.10
-2.40	1.20	-16.20	0.90	-0.10	903.80
-2.10	-0.30	-16.10	2.45	0.10	919.50
-0.80	-1.40	-18.00	1.15	-1.90	942.80
6.44	6.26	16.83	2.38	3.14	
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>					
-1.50	3.40	-25.90	-0.62	-18.30	790.20
9.10	24.10	-32.60	-0.97	-14.60	807.70
19.60	16.00	-34.90	3.10	-1.10	825.10
13.00	-2.90	-42.60	-7.62	-11.20	849.90
-5.70	-11.10	-41.10	-4.58	-2.70	868.40
-33.00	-28.40	-33.80	5.79	13.00	884.80
-26.30	-20.00	-32.30	3.28	3.10	903.30
-3.30	-6.20	-32.30	3.77	-0.10	919.90
-12.50	-11.00	-34.10	4.71	-1.70	937.50
13.78	13.68	34.40	3.83	7.31	

(Continued)

TABLE 6.1

Date of Forecast	OR		AR		GG	
	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-9.00	-2.80	-4.90	4.20	-1.10	8.70
3rd Q 1967	-5.40	6.60	-5.80	5.90	4.50	16.70
4th Q 1967	10.20	-2.90	-3.00	-14.00	12.30	0.80
1st Q 1968	-3.50	-21.50	2.20	-16.10	6.40	-12.00
2nd Q 1968	-17.50	-16.20	-29.90	-29.50	-17.90	-17.40
3rd Q 1968	-39.60	-25.60	-49.60	-36.60	-50.30	-38.00
4th Q 1968	-17.80	-18.00	-25.10	-24.30	-26.80	-26.80
1st Q 1969	-6.20	-8.20	3.00	0.70	-5.60	-10.10
AAFE	13.65	12.73	15.44	16.41	15.61	16.31
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-7.00		-6.40		3.70	
3rd Q 1967	-2.40	2.20	-5.40	-0.50	7.80	13.20
4th Q 1967	9.20	-8.30	3.10	-13.00	18.70	1.50
1st Q 1968	-16.50	-29.20	-7.80	-21.00	-5.00	-18.00
2nd Q 1968	-39.30	-28.70	-53.50	-43.70	-37.80	-27.60
3rd Q 1968	-40.70	-32.50	-55.50	-48.10	-54.20	-47.70
4th Q 1968	-20.50	-16.00	-30.90	-25.10	-29.80	-26.40
AAFE	19.37	19.48	23.23	25.23	22.43	22.40
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-5.45		-1.45		0.85	
3rd Q 1967	-5.82	3.45	-5.85	3.35	3.28	12.85
4th Q 1967	5.98	-2.40	-2.62	-9.72	10.88	3.48
1st Q 1968	-3.20	-16.10	0.08	-13.05	3.78	-9.30
2nd Q 1968	-14.50	-14.27	-25.15	-25.30	-14.97	-15.05
3rd Q 1968	-27.57	-20.42	-35.25	-28.92	-36.37	-30.47
4th Q 1968	-15.75	-12.15	-21.70	-17.55	-22.90	-18.82
AAFE	11.18	11.47	13.16	16.32	13.29	15.00

(Concluded)

NO		Naive 1 Error
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	
<i>Third Quarter</i>		
-2.40	7.30	-41.60
10.50	23.20	-51.80
18.90	8.40	-58.30
13.40	-7.10	-60.30
-20.30	-19.80	-57.20
-53.30	-40.90	-50.00
-26.60	-27.00	-48.40
-4.60	-6.90	-50.30
18.75	17.58	52.24
<i>Fourth Quarter</i>		
0.70		
13.00	19.30	-75.20
23.40	8.20	-76.00
1.50	-13.70	-76.40
-41.00	-30.90	-73.40
-56.30	-49.60	-66.10
-28.90	-24.90	-66.40
23.54	24.43	72.25
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>		
0.08		
9.50	19.50	-44.12
17.80	11.35	-46.22
10.35	-4.60	-49.62
-16.32	-16.45	-48.77
-39.50	-33.50	-41.90
-23.02	-19.80	-40.80
16.65	17.53	45.24

TABLE 6.1

AR		GG	
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-4.90	4.20	-1.10	8.70
-5.80	5.90	4.50	16.70
-3.00	-14.00	12.30	0.80
2.20	-16.10	6.40	-12.00
-29.90	-29.50	-17.90	-17.40
-49.60	-36.60	-50.30	-38.00
-25.10	-24.30	-26.80	-26.80
3.00	0.70	-5.60	-10.10
15.44	16.41	15.61	16.31
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-6.40		3.70	
-5.40	-0.50	7.80	13.20
3.10	-13.00	18.70	1.50
-7.80	-21.00	-5.00	-18.00
-53.50	-43.70	-37.80	-27.60
-55.50	-48.10	-54.20	-47.70
-30.90	-25.10	-29.80	-26.40
23.23	25.23	22.43	22.40
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>			
-1.45		0.85	
-5.85	3.35	3.28	12.85
-2.62	-9.72	10.88	3.48
0.08	-13.05	3.78	-9.30
-25.15	-25.30	-14.97	-15.05
-35.25	-28.92	-36.37	-30.47
-21.70	-17.55	-22.90	-18.82
13.16	16.32	13.29	15.00

(Concluded)

NO		Naive 1 Error	Autoregr. Error	Naive 2 Error	Realized Data
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error				
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>					
-2.40	7.30	-41.60	1.63	-30.20	805.90
10.50	23.20	-51.80	-1.68	-24.80	826.90
18.90	8.40	-58.30	-2.26	-7.60	848.50
13.40	-7.10	-60.30	-7.34	-13.20	867.60
-20.30	-19.80	-57.20	-2.49	0.40	884.50
-53.30	-40.90	-50.00	7.89	20.20	901.00
-26.60	-27.00	-48.40	6.41	4.70	919.40
-4.60	-6.90	-50.30	6.17	-2.00	937.90
18.75	17.58	52.24	4.48	12.89	
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>					
0.70			0.79		
13.00	19.30	-75.20	-6.80	-39.20	850.30
23.40	8.20	-76.00	-2.25	-8.40	866.20
1.50	-13.70	-76.40	-5.10	-13.60	883.70
-41.00	-30.90	-73.40	0.40	3.40	900.70
-56.30	-49.60	-66.10	10.78	27.50	917.10
-28.90	-24.90	-66.40	8.67	4.40	937.40
23.54	24.43	72.25	4.92	16.08	
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>					
0.08			0.85		
9.50	19.50	-44.12	-3.10	-21.62	819.22
17.80	11.35	-46.22	0.47	-3.97	836.43
10.35	-4.60	-49.62	-5.44	-10.37	856.92
-16.32	-16.45	-48.77	-3.04	-0.77	876.07
-39.50	-33.50	-41.90	6.83	16.60	892.90
-23.02	-19.80	-40.80	5.00	3.45	911.80
16.65	17.53	45.24	3.53	9.47	

TABLE
GNP in Constant Dollars, Forecasts

Date of Forecast	OR		AR		GG	
	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-0.50	-0.70	3.30	3.10	0.90	0.60
3rd Q 1967	-1.70	2.20	-1.20	2.80	-2.20	1.70
4th Q 1967	-2.40	0.10	-3.00	-0.10	1.00	3.70
1st Q 1968	5.90	1.40	3.00	-1.60	5.10	0.60
2nd Q 1968	0.50	-3.10	-2.70	-6.40	-1.20	-4.80
3rd Q 1968	-5.80	-5.00	-5.50	-4.80	-7.50	-6.80
4th Q 1968	-1.80	0.90	-3.30	-0.70	-3.20	0.30
1st Q 1969	-3.50	0.70	-0.20	4.00	0.20	4.30
2nd Q 1969	-0.10	2.70	5.60	8.10	4.80	7.50
3rd Q 1969	0.80	0.80	2.80	2.70	0.00	0.00
AAFE	2.30	1.76	3.06	3.43	2.61	3.03
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-6.30	-1.20	-1.90	3.00	-2.60	2.50
3rd Q 1967	-2.80	7.20	-1.60	8.40	0.50	10.30
4th Q 1967	7.20	5.20	-1.40	-1.80	6.90	5.40
1st Q 1968	-0.70	-9.30	0.30	-8.30	4.60	-3.90
2nd Q 1968	-2.50	-5.30	-9.50	-12.30	-6.60	-9.40
3rd Q 1968	-13.20	-9.00	-17.40	-13.40	-17.40	-13.40
4th Q 1968	-8.60	-2.00	-11.60	-4.60	-11.50	-4.10
1st Q 1969	0.40	0.50	5.50	5.70	4.10	3.90
2nd Q 1969	0.00	3.50	7.70	11.00	2.20	5.70
AAFE	4.63	4.80	6.32	7.61	6.27	6.51

6.2
versus Realization for OBE

NO		
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Naive 1 Error
<i>First Quarter</i>		
2.10	1.90	-4.00
1.50	5.30	-7.50
4.70	7.40	-5.50
8.20	3.50	-9.80
-1.50	-5.10	-12.50
-8.70	-7.90	-7.00
-3.10	-0.50	-5.70
2.10	6.30	-4.60
2.10	4.70	-3.60
4.00	3.90	-3.90
3.80	4.65	6.41
<i>Second Quarter</i>		
-2.00	3.10	-11.50
5.90	15.40	-13.00
13.00	11.60	-15.30
9.50	0.60	-22.30
-7.60	-10.40	-19.50
-18.80	-14.80	-12.70
-11.40	-4.80	-10.30
5.80	5.90	-8.20
-2.90	0.40	-7.50
8.54	7.44	13.37

(Continued)

TABLE
GNP in Constant Dollars, Forecasts

AR		GG	
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>			
3.30	3.10	0.90	0.60
-1.20	2.80	-2.20	1.70
-3.00	-0.10	1.00	3.70
3.00	-1.60	5.10	0.60
-2.70	-6.40	-1.20	-4.80
-5.50	-4.80	-7.50	-6.80
-3.30	-0.70	-3.20	0.30
-0.20	4.00	0.20	4.30
5.60	8.10	4.80	7.50
2.80	2.70	0.00	0.00
3.06	3.43	2.61	3.03
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-1.90	3.00	-2.60	2.50
-1.60	8.40	0.50	10.30
-1.40	-1.80	6.90	5.40
0.30	-8.30	4.60	-3.90
-9.50	-12.30	-6.60	-9.40
-17.40	-13.40	-17.40	-13.40
-11.60	-4.60	-11.50	-4.10
5.50	5.70	4.10	3.90
7.70	11.00	2.20	5.70
6.32	7.61	6.27	6.51

6.2
versus Realization for OBE

NO		Naive 1 Error	Autoregr. Error	Naive 2 Error	Realized Data
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error				
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>					
2.10	1.90	-4.00	1.74	-5.60	661.20
1.50	5.30	-7.50	0.95	-3.50	672.20
4.70	7.40	-5.50	6.27	2.00	677.50
8.20	3.50	-9.80	-0.19	-4.30	689.40
-1.50	-5.10	-12.50	-1.31	-2.70	702.20
-8.70	-7.90	-7.00	5.80	5.50	708.70
-3.10	-0.50	-5.70	3.73	1.30	718.00
2.10	6.30	-4.60	4.20	1.10	723.70
2.10	4.70	-3.60	6.05	1.00	727.20
4.00	3.90	-3.90	5.73	-0.30	730.60
3.80	4.65	6.41	3.60	2.73	
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>					
-2.00	3.10	-11.50	3.51	-14.70	668.70
5.90	15.40	-13.00	7.67	-5.00	677.70
13.00	11.60	-15.30	9.05	-0.30	687.30
9.50	0.60	-22.30	-1.59	-11.30	701.90
-7.60	-10.40	-19.50	3.87	0.10	709.20
-18.80	-14.80	-12.70	12.28	12.30	714.40
-11.40	-4.80	-10.30	9.70	3.70	722.60
5.80	5.90	-8.20	12.24	3.20	727.30
-2.90	0.40	-7.50	14.64	1.70	731.10
8.54	7.44	13.37	8.28	5.81	

(Continued)

TABLE 6.2

Date of Forecast	OR		AR		GG	
	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-5.60	3.10	-2.60	4.60	0.40	8.80
3rd Q 1967	2.20	9.80	1.30	8.90	3.70	11.10
4th Q 1967	8.70	2.70	-0.40	-5.80	8.00	2.30
1st Q 1968	-1.70	-13.20	1.50	-10.00	7.50	-3.80
2nd Q 1968	-11.30	-9.40	-20.10	-18.30	-16.10	-14.20
3rd Q 1968	-23.80	-13.00	-32.30	-21.70	-28.90	-18.50
4th Q 1968	-3.80	-1.90	-8.70	-6.40	-6.20	-4.60
1st Q 1969	2.20	3.10	8.10	8.90	6.00	6.20
AAFE	7.41	7.03	9.38	10.58	9.60	8.69
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-1.70		-1.10		6.30	
3rd Q 1967	4.90	7.20	2.40	5.00	5.50	7.90
4th Q 1967	8.20	-0.20	4.50	-2.90	11.70	3.30
1st Q 1968	-8.80	-16.70	-3.30	-11.30	4.60	-3.30
2nd Q 1968	-23.80	-14.80	-34.30	-25.40	-29.00	-20.00
3rd Q 1968	-21.00	-14.60	-33.80	-27.50	-26.70	-20.50
4th Q 1968	-2.20	2.90	-9.00	-3.40	-2.60	1.20
AAFE	10.09	9.40	12.63	12.58	12.34	9.37
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>						
2nd Q 1967	-3.52		-0.57		1.25	
3rd Q 1967	0.65	6.60	0.23	6.28	1.88	7.75
4th Q 1967	5.43	1.95	-0.07	-2.65	6.90	3.68
1st Q 1968	-1.32	-9.45	0.38	-7.80	5.45	-2.60
2nd Q 1968	-9.27	-8.15	-16.65	-15.60	-13.22	-12.10
3rd Q 1968	-15.95	-10.40	-22.25	-16.85	-20.12	-14.80
4th Q 1968	-4.10	-0.02	-8.15	-3.77	-5.87	-1.80
AAFE	5.75	6.10	6.90	8.83	7.81	7.12

(Concluded)

NO		
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Naive 1 Error
<i>Third Quarter</i>		
0.00	8.60	-17.00
6.80	14.00	-22.80
11.50	6.10	-27.80
12.90	1.20	-29.30
-17.90	-16.00	-25.20
-29.90	-19.40	-17.30
-5.40	-3.50	-13.90
9.90	10.60	-12.10
11.79	9.93	20.67
<i>Fourth Quarter</i>		
4.70		
7.20	9.60	-35.30
13.50	5.60	-34.80
10.10	1.80	-35.00
-31.00	-22.00	-29.80
-23.10	-20.90	-20.90
-1.40	3.50	-17.80
13.00	10.57	28.93
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>		
1.20		
5.35	11.08	-19.65
10.68	7.68	-20.85
10.18	1.78	-24.10
-14.50	-13.37	-21.75
-20.12	-15.75	-14.47
-5.32	-1.32	-11.92
9.62	8.50	18.79

TABLE 6.2

AR		GG	
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-2.60	4.60	0.40	8.80
1.30	8.90	3.70	11.10
-0.40	-5.80	8.00	2.30
1.50	-10.00	7.50	-3.80
-20.10	-18.30	-16.10	-14.20
-32.30	-21.70	-28.90	-18.50
-8.70	-6.40	-6.20	-4.60
8.10	8.90	6.00	6.20
9.38	10.58	9.60	8.69
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-1.10		6.30	
2.40	5.00	5.50	7.90
4.50	-2.90	11.70	3.30
-3.30	-11.30	4.60	-3.30
-34.30	-25.40	-29.00	-20.00
-33.80	-27.50	-26.70	-20.50
-9.00	-3.40	-2.60	1.20
12.63	12.58	12.34	9.37
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>			
-0.57		1.25	
0.23	6.28	1.88	7.75
-0.07	-2.65	6.90	3.68
0.38	-7.80	5.45	-2.60
-16.65	-15.60	-13.22	-12.10
-22.25	-16.85	-20.12	-14.80
-8.15	-3.77	-5.87	-1.80
6.90	8.83	7.81	7.12

(Concluded)

NO		Naive 1 Error	Autoregr. Error	Naive 2 Error	Realized Data
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error				
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>					
0.00	8.60	-17.00	10.54	-21.80	674.20
6.80	14.00	-22.80	10.61	-10.80	687.50
11.50	6.10	-27.80	8.76	-5.30	699.80
12.90	1.20	-29.30	3.55	-12.80	708.90
-17.90	-16.00	-25.20	10.11	4.20	714.90
-29.90	-19.40	-17.30	19.28	20.20	719.00
-5.40	-3.50	-13.90	-18.40	7.10	726.20
9.90	10.60	-12.10	21.58	5.00	731.20
11.79	9.93	20.67	12.86	10.90	
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>					
4.70			13.28		
7.20	9.60	-35.30	10.21	-19.30	700.00
13.50	5.60	-34.80	13.15	-4.80	706.80
10.10	1.80	-35.00	9.82	-13.00	714.60
-31.00	-22.00	-29.80	17.27	9.40	719.50
-23.10	-20.90	-20.90	27.28	29.10	722.60
-1.40	3.50	-17.80	27.29	10.20	730.10
13.00	10.57	28.93	16.90	14.30	
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>					
1.20			7.27		
5.35	11.08	-19.65	7.36	-9.65	684.35
10.68	7.68	-20.85	9.31	-2.10	692.85
10.18	1.78	-24.10	2.89	-10.35	703.70
-14.50	-13.37	-21.75	7.48	2.75	711.45
-20.12	-15.75	-14.47	16.16	16.78	716.17
-5.32	-1.32	-11.92	14.78	5.58	724.22
9.62	8.50	18.79	9.32	7.87	

TABLE
Unemployment Rate, Forecasts

Date of Forecast	OR		AR		GG	
	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
	<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>					
2nd Q 1967	0.00	0.00	-0.20	-0.20	-0.10	-0.10
3rd Q 1967	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.30	0.10	0.00
4th Q 1967	0.20	0.10	0.20	0.10	-0.40	-0.50
1st Q 1968	-0.10	-0.10	0.30	0.20	0.50	0.40
2nd Q 1968	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.40
3rd Q 1968	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20
4th Q 1968	0.40	0.30	0.50	0.30	0.50	0.30
1st Q 1969	0.30	0.30	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
2nd Q 1969	0.00	-0.20	-0.90	-1.00	-0.30	-0.40
3rd Q 1969	-0.10	0.00	-0.20	0.20	-0.10	-0.20
AAFE	0.12	0.11	0.30	0.26	0.24	0.27
	<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>					
2nd Q 1967	0.30	0.10	0.00	-0.20	0.10	-0.20
3rd Q 1967	0.30	-0.10	0.50	0.10	0.20	-0.20
4th Q 1967	0.30	0.30	0.60	0.50	-0.20	-0.20
1st Q 1968	0.20	0.30	0.60	0.70	1.00	1.00
2nd Q 1968	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	-0.40
3rd Q 1968	0.60	0.40	0.60	0.40	0.80	0.60
4rd Q 1968	0.70	0.50	0.80	0.60	0.90	0.70
1st Q 1969	0.20	0.20	0.10	0.00	0.20	0.20
2nd Q 1969	0.00	-0.10	-1.40	-1.50	-0.10	-0.30
AAFE	0.29	0.23	0.52	0.46	0.40	0.42

6.3
versus Realization for OBE

NO		Naive 1 Error	A
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error		
	<i>First Quarter</i>		
	0.60	0.60	-0.20
	-0.10	-0.10	0.00
	-0.50	0.60	0.00
	0.70	0.60	0.20
	-0.60	-0.50	0.10
	0.10	0.00	0.00
	0.40	0.30	0.20
	0.20	0.20	0.10
	-0.50	-0.60	-0.20
	-0.30	-0.20	-0.20
	0.40	0.37	0.12
	<i>Second Quarter</i>		
	1.30	1.00	-0.20
	-0.10	-0.50	0.00
	-0.50	-0.05	0.20
	0.90	0.90	0.30
	-0.50	-0.40	0.10
	0.80	0.60	0.20
	0.90	0.70	0.30
	0.20	0.20	-0.10
	0.00	-0.10	-0.40
	0.58	0.54	0.20

(Continued)

TABLE
Unemployment Rate, Forecasts

AR		GG	
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>			
-0.20	-0.20	-0.10	-0.10
0.40	0.30	0.10	0.00
0.20	0.10	-0.40	-0.50
0.30	0.20	0.50	0.40
0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.40
0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20
0.50	0.30	0.50	0.30
0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
-0.90	-1.00	-0.30	-0.40
-0.20	0.20	-0.10	-0.20
0.30	0.26	0.24	0.27
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>			
0.00	-0.20	0.10	-0.20
0.50	0.10	0.20	-0.20
0.60	0.50	-0.20	-0.20
0.60	0.70	1.00	1.00
0.10	0.10	0.10	-0.40
0.60	0.40	0.80	0.60
0.80	0.60	0.90	0.70
0.10	0.00	0.20	0.20
-1.40	-1.50	-0.10	-0.30
0.52	0.46	0.40	0.42

6.3
versus Realization for OBE

NO		Naive 1 Error	Autoregr. Error	Naive 2 Error	Realized Data
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error				
<i>First Quarter of Forecast</i>					
0.60	0.60	-0.20	0.05	-0.20	3.90
-0.10	-0.10	0.00	0.26	0.20	3.80
-0.50	0.60	0.00	-0.10	0.00	3.90
0.70	0.60	0.20	0.32	0.20	3.80
-0.60	-0.50	0.10	0.10	-0.10	3.60
0.10	0.00	0.00	0.03	-0.10	3.60
0.40	0.30	0.20	0.35	0.20	3.40
0.20	0.20	0.10	0.02	-0.10	3.30
-0.50	-0.60	-0.20	0.03	-0.30	3.50
-0.30	-0.20	-0.20	0.12	0.00	3.70
0.40	0.37	0.12	0.14	0.14	
<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>					
1.30	1.00	-0.20	0.34	-0.20	3.90
-0.10	-0.50	0.00	0.30	0.40	3.80
-0.50	-0.05	0.20	0.18	0.20	3.70
0.90	0.90	0.30	0.59	0.30	3.70
-0.50	-0.40	0.10	0.18	-0.03	3.60
0.80	0.60	0.20	0.40	0.00	3.40
0.90	0.70	0.30	0.56	0.30	3.30
0.20	0.20	-0.10	0.06	-0.50	3.50
0.00	-0.10	-0.40	0.16	-0.60	3.70
0.58	0.54	0.20	0.31	0.31	

(Continued)

TABLE 6.3

Date of Forecast	OR		AR		GG	
	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	0.60	0.00	0.30	-0.20	0.30	-0.40
3rd Q 1967	0.40	-0.10	0.70	0.10	0.30	-0.30
4th Q 1967	0.00	0.20	0.60	0.70	-0.40	-0.20
1st Q 1968	0.30	0.40	0.70	0.80	1.00	1.00
2nd Q 1968	0.60	0.40	0.70	0.50	0.70	-0.10
3rd Q 1968	1.00	0.70	1.20	0.80	1.30	1.00
4th Q 1968	0.60	0.40	0.70	0.50	0.90	0.70
1st Q 1969	0.10	0.10	-0.10	-0.10	0.20	0.20
AAFE	0.45	0.29	0.63	0.46	0.64	0.49
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>						
2nd Q 1967	0.80		0.60		0.30	
3rd Q 1967	0.20	-0.20	0.60	0.10	0.10	-0.40
4th Q 1967	-0.10	0.20	0.40	0.70	-0.60	-0.30
1st Q 1968	0.80	0.70	1.20	1.10	1.40	1.30
2nd Q 1968	1.20	0.80	1.30	1.00	1.30	0.40
3rd Q 1968	1.00	0.70	1.30	1.00	1.40	1.10
4th Q 1968	0.50	0.30	0.70	0.50	0.80	0.60
AAFE	0.66	0.48	0.87	0.73	0.84	0.68
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>						
2nd Q 1967	0.43		0.18		0.15	
3rd Q 1967	0.23	-0.10	0.55	0.15	0.18	-0.22
4th Q 1967	0.10	0.20	0.45	0.50	-0.40	-0.30
1st Q 1968	0.30	0.33	0.70	0.70	0.98	0.93
2nd Q 1968	0.45	0.33	0.53	0.40	0.53	-0.12
3rd Q 1968	0.68	0.48	0.80	0.58	0.93	0.73
4th Q 1968	0.55	0.38	0.68	0.48	0.78	0.58
AAFE	0.39	0.30	0.55	0.47	0.56	0.48

(Concluded)

NO		Naive 1 Error
Ex Post Error	Ex Ante Error	
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>		
1.80	1.20	-0.20
0.00	-0.50	0.20
-0.60	-0.50	0.30
0.70	0.80	0.30
0.10	-0.10	0.30
1.30	1.00	0.30
0.90	0.70	0.10
0.20	0.20	-0.30
0.70	0.63	0.25
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>		
2.20		
-0.10	-0.60	0.30
-0.80	-0.50	0.30
1.00	1.00	0.50
0.80	0.40	0.40
1.40	1.10	0.10
0.70	0.50	-0.10
1.00	0.68	0.28
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>		
1.48		
-0.07	-0.42	0.13
-0.60	-0.52	0.20
0.83	0.83	0.33
-0.05	0.15	0.23
0.90	0.68	0.15
0.73	0.55	0.13
0.66	0.53	0.19

TABLE 6.3

	AR		GG	
	Post Error	Ante Error	Post Error	Ante Error
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>				
	0.30	-0.20	0.30	-0.40
	0.70	0.10	0.30	-0.30
	0.60	0.70	-0.40	-0.20
	0.70	0.80	1.00	1.00
	0.70	0.50	0.70	-0.10
	1.20	0.80	1.30	1.00
	0.70	0.50	0.90	0.70
	0.00	-0.10	0.20	0.20
	0.63	0.46	0.64	0.49
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>				
	0.60		0.30	
	0.60	0.10	0.10	-0.40
	0.40	0.70	-0.60	-0.30
	1.20	1.10	1.40	1.30
	1.30	1.00	1.30	0.40
	1.30	1.00	1.40	1.10
	0.70	0.50	0.80	0.60
	0.87	0.73	0.84	0.68
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>				
	0.18		0.15	
	0.55	0.15	0.18	-0.22
	0.45	0.50	-0.40	-0.30
	0.70	0.70	0.98	0.93
	0.53	0.40	0.53	-0.12
	0.80	0.58	0.93	0.73
	0.68	0.48	0.78	0.58
	0.55	0.47	0.56	0.48

(Concluded)

NO		Naive 1 Error	Autoregr. Error	Naive 2 Error	Re
Ex Post Error	Ante Error				
<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>					
1.80	1.20	-0.20	0.40	-0.20	3.90
0.00	-0.50	0.20	0.62	0.80	3.60
-0.60	-0.50	0.30	0.43	0.30	3.60
0.70	0.60	0.30	0.72	0.30	3.70
0.10	-0.10	0.30	0.56	-0.30	3.70
1.30	1.00	0.30	0.61	0.00	3.70
0.90	0.70	0.10	0.66	0.10	3.70
0.20	0.20	-0.30	0.20	-0.90	3.70
0.70	0.63	0.25	0.53	0.36	
<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>					
2.20			0.70		
-0.10	-0.60	0.30	0.80	1.10	3.50
-0.80	-0.50	0.30	0.59	0.30	3.60
1.00	1.00	0.50	1.02	0.50	3.50
0.80	0.40	0.40	0.75	-0.40	3.30
1.40	1.10	0.10	0.71	-0.30	3.50
0.70	0.50	-0.10	0.70	-0.10	3.70
1.00	0.68	0.28	0.75	0.45	
<i>Forecast One Year Ahead</i>					
1.48			0.37		
-0.07	-0.42	0.13	0.50	0.63	3.67
-0.60	-0.52	0.20	0.27	0.20	3.70
0.83	0.83	0.33	0.66	0.33	3.67
-0.05	0.15	0.23	0.40	-0.27	3.47
0.90	0.68	0.15	0.44	-0.10	3.45
0.73	0.55	0.13	0.57	0.13	3.47
0.66	0.53	0.19	0.46	0.27	

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

	NO			AR		
	SER	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
CA	-1.52	0.13	-1.39	-2.05	-0.19	-2.24
CD	3.07	0.39	3.46	-0.25	-0.03	-0.28
CN	3.57	0.59	4.14	0.51	0.53	1.04
CS	2.14	0.13	2.27	0.21	0.11	0.31
C	7.26	1.22	8.48	-1.59	0.42	-1.17
IH	0.48	-1.20	-0.72	0.27	-1.48	-1.21
ISE	-1.29	0.00	-1.29	4.92	0.00	4.92
DII	-6.79	0.07	-6.72	-4.48	0.08	-4.40
I	-7.60	-1.13	-8.73	0.71	-1.40	-0.69
-IMT	0.56	-0.40	0.16	-0.63	-0.23	-0.85
-IMS	-1.49	-0.07	-1.56	-0.15	-0.01	-0.16
-NFB	-0.93	-0.47	-1.40	-0.78	-0.23	-1.01
GNP58	-1.27	-0.38	-1.65	-1.66	-1.21	-2.87
GNP\$	-1.52			-2.01		
W	0.79	3.85	4.64	-0.75	2.33	1.58
PRI	-0.06	1.84	1.78	0.08	-0.34	-0.26
DIV	-0.15	-0.12	-0.27	-0.59	-0.03	-0.62
TRP	-0.24	0.00	-0.24	0.14	0.00	0.14
-SIP	-0.11	-0.26	-0.37	-0.23	0.07	-0.16
-TPF	-0.27	-1.10	-1.37	-0.30	-0.15	-0.45
-TPSL	0.02	-0.16	-0.14	0.18	-0.02	0.16
Total DI\$ SER	-0.02	4.05	4.03	-1.47	1.86	0.39
.46XDI\$ SER	-0.01			-0.68		
All GNP-Price Induced	-1.53	-0.29	-1.82	-2.69	-0.61	-3.30
Not decomposed		-0.05			-0.18	
Price			3.47			-0.46
Ex post GNP\$			1.65			-3.76
Policy var.			-0.37			-0.37
Other exog.			-3.46			-3.46
Exog. price			-1.79			-1.79
Nonlinearity						-0.04
Ex ante GNP\$			-3.97			-9.34

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

6.4
Error, 2nd Quarter, 1968

GG		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-1.28	0.11	-1.17
1.18	0.26	1.44
2.93	0.65	3.58
1.02	0.16	1.18
3.85	1.18	5.03
0.26	-1.28	-1.02
1.61	0.01	1.62
6.89	0.06	-6.83
-5.02	-1.21	-6.23
0.56	-0.40	0.16
-0.23	-0.07	-0.30
0.33	-0.47	-0.14
-0.84	-0.50	-1.34
-0.45	5.32	4.87
-0.43	1.24	0.81
-0.16	-0.13	0.29
-0.11	-0.01	-0.10
-0.27	-0.01	-0.26
-0.28	-0.97	-1.25
0.17	-0.14	0.03
-1.53	5.34	3.81
-1.73	0.30	-1.43
	-0.28	
	0.58	
		2.25
		0.82
		-0.37
		-3.46
		-1.79
		-0.03
		-4.38

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

Forecast Error	AR		Forecast Error
	SER - CON	Other	
-1.39	-2.05	-0.19	-2.24
3.46	-0.25	-0.03	-0.28
4.14	0.51	0.53	1.04
2.27	0.21	0.11	0.31
8.48	-1.59	0.42	-1.17
-0.72	0.27	-1.48	-1.21
-1.29	4.92	0.00	4.92
-6.72	-4.48	0.08	-4.40
-8.73	0.71	-1.40	-0.69
0.16	-0.63	-0.23	-0.85
-1.56	-0.15	-0.01	-0.16
-1.40	-0.78	-0.23	-1.01
-1.65	-1.66	-1.21	-2.87
	-2.01		
4.64	-0.75	2.33	1.58
1.78	0.08	-0.34	-0.26
-0.27	-0.59	-0.03	-0.62
-0.24	0.14	0.00	0.14
-0.37	-0.23	0.07	-0.16
-1.37	-0.30	-0.15	-0.45
-0.14	0.18	-0.02	0.16
4.03	-1.47	1.86	0.39
	-0.68		
-1.82	-2.69	-0.61	-3.30
		-0.43	
		-0.18	
3.47			-0.46
1.65			-3.76
-0.37			-0.37
-3.46			-3.46
-1.79			-1.79
			-0.04
-3.97			-9.34

6.4
Error, 2nd Quarter, 1968

GG			OR		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-1.28	0.11	-1.17	-1.51	0.10	-1.41
1.18	0.26	1.44	-0.33	0.36	0.03
2.93	0.65	3.58	1.77	0.96	2.73
1.02	0.16	1.18	0.54	0.25	0.79
3.85	1.18	5.03	0.47	1.67	2.14
0.26	-1.28	-1.02	0.28	0.08	0.36
1.61	0.01	1.62	3.01	0.00	3.01
6.89	0.06	-6.83	-4.79	0.06	-4.73
-5.02	-1.21	-6.23	-1.50	0.14	-1.36
0.56	-0.40	0.16	0.56	-0.49	0.07
-0.23	-0.07	-0.30	-0.39	-0.06	-0.45
0.33	-0.47	-0.14	0.17	-0.55	-0.38
-0.84	-0.50	-1.34	-0.86	1.26	0.40
-1.02			-1.04		
-0.45	5.32	4.87	-1.07	4.08	4.10
-0.43	1.24	0.81	-0.32	0.59	0.27
-0.16	-0.13	0.29	0.15	-0.08	0.07
-0.11	-0.01	-0.10	0.28	0.00	0.28
-0.27	-0.01	-0.26	-0.21	-0.01	-0.22
-0.28	-0.97	-1.25	-0.29	-0.80	-1.09
0.17	-0.14	0.03	0.31	-0.11	0.20
-1.53	5.34	3.81	-1.15	4.76	3.61
-0.71			-0.53		
-1.73	0.30	-1.43	-1.57	2.22	0.65
	-0.28			-0.25	
	0.58			2.47	
		2.25			0.91
		0.82			1.56
		-0.37			-0.37
		-3.46			-3.46
		-1.79			-1.79
		-0.03			-0.04
		-4.38			-4.10

the glossary.

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

	NO			AR		
	SER	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
CA	-7.16	-0.18	-7.34	-4.79	0.62	4.17
CD	-0.51	-0.20	-0.71	-0.92	0.01	-0.91
CN	3.89	0.35	4.24	-1.16	1.40	0.24
CS	-0.94	-0.09	-1.03	-0.95	0.29	-0.66
C	-4.72	-0.12	-4.84	-7.82	2.32	-5.50
IH	-0.91	-1.96	-2.87	-0.17	-1.92	-2.09
ISE	-0.10	-0.36	-0.46	4.24	-2.88	1.36
DII	-1.28	0.06	-1.22	0.77	0.06	0.83
I	-2.29	-2.26	-4.55	4.84	-4.74	0.10
-IMT	1.05	0.21	1.26	-0.44	0.00	-0.44
-IMS	-0.88	0.10	-0.78	0.18	-0.07	0.11
-NFB	0.17	0.31	0.48	-0.26	-0.07	-0.33
GNP58	-6.84	-2.07	-8.91	-3.24	-2.49	-5.73
GNP\$	-8.38			-3.97		
W	-1.68	-4.40	-6.08	0.45	-2.76	-2.31
PRI	-0.31	0.53	0.22	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
DIV	-0.33	-0.29	-0.62	0.24	-0.23	0.01
TRP	-0.18	0.00	-0.18	0.03	0.00	0.03
-SIP	-0.46	0.27	-0.19	0.11	0.15	0.26
-TPF	-1.47	1.16	-0.31	-1.47	6.31	4.84
-TPSL	1.02	0.16	1.19	0.44	0.06	0.50
Total DI\$ SER	-3.41	-2.57	-5.97	-0.23	3.53	3.30
.46XDI\$ SER	-1.58			-0.11		
All GNP-Price Induced	-9.96	-0.68	-10.64	-4.08	-2.67	-6.75
Not decomposed		0.91			-2.02	
Price			-4.80			-2.34
Ex post GNP\$			-15.44			-9.09
Policy var.			-0.49			-0.49
Other exog.			-0.45			-0.45
Exog. price			1.31			-1.31
Nonlinearity						0.02
Ex ante GNP\$			-15.07			-8.70

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

6.5
Error, 3rd Quarter, 1968

GG		
SER-CON	Other	Forecast Error
-6.48	0.77	-5.71
-0.30	-0.42	-0.72
1.71	0.73	2.44
-0.91	-0.06	-0.97
-5.98	1.02	-4.96
-0.94	-1.00	-1.94
1.81	-2.18	-0.37
-1.28	0.05	-1.23
-0.41	-3.13	-3.54
0.95	-0.44	0.51
0.27	0.00	0.27
1.22	-0.44	0.78
-5.17	-2.55	-7.72
-6.33		
-1.32	-3.62	-4.94
0.34	0.02	0.36
-0.34	-0.19	-0.53
-0.04	0.00	-0.04
-0.05	0.23	0.18
-1.47	5.02	3.55
0.71	0.13	0.84
-2.17	1.59	-0.58
-1.00		
-7.33	-1.86	-9.19
	-1.17	
	-0.69	
		-2.56
		-11.75
		-0.49
		-0.45
		1.31
		0.01
		-11.37

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

Forecast Error	AR		Forecast Error
	SER - CON	Other	
-7.34	-4.79	0.62	4.17
-0.71	-0.92	0.01	-0.91
4.24	-1.16	1.40	0.24
-1.03	-0.95	0.29	-0.66
-4.84	-7.82	2.32	-5.50
-2.87	-0.17	-1.92	-2.09
-0.46	4.24	-2.88	1.36
-1.22	0.77	0.06	0.83
-4.55	4.84	-4.74	0.10
1.26	-0.44	0.00	-0.44
-0.78	0.18	-0.07	0.11
0.48	-0.26	-0.07	-0.33
-8.91	-3.24	-2.49	-5.73
	-3.97		
-6.08	0.45	-2.76	-2.31
0.22	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
-0.62	0.24	-0.23	0.01
-0.18	0.03	0.00	0.03
-0.19	0.11	0.15	0.26
-0.31	-1.47	6.31	4.84
1.19	0.44	0.06	0.50
-5.97	-0.23	3.53	3.30
	-0.11		
-10.64	-4.08	-2.67	-6.75
		-0.65	
		-2.02	
-4.80			-2.34
-15.44			-9.09
-0.49			-0.49
-0.45			-0.45
1.31			-1.31
			0.02
-15.07			-8.70

6.5
Error, 3rd Quarter, 1968

GG			OR		
SER-CON	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-6.48	0.77	-5.71	-4.76	-0.06	-4.82
-0.30	-0.42	-0.72	-0.71	-0.23	-0.94
1.71	0.73	2.44	-1.51	0.09	-1.42
-0.91	-0.06	-0.97	-0.94	-0.17	-1.11
-5.98	1.02	-4.96	-7.92	-0.37	-8.29
-0.94	-1.00	-1.94	0.09	-0.67	-0.58
1.81	-2.18	-0.37	-0.10	0.39	0.29
-1.28	0.05	-1.23	-0.28	0.04	-0.24
-0.41	-3.13	-3.54	-0.29	-0.24	-0.53
0.95	-0.44	0.51	2.55	-0.13	2.42
0.27	0.00	0.27	0.32	0.06	0.38
1.22	-0.44	0.78	2.87	-0.07	2.80
-5.17	-2.55	-7.72	-5.34	-0.68	-6.02
-6.33			-6.54		
-1.32	-3.62	-4.94	-0.23	-2.81	-3.04
0.34	0.02	0.36	0.09	-0.69	-0.60
-0.34	-0.19	-0.53	0.17	0.14	0.03
-0.04	0.00	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
-0.05	0.23	0.18	0.14	0.17	0.31
-1.47	5.02	3.55	-1.47	0.65	-0.82
0.71	0.13	0.84	0.47	0.09	0.56
-2.17	1.59	-0.58	-0.86	-2.73	-3.59
-1.00			-0.40		
-7.33	-1.86	-9.19	-6.94	-0.18	-7.12
	-1.17			-1.11	
	-0.69			0.93	
		-2.56			-1.49
		-11.75			-8.61
		-0.49			-0.49
		-0.45			-0.45
		1.31			1.31
		0.01			0.43
		-11.37			-7.81

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TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

	NO			AR		
	SER	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
CA	-5.12	-0.23	-5.35	-1.19	-0.33	-1.52
CD	0.45	-0.10	0.35	0.67	-0.15	0.52
CN	7.03	0.42	7.45	2.00	-0.08	1.92
CS	0.75	0.13	0.88	0.72	-0.04	0.68
C	3.11	0.22	3.33	2.20	-0.60	1.60
IH	-1.25	-0.05	-1.30	-1.13	-0.03	-1.16
ISE	-6.87	0.00	-6.87	-3.46	0.00	-3.46
IIA	-0.31	-0.42	-0.73	-0.39	-0.12	-0.51
IINA	-2.03	-0.37	-2.40	0.19	0.21	0.40
I	-10.46	-0.84	-11.30	-4.79	0.06	-4.73
-IMT	5.84	0.08	5.92	-0.57	0.19	-0.38
-IMS	-1.29	0.08	-1.21	-0.08	0.08	0.00
-NFB	4.55	0.16	4.71	-0.65	0.27	-0.38
GNP58	-2.80	-0.46	-3.26	-3.24	-0.27	-3.51
GNP\$	-3.46			-4.00		
W	-4.55	-9.14	-9.22	-2.78	-8.16	-8.24
PRI	-0.67	1.61	0.94	-0.55	0.88	0.38
DIV	0.16	-0.02	0.14	0.50	0.02	0.52
TRP	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.20
-SIP	-0.52	0.60	0.08	0.21	0.15	0.36
-TPF	0.69	1.46	2.15	0.70	1.31	2.01
-TPSL	1.47	0.21	1.68	0.38	0.19	0.57
Total DI\$ SER	-3.38	-0.81	-4.19	-1.34	-2.86	-4.20
.46XDI\$ SER	-1.57			-0.62		
All GNP-price Induced	-5.03	1.18	-3.85	-4.62	0.49	-4.13
Not decomposed		-0.80			-0.74	
Price		1.98			1.23	
Ex post GNP\$			-3.48			-0.95
Policy var.			-7.33			-5.08
Other exog.			-2.93			-2.93
Exog. price			0.70			0.70
Nonlinearity			-0.74			-0.74
Ex ante GNP\$			-10.30			-8.01

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

6.6
Error, 4th Quarter, 1968

GG		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-2.57	-0.52	-3.09
1.02	-0.37	0.65
5.60	0.09	5.69
1.36	-0.49	0.87
5.41	-1.29	4.12
-1.63	0.35	-1.28
-3.14	-0.01	-3.15
-0.35	-0.26	-0.61
-1.81	-0.08	-1.89
-6.93	0.00	-6.93
1.09	-0.64	0.45
-0.20	0.08	-0.12
0.89	-0.56	0.33
-0.63	-1.85	-2.48
-0.78		
-3.85	-9.29	-9.28
-0.51	1.43	0.92
0.13	0.02	0.15
0.22	0.00	0.22
-0.24	0.47	0.23
0.69	1.47	2.16
1.02	0.21	1.23
-2.54	-1.83	-4.37
-1.18		
-1.96	-0.91	-2.87
	-0.31	
	-0.60	
		-2.75
		-5.62
		-2.93
		0.70
		-0.74
		-0.77
		-9.36

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

Forecast Error	AR		
	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-5.35	-1.19	-0.33	-1.52
0.35	0.67	-0.15	0.52
7.45	2.00	-0.08	1.92
0.88	0.72	-0.04	0.68
3.33	2.20	-0.60	1.60
-1.30	-1.13	-0.03	-1.16
-6.87	-3.46	0.00	-3.46
-0.73	-0.39	-0.12	-0.51
2.40	0.19	0.21	0.40
1.30	-4.79	0.06	-4.73
5.92	-0.57	0.19	-0.38
1.21	-0.08	0.08	0.00
4.71	-0.65	0.27	-0.38
3.26	-3.24	-0.27	-3.51
	-4.00		
9.22	-2.78	-8.16	-8.24
0.94	-0.55	0.88	0.38
0.14	0.50	0.02	0.52
0.04	0.20	0.00	0.20
0.08	0.21	0.15	0.36
1.15	0.70	1.31	2.01
1.68	0.38	0.19	0.57
1.19	-1.34	-2.86	-4.20
	-0.62		
0.85	-4.62	0.49	-4.13
		-0.74	
		1.23	
0.48			-0.95
0.33			-5.08
0.93			-2.93
0.70			0.70
0.74			-0.74
			0.04
0.30			-8.01

6.6
Error, 4th Quarter, 1968

GG			OR		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-2.57	-0.52	-3.09	-1.42	-0.23	-1.65
1.02	-0.37	0.65	1.05	-0.14	0.91
5.60	0.09	5.69	2.73	0.12	2.85
1.36	-0.49	0.87	1.05	0.03	1.08
5.41	-1.29	4.12	3.41	-0.22	3.19
-1.63	0.35	-1.28	-1.25	-0.03	-1.28
-3.14	-0.01	-3.15	-1.67	0.00	-1.67
-0.35	-0.26	-0.61	-0.31	-0.13	-0.44
-1.81	-0.08	-1.89	-0.76	0.01	-0.75
-6.93	0.00	-6.93	-3.99	-0.15	-4.14
1.09	-0.64	0.45	-0.86	-0.03	-0.89
-0.20	0.08	-0.12	-0.19	0.06	0.13
0.89	-0.56	0.33	-1.05	0.03	-1.02
-0.63	-1.85	-2.48	-1.63	-0.24	-1.97
-0.78			-2.01		
-3.85	-9.29	-9.28	-1.66	-5.12	-6.78
-0.51	1.43	0.92	-0.70	1.08	0.38
0.13	0.02	0.15	0.50	0.04	0.54
0.22	0.00	0.22	0.17	0.00	0.17
-0.24	0.47	0.23	-0.20	0.52	0.32
0.69	1.47	2.16	0.70	1.05	1.75
1.02	0.21	1.23	0.16	0.15	0.31
-2.54	-1.83	-4.37	-1.03	-2.28	-3.31
-1.18			-0.48		
-1.96	-0.91	-2.87	-2.49	0.25	-2.24
	-0.31			-0.40	
	-0.60			0.65	
		-2.75			-0.51
		-5.62			-2.75
		-2.93			-2.93
		0.70			0.70
		-0.74			-0.74
		-0.77			-0.31
		-9.36			-6.03

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

	NO			AR		
	SER	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
CA	-5.50	0.18	-5.32	-0.52	0.03	-0.49
CD	-0.24	0.17	-0.07	-0.27	-0.04	-0.31
CN	5.70	0.79	6.49	-0.03	0.21	0.18
CS	-0.27	0.27	0.00	-0.12	0.07	-0.05
C	-0.31	1.41	1.10	-0.94	0.27	-0.67
IH	-0.98	-0.13	-1.11	-0.70	-0.13	-0.83
ISE	-0.36	-0.13	-0.49	1.11	0.25	1.36
IIA	-0.02	-0.42	-0.44	-0.61	-0.04	-0.65
IINA	3.24	-0.45	2.79	4.90	0.32	5.22
I	1.88	-1.13	0.75	4.70	0.40	5.10
-IMT	1.74	-0.01	1.73	-4.39	0.13	-4.26
-IMS	-1.09	0.00	-1.09	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
-NFB	0.65	-0.01	0.64	-4.40	0.13	-4.27
GNP58	2.22	0.27	2.49	-0.64	0.80	0.16
GNP5	2.77			-0.80		
W	-4.05	-0.12	-4.17	-1.14	-1.61	-2.75
PRI	0.51	0.03	0.58	0.43	-0.58	-0.15
DIV	0.38	0.08	0.46	0.43	0.05	0.48
TRP	-0.38	0.00	-0.38	-0.15	0.00	-0.15
-SIP	-0.51	0.27	-0.24	-0.08	0.21	0.13
-TPF	0.89	0.56	1.45	0.90	0.43	1.33
-TPSL	2.49	0.08	2.57	0.89	0.06	0.95
Total DI\$ SER	-0.67	0.94	0.27	1.28	-1.12	-0.16
.46XDI\$ SER	-0.31			0.59		
All GNP-price	2.46	0.20	2.66	-0.21	-0.05	-0.26
Induced		0.39			-0.03	
Not decomposed		-0.19			-0.02	
Price			-5.08			-1.98
Ex post GNP\$			-2.42			-2.24
Policy var.			-2.31			-2.31
Other exog.			7.45			7.45
Exog. price			-1.56			-1.56
Nonlinearity						0.15
Ex ante GNP\$			1.16 ²			1.49

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

6.7
Error, 1st Quarter, 1969

GG		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-3.43	0.04	-3.39
-0.61	-0.02	-0.63
3.11	0.42	3.53
-0.18	0.14	-0.04
-1.11	0.58	-0.53
-0.41	-0.06	-0.47
1.23	-0.23	1.00
-0.02	-0.27	-0.29
3.54	-0.07	3.47
4.34	-0.63	3.71
-2.67	0.12	-2.55
-0.13	0.01	-0.12
-2.80	0.13	-2.67
0.43	0.08	0.51
0.54		
-2.42	-1.71	-4.13
0.29	-0.05	0.24
0.38	0.05	0.43
-0.17	0.00	-0.17
-0.16	0.26	0.10
0.89	0.62	1.51
1.47	0.09	1.56
0.28	-0.74	-0.46
0.67	0.47	0.20
	0.11	
	0.58	
		-3.02
		-3.22
		-2.31
		7.45
		-1.56
		0.37
		0.79

Macroeconometric Models

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

Forecast Error	AR		Forecast Error
	SER - CON	Other	
-5.32	-0.52	0.03	-0.49
-0.07	-0.27	-0.04	-0.31
6.49	-0.03	0.21	0.18
0.00	-0.12	0.07	-0.05
1.10	-0.94	0.27	-0.67
-1.11	-0.70	-0.13	-0.83
-0.49	1.11	0.25	1.36
-0.44	-0.61	-0.04	-0.65
2.79	4.90	0.32	5.22
0.75	4.70	0.40	5.10
1.73	-4.39	0.13	-4.26
-1.09	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
0.64	-4.40	0.13	-4.27
2.49	-0.64	0.80	0.16
	-0.80		
-4.17	-1.14	-1.61	-2.75
0.58	0.43	-0.58	-0.15
0.46	0.43	0.05	0.48
-0.38	-0.15	0.00	-0.15
-0.24	-0.08	0.21	0.13
1.45	0.90	0.43	1.33
2.57	0.89	0.06	0.95
0.27	1.28	-1.12	-0.16
	0.59		
2.66	-0.21	-0.05	-0.26
		-0.03	
		-0.02	
-5.08			-1.98
-2.42			-2.24
-2.31			-2.31
7.45			7.45
-1.56			-1.56
			0.15
1.16			1.49

glossary.

The Decomposition of Forecasting Error: The OBE Model 315

6.7
Error, 1st Quarter, 1969

GG			OR		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-3.43	0.04	-3.39	-1.60	-0.23	-1.83
-0.61	-0.02	-0.63	-0.44	0.03	-0.41
3.11	0.42	3.53	1.40	-0.24	1.16
-0.18	0.14	-0.04	0.07	-0.09	-0.16
-1.11	0.58	-0.53	-0.71	-0.53	-1.24
-0.41	-0.06	-0.47	-0.58	-0.13	-0.71
1.23	-0.23	1.00	-0.96	-0.26	-1.22
-0.02	-0.27	-0.29	-0.02	-0.15	-0.17
3.54	-0.07	3.47	2.64	0.34	2.98
4.34	-0.63	3.71	1.08	-0.20	0.88
-2.67	0.12	-2.55	-2.96	0.39	-2.57
-0.13	0.01	-0.12	-0.29	0.05	-0.24
-2.80	0.13	-2.67	-3.25	0.44	-2.81
0.43	0.08	0.51	-2.88	-0.29	-3.17
0.54			-3.60		
-2.42	-1.71	-4.13	-1.57	-3.95	-5.52
0.29	-0.05	0.24	-0.03	-0.20	-0.23
0.38	0.05	0.43	0.36	-0.01	0.37
-0.17	0.00	-0.17	-0.12	0.00	-0.12
-0.16	0.26	0.10	-0.11	0.31	0.20
0.89	0.62	1.51	0.89	0.96	1.85
1.47	0.09	1.56	0.39	0.14	0.53
0.28	-0.74	-0.46	-0.19		-2.92
0.13			-0.09		
0.67	0.47	0.20	-3.69	-0.72	-4.41
	0.11			-0.55	
	0.58			-0.17	
		-3.02			-2.02
		-3.22			-6.43
		-2.31			-2.31
		7.45			7.45
		-1.56			1.56
		0.37			0.04
		0.79			-2.81

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

	NO			AR		
	SER	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
CA	-5.28	-0.36	-5.64	-0.27	-0.36	-0.63
CD	-0.80	-0.19	-0.99	-0.81	-0.36	-1.17
CN	5.99	0.51	6.50	0.52	-0.11	0.41
CS	0.78	-0.12	0.66	0.63	-0.34	0.29
C	0.69	-0.16	0.53	0.07	-1.17	-1.10
IH	0.32	0.00	0.32	0.33	0.01	0.34
ISE	-8.90	0.00	-8.90	-0.36	0.00	-0.36
IIA	1.25	-0.45	0.80	1.60	-0.05	1.55
IINA	-0.45	-0.44	-0.89	-1.29	-0.34	-1.63
I	-7.78	-0.89	-8.67	0.28	0.35	-0.10
-IMT	9.91	0.00	9.91	5.83	-0.44	5.39
-IMS	-0.33	-0.03	-0.36	0.79	-0.06	0.73
-NFB	9.58	-0.03	9.55	6.62	-0.50	6.12
GNP58	2.49	-1.08	1.41	6.97	-1.31	4.93
GNP\$	3.15			8.81		
W	-3.33	2.31	-1.02	1.88	3.00	4.88
PRI	-1.23	0.93	-0.30	-1.82	0.41	-1.41
DIV	-0.15	-0.06	-0.21	-0.42	0.04	-0.38
TRP	-0.42	0.00	-0.42	-0.33	0.00	-0.33
-SIP	-0.41	0.01	-0.40	0.08	-0.19	-0.11
-TPF	-0.15	0.27	0.12	-0.18	-0.55	-0.73
-TPSL	3.22	0.04	3.26	0.88	-0.08	0.80
Total DI\$ SER	-2.47	3.50	1.03	0.09	2.63	2.72
.46XDI\$ SER	-1.15			0.04		
All GNP-price Induced	2.00	0.60	2.60	8.85	-1.82	7.03
Not decomposed		0.32			1.42	
Price		0.28			-3.24	
Ex post GNP\$			-4.68			0.85
Policy var.			-2.08			7.88
Other exog.			-1.34			-1.34
Exog. price			3.30			3.30
Nonlinearity			-0.20			-0.20
Ex ante GNP\$			-0.32			9.78

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

6.8
Error, 2nd Quarter, 1969

GG		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-3.05	-0.46	-3.51
-0.44	-0.26	-0.70
4.41	0.12	4.51
0.53	-0.26	0.27
1.45	-0.86	0.59
0.23	0.01	0.24
-4.06	0.00	-4.06
1.28	-0.28	1.00
-1.14	-0.57	-1.71
-3.69	-3.74	-4.53
7.58	-0.24	7.34
0.82	-0.03	0.79
8.40	-0.27	8.13
6.16	-4.87	4.19
7.79		
-0.85	1.43	0.58
-1.98	0.96	-1.02
-0.14	0.06	-0.08
0.08	0.00	0.08
-0.06	-0.05	-0.11
-0.16	0.09	-0.07
1.79	0.01	1.80
-1.32	2.50	1.18
-0.61		
7.18	-1.07	6.11
	1.15	
	-2.22	
		-1.74
		4.37
		-1.34
		3.30
		-0.20
		0.48
		6.6

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

er	Forecast Error	AR		Forecast Error
		SER - CON	Other	
36	-5.64	-0.27	-0.36	-0.63
9	-0.99	-0.81	-0.36	-1.17
1	6.50	0.52	-0.11	0.41
2	0.66	0.63	-0.34	0.29
6	0.53	0.07	-1.17	-1.10
0	0.32	0.33	0.01	0.34
0	-8.90	-0.36	0.00	-0.36
5	0.80	1.60	-0.05	1.55
4	-0.89	-1.29	-0.34	-1.63
0	-8.67	0.28	0.35	-0.10
0	9.91	5.83	-0.44	5.39
1	-0.36	0.79	-0.06	0.73
1	9.55	6.62	-0.50	6.12
	1.41	6.97	-1.31	4.93
		8.81		
	-1.02	1.88	3.00	4.88
	-0.30	-1.82	0.41	-1.41
	-0.21	-0.42	0.04	-0.38
	-0.42	-0.33	0.00	-0.33
	-0.40	0.08	-0.19	-0.11
	0.12	-0.18	-0.55	-0.73
	3.26	0.88	-0.08	0.80
	1.03	0.09	2.63	2.72
		0.04		
	2.60	8.85	-1.82	7.03
			1.42	
			-3.24	
	-4.68			0.85
	-2.08			7.88
	-1.34			-1.34
	3.30			3.30
	-0.20			-0.20
				0.14
	-0.32			9.78

6.8
Error, 2nd Quarter, 1969

GG			OR		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-3.05	-0.46	-3.51	-0.38	-0.99	-1.37
-0.44	-0.26	-0.70	-5.40	4.04	-1.36
4.41	0.12	4.51	5.99	-5.31	0.68
0.53	-0.26	0.27	0.78	-0.55	0.23
1.45	-0.86	0.59	0.99	-2.81	-1.82
0.23	0.01	0.24	0.32	0.00	0.32
-4.06	0.00	-4.06	-2.14	0.00	-2.14
1.28	-0.28	1.00	1.25	-0.11	1.14
-1.14	-0.57	-1.71	-1.15	0.08	-1.07
-3.69	-3.74	-4.53	-1.72	5.73	-1.75
7.58	-0.24	7.34	1.91	0.11	2.02
0.82	-0.03	0.79	0.77	0.07	0.84
8.40	-0.27	8.13	2.68	0.18	2.86
6.16	-4.87	4.19	1.95	3.10	-0.71
7.79			2.47		
-0.85	1.43	0.58	-1.95	-2.49	-4.44
-1.98	0.96	-1.02	-1.34	0.04	-1.30
-0.14	0.06	-0.08	-0.15	0.01	-0.14
0.08	0.00	0.08	0.12	0.00	0.12
-0.06	-0.05	-0.11	-0.01	0.12	0.11
-0.16	0.09	-0.07	-0.13	1.05	0.92
1.79	0.01	1.80	0.12	0.15	0.27
-1.32	2.50	1.18	-3.34	-1.12	-4.46
-0.61			-1.55		
7.18	-1.07	6.11	0.92	-1.01	-0.09
	1.15			0.15	
	-2.22			-1.16	
		-1.74			-2.55
		4.37			-2.64
		-1.34			-1.34
		3.30			3.30
		-0.20			-0.20
		0.48			-0.39
		6.61			-0.49

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

	NO			AR		
	SER	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
CA	-6.99	-0.15	-7.14	-0.12	0.08	-0.04
CD	0.97	-0.22	0.75	1.90	-0.19	1.71
CN	8.62	0.36	8.98	2.78	0.15	2.93
CS	0.08	0.12	0.20	0.48	0.05	0.53
C	2.68	0.11	2.79	5.04	0.09	5.13
IH	-0.74	0.10	-0.64	-0.12	0.11	-0.01
ISE	-0.81	-0.85	-1.66	-1.25	-0.32	-1.57
IIA	-0.45	-0.57	-1.02	-0.80	-0.01	-0.81
IINA	-0.75	-1.16	-1.91	-1.78	-0.44	-2.22
I	-2.75	-2.48	-5.23	-3.95	-0.66	-4.61
-IMT	5.99	0.00	5.99	1.51	-0.15	1.36
-IMS	-0.14	0.64	0.50	0.38	0.57	0.95
-NFB	5.85	0.64	6.49	1.89	0.42	2.31
GNP58	5.78	1.73	4.05	2.98	-0.16	2.83
GNP\$	7.46			3.85		
W	-0.22	1.16	0.94	-0.23	2.70	2.47
PRI	-0.12	0.51	0.39	-0.46	0.72	0.26
DIV	-0.23	0.08	-0.15	-0.41	-0.04	0.37
TRP	-0.46	0.00	-0.46	-0.09	0.00	-0.09
-SIP	-0.50	0.26	-0.24	-0.05	0.20	0.15
-TPF	-1.02	-0.21	-1.23	-1.02	-0.42	-1.44
-TPSL	-2.99	-0.03	-3.02	-0.08	-0.06	-0.14
Total DI\$ SER	-5.54	1.77	-3.77	-2.34	3.18	0.84
.46XDI\$ SER	-2.57			-1.09		
All GNP-price	4.89	0.28	5.17	2.76	0.83	3.59
Induced		0.78			0.44	
Not decomposed		0.50			0.39	
Price			-5.96			0.45
Ex post GNP\$			-0.79			4.04
Policy var.			1.74			1.74
Other exog.			-1.46			-1.46
Exog. price			-0.86			-0.86
Nonlinearity						0.04
Ex ante GNP\$			-1.37			3.50

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

6.9
Error, 3rd Quarter, 1969

GG		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-3.85	-0.42	-4.27
1.72	-0.38	1.34
6.27	-0.23	6.04
0.28	-0.09	0.19
4.42	-1.12	3.30
-0.38	0.10	-0.28
-0.12	-1.42	-1.54
-0.46	-0.39	-0.85
-0.46	-0.49	-0.95
-1.42	-2.20	-3.62
-0.48	0.25	-0.23
-0.05	0.68	0.63
-0.53	0.93	0.40
2.47	2.39	0.08
3.19		
-0.23	-4.31	-4.54
-0.39	0.58	0.19
-0.23	-0.09	0.14
-0.08	0.00	-0.08
-0.24	0.46	0.22
0.99	-0.80	-1.19
-1.31	0.07	-1.24
-3.47	-2.31	-5.78
1.58	1.53	0.05
	0.25	
	1.28	
		-3.94
		-3.89
		1.74
		-1.46
		-0.86
		0.17
		-4.30

TABLE
Decomposition of First Quarter

Forecast Error	AR		Forecast Error
	SER - CON	Other	
-7.14	-0.12	0.08	-0.04
0.75	1.90	-0.19	1.71
8.98	2.78	0.15	2.93
0.20	0.48	0.05	0.53
2.79	5.04	0.09	5.13
-0.64	-0.12	0.11	-0.01
-1.66	-1.25	-0.32	-1.57
-1.02	-0.80	-0.01	-0.81
-1.91	-1.78	-0.44	-2.22
-5.23	-3.95	-0.66	-4.61
5.99	1.51	-0.15	1.36
0.50	0.38	0.57	0.95
6.49	1.89	0.42	2.31
4.05	2.98	-0.16	2.83
	3.85		
0.94	-0.23	2.70	2.47
0.39	-0.46	0.72	0.26
-0.15	-0.41	-0.04	0.37
-0.46	-0.09	0.00	-0.09
-0.24	-0.05	0.20	0.15
-1.23	-1.02	-0.42	-1.44
-3.02	-0.08	-0.06	-0.14
-3.77	-2.34	3.18	0.84
	-1.09		
5.17	2.76	0.83	3.59
		0.44	
		0.39	
			0.45
-5.96			4.04
-0.79			1.74
1.74			-1.46
-1.46			-0.86
-0.86			0.04
			3.50
-1.37			

6.9
Error, 3rd Quarter, 1969

GG			OR		
SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error	SER - CON	Other	Forecast Error
-3.85	-0.42	-4.27	-1.49	-0.09	-1.58
1.72	-0.38	1.34	1.67	-0.23	1.44
6.27	-0.23	6.04	2.12	-0.14	1.98
0.28	-0.09	0.19	0.38	-0.05	0.33
4.42	-1.12	3.30	2.68	-0.51	2.17
-0.38	0.10	-0.28	-0.44	0.10	-0.34
-0.12	-1.42	-1.54	-1.31	-0.06	-1.37
-0.46	-0.39	-0.85	-0.95	-0.13	-1.08
-0.46	-0.49	-0.95	-0.75	-0.35	-1.10
-1.42	-2.20	-3.62	-3.45	-0.44	-3.89
-0.48	0.25	-0.23	0.81	0.41	1.22
-0.05	0.68	0.63	0.76	0.59	1.35
-0.53	0.93	0.40	1.57	1.00	2.57
2.47	2.39	0.08	0.80	0.05	0.85
3.19			1.03		
-0.23	-4.31	-4.54	-0.23	0.89	0.66
-0.39	0.58	0.19	-0.42	0.27	-0.15
-0.23	-0.09	0.14	-0.43	-0.01	-0.44
-0.08	0.00	-0.08	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
-0.24	0.46	0.22	-0.10	0.27	0.17
0.99	-0.80	-1.19	-1.01	-0.01	-1.02
-1.31	0.07	-1.24	-0.08	0.00	-0.08
-3.47	-2.31	-5.78	-2.30	1.41	-0.89
-1.61			-1.07		
1.58	1.53	0.05	-0.04	1.09	1.05
	0.25			0.00	
	1.28			1.09	
		-3.94			-0.61
		-3.89			0.44
		1.74			1.74
		-1.46			-1.46
		-0.86			-0.86
		0.17			0.08
		-4.30			-0.06

glossary.

TABLE 6.10
Effects of Errors in Inputs for O8E, 2nd Quarter, 1968

Variable	No Constant Adjustments		AR Constant Adjustments		GG Constant Adjustments		OR Constant Adjustments		Ex Ante Minus Ex Post
	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	
	<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>								
CA	2.23	-5.11	-2.41	-6.58	0.61	-5.10	-0.34	5.16	1.59
CD	2.95	2.24	-0.20	-1.11	1.61	0.89	0.55	-0.39	-0.08
CN	-2.72	1.52	-2.10	-1.86	1.08	1.36	1.77	0.35	-0.35
CS	1.73	0.70	-0.79	-1.45	1.09	0.12	0.33	-0.78	-0.12
C	4.19	-0.65	-5.50	-11.00	2.23	-2.73	2.31	-5.98	-1.67
IH	0.31	-2.56	-1.02	-3.11	-0.85	-2.79	0.83	0.25	-0.69
ISE	-1.73	-2.19	3.60	4.96	0.12	-0.25	1.75	2.04	-0.15
DII	-0.99	-2.21	-1.37	-0.54	-1.03	-2.16	-0.06	-0.30	-0.83
I	-2.41	-6.96	1.21	1.31	-1.76	-5.20	2.52	1.99	-1.67
-IMT	-0.27	0.99	0.04	-0.40	0.45	0.96	-1.17	1.25	-0.16
-IMS	-0.55	-1.33	0.13	0.24	-0.30	-0.03	-0.52	-0.14	-0.04
-NFB	-0.82	-0.34	0.17	-0.16	0.15	0.93	-1.69	1.11	-0.20
GNP58	0.96	-7.95	-4.12	-9.85	0.72	-7.00	3.14	-2.88	-2.72
GNP\$	9.51	-5.73	-4.50	-13.39	6.56	-4.99	5.59	-2.82	-5.27
DI\$	6.66	1.10	-8.64	-4.96	1.83	1.64	5.24	1.33	-2.25
	<i>Third Quarter of Forecast</i>								
CA	-0.87	-6.22	-6.33	-7.85	-2.97	-6.06	-4.41	-6.06	2.17
CD	1.54	1.89	-1.78	-1.26	0.40	1.05	-0.83	0.08	-0.01
CN	3.81	3.64	-1.99	-0.07	-2.02	3.67	-0.21	2.64	-0.07
CS	1.33	1.21	-1.79	-1.11	0.01	0.88	-1.37	-0.29	-0.03
C	-2.81	0.52	-11.89	-10.29	-4.58	-0.46	-6.82	-3.63	2.06
	<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>								
IH	-4.26	-5.56	-5.18	-6.34	-4.53	-5.81	-1.30	-2.58	0.10
ISE	2.51	-4.36	6.96	3.50	0.11	-3.04	1.65	-0.02	-0.26
DII	-4.78	-7.91	-6.06	-6.17	-4.86	-7.36	-4.83	-6.02	-0.48
I	-6.53	-17.83	-4.28	-9.01	-9.28	-16.21	-4.48	-8.62	-0.64
-IMT	-5.49	0.43	1.32	-1.70	-0.17	0.28	-1.53	0.64	-0.65
-IMS	-0.25	-1.46	0.27	0.27	0.00	-0.12	0.03	-0.16	-0.17
-NFB	-5.74	-1.03	-1.05	-1.43	-0.17	0.16	-1.50	0.48	-0.82
GNP58	-15.08	-18.34	-17.22	-20.73	-14.03	-0.46	-9.80	-11.77	0.66
GNP\$	-13.00	-20.33	-24.86	-29.94	-12.31	-17.93	-14.75	-17.50	0.86
DI\$	-1.67	-5.88	-9.56	-13.76	0.69	-4.56	-2.89	-6.21	0.45
	<i>Fourth Quarter of Forecast</i>								
CA	-3.18	-8.50	-9.72	-10.21	-4.87	-8.26	-6.55	-8.38	2.95
CD	-0.32	-0.39	-3.10	-3.41	-0.37	-0.97	-0.99	-1.40	0.16
CN	-5.13	1.36	-2.63	-2.45	-2.11	1.42	-0.66	0.50	-0.09
					0.44	0.40	-0.76	-0.92	0.00

DII	-0.99	-2.21	4.96	0.12	-0.25	1.75	0.25	-0.69	
I	-2.41	-6.96	-0.54	-1.03	-2.16	2.04	2.04	-0.15	
-IMT	-0.27	0.99	1.31	-1.76	-5.20	-0.06	-0.30	-0.83	
-IMS	-0.55	-1.33	-0.40	0.45	0.96	2.52	1.99	-1.67	
-NFB	-0.82	-0.34	0.24	-0.30	-0.03	-1.17	1.25	-0.16	
GNP58	0.96	-7.95	-0.16	0.15	0.93	-0.52	-0.14	-0.04	
GNP\$	9.51	-5.73	-9.85	0.72	-7.00	3.14	-2.88	-0.20	
DIS	6.66	1.10	-4.96	6.56	-4.99	5.59	-2.82	-5.27	
			1.83	1.64		5.24	1.33	-2.25	
			Third Quarter of Forecast						
CA	-0.87	-6.22	-7.85	-2.97	-6.06	-4.41	-6.06	2.17	
CD	1.54	1.89	-1.26	0.40	1.05	-0.83	0.08	-0.01	
CN	3.81	3.64	-0.07	-2.02	3.67	-0.21	2.64	-0.07	
CS	1.33	1.21	-1.11	0.01	0.88	-1.37	-0.29	-0.03	
C	-2.81	0.52	-11.89	-4.58	-0.46	-6.82	-3.63	2.06	
			-10.29						

IH	-4.26	-5.56	-5.18	-4.53	-5.81	-1.30	-2.58	0.10	
ISE	2.51	-4.36	6.96	0.11	-3.04	1.65	-0.02	-0.26	
DII	-4.78	-7.91	-6.06	-4.86	-7.36	-4.83	-6.02	-0.48	
I	-6.53	-17.83	-4.28	-9.28	-16.21	-4.48	-8.62	-0.64	
-IMT	-5.49	0.43	-1.32	-0.17	0.28	-1.53	0.64	-0.65	
-IMS	-0.25	-1.46	0.27	0.00	-0.12	0.03	-0.16	-0.17	
-NFB	-5.74	-1.03	-1.05	-0.17	0.16	-1.50	0.48	-0.82	
GNP58	-15.08	-18.34	-17.22	-14.03	-0.46	-9.80	-11.77	0.66	
GNP\$	-13.00	-20.33	-24.86	-29.94	-17.93	-14.75	-17.50	0.86	
DIS	-1.67	-5.88	-9.56	0.69	-4.56	-2.89	-6.21	0.45	
			-13.76						
			Fourth Quarter of Forecast						
CA	-3.18	-8.50	-9.72	-4.87	-8.26	-6.55	-8.38	2.95	
CD	-0.32	-0.39	-3.10	-0.37	-0.97	-0.99	-1.40	0.16	
CN	-5.13	1.36	-2.63	-2.11	1.42	-0.66	0.50	-0.09	
CS	0.63	0.63	-1.83	0.44	0.40	-0.76	-0.92	0.00	
C	-8.00	-6.90	-17.28	-6.98	-7.41	-8.96	-10.20	3.02	
IH	-5.12	-6.23	-6.38	-7.21	-6.02	-2.71	-3.42	-0.08	
ISE	-6.25	-6.74	-10.70	-6.80	-5.80	-1.44	-2.66	-0.15	
DII	-10.02	-7.67	-10.70	-10.09	-6.91	-8.67	-5.86	1.18	
I	-21.39	-20.64	-17.20	-22.91	-19.20	-12.82	-11.94	0.95	
-IMT	-4.06	-2.33	-0.68	-0.01	-2.56	0.62	-1.95	-1.64	
-IMS	-0.38	-1.47	0.44	0.03	0.09	0.18	-0.06	-0.35	
-NFB	-4.44	-3.81	-0.24	0.02	-2.65	0.80	-2.01	-1.99	
GNP58	-33.83	-31.34	-34.72	-29.77	-29.26	-20.98	-24.15	1.98	
GNP\$	-37.76	-40.38	-50.46	-34.19	-37.17	-32.04	-38.67	10.12	
DIS	-15.99	-15.73	-25.50	-13.58	-14.04	-13.84	-16.75	3.73	
			-25.70						

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

by Macroeconometric Models

C	-5.82	-2.49	-1.18	-0.31	-1.49	-0.41	0.03
IH	-5.70	-7.00	-6.41	-2.29	-9.25	-6.06	2.14
ISE	4.49	-2.38	-5.07	-6.33	-1.92	-3.20	1.22
DII	-3.82	-6.95	2.74	-0.72	0.08	-1.59	0.11
I	-5.03	-16.33	-4.88	-4.99	-3.28	-4.47	0.20
-IMT	-5.17	0.75	-7.21	-11.94	-5.12	-9.26	1.53
-IMS	0.36	-0.85	-1.21	-1.59	2.60	1.71	-0.48
-NFB	-4.81	-0.10	0.08	0.25	0.48	0.35	-0.08
GNP58	-15.69	-18.92	-1.13	-1.51	3.08	2.06	-0.56
GNP\$	-22.46	-32.76	-13.96	-17.47	-11.29	-13.26	3.11
D1\$	-10.68	-14.89	-18.58	-21.59	-15.21	-21.23	5.63
			0.22	-3.98	-6.36	-9.68	2.31
			-7.44	-7.93	-5.75	-7.58	2.62
CA	-4.89	-10.21	-6.38	-9.77	-1.99	-2.40	0.38
CD	-2.23	-2.30	-2.81	-2.49	-2.36	-1.20	0.49
CN	-1.74	4.75	1.56	4.61	-0.61	-0.77	0.21
CS	-0.78	-0.78	-0.56	-0.70	-10.71	-11.95	3.70
C	-9.64	-8.54	-11.54	-8.35			

Third Quarter of Forecast

The Decomposition of Forecasting Error: The OBE Model 323

IH	-6.93	-8.04	-6.46	-7.29	-7.09	-7.56	-3.31	-4.02	0.93
ISE	-4.38	-4.87	-4.83	-3.47	-5.76	-4.76	-2.65	-3.87	0.35
DII	-7.98	-5.63	-9.66	-5.09	-8.41	-5.23	-5.74	-2.91	1.22
I	-19.29	-18.54	-20.95	-15.85	-21.26	-17.55	-11.68	-10.80	2.50
-IMT	-5.65	-1.92	-0.73	-4.99	-0.67	-3.22	1.20	-1.37	-1.41
-IMS	0.24	-0.85	-0.16	0.17	0.43	0.31	0.66	0.42	-0.26
-NFB	-3.41	-2.77	-0.57	-4.82	-0.24	-2.91	1.86	-0.95	-1.67
GNP58	-32.34	-29.85	-32.39	-32.21	-29.32	-28.81	-20.53	-23.70	4.53
GNP\$	-50.45	-53.07	-47.00	-49.44	-47.13	-50.11	-32.78	-39.41	12.37
D1\$	-24.43	-24.17	-13.49	-13.66	-20.26	-20.72	-14.31	-17.22	6.73
			-8.91	-9.54	-7.36	-10.87	-7.16	-8.53	3.06
CA	-5.36	-11.00	-3.04	-4.21	-3.03	-3.73	-2.06	-3.42	0.41
CD	-2.53	-3.52	-0.01	0.40	1.52	6.05	-0.84	-0.16	0.31
CN	-0.34	6.16	-1.21	-0.92	-1.21	-0.94	1.22	-0.99	0.17
CS	-1.64	-0.98	-13.17	-14.27	-10.08	-9.49	-11.28	-13.10	3.95
C	-9.87	-9.34	-7.07	-6.73	-7.35	-7.11	-3.85	-3.53	1.00
IH	-7.78	-7.46	-6.11	-6.47	-2.96	-7.02	-3.93	-6.07	0.83
ISE	1.69	-7.21	-9.38	-9.46	-7.74	-8.45	-5.67	-5.60	3.37
DII	-8.55	-8.64	-22.36	-22.66	-18.05	-22.58	-13.45	-15.20	5.20
I	-14.64	-23.31	-3.45	1.94	-3.31	4.03	3.80	5.82	-1.57
-IMT	-4.46	5.45	0.40	1.13	0.46	1.25	0.53	1.37	-0.27
-IMS	0.39	0.03	-3.05	3.07	-2.85	5.28	4.33	7.19	1.84
-NFB	-4.07	5.48	-38.78	-33.86	-30.98	-26.79	-20.40	-21.11	7.31
GNP58	-28.58	-27.17	-63.16	-55.28	-58.41	-54.04	-37.90	-40.54	6.69
GNP\$	-54.04	-56.12	-22.18	-19.36	-28.41	-27.13	-16.51	-20.86	5.76
D1\$	-30.70	-29.57							

Fourth Quarter of Forecast

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

terly Macroeconometric Models

GNP	5.86	-0.17	0.01	1.63	5.16	0.04	1.20	0.14
CS	0.59	0.42	0.37	0.63	0.59	1.03	0.87	-0.01
C	-2.33	-2.95	-3.62	-0.51	-1.04	0.01	-1.23	0.87
IH	0.01	-0.10	-0.93	-0.56	-1.03	-0.34	-1.05	2.51
ISE	-7.76	-7.25	5.89	-6.76	-5.76	-1.82	-3.04	0.12
IIA	-0.80	-0.06	0.71	-0.67	-0.96	-0.48	-0.65	0.14
IINA	-4.22	-1.24	2.66	-3.99	-0.52	-1.65	-0.52	0.08
I	-12.77	-9.97	4.87	-11.98	-8.27	-4.29	-3.41	0.18
-IMT	1.27	1.03	-3.23	1.14	-1.41	-1.41	-3.98	0.52
-IMS	-0.14	0.06	0.05	0.01	-0.11	0.13	-0.11	-2.67
-NFB	-1.13	1.09	-3.18	1.15	-1.52	-1.28	-4.09	-0.20
GNP58	-13.97	-11.83	-11.67	-11.34	-10.83	-5.56	-8.73	-0.87
GNP\$	-23.70	-20.33	-22.77	-22.80	-25.60	-12.05	-18.68	0.16
DI\$	-12.61	-10.72	-10.89	-11.60	-12.10	-5.68	-8.59	1.13
CA	-1.99	-4.09	-4.72	-3.85	-7.36	2.80	-4.17	0.90
CD	-0.76	0.10	-1.07	-1.15	-1.85	0.80	-0.56	-0.09
CN	1.36	0.99	1.40	2.79	7.32	2.13	2.81	-0.39
CS	-0.04	-0.02	0.27	0.29	0.56	0.64	0.87	-0.07

Third Quarter of Forecast

The Decomposition of Forecasting Error: The OBE Model 325

C	-1.43	-0.90	-3.02	-6.87	-1.92	-1.33	-1.05	0.33
IH	-1.12	-0.80	-0.97	-0.63	-0.95	-0.71	-0.74	0.66
ISE	2.69	-6.21	-4.37	-4.73	-0.47	-4.53	-0.93	0.42
IIA	0.33	1.13	-0.18	1.37	0.11	1.11	1.48	0.10
IINA	-4.59	-5.48	-1.25	-2.88	-3.98	-5.69	-3.60	1.40
I	-2.69	-11.36	-6.77	-6.87	-5.29	-9.82	-3.79	2.53
-IMT	0.08	9.99	-1.34	4.05	-0.74	6.60	3.03	-0.49
-IMS	-0.02	-0.38	0.28	1.01	0.01	0.80	0.81	-1.19
-NFB	0.06	-9.61	1.06	5.06	-0.73	7.40	3.84	-0.68
GNP58	-4.06	-2.65	-10.85	-5.93	-7.94	-3.75	-1.00	2.23
GNP\$	-24.48	-26.58	-33.00	-25.10	-31.20	-26.80	-17.78	-0.44
DI\$	-17.27	-16.17	-17.44	-14.64	-6.10	-4.80	-10.72	-0.50
CA	0.52	-6.62	-4.36	-4.40	-2.58	-6.85	-3.57	0.55
CD	-0.13	0.62	-0.32	1.39	-0.89	0.45	1.95	-0.01
CN	2.34	11.32	0.99	3.92	4.75	10.79	5.63	-0.42
CS	1.19	1.39	0.27	0.80	1.10	1.29	1.52	-0.10
C	3.92	6.71	-3.42	1.71	1.38	4.68	5.53	0.02
IH	-0.36	-1.00	-0.82	-0.83	-0.64	-0.92	-0.94	2.08
ISE	-2.22	-3.88	-2.01	-3.58	-1.39	-2.93	1.06	0.39
IIA	-0.15	-1.17	-0.30	-1.11	-0.45	-1.30	-0.99	0.07
IINA	-2.33	-4.24	-1.11	-3.33	-4.11	-5.06	-3.43	0.27
I	-5.06	-10.29	-4.24	-8.85	-6.59	-0.21	-4.30	2.81
-IMT	1.72	7.71	-0.83	2.19	5.37	5.14	0.92	-0.58
-IMS	-0.34	0.16	0.74	1.69	0.77	1.40	1.43	-0.39
-NFB	1.38	7.87	1.57	3.88	6.14	6.54	2.35	-0.97
GNP58	0.24	4.29	-6.09	-3.26	0.93	1.01	3.58	1.86
GNP\$	-28.14	-28.93	-34.97	-30.23	-20.55	-30.44	-20.52	4.06
DI\$	-13.79	-17.56	-18.32	-17.50	-12.16	-17.90	-11.62	0.42

Fourth Quarter of Forecast

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

TABLE 6.13
Effects of Errors in Inputs for OBE, 1st Quarter, 1969

Variable	No Constant Adjustments		AR Constant Adjustments		GG Constant Adjustments		OR Constant Adjustments		Ex Ante Minus Ex Post
	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	
					<i>Second Quarter of Forecast</i>				
CA	0.24	-5.40	-0.38	-1.01	-1.36	-4.87	-1.34	-2.71	0.54
CD	0.12	-0.87	0.40	-0.77	0.87	-1.57	0.38	-0.98	-0.06
CN	1.68	8.18	1.23	1.64	2.31	6.84	1.85	2.53	-0.06
CS	-0.72	-0.06	-0.37	-0.08	-0.37	-0.10	-0.48	-0.25	-0.01
C	1.32	1.85	0.88	-0.22	-0.29	0.30	0.41	-1.41	0.41
IH	-0.78	-0.46	-0.52	-0.18	-0.06	0.18	-0.38	-0.06	0.57
ISE	7.78	-1.12	1.21	0.85	2.75	-1.31	0.05	-2.09	0.44
I/A	0.56	-1.36	0.19	1.74	0.57	1.57	0.73	1.87	0.05
I/A	-3.33	-4.22	1.64	0.01	2.60	0.89	-0.90	-1.97	1.04
I	4.23	-4.44	2.52	2.42	5.86	1.33	-0.50	-2.25	2.10
-IMT	-1.28	8.63	-2.89	2.50	-2.06	5.28	1.39	3.41	-0.18
-IMS	0.12	-0.24	0.14	0.87	-0.04	0.75	-0.19	0.65	-0.11
-NFB	-1.16	8.39	-2.75	3.37	-2.10	6.03	1.20	4.06	-0.29
GNP58	4.39	5.80	0.65	5.57	3.47	7.66	1.11	0.40	2.22
GNP\$	-1.43	-3.51	-5.83	2.05	-6.50	-2.30	-2.38	-5.02	-2.70
D/\$	-4.91	-3.78	-3.62	-0.80	-4.50	-3.20	-0.57	-4.92	0.04

Third Quarter of Forecast

CA	2.28	-4.86	-0.44	-0.48	-0.14	-4.41	-0.77	-2.35	0.15
CD	0.54	1.29	-0.08	1.63	-1.07	0.27	-0.10	1.34	-0.05
CN	2.52	11.50	1.48	4.41	3.83	9.87	3.34	5.32	-0.53
CS	0.47	0.67	0.05	0.58	0.39	0.58	0.06	0.39	-0.16
C	5.81	8.60	1.01	6.14	3.01	6.31	2.53	4.70	-0.59
IH	1.38	0.74	1.02	1.01	1.47	1.19	1.48	1.14	0.39
ISE	0.04	-1.62	2.02	0.45	-0.60	-2.14	-1.54	-2.91	0.25
I/A	0.17	-0.85	0.15	-0.66	-0.79	0.79	0.45	-0.63	0.05
I/A	-1.51	-3.42	1.94	-0.28	-1.89	-2.84	-1.26	-2.36	0.28
I/A	0.08	-5.15	5.13	0.52	-0.96	-4.58	-0.87	-4.76	0.97
I	0.39	6.38	-1.10	0.26	3.37	3.14	0.06	1.28	0.08
-IMT	-0.19	0.31	0.52	1.47	0.74	1.37	-0.10	1.25	0.26
-IMS	0.20	6.69	-0.58	1.73	4.11	4.51	-0.04	2.53	0.34
-NFB	6.09	10.14	5.56	8.39	6.16	6.24	1.62	2.47	0.72
GNP58	-8.83	-4.78	-1.29	2.75	-1.93	-5.82	-6.85	-6.41	-2.33
GNP\$					0.96	-4.82	-4.73	-5.62	-1.88

CA	0.24	-5.70	-0.38	-1.01	-1.36	-4.87	-1.34	-2.71	0.54
CD	0.12	-0.87	0.40	-0.77	0.87	-1.57	0.38	-0.98	-0.06
CN	1.68	8.18	1.23	1.64	2.31	6.84	1.85	2.53	-0.06
CS	-0.72	-0.06	-0.37	-0.08	-0.37	-0.10	-0.48	-0.25	-0.01
C	1.32	1.85	0.88	-0.22	-0.29	0.30	0.41	-1.41	0.41
IH	-0.78	-0.46	-0.52	-0.18	-0.06	0.18	-0.38	-0.06	0.57
ISE	7.78	-1.12	1.21	0.85	2.75	-1.31	0.05	-2.09	0.44
I	0.56	-1.36	0.19	1.74	0.57	1.57	0.73	1.87	0.05
IINA	-3.33	-4.22	1.64	0.01	2.60	0.89	-0.90	-1.97	1.04
I	4.23	-4.44	2.52	2.42	5.86	1.33	-0.50	-2.25	2.10
-IMT	-1.28	8.63	-2.89	2.50	-2.06	5.28	1.39	3.41	-0.18
-IMS	0.12	-0.24	0.14	0.87	-0.04	0.75	-0.19	0.65	-0.11
-NFB	-1.16	8.39	-2.75	3.37	-2.10	6.03	1.20	4.06	-0.29
GNP58	4.39	5.80	0.65	5.57	3.47	7.66	1.11	0.40	2.22
GNP\$	-1.43	-3.51	-5.83	2.05	-6.50	-2.30	-2.38	-5.02	-2.70
D1\$	-4.91	-3.78	-3.62	-0.80	-4.50	-3.20	-0.57	-4.92	0.04

Third Quarter of Forecast

CA	2.28	-4.86	-0.44	-0.48	-0.14	-4.41	-0.77	-2.35	0.15
CD	0.54	1.29	-0.08	1.63	-1.07	0.27	-0.10	1.34	-0.05
CN	2.52	11.50	1.48	4.41	3.83	9.87	3.34	5.32	-0.53
CS	0.47	0.67	0.05	0.58	0.39	0.58	0.06	0.39	-0.16
C	5.81	8.60	1.01	6.14	3.01	6.31	2.53	4.70	-0.59
IH	1.38	0.74	1.02	1.01	1.47	1.19	1.48	1.14	0.39
ISE	0.04	-1.62	2.02	0.45	-0.60	-2.14	-1.54	-2.91	0.25
I	0.17	-0.85	0.15	-0.66	0.06	-0.79	0.45	-0.63	0.05
IINA	-1.51	-3.42	1.94	-0.28	-1.89	-2.84	-1.26	-2.36	0.28
I	0.08	-5.15	5.13	0.52	-0.96	-4.58	-0.87	-4.76	0.97
-IMT	0.39	6.38	-1.10	0.26	3.37	3.14	0.06	1.28	0.08
-IMS	-0.19	0.31	0.52	1.47	0.74	1.37	-0.10	1.25	0.26
-NFB	0.20	6.69	-0.58	1.73	4.11	4.51	-0.04	2.53	0.34
GNP58	6.09	10.14	5.56	8.39	6.16	6.24	1.62	2.47	0.72
GNP\$	-8.83	-4.78	-1.29	2.75	-1.93	-5.82	-6.85	-6.41	-2.33
D1\$	-1.69	-5.46	-0.95	-0.11	0.96	-4.82	-4.73	-5.62	-1.88

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

TABLE 6.14
Effects of Errors in Inputs for OBE, 2nd Quarter, 1969

Variable	No Constant Adjustments		AR Constant Adjustments		GG Constant Adjustments		OR Constant Adjustments		Ex Ante Minus Ex Post
	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	Effect of Errors in Lagged Inputs	Total Ex Post Error	
CA	1.90	-5.24	0.32	0.28	0.23	-4.04	0.17	-1.41	0.58
CD	0.13	0.88	-0.57	1.14	-0.48	0.86	-0.49	0.95	-0.07
CN	-0.44	8.54	0.04	2.97	2.00	8.04	0.81	2.79	-0.17
CS	0.74	0.94	0.33	0.86	0.67	0.86	0.28	0.61	-0.03
C	2.33	5.12	0.12	5.25	2.42	5.72	0.77	2.94	0.31
IH	0.85	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.42	0.14	0.55	0.21	0.53
ISE	-9.25	-10.91	1.28	-0.29	-5.58	-7.12	-1.93	-3.30	0.12
I/A	-1.07	-2.09	-0.19	-1.00	-0.97	-1.82	-0.34	-1.42	0.56
I/A	-2.47	-4.38	1.00	-1.22	-1.62	-2.57	-1.10	-2.20	1.75
I	-11.94	-17.17	2.32	-2.29	-7.75	-11.37	-2.82	-6.71	2.96
-IMT	2.42	8.41	1.75	3.11	6.27	6.04	0.64	1.86	-0.26
-IMS	-0.23	0.27	0.30	1.25	0.76	1.39	0.15	1.50	-0.16
-NFB	2.19	8.68	2.05	4.36	7.03	7.43	0.79	3.36	-0.42
GNP58	-7.42	-3.37	4.49	7.32	1.70	1.78	-1.26	-0.41	2.85
GNP\$	-11.70	-12.49	8.93	12.97	1.21	-2.68	-6.26	-5.82	1.50
DI\$	-2.14	-5.91	5.86	6.70	3.89	-1.89	-6.98	-7.87	-0.52

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.

The Decomposition of Forecasting

CHART 6
OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 2




CHART 6.1
OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 2nd Quarter, 1967

CN	0.07	0.95	0.86	-0.48	1.14	-0.57	0.04	0.57	0.07	-0.52
CS	-0.17	2.79	8.04	2.00	2.97	0.33	0.86	2.97	0.81	-0.49
C	-0.03	0.61	0.86	0.67	0.86	0.12	5.25	0.23	0.28	0.81
IH	0.31	2.94	5.72	2.42	5.25	0.23	0.21	0.23	0.77	0.77
ISE	0.53	0.21	0.14	0.42	0.22	1.28	-0.29	1.28	0.55	0.55
IIA	0.12	-3.30	-7.12	-5.58	-0.29	-0.19	-1.00	-0.19	-1.93	-1.93
IINA	0.56	-1.42	-1.82	-0.97	-1.00	1.00	-1.22	1.00	-0.34	-0.34
I	1.75	-2.20	-2.57	-7.75	-2.29	2.32	1.75	2.32	-1.10	-1.10
-IMT	2.96	-6.71	6.04	6.27	3.11	1.75	8.41	1.75	-2.82	-2.82
-IMS	-0.26	1.86	6.27	0.76	3.11	0.30	0.27	0.30	0.64	0.64
-NFB	-0.16	1.50	1.39	7.03	4.36	2.05	8.68	2.05	0.15	0.15
GNP58	-0.42	3.36	7.43	7.06	7.32	4.49	-3.37	4.49	0.79	0.79
GNP\$	2.85	-0.41	1.78	1.70	7.32	8.93	-11.70	8.93	-1.26	-1.26
DIS	1.50	-5.82	-2.68	1.21	12.97	5.86	-2.14	5.86	-6.26	-6.26
	-0.52	-7.87	-1.89	3.89	6.70			6.70	-6.98	-6.98

NOTE: For definition of symbols, see glossary.




CHART 6.2
OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 3rd Quarter, 1967





CHART 6.3
OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 4th



ART 6.2
 s: 3rd Quarter, 1967

Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 No equation adjustment
 OR equation adjustment
 AR equation adjustment




CHART 6.3
 OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 4th Quarter, 1967

Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 No equation adjustment
 OR equation adjustment
 AR equation adjustment




CHART 6.4
OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 1st Quarter, 1968






CHART 6.5
OBE Ex Post Forecasts



Macroeconomic Models

RT 6.4
 sts: 1st Quarter, 1968

Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 No equation adjustment
 OR equation adjustment
 AR equation adjustment



The Decomposition of Forecasting Error: The Wharton Model 333

CHART 6.5
 OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 2nd Quarter, 1968

Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 No equation adjustment
 OR equation adjustment
 AR equation adjustment




CHART 6.6
OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 3rd Quarter, 1968

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 - - - - - No equation adjustment
 - · - · - OR equation adjustment
 - · - · - AR equation adjustment





CHART 6.7
OBE Ex Post Forecasts

— Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 - - - - - No equation adjustment
 - · - · - OR equation adjustment
 - · - · - AR equation adjustment



Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 No equation adjustment
 QR equation adjustment
 AR equation adjustment




CHART 6.7
 OBE Ex Post Forecasts: 4th Quarter, 1968

Actual
 No change forecast (Naive 1)
 No equation adjustment
 QR equation adjustment
 AR equation adjustment

