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Resident and Nonresident Tuition and Enrollment at Flagship State Universities

Michael J. Rizzo and Ronald G. Ehrenberg

7.1 Introduction

The recent economic downturn in the United States has led to severe current and projected budget deficits in most states. Sharp rises in health care costs and increased competition for state funds from other sources has concurrently led to a decrease in the shares of state budgets earmarked for the higher education sector.¹ Because universities are able to attract revenue from other sources (e.g., tuition, annual giving, and federal student aid) and they are a discretionary component of most state budgets, they are often the first to go under the knife during tough times. The resulting revenue shortages from these budget cuts will most certainly have deleterious effects on college accessibility and on the behavior of these higher education institutions. Inasmuch as 65 percent of the 9.2 million students enrolled in four-year institutions in 1999 were enrolled in public institutions and in most states the major public research universities are also the most selective in terms of admissions, it is important to understand institutional responses relating to tuition

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1. From fiscal year (FY) 1992 to FY2002, the share of states' discretionary budgets allocated to higher education has fallen 0.8 percentage points, from 13.5 percent to 12.7 percent. Health care's share has risen from 12.1 percent to 16.0 percent during this time. See National Association of State Budget Officers (2002). and enrollment policies, as well as the likely changes in state grant aid policies.

During the 1979 to 2000 period, the average state appropriation at the flagship public research institutions, as a share of total current fund revenues at the institution, fell from 42 percent to 31 percent. Only ten institutions saw increases in the share of their revenues coming from state appropriations over this period, and only three of these saw any increase in the share during the 1988 to 2000 period.

To make up for this revenue shortfall, public institutions can increase their undergraduate tuition revenues in two ways.² First, they may increase the tuition level they charge in-state students; however, this is often a politically unpopular move. Second, because all public research institutions charge a higher tuition to out-of-state students than they do to in-state students, they can raise the tuition level they charge out-of-state students and/or adjust the composition of their student body by enrolling more out-of-state students.

Adjusting the share of students that come from out-of-state is at best a short-run solution and for political reasons may be much less easily adjusted than the out-of-state student tuition level. After some point, it may be politically very difficult to further expand the share of out-of-state students, while state officials may not be concerned about charging nonresident students increasingly higher rates of tuition. The political difficulties arise because enrolling more nonresidents may preclude qualified students from one's own state from attending the flagship public university in the state. On the flip side, it would be unwise for a state to totally exclude nonresidents from its universities' corridors because other states might then retaliate against students from the state in question.

The prospects for revenue augmentation from increasing nonresident enrollments are diminished by the presence of tuition reciprocity agreements. These are either bilateral or multilateral agreements between schools and/ or states allowing nonresident students to attend a public university at less than the normal out-of-state tuition.³ These agreements are often program specific, have a regional focus, and were created to encourage universities to achieve cost efficiencies in their program offerings.

An institution's ability to employ different tuition and enrollment strategies is dependent upon its degree of autonomy from state interests. Be-

2. There are, of course, other sources of revenue. Total educational and general current fund revenues include undergraduate and graduate student tuition and fees; federal, state, and local appropriations; government grants and contracts; private gifts; payouts from endowments; sales and services of educational activities; and other sources. Local revenues are typically directed to community colleges, while federal monies are focused on direct student support. The endowment levels at most public institutions are small, so increasing the payout rate is unlikely to have a large impact on annual revenues. Public institutions are actively seeking to increase their fund-raising revenues, but many are starting from very low bases.

3. In some cases, if the flow of students between states taking advantage of tuition reciprocity agreements is not roughly equal, the state that exported more students than it imported makes a payment to the importing state to compensate it for bearing more than its fair share of the costs. These payments go to the state treasury, however, not to the universities themselves. cause elected state officials' interests diverge from those of university administrators and faculty members, we expect institutions in states where there is more legislative oversight in the form of a statewide coordinating board and/or fewer governing boards to find it more difficult to increase tuition and to adjust their enrollment margins.⁴

Some observers have expressed concern that direct student aid (both federal grant aid and state aid), which was designed to improve access, has instead given institutions the freedom to increase tuition. States' financing of higher education is increasingly being provided in the form of grant aid to students rather than in the form of appropriations to institutions. From 1979 to 2000, average (median) direct student aid as a share of total higher education aid has increased from 3.0 percent to 5.8 percent (1.8 percent to 4.8 percent). While the real value of the federal Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (Pell Grant) fell by 9 percent over this time period, access to federal subsidized loans was vastly expanded. In fact, by 1999, 45.4 percent of students receiving financial aid did so in the form of federal loan aid.

How tuition levels, or the availability of grant or loan aid, influence access are empirical questions that we will not address in this chapter. Rather, we will analyze how tuition and enrollment strategies at institutions react to changes in federal and state need-based student aid and to state appropriations to public higher education institutions. The former increases student mobility by expanding their choice set, while the latter does not travel with the student.


Institutions may also choose nonresident enrollment policies to satisfy different interests. Because many flagship publics are also high quality institutions, they typically experience an excess demand for seats and can enroll nonresidents to improve academic quality or to enhance the diversity of their student bodies.


Given differing state governance structures, political climates, institutional objectives, and the like, it is not surprising to see the dramatic disparity across states in their use of nonresidents as an enrollment strategy. Figure 7.1 shows that many of the larger, more populous states such as Ohio, Illinois, Texas, California, and New York, do not make great use of this strategy, enrolling less than 10 percent of their first-time freshmen from out-of-state in 1998.^{5,6} However, other states that are smaller, older,

6. Public Universities in Texas do not get to keep the extra tuition revenue they receive from enrolling out-of-state students; this revenue flows into the state government coffers. As such they have no financial incentive to enroll out-of-state students.

^{4.} See Lowry (2001a,b). Lowry also points out that states (schools) where a high percentage of university trustees are appointed by elected officials or directly elected by the voting public also have lower tuition.

^{5.} The categories were defined using a means-clustering analysis described by Everitt (1993). This is an exploratory data technique meant to find natural groups in the data. Multiple iterations suggest that the data be broken into four nonoverlapping groups. Multiple iterations suggest that the most natural partition was four groups. States near the average include Maine and Georgia, enrolling about 20 percent each.





and/or have a history of private provision of higher education enroll nearly half of their entering classes as nonresidents. Vermont, Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire respectively enrolled 66 percent, 60 percent, 48 percent and 40 percent of their classes in 1998 in this manner.

Table 7.1 lists the ninety-one flagship public research institutions whose behavior is analyzed in our study.⁷ They are primarily Research I and II institutions and were chosen because they are the most selective and largest public institutions in each state, and they enroll the largest shares of nonresidents, or out-of-state students. This chapter is motivated by our desire to understand the causes and consequences of nonresident enrollment. We seek to explain how the share of nonresidents among first-time freshmen varies at a point in time across these institutions and over time at any given institution. We employ panel data from a variety of sources and estimate a system of equations to explain the levels of state need-based grant aid per student, in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition, and the share of out-of-state students among first-time freshmen. The longitudinal nature of the data permits us to control for omitted variable bias.

In the next section, we briefly survey related literature. Section 7.3 presents information on trends in tuition, enrollment, and grant aid. In addition to summarizing the data we use to explain these trends, it also discusses the results of a survey we undertook to obtain information on the nature and prevalence of tuition reciprocity agreements. Section 7.4 describes our estimation strategy, presents empirical results, and conducts some policy simulations based upon these results. Section 7.5 briefly concludes.

7.2 Selective Literature Review

The literature on pricing and access in public higher education is replete with papers that analyze issues related to one or more of the following state grant aid, in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition, and nonresident enrollment shares—but none has studied all of these issues simultaneously. Two papers have addressed the determinants of nonresident enrollments. Mixon and Hsing (1994) found, using cross-section data for a sample of public *and* private academic institutions, that higher nonresident tuition levels were associated with higher nonresident enrollment shares. Their findings lent credence to the notion that universities enroll nonresidents for revenue purposes. Siow (1997) found, after controlling for student body

^{7.} There are eighty-four schools from forty-three states that were classified as Research I and II institutions in 1994 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. To fully exploit state variation in tuition, enrollment, and grant aid policies, we added the flag-ship public institution from each state that did not have a Research I or II institution. These states were Alaska, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Dakota.

1 0			
School	1994 Carnegie Classification	School	1994 Carnegie Classification
Arizona State University (AZ)	RI	University of Hawaii at Manoa (HI)	RI
Auburn University (AL)	RII	University of Houston (TX)	RII
Clemson University (SC)	RII	University of Idaho (ID)	RII
Colorado State University (CO)	RI	University of Illinois at Chicago (IL)	RI
Florida State University (FL)	RI	University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (IL)	RI
Georgia Institute of Technology (GA)	RI	University of Iowa (IA)	RI
Indiana University at Bloomington (IN)	RI	University of Kansas (KS)	RI
Iowa State University (IA)	RI	University of Kentucky (NY)	RI
Kansas State University (KS)	RII	University of Louisville (KY)	RII
Kent State University (OH)	RII	University of Maine (ME)	DII
Louisiana State University (LA)	RI	University of Maryland, College Park (MD)	RI
Michigan State University (MI)	RI	University of Massachusetts, Amherst (MA)	RI
Mississippi State University (MS)	RII	University of Michigan (MI)	RI
New Mexico State University (NM)	RI	University of Minnesota, Twin Cities (MN)	RI
North Carolina State University (NC)	RI	University of Mississippi (MS)	RII
Ohio State University (OH)	RI	University of Missouri, Columbia (MO)	RI
Ohio University (OH)	RII	University of Montana (MT)	DII
Oklahoma State University (OK)	RII	University of Nebraska at Lincoln (NE)	RI
Oregon State University (OR)	RI	University of Nevada, Reno (NV)	DII
Pennsylvania State University (PA)	RI	University of New Hampshire (NH)	DII
Purdue University (IN)	RI	University of New Mexico (NM)	RI
Rutgers University, New Brunswick (NJ)	RI	University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (NC)	RI

Table 7.1 Flagship Public Research Institutions in the Sample

Southern Illinois University, Carbondale (IL)	RII	University of North Dakota (ND)	DII
State University of New York at Albany (NY)	RII	University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus (OK)	RII
State University of New York at Buffalo (NY)	RII	University of Oregon (OR)	RII
Temple University (PA)	RI	University of Pittsburgh (PA)	RI
Texas A&M University (TX)	RI	University of Rhode Island (RI)	RII
Texas Tech University (TX)	RII	University of South Carolina at Columbia (SC)	RII
University of Alaska at Fairbanks (AK)	DII	University of South Dakota (SD)	DII
University of Alabama, Birmingham (AL)	RI	University of South Florida (FL)	RII
University of Arizona (AZ)	RI	University of Tennessee at Knoxville (TN)	RI
University of Arkansas (AR)	RII	University of Texas at Austin (TX)	RI
University of California, Berkeley (CA)	RI	University of Utah (UT)	RI
University of California, Davis (CA)	RI	University of Vermont (VT)	RII
University of California, Irvine (CA)	RI	University of Virginia (VA)	RI
University of California, Los Angeles (CA)	RI	University of Washington, Seattle (WA)	RI
University of California, Riverside (CA)	RII	University of Wisconsin, Madison (WI)	RI
University of California, San Diego (CA)	RI	University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee (WI)	RII
University of California, Santa Barbara (CA)	RI	University of Wyoming (WY)	RII
University of California, Santa Cruz (CA)	RII	Utah State University (UT)	RI
University of Cincinnati (OH)	RI	Virginia Commonwealth University (VA)	RI
University of Colorado at Boulder (CO)	RI	Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VA)	RI
University of Connecticut (CT)	RI	Washington State University (WA)	RII
University of Delaware (DE)	RII	Wayne State University (MI)	RI
University of Florida (FL)	RI	West Virginia University (WV)	RI
University of Georgia (GA)	RI		

Note: Carnegie Classification descriptions can be found at http://chronicle.com/stats/carnegie.

ability, that universities with more successful researchers were more likely to have larger shares of nonresident and foreign students.

Other studies have addressed the determinants of tuition levels for instate students at public universities. Using cross-section data, Lowry (2001a,b) found that net tuition and fee revenues were higher at public universities that receive less state government funding per student and in states in which public universities have more financial autonomy. Quigley and Rubinfeld (1993) found that states with high private enrollments and many private colleges and universities charged higher tuition levels at their public universities.

Several studies have treated tuition levels at public higher education institutions and state appropriations to these institutions as being simultaneously determined. In the context of a model in which state appropriations were treated as endogenous, Koshal and Koshal (2000) found that lower state appropriations per student, higher median family income, and a higher share of students that came from out of state were all associated with higher in-state tuition levels. However, Lowry's (2001a,b) work suggests that state appropriations per student can be treated as exogenous in in-state tuition equations.

Greene's (1994) work is one of the few studies that addressed out-ofstate tuition levels at public universities. Using cross-section data, he found that states with many private colleges, lower tax rates, poor labor markets, and strong in-migration of both population and students charged higher nonresident tuition. While he observed that higher regional tuition was associated with higher nonresident tuition levels, the association was not statistically significant.

Research relating to federal and state grant aid has addressed how grant aid affects tuition levels and access. Examples include Balderson (1997), Coopers and Lybrand (1997), Hauptman and Krop (1998), McPherson and Schapiro (1998), and the National Center for Education Statistics (2001). Of concern to many researchers and policymakers is whether academic institutions respond to increases in the Pell Grant program maximum-benefit level by increasing their tuition levels. Estimates of the size of this "Bennett hypothesis" at public institutions range from negligible to a \$50 increase in tuition for every \$100 increase in aid.⁸ Little attention has been given to the determination of federal grant aid levels themselves, let alone to how states determine how much of their resources to devote to financial aid for students.

Most of the prior studies are cross-section analyses and are subject to the criticism that unobserved institution- or state-specific variables may lead to biased coefficient estimates. To avoid this problem, we employ a rich lon-

^{8.} It is named for William Bennett, the secretary of education during the Reagan administration.

gitudinal institution-level data set that is derived primarily from the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and its successor, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), in the estimation reported below. The HEGIS and IPEDS data are supplemented with data from numerous other sources.

We report estimates of a system of four simultaneously determined equations for state need-based grant aid, in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition, and the share of undergraduate students that are nonresidents. The explanatory variables that are treated as exogenous in our models include federal financial aid parameters, institutional characteristics, state governance characteristics, tuition reciprocity agreement parameters, measures of higher education competition in the state and the institution's enrollment capacity, and other state- and regional-specific information. Our analyses should be viewed as reduced form in nature due to the difficulty of finding suitable supply-and-demand restrictions for each equation.

7.3 Data

Our study uses data on resident and nonresident enrollment and tuition levels for a sample of ninety-one American public research institutions representing all fifty states. The data come from a variety of sources including HEGIS, IPEDS, the National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP), and the annual Current Population Surveys (CPS), as well as other sources. Our econometric analyses use data for eight years during the 1979 to 1998 period.⁹

Table 7.2 presents data on the shares of full-time first-time freshmen that were nonresidents at sample institutions during the 1979 to 1998 period. Overall, the enrollment share of nonresidents rose from 0.174 to 0.191 during the period. However, from 1981 through 1992, when states faced particularly difficult financial times, the average share increased from 0.166 to 0.205, an increase of almost 0.04, and then remained relatively constant as budget situations improved during the remainder of the period.

To illustrate the magnitude of a 4 percentage point increase in nonresident enrollment, consider a school with a freshman enrollment of 3,000 students and a nonresident tuition premium of \$6,000. If this school decides to enroll 4 percent more of its class as nonresidents (120 students) over the course of four years, this would provide the institution with an additional \$2.88 million of revenues that could be used to raise faculty salaries, invest in start-up costs for new scientists, hire additional faculty and staff, reduce class sizes, and offer more courses.

9. Table 7A.1 details the sources for all of our data. The specific years included in the study were dictated by the years in which information on resident and nonresident enrollments were collected as part of HEGIS or IPEDS. The 1998 academic year was the most recent year for which IPEDS Residence and Migration data was publicly available at the time of this writing.

Year	Unweighted Average	Standard Deviation	Weighted Average	Median	Minimum	Maximum
1979	0.174	0.120	0.168	0.136	0.011	0.550
1981	0.166	0.120	0.161	0.133	0.007	0.543
1984 ^a	0.171	0.128	0.170	0.127	0.010	0.629
1988	0.203	0.136	0.205	0.158	0.012	0.602
1992	0.205	0.157	0.201	0.169	0.001	0.660
1994	0.202	0.152	0.196	0.172	0.005	0.674
1996	0.196	0.145	0.194	0.167	0.005	0.665
1998	0.191	0.139	0.185	0.179	0.006	0.660
$\% \Delta$	9.4	15.7	10.3	31.2	-47.8	19.9

Table 7.2	Proportion of First-Time Freshmen from Out of State (excluding foreign
	students): Flagship Public Research and Doctoral Institutions

Source: NCES Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via direct surveys and WebCASPAR. *Notes:* For weighted averages, weights are full-time equivalent first-time freshman enrollments. Δ indicates change.

^aNumbers of out-of-state freshmen imputed for the eight California schools in 1984.

Schools that exhibited the largest increases in nonresident enrollment shares during the period included Pittsburgh, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Mississippi State, which all more than doubled their shares during the period. In contrast, the University of Illinois at Chicago, Texas Tech, Houston, South Florida, and the University of California schools reduced their nonresident enrollment shares by more than half. While the time series variation in nonresident enrollment shares exhibited in this table may not appear very striking, more dramatic cross-section variation exists and can be seen in figure 7.1.

The well-documented increases in resident and nonresident tuition that occurred during the period are shown in table 7.3. In real terms, both resident and nonresident tuition levels more than doubled between 1979 and 1998, with each growing at about 4 percent per year above the rate of inflation. This table veils the dramatic cross-section variation that exists in public higher education tuition levels. For instance, in 1998 Vermont charged its residents over \$7,000 and Pittsburgh, Temple, Michigan, Penn State, and New Hampshire all charged over \$6,000, while all of the Florida universities, Arizona universities, Idaho, Houston, Texas A&M, and the University of Nevada at Reno charged near \$2,000. The public higher education institutions in California and Texas are among those that increased tuition at the fastest rates, while the Florida and Mississippi schools exhibited the smallest increases during the period.

Every public research institution charges a higher price to nonresidents, presumably because state taxpayers do not want to subsidize the schooling of nontaxpayers from other states. Moreover, the extent to which

Table 7.3	-In-	State and O	ut-of-State Ti	uition Levels	s (1996 dollar:	In-State and Out-of-State Tuition Levels (1996 dollars): Flagship Public Research and Doctoral Institutions	iblic Researd	ch and Docto	oral Institutio	sue		
			-In-	In-State					Out-c	Out-of-State		
Vear	Ачетада	% Increase	Weighted Average	Median	Minimim	Maximum	Average	% Increase	Weighted Average	Median	Minimim	Maximum
1741	AVVI ago	וורורמסר	UVUAË	ITEMATA	TIMITITAT	TIMITTVPTAT	AVV1450		AVVI ago	INTONIATI	TIMITITAT	
1979	1,552		1,582	1,509	676	3,435	4,250		4,246	4,097	2,068	8,182
	(520)	5.2					(1, 273)	4.3				
1981	1,633		1,667	1,569	638	3,799	4,431		4,460	4,105	1,844	8,402
	(615)	19.0					(1,401)	17.4				
1984	1,943		2,006	1,861	557	5,126	5,203		5,334	5,047	1,755	9,799
	(756)	16.6					(1,614)	20.7				
1988	2,266		2,320	2,100	1,018	4,840	6,282		6,454	6,059	3,238	13,393
	(859)	25.0					(1, 833)	28.2				
1992	2,833		2,887	2,656	1,315	6,724	8,055		8,243	7,604	4,139	16,103
	(1,065)	11.0					(2,551)	8.8				
1994	3,145		3,174	2,847	1,417	6,919	8,766		8,939	8,169	3,982	17,131
	(1, 189)	6.5					(2,768)	7.9				
1996	3,348		3,397	3,102	1,568	7,726	9,459		9,689	9,030	5,100	17,916
	(1, 185)	5.3					(2, 659)	6.7				
1998	3,525		3,553	3,302	1,697	7,669	10,094		10,284	9,586	5,512	18,623
	(1,181)						(2,687)					
∿∆	127	125	119	151	123	137	142	134	167	128		
CAGR (%)	4.2		4.1	4.0	4.7	4.1	4.4		4.5	4.3	5.0	4.2
Source: NCI	3S Higher E	ducation G	eneral Inform	nation Surve	sys (HEGIS)	Source: NCES Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via WebCASPAR.	d Postsecon	idary Educa	tion Data Sy	stem (IPEI	DS) via WebC	ASPAR.
Notes: Standard deviations 1	lard deviation	ons in paren	itheses. Weigi	nts are full-i	time equivale	n parentheses. Weights are full-time equivalent first-time freshmen enrollments. CAGK = compound annual growth rate.	eshmen enr	ollments. C	AGK = com	pound ann	aal growth ra	e.

Year	Out-of-State/ In-State Ratio (1)	Mean Differential (2)	% Increase in Differential (3)	Weighted Average (4)	Median (5)	Minimum (6)	Maximum (7)
1979	2.74	2,698		2,664	2,537	1,138	5,028
1981	2.71	2,798	3.7	2,793	2,517	1,077	5,321
1984	2.68	3,260	16.5	3,328	3,150	1,198	6,526
1988	2.77	4,016	23.2	4,133	3,878	1,469	8,968
1992	2.84	5,222	30.0	5,357	4,855	1,878	10,891
1994	2.79	5,620	7.6	5,765	5,471	1,770	11,439
1996	2.82	6,110	8.7	6,292	6,060	2,400	12,206
1998	2.86	6,569	7.5	6,731	6,471	2,537	12,695
$\% \Delta$	4.6	143		153	155	123	152
CAGR (%)	0.2	4.5		4.7	4.8	4.1	4.7

 Table 7.4
 In-State, Out-of-State Tuition Differentials (1996 dollars): Flagship Public

 Research and Doctoral Institutions

Source: NCES Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via direct surveys and WebCASPAR.

Notes: Weights are full-time equivalent first-time freshmen enrollment. CAGR = compound annual growth rate. Δ = change.

nonresidents pay more than residents increased during the period. While both in-state and nonresident tuition levels have experienced roughly equal percentage increases during the period and, thus, the ratio of nonresident to in-state tuition has remained nearly constant, the real difference in resident and nonresident tuition levels substantially increased during the period because nonresident tuition levels began at a higher base.

Table 7.3 shows that while in-state tuition increased by an average of less than \$2,000 in real terms, nonresident tuition increased by an average of more than \$5,000 in real terms. As a result, the average premium charged to nonresidents has increased in real terms from \$2,700 in 1979 to over \$6,500 in 1998 (see table 7.4). This change is significant because as the absolute difference between in-state and nonresident tuition widens, out-of-state enrollments become less desirable from the student-demand side.¹⁰

The lowest out-of-state tuition levels and smallest increases occurred largely in the southeastern region. Both the largest out-of-state tuition levels and tuition increases occurred at Michigan, the Virginia schools, North Carolina schools, and the California schools. As with the overall level of nonresident tuition, the smallest premia charged to nonresidents and the smallest increases tended to occur at southeastern public institutions. The strong regional patterns that we observe in tuition and enrollment trends

^{10.} These raw data suggest that during the period institutions adjusted their out-of-state tuition levels to generate revenue.

suggest the importance of historical competitive and political economic factors.

Turning to trends in state support for public higher education, tables 7.5 and 7.6 outline the changes in state need-based grant aid to students attending public institutions and state appropriations to public higher education institutions that occurred during the period. Table 7.5 shows that average state-provided need-based grant aid per full-time-equivalent undergraduate enrolled in public higher education institutions in the state has

Full-Time Equivalent Public Undergraduate in the State (1996 dollars) Flagship Public Research and Doctoral Institutions								
Year	Unweighted Average	Standard Deviation	Median	Minimum	Maximum			
1979	67.5	78.4	34.9	5.4	415.9			
1981	77.2	89.9	45.2	4.5	410.9			
1984	93.2	127.0	51.3	11.0	663.4			
1988	117.0	134.2	60.9	10.3	594.8			
1992	128.6	140.4	89.2	9.0	644.0			
1994	139.1	162.4	92.0	10.8	881.1			
1996	183.5	196.6	125.8	10.7	949.1			
1998	284.7	322.0	180.2	6.8	1,585.6			
$\% \Delta$	321.6	310.8	416.8	25.6	281.2			
CAGR (%)	7.5	7.3	8.6	1.1	6.9			

Table 7.5 Need-Based Grant Aid to In-State Undergraduate Public Students per

Source: NASSGAP Annual Reports, HEGIS, and IPEDS.

Notes: CAGR = compound annual growth rate. Δ = change.

	Public 1	Research and	Doctoral Insti	itutions		
Year	Unweighted Average	Weighted Average	Standard Deviation	Median	Minimum	Maximum
1979	9,446	8,932	4,355	8,430	3,200	25,297
1981	9,394	8,809	4,747	8,532	3,126	29,429
1984	9,977	9,544	4,495	9,162	3,180	26,045
1988	11,397	10,788	5,203	10,615	3,698	24,741
1992	11,227	10,934	4,769	10,549	3,300	26,736
1994	11,069	10,835	4,522	10,454	3,361	25,372
1996	11,204	10,922	4,429	10,666	3,180	24,421
1998	10,777	10,569	4,030	10,429	3,218	23,306
2000	11,402	11,173	4,364	11,032	3,328	24,073
$\% \Delta$	20.7	25.1	0.2	30.9	4.0	-4.8
CAGR (%)	0.9	1.0	0.0	1.2	0.2	-0.2

Table 7.6	State Appropriations per FTE Undergraduate (1996 dollars): Flagship
	Public Research and Doctoral Institutions

Source: HEGIS and IPEDS.

Notes: CAGR = compound annual growth rate. Δ = change.

more than quadrupled in real terms, growing from roughly \$67 per student per year to \$285 per student per year.¹¹ One recent study found that 68.5 percent of first-time full-time students enrolled in public higher education institutions received financial aid from any source and that 26.9 percent of these students received state grant aid averaging \$1,742 per year.¹² Inasmuch as the average in-state tuition in 1998 was \$3,525, state grant aid alone appears to cover over half of the tuition costs for *eligible* students.

Among the most generous states, in terms of state-provided grant aid per full-time-equivalent student enrolled in public higher education institutions are New York, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, while the least generous states include Wyoming, Utah, Montana, and Mississippi. New Mexico, Virginia, Washington, Maine, and Massachusetts are among those states that increased state aid per student the fastest during the period, while Utah, Wyoming, Montana, Alabama, and Mississippi actually decreased, in real terms, the amount of need-based grant aid they awarded per student enrolled in public institutions during the period. While direct student aid grew rapidly, real state appropriations per full-time-equivalent student to public higher education institutions saw very little growth during the period. Table 7.6 summarizes data on real average state government appropriations per full-time-equivalent undergraduate. Nationwide real state appropriations per student did not increase between 1988 and 2000 and only grew by 21 percent between 1979 and 2000, a 1 percent per annum annual growth rate. Again, dramatic cross-section variation existed in state funding per student.

A few states were able to generously increase support for selected institutions during the period. New Mexico, Maryland, Georgia Tech, Maine, and Oklahoma State all enjoyed a doubling of real state support, amounting to increases between \$6,000 and \$12,000 per student. However, of the ninety-one schools in our sample, twenty-two faced decreases in real state appropriations per student between 1979 and 2000. Among the hardest hit were many of the California and Virginia schools, each losing anywhere from 10 percent to 49 percent of its state support. These losses represented \$1,000 to \$12,000 per-student cuts in real state appropriations.

In the face of budget pressures and changing political attitudes, states may have an easier time funding direct student aid increases under the guise of promoting access. Legislators and their constituents may also prefer not to fund institutions directly because they may worry that the dol-

^{11.} Although the annual percentage increases in real student grant aid (7.5 percent) outpaced the annual real increases in tuition (4.5 percent), the real dollar cost to students still rose during the period.

^{12.} See National Center for Education Statistics (2001). In addition, 28.3 percent of aid recipients receive federal grants averaging \$2,262, 30.9 percent of aid recipients received institutional grants averaging \$2,576 per student, and 45.4 percent received loan aid averaging \$3,490 per student in 1999.

lars will not go to the intended uses. Raw correlations, however, do not indicate that states that are more generous to students are less generous to institutions (the simple correlation coefficient is 0.14). In fact, it appears that there are states that are generous to higher education on both dimensions and states that are not.

Figure 7.2 depicts state preferences for direct student aid versus institutional aid in 1996, controlling for per capita tax revenues.¹³ Controlling for per capita tax revenues accounts for the fact that states that have more money will be able to spend more on both grants and institutional appropriations. The axes represent U.S. averages. We see that New York, Michigan, Maryland, and California exert a great deal of effort to fund both student financial aid and state appropriations to public higher education, while Wyoming, Nebraska, Delaware, Idaho, Utah, and Montana fund neither very well. Some states do appear to prefer one form of aid to another. New Jersey, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Illinois are above average funders of public higher education institutions, while Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Mississippi are above average funders of aid to students.¹⁴ Wealthier and larger states seem to support higher education on both fronts (northeast quadrant of figure 7.2) more greatly than the rural and poorer states (southwest quadrant of figure 7.2). It is somewhat of a surprise that no clear regional disparities emerge when comparing state preferences for direct student aid versus in-kind institutional aid.

During the 1990s, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and New Mexico each introduced direct student financial aid programs that were based on student performance rather than student need. In some cases these grant aid awards came at the expense of their need-based aid programs. The largest program was Georgia's Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Scholarship Program, which awarded \$208 million of Georgia's total grant aid support of \$209 million in academic year 1998. Florida and New Mexico's programs each comprised well over 50 percent of their states' total grant aid funding, while the programs in Mississippi and Arkansas were very small.

Tuition reciprocity agreements are agreements between a school or state and another state or consortium that allow a nonresident student from a neighboring state to attend the public institution at less than the normal out-of-state tuition. The magnitude of the discount may depend on the type of program in which a student is interested, the county in which a student resides, the availability of opportunities in the home state, whether the

14. This table shows results for need-based aid. Many states are now moving to merit-based aid programs (e.g., Georgia), and inclusion of this would alter this picture.

^{13.} Figure 7.2 plots normalized residuals from a regression of grant aid on per capita tax revenues in 1996 against residuals from a regression of state appropriations on per capita tax revenues in 1996. These are institution-level regressions, and each point on the graph represents enrollment weighted state averages for those states with multiple institutions.




Fig. 7.2 1996 state appropriation per student versus need-based grant aid per student

Note: Plot of state averages of residuals from regression of state appropriations per student on per capita tax revenues versus residuals from regression of grant aid per student on per capita tax revenues.

student is an undergraduate or graduate, whether the student attends partor full-time, and many other factors. While some schools negotiate agreements bilaterally with other states, many now choose to participate in consortium agreements in which a number of states in a geographical region are treated similarly under the agreement.

Tuition reciprocity agreements typically do *not* require that an institution accept a given number of students, or all students whose "quality" is above a specified level, from out-of-state. They only specify that if the out-of-state students are admitted, that the tuition charged to them be below the normal out-of-state student rate. Given that the political process has approved the agreement, at the margin, institutions will only accept students under a tuition reciprocity agreement if there is excess capacity at the institution for the programs in which the students are applying or if the accepted students yield more in prestige to the university than accepting more in-state students would yield the institution and if rejecting the marginal in-state students will not cause political problems for the institution.¹⁵

Under these circumstances, the marginal revenue received by the public university from accepting out-of-state students enrolled under tuition reciprocity agreements is always at least equal to the marginal revenue the institution would have received if it had not enrolled these students. While the marginal revenue the institution receives from a student admitted under a tuition reciprocity agreement may be less than the institution would have received if it *could* have enrolled more out-of-state students paying its normal out of state tuition, the latter would not always be possible. Moreover, the state as a whole is better off with the tuition reciprocity agreement because students from the state also have the opportunity to study in other states' public institutions. As we have indicated above, if the balance of students flowing between two states is not equal, often there are additional payments made directly to the coffers of the state that is receiving more students than it is sending.

In the spring of 2001, CHERI conducted a Tuition Reciprocity Agreements at Public Research and Doctoral Universities survey. The sample consisted of all 149 public institutions that were classified as Research or Doctoral institutions by the Carnegie Foundation in their 1994 classification scheme. Of the 128 universities that responded to the survey, 61 said that they participated in a tuition reciprocity program with schools in another state or as part of a consortium. Table 7.7 indicates that thirty-nine of the ninety-one institutions in our sample, a slightly smaller percentage than found in our reciprocity survey sample, participated in such an arrangement.

15. Because of these conditions, sometimes the flagship institutions in a state opt out of the program. So, for example, the University of California campuses are not part of the Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) undergraduate exchange consortium, but the California Maritime Academy at California State University is a participant.

Table 7.7		Tuition Reciprocity Agreements				
	No. of Schools Reporting Reciprocal Enrollments	Agreements That Don't Report Enrollment	Mean Share of Undergrads That Are Reciprocal (%)	Max. Share of Undergrads That Are Reciprocal (%)	Mean Share of Enrollment That Are Nonresidents (%)	Mean Share of Nonresidents That Are Reciprocal (%)
Year	(1)	(2)	¹ (3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
1979	3	36				
1981	4	35				
1984	10	29	3.6	16.6	21.5	16.7
1988	15	24	3.1	22.4	23.8	13.0
1992	20	19	7.6	30.1	24.2	31.4
1994	24	15	6.7	30.1	25.4	26.4
1996	28	11	5.5	28.6	23.9	23.0
Source:] .ilr.corne	<i>Source:</i> HEGIS, IPEDS, and 2001 Annual C. ilr.cornell.edu/cheri and click on "Surveys."	Annual Cornell Highe "Surveys."	r Education Research Inst	12001 Annual Cornell Higher Education Research Institute Survey. For more information about this survey, please see http://www k on "Surveys."	rmation about this survey,	please see http://www
Note: Co	olumn (5) reports results fi	or those schools that re	Note: Column (5) reports results for those schools that report reciprocal enrollment.			

Four consortia are represented among our survey responses: the Academic Common Market, the Midwest Student Exchange Program, the New England Regional Student Program, and the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education. Some institutions in the survey also participate in student exchange programs (e.g., the National Student Exchange, the Consortium of Universities in the Washington Metropolitan Area, and the Tuition Exchange, Inc.). Student exchange programs differ from reciprocity agreements in that students participating in them are either visiting another school for a specified time period, or eligibility is limited to a narrowly defined group of students.¹⁶

While the number of schools participating in these agreements has not changed over our sample period, columns (4) and (5) suggest that students have been increasingly taking advantage of such programs. In addition, the schools that report reciprocal enrollments also enroll a larger share of non-residents than the average school in our survey. In 1996, for example, an average of 23.9 percent of enrolled students were nonresidents in the twenty-eight schools reporting reciprocal enrollments, while an average of 19.6 percent of enrolled students were nonresidents in the entire sample.

Increasing nonresident enrollment shares under these programs does not translate into higher revenues for public higher education institutions given that these students often pay the in-state tuition level.¹⁷ The final column of the table indicates that for these schools, nearly a quarter of their nonresident enrollments are covered under this plan. Returning to our example from earlier, a typical school would then forgo about \$720,000 in additional tuition revenues due to the presence of these agreements.¹⁸

7.4 Estimation Strategy and Results

7.4.1 Model Specification

To achieve a fuller understanding of the causes and consequences of changing tuition and enrollments, we move to a multivariate analysis. We

16. A brief description of each of the consortia and exchange programs and the institutions participating in each is found at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri. Click on surveys and then click on tuition reciprocity.

17. Recall from the preceding that sometimes revenues flow from one state to another if the flow of students across the two states does not equalize. However, such revenues accrue to the state, not to the academic institution.

18. Of course, it is unlikely that anyone would leave cash on the table. The long-term cost savings from eliminating program duplication will very likely make up for the revenue losses. States might also gain politically from engaging in these agreements. States that send students likely save money because they do not have to establish and maintain costly programs. States and colleges that receive students can operate programs more efficiently because they gain quality students, and if the supply of students is elastic, they might be able to fill spaces that otherwise would have been vacant. Students benefit by not having to pay out-of-state tuition, which may have prevented many of them from earning degrees in the fields they had chosen.

estimate a system of four simultaneously determined equations using panel data, with the institution year as our unit of analysis in which the logarithm of state need-based grant aid per student, the logarithm of in-state tuition, the logarithm of out-of-state tuition, and the logarithm of the odds ratio of the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents are each specified to be functions of each other, a vector of exogenous variables and random uncorrelated (across equations) error terms.¹⁹ Our model should be thought of as being only a "semistructural," rather than a structural model, because the variables found on the right-hand side of each equation likely capture both demand and supply factors and represent an equilibrium condition in the underlying structural model.

Table 7A.3 provides the reader a sense of from which side of the market each variable originates. The variables are grouped into six major categories: state demographic and institutional variables, variables reflecting the sources of institutional aid, variables reflecting the sources of student financial aid (including federal financial aid program variables), variables reflecting institutional enrollment pressures, variables reflecting quality measures and the competitive position of the institutions, and the endogenous variables.²⁰

The table shows the variables that are excluded and included in each equation.²¹ A blank indicates that the variable is excluded from that equation. For included variables, D indicates that the variable is assumed to influence the outcome through the demand side of the market, S indicates that it is assumed to influence the outcome through the supply side of the market, and B indicates that it is assumed to influence the outcome through both sides of the market. Similarly, + indicates that we expect that the net effect of the variable is to increase the outcome, – indicates that we expect that the net effect of the variable is to decrease the outcome, and ? indicates that the prediction is ambiguous. Our preferred specification for each of the four equations of interest is described in the following.

The state need-based grant aid equation is assumed to result from the interaction of students' demand for financial aid and the state's willingness to supply it. The in-state tuition equation is assumed to result from the interaction of in-state students' demand for seats at the institution and the institution's willingness to supply such seats. The institution's willingness

19. The first variable, average state need-based aid per student, is observed at the state, not institutional, level.

20. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Some variables might be considered to have an impact for multiple reasons. For example, institutions with larger per-student endowments have greater financial capabilities ("institutional financial aid"), but larger endowments are also indicative of an institution's "high quality." Further, it is not unreasonable to think that enrollment-pressure variables and school-quality variables also capture an institution's competitive position to the same extent as well.

21. There are obvious complications in estimating the system exactly as we have specified it here. The most glaring difficulty is our ability (or lack thereof) to properly identify the system of equations. We discuss the structural system here for expositional purposes and address the empirical relevance in detail in the next section.

to supply seats can be thought of as being derived from a utilitymaximizing model of university behavior in which the objective of the university is to maximize its prestige, which in turn depends upon the average quality of the students that it enrolls, subject to a balanced budget constraint (Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984; Ehrenberg 2000; Garvin 1980; Winston 1999). A public university's behavior may also be constrained by its state government, which may have different objectives than the university does. For example, while the university may want to maximize student quality, the political process may want to keep in-state tuition as low as possible (Groen and White 2001). The out-of-state tuition and the share of nonresident students enrolled at an institution are similarly assumed to result from the interaction of out-of-state students' demand for seats at the institution and the institution's willingness to supply such seats, the latter constrained by the political process in the state.

The grant aid equation includes variables that relate to federal and other state and institutional sources of student financial aid. Federal loan and grant program variables included in the model are the size of the maximum Pell Grant (PELL), the percent cap on costs (CAP), and categorical variables that indicate the degree of access that students have to subsidized federal loans (1979, 1992).²² The presence of state merit aid programs (MERIT) both reduces student demand for need-based aid and the state's pool of available resources from which it might fund need-based aid programs. Variables that relate to institutional sources of aid are the logarithm of real state appropriations per student (APP), the logarithm of real endowment per student (END), and the logarithm of in-state tuition (TUITI)—each of these variables generates income that the institution can use, in principle, for scholarship aid. State demographic and institutional structure variables that are included in this equation (to capture a state's financial capacity to provide need-based student aid) are its real tax revenues per capita (TAX), its unemployment rate (UNEMP), the share of its households with incomes below that necessary to be eligible for a Pell Grant (ELIG), and the share of its population that is college aged (AGE). Also included is the degree of political autonomy of each school, as measured by the number of governing boards in the state (GOV).²³

22. The percent cap is a percentage of college costs that students were eligible to receive in Pell Grants. The cap was removed in 1992 so that students at low-tuition institutions that were eligible for the maximum Pell Grant could use any funds in excess of tuition costs to pay for living and other expenses. In 1981, student access to subsidized loans was dramatically reduced with the repeal of the Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) after a run-up in usage from its inception in 1978. Access was expanded again in 1992 with the removal of a portion of housing assets in the Expected Family Contribution formula.

23. Lowry (2001a,b) hypothesized that the greater the number of different independent governing boards in a state, the more decentralized state governance of higher education was and, thus, the less that political pressure from the state could be used to keep tuition levels down. He found evidence that this relationship held. It is not clear, however, whether state aid per student will be higher or lower in states with more political autonomy for their higher education institutions.

To control for the impact of enrollment pressure on grant aid, we include a measure of state seating capacity (SEAT), calculated as the ratio of a state's predicted enrollment in its public higher education institutions to its actual enrollment in these institutions in a year.²⁴ Additional measures of enrollment pressures that are included are the ratio of graduate enrollments to undergraduate enrollments in the state (GRAD); the share of new students in the state enrolled in private colleges (PRIV) and in two-year colleges (TWO); and the logarithm of real average tuition in the region excluding the state in which the institution is located (TUITR).²⁵ Also included are measures of overall quality in the state, as measured by the weighted average Barron's rating of public (BPUB) and private (BPRIV) institutions in the state.

Our in-state tuition equation is similarly specified. However, real state tax revenues per capita are excluded from this equation because the impact of state resources on tuition is captured by the inclusion of real state appropriations per student (APP). The latter is treated as exogenous in our model.²⁶ In addition, we include institutional measures of school quality—categorical variables that indicate the Barron's rank of each institution as well as the level of per-student grant aid (the dependent variable in the previous equation)—where higher levels would be expected to allow institutions to raise tuition.²⁷

More generous student financial aid packages (e.g., federal financial aid programs) make it easier for a school to increase tuition for at least two reasons. First, federal financial aid may reduce barriers to entry for students

24. Predicted enrollments are calculated by dividing a state's full-time equivalent public four-year enrollment in 1970 by the size of the college-age population in the state in 1970 (ages eighteen-twenty-four) and then multiplying this ratio by a weighted cohort size in each year of our study. If both the share of students going to public institutions and college enrollment rates in a state remained constant over time, then the weight used to calculate predicted enrollments in year *t* would simply be the size of the college-age population in year *t*. Between 1970 and 1998, the share of students attending public institutions was stable (between 75 and 80 percent), but enrollment rates increased nationwide from 28.8 percent to 42 percent. To account for the enrollment rate expansion, we allow the population weight to grow as the enrollment rate grows in each year. We would prefer to have used the ratio of seats available in public colleges to the number of its high school graduates as a capacity measure, but we did not do so because of endogeneity concerns. Nonetheless, estimates that excluded this variable from the analysis were very similar to those that included it. Because this suggests that the endogeneity of capacity is not driving our results, this variable is included in all of the estimates that excluded in all of the estimates that the collow.

25. The grant aid per student equation is estimated using state-level data. As such, all institution-level variables, including real state appropriations per student, are excluded from this equation.

26. As noted previously, Lowry (2001a,b) found that it was permissible to treat state appropriations per student as exogenous in the in-state tuition equation.

27. For roughly three decades, Barrons Profiles of American Colleges has assigned categorical rankings to four-year institutions according to a subjective measure of quality. From best to worst, they rank institutions as *most competitive, highly competitive, very competitive, competitive, less competitive,* and *noncompetitive.* We created a categorical variable HIGHB for those institutions in the top two categories as well as LOWB for those in the bottom two. The coefficients on these variables are then relative to the omitted middle categories. at the margin of attending college. Second, institutions can increase tuition, and for those students not at the grant or loan limits, each dollar of tuition increase will be covered by an additional dollar of aid, up until some maximum. Further, the availability of merit aid will increase the desirability of attending college for all students, putting upward pressure on tuition. Institutional sources of aid have a less obvious impact on tuition. While increased state appropriations per student may allow schools to keep tuition low, this increase in in-kind student aid may result in an increase in demand, forcing tuition upward. Larger endowments per student generate more income for an institution, but more importantly reflect higher institutional quality and permit higher tuition levels. Similarly, higher institutional quality in absolute (as measured by the Barron's ranking) and relative terms (as measured by the ranking of other schools in the state) measures as well as strong enrollment pressure allows institutions to charge high tuition levels.

The logarithm of real out-of-state tuition (TUITO) is specified to be a function of the logarithm of real in-state tuition (TUITI) and most of the variables included in the in-state tuition equation. Again, real state tax revenue per capita is excluded from the equation. A notable difference is that we replace the institution's Barron's ranking with measures of the shares of students in the state enrolled at other public (BSPUB) or private (BSPRIV) institutions in the state that are of equal or better Barron's rankings than the institution. These variables capture the institution's monopoly power within the state for students seeking to attend institutions of its quality or higher. Similarly, we include the share of students in the region enrolled in schools of equal or better quality that are enrolled in private schools (SPRIV); the greater this share, the higher the average tuition will be at institutions perceived as good alternatives to the institution. The logarithm of the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents (NON) is included to capture the financial benefits to the institution from increasing out-ofstate enrollment. Finally, we include the logarithm of the share of undergraduates that are enrolled under reciprocity agreements (RECIP) whose a priori impact on nonresident tuition is unclear.

The final equation is the nonresident enrollment share equation. The dependent variable is specified as the logarithm of the odds ratio of the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresidents to allow the error term to be normally distributed. This equation is specified very similarly to the out-of-state tuition equation, with the logarithm of real out-of-state tuition (TUITO) included as an explanatory variable. We also include the logarithm of the mean Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores in the state in which the institution is located (SAT) to see if states with a low supply of "high-quality" high school graduates seek to recruit out-of-state students to attract top talent.²⁸

^{28.} Groen and White (forthcoming) discuss this issue in detail.

Starting with the Georgia HOPE program, which was established in 1993, a number of states have recently adopted merit-based grant aid programs for students who attend college within state. These programs increase the incentive that students from those states have to attend college within state (Dynarski, chap. 2 in this volume). During our sample period, only Georgia, Arkansas, Florida, New Mexico, and Mississippi instituted such programs (between 1994 and 1998), but seven more did so by 2002. Such programs should serve to increase the demand for in-state students to attend public institutions in the state, which may limit the public institution's ability to expand, or even maintain, its nonresident enrollment share. We include year/state interaction terms for those years in which an institution was in a state that had adopted one of these programs do, in fact, reduce nonresident enrollment share.²⁹

We present two types of estimates for each equation. First, to understand why tuition, grant aid, and nonresident enrollment vary across states and institutions at a point in time, we present pooled cross-section time series estimates, using institutional level data for eight years between 1979 and 1998. Year dichotomous variables are included in these models to control for idiosyncratic time effects.

While the wide variation in the cross-section data makes this approach appealing, it is subject to possible omitted-variables bias. For example, institutions located in beautiful areas, other factors held constant, may be able to charge higher tuitions. In this example, omission of "beauty" as an explanatory variable might bias the estimates of other explanatory variables' parameters effects on tuition if these variables are correlated with "beauty." We have attempted to minimize this problem by including a carefully constructed, rich set of explanatory variables in our models.

An alternative way of controlling for omitted variables is to take advantage of the panel nature of the data and employ a fixed effects estimation strategy. The panel data results are useful in understanding how *changes* in explanatory variables affect *changes* in the dependent variables. In addition, the panel data results will be employed to simulate how changes in key explanatory variables will affect changes in the outcomes of interest to us.

Inasmuch as these four outcomes are determined simultaneously, we would prefer to estimate a jointly determined system of four equations using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to control for the endogeneity of these outcomes.³⁰ However, the success of this procedure is highly dependent on

^{29.} For example, we include a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for Georgia institutions in our sample for 1994, 1996, and 1998 and is zero otherwise.

^{30.} The 2SLS estimation is necessary to attempt to correct for the biases that result from the violation of the orthogonality conditions necessary for ordinary least squares (OLS) to be unbiased, though the signs of the potential biases here are ambiguous.

finding appropriate "instruments" for the endogenous variables in the system.³¹ Determining a suitable vector of restrictions has proven to be a challenging endeavor, and to avoid debate over the restrictions we have chosen, we will report estimates from the reduced-form model for our system.

The reduced form is found by solving for the endogenous variables in the system. What one is left with is a system of four outcome equations, with each outcome being a function of purely exogenous variables. Without agreement on acceptable exclusion restrictions, we are unable to recover the underlying structural parameters from estimates of the reduced-form model. However, the only real cost of using this procedure is that we are unable to make direct assessments of the impacts that changes in each of the outcomes explicitly has on the other outcomes in the system.

We should caution that without a properly specified structural model, one cannot be sure that the estimated associations in our data are causal. However, we believe that our results are of interest and provide a guide to how a public university and prospective students react to state actions and other changes in environmental variables. Those estimates and those we tried using a variety of different sets of instruments proved to be very similar to the estimates of the reduced-form system that follows. Tables 7A.4 and 7A.5 present the 2SLS "structural" results for readers that are interested in these findings.³²

7.4.2 Econometric Estimates: Cross-Section Findings

The odd-numbered columns of tables 7.8 and 7.9 present the estimated coefficients from the cross-section equations. We have suppressed the stan-

31. We tried to instrument using the following: In the grant aid equation, we instrument for in-state tuition using the institution's Barron's ranking because the quality of an institution's students likely affects tuition, but not a state's willingness to disperse financial aid to all students in the state. In the in-state tuition equation, we instrument for grant aid with state tax revenues per capita and the weighted ranking of public schools in the state. In the out-of-state tuition equation, we instrument for in-state tuition with state private enrollment share, state two-year enrollment share, weighted ranking of private schools in the state, state tax revenues per capita, and weighted rank of public schools in the state. Nonresident enrollment shares are instrumented with average SAT scores of high school seniors in the state. In the nonresident enrollment share equation, out-of-state tuition is instrumented with state private enrollment share, state two-year enrollment share, weighted ranking of private schools in the state. In the nonresident enrollment share equation, out-of-state tuition is instrumented with state private enrollment share, state two-year enrollment share, weighted ranking of private schools in the state.

32. Although finding suitable exclusion restrictions is a challenging endeavor for this system of equations, the estimates in tables 7A.4 and 7A.5 have proven to be robust to a variety of specification changes. The key exclusion restrictions that are necessary to identify the model are real state tax revenue per capita in the in-state and out-of-state tuition equations and average SAT scores of high school students in the state in the nonresident enrollment share equation. Many of the other exclusions are made to reduce multicollinearity. We suspect that the insensitivity of the 2SLS estimates and their similarity to reduced-form estimates is due to the instruments being either "too weak" or "too strong." By the former, we mean that there is not enough exogenous variation to produce a change in the outcome in question (with a corresponding large asymptotic variance matrix of the 2SLS estimator). By the latter, we mean that the instruments may also be correlated with the underlying model's disturbance term.

	Gran	ıt Aid	In-State	Tuition
Variable	Cross Section (1)	Panel (2)	Cross Section (3)	Panel (4)
State demographics/institutional characteristics				
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX)	0.57*	0.20*	0.07	0.05
Log unemployment (UNEMP)	0.34*	0.04	0.20*	0.08^{*}
Share of population aged 18–24 (AGE)	-23.38*	-13.49*	0.49	-9.31*
Share of population with incomes below maximum				
Pell allowable (ELIG)	-0.07	1.14*	-1.23*	0.40
Log number of governing boards (GOV)	0.01	n.a.	0.00	n.a.
Sources of institutional aid				
Log state appropriations per student (APP)	-0.27*	0.53*	-0.24*	-0.18*
Log endowment per student (END)	0.02	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Sources of student financial aid				
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	-10.70	1.32*	-1.89	0.48*
Percent cap on costs (CAP)	-3.50	0.70*	-0.72	0.34*
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)	n.a.	0.57*	n.a.	0.15*
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)	n.a.	0.73*	n.a.	0.38*
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT)	1.01*	0.77*	0.05	0.24*
Florida Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.82	-0.30	-0.47^{*}	-0.19^{*}
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT)	-1.77*	-1.55*	-0.15	-0.10
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT)	-1.90*	-1.01*	0.19	-0.09
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT)	0.69	0.73*	-0.21	-0.07
Enrollment pressure				
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD)	0.14*	-0.09	0.05*	-0.02
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)	1.36*	-1.14^{*}	0.86*	0.53*
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO)	0.63*	1.32*	-0.35*	-0.07
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT)	-0.87*	0.31*	-0.23*	0.15*
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR)	0.27*	-0.08	0.12*	0.06^{*}
School quality/competitive position				
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.06*
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)	-0.01	-0.01	0.10*	0.06
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV)	0.32*	0.02	0.00	0.04*
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB)	0.30*	0.00	0.05*	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.595	0.618	0.722	0.866

Table 7.8 State Need Based Grant Aid and Instate Tuition Equations Reduced Form

Michael J. Rizzo and Ronald G. Ehrenberg

Regression Results

328

Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. n.a. = not applicable. *Significant at the 05 percent level

*Significant at the 95 percent level.

dard error reporting to make the tables more readable. Variables that have an asterisk (*) are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Turning first to the average state need-based grant aid per-student equation (column [1]), it appears that differences across states in the level of per-student grant aid awards are best explained by differences in demographic charac-

Out-of-State Tuition and Nonresident Enrollment Share Equations Reduced Form Regression Results

Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) State demographics/institutional characteristics Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 0.00 0.08* -0.25 -0.2 Log unemployment (UNEMP) 0.13* 0.05* -0.37* -0.1 Share of population with incomes below maximum -1.26 -4.10* 10.16* 3.4 Share of population with incomes below maximum -1.25* 0.59* 1.24* -1.1 Log number of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 n.a. -0.03* n.a. Sources of institutional aid - - - - - - - 1.6* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid - - - - - - - - 0.5* n.a. -0.5*		Out-of Tuit		Nonre Sha	sident are
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 0.00 0.08^* -0.25 -0.2 Log unemployment (UNEMP) 0.13^* 0.05^* -0.7^* -0.1 Share of population with incomes below maximum -1.26 -4.10^* 10.16^* 3.4 Share of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 $n.a.$ -0.03^* -1.16^* 0.00^* Sources of institutional aid Log endowment per student (END) 0.05^* 0.01^* 0.16^* 0.00^* Sources of student financial aid Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) -0.35 0.16^* 5.11 0.00^* Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.00^* Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) $n.a.$ 0.46^* $n.a.$ -0.8^* Post-1972 subsidized loan access (1992) $n.a.$ 0.46^* $n.a.$ -0.8^* Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02^* -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.01^* 0.04^* 0.02^* 0.93^* 0.6^* Share of FTE FTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* $0.93^$	Variable	Section		Section	Panel (4)
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX) 0.00 0.08^* -0.25 -0.2 Log unemployment (UNEMP) 0.13^* 0.05^* -0.7^* -0.1 Share of population with incomes below maximum -1.26 -4.10^* 10.16^* 3.4 Share of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 $n.a.$ -0.03^* -1.16^* 0.00^* Sources of institutional aid Log endowment per student (END) 0.05^* 0.01^* 0.16^* 0.00^* Sources of student financial aid Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) -0.35 0.16^* 5.11 0.00^* Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.00^* Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) $n.a.$ 0.46^* $n.a.$ -0.8^* Post-1972 subsidized loan access (1992) $n.a.$ 0.46^* $n.a.$ -0.8^* Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02^* -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.01^* 0.04^* 0.02^* 0.93^* 0.6^* Share of FTE FTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* $0.93^$	State demographics/institutional characteristics				
Share of population aged 18–24 (AGE) -1.26 -4.10* 10.16* 3.4 Share of population with incomes below maximum Pell allowable (ELIG) -1.25* $0.59*$ 1.24* -1.1 Log number of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 n.a. -0.03* n.a Sources of institutional aid -0.05* -0.23* -1.16* 0.0 Log endowment per student (APP) -0.15* -0.23* -1.16* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid -0.03* n.a. 0.05* 0.01* 0.16* 0.0 Sources of subdent financial aid -0.43 -0.17* 1.57 0.0 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) n.a. 0.46* n.a. -0.8* Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1992) n.a. 0.46* n.a. -0.8 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.17* 0.17* 0.17 -0.4 Hoissistip Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02* -0.02 -0.23 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02* 0.17* 0.17* 0.1 -0.1 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20*<	Log tax revenues per capita (TAX)	0.00	0.08*	-0.25	-0.21*
Share of population with incomes below maximum Pell allowable (ELIG) -1.25^* 0.59^* 1.24^* -1.1 Log number of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 $n.a.$ -0.03^* $n.a.$ Sources of institutional aid Log state appropriations per student (APP) -0.15^* -0.23^* -1.16^* 0.0 Log endowment per student (END) 0.05^* 0.01^* 0.16^* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) -0.35 0.16 5.11 0.00 Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.0 Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1979) $n.a.$ 0.06^* $n.a.$ -0.58 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.08^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.44 Florida Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02 -1.28^* -1.16^* Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.4 -0.1^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.2^* Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.04 0.06^* -0.31^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.06^* -0.31^* 0	Log unemployment (UNEMP)	0.13*	0.05*	-0.37*	-0.16*
Pell allovable (ELIG) -1.25^* 0.59^* 1.24^* -1.14^* Log number of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 $n.a.$ -0.03^* $n.a.$ Sources of institutional aid 0.00 $n.a.$ -0.03^* $n.a.$ Log state appropriations per student (APP) -0.15^* -0.23^* -1.16^* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid 0.05^* 0.01^* 0.16^* 0.0 Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.0 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1992) $n.a.$ 0.46^* $n.a.$ -0.8 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02^* -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 Inrollment pressure Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of the undergrads in reciprocity agr	Share of population aged 18–24 (AGE)	-1.26	-4.10^{*}	10.16*	3.45
Log number of governing boards (GOV) 0.00 n.a. -0.03^* n.a.Sources of institutional aidLog state appropriations per student (END) 0.05^* 0.01^* 0.16^* 0.00^* Sources of student financial aidLog maximum Pell Grant award (PELL) -0.35 0.16 5.11 0.00^* Porcent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.00^* Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1992)n.a. 0.46^* n.a. -0.8^* Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)n.a. 0.46^* n.a. -0.8^* Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1^* Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02^* 0.03 0.31 0.1^* Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE FTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.3 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements 0.00 0.00^* -0.01^* 0.00^* Weak Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00^* Weak Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.00^* 0.03^* 0.28^* -0.01	Share of population with incomes below maximum				
Sources of institutional aid Log state appropriations per student (APP) -0.15^* -0.23^* -1.16^* 0.0 Log endowment per student (END) 0.05* 0.01* 0.16* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid -0.35 0.16 5.11 0.0 Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.0 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) n.a. 0.06^* n.a. -0.46^* n.a. -0.5 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1992) n.a. 0.06^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.46^* Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1^* Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.01^* 0.04 -0.1^* 5.5^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19^* 0.26^* -0.2	Pell allowable (ELIG)	-1.25*	0.59*	1.24*	-1.10
Sources of institutional aid Log state appropriations per student (APP) -0.15^* -0.23^* -1.16^* 0.0 Log endowment per student (END) 0.05* 0.01* 0.16* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid -0.35 0.16 5.11 0.0 Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.0 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) n.a. 0.06^* n.a. -0.46^* n.a. -0.5 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1992) n.a. 0.06^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.46^* Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1^* Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.01^* 0.04 -0.1^* 5.5^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19^* 0.26^* -0.2	Log number of governing boards (GOV)	0.00	n.a.	-0.03^{*}	n.a.
Log endowment per student (END) 0.05^* 0.01^* 0.16^* 0.0 Sources of student financial aid -0.35 0.16 5.11 0.0 Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.0 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979) $n.a.$ 0.06^* $n.a.$ -0.46^* $n.a.$ Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992) $n.a.$ 0.46^* $n.a.$ -0.8 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.11^* -0.07 -0.29 -0.4 Mississipi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.31 0.1 Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.1^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.16^* 0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUTR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.3 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.04 0.06 -0.20^* 0.0 School quality/competitive position 0.04 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 0.02^* 0.01^* Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.2 0.21^* 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPRIV)$ 0.00 0.00 0.00^* 0.02^* 0.02^* 0.21^* 0.21^* <					
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	Log state appropriations per student (APP)	-0.15*	-0.23*	-1.16*	0.07
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	Log endowment per student (END)	0.05*	0.01*	0.16*	0.04
Percent cap on costs (CAP) -0.43 -0.17^* 1.57 0.0 Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)n.a. 0.05^* n.a. -0.5 Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)n.a. 0.46^* n.a. -0.8 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.08^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.4 Florida Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.11^* -0.07 -0.29 -0.4 Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02 0.03 0.31 0.1 Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.1 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.0 School quality/competitive positionweak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.01 0.28^* -0.01 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPRIV) 0.00^* 0.01^* 0.01^* 0.02 0.21^* 0.21^* Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state $(BSPRIV)$ 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.01^* 0.02 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)n.a. 0.05^* n.a. -0.5 Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)n.a. 0.46^* n.a. -0.8 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.08^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.4 Florida Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02 0.03 0.31 0.11^* Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31^* Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements (RECIP) 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.01 School quality/competitive position $Weighted Barron's rank (HIGHB)$ 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.00 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.01 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 <t< td=""><td>Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)</td><td>-0.35</td><td>0.16</td><td>5.11</td><td>0.00</td></t<>	Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	-0.35	0.16	5.11	0.00
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)n.a. 0.05^* n.a. -0.5 Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)n.a. 0.46^* n.a. -0.8 Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.08^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.4 Florida Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.02 0.03 0.31 0.11^* Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11^* Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31^* Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements (RECIP) 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.01 School quality/competitive position $Weighted Barron's rank (HIGHB)$ 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.00 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.01 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 <t< td=""><td>Percent cap on costs (CAP)</td><td>-0.43</td><td>-0.17^{*}</td><td>1.57</td><td>0.08^{*}</td></t<>	Percent cap on costs (CAP)	-0.43	-0.17^{*}	1.57	0.08^{*}
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)n.a. 0.46^* n.a. -0.8^* Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.08^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.4 Florida Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.1 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.11^* -0.07 -0.29 -0.4 Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02^* -0.03 0.31 0.1 Enrollment pressure -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 Share of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.3 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.0 School quality/competitive position $weak$ Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.0 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPIV) 0.04^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.0 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPUB)$ -0.01 -0.01 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state $(BSPRIV)$ 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.0 <tr< td=""><td></td><td>n.a.</td><td>0.05*</td><td>n.a.</td><td>-0.52*</td></tr<>		n.a.	0.05*	n.a.	-0.52*
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT) -0.08^* 0.17^* 0.17 -0.4 Florida Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27 -0.02 -1.28^* -1.13 Georgia Merit Program (MERIT) -0.11^* -0.07 -0.29 -0.4 Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02^* 0.03 0.31 0.11^* Enrollment pressure $Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD)-0.010.02-0.04-0.11^*Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)0.20^*0.190.39-0.6Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO)-0.090.08-0.37^*0.2Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT)0.040.16^*-0.26^*-0.2Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR)0.15^*0.10^*0.00^*0.00^*School quality/competitive positionWeak Barron's rank (HOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPRIV)0.04^*0.05^*-0.31^*0.0^*Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB)0.07^*0.030.28^*-0.01Institution's share of quality public seats in the state(BSPRIV)0.000.000.01^*0.02^*Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV)0.37^*$	Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)	n.a.	0.46*	n.a.	-0.84*
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		-0.08*	0.17*	0.17	-0.44
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02 0.03 0.31 0.11 Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position $weak Barron's rank (LOWB)$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPRIV)$ 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1	Florida Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.27	-0.02	-1.28*	-1.18*
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT) -0.27^* -0.03 0.48 0.2 New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02 0.03 0.31 0.11 Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position $weak Barron's rank (LOWB)$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPRIV)$ 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1	Georgia Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.11*	-0.07	-0.29	-0.44*
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT) -0.02 0.03 0.31 0.11 Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements (RECIP) 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Meighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1		-0.27^{*}	-0.03	0.48	0.24
Enrollment pressureRatio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD) -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position $Na.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPUB)$ -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1		-0.02	0.03	0.31	0.18
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV) 0.20^* 0.19 0.39 -0.6 Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.31 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements $(RECIP)$ 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Strong Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPUB)$ -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1					
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Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO) -0.09 0.08 -0.37^* 0.2 Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.3 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position 0.04 0.00 -0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive position 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.1 Weak Barron's rank (LOWB) $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ $n.a.$ Strong Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state $(BSPUB)$ -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1	Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)	0.20*	0.19	0.39	-0.67
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT) 0.04 0.16^* -0.26^* -0.2 Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.3 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive positionn.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.11^* Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1		-0.09	0.08	-0.37*	0.23
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR) 0.15^* 0.10^* 0.08 0.3 Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements (RECIP) 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.0 School quality/competitive positionn.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.1 Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.0 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.0 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1		0.04	0.16*	-0.26^{*}	-0.28^{*}
Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity agreements (RECIP) 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive positionn.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.1 Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.0 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.0 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.1		0.15*	0.10*	0.08	0.35*
(RECIP) 0.00 0.00 -0.09^* 0.00 School quality/competitive positionn.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.11 Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11					
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Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB) 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.11 Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.00 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.55 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11	School quality/competitive position				
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Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV) 0.04^* 0.05^* -0.31^* 0.0 Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.0 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state -0.00 -0.00 0.00^* 0.00 (BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5^* Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11	Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)	0.04	0.00	-0.20	0.11
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB) 0.07^* 0.03 0.28^* -0.01 Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.55 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11		0.04*	0.05*	-0.31*	0.04
Institution's share of quality public seats in the state (BSPUB) -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state (BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.55 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11		0.07*	0.03	0.28*	-0.03
(BSPUB) -0.01 -0.04 1.29^* 0.2 Institution's share of qual. private seats in the state 0.00 0.00 0.01^* 0.00 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11					
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(BSPRIV) 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.0 Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11* -1.07* -0.1					
Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV) 0.37^* -0.11 -0.03 -0.5 Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11^* -1.07^* -0.11		0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00
Log SAT (SAT) -0.01 2.11* -1.07* -0.1					-0.56*
					-0.15
A dijisted P^2 0.704 0.004 0.501 0.20	Adjusted R^2	0.794	0.904	0.501	0.204

Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. n.a. = not applicable.

*Significant at the 95 percent level.

teristics, enrollment pressures, and overall institutional quality in the states.³³

With respect to demographic characteristics, wealthier states, as measured by per capita tax revenues (TAX), award more grant aid per student, but states in which a larger share of the population is of college age (AGE) award less aid per student. Further, states in which labor markets are loose award more grant aid per student. However, institutional autonomy (GOV) does not seem to be correlated with state grant aid generosity.

The entire vector of enrollment and state quality variables are strongly related to grant aid awards. Undergraduates in states with less competition for funds with more costly graduate students (GRAD) receive more grant aid. In addition, when private and community college enrollments (PRIV, TWO) are large relative to public four-year college enrollments, grant aid awards are larger—presumably due to the private colleges' subsidizing their own students and the large in-kind subsidy provided by the low-cost (and hence low state appropriations) community colleges.³⁴ Further, the average (excluding in-state) tuition in the region (TUITR) that the state is located in seems to be positively correlated with the level of grant aid that is awarded. Curiously, states with greater available seating capacity in their public institutions-that is, their predicted enrollments exceed what they actually enroll in a given year (SEAT)—award less grant aid per student, contrary to our a priori expectation. As expected, states with higherquality public (BPUB) and private (BPRIV) academic institutions, and thus likely higher costs, offer more grant aid.

Do other sources of student financial aid affect state need-based grant aid awards? One might expect that growing state affinities for non-needbased aid programs would crowd out spending on need-based grant aid to students. The preliminary evidence varies by state. While it is not surprising to see that Georgia, Mississippi, and Florida have coupled increasing merit-based aid generosity with decreasing need-based aid support, it is surprising to see that Arkansas and New Mexico have responded by increasing their need-based aid generosity, ceteris parabis. However, as hinted at by figure 7.2, it appears that states prefer one type of aid to another. It appears that states awarding larger in-kind awards (state appropriation per student to four-year institutions [APP]) award significantly less grant aid per student than states where appropriations are lower.

Moving to the in-state tuition equation (column [3]), we find that sources of institutional aid and enrollment pressures go a long way in explaining

^{33.} All of the results discussed in the paper are ceteris paribus, or other variables in the model held constant, findings.

^{34.} However, this result may be picking up higher-order moments of the state income distribution as the share of two-year students from lower-income families is far greater than that for four-year students. Therefore, states with comparatively large two-year enrollments may have wider and lower income distributions than others.

differences across institutions in in-state tuition levels. Schools that receive higher state appropriations per student (APP) charge lower tuition, though the elasticity is far from unity. Taken together, the impacts of having a strong Barron's ranking (HIGHB) and having higher endowment per student (END) suggest that higher-quality schools are able to charge more for their product.

Once again, the entire enrollment-pressure vector is significant in explaining cross-institution variation in in-state tuition levels. When private competition in a state is important, as measured by the share of first-time freshmen in the state that are enrolled in private academic institutions (PRIV), public universities are able to charge higher tuition, as do institutions in states in which a smaller share of students attend two-year colleges (TWO). A striking result is that the cross-section evidence suggests that in-state undergraduate students are partially subsidizing the huge costs of graduate education at these research universities. Across institutions, the higher the ratio of graduate to undergraduate students (GRAD), the higher the in-state undergraduate tuition. However, this finding might merely reflect that universities with larger shares of their students enrolled as graduate students may be higher-quality institutions, which attract better faculty and thus can charge higher tuition levels to its residents. Not surprising, however, is that institutions with more seating capacity (SEAT) tend to charge a lower price for their product and that higher regional tuition (TUITR) allows institutions to charge a higher price.

There is little evidence that differences in student financial aid affect instate tuition levels and mixed evidence on state demographic and institutional factors. Public universities in states in which the unemployment rate (UNEMP) is high, and hence the opportunity cost of enrolling in school is low, charge higher in-state tuition. Unlike Lowry (2001b), we find no evidence that public universities in states with more autonomous governance structures (GOV) charge higher tuition.

Column (5) of table 7.9 displays the results for the nonresident tuition equation. Contrary to our results for in-state tuition, we do not find that nonresident undergraduates are subsidizing graduate education. Also, given that nonresident enrollments can be viewed to either enhance revenues or school quality, it is not surprising that institutional aid and school-quality variables primarily drive the out-of-state tuition results.

Institutions receiving higher state appropriations per student (APP) charge less to nonresidents, though the elasticity is small, and institutions with larger endowments per student (END) charge a higher price to non-residents. Further, schools charge nonresidents more in states in which the average quality of private colleges (BPRIV) and public colleges (BPUB) are higher. As alluded to previously, these quality measures are closely related to the broader concept of competitive position. In the case of non-resident tuition, regional competition clearly also matters, as schools lo-

cated in regions in which a large share of students attend private schools (SPRIV) are able to charge more to out-of-state residents. Similarly, when the average tuition in the geographical region is higher (TUITR), schools also charge more to nonresidents.

While demographic characteristics in the state affect nonresident tuition the same way they affect in-state tuition, unlike in the in-state tuition equation, evidence of the impact of merit-aid programs (MERIT) on tuition is not mixed. These programs seem to have had a negative effect on nonresident tuition levels—likely deriving from the fact that the increasing prevalence of merit-based aid programs provides an incentive for students who otherwise would have attended more costly out-of-state or private institutions to remain in-state.

Column (7) presents the nonresident enrollment share equation. Taken as a whole, the entire vector of variables aside from the sources of student financial aid are strong predictors (across institutions) of nonresident enrollment share differences. The results seem to indicate that nonresident students are used both for the purposes of generating revenues and to augment institutional quality. Turning to the institutional aid variables, we see that states providing higher state appropriations per student (APP) tend to enroll fewer nonresidents. While one might expect nonresidents to prefer to attend institutions that receive more state support per student, sometimes state support per student is endogenous in the sense that institutions may receive greater state appropriations per student for each in-state student they enroll. Further, institutions that receive high levels of state support may not need to turn to nonresidents to generate needed revenues. We also find that schools with larger endowments per student (END) attract more nonresidents—further suggesting that this variable be included in the "quality" vector.

Flagship public institutions face political pressure to ensure access to the children of state residents. We do not find, however, that when seating capacity at all public institutions in a state is low (SEAT), that public institutions enroll smaller fractions of nonresidents. In fact, we find that institutions with a shortage of capacity enroll the largest nonresident enrollment shares.³⁵ Again, this might be a result of the higher-quality institutions being the ones with less excess capacity than lesser institutions. Another enrollment result that is somewhat surprising is that institutions that enroll a larger share of their undergraduates under tuition reciprocity agreements (RECIP) tend to enroll a smaller share of nonresidents than other institutions.

We do find that schools located in states where high school student qual-

35. Due to concerns that the enrollment constraints at the University of California may be heavily influencing our results, we reestimated all of our equations without these schools. These results were very similar (with larger standard errors) to those presented in the text.

ity is relatively poor (SAT) enroll a larger share of nonresidents—they need to look elsewhere to find high-quality students. Another variable relating to institutional quality is the institution's share of enrollments in a state at schools of equal or higher quality. Other variables held constant, institutions whose enrollment is large relative to the total of all public enrollments (BSPUB) or all private enrollments (BSPRIV) at institutions of equal or greater quality in the state have larger shares of nonresident enrollments.³⁶ It is also not surprising to see that institutions located in states where the average quality of public institutions is high (BPUB) tend to enroll more nonresidents, and those in states where average private school quality (BPRIV) is high enroll fewer nonresidents. Given the tuition premium paid by nonresidents at public institutions, the cost-per-quality unit of attending private schools in the state may be comparable to that for attending out-of-state public institutions.

Turning last to the demographic characteristics, the effect of unemployment rates and the proportion of households that are Pell Grant eligible are as expected. Contrary to our expectations, we find that once we control for other factors, schools in states with more governing boards (GOV), hence more autonomous institutions, enroll smaller shares of nonresidents. Further, the institutions located in states with larger college-aged population shares (AGE) enroll more nonresidents.

7.4.3 Econometric Estimates—Panel Data Results

The even-numbered columns of tables 7.8 and 7.9 present our fixed effects estimates. Because these parameters are estimated from within institution changes over time, they are useful for understanding the potential impacts of policy changes. One might expect that because most of the variation in our data occurs across institutions, fewer statistically significant coefficients would arise, but this is not what we observe. Our discussion focuses on results that significantly differ from those found in the cross section, and we make some brief comments on those that do not, which are noteworthy nonetheless.³⁷

Turning first to the state need-based grant aid equation (column [2]), we find that changes in sources of student financial aid are the primary determinants of changes in state student need-based grant aid. As students have more access to federal grants (PELL, CAP) and loans (1979, 1992), states respond by awarding more grant aid. Three other results stand out. First,

36. For example, for the public schools, we simply take the ratio of full-time-equivalent first-time freshmen enrollments in the school under observation and divide it by the total number of full-time-equivalent first-time freshmen students in public institutions in the state that have at least as high a Barron's ranking as the school under observation.

37. If a so-called "fixed effect" result differs from a cross-sectional estimate, it is likely because the cross-sectional equations did not properly control for time-invariant, institution-(or state-) specific information that was also *correlated* with the other explanatory variables in the model. we find that, controlling for other factors, increases in state appropriations per student (APP) lead to states' awarding more grant aid—indicating that in-kind aid and direct student aid are perhaps complementary. Second, the impact of enrollment pressures within states is very different than the impact across states. Most notably, we find that as the seating capacity in a state increases (SEAT), states respond by awarding more need-based grant aid per student. Third, we find that state grant aid responds to changes in the income distribution of a state's population. An increase in the share of households whose incomes fall below the maximum level that permits them to be eligible for Pell Grants (ELIG) leads to higher levels of state need-based grant aid per student. Note, too, that changes in institutional quality in the state are not good predictors of grant aid changes. In fact, since quality measures are unlikely to vary much within institutions over time, we do not expect to find statistical significance in many of these variables in any of the equations. As a result, we will ignore these variables in the discussion that follows.

We turn next to the in-state tuition equation (column [4]). While institutional aid and enrollment factors were largely responsible for explaining cross-institutional differences in the cross section, these results indicate that changes in the availability of student financial aid are also very important. In addition, the impact of enrollment pressures and demographic changes are felt somewhat differently.

We find that increased state appropriations per student (AID) are still associated with lower in-state tuition changes, but neither increases in endowment per student (END) nor changes in the share of students that are graduate students (GRAD) are statistically significantly associated with changes in in-state tuition in the panel. What may be of concern to policymakers is that it appears that institutions are attempting to capture the additional revenues that have been generated by federal financial aid programs. We find that an increase in the generosity of the Pell Grant (PELL) by 10 percent leads institutions to raise in-state tuition levels by 4.8 percent. We also find that tuition has also significantly increased as students have had more access to federal subsidized loans (19xx). The implementation of state merit-aid programs has produced mixed results, with tuition rising in the Arkansas institutions and falling in the Florida institutions.

Two additional results are of interest. Unlike in the cross section, as the share of the population that is college aged (AGE) increases, in-state tuition levels fall, but increases in seating capacity result in tuition increases. The latter result is difficult to explain and may reflect reverse causality in the data, despite our best efforts to control for this potential occurrence.

The nonresident tuition equation results in the panel (column [6]) are very similar to the cross-section results, with the most notable difference being that changes in nonresident tuition are largely explained by changes in state demographic characteristics. As tax revenues, unemployment rates, and the share of households with low incomes increase within a state, we find that nonresident tuition will increase. As the college-aged population increases in its size relative to the remainder of the population, we find that nonresident tuition will decrease. While we saw that institutions responded to federal grant aid increases by increasing in-state tuition, we do not see the same occurring with nonresident tuition. However, it appears that as students have more access to federal subsidized loans, institutions in-turn respond by increasing nonresident tuition. An interesting difference from the cross-section results is that as average SAT scores improve within a state, institutions will have less pressure to pursue nonresident enrollment strategies to improve quality, and we find this manifestation through nonresident tuition increases. Last, just as in the in-state tuition equation and similarly puzzling, we find that as seating capacity increases at an institution, it responds by increasing nonresident tuition.

Finally, turning to the nonresident enrollment share equation (column [8]), we see that the fixed effects results are starkly different from the crosssectional results. No longer do institutional aid factors matter. This may be due to the finding that as state tax revenues increase (and hence the pool of funds available for institutional and student aid), nonresident enrollment shares decrease within an institution.

While sources of student financial aid were not able to explain crosssectional differences in nonresident enrollments, taken as a whole they seem to do a better job of explaining within-institution changes. We find that as the cap on costs covered by the Pell Grant increases (CAP), more nonresidents would attend an institution, but surprisingly, as access to subsidized loans expands, fewer nonresidents would attend. The presence of merit-aid programs in Florida and Georgia have led institutions in each state to enroll far fewer nonresidents than they had before these programs were instituted.³⁸

As a whole, changes in enrollment pressure are not able to explain changes in nonresident enrollment shares. However, we find that nonresident enrollment shares increase as regional tuition levels (TUITR) increase. Last, as more of the quality slots in institutions in a region are in private schools (SPRIV), the share of nonresidents at the public schools falls. Taken as a whole, these results indicate that nonresident student demand is primarily responsible for explaining within-institution changes in nonresident enrollment shares over time.

Before turning to some simple policy simulations in the next section, we address several important issues. First, inasmuch as we are estimating a reduced-form system, it is natural to run specifications with and without certain variables that might be problematic (e.g., seating capacity, state ap-

^{38.} An unstated goal of each of these programs was to keep high-quality residents from attending universities out of state. This evidence suggests that this may have indeed occurred.

propriations per student, state need-based grant aid per student) to see how sensitive our other results are to those variables' inclusion or omission. Our estimates of the system when we exclude/include different permutations of the preceding three variables proved to be remarkably similar to the previously described results. Second, it would be interesting to determine the impact that per-student need-based grant aid awards have on tuition and enrollments. Because grant aid is a state-level, rather than an institutional-level, variable one can argue that it is reasonable to treat it as exogenous to the institution and include it as an explanatory variable in the other equations. We have done this, and the results are reported in tables 7A.6 and 7A.7.

When per-student grant aid is included as an explanatory variable, the estimated effects of the other variables in the model are qualitatively (and in most cases quantitatively) similar to the results presented in tables 7.8 and 7.9. What is interesting is that we find an impact of state need-based grant aid per student on tuition and enrollment only in the cross section. That is, institutions located in states that award more need-based student aid are those that charge the highest in-state and nonresident tuition, ceteris parabis, and are also the institutions that enroll the smallest share of nonresidents. However, *changes* in state need-based grant aid do not affect *changes* in in-state and nonresident tuition and nonresident enrollment.

7.4.4 Policy Simulations

Table 7.10 outlines the effects that selected policy changes have on the four outcomes, using the panel data estimates presented in tables 7.8 and 7.9.³⁹ The discussion below focuses only on those factors that are likely to vary substantially between years. Inspection of the grant aid results indicates that changes in grant aid are a result of a variety of factors in a state, not solely the result of economic factors. If a state at the average perstudent grant aid level experienced an increase of \$1,000 in per capita tax revenues, that state would only increase per-student grant aid by \$12 over an average of \$307. It appears that there are some spillover effects of increasing institutional and other student sources of financial aid. When the Pell Grant maximum is increased by \$100, we see states respond by increasing per-student need-based grant aid by \$14, and when states increase state appropriations per student by \$1,000, they also increase support for students by \$15.

Increases in state support for higher education institutions helps to curb

^{39.} The table reports marginal effects from the presented regressions evaluated at the sample means in the data. When we calculated the marginal effects for individual institutions and then took their means, the impacts were nearly identical.

Selected Policy Change	Grant Aid (\$)	In-State Tuition (\$)	Out-of-State Tuition (\$)	Nonresident Share
Increase state tax revenues per capita by \$1,000	12*	32	158*	-1.16*
Increase maximum real Pell Grant award by \$100	14*	58*	56	-0.01
Increase real state appropriations per student by				
\$1,000	15*	-60*	-222*	0.19
Increase real endowment per student by \$1,000	0	2	7*	0.05
Increase ratio of grad students to first-time				
freshmen by 10 points	-3	-5	20	-0.30
Increasing seating capacity 10 percentage points	11*	63*	187*	-0.81^{*}
Increases in average regional tuition by \$1,000	-3	23*	145*	1.42*
Increase share of students enrolled in privates by				
1 percentage point	-15^{*}	80*	84	-0.82
Increase share of students enrolled in two-year				
schools by 1 percentage point	10*	-6	20	0.16
Having higher SAT scores by 10 points in your state			201*	-0.40
Increasing the share of students reciprocal by 10				
percentage points			-24	0.003
Average 1998 value of dependent variable	307	3,525	10,094	19.1%

Table 7.10 Effect of Selected Policy Changes on Outcomes: Fixed Effects Reduced-Form Regression Results, Evaluated at 1998 Level of Appropriate Variable

Notes: Nonresident share represents percentage point changes: for example, -2.0 would indicate that nonresident share falls from *x* percent to (*x* – 2) percent. For enrollment equation, numbers indicate percentage point change in share due to being in this category relative to average. Table reports marginal effects evaluated at mean.

*Significant at the 95 percent level.

in-state tuition increases, but the magnitude of this effect is quite small. For the average institution in our sample, it would take an increase of \$1,000 in state appropriations per student to generate an in-state tuition reduction of only \$60. The comparable reduction in out-of-state tuition would be larger, about \$222. The small estimated elasticities of some of the other variables are misleading. For example, while the elasticity of in-state tuition with respect to the Pell Grant is only 0.48, this translates into institutions raising in-state tuition by \$58 every time the Pell Grant maximum increases by \$100 (while the magnitude of the effect is similar for nonresident tuition, the effect is not statistically significant). This result is particularly alarming when one considers that a majority of students receiving the Pell Grant do not receive the maximum award (and thus will experience a larger price increase than those at the margin) and that the Pell Grant program annually exceeds its program allocation from Congress.

Finally, our estimates suggest that most things within institutional or state control would fail to influence the share of nonresidents that public universities enroll. Even the statistical impact of reciprocity agreements is inconsequential. While increases in average tuition rates in the region tend to increase nonresident enrollment shares, clearly individual institutions have little or no control over these rates. About the only tool a state seems to have at its disposal (according to this model) to reduce the dependence on nonresidents is to raise tax revenues. Our estimates suggest that raising per capita tax revenues by \$1,000 will result in the nonresident enrollment share falling by 1.2 percentage points—which would probably not be viewed favorably by state taxpayers.

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have analyzed why state need-based grant aid per student, in-state and out-of-state tuition levels, and nonresident enrollment shares differ across flagship public research universities at a point in time and how each changes over time. There are wide disparities across states in political persuasion, demographic characteristics, income, the availability of private college alternatives, historical factors, university governance, and funding priorities that lead to most of the cross-section differences that we observe in these outcomes. Exploiting the panel nature of the data enables us to control for unmeasured institutional heterogeneity and allows a look within specific institutions to determine which factors are most important in determining changes in these outcomes.

This paper was largely motivated by our interest in understanding why flagship public institutions make such varying use of nonresident enrollments. As such, the major insight that we draw is that these public institutions do not appear to use nonresident enrollments to supplement or replace revenues (as is the a priori belief of many observers). Rather, it appears that they enroll nonresidents to improve institutional quality or to serve other interests. This assessment can be reached after considering three major findings in this paper.

First, the flagship institutions appear to use nonresident enrollments to take advantage of cost efficiencies achieved through participation in tuition reciprocity agreements. Though the empirical evidence we present on the matter is scant, the increased usage of tuition reciprocity programs (as observed in our survey) suggests that institutions realize the revenue limitation in expanding nonresident enrollments. Further, these agreements also reflect the growing regionalization of these state schools. In fact, we find that institutions respond to higher regional tuition by charging high in-state and out-of-state tuition and we see that nonresident students tend to migrate more often when average tuition in their region of residence is higher.

Second, it does appear that institutions attempt to capture additional revenues by cannibalizing the monies provided by federal and state grant

aid programs. Consistent with the Bennett hypothesis, we find substantial evidence that increases in the generosity of the federal Pell Grant program, access to subsidized loans, and state need-based grant aid awards lead to increases in in-state tuition levels. However, we find no evidence that nonresident tuition is increased as a result of these programs. This observation suggests that institutions look to nonresident enrollments not as a revenue source but rather as a quality source. In fact, our nonresident tuition results provide more support for this theory by showing that institutions decrease nonresident tuition substantially when the quality of the high school graduates in their own state falls (\$200 for every fall in average SAT scores by 10 points). Further, there is little evidence that institutions in states where merit-based aid programs were initiated have made attempts to capture these additional monies in the form of higher tuition (with the exception of Arkansas). However, recent research suggests that institutions in other states attempt to capture rents through increases in other fees and charges (Long, forthcoming).

Third, while differences in state appropriations per student can partially explain cross-sectional differences in the use of nonresident enrollments, it does not appear that public institutions make up for losses in state institutional appropriations by adjusting the proportion of students they enroll from out of state. As expected, we find that institutions respond to state appropriations slowdowns by increasing both in-state and nonresident tuition. The lack of response to changes in state appropriations in the nonresident enrollment share suggests that the top flagship institutions may have already reached an equilibrium with regard to nonresident enrollments.

It should also be recognized that institutional and overall measures of state education quality and competitive position are very strong predictors of cross-sectional differences in tuition and enrollment. Clearly, these factors do not vary rapidly within institutions or states over time, so it is not surprising that we are unable to parse out any statistically significant relationship between these factors and the tuition and enrollment outcomes. This should not be taken to diminish the importance of these factors.

We must caution that the period our data span ends before the recession of the early years of the twenty-first century, the accompanying growing tightness in state government budgets, and thus the decline in the growth and in some cases the decline in the level—of real state appropriations per student to public higher education institutions. Finding other sources of revenue became increasingly important to public higher education institutions, and a number increased their in-state tuition levels at double-digit rates for the 2002–2003 academic year. Time will tell if they will increasingly turn to out-of-state students' tuition revenues to fill the holes in their budgets.

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Table 7A.1	Sources and Definitions of Variables	
Variable	Definition/Explanation	Source
1979	Dummy for years subsequent to repeal of Middle Income Student Assistant Act in 1979, which reinstated needs test for eligibility for subsidized federal loans	1.2
1992	Dummy for years subsequent to 1992, when the 5.64% of home equity that was taxable in the expected family contribu- tion (EFC) calculation was removed from taxable assets	1.2
	Share of population in a state between ages 18 and 24	6
AID	Logarithm of need-based state grant aid to in-state undergraduate students attending institutions in their own state per full-time equivalent four-vear undergraduate in the state. Includes federal matching LEAP/SSIG monies	4
	Logarithm of state government appropriations in 1,000s per full-time equivalent undergraduate at the institution	5
BPRIV	Undergraduate enrollment weighted average Barron's ranking of all rated four-year private institutions in the state	6.5
	Undergraduate enrollment weighted average Barron's ranking of all rated four-year public institutions in the state	6.5
	Institution's undergraduate enrollment divided by the total undergraduate enrollment of all equally or higher-rated private	6.5
	(Barron's) institutions in the state	
BSPUB	Institution's undergraduate enrollment divided by the total undergraduate enrollment of all equally or higher-rated public (Barron's) institutions in the state (including the institution of observation)	6.5
CAP	Maximum percentage of college costs covered by Pell Grants. Initially 50% of costs, raised to 60% in 1986 and eliminated in 1992.	٢
ELIG	Share of state's households with incomes below the maximum allowable to be eligible to receive federal grant aid. Maxi- mum income eligibility estimated from EFC calculation.	8.7
END	Logarithm of institutional endowment in 1,000s per full-time equivalent undergraduate at the institution Number of coverning boords in the cross	S O
	Ratio of full-time equivalent graduate students to full-time equivalent undergraduate students at the institution	ŝ
	Dummy variable equal to 1 if Barron's ranking is "Highly Competitive" or "Most Competitive"	9
	Dummy variable equal to 1 if Barron's ranking is "Not Competitive" or "Less Competitive"	9
	Dummy variable equal to 1 if state had a merit aid program in that year	4

NON	Logarithm of the share of first-time freshmen that are nonresident, nonforeign students. In nonresident share equation, we use the how-odds ratio. That is the share divided by one minus the share.	5.10
PELL Priv	Logarithm of the maximum available Pell Grant award Share of FTFFTF in state in mivates (PRIV)	٢
RECIP	Logarithm of the share of full-time equivalent undergraduates enrolled under tuition reciprocity programs	11
SAT	Average SAT score in the state (includes public and private high school students)	12
SEAT	Maximum number of full-time equivalent first-time freshman enrollment in the state historically at public schools of	5.12
	equal or greater Barron's rank divided by the current number of high school graduates in the state	
SPRIV	In the census region, the share of full-time equivalent first-time freshmen in schools that are of equal or greater Barron's	5.6
TAX		13.3
TUITI		5
TUITO		5
TUITR (EQUN 1&2)		5
TUITR (EQUN 3&4)	Logarithm of the enrollment weighted average of public in-state, public out-of-state, and private tuition in the census	5
	region, including schools in the state of observation	
TWO	Share of public full-time equivalent first-time freshman enrollment in the state in two-year colleges	5
UNEMP	Logarithm of the state average unemployment rate	14

ports; 5. Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Surveys via WebCASPAR (see http://caspar.nsf.gov or www.nces.ed.gov/ipeds); 6. Barron's Profiles of site at www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri), 12. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 13. U.S. Bureau of sus, Population Estimates Program—Age distribution data on web site; 4. National Association of State Scholarship and Grant Programs. Annual Survey Re-American Colleges, 1979–1996; 7. American Council on Education Center for Policy Analysis, 2000 Status Report on the Pell Grant Program: 8. Current Populaion Surveys, Estimates of Income of Households by State 1979-1996; 9. Education Commission of the States; 10. Older resident enrollment data from Higher Education General Information Surveys not available on WebCASPAR retrieved through original "Fall Residence and Migration Surveys," 11. Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI), Survey of Tuition Reciprocity Programs of Public Research Doctoral Institutions. Summer 2001 (available on CHERI webhe Census, Census of Governments via the Statistical Abstract of the United States; 14. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Sources: 1. United States Department of Education web site; 2. Michael Mumper, Removing College Price Barriers, SUNY Press, 1996; 3. U.S. Bureau of the Cen-Earnings.

Votes: FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. All data in real values using 1996 calendar year GDP impact price deflator.

Variable	1979	1981	1988	1992	1994	1996	1998
State demographics/institutional characteristics							
Per capita real state tax revenues	2,279	1,865	3,070	2,535	2,669	4,720	5,185
Unemployment rate	5.78	6.91	6.43	6.51	6.36	5.38	4.80
Share of population aged 18-24 (%)	13.5	13.3	11.1	10.2	9.9	9.6	9.7
Share of population with incomes below Pell							
maximum (%)	63.9	57.5	53.5	49.3	45.0	44.9	49.8
Sources of institutional aid							
Endowment per student	957	1,401	4,466	7,726	9,809	13,977	19,337
Sources of student financial aid							
Pell Grant award (real)	3,416	2,663	2,734	2,617	2,392	2,470	2,917
Enrollment pressure							
No. of graduate students/first-time							
freshmen	1.20	1.24	1.27	1.59	1.58	1.49	1.10
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (%)	30.3	30.7	30.0	31.1	30.7	30.2	23.3
Share of FTEFTF in state in two-years (%)	45.7	47.3	44.0	46.0	44.9	44.2	41.9
Seating capacity (predicted/actual)	1.34	1.31	0.99	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.86
Composite regional tuition	2,932	3,086	5,567	6,090	6,332	6,672	7,059
Composition regional tuition, ex-in-state	4,217	4,439	8,005	8,721	9,047	9,541	10,002
School and student quality/competitive							
position							
No. of schools strong Barron's rank	2	3	5	13	11	11	11
No. of schools weak Barron's rank	17	15	16	13	7	11	11
Weighted rank of privates in state	2.56	2.64	2.90	2.74	2.98	2.98	2.98
Weighted rank of publics in state	2.38	2.39	2.60	2.60	2.66	2.67	2.67
Institution's share of state's quality private							
seats (%)	251.0	299.3	262.0	267.7	273.9	191.6	191.6
Institution's share of state's quality public							
seats (%)	47.9	47.5	52.9	50.8	51.1	49.9	49.9
Share of quality regional seats, private (%)	37.8	37.3	39.4	40.9	40.0	39.5	39.5
Average SAT scores of high school							
graduates	936	939	1,042	966	1,043	1,057	1,062

Table 7A.2 Average Values of Selected Independent Variables

Notes: Table contains values for those variables not in earlier tables. Also excludes categorical variables. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen.

Table 7	A.3
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Expected Impacts and Exclusion Restrictions in Estimated Equations

	Equation					
Variable	Grant Aid	In-State Tuition	Out-of-State Tuition	Nonresiden Share		
Endogenous variables						
Log need-based grant aid per public student						
(AID)		D+				
Log in-state tuition (TUITI)	B+		S+			
Lot out-of-state tuition (TUITO)				B ?		
Log nonresident enrollment share (NON)			B ?			
State demographics/institutional characteristics						
Log state tax revenues per capita (TAX)	S+					
Log unemployment (UNEMP)	D?	D?	B ?	B ?		
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE)	S–	D+	D+	D+		
Share of population with incomes below						
maximum Pell allowable (ELIG)	D+	D-	D–	D–		
Log number of governing boards (GOV)	S?	S+	S+	S?		
Sources of institutional aid						
Log state appropriations per student (APP)	B–	B ?	B ?	B ?		
Log endowment per student (END)	B–	B+	$\mathbf{B}+$	B ?		
Sources of student financial aid						
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	B–	D+	D+	D+		
Percent cap on costs (CAP)	D-	D+	D+	D+		
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)	D+	D-	D–	D–		
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)	D+	D-	D–	D–		
State merit-based aid programs (MERIT)	B–	B+	S+	S–		
Enrollment pressure						
Ratio of the grad to undergrad enrollments						
(GRAD)	D-	B ?	B ?	B ?		
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)		S+				
Share of FTEFTF in state 2 years (TWO)	B ?	S–				
Log seating capacity (SEAT)	S+	D-	B ?	S+		
Log composite regional tuition (TUITR)	B–	S+	D+	D+		
Log share of the undergrads in reciprocity						
agreements (RECIP)			B ?	B ?		
School and student quality/competitive position						
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)		D-	D–	D–		
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)		D+	D+	D+		
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state						
(BPRIV)	B+	D-				
Weighted Barron's rank publics in state (BPUB)	B ?					
Institution's share of quality public seats in the						
state (BSPUB)			$\mathbf{B}+$	D+		
Institution's share of quality private seats in the				2		
state (BSPRIV)			$\mathbf{B}+$	D+		
Share of quality seats in region that are private				2		
(SPRIV)			D+	$\mathbf{D}+$		
Log SAT (SAT)			2	S–		

Notes: D, S, or B refers to whether the variable would be included in a structural demand equation, a supply equation, or both, respectively. + or - refers to our a priori prediction on the direction of a variable's impact on the outcome under analysis. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen.

Structural Estimates: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Results	

	Grant Aid		In-State Tuition	
Variable	Cross Section (1)	Panel (2)	Cross Section (3)	Panel (4)
A. State Need-Based Grant Aid and In-	State Tuition	n Equations		
Endogenous variables				
Log need-based grant aid per public student (AID)			0.27^{*}	0.18
Log in-state tuition (TUITI)	1.59*	0.30		
State demographics/institutional characteristics				
Log state tax revenues per capita (TAX)	0.48^{*}	0.19*		
Log unemployment (UNEMP)	0.01	0.02	0.10^{*}	0.06*
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE)	-24.49*	-10.67	7.28*	-7.23*
Share of population with incomes below maximum				
Pell allowable (ELIG)	2.00*	1.03	-1.15*	0.14
Log number of governing boards (GOV)	0.01		0.00	
Sources of institutional aid				
Log state appropriations per student (APP)	0.10	0.59*	-0.25*	-0.32*
Log endowment per student (END)	-0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Sources of student financial aid				
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	-7.95	1.17*	0.45	0.27
Percent cap on costs (CAP)	-2.40	0.59*	0.06	0.21
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)	0.64	0.53*	-0.14	0.04
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)	n.a.	0.61*	n.a.	0.23
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT)	0.93*	0.69*	-0.17	0.11
Florida Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.10	-0.25	-0.26	-0.13
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT)	-1.58*	-1.52*	0.38*	0.19
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT)	-2.18*	-0.99*	0.69*	0.10
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT)	1.04	0.75*	-0.41*	-0.19
Enrollment pressure				
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD)	0.05	-0.08	0.02	0.01
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)	-0.06	-1.30^{*}	0.51*	0.72*
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO)	1.20*	1.34*	-0.46*	-0.30
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT)	-0.50*	0.26	-0.01	0.10
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR)	0.08	-0.10	0.02	0.08^{*}
School and student quality/competitive position				
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)			0.01	0.05
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)			0.10^{*}	0.06
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV)	0.31*	0.01	-0.08*	0.04*
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB)	0.20*	-0.01		
Adjusted R^2	0.585	0.618	0.647	0.843
	0.000	0.010	0.017	5.0 12

	Out-of Tuit		Nonre Sha	
	Cross Section (5)	Panel 6)	Cross Section (7)	Panel (8)
B. Out-of-State Tuition and Nonresident E	nrollment Sh	are Equatio	ns	
Endogenous variables				
Log in-state tuition (TUITI)	0.49*	0.90*		
Log out-of-state tuition (TUITO)			-1.49*	-0.26
Log nonresident enrollment share (NON)	-0.03	-0.06		
State demographics/institutional characteristics				
Log unemployment (UNEMP)	0.01	-0.08*	-0.33*	-0.17*
Share of population aged 18-24 (AGE)	-1.25	1.13	3.12	4.57
Share of population with incomes below max Pell				
allowable (ELIG)	-0.69*	0.05	0.59	-0.54
Log number of governing boards (GOV)	0.00^{*}		-0.02^{*}	
Sources of institutional aid				
Log state appropriations per student (APP)	-0.05	0.00	-1.30*	-0.01
Log endowment per student (END)	0.04^{*}	0.02*	0.21*	0.03
Sources of student financial aid				
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	-0.09	0.02	-0.12	-0.27
Percent cap on costs (CAP)	-0.18	-0.02	0.16	-0.02
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)				
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)				
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.14	-0.07	-0.11	-0.43
Florida Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.04	0.09	-1.34*	-1.16*
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.06	0.05	-0.14	-0.44*
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.30*	0.04	0.06	0.19
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT)	0.12	0.04	0.30	0.18
Enrollment pressure	0112	0.01	0.20	0.10
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD)	-0.04*	0.02	-0.08	-0.10
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT)	0.14*	-0.02	-0.11	-0.29
Log regional composite tuition (TUITR)	0.11*	0.07*	0.34*	0.37*
Log share of FTE undergrads in reciprocity	0.11	0.07	0.51	0.57
agreements (RECIP)			-0.07*	0.05
School and student quality/competitive position			0.07	0.05
Poor Barron's rank (LOWB)	-0.10*	0.00	-0.41*	0.02
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)	-0.10	0.00	-0.41 -0.08	0.02
Institution's share of quality public seats in the state	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.11
(BSPUB)	-0.03	0.04	1.06*	0.29*
Institution's share of quality private seats in the state	-0.05	0.04	1.00	0.29
(BSPRIV)	0.00	0.00	0.02*	0.00
Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV)	0.00	-0.14^{*}	0.02*	-0.59*
Lot SAT (SAT)	0.19	-0.14	-1.21*	0.21
Adjusted R ²	0.865	0.933	0.374	0.203

Notes: The efficiency of a system such as ours can be improved if one accounts for the correlation among the error terms in each equation. 3SLS estimates were largely similar to the 2SLS estimates, but are not reported here due to concern that one or more of the equations in the system are misspecified, which can effect estimates in other equations (Johnston and DiNardo 1997). FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen.

*Significant at the 95 percent level.

Reduced-Form Regression Results Including Grant Aid as Explanatory Variable

8	8	1	·	
	Gran	t Aid	In-State	Tuition
Variable	Cross Section (1)	Panel (2)	Cross Section (3)	Panel (4)
A. State Need-Based Grant Aid and In-	State Tuition	e Equations		
State demographics/institutional characteristics				
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX)	0.57*	0.20*	0.04	0.04
Log unemployment (UNEMP)	0.34*	0.04	0.16*	0.08*
Share of population aged 18–24 (AGE)	-23.38*	-13.49*	2.10	-9.04*
Share of population with incomes below maximum Pell				
allowable (ELIG)	-0.07	1.14*	-1.17*	0.37
Log number of governing boards (GOV)	0.01	n.a.	0.00	n.a.
Sources of institutional aid				
Log state appropriations per student (APP)	-0.27*	0.53*	-0.21*	-0.19*
Log endowment per student (END)	0.02	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Sources of student financial aid				
Log need-based grant aid per public student (AID)	n.a.	n.a.	0.08*	0.02
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	-10.70	1.32*	-1.18	0.44*
Percent cap in costs (CAP)	-3.50	0.70^{*}	-0.47	0.32*
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)	n.a.	0.57*	0.01	0.13*
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)	n.a.	0.73*	n.a.	0.36*
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT)	1.01*	0.77*	-0.04	0.22*
Florida Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.82	-0.30	-0.40	-0.18*
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT)	-1.77*	-1.55*	0.01	-0.07
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT)	-1.90^{*}	-1.01*	0.35*	-0.07
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT)	0.69	0.73*	-0.27	-0.09
Enrollment pressure				
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD)	0.14*	-0.09	0.03*	-0.01
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)	1.36*	-1.14*	0.76*	0.55*
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO)	0.63*	1.32*	-0.39*	-0.10
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT)	-0.87^{*}	0.31*	-0.15*	0.15
Log composite regional tuition, ex-in-state (TUITR)	0.27*	-0.08	0.10*	0.063
School quality/competitive position				
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.05*
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)	-0.01	-0.01	0.10*	0.06*
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV)	0.32*	0.02	-0.02	0.043
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB)	0.30*	0.00	0.03	0.01
Adjusted R^2	0.595	0.618	0.737	0.866
Αυμείτα Λ	0.595	0.018	0.757	0.000

(continued)

	Out-of-State Tuition		Nonresident Share	
	Cross Section (5)	Panel (6)	Cross Section (7)	Panel (8)
B. Out-of-State Tuition and Nonresident E	nrollment Sh	are Equatio	ns	
State demographics/institutional characteristics		1		
Log tax revenues per capita (TAX)	-0.04	0.08*	-0.21	-0.21*
Log unemployment (UNEMP)	0.11*	0.05*	-0.30*	-0.16*
Share of population aged 18–24 (AGE)	-0.06	-4.06^{*}	8.11	4.04
Share of population with incomes below maximum Pell				
allowable (ELIG)	-1.26*	0.58*	1.27	-1.13
Number of governing boards (GOV)	-0.01	n.a.	-0.16	n.a.
Sources of institutional aid				
Log state appropriations per student (APP)	-0.14*	-0.24*	-1.17*	0.07
Log endowment per student (END)	0.04*	0.01*	0.16*	0.03
Sources of student financial aid				
Log need-based grant aid per public student (AID)	0.06*	0.01	-0.09*	0.02
Log maximum Pell Grant award (PELL)	0.22	0.13	4.15	0.03
Percent cap on costs (CAP)	-0.25	-0.18*	1.25	0.08
Post-1979 subsidized loan access (1979)	-0.08	0.04	-0.02	-0.52*
Post-1992 subsidized loan access (1992)	n.a.	0.45*	n.a.	-0.83*
Arkansas Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.12	0.17	0.28	-0.46
Florida Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.24*	-0.02	-1.39*	-1.18*
Georgia Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.03	-0.05	-0.44	-0.42*
Mississippi Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.18	-0.02	0.23	0.25
New Mexico Merit Program (MERIT)	-0.06	0.02	0.40	0.15
Enrollment pressure				
Ratio of FTE grad to undergrad enrollments (GRAD)	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.10
Share of FTEFTF in state in privates (PRIV)	0.11	0.20	0.40	-0.62
Share of FTEFTF in state in 2 years (TWO)	-0.13*	0.07	-0.38	0.20
Seating capacity (predicted enroll/actual enroll) (SEAT)	0.07*	0.16*	-0.35*	-0.29*
Log composite regional tuition (TUITR)	0.14*	0.10*	0.10	0.35*
Log share of FTE undergrads in reciprocity agreements		0110	0110	0.00
(RECIP)	-0.01	0.00	-0.08*	0.06
School and student quality/competitive position	0101	0.00	0.00	0.00
Weak Barron's rank (LOWB)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Strong Barron's rank (HIGHB)	0.04	0.00	-0.20	0.11
Weighted Barron's rank of privates in state (BPRIV)	0.02	0.05*	-0.26*	0.04
Weighted Barron's rank of publics in state (BPUB)	0.06*	0.03	0.31*	-0.03
Institution's share of quality public seats in the state	0.00	0.05	0.51	0.05
(BSPUB)	0.01	-0.04	1.27*	0.29*
Institution's share of quality private seats in the state	0.01	0.07	1.41	0.29
(BSPRIV)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Share of quality seats in region that are private (SPRIV)	0.32*	-0.11	0.01	-0.57*
Lot SAT (SAT)	-0.12	-0.11 2.12*	-0.86	-0.37
Adjusted R ²	0.802	0.904	0.508	0.205

Notes: FTE = full-time equivalent. FTEFTF = full-time equivalent first-time freshmen. n.a. = not applicable.

*Significant at the 95 percent level.

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Comment Michelle J. White

This is an interesting and ambitious paper. Researchers in the past have taken small bites from the problem of explaining how public universities behave, but Rizzo and Ehrenberg are the first to bite off the whole problem and attempt to understand simultaneously how in-state and out-of-state tuition levels, state grants to universities, and the number of out-of-state relative to in-state students at public universities are determined.

Because the paper is empirical, I will first discuss models of how public universities behave and then turn to Rizzo and Ehrenberg's empirical results.

Theoretical Considerations

The main problem in understanding how public universities behave is that economists don't really understand what public universities' goals are. We also don't understand how states want their public universities to behave or whether public universities actually do what their states want.

One possibility is that public universities' goal is to maximize average student ability-as measured by students' grades or standardized test scores or some combination-subject to a fixed-capacity constraint. If there are separate demand curves by in-state versus out-of-state students, then this approach implies that universities should admit both types of students in declining order of ability to the point where the marginal student admitted has the same ability level regardless of whether the student is from in-state or out-of-state. In this approach, universities don't care where students come from. Another possibility is that public universities maximize tuition revenue subject to the same capacity constraint. Because public universities charge out-of-state students higher tuition, this approach suggests that the marginal out-of-state student admitted to a public university will be of lower quality than the marginal in-state student admitted because the revenue collected from the out-of-state student is higher. Combining these two considerations suggests that some selective public universities can advance on both the quality and the revenue fronts simultaneously by admitting more out-of-state students, since marginal

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out-of-state students may both be higher ability and pay higher tuition than marginal in-state students. In particular, high-quality public universities may attract and admit substantial numbers of out-of-state students.

The degree to which public universities can attract high-ability out-ofstate applicants varies across institutions. As Hoxby (1997) has pointed out, over time students have tended to choose universities that are further from home. This has both increased the number of out-of-state applicants to public universities and also increased the extent of competition among universities of a given quality level. Public universities have the most market power and can charge the highest tuition if the number of students in the region is high, if there are few competing universities of the same or higher quality in the region, and if more of the competing universities are private rather than public and have high tuition.

Another important set of issues for public university behavior concerns state control. How do states want their public universities to behave, and do public universities actually behave in their states' interest? Again, it is unclear what states' goals are. State legislators often want public universities to set low admission standards for in-state students and to admit few out-of-state students so that constituents' children (deserving or not) will be admitted. States also want students from low-income families to be able to attend public universities, so they want low tuition levels for in-state students and grants in aid for in-state students from low-income families. Since state appropriations and tuition are alternative ways of financing public universities, states can keep tuition levels low by increasing state appropriations. But Rizzo and Ehrenberg present data suggesting that many state legislatures have allowed appropriation levels to stagnate so that low tuition levels reduce overall quality.

States also have long-term objectives for public universities. Attending university (whether public or private) increases students' human capital and productivity, meaning that in the future they will pay higher taxes and create new jobs (see Goldin and Katz [1998] for discussion). But whether the state benefits from graduates' higher productivity depends on whether graduates locate in the state as adults. Public universities are therefore a means by which states both retain high-ability students who grew up locally and attract high-ability students who grew up elsewhere; that is, public universities are recruiting devices as well as productivityenhancement devices. (See Groen and White [2003] for discussion.) States thus want their public universities to have reasonably high quality so that high-ability high school graduates will stay at home. But they do not seem to want their public universities to be very high quality, because in-state students may be excluded, and the out-of-state students who replace them are likely to leave the state after graduation. These considerations suggest that states tend to prefer that their public universities have an intermediate quality level.¹ They also suggest that the largest states should prefer to have higher-quality public universities. Finally, states that have more migration have an incentive to spend less on their public universities. This is because in-migration allows states to obtain human capital without paying for it, while out-migration causes states to lose their investments in education (see Quigley and Rubinfeld 1993).

Tax considerations also affect how states finance public universities and indirectly affect the optimal quality level. If states use income taxes to raise revenue and if parents itemize on their federal taxes, then states and parents together can save money by using appropriations or direct grants to students to support public universities, while keeping tuition levels low. This is because state income tax payments are deductible from federal taxes, but tuition payments to public universities are not. However, this consideration does not apply to out-of-state tuition because the tax benefit goes to out-of-state parents. Thus tax considerations suggest another reason why states want low tuition levels for in-state students but high tuition levels for out-of-state students.

Finally, how do states induce their public universities to do what the state wants rather than what the universities want? How autonomous are public universities? These considerations seem to vary quite a bit across states. Some states' constitutions specify a high degree of autonomy for their public universities so that the state government has only indirect control. In Michigan, for example, public universities set their own tuition levels and can offset lower state appropriations by raising tuition. In other states, the state government engages in a high degree of micromanagement, including setting tuition levels and many other policies. As Rizzo and Ehrenberg point out, Texas does not even allow the University of Texas to keep the extra tuition that it collects from out-of-state students. My personal pet theory is that states tend to have more control over public universities when the university is located in the state capitol, due to the fishbowl effect.

Empirical Considerations

Now turn to the empirical work. To start with, Rizzo and Ehrenberg have constructed a very nice new panel data set of public universities. I hope that they will continue to expand the data set and that they will eventually expand it to include private universities because private universities are the natural group against which to compare the behavior of public universities. I also hope that they will expand the data set to cover the years since 1998, when economic conditions were much less favorable than dur-

^{1.} However, Groen and White's (2003) results suggest that states, in fact, benefit when their public universities are high quality and admit many out-of-state students because the recruitment effect of public universities applies equally, regardless of students' ability and regardless of whether they are from in-state or out of state.

ing the 1990s, and many states had large budget deficits. The availability of the data set will hopefully encourage future research on the question of how universities behave.

The authors estimate four separate equations explaining in-state tuition, out-of-state tuition, grant aid per student, and the fraction of students from out of state. I was unclear why they included an equation explaining state grant aid to universities but did not explain state appropriations to universities, particularly because their evidence suggests that the two are closely related. Rizzo and Ehrenberg point out that their equations explaining in-state and out-of-state tuition are reduced forms that reflect both supply and demand considerations. On the demand side, it might be possible to measure demand directly by obtaining data on the number of in-state and out-of-state applicants to each university. It would also be of interest to include a measure of interstate migration flows.

The authors acknowledge that the various equations they estimate are likely to be subject to simultaneous equation bias, and they address the problem by using two-stage least squares. But simultaneity may be a larger problem than the authors have considered. For example, Rizzo and Ehrenberg treat the level of state appropriations to public universities as exogenous in the equation explaining in-state tuition levels. But at some public universities, such as the University of Michigan, legislators tend to cut the state appropriation if they think that the university has set in-state tuition too high. Thus causation can run in both directions. Student capacity (the SEATS variable) may also be endogenous because universities are more willing to expand when their tuition levels are higher, holding other factors such as state appropriations constant.

I'd also like to see Rizzo and Ehrenberg experiment more with proxy measures for how closely states control their public universities. Their only variable along these lines, the number of governing boards, was not significant in any of the estimated equations. Other possible variables might include whether individual public universities are located in the state capital and whether individual public universities are part of a multicampus university system. Another possible variable is whether the state constitution or other state legislation specifies an independent role for the university.

The results that I found the most interesting are those that tend to confirm the general hypothesis that higher education is a competitive industry and that public universities respond to competition in a similar way to firms in other industries. Thus higher-quality universities charge higher tuition, both to in-state and out-of-state students. Also, when competitor universities charge more, public universities respond by raising their own tuition. Finally, public universities that are large relative to their in-state student populations tend to adjust by providing more grants in aid (which increases demand) and by enrolling more out-of-state students (which also increases demand), rather than by lowering admission standards.

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