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Monetary and Financial Reform in Two Eras of Globalization

Barry Eichengreen and Harold James

This paper reviews the history of successes and failures in international monetary and financial reform in two eras of globalization, the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century, and in the period in between. That history is rich, varied, and difficult to summarize compactly. We therefore organize our narrative around a specific hypothesis.

That hypothesis is that a consensus on the need for monetary and financial reform is likely to develop when such reform is seen as essential for the defense of the global trading system. Typically the international monetary and financial system evolves in a gradual and decentralized manner in response to market forces. The shift toward greater exchange rate flexibility and capital account convertibility since 1973 is the most recent and therefore obvious illustration of what is a more general point. Large-scale and discontinuous reform at a more centralized level—that is, reforms agreed to and implemented by groups of governments—tend to occur only when problems in the monetary and financial system are seen as placing the global trading system at risk. Throughout the period we consider, there has existed a deep and abiding faith in the advantages of trade for economic growth, the principal exception being the unusual circumstances of the 1930s, when trade and prosperity came to be seen as at odds. Consequently, priority has been attached to reform in precisely those periods when monetary and financial problems are perceived as posing a threat to the global trading system and hence to growth and prosperity generally. In contrast,

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there has never existed a comparable consensus on the benefits of open international capital markets for stability, efficiency, and growth.¹ It follows that disruptions to capital markets that do not also threaten the trading system have had less of a tendency to catalyze reform. We test this hypothesis by confronting it with evidence from major attempts—successful and unsuccessful—to reform the international monetary system.

Changes in the balance of opinion regarding the operation of capital markets also help to explain the form that successive reform efforts have taken. In the nineteenth century, capital markets were viewed as benign. The role of governments was limited to providing a framework for their operation; the principal constituents of that framework were the gold standard, which provided stable exchange rates, and the national central bank, which provided a uniform and elastic currency. International economic policy, such as it was, was limited to supporting this regime in times of crisis.

When, in response to policy inconsistencies between countries, capital markets malfunctioned in the 1930s, controls were slapped on their operation. Financial markets were suppressed, and banks became the agents of governments' industrial policies. The role of policy became to supersede rather than to support the markets. Mostly policy was formulated solely with regard to a national context. After 1945, when internationalism revived, policy at the international level largely meant coordinating the financial restrictions imposed by governments and in addition supplying the international financial services that immobilized markets could not.

As memories of the Great Depression faded and the inefficiencies of financial repression became evident, the notion that the allocation of financial resources was a task for the market, familiar from the nineteenth century, enjoyed a rebirth. The task for policy again came to be seen as providing a framework within which markets could operate. But how to do so was controversial. Whether the efforts of national governments and multilateral institutions (the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in particular) to structure and stabilize the operation of international financial markets have helped by diminishing the incidence and severity of crises or hurt by aggravating moral hazard thus became the topic of the day.

The result has been a wide-ranging debate over how to reform the IMF, the Group of Seven (G7) and the "international financial architecture" generally.² As we read it, the key conclusions of this debate are the need to limit the frequency and magnitude of IMF rescue loans in order to contain moral hazard, and the need to encourage adherence to international standards for

1. However, the official community may have come near to such a consensus on the eve of the 1997 Asia crisis, when there appeared to be general agreement on the need to add a code for capital market liberalization to the IMF's Articles of Agreement, a decision from which it revealingly stepped back subsequently.

2. Williamson (2000) and Goldstein (2001) provide two overviews of the key contributions to this debate.

sound financial practice as a way of stabilizing and strengthening financial markets. An historical perspective suggests that these foci are logical consequences of the move back to a more market-based financial system; they reflect the world economy's return to a more nineteenth-century-style international financial system following an extended rupture. That nineteenth-century system featured limited lender-of-last-resort-type facilities at the domestic and international levels. In addition, international standards—specifically, the international gold standard—provided the basis for organizing the operation of nineteenth-century financial markets. Not coincidentally, the focus of the current debate on the role of official lending and international standards in structuring and stabilizing the operation of international financial markets has a pervasive “back-to-the-future” flavor about it.

11.1 The Nineteenth Century

The first notable nineteenth-century attempt to reform the international monetary and financial system was in 1867 at a conference in Paris called by Emperor Napoleon III. There was substantial agreement about the desirability of a common monetary standard. Some of the participants went a step further, advocating standardized coinage.

Two aspects of this initiative are worth emphasizing. First, the impulse to coordinate monetary arrangements reflected not threats to financial stability but rather the desire for monetary standardization as a way of promoting international trade, which was uniformly regarded as a high priority. Second, the call for monetary standardization was a manifestation of the broader desire for economic standardization in an era when technology and policy were drawing national economies more closely together. Trade expanded enormously following France and Britain's negotiation of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty in 1860 and its extension to other countries. The railway and the telegraph had already begun to link national markets more tightly (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). As a result, the 1860s and 1870s were marked by an unprecedented drive for international standards and harmonized regulation. An International Postal Congress met in Paris in 1863, and an International Statistical Congress convened in Berlin later that same year. The First Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Wounded Soldiers was signed and the International Committee of the Red Cross established in 1864. In 1868 Heinrich von Stephan launched an initiative for an International Postal Union, and the Mannheim Rhine Shipping Agreement made possible large-scale navigation on Europe's largest inland waterway. Standardization was all the rage.

Money was an obvious area where standardization promised major benefits. In 1866 the U.S. Congressional Coinage Committee concluded that “The only interest of any nation that could possibly be injuriously affected

by the establishment of this uniformity is that of the money-changers—an interest which contributes little to the public welfare” (Russell 1898, 35). At the end of the Paris conference, the diplomat in charge of the Emperor’s currency program, de Parieu, concluded that the meeting had laid “siege to the citadel of monetary diversity, the fall of which you would like to behold, or, at least, to gradually destroy its walls, for the benefit of the daily increasing commerce and exchanges of every description among the different members of the human family” (U.S. Senate 1879, 875–70).

There was, however, less agreement on the monetary arrangement around which this standardization should take place. Whereas Great Britain was wedded to the gold standard, France was committed to bimetallism. There was little urgency to the proceedings apart from the Emperor’s search for a bolster to his waning prestige. There was no sense of crisis: Trade was growing, monetary harmonization or not. The outcome of the deliberations was thus some additional sentiment in favor of gold-based currencies but no specific plan (Einaudi 2000).³

There being no pressing need for action, the international monetary and financial system evolved on the basis not of intergovernmental negotiations but of its own momentum.⁴ That the leading economic and financial power, Great Britain, had adopted the gold standard encouraged other countries to do the same in order to be able to better access British markets. By joining the gold standard, countries were better able to borrow abroad (Bordo and Flandreau, chap. 9 in this volume), which in this period primarily meant borrowing from Britain, while going onto the gold standard lent additional stimulus to trade with other gold-standard countries (Lopez-Cordoba and Meissner 2000). Thus, market forces more than negotiations among governments provided the impetus for monetary standardization. It did not go unnoticed that the first country to experience an industrial revolution had also been first to adopt the gold standard. On the European continent, the desire to emulate the first industrial nation thus provided additional motivation for joining the gold standard club. Once Germany went onto the gold standard, the attractions for other countries were heightened.⁵ The United States chose gold rather than bimetallism in 1873 and 1879 as a way of restoring credibility in the disordered postbellum circum-

3. Subsequent conferences were no more successful (Reti 1998). Agreement even on cooperation limited to the standardization and intercirculation of coinage was limited to cases like the members of the Scandinavian Union, who had already developed unusually close ties over a number of years.

4. This is the theme of Gallarotti (1995).

5. Germany emerged from Franco-Prussian War as Great Britain’s leading industrial rival, was flush with reparations, and derived no trading advantages from the use of silver currency as the result of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires’ reliance on inconvertible paper. For all these reasons it found going over to gold attractive, which made it attractive for other countries to follow. The importance of these network effects is a theme of Eichengreen (1996). See Meissner (2000) for evidence.

stances. With the three major industrial countries on gold, a new world order was born.

The other element of the prewar institutional framework was the national central bank. It was precisely in the second half of the nineteenth century that central banks developed their distinctive profiles and responsibilities, first as bankers to the government and then as stewards of the financial system. This was when Walter Bagehot articulated their role as lenders of last resort and specified rules for the extension of those services. The new central banks—in particular the German Reichsbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve System—were also intended to deal with internationally transmitted developments. The development of this institutional capacity can again be interpreted as a functionalist response to industrialization and financial deepening.

The stability of this regime should not be overstated. Banking crises and forced suspensions of convertibility were recurrent problems, as attested to by the vast literature on the subject. Bordo et al. (2001) show that, compared to today, banking and currency crises were only slightly less frequent, and their impact on output was every bit as severe. But no ambitious international reforms were tabled to address these problems.

There is some controversy about the cooperative management of this international system. Eichengreen (1992) argues that support operations by the Bank of France, the Bank of England, the State Bank of Russia, and other central banks and governments, while sporadic and ad hoc, were critical for regime maintenance when the stability of the system was under threat. Flandreau (1997) and Mouré (2002) have argued that this overstates the extent of cooperation prior to the Great War. Central bank cooperation—whether frequent or not, whether critical or not—was, however, increasingly recognized as a way of contending with threats to stability. It follows that, when it came time to reconstruct the international monetary and financial system after the Great War, discussions centered on the scope for regularizing and institutionalizing the practice.

11.2 From World War I to the Great Depression

The first reform efforts of the interwar years were at international conferences in Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922. The overarching goal of these meetings was the “reconstruction of Europe,” but the most pressing political-economic issues, reparations and war debts, could not be touched. The worst threat came from countries that experienced exchange rate depreciation and noticed benefits for exports and, more important politically, for employment. Many of the war-devastated European countries in this way came more or less openly to regard inflation and competitive devaluation as devices for securing employment and political stabilization. Their “exchange dumping” was not happily received abroad. The United King-

dom, Canada, and the United States sought a response in antidumping legislation, of which the culmination came with the U.S. Fordner-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922.

For a country such as Great Britain, which had been at the center of the prewar trading system, this was devastating. Consequently, the leading British figure at Genoa, the charismatic wartime prime minister David Lloyd George, made the trade motivation for currency agreements the center of the British strategy. As Lloyd George explained to parliament before leaving for Genoa, “The machinery of commerce, on whose sweet and steady working England depends more than any country in the world, has been shattered. . . . At the beginning of 1922 England’s international trade was about fifty percent of its pre-war figure. Two million of her artisans were workless and wageless, and dependent on a vast and ruinous provision of outdoor relief.” On his return from the conference, the prime minister explained further: “If Genoa were to fail, the condition of Europe would indeed be tragic. The channels of international trade would become hopelessly clogged by restrictions and difficulties, artificial and otherwise. Countries would stagnate in the poisonous national swamps of insolvency. There would be quarrels, suspicions and feuds between nations, ending in who knows what great conflict” (Mills 1922, 11, 313).

Although the recommendations of the Genoa experts included measures to simplify customs procedures and reduce transport costs, their main thrust was monetary—they were directed at stopping currency depreciation. They recommended the restoration of gold convertibility, the creation of independent central banks, fiscal discipline, financial assistance for weak-currency countries, and cooperative central bank management. It will be evident from our description of the prewar system that none of these elements was entirely new. Gold convertibility and an independent central bank to reconcile its maintenance with the fluctuating financial needs of industry and trade (by providing “an elastic currency,” in the phrase that featured in discussions of the establishment of the Federal Reserve System) had been centerpieces of the prewar system, and there was agreement at Brussels and Genoa on the desirability of putting them back in place.⁶ Regime-preserving cooperation had already brought several of those banks of issue into closer, more regular contact. Even the form of that cooperation, assistance for countries with financial problems, suggested a mechanism through which the incentives to rejoin the international system might now be sharpened.

In all these respects, then, the appropriate metaphor for the development of the international monetary and financial system was evolution rather

6. About the gold standard there was no question. And, as the delegates to the Brussels Conference concluded, “Banks and especially Banks of Issue should be free from political pressure and should be conducted only on lines of prudent finance” (Bank of England, OC50/6, 13 December, 1933, per Jacobsson, “Notes on a Conversation with Sir Otto Niemeyer”).

than revolution. Absent threats to the global trading system and hence to growth and recovery, neither Brussels nor Genoa generated reform proposals that departed significantly from the prewar status quo.

The consequences were mixed. Genoa was a successful negotiation to the limited extent that it produced a workable short-term solution to the problems of the postwar international monetary system, but it did nothing to address the underlying weaknesses of the gold-exchange standard, something that became painfully evident once the Great Depression struck. At a more fundamental level, it failed to achieve policymakers' goal of rebuilding the international trading system.

Genoa was basically a monetary agreement, although discussions touched on a number of other issues. The international standard to which parties to the Genoa Agreement were held was the international gold standard. But at Genoa we also see a first hint of a trend that would become increasingly evident as the century progressed: that full participation in the international system, and in particular the ability to derive the full benefits of open, multilateral trade, required adherence to standards for policy and behavior beyond the strictly monetary. This tendency manifested itself at Genoa in the recognition that fiscal policy was a matter of common concern. All countries that participated actively in the international system, the delegates agreed, should strive for balanced budgets and fiscal transparency. Fiscal discipline had acquired prominence when the budgets of the countries that had been engaged in World War I fell into deficit and postwar societies, confronting a changed balance of political pressures, found it impossible to produce the consensus needed to restore fiscal balance. As hyperinflation in Central and Eastern Europe revealed, chronic budget deficits could wreak havoc with financial stability, exchange rate stability, and the reconstruction of international trade. As a result of these political changes, monetary and financial stability, and the reconstruction of international trade, now required more than simply adoption of a particular monetary standard. Specifically, the fiscal prerequisites for the maintenance of that monetary standard also had to be met.

Unfortunately, the parties to this agreement lacked a mechanism for encouraging adherence to this standard. Conditional financial assistance was a potential carrot, but not all countries sought or obtained such assistance, although a limited number of stabilization loans were extended through the League of Nations, notably in the cases of Austria and Hungary, and by national governments (Santaella 1992). Just as IMF conditionality cannot affect behavior when countries are reluctant to come to the IMF, fiscal discipline could not be required as a condition of official assistance in the 1920s when official assistance was provided only sporadically.

The major drawback of the League system was that there existed no multilateral organization with the requisite capacity, absent U.S. membership. The establishment of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) can be

seen as a response to this problem. The effort to establish the first “world bank” (as contemporaries referred to the BIS) originated in the effort to use technocratic means to solve the postwar dispute over reparations and interallied debt payments that pitted Germany against France, France against Great Britain and the United States, and Great Britain against the United States, and to prevent that dispute from derailing efforts to reconstruct the international trading system.⁷ But the BIS was intended as more than a reparations bank; its founders saw it as a way of providing technical solutions to economic problems, of cultivating cooperation among central banks, and ultimately of stabilizing the world trading system.⁸

The constitution of the BIS reflected the political circumstances in which it had been established.⁹ All of South and Central America, Africa, Great Britain’s overseas dominions, and Asia were excluded, with the exception of Japan, which owed its inclusion to its status as a reparations creditor.¹⁰ While Spain was left out, the United States was brought in, although its representation was unofficial because the Federal Reserve System was forbidden to participate.¹¹

7. In 1929, a new reparations scheme, the Young Plan, was adopted at the Paris Experts’ Conference. Previously, under the Dawes Plan, the agent-general had been responsible for converting the marks paid by the German government into foreign currency and judging whether the foreign exchange market would allow such a large transaction. Now, Germany was to instead pay her reparation marks to a new institution, the BIS, which replaced the transfer protection mechanism of the Dawes Plan. Whereas the agent general had possessed the discretionary power to reinvest reparation payments in German securities and thus to limit the pressure on the exchange rate, now the transfer would be automatic, but the national central bankers who comprised the new institution’s board would collaborate in offsetting any adverse consequences for the foreign exchange market. The bank also acted as the fiscal agent for the Dawes and Young loans, as well as other international loans.

8. Sir Charles Addis, a member of the committee established at the 1929 Hague Conference to design the new bank, wrote: “It was hoped by this plan to fulfill the dream of Genoa by the gradual development of the BIS into a cooperative society of Central Banks” (Bank of England, G1/1, 28 July 1929, Addis to Leith-Ross [British Treasury]). Others described the object of the BIS as collaboration to “evolve a common body of monetary doctrine” and to “smooth out the business cycle, and to contribute toward a greater equilibrium in the general level of economic activity” (*Fifth Annual Report*, also quoted in Eichengreen 1992, 263).

9. Disputes among the Paris experts, at the Hague conferences, and within the Organization Committee left the BIS “vague, obscure, badly arranged and sometimes inconsistent,” in the words of one of its directors. (Bank of England, G1/1, Otto Niemyer memorandum).

10. One is reminded of the fact that fully a third of the executive directors on today’s IMF board are European, while only two out of twenty-four are African, reflecting political imperatives when this successor to the BIS was created in 1944.

11. Reflecting the risk of involving the United States officially in the reparations quagmire. As a consequence, the BIS held its dollar deposits at two leading private New York banks. Moreover, the bank was not situated in a major financial center: The choice of site initially lay between the small countries of Europe, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, with France advocating a Belgian location and Great Britain and Germany militantly opposed. In Switzerland, the eventual choice, Zürich, was rejected because, although a major financial center, it was too German; Geneva implied too much of an entanglement with the League of Nations; and thus the choice fell on Basel. Staffing followed the principal of national representation. The first president, Gates McGarrah, was an American, but the general manager in charge of operations was a young Banque de France official, Pierre Quesnay. Protests from

It was difficult after the deliberations of the organization committee to avoid the conclusion drawn by a later British director of the Bank, Sir Otto Niemeyer, that “No one who started out to construct a Super Bank for world cooperative purposes could conceivably have hit on the constitution proposed for the BIS.”¹² The BIS was not permitted to make medium- or long-term investments (outside Germany) that might have been useful for stabilization purposes. Its capital was a mere 500 million gold francs suisses, subscribed by central banks or (in the case of Japan and the United States) banking groups.¹³ It had only 1,800 million Swiss francs in deposits, of which SF 300 million were reinvested in Germany, SF 650 million were short-term deposits by reparations creditors that had not yet transferred their annuities, and SF 800 million represented other central bank deposits. These resources were already exhausted by August 1930, three months after the bank opened for business.¹⁴

The BIS was then confronted by a world financial crisis of unimagined proportions. Should it provide emergency credits to central banks? This seemed logical, given that the BIS was a central banker’s bank, but French objections to a proposed Austro-German customs union and to German rearmament, both of which were prohibited under the Versailles Treaty, blocked the Bank from providing early and generous assistance in response to requests for Germany and Austria. Should it attempt new forms of lending? The need arose out of the world depression and financial crisis immobilizing bank loans, including loans and credits from foreign banks denominated not in domestic currency but in dollars and sterling. This was where an international lender might have done what national central banks, constrained by fixed exchange rates and unable to print dollars, could not.

In the autumn of 1930 a BIS subcommittee launched an inquiry into how

Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht that Quesnay had been the figure responsible for organizing a speculative attack on the mark in the spring of 1929 were ignored. Quesnay had powerful claim to his new position: Owen Young, the architect of the new reparations plan, hailed the thirty-six-year-old economist as the principal author of both the Young Plan and the Bank. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 185, 30 January 1930, “Bank für internationalen Zahlungsausgleich”). Quesnay’s deputy was Ernst Hülse from the Reichsbank, a blinkered and unimaginative bureaucrat more intent on warding off invasions of his administrative turf than on rescuing the international financial system (e.g., Bank of England G1/4, 2 November 1931, Rodd to Siepmann). The result would have been deadlock or a descent into routine and trivial business had Quesnay not possessed rather more imagination and initiative.

12. Bank of England, G1/1, Otto Niemeyer memorandum.

13. See Auboin (1955). This was a mere 0.1 percent of 1930 U.S. gross national product (GNP), whereas the capital of the IMF was 4.0 percent of U.S. GNP in 1945.

14. Bank of England, G1/2, 12 July 1930, Siepmann memorandum on phone conversation with Rodd (BIS). One of its staff came to the conclusion that “if things continue to take their present course, the Bank will be in a completely frozen position within a month and unable to meet its liabilities without borrowing” (Bank of England, G1/2, 10 August 1930, HAS Note on telephone conversation with Rodd). The BIS’s sole operation of systematic significance in its first year of existence was a stabilization credit of £3 million in April 1931 designed to allow Spain to return to the gold standard, a goal that the global depression prevented from being achieved.

the Bank might address these problems.¹⁵ To thaw Central European credit, it recommended that a sum equivalent to the BIS's capital, plus its deposits, be placed in medium-term bills bought from banks. A more ambitious proposal was tabled in February 1931 by the Bank of England and became known as the Kindersley (or Norman-Kindersley) scheme. (Montagu Norman was the influential governor of the Bank of England, and Sir Robert Kindersley was a director of both the Bank of England and the BIS.) This was a response to the collapse of international bond markets, on which new issues had been rendered impossible by the implosion of security prices. Kindersley and Norman recommended the creation of an international corporation with a capital of £25–50 million empowered to issue bonds up to three times its capital on behalf of national governments, municipalities, mortgage banks, harbor boards, railways, and public utility companies.¹⁶

Although their scheme won the support of Germany, where the danger of financial collapse was acute, other countries feared the inflationary consequences. The governor of the Banque de France argued that BIS participation in the Kindersley scheme would be contrary to the Bank's statutes.¹⁷ American financiers were similarly skeptical. The Bank's first president, an American, Gates McGarrah, warned the leading New York bank, J. P. Morgan, that the scheme was impractical and that it would be better to organize new loans through private banking channels.¹⁸ The proposal thus languished. As Norman noted sadly, the BIS was "already slipping to the bottom of a ditch and in that position seems likely to do no more than helpfully perform a number of routine and Central Banking operations."¹⁹

A more modest but in some ways more interesting idea submitted by the Belgian banker Emile Francqui to the medium-term credit subcommittee fared little better. Reflecting worries that rescue efforts relying on central banks and official institutions would fail owing to their limited financial and political resources, Francqui proposed to supplement official contributions by catalyzing private-sector lending (to use modern IMF parlance). The BIS, he proposed, should rediscount up to £10 million of commercial paper in order to reinvigorate financial markets and pave the way for Ivar Kreuger, the charismatic Swedish speculator and financier, to underwrite

15. Bank of England, OV4/84, 29 October 1930, Quesnay to Siepmann, attaching memorandum by Dr. Simon.

16. Bank of England, OV4/34, 2 February 1931, memorandum "Kindersley scheme."

17. Moreover, where French banks were supposed to subscribe most of the bonds, there was no readiness to offer them "means of controlling the use of the funds furnished" (27 February 1931, Moret communication to McGarrah).

18. The Morgan bankers agreed. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 797.3; BIS, 18 March 1931, McGarrah cable for Lamont and Gilbert).

19. 3 March 1931, Norman to Harrison.

new issues. But Francqui's initiative was not well received by the two hostile camps in the BIS. The British and Germans regarded the idea as inadequate, while the French dismissed it as "utopian."²⁰

In sum, the BIS lacked the finances and leadership to cope with a crisis of such enormity. There was no consensus regarding its role and a reluctance on the part of the creditor countries to finance its operations. Its shareholders were divided, and no country had the capacity to impose a coherent vision. The BIS therefore retreated into the safer world of data dissemination. It failed to do anything to prevent a major crisis and was out of its depth in dealing with the consequences.

11.3 The 1930s

While this attempt to manage the crisis failed, there was still hope that the international community would draw constructive lessons from it. The first opportunity to demonstrate that it had was the London Conference. A World Economic Conference had long been suggested by American diplomats as a way of bringing Europe to its senses and as a way of limiting retaliation against the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Here, then, we see the role of threats to the trading system in galvanizing reform. Great Britain took up the idea in October 1930 and passed it on to Germany. The Germans, for their part, thought it might open a way to make the United States interested in the financial side of economic questions and in particular in the end of reparations. The German foreign minister then urged his ambassadors to sell the plan to the Americans as a potential platform for Hoover's reelection campaign.²¹

As the conference approached, governments realized that a large meeting would not produce results unless adequate groundwork was laid. The meetings of preliminary commissions and committees that began in late 1932 under the auspices of the League of Nations represented the last major attempt to deal with the policy questions of the Depression era in an international framework. Separate monetary and trade subcommittees met to define the respective agendas. Unfortunately, each saw the design of its deliberations as hinging on its counterpart's. Speakers at the Financial Subcommittee agreed that "freer trade was a prerequisite of a return to normal

20. Bank of England, OV4/84, 7 May 1931, report of Francqui subcommittee; 22 April 1931, McGarrah to Norman; 18 May 1931, BIS board meeting. This pessimism was not unjustified, since the BIS meeting at which Francqui and Kindersley plans were killed off took place just a week after the collapse of the Vienna Creditanstalt. The crisis quickly infected much of the European continent and moved over to England and the United States. Less than a year after he was supposed to have organized a scheme that might rescue the international financial system, Ivar Kreuger killed himself in a Paris hotel room.

21. Politisches Archive des Auswartigen Amtes, W21A, 20 December 1930, Hoesch cable; 29 December 1930, Curtius to Hoesch.

economic conditions and of a return to the gold standard.”²² In the Economic (i.e., trade) Sub-Committee, financial normalization was seen as a precondition for rebuilding trade. No progress was made in breaking this logjam.

The second attempt at preparation involved politicians rather than technocrats in April-May 1933. The newly inaugurated U.S. president, Franklin Roosevelt, offered a tariff truce for the duration of the conference. The debt issue was widened by the German central bank president’s attempt to win consent for a German moratorium on servicing long-term private foreign debt. And the monetary issue was raised in acute form by the announcement of the U.S. gold embargo while British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and his chief financial adviser, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, were still en route to a preliminary meeting in Washington, D.C.

By the time the conference finally met, on 12 June 1933 at the London Geological Museum, there were too many parties interested in killing it off for there to be much chance of success. The conference resembled nothing so much as an Agatha Christie novel in which there are too many suspects, all with plausible motives and dubious alibis. Great Britain’s insistence on war debt reduction, which it believed to be the original *raison d’être* of the conference, meant that it did not want discussions to widen. Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain stressed that the conference would not be successful if it did not resolve the war debt issue. But Roosevelt’s instructions to the U.S. delegation excluded either formal or informal discussion of war debts as well as disarmament.²³

The currency stabilization goals of the conference were fatally undermined by President Roosevelt’s “bombshell message” that the United States had no intention of stabilizing the dollar. The U.S. administration was determined that national stability should have priority over internationalism. Rebuilding trade was desirable as a way of giving impetus to U.S. exports, but there was little immediate scope for this in the depressed conditions of the 1930s, with much of Central Europe having come under German domination and Latin America having turned to import substitution. Roosevelt’s unilateral monetary initiative was thus a desperate effort to stimulate recovery at home regardless of the consequences for the international monetary and trading systems. By the fifth week, delegates realized that the position was hopeless. On 27 July, the conference went into recess, and the free-trading U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered a mournful closing speech.²⁴

22. League of Nations, R2672, 1 November 1932, second meeting of monetary subcommittee.

23. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933 I, p. 621.

24. “A reasonable combination of the practicable phases of both economic nationalism and economic internationalism—avoiding the extremes of each—should be our objective,” he modestly concluded. In practice, the participants ignored even the tariff truce: Great Britain

The reasons for this failure are not hard to see. The Roosevelt administration recognized the desirability of rebuilding world trade but, in the absence of international cooperation, saw domestic stability and trade reconstruction as at loggerheads. It saw itself as having no choice but to put this aspiration on hold until currency depreciation and monetary reflation had succeeded in initiating recovery. In any case, rebuilding world trade was the last thing that appealed to a Germany intent on expanding its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Support for protectionist measures was also strong in France, where farmers were now feeling the brunt of the depression. Thus, proposals for monetary and financial stabilization as a way of rebuilding world trade met with limited support.

11.4 Bretton Woods

From this experience the British economist John Maynard Keynes drew the conclusion that multilateral negotiations among governments of roughly comparable influence could not be expected to succeed and that a workable plan could only be realized at the insistence of “a single power or like-minded group of powers” (Skidelsky 1992, 482). Keynes’s insight provides the obvious explanation for the greater success of the next conference. Although there were forty-four or forty-five nations represented at Bretton Woods (depending on one’s view of the status of the Danish delegation), only the United States and the United Kingdom played significant roles.²⁵ Plans for the IMF and the World Bank had already emerged from earlier Anglo-American discussions, which the other participants had no choice but to accept. Although there was negotiation over the Bretton Woods Agreement, that negotiation was fundamentally bilateral.

Moreover, it was lopsided bilateralism: the United States had a preponderance of power, whereas the United Kingdom was financially and economically strapped. This imbalance shaped the negotiations, in which Keynes’s vision (which would have placed much greater obligations to adjust on the surplus country or countries) was defeated and the America’s White Plan was adopted with only minor modification.

In addition, there was now more of a consensus regarding the economic basis of the new world order. Capital flows were destabilizing, competitive devaluations a threat, discriminatory trade policies a danger.²⁶ Some scholars trace the making of the postwar settlement to the emergence of what

raised schedules on fifty items, claiming that it had made applications for these before the truce came into effect on 12 May. In September, the Netherlands and Sweden, and then in November Great Britain, withdrew from the truce. This was the end of the last major attempt at international cooperation on trade and financial issues.

25. Although it is sometimes claimed that in-between powers, in particular Canada and France, played a role in brokering between the British and American delegations.

26. And associated with the politically discredited systems of Germany and Japan.

they term an “epistemic community” of policy experts who trusted one other and shared a vision of managed internationalism (Ikenberry 1993). Intellectual consensus there was, but this does not suffice to explain the success of Bretton Woods; there had been a similar consensus in the 1920s regarding the desirability of returning to the gold standard and of central bank cooperation. Montagu Norman, Hjalmar Schacht, and Benjamin Strong had been on terms of great intimacy, in other words; although they spoke a common intellectual language, and evolved a sort of international solidarity of central banks, they nonetheless proved incapable of mounting an institutionalized response to global financial problems.

Why, then, when they failed did their successors at Bretton Woods succeed? To start with, the context for Bretton Woods was different. Although there was no immediate crisis, there was significant pressure to produce a settlement. The conference met just after the Allied landings in Normandy, which created the possibility of an early end to the European war.²⁷ The timetable was further tightened by the need to act before the November U.S. elections.²⁸

Moreover, the participants structured and ordered the Bretton Woods negotiations by attaching priority to the reconstruction of trade. In the 1920s nationalism had subverted the efforts of internationalists to restore a free and open trade regime; the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe depended on tariffs for public-sector revenues and for easing the adjustment to their new economic and political circumstances. The tariff truce conferences convened by the League of Nations consequently elicited little enthusiasm. In 1933 attitudes toward trade liberalization had been mixed; whereas some governments attached priority to reconstructing trade, others preferred to suppress it.²⁹ What sort of monetary and financial order might be tailored to such a world was unclear. In 1944, in contrast, there was no doubt about the U.S. commitment to trade liberalization and therefore about its preference for a monetary system that mandated exchange rate stability and current-account convertibility as a way of creating a trade-friendly financial environment.³⁰ U.S. export interests could be enlisted to push for congressional ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement. And given America’s preponderance of power, other countries had no choice but

27. The conference took place before the Allied disaster at Arnhem.

28. As Morgenthau candidly told a strategy meeting preparing for Bretton Woods, “we felt that it was good for the world, good for the nation, and good for the Democratic Party, for us to move” (Blum 1967, 248). White was equally insistent that the meetings had to take place before the American party political conventions (Interdepartmental meetings, 1 April 1944).

29. As noted above, the attitude of the U.S. government was somewhat ambivalent (Cordell Hull felt much more strongly about liberalization than many of his colleagues), and other countries, whether they saw protection and discrimination as a means of cultivating self-sufficiency (as in Germany) or supporting agriculture (as in France and Italy), were strongly opposed.

30. Capital account convertibility, being less essential to trade, was a different story.

to go along. They might push for concessions on the margin, insisting that pegged exchange rates should also be adjustable, by arguing that there should be a five-year transitional period before current account convertibility was required, and by seeking to maximize the financial resources of the IMF and the World Bank. But with memories of trade warfare in the 1930s still fresh, they fundamentally shared the U.S. priority of establishing a trade-friendly monetary and financial environment.

11.5 After Bretton Woods

That this vision took time to be realized reminds us that monetary and financial reform is rarely swift. Even in Western Europe, the restoration of current account convertibility took longer than envisaged, until December 1958.³¹ Japan accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF agreement on current account convertibility in 1964. Most developing countries retained current account restrictions until the 1980s and 1990s.

Two stories can be told about the disintegration of Bretton Woods. According to one, the breakdown was a Triffinite consequence of a buildup of claims on the United States that were needed for the liquidity of the system but could be converted in a panic. According to the other, the breakdown was a result of U.S. action in response to a worsening trade position, in which the country's most aggressive trade partner, Japan, refused to consider any revaluation that might stem the tide of exports. Since foreign competition, and especially the competition of Japanese manufactured goods (at that time the greatest attention was given to textiles) was a major political issue, action by the administration was needed to tackle the trade problem. The Nixon package of 15 August 1971, which by closing the gold window (through which gold had been made available at \$35 an ounce) ended the par value system, limited the import surcharge to 10 percent. By this interpretation, a modification of the monetary order was needed to prevent a trade war.

The new system of parities calculated at the Smithsonian in December 1971 held for just over a year. The renewed collapse is best explained in terms of an expansive U.S. monetary policy leading to larger U.S. trade deficits and thus to the reemergence of the same problems that had caused the breakdown of August 1971 in the first place. Allowing the international monetary system to break down was thus seen as the alternative to a vicious descent into protectionism and trade warfare. Alternatives they were, but not mutually exclusive ones: As it was, the 1970s witnessed a dramatic expansion in the "new protectionism" of voluntary export restraints, dubious

31. It was achieved not so much through the IMF as with the bilateral support of the United States through the Marshall Plan to the European Payments Union (although the attainment of convertibility was preceded by a surge of IMF credit in 1956–57).

consumer safety standards, and similar devices to circumvent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules.

Following the collapse of the par value system, calls were heard for a new Bretton Woods. But there was never a systematic redesign of international monetary and financial arrangements. The international monetary system (or “non-system” as it was dubbed by John Williamson) evolved through a series of patchwork reforms. The agency of this process, the Committee of Twenty (C20), faced no particular time pressure and broke down in the face of the 1973–74 oil shock. France and Japan preferred the restoration of fixed exchange rates but in the context of a system that imposed firmer constraints on the United States. German policymakers were divided, British policymakers weak and confused. The United States, for its part, did not want the dollar to be placed again in the impossible position of the 1960s. U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz and his undersecretary, Paul Volcker, were prepared to contemplate pegged rates only if the bands around them were wide and a mechanism was created to force surplus countries to adjust. With lack of agreement on the latter, they reluctantly concluded that floating rates were the only option. And this was not acceptable to America’s C20 partners.

Bilateral discussions between U.S. and French Treasury officials, rather than the more multilateral C20 approach, produced the formula that reconciled prevailing institutions with the new reality. Instead of a “system of stable rates,” countries committed to maintaining a “stable system of rates.”³² This was a minimalist approach to reform but probably the only one practicable at the time. It acknowledged the shift by a growing number of countries toward more flexible exchange rates, which was already a fait accompli. Beyond that, it committed them to little.

The failure of more radical reforms reflected the absence of a consensus on the direction that they should take. There was no overwhelming threat to world trade from the increased variability of exchange rates, contrary to warnings sounded following the collapse of Bretton Woods. In part this reflected the large number of small countries that continued to peg their currencies to that of a larger trading partner. In addition it reflected the ample supply of credit provided by the process of petro-dollar recycling.

Where fears for the continued expansion of trade were greatest was where trade mattered most: namely, in Europe. In response, Germany and France devised for themselves a mini-Bretton Woods (the Snake and then the European Monetary System). Initially, negotiations proceeded on a tripartite basis, with the United Kingdom (now a member of the European Community) playing an active part. This produced few results, but the scheme developed quickly when only German and French negotiators were involved.

32. This Franco-American compromise was discussed at the Rambouillet Summit (by the five leading Western industrial countries) and institutionalized in the Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement, which obliged countries to promote stable exchange rates by fostering orderly economic conditions while empowering the Fund to conduct “firm surveillance” of those policies.

The most active phase of monetary and exchange rate coordination in the post-Bretton Woods years was the mid-1980s. Again, governments were prompted to act by threats to the trading system, specifically the appreciation of the dollar and the threat of a protectionist response by the U.S. Congress. In the spring of 1985, the Senate unanimously voted a resolution calling for retaliation against Japanese imports, and a bill was then introduced providing for surcharges on the products of those countries with large surpluses against the United States. The obvious response that might defuse domestic pressure in the United States without threatening the international trading system was exchange rate realignment. Formally the venue was the regular meetings of Group of Five (G5) or G7 finance ministers (probably the central locus of financial cooperation between the major industrial countries), although critical momentum was gained in bilateral discussions between Japan and the United States. The United States had a preponderance of influence insofar as Japan was vulnerable to U.S. protectionism. Trade issues lent monetary discussions substantial urgency and made the Japanese willing to accept a deal. The outcome was agreement by the G5 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New York in September 1985 to reduce the value of the dollar in an “orderly” way through concerted intervention and, more importantly, the adoption of stimulative policies by Japan.³³ The Plaza Agreement was followed in 1987 by a new negotiation at a meeting of the finance ministers (now the Group of Six, or G6) at the Louvre, with the aim of stabilizing exchange rates and again of stimulating growth in Japan (Funabashi 1998).

None of these discussions tackled what appears in retrospect to be the most important new development of the post-Bretton Woods years, namely, the explosive growth of capital flows.³⁴ This oversight was rudely

33. Though it should be noted that the dollar was already declining on foreign exchange markets.

34. In the international system as it was emerging in the 1970s, with strong private-sector lending solving the problem of petro-dollar recycling, it actually looked as if the Bretton Woods institutions were redundant. The IMF's attempt to remain at the center of the system through a new approach to the reserve problem, in which a “substitution account” would replace national currencies with SDRs, was never realized. The private sector handled the imbalances and liquidity problems of the 1970s sufficiently well that many commentators concluded that the IMF and the World Bank would lead a more and more marginal existence, catering only to poor countries excluded from the world's capital markets. We are aware of similar arguments made about the diminished role of the multilaterals at the beginning of the twenty-first century and choose our language in order to bring out the parallels. Irving Friedman put it then, “because they depend upon full and prompt servicing of their loans for their financial profitability and viability, private banks (in contrast to the Fund and the Bank) understandably tend to focus their attention upon the best managed countries, and, within these countries, the best managed firms in the most advanced sectors of the economy” (Friedman 1977, 119). Another prominent banker, Rimmer de Vries of Morgan Guaranty, in April 1982 described the new private-sector consensus in the following terms: “in recent years Fund and commercial bank lending have evolved in different directions.” They had distinct and separate spheres of operation, and “thus the Fund must not be viewed as a protective umbrella under which the international banking community can find shelter in times of trouble” (de Vries 1982, 10).

brought to the world's attention in the summer of 1982 by threats of default by Mexico and Argentina. Dealing with what became the Latin American debt crisis required new money from official as well as private sources. The most difficult task was to involve the private sector—as had been attempted in 1931 when the BIS called on Ivar Kreuger. Initially, efforts to do so were led not by the multilateral institutions but by national central banks, especially in the major financial centers, which promptly and even brutally pressed commercial banks to put in new funds. The BIS offered bridge loans while the crisis countries awaited IMF assistance. Although the IMF eventually came to play a central role, linking its conditionality to bank assistance, the cumbersome structure of its decision making precluded an immediate response of the sort needed in times of crisis.³⁵

This solution removed the threat of default at a time when the money-center banks were heavily exposed. Thus, 1982 did not join 1873, 1890, or 1931, when crises at the periphery spread to the center. It did less to solve the problems of the debtor countries. In the end, it was initiatives by private financial institutions to write down nonperforming debt that prompted U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady to embrace a scheme that would reduce rather than pile up debt and enable developing countries to regain market access.

Given how rapidly the crisis unfolded and the consequent lack of time to redesign the system, it is not surprising that existing institutions and mechanisms (national central banks, the BIS, the IMF) were stretched beyond their original (some might say proper) purposes. In any case, the climate was inhospitable for radical redesign. It should be recalled that this was a time of tension between the major industrial countries over economic and monetary policy, when the Europeans attacked the United States for what German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called the “highest interest rates since Jesus Christ,” and in which many U.S. policymakers (notably Treasury Secretary Donald Regan) had a thinly veiled contempt for any kind of internationalism.

The financial crisis of the early 1980s was a shock to international trade. The dollar value of world trade only reached its 1980 level again in 1986, and Western Hemisphere trade again matched its 1980 level only in 1988. Nevertheless the form of crisis resolution, which obliged Latin American countries to export in order to service debt, meant that there was little room for 1930s-style experiments in trade restriction. Ultimately, the global trading system was not jeopardized. Hence, these events did not prompt fundamental monetary and financial reform.

The end of the 1980s is as good a point as any at which to take stock of the situation on the eve of the events that provide the context for current de-

35. In critical cases, the managing director in fact regularly agreed on measures ahead of formal executive board votes (James 1996, ch. 12).

bates. Although much had changed in the course of preceding decades, the extent of continuity is also striking. International monetary stability and exchange rate stability were still regarded as largely synonymous. But exchange rate stability was valued less for its own sake than as a way of supporting a stable and expanding network of trade. There was nothing new about this. It is one way of interpreting the enthusiasm for the International Monetary Conference of 1867, the Brussels Conference in 1920, and the Genoa Conference in 1922. The absence of a comparable commitment to free and open trade explains the failure to agree on an agenda for monetary reform at the London Conference of 1933. The desire to rebuild the network of international trade, thereby providing foreign markets for U.S. exports and solidifying intra-European links, was a prime motivation of U.S. negotiators at Bretton Woods. And the concern of U.S. and Japanese officials over protectionist threats was a motivation for the Plaza and Louvre Accords.

11.6 The 1990s

Globalization was the byword of the 1990s, reflecting the rapid growth of international financial transactions, the integration of developing countries into the world economy, and the information and communications revolution that brought satellite television, the cell phone, and the Internet to remote corners of the world. Capital flows rose exponentially, enabling countries to finance their development needs abroad but also applying more intense pressure—in the form of capital flight—if things went wrong.

Influencing this market was no easy task. In the debt crisis of the 1980s, large banks could be counted on to coordinate their smaller counterparts, and the IMF could simply communicate with the large intermediaries. By the time of the next debt crisis in 1994–95, the progress of securitization meant that the investor base was larger and more heterogeneous: It now included hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds as well as legions of individual investors. Getting such a large number of creditors to recognize their collective interest (sometimes even to determine their identity) was no easy task. This explains the dilemma facing the IMF of how to ameliorate the severity of a crisis without at the same time bailing out investors (who may have a collective interest in staying in but an individual interest in getting out) and aggravating moral hazard.

An inadvertent effect of these capital flows was to highlight weaknesses in domestic financial systems. Capital-account liberalization allowed banks and corporations to fund themselves offshore and currency mismatches to develop on their balance sheets. It facilitated gambling where corporate governance was weak, supervision and regulation were underdeveloped, and the financial safety net was unconditional. This environment proved a fertile seedbed for banking crises. And the same factors limited the capac-

ity of central banks and governments, unable to print dollars and worried that re-regulating flows would damage their credibility, to intervene in stabilizing ways. They meant that IMF intervention to contain the consequences might require unprecedented quantities of finance.

Moreover, just as the recovery of capital mobility in the quarter century following World War II had undermined the pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates of Bretton Woods, the further growth of capital flows now complicated efforts to operate crawling bands and exchange rate target zones. If doubts arose about the sustainability of an exchange rate, market participants could take positions against it. These dynamics played themselves out in the series of crises that ricocheted through Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The result was steady erosion in the share of IMF member countries operating soft currency pegs, which were abandoned in favor of currency boards (and, in Europe, monetary union) on the one hand and more freely floating exchange rates on the other.³⁶

This left the IMF in search of an anchor for macroeconomic policy and a focus for its advice. Should it advocate currency boards and dollarization? Should it urge its members to float their currencies and target inflation? Should it discourage intermediate regimes as crisis prone, or was any exchange rate arrangement still viable so long as domestic macroeconomic policies were brought into conformance with its dictates? Disagreements over these issues among the Fund's shareholders, staff, and management (reflecting equally deep divisions in the scholarly literature) prevented the institution from offering clear and coherent advice, which did not enhance its credibility in the eyes of the markets or its members (assisting in exchange rate management having been the IMF's original *raison d'être* and intellectual bread and butter). Floating rates appeared to many developing-country governments as presenting too great a risk to domestic financial systems, which might be exposed to a mismatch between liabilities (in dollars or other foreign currencies) and domestic currency assets. Pegging the exchange rate, adopting a currency board, or dollarizing (in the late-1990s variant) were still regarded as valid devices where the crisis was extreme, but there was an understandable reluctance to endorse policies that were tantamount to locking the door and throwing away the key.³⁷

One way of understanding the expanding scope of IMF conditionality is as a search for new sources of credibility for national policy. The Fund might condition its assistance on agreement to make the central bank independent, to empower the prime minister or the finance minister to veto the spending decisions of subcentral governments, or to make budgeting more transparent, all as ways of enhancing the credibility of policy. These in-

36. See Fischer (2001) for an overview of these trends.

37. This was the well-known inability to articulate an exit strategy from these rigid monetary-cum-exchange-rate regimes, analyzed in Eichengreen et al. (1998).

stances of what the critics of the IMF dismissed as the Fund's excessively intrusive structural conditions were justified by the institution and its champions as attempts to enhance credibility by strengthening policy-making institutions, as opposed to extracting incredible promises of intent.³⁸

None of these justifications prevented the IMF from being roundly and widely criticized for its structural interventions (Feldstsein 1998). The Fund attached more than fifty structural policy conditions to the typical three-year loan disbursed through its Extended Fund Facility in the 1990s and nine to fifteen structural conditions to its typical one-year standby arrangement. Their scale and scope were unlike anything in the institution's prior history. The IMF moved into areas like corporate governance, accounting methods and principles, attacks on corruption, and even at times the desirability of democratization, unprecedented issues for what was a financial institution.

Mexico in 1994–95 was the first test of this new approach.³⁹ The Mexican crisis was a debt crisis, but it was also a banking crisis, as a result of the balance sheet mismatches described above, and a confidence crisis, reflecting turmoil in the political system (the Colosio assassination in the run-up to the presidential election).⁴⁰ The Fund conditioned its assistance on reform of the banking system as well as on the standard macroeconomic measures. Moreover, the scale of the assistance received by Mexico was unprecedented, reflecting the explosive growth of international financial markets and the need for large amounts of liquidity if default and restructuring were to be headed off.

The Fund's actions were consonant with the preferences of its principal shareholder. The mid-1990s may have been the peak of U.S. Treasury influence over the IMF, matched only by the first fragile decade of the Fund's existence. Europe's Maastricht-minded countries were busy tending their gardens, and Japan was in the throes of its financial crisis. The emerging markets had only begun asserting themselves. Although it is easy to exaggerate the intimacy of the IMF–U.S. Treasury connection, it is hard to offer another equally convincing explanation for the extraordinary pressure for

38. In addition, this new emphasis on structural reform is impossible to understand except in the context of transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Transition was the dominant event of the 1990s. As such, it dominated the IMF's attention. And it was fundamentally a problem of structural transformation. It is hard to imagine approach to multilateral support for this process that would have not emphasized structural reform, in other words, or focused on privatizing public enterprise, building regulatory institutions, and developing administrative capacity. This preoccupation shifted the focus of IMF staff and management from macroeconomic surveillance to a host of new structural policy issues. For better or for worse (opinions differ), the IMF grew accustomed to attaching structural policy conditions to its loans and did so whether the recipient was a Latin American reformer or an Asian tiger.

39. The European currency crisis of 1992–93 had been handled internally and involved the IMF only as an observer.

40. Thus, some authors (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1995) have been led to characterize the Mexican episode as purely a crisis of investor confidence.

capital account liberalization placed on emerging markets by the Fund and other multilaterals in this period.

The Asian crisis of 1997–98 and its repercussions in Brazil and globally (with Russia's default and the all-but-failure of Long-Term Capital Management) brought these issues to a head. Suffice it to say that virtually every aspect of IMF intervention was called into question.⁴¹ Yet there is a paradox. At the same time the IMF was so universally excoriated, it came to be seen as more vital than ever to the operation of the global financial system. The obvious manifestation of this was the increase in the fund's resources from 146 billion in special drawing rights (SDR) to SDR 212 billion in the 1998–99 quota review. Until the Asian crisis threatened to become a global crisis, the review had been stalled because of the reluctance of the U.S. Congress to agree to an increase.⁴² But once the crisis threatened to reach U.S. shores, debate quickly gave way to action.

11.7 Reform for the Future

At the same time, there is little consensus on desirable directions for reform. In part this reflects disagreement and confusion over the nature of recent crises. The events surrounding the devaluation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 could be regarded as a conventional crisis of a sort to which the IMF was accustomed.⁴³ But the consequences, not only for Thailand but for its neighbors, were unexpectedly severe. Indeed, it was the international spread of the crisis that was particularly perplexing. Growth rates in other

41. The fund was criticized for failing to anticipate the crisis, for paying inadequate attention to the hedge-fund problem, and for inadequately monitoring financial markets. It was attacked for creating moral hazard. Its conditionality was impugned on the grounds that the Asian countries had not entered their crises with monetary and fiscal problems (Thailand to the contrary notwithstanding). Its exchange rate advice was rejected by the champions of currency boards and collective pegs. Demands that insolvent financial intermediaries be closed and the financial system restructured were faulted for damaging confidence in the midst of the crisis. The fund's structural conditions were criticized for exceeding the institution's competence and as poorly attuned to Asian economies' distinctive development model. Its deliberations were criticized as opaque and unrepresentative. About the only feature of the institution that remained free of criticism was the food in the staff cafeteria.

42. Congress was blocking the increase by threatening to attach to the increase in the U.S. quota demands on IMF conditionality of very dubious relevance to the IMF's mission (limitations on government funding of family planning, labor, and environmental issues). Its veto was binding, since members holding over 85 percent of the IMF's quotas had to agree.

43. The baht was overvalued (Chinn and Dooley 1998). The growth of Thailand's export markets (and those of most other Asian countries) had already begun to slow in the second half of 1995. Real estate and other asset valuations had already declined significantly, presaging slower economic growth and problems in the banking system. The current account deficit had ballooned to 8 percent of GDP, presaging serious problems if investors pulled the plug. The IMF saw this problem coming and warned the Thai authorities before the fact. And its program—financial assistance to moderate the demand compression required to close the capital account, conditioned on policy reforms to constrain the rate of growth of domestic credit—was cut from familiar cloth.

Asian countries had slowed at most modestly in 1995–96. No one was warning of unsustainable external positions. The force with which turbulence hit the rest of the region thus constituted a surprise. Asia's plight could not be dismissed as comeuppance for governments that had run unsustainable policies fueled by excessive credit expansion and manifested in dangerously overvalued exchange rates.

In the absence of another diagnosis with clear policy implications, the IMF instinctively prescribed the standard course of treatment. It recommended narrowing budget deficits, hiking interest rates, and closing insolvent financial institutions to restore confidence and attract back flight capital. When these steps failed to calm the markets, the Fund was forced to acknowledge that they had been ineffectual (IMF 1999).

Even with benefit of hindsight, it is not clear what alternative course of treatment would have been better. Two schools emerged, one that attributed the crisis to connected lending, excessive reliance on debt finance, and poor prudential supervision and regulation, which together undermined the resilience of the financial system (Goldstein 1998), and another that ascribed it to investor panic, compounded by the IMF's insistence on pointing to structural problems (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Furman and Stiglitz 1998). With the passage of time there has emerged a synthesis of these views to which most observers now subscribe. However, the weight attached to the components continues to differ. U.S. and European officials, who embrace the view that the Asian crisis was a product of flawed domestic financial systems and drew the lesson that such problems can put global stability at risk, have placed at the top of the international agenda measures to upgrade financial-market governance and supervision.

The vehicles for doing so are international financial codes and standards for everything from auditing and accounting to bankruptcy, insolvency, and corporate governance. To be sure, some emerging markets, in Asia in particular, view these standards as an effort to foist upon them Western modes of corporate and financial governance ill suited to an "Asian model" of high debt gearing and close public-private collaboration. Low-income countries fear that they will be denied market access and multilateral assistance if they are unable to meet the standards of the international community. But there remains no other coherent approach to strengthening financial systems.⁴⁴ The most difficult task for the multilaterals is to monitor compliance

44. In principle, it continues in a way that is attuned to the worries of Asian and emerging-market economies. That the Financial Stability Forum includes a number of emerging economies, the BIS (whose Committee of Banking Supervisors is responsible for revision of the Basel international capital standards) has expanded into Asia, and private-sector organizations like the International Accounting Standards Committee include representatives of emerging markets and have subcommittees dedicated to their problems go some way toward meeting their objections.

and publicize their findings in a way that strengthens market discipline without running the risk of precipitating a crisis.⁴⁵ Whether the IMF is sufficiently nimble to walk this line remains to be seen.

Group of Seven summiteers, finance ministers, and the governors of the IMF drew the further lesson that the Fund must strengthen its surveillance, of capital markets in particular, in order to better anticipate and avert future crises. This is no easy adaptation for staff schooled in the principles of macroeconomic management but not accounting or corporate governance. This leaves the Fund no alternative but to access the relevant expertise externally.⁴⁶

Asian governments, including Japan's, understandably resist the idea that Asia is a hotbed of "crony capitalism," preferring the interpretation of the crisis that blames the overreaction of investors. This has led them to call for tighter regulation of capital flows, to be achieved by forcing over-the-counter forward currency transactions into organized exchanges, taking steps to prevent large traders from manipulating markets, and cracking down on hedge funds. Unfortunately, it is not clear how these goals can be achieved short of the reimposition of capital and exchange controls and the re-regulation of financial markets. While the over-the-counter market can be taxed, it can move offshore.⁴⁷ Hedge funds can be regulated, but they can disguise their transactions. Hong Kong could intervene in the Hang Seng to squeeze speculators, but it is not clear that other governments can do so without casting doubt on their commitment to the market.

The same constraint shapes the debate over the functions of the international financial institutions. The World Bank has taken on board the critique that its role should be to subsidize investments in global public goods like health and environment that, standard economic arguments suggest, private markets undersupply, now that the growth of private capital markets has reduced the need for official sources of development finance.⁴⁸ The IMF has accepted that its members should draw on its facilities mainly in times of crisis and not borrow for extended periods. There is agreement that market-based debt restructuring should be relied on more, financial rescues less. Why is there consensus on these points but not on so many others? Simply put, these conclusions reflect the recognition that the role of international financial cooperation is now conceived, as it was once before, in the nineteenth century, as supporting rather than superseding the markets.

45. The IMF has taken its first tentative attempts in this direction by releasing several experimental Reviews of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).

46. This is the approach being taken to gathering and analyzing the information needed for the ROSCs that the IMF now proposes to issue for its members, and in the IMF's and World Bank's joint Financial Sector Assessment Programs.

47. From Kuala Lumpur to Singapore, for example.

48. As for whether it will actually curtail its development lending, we will have to see.

11.8 Conclusion

In this essay we have characterized the development of the institutions of international monetary and financial cooperation in evolutionary terms. We have shown that large-scale, comprehensive reform like that which took place in 1944 is extremely rare; it is the exception to the rule. The 1944 reforms were a response to circumstances so unusual (the breakdown of the international monetary and trade regimes in the 1930s, and the world war) that they are unlikely to be repeated. The normal process of change is different. As with many evolutionary processes, punctuated equilibrium seems an appropriate metaphor for its pace and character.

What then determines the nature of the equilibrium and the location of the punctuation marks? We have argued that concerted monetary and financial reform is most likely when there is a consensus on the benefits of free and open trade and when monetary and financial problems are seen as threatening the stability of the global trading system. To take two examples, at Bretton Woods the desire to construct a free and open trading system, and the fear that financial dislocations placed this goal at risk, helped to set the stage for monetary and financial reform; in the 1930s, in contrast, there was no comparable consensus regarding the benefits of free and open trade, and as a result there was no significant reform of the international monetary system.

This insight sheds light on the mixed success of recent efforts to strengthen the international financial architecture. The most durable component of the late-twentieth-century liberal consensus is, once again, the benefits of free and open trade. The fear that monetary disorder might provoke a protectionist backlash consequently provides powerful impetus for reform at the regional level, where trade matters most. When in the early 1990s the crisis in the European Monetary System (EMS) threatened to unleash “competitive devaluations” and jeopardize political support for the single market, Europe accelerated its forced march to monetary union. And when exchange rate volatility disrupted Asian trade following the onset of the region’s crisis in 1997–98, Asian policymakers displayed a surprisingly readiness to contemplate ambitious reform initiatives such as swap arrangements, collective pegs, and even a regional monetary fund.

Yet the trading system has proven surprisingly resilient to these financial body blows. Notwithstanding the financial disruptions of the most recent decade, trade has continued to expand.⁴⁹ To argue that far-reaching monetary and financial reforms are needed to shield the global trading system

49. There have been casualties, to be sure, such as the U.S. president’s fast-track authority, efforts to quickly expand the North American Free Trade Agreement into a free trade area for the Americas, and a new round of global trade talks. But it is hard to argue that the global trading system has been seriously placed at risk.

from a destructive protectionist backlash would be a stretch. Absent this threat, it has been difficult to develop a consensus for radical reform of the international monetary and financial system.

To be sure, this is only one of several reasons why nations have not been able to agree on far-reaching changes in international financial institutions and arrangements. No country today possesses the financial power and political leverage of the United States in 1944. The number of consequential players in international negotiations is larger than ever before. Their circumstances and outlooks are more varied. The complexity of negotiations is correspondingly greater. It follows that a nonnegligible portion of progress on monetary and financial reform has been at the regional level, where numbers are smaller, outlooks are more uniform, and exceptional institutions or concentrations of power limit transactions costs. Suffice it to say that no monocausal explanation for the success or failure of particular negotiations (including our own) can be fully adequate. Unfortunately, multi-factor explanations (like those hinted at in this paper and summarized in table 11.1) are impossible to test formally, given the small size of the sample.

Still, to the extent that monetary spillovers and financial flows are global and not just regional, there continue to be calls for a global response. Clearly, there will be no global regulatory agency with the power to override national financial policies because there is no appetite for global government.⁵⁰ Rather, the response of the international policy community is to embrace international standards as a way of simulating some of the functions of a global regulator.

This agenda for reforming the international monetary and financial system is frequently characterized as historically unprecedented—as demanding of countries that wish to participate in international capital markets a commitment to institutional harmonization unlike anything required of their predecessors. This is the view of both the champions of the standard-centered agenda and of its critics, who see it as intrusive, subversive of national sovereignty, and insensitive to the needs and circumstances of developing countries. Our review of the historical evidence suggests that the initiative is in fact neither as novel nor as unprecedented as these interpretations suggest. In the nineteenth century, as now, reform efforts were centered on international standards designed to stabilize and stimulate international transactions. The difference then was that the pressure for institutional reform and harmonization in the interest of trade expansion and financial stability focused on the monetary standard narrowly defined (and on the gold standard in particular). After World War II the standard

50. Although the experience of European Union suggests that there may exist a feasible halfway house, the reaction again the intrusions of European Union regulation, evident in the September 2000 Danish referendum and in British political discourse, suggests that resistance to the construction of institutions of global governance, with significant enforcement powers of their own, will not be easily subdued.

Table 11.1 International Reform Negotiations: Preconditions and Outcomes

	Consensus	Time Pressure	Power Politics	Outcome
1867 Paris	Yes	No	Cooperative multilateral	None
1922 Genoa	Yes		multilateral	Restored gold standard, central bank cooperation
1929 Paris/the Hague	Yes	No	Antagonistic multilateral	Weak and small international bank
1933 London	No	No	Highly antagonistic multilateral	None
1944 Bretton Woods	Yes	Yes	Bilateral/preponderance United States/ United Kingdom	Fixed but adjustable exchange rates, convertibility requirement, rules on deficits, support facilities (IMF)
1970s C20	No	No	Bilateral/preponderance United States/France	Exchange rate choice, IMF remains in existence
1979 EMS	Yes	Yes	Bilateral/preponderance Germany/France	Fixed but adjustable exchange rates, limited intervention requirements
1982 Latin American debt	No	Yes	Unsettled multilateral	New tasks for IMF
1985-87 Plaza/Louvre	No	Yes	Bilateral/preponderance United States/Japan	Intervention, monetary policy coordination
1994-95 Mexico	No	Yes	Weak cooperative	
1997-98 East Asia	No	Yes	Weak cooperative	

to which countries were held was the Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, which detailed commitments to current account convertibility and pegged exchange rates. Now the range of monetary and financial standards to which countries are expected to conform is greater: These include not just IMF codes of conduct for monetary and fiscal policies but a lengthy list of international financial standards covering everything from auditing and accounting to bankruptcy and insolvency procedures, prudential supervision and regulation, and corporate governance. This is obviously a response to the rapid internationalization of business activity. Although the scope of these commitments is unprecedented, their nature is not: The new approach is a throwback to the nineteenth century insofar as the markets rather than the multilaterals are the ultimate arbitrators of countries' compliance.

What then accounts for what is new and novel, namely, the scope and ambition of the agenda? Whereas in the nineteenth century adherence to the gold standard was regarded as both necessary and sufficient for a country to be active on international financial markets, adherence to a particular monetary standard is now seen as insufficient. The change reflects the unprecedented extent of financial integration, reflecting technology as well as policy, which has erased the line between domestic and international financial markets and led to the recognition that measures to strengthen and stabilize domestic financial markets are prerequisites for international financial stability.⁵¹ Absent a U-turn away from financial integration, which we think is unlikely, this approach to buttressing financial stability, organized around standards for areas extending well beyond the monetary, is likely to remain the focus of reform efforts for the foreseeable future.

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51. Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999) make the case that financial integration today is deeper, wider, and in an economic sense more profound than a hundred years ago.

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Comment Peter B. Kenen

The title of this paper led me to expect that Eichengreen and James would concentrate on ways in which globalization influenced the evolution of the monetary and financial system during the last part of the nineteenth century and the last part of the twentieth century. In fact, they take on a much larger task: asking why some reform efforts failed and others succeeded. They set out their hypothesis right away: “That hypothesis is that a consensus on the need for monetary and financial reform is likely to develop when such reform is seen as essential for the defense of the global trading system.” In most periods, they say, the monetary and financial system evolves in a gradual manner, largely in response to market forces. Discontinuous reform, by contrast, occurs only when problems in the monetary and financial system are seen as putting the global trading system at risk. This is, they say, a result of the fact that, throughout most of the period under study, there was “deep and abiding faith in the advantages of trade for economic growth” but no “comparable consensus on the benefits of open international capital markets for stability, efficiency, and growth.”

This way of interpreting the history of monetary reform has much to commend it. Reforms *do* occur discontinuously. So do other forms of international monetary cooperation. I made the same point several years ago (Kenen 1989), when I said that the episodic nature of policy coordination among the major industrial countries calls into question the way that econ-

omists usually model policy coordination. It can best be viewed, I said, as a sporadic regime-preserving process, not a continuous policy-optimizing process. I was therefore pleased to note that Eichengreen and James use the same phrase to characterize the episodes studied in their paper.

Nevertheless, I have reservations about the strong form of the hypothesis set out in their paper—one that attaches *exclusive* importance to the preservation of the trading system and little or no intrinsic importance to the preservation of open capital markets or to the influence of the monetary system on the ability of national governments to maintain domestic economic stability.

On several occasions, Eichengreen and James demonstrate clearly that the defense of the trading system *was* indeed the dominant objective of some or all of the governments involved in a particular episode. They quote, for example, the statement by David Lloyd George about the importance of the Genoa Conference for the preservation of the trading system. Soon thereafter, however, they appear to contradict him. They say that the Genoa Conference failed to generate significant reforms because the impending return to the prewar monetary system did not appear to pose a threat to the trading system.

At times, moreover, Eichengreen and James adopt a somewhat dubious strategy. They argue, plausibly enough, that failure to reform the monetary and financial system *would* have done damage to the trading system, and they therefore conclude that defense of the trading system was the rationale for the particular reform at issue. Remember, however, the wording of their own hypothesis. Reform of the monetary and financial system occurs when it “is *seen* as essential” to defend the trading system. To say that the trading system might have been harmed in the absence of monetary reform is different and less compelling than adducing evidence to show that those involved in a particular reform effort were fully cognizant of that possibility.

This brings me to my second reservation about the paper. Some reforms of the monetary and financial system have been trade-regime preserving. The Plaza and Louvre agreements come to mind immediately—although they should perhaps be viewed as examples of ad hoc cooperation rather than examples of full-fledged reform. The dollar crisis of 1971 is another example; although the prevailing exchange rate regime was not seen as a threat to the trading system, the tactics employed by the United States to achieve an exchange rate realignment were widely seen as a serious threat to the trading system.

Consider, however, some other episodes, starting with the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, which was the most comprehensive reform of the international monetary system. No one would deny that the attempt to stabilize exchange rates in the postwar world reflected the common belief that the resort to tariffs and quotas in the 1930s was due in part to the disintegration of the monetary system. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods system attached

very little importance to the revival of private capital flows. In other words, trade trumped finance. But Eichengreen and James pay no attention to the other important aim of those who designed the Bretton Woods system—maintaining domestic prosperity in the postwar world. Nor do they pay enough attention to domestic matters in their account of reform—or its absence—during the nineteenth century. The failure of the 1867 Paris Conference to produce a meaningful reform of the monetary system was not, I believe, due mainly to the absence of any grave threat to the trading system. It appears to have reflected lack of agreement about the best way to achieve domestic monetary stability.

Leaping forward once again, this time to the 1980s, the reforms or ad hoc arrangements—call them what you will—adopted to cope with the Latin American debt crisis reflected concerns about the vulnerability of the U.S. banking system. They had very little to do with trade, except in the tautological sense that, left to themselves, the crisis-stricken countries might have imposed import controls that would have been marginally disruptive of the trading system. (The paper notes that trade contracted in the early 1980s when measured in nominal terms, but that was due to the recession and subsequent stagflation in the industrial countries and to the fall in the price of oil, not to major trade-policy changes or the debt crisis itself.)

Coming at last to the 1990s, I am not persuaded that the steps taken to deal with the Asian crisis, whatever their merits or defects, reflected deep worries about the effects of the crisis on the trading system. By that time, if not earlier, the official community was strongly committed to the integrity of an international financial system friendly to private capital flows, as well as the liberalization of trade in financial services. How else can one explain the ill-fated push for capital account convertibility on the eve of the Asian crisis? How else can one explain the importance attached to financial-sector reform in the crisis-stricken countries and the ongoing attempt to foster compliance with international codes and standards defining “best practice” in the public, financial, and corporate sectors?

Eichengreen and James rightly observe that the commitment to an open trading system has been an “abiding” commitment, whereas the commitment to open capital markets has waxed and waned. This fact by itself, however, should not cause us to minimize the importance of the sporadic commitment to open capital markets when we interpret attempts to reform the international monetary system.

Before turning to the last part of the paper, let me draw attention to a monetary reform—the move to European monetary union—that does support the thesis of this paper. Eichengreen and James mention it only in passing, because they limit themselves to reform of the global monetary system. Yet the move to European monetary union was in part the consequence of a perceived threat to the trading system. The timing of the move owes much to the adoption of the Single European Act, which required the rapid

elimination of all controls on intra-European capital movements and thus posed a threat to the viability of the EMS. Padoa-Schioppa (1988) laid out the implications. If the EMS was not replaced by a full-fledged monetary union, it would succumb eventually to an exchange rate crisis and give way to greater exchange rate flexibility within the European Community. But large exchange rate changes would threaten the integrity of the single market by generating pressures for covert protection—and that is what actually happened during the EMS crisis of 1992–93 (see, e.g., Eichengreen 1996). In short, the move to monetary union cannot be explained without citing the threat to the trading system posed by the removal of capital controls.

In the last part of their paper, Eichengreen and James make some intriguing statements about the current attempt to reform the international financial system.

One of those statements pertains to the role of international standards and codes in promoting domestic adaptation to the integration of financial markets. Eichengreen and James are right to point out that the scope of this effort is unprecedented, but they go on to argue that the strategy is not new—that it is a throwback to the nineteenth century because it involves global standardization and “insofar as the markets rather than the multilaterals are the ultimate arbitrators of countries’ compliance.” If that proves to be true, however, it will be because the various standards and codes have been poorly designed for the purpose at hand. They attempt to define “best practice” rather than minimally acceptable practice. As a result, developing countries have insisted that they be judged by the progress they make, not the level of compliance they achieve, and they have thus far blocked any attempt by the official sector to devise and apply incentives and penalties designed to promote compliance with the new standards and codes.¹ But markets don’t care very much about progress; they are—and should be—interested in absolute compliance. Therefore, they are not likely to make much sense or much use of the ongoing official assessments of compliance, which also emphasize progress.

The second statement pertains to the role of the IMF. “There is,” we are told, “agreement that market-based debt restructuring should be relied on more, financial rescues less.” This is true but says very little. The official community has used similar language ever since the Mexican crisis but has continued to engage in financial rescues. A seemingly innocuous sentence in a communiqué of the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee points to the unresolved problem. It “reaffirms the exceptional character of financing beyond normal access limits, and repeats that reliance on

1. For evidence to this effect, compare two documents, the *Issue Paper of the Task Force on Implementation of Standards* (Financial Stability Forum 2000a), which contains a long list of incentives and penalties that might be employed by the official sector, and the *Report of the Follow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards* (Financial Stability Forum 2000b), which backs away from most of them.

the catalytic approach at high levels of access must presume substantial justification” (IMF 2001). Let me translate that from fundspeak into ordinary English. Up to now, the committee is saying, official financing has been regarded as best way to catalyze voluntary private-sector involvement in crisis resolution. If we limit official financing to “ordinary” levels, can we expect to catalyze that sort of involvement, or will we have to rely more heavily on other, “concerted” ways of involving the private sector? There is, to be sure, little enthusiasm for large-scale official financing, partly because of concern about moral hazard. But there is less than full agreement on the best way to do without it.

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