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## Fiscal Deficits, Debt, and Monetary Policy in a Liquidity Trap\*

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### Abstract

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The macroeconomic response to the economic crisis has revived old debates about the usefulness of monetary and fiscal policy in fighting recessions. Without the ability to further lower interest rates, policy authorities in many countries have turned to expansionary fiscal policies. Recent literature argues that government spending may be very effective in such environments. But a critical element of the stimulus packages in all countries was the use of deficit financing and tax reductions. This paper explores the role of government debt and deficits in an economy constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Given that the liquidity trap is generated by a large increase in the desire to save on the part of the private sector, the wealth effects of government deficits can provide a critical macroeconomic response to this. Government spending financed by deficits may be far more expansionary than that financed by tax increases in such an environment. In a liquidity trap, tax cuts may be much more effective than during normal times. Finally, monetary policies aimed at directly increasing monetary aggregates may be effective, even if interest rates are unchanged.

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**JEL codes:** E2, E5, E6

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# 1 Introduction

The dramatic policy response to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis followed by many countries has revived some old debates about the use of fiscal and monetary policy in fighting recessions. The central dilemma for policy-makers in Japan, North America and Europe has been to try to counter a large recession brought on by an unprecedented fall in private consumption and investment spending, but at the same time being constrained by the inability to lower nominal interest rates below their current near-zero level. The end-result was an ad hoc series of fiscal and monetary measures - deficit financed government spending increases, tax cuts, and ‘unconventional’ monetary policy measures such as open market purchases on long-dated securities, direct increases in the monetary base, etc. Coming under the catch-all term of ‘stimulus-packages’, the design of these policies did not come from theoretical frameworks or quantitative macro-economic models of the style that have been explored within central banks for the last decade, but rather produced from ‘back of the envelope’ style arguments about the size of fiscal multipliers and the impact of liquidity injections on credit flows.

At the same time, there has been a vigorous debate within the economics profession about the usefulness of fiscal and monetary stimulus at all<sup>1</sup>. One fact that has been less well recognized perhaps is that the central dilemma about the options for economic policy in a liquidity trap has been extensively studied within the recent vintage of New Keynesian DSGE models in light of the 1990’s experience of Japan. In particular, Krugman (1998), Eggertston and Woodford (2003,2005), Jung et al. (2005), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) and many other writers explored how monetary and fiscal policy could be usefully employed even when the authorities have no further room to reduce short term nominal interest rates. Recently, a number of authors have revived this literature in light of the very similar problems now encountered by the economies of Western Europe and North America. Papers by Christiano et al (2009), Eggertson (2009), Cogan et al. (2008) have explored the possibility for using government spending expansions, tax cuts, and monetary policy when the economy is in a ‘liquidity trap’.

One key aspect of the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in a liquidity trap that seems to have so far gone relatively unexplored is the role that government deficits and debt issue plays as part of a stimulus package. On the one hand, there has been overwhelming agreement among policy practioners that in order to be useful, fiscal stimulus must be financed with debt rather than compensating tax increases, and also that part of the stimulus could be

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<sup>1</sup>See for instance Krugman (2009), and the response by Cochrane (2009).

based on tax cuts rather than spending increases. But in most of the existing classes of New Keynesian DSGE models that examine fiscal and monetary policies in a liquidity trap, the distinction between tax financed and debt financed fiscal stimulus is irrelevant (and tax cuts that leave the present value of taxation unchanged are also irrelevant), because these models are characterized by Ricardian equivalence, with infinitely lived consumers and infinite planning horizons.

It would seem then that in order to offer a serious analysis of the role of fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap, it is necessary to depart from the benchmark assumption of the infinitely lived Ramsey consumer. This paper takes a first step in this direction. Following a number of recent papers (e.g. Annichiarico et al 2008), we amend the basic New Keynesian sticky price model of Woodford (2003) and Clarida Gali and Gertler (1999) by incorporating finite planning horizons in the manner of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). This means that government spending financed by debt has different effects than that financed by tax increases, that government debt itself has wealth effects for currently-alive households, that pure lump-sum tax cuts may be expansionary, and moreover, that monetary policy aimed at increasing the outstanding stock of monetary aggregates may have direct ‘real balance’ effects independently of its effect (or non-effect) on nominal interest rates.

We explore the impacts of fiscal and monetary policy in this model, and contrast the results with the recent literature on policy in a liquidity trap. We focus on a scenario where a large increase in the desire to save on the part of households pushes down the economy’s underlying real interest rate, and in an economy with sticky prices, causes a fall in aggregate demand output and inflation.

Our central results may be summarised briefly. We find that in an environment where monetary policy rules work ‘normally’, adjusting interest rates in response to inflation and output ‘gaps’, the introduction of finite planning horizons has little to offer with respect to the analysis of the impacts of fiscal policy and monetary policy shocks. When the model is calibrated to introduce empirically realistic planning horizons, there is little quantitative impact of the deviation from Ricardian equivalence. In our benchmark model, for instance, the ‘balanced budget’ government spending multiplier is unity, and the multiplier implied by purely deficit financed government spending is only slightly larger.

By contrast, when policy is constrained by ‘a liquidity trap’, there may be a dramatic difference between the response of the economy with an effectively infinite planning horizon and that with finite horizon. Equivalently, the impact of deficit financing of fiscal policies may be much greater than policies financed by taxes. In our benchmark model, the balanced budget government spending multiplier is also unity, even in a liquidity trap. But the

multiplier for a deficit financed government spending expansion is over 2. Intuitively, the model predicts that government debt issue has substantial wealth effects in a liquidity trap. These wealth effects stimulate aggregate demand and private consumption, and play an expansionary macroeconomic role, aside from the direct effects of government spending.

Another perspective is as follows. In an economy with Ricardian equivalence and no capital, a large increase in the desire to save cannot be satisfied in equilibrium. In a flexible price world, we would simply see a fall in real interest rates. In a liquidity trap, where prices are sticky, the adjustment has to take place through a large fall in current output and consumption (see Christiano et al (2009) for an explication of this argument). But in a world with finite horizon consumers, government debt issue in effect provides a vehicle for saving on the part of the private sector. This satisfies part of their increase in the desire to save, and as a result, places a limit on the degree to which aggregate demand and consumption has to fall. Effectively, our results suggest that this macroeconomic role of government debt issue can play an important part in a fiscal stimulus package during a liquidity trap.

We also show that the role of government debt issue is essentially equivalent, in our model, to the utilization of the ‘real balance’ effect in monetary expansion. As a corollary then, the model implies that this real balance effect may be negligible in normal times, but play a non-trivial role during a liquidity trap. Again, however, a key requirement for it to work is that Ricardian equivalence fails.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the nature of fiscal and monetary policy responses to the recent crisis. The next section develops the basic model to be used throughout the paper. Section 4 discusses the nature of the steady state in the model. Section 5 and 6 outline the impact of government spending, tax, and debt shocks in the model when the economy is both outside and within a liquidity trap, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

## **2 Fiscal and Monetary Responses to the Crisis**

### **2.1 The limits to monetary policy**

Following the collapse in economic activity across global economies in late 2008, monetary authorities in almost all countries reduced interest rates dramatically. But by mid 2009, for most central banks, policy rates were close to their minimum feasible levels. Figure 1 describes the path of policy rates from mid 2008 in 5 major economies. The US, the UK, Canada, and the ECB all reduced rates in September 2008. By the end of the year, the US

Federal Funds rate was near zero. By mid 2009, the other three economies had rates at or below 1 percent. Japan of course, already had a policy rate below 1 percent, but reduced it further in early 2009.

Reaching the limit of monetary policy traction through the interest rate channel, central banks engaged in a range of ‘unconventional’ monetary policy strategies. The US Federal Reserve for instance, promising to "employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability" , began in late 2008 to widen the range of counter-parties it would lend to, and accept a broader form collateral form of collateral, based on the assumption that the normal links between interest rates and credit expansion were failing to operate during the crisis. Later, the Fed directly intervened in long term securities markets, and by mid 2009 had more than doubled the size of its balance sheet (Rudebusch, 2009) Similarly, in March 2009, the Bank of England began a policy of ‘Quantitative Easing’, involving purchase of various government and corporate bonds<sup>2</sup>. The ECB has taken a range of similar measures.

There is considerable scepticism about the effectiveness of this unconventional monetary policy however. Evidence from Japan in the late 1990’s provides little support that increasing available liquidity can stimulate credit flows to consumers and firms and stimulate activity, holding the interest rate constant. Similarly, recent studies in the US suggest that quantitative easing would have to be much larger than even the recent Fed balance sheet expansions in order to be effective (Krugman 2009).

A final channel of monetary policy is through communications and the targeting of expectations. Even if interest rates remain at zero for some considerable period, the monetary authority can influence current conditions by announcing its intention to maintain low interest rates even after the recovery is underway. By doing so, the authority can influence current spending decisions of the private sector, to the extent that they are based on the projected path of interest rates into the future. This tool has been a key part of the communications strategy of all central banks over the last year.

## **2.2 Fiscal stimulus policies**

Since monetary policy has essentially reached the limit of its effectiveness, virtually all governments, both in advanced economies and emerging market economies, instigated fiscal stimulus packages. Following the G20 meetings in late 2008, in conjunction with the IMF policy recommendations, a rough consensus emerged on a need for fiscal stimulus equal to

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<sup>2</sup>See Cespedes, Chang, and Garcia-Cicco (2010) for a discussion of a range of ‘Heterodox’ central bank policies.

2 percent of GDP. The breakdown between direct spending and tax cuts was not directly prescribed however. Table 1 describes the composition of the stimulus packages in the G20 economies. In terms of GDP per capita, after Saudi Arabia, China and the US bring the largest fiscal stimulus, with 5 and 6 percent of GDP, respectively. But the packages differ sharply in their composition, with China's stimulus plan having no tax cut component at all, while in the US about a third of the overall stimulus is in the form of tax cuts. Britain's plan is mostly comprised on tax cuts, while Russia and Brazil's stimulus has only tax cuts. But even without tax cuts, all stimulus plans have been financed by large increases in public sector deficits. Table 2 illustrates the pre-crisis and post-crisis fiscal balances (projected) for G-20 countries. Many of the advanced economies already had very weak fiscal positions already in 2007, but deficits dramatically increased in most of these countries over the last year, and are projected to remain far above the pre-crisis trend until 2014 at least. Emerging economies were generally in a much better fiscal position before the crisis, but most of these countries also have had a significant increase in the fiscal deficit.

While there is significant consensus on the need for fiscal stimulus, the magnitude of the increase in public sector debt, especially among the advanced economies, has raised considerable concerns (IMF). Table 3 gives the projections for public sector debt for G20 countries. Higher debt has the potential to raise long term real interest rates, crowding out investment spending and growth, and also potentially raises the prospect of higher future rates of inflation.

In the analysis below, we discuss a model of the short term alone, abstracting from the long run costs of fiscal deficits. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how, in the short run, deficits may have dramatically different effects whether the economy is inside or outside a liquidity trap. While we do not dismiss the dangers of increasing public sector debt, it remains true that, at least for the larger economies, these dangers are more in the future than the present. At present, both the path of long term interest rates and inflationary expectations in most advanced economies seem to indicate little concern for unsustainable debt levels or high future inflation.

## **3 The model of overlapping generations**

### **3.1 Demographics and Households**

We employ a very standard Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) model of uncertain lifetimes, in overlapping generations economy. Time is discrete. At any date a cohort of measure  $1 - \gamma$

households is born, where  $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$ . An individual household dies with probability  $1 - \gamma$  in each period, independent of age, so that  $\gamma$  is the probability of survival from one period to the next. Thus, the total population at any time  $t$  is  $\sum_{s=-\infty}^t (1 - \gamma)\gamma^{t-s} = 1$ . As in Blanchard's model, we assume a full annuities market, whereby savers get a premium on lending to cover their unintended bequests, and borrowers pay a premium to cover their posthumous debts. Let the utility of a cohort born at date  $v$ , evaluated from date 0 be defined as:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\beta\gamma)^t (\log C_{t,v} - v(H_{t,v}) + g(G_t)) \quad (1)$$

Here we define  $C_{t,v}$  as the consumption in time  $t$  of cohort  $v$ , and  $H_{t,v}$  is labor supply. Assume that  $v'(H_{t,v}) > 0$ ,  $v''(H_{t,v}) \geq 0$ . Households supply labour in all periods of life, but real wages are declining over an agent's lifetime in the manner suggested by Blanchard and Fischer (1989). We assume that the composite consumption good represented by  $C_{t,v}$  is differentiated across a continuum of individual goods, so that  $C_{t,v} = \left[ \int_{i=0}^1 C_{t,v}(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}$ , where  $\theta$  is the elasticity of substitution across individual brands. Households also derive utility from aggregate government spending, denoted  $G_t$ . Government spending is taken as given by each household, and utility from government spending is separable from utility of consumption  $C_{t,v}$ . We assume that  $g'(\cdot) > 0$ ,  $g''(\cdot) < 0$ .

We focus on a model without capital, so as to make the comparison with the standard neo-Keynesian DSGE model as clear as possible. Households have only one form of 'outside' savings instrument; government bonds. The budget constraint in time  $t$  for an agent born in time  $v \leq t$  is

$$P_t C_{t,v} + B_{t+1,v} = P_t w_{t,v} H_{t,v} + \Pi_{t,v} - T_{t,v} + \frac{(1+i_t)}{\gamma} B_{t,v} \quad (2)$$

Here  $B_{t+1,v}$  represent the nominal bond holdings of cohort  $v$ , and  $T_{t,v}$  represents their net tax liability to the government.  $P_t = \left[ \int_{i=0}^1 P_t(i)^{1-\theta} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$  is the consumer price index. Real wages in terms of the composite consumption good are denoted  $w_{t,v}$ , which are cohort-specific, as described below. Profits from firms are represented by  $\Pi_{t,v}$ . The presence of full annuity markets implies that rates of return are grossed up to cover the probability of death. To see this, note that in *aggregate*, savers will receive a return of  $\gamma * \frac{(1+i_t)}{\gamma} + (1-\gamma) * 0 = (1+i_t)$  on their bond holdings.

Maximizing utility subject to these two constraints gives the conditions:

$$\frac{1}{C_{t,v}} = E_t \frac{\beta\gamma}{C_{t+1,v}} \frac{(1+i_{t+1})P_t}{\gamma P_{t+1}} \quad (3)$$

$$v'(H_{t,v}) = \frac{w_{t,v}}{C_{t,v}} \quad (4)$$

Conditions (3)-(4) characterize optimal consumption and labor supply. In addition, the household must choose individual brands to minimize expenditure conditional on a given composite consumption. The familiar condition for the optimal brand choice is given by:

$$C_{t,v}(i) = \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P(i)} \right)^{-\theta} C_{t,v}$$

The Euler equation, in conjunction with the household budget constraint, can be represented in the ‘certainty equivalent’ representation<sup>3</sup>:

$$C_{t,v} = (1 - \beta\gamma) \left( \frac{(1+r_t)}{\gamma} b_{t,v} + E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \alpha_i (w_{t+i,v} H_{t+i,v} + \Pi_{t+i,v} + t_{t+i,v}) \right) \quad (5)$$

where  $1+r_t = \frac{(1+i_t)P_t}{P_{t+1}}$ ,  $t_{t,v} = \frac{T_{t,v}}{P_t}$ ,  $b_{t,v} = \frac{B_{t,v}}{P_{t-1}}$  and  $\alpha_t = \prod_{s=t}^{\infty} (1+r_s)^{-1} \gamma^{s-t}$ . In order to re-write (5) in the form of a dynamic equation in aggregate consumption, it is necessary to be more specific about the way in which wage income evolves over time. Assume that  $w_{t,v} = a_{t,v} w_t$ , and  $a_{t,v} = \bar{a} \phi a_{t-1,v}$ , where  $w_t$  is the economywide average wage,  $\bar{a}$  is a constant normalization, and  $0 \leq \phi \leq 1$ <sup>4</sup>. Thus, relative to the economy-wide average, the wage of each cohort declines over time. This captures, in a crude way, the declining human capital income profile coming from the fact of retirement, while still maintaining the ability to aggregate across cohorts that is central to the Blanchard-Yaari model. In the description of technology below, we will tie this wage differential to effective labour productivity differences across time. In addition, in order to allow for easy aggregation to an economy-wide consumption function, we assume that cohort-specific profits and taxes obey the same properties as wage income.

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<sup>3</sup>This representation ignores complications due to Jensen’s inequality, and is presented simply to give a heuristic account of the aggregation process. The analysis of the model is done by first order approximation however, and the solution of the aggregate model is exact at this order. Thus, the error has no consequences for the results below.

<sup>4</sup> $\bar{a}$  is chosen so that when the cohort specific wage is averaged across all currently alive cohorts, it equals the economy wide average wage. This requires that  $\bar{a} = \frac{(1-\gamma\phi)}{1-\gamma}$ .



### 3.2 Aggregation

To represent economy-wide outcomes, we need to aggregate across cohorts. One immediate aggregation difficulty arises from (4). Because a) households have different consumption levels, and b) each cohort has a different productivity of labor in production of final goods, it will not be possible to aggregate (4) across generations, in general. To proceed, we then make the following specific functional form assumption:

$$v(H_{t,v}) = \eta H_{t,v} \quad (6)$$

Thus, we assume that the disutility of work is linear in hours worked. In that case, we can aggregate (4) directly across all currently alive cohorts. This restricts the analysis somewhat, but has the appeal that it leads to a simple prediction for the impacts of monetary and fiscal policy shocks when nominal interest rates are positive, and when full Ricardian equivalence holds. The key question we address is how allowing for both of these features to be relaxed (zero-interest rates and non-Ricardian equivalence) together impacts on the effects of policy.

The assumption (6) allows us to write the aggregate labor supply condition as:

$$\eta C_t = w_t \quad (7)$$

The consumption expression (5) may be aggregated across cohorts to give:

$$C_t = (1 - \beta\gamma) \left( (1 + r_t)B_t + E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \tilde{\delta}_i (w_{t+i}H_{t+i} + \Pi_{t+i} - t_{t+i}) \right) \quad (8)$$

where now  $\tilde{\delta}_i = \prod_{s=t}^{t+i} (1 + r_s)^{-1} (\gamma\phi)^{s-t}$

In aggregate, the budget constraint for all households is:

$$B_{t+1} = (1 + r_t)B_t + w_t H_t + \Pi_t - t_t - C_t \quad (9)$$

Note that in the aggregate, there is no  $\gamma$  term in the flow budget constraint, since the risk premium just represents a transfer from one generation to another.

Then manipulating (8) and (9), we can write the aggregate Euler equation as:

$$C_{t+1} = \frac{\beta(1 + r_{t+1})}{\phi} C_t - \frac{(1 - \gamma\phi)(1 + r_{t+1})(1 - \beta\gamma)b_{t+1}}{\gamma\phi} \quad (10)$$

In contrast to the standard Ramsey model, in this model, the growth in aggregate consumption depends on both interest rates and aggregate wealth. When  $\phi\gamma < 1$ , and aggregate wealth is positive, aggregate consumption growth is lower than in the Ramsey model, be-

cause the average households is effectively less patient. Equivalently, a rise in the value of government debt generates a wealth effect which reduces desired aggregate savings.

### 3.3 Firms

Retail goods firms hire labor and capital in order to produce their individual brands, using the production function:

$$Y_t(i) = A_t H_t(i)^{1-\alpha} \quad (11)$$

where  $H_t(i) = \int_{j=0}^1 \sum_{s=t}^{-\infty} a_{t,s} H_t(i, s, j)$  is firm  $i$ 's composite employment. The expression  $H_t(i, s, j)$  represents the employment by firm  $i$  of household  $j$  of cohort  $s$ . Each household in a given cohort  $s$  has an identical effective labour productivity  $a_{t,s}$ , captured by the process described above. The idea is that labour of different vintages have different efficiencies, and since  $\phi < 1$ , labor income per unit of effort tends to decline over time, for each cohort. This is an important feature of the model, since it gives each generation a downward sloping income profile over their planning horizon. Effectively, it allows for a greater desire to save on the part of each cohort, and puts the model closer to the standard OLG model with working and retirement phases of life.

We abstract from capital accumulation, but allow for the presence of a fixed factor of production, so that  $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$ . Finally,  $A_t$  is a productivity term, common to all firms.

Retail firms are monopolistically competitive, and face an elasticity of demand given by  $\theta > 1$  in each period. Firms adjust their prices according to the usual Calvo assumption of a constant probability of price change,  $1 - \kappa$ , however long ago the previous price change was made. When they adjust their price, firms maximize discounted expected profits, where per period profits for each firm  $i$  are  $\Pi_t(i) = P_t(i)Y_t(i) - W_t H_t(i)$ . Thus, firm  $i$ 's expected discounted profit is written as:

$$V_t(i) = E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \delta_{t+j} \kappa^j \left[ P_{t+j}(i) Y_{t+j}(i) - W_{t+j}(i) \left( \frac{Y_{t+j}(i)}{A_{t+j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right]$$

where  $W_t = w_t P_t$  is the aggregate nominal wage, and the firm's demand function is  $Y_t(i) = \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} C_t$ . The profit maximizing price for firm  $i$ , setting its price at time  $t$  is then

$$\tilde{P}_t(i) = \frac{E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{\theta}{(\theta-1)(1-\alpha)} \delta_{t+j} \kappa^j W_{t+j}(i) \left( \frac{Y_{t+j}(i)}{A_{t+j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \delta_{t+j} \kappa^j Y_{t+j}(i)}. \quad (12)$$

Each newly price setting firm sets the same price. Then, using the law of large numbers, the price index is then  $P_t = [(1 - \kappa)\tilde{P}_t^{1-\theta} + \kappa P_{t-1}^{1-\theta}]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$ .

### 3.4 Fiscal authority

The fiscal authority has expenditure commitments arising from net transfers to households and direct government spending. For now, we do not separately consider nominal money balances in the model, so there is no direct measure of seigniorages revenues. Thus, the fiscal authority obtains revenue simply from net tax receipts  $T_t$  and nominal debt issue. The government budget constraint is given by:

$$T_t + P_t G_t = B_{t+1} - (1 + i_t)B_t \quad (13)$$

We allow for a number of different possible configurations of fiscal policy rules. One such rule is to take the path of government spending as exogenously given to the fiscal authority, and adjust the net transfer so as to achieve a given target for the debt to GDP ratio. Alternatively, net transfers could be adjusted so as to keep the government budget in balance in every period, maintaining a constant path of (real or nominal) government debt.

### 3.5 Monetary policy

Assume that the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule, given by:

$$i_t^R = (1 + \rho_t)(1 + \hat{\pi}) \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \frac{1}{1 + \hat{\pi}} \right)^{\sigma_\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{\widehat{Y}} \right)^{\sigma_y} - 1 \quad (14)$$

where  $\rho_t$  represents a desired path for the equilibrium real interest rate,  $\bar{\pi}$  represents a desired path for the inflation rate, and  $\widehat{Y}$  is the target level of aggregate output. We assume that  $\sigma_\pi > 1$  and  $\sigma_y > 0$ . This rule is somewhat unrealistic in that we do not allow for interest rate ‘smoothing’. This is not critical for the results, however.

The monetary authority can follow the rule (14) only when  $i_t^R > 0$  however. If the rule stipulates a negative nominal interest rate, then the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Thus, the path of nominal interest rates in the model must be governed by:

$$i_t = \max(i_t^R, 0). \quad (15)$$

### 3.6 Equilibrium conditions

Now, combining (9), (11), and (13) the aggregate resource constraint for the final composite good is:

$$A_t H_t^{1-\alpha} = Y_t = G_t + C_t \quad (16)$$

The zero lower bound condition (15) is usually thought of as a constraint on the short run behavior of monetary policy. But this is not necessarily the case. For instance, if the monetary authority has a long run target for inflation that is low enough, it is possible that the long run real interest rate is forced down to the level where the zero bound is a binding constraint. Although this has no consequences for the long run path of output, it does place a condition on the required path of real government debt. We explore this issue briefly in the next section.

## 4 Long run flexible price equilibrium

In a flexible price equilibrium (7) and (12) give the solution for equilibrium aggregate output:

$$\frac{\theta\eta}{\theta-1}(Y-G) = (1-\alpha)A^{1/(1-\alpha)}Y^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \quad (17)$$

From (17), the long-run government spending multiplier is given by

$$\frac{dY}{dG} = \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha+(1-g_y)\alpha} \quad (18)$$

where  $g_y \equiv \frac{G}{Y} < 1$ . The multiplier is increasing in the steady state ratio of government spending to GDP, but it must be no greater than unity.

Define  $b_y = \frac{b}{Y}$  as the long run government debt to GDP ratio. For a given value of  $g_y$ , the long run real interest rate is determined by the steady state version of (10):

$$\left(\frac{\beta(1+r)}{\phi} - 1\right) = \Phi(1+r)b_y \quad (19)$$

where  $\Phi \equiv \frac{(1-\gamma\phi)(1-\beta\gamma)}{\gamma\phi(1-g_y)}$ . The real interest rate is increasing in the steady state government debt-GDP ratio. In this model, without capital, government debt does not crowd out real investment, and has no effect on steady state aggregate output or consumption. But a higher  $b_y$  increases real interest rates, and tilts the profile of consumption of each generation towards the future.

The steady state nominal interest rate is obtained from (14), taking the desired real

interest rate  $\rho$  as constant.

$$(1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + \pi), \quad i > 0 \quad (20)$$

$$(1 + \pi) = (1 + r)^{-1}, \quad i = 0 \quad (21)$$

For a given target rate of real interest rate, inflation, and output, there may be more than one inflation rate satisfying these conditions, where  $i$  is defined by (15). For instance, one equilibrium is given by  $\pi = \hat{\pi}$ ,  $Y = \hat{Y}$  and  $i = \rho$ . But another equilibrium is given by:

$$i = 0, \quad \pi = [(1 + \rho)(1 + \hat{\pi})^{1 - \sigma_\pi}]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma_\pi}} - 1$$

Benhabib et al. (2002) were the first to demonstrate that Taylor rules will in general be associated with multiple equilibrium rates of inflation when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. Here we focus only on equilibria with positive inflation rates, where the steady state inflation rate is equal to the target rate  $\hat{\pi}$ <sup>5</sup>. In this economy, there is only one such equilibrium consistent with (19) and (15). Thus, we may re-write (20) as

$$(1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + \hat{\pi}), \quad i > 0 \quad (22)$$

$$(1 + \hat{\pi}) = (1 + r)^{-1}, \quad i = 0 \quad (23)$$

The two conditions (19) and (22) have separate interpretations, depending upon whether the nominal interest rate is positive or at the zero lower bound. When  $i > 0$ , the conditions determine  $i$  and  $r$  separately, for given  $\hat{\pi}$  and  $b_y$ . The steady state monetary rule (14) determines  $\hat{\pi}$ , while  $b_y$  is determined by steady state fiscal policy, consistent with (13), in conjunction with an appropriate transversality condition. Thus, monetary and fiscal policy can be thought of as independent in a steady state with  $i > 0$ . Moreover, there is a recursive structure such that the fiscal stance, summarized by the value of  $b_y$ , determines  $r$ , while the inflation target determines  $i$ .

But (19) and (22) may also be associated with an equilibrium where  $i = 0$ ; the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound. From (22), this can occur only if  $r < 0$ ; that is, if the economy is dynamically inefficient. From (19), dynamic inefficiency can occur, even when  $b_y > 0$ , when  $\phi < 1$ . If each cohort has a declining wage profile over time, the economy may be dynamically inefficient even if government debt to GDP is positive.

The behavior of the steady state under the zero lower bound is fundamentally different

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<sup>5</sup>This requires that the authority have a steady state target real interest rate equal to the real interest rate implied by (19), and a steady state target for output equal to that implied by (17).

from that with  $i > 0$ . Putting (19) and (22) together in the case when  $i = 0$ , we obtain the single relationship:

$$\pi^T = \frac{\beta}{\phi} - \Phi \frac{b_y}{1 - g_y} - 1 \quad (24)$$

Condition (24) defines the sense in which monetary and fiscal policy are interdependent in an economy at the zero lower bound<sup>6</sup>. If the government debt-GDP ratio is such that the equilibrium real interest rate is negative, then the target rate of inflation must be uniquely determined. Conversely, if the target rate of inflation is taken as given, then the debt-GDP ratio must be adjusted so as to achieve the equilibrium real interest implied by this target. Moreover, at the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the steady state is no longer recursive. A higher value of  $\pi^T$  implies a lower (more negative) real interest rate, and must be accompanied by a fall in  $b_y$ , holding  $g_y$  and all the other variables constant.

Figure 2 illustrates the trade-off implied by (24). In the Figure,  $\tilde{b}_y$  represents the value of the debt ratio for which  $r = 0$ , implied by (19). For  $b_y < \tilde{b}_y$ , the real interest rate is negative. Whether the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound depends on the inflation target. The schedule MF illustrates (24). For a given  $b_y < \tilde{b}_y$ , the lower is the inflation target, the more likely that the economy will be at the zero lower bound. MF describes the required values of  $b_y$  for each value of the inflation target, when the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound. Thus, in a steady state, there must be a negative relationship between government debt and the inflation rate, when the economy is at the zero lower bound<sup>7</sup>. Intuitively, the condition says that, in the long run, if monetary authorities are committed to low inflation targets, then low real interest rate episodes are likely to push them to the zero bound. If they continue to be committed by a low inflation target at the zero bound, then it really means that they are preventing the real interest rate from falling any further. This can only be done through giving up control of the outstanding stock of government debt. Equivalently, if the fiscal authority insists on reducing the stock of real debt in an environment where the real interest rate is pushed below zero, then the monetary authorities must accommodate this with a higher rate of inflation. In either case, with a permanent zero nominal interest rate, there must be a negative relationship between government debt and inflation.

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<sup>6</sup>Leeper (2010) provides an alternative view of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy even when nominal interest rates are positive, based on the interdependence implied by the public sector budget constraint.

<sup>7</sup>Beaudry, Devereux and Siu (2009) examine this restriction in a more complete dynamic growth model. Condition (24) abstracts from the possibility of bubble equilibria. When the real interest rate is negative, it is possible that other non-fundamental assets may be valued in equilibrium, so that total wealth would include both the value of government debt and the bubble asset.

## 5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Short-Run under a zero lower bound

We now turn to an analysis of the model in the short run, when prices adjust as in (12). As in Christiano et al. (2009), Woodford and Eggertson (2003, 2005), and Eggertson (2009), we wish to explore the usefulness of monetary and fiscal policy in responding to an environment where the economy has been pushed to a zero lower bound - that is, where the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero for some time period. Initially, we will just compare the differential effects of policy in the two environments - one where the nominal interest rate operates according to a standard Taylor rule and another where the nominal interest rate is zero. This gives us the basic contrasting results of this section. We later provide a quantitative comparison the usefulness of alternative monetary and fiscal policies in responding to the zero-lower bound constraint.

Under what circumstances should the policymaker face a zero interest rate constraint? As in the previous literature, we may think of this situation as generated by a large increase in the representative agents' discount factor, raising desired savings and pushing down the flexible price equilibrium real interest rate. If the policy maker follows a Taylor rule, as in (14), then the nominal interest rate may be pushed down to its lower bound. The increase in desired savings leads to a fall in aggregate demand and a fall in the output gap. The optimal response to this shock in normal times would be to reduce nominal interest rates so as to facilitate the required real interest rate adjustment. But when nominal interest rates are zero, they cannot be reduced further. How should policy respond? Two main answers have been offered in the literature. Krugman (1998), Jung et al (2005), and Eggertson and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of alternative monetary policy rules that may be used despite the fact that the interest rate is held at or near zero for some time. The common feature of of these proposals is that the policy maker should make an announcement about the conduct of monetary policy in the periods after the economy has left the zero bound region. If the authority announces that policy will remain loose even after the zero bound no longer binds, then it acts so as to lessen the deflationary impact of the current shock. The obvious difficulty with using monetary policy in this way is that the announcement must be credible for it to have any effect on current output and inflation. The policy-maker must follow a history- dependent rule, continuing to pursue monetary easing even after the conditions that warrant such easing have elapsed. Eggertson and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of targets for the monetary authority to follow that would replicate the optimal history dependent rule, but may be easier to communicate to the public.

The second main response to a zero lower bound trap is the use of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be used to directly influence aggregate demand in the traditional Keynesian manner, even when the monetary authority has no ability to reduce interest rates any further. Fiscal policy options for the zero lower bound trap are discussed by Christiano et al. (2009), Eggertson (2009), and Cogan et al. (2009).

One common characteristic of the previous literature analyzing the role of policy at the zero lower bound is that the models display Ricardian equivalence. Hence, the financing of government spending expansion has no role to play, and the real balance effects of monetary policy are not operative. In the recent policy discussion summarised in Section 1, however, the need to run government deficits, generated either by tax cuts or bond financed government spending increases, is seen as a paramount part of the stimulus package in all countries. The notion that the large fiscal expansions that are taking place in many countries could just as easily be financed with tax increases as with government deficits seems completely at variance with all policy discussion. Hence, it is important to be able to analyze the impact of fiscal deficits when interest rates are stuck at the zero lower bound, and to compare this with the case where interest rates are employed as part of a regular monetary policy. The advantage of using the current model is that we can separately analyze the role played by tax cuts and spending increases, and distinguish between debt financed and tax-financed fiscal expansion. In addition, we may analyze separately the real balance effects monetary policy, which can operate even at zero interest rates<sup>8</sup>.

## 5.1 Approximating the model under a Taylor rule.

In the case where nominal interest rates are positive and adjust according to (14), we have a standard New Keynesian model, save for the presence of government debt in the Euler equation (10). Using (10) and (16), we may approximate (10) as follows:

$$\widehat{Y}_{t+1} = \widehat{Y}_t + ((i_{t+1} - E_t\pi_{t+1}) + \widehat{\nu}_{t+1}) - \Phi\widehat{b}_{t+1} - E_t(\widehat{G}_{t+1} - \widehat{G}_t) \quad (25)$$

where  $\widehat{Y}_t = \log(\frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}})$ ,  $\widehat{G}_t = \frac{G_t - \bar{G}}{\bar{Y}}$ ,  $\widehat{\pi}_t = \log(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}})$ ,  $\widehat{b}_t = \frac{b_t - \bar{b}}{\bar{Y}}$ , and  $\Phi \equiv \frac{(1-\beta\phi)(1-\gamma\phi)}{\gamma\phi(1-g_y)}$ . The linear approximation is taken around an initial debt-GDP ratio equal to zero<sup>9</sup>, so that  $\bar{b} = 0$ . The government spending shock represents a deviation of government spending

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<sup>8</sup>Ireland (2005) emphasizes the ‘real balance effect’ of monetary policy, which can operate even when the nominal interest rate is zero. He does so in a purely flexible price model though, similar to the case of section 2 above.

<sup>9</sup>This facilitates the exposition. Allowing for non-zero debt ratios requires the interest rate to be an additional state variable, which makes the algebra more complicated, but does not substantially change the results so long as  $b_y$  is not too large. .



from the steady state level, relative to GDP. We are assuming that there is an optimal (flexible price equilibrium) level of government spending to given by  $\bar{G}$ , and movements in government spending here represent deviations from the optimum. The variable  $\widehat{\nu}_t$  represents a temporary shock to the discount factor, where we assume that the discount factor can be represented as  $\beta_t = \beta \exp(\nu_t)$ , and the steady state value of  $\nu$ , is set at zero;  $\bar{\nu} = 0$ . The departure from full Ricardian equivalence is governed by the composite coefficient  $\Phi$ , which depends on the steady state discount rate, the probability of survival, and the time path of labor income within each cohort.

The forward looking inflation equation follows in standard fashion from the first order approximation of (12) and the definition of the price index.

$$\pi_t = \lambda \left( \frac{\widehat{Y}_t - \widehat{G}_t}{1 - g_y} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \widehat{Y}_t \right) + \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} \quad (26)$$

where  $\lambda = \frac{(1-\kappa\beta)(1-\kappa)(1-\alpha)}{\kappa((1-\alpha)+\alpha\theta)}$ . The term in brackets represents the deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state level, given the assumptions on the disutility of labour for each generation.

The linear approximation of the interest rate rule is written as:

$$i_t^R = \rho + \bar{\pi} + \sigma_\pi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) + \sigma_y \widehat{Y}_t \quad (27)$$

In this section, we assume that  $i_t^R > 0$ , so that the interest rate always follows (27).

Finally, we take a linear approximation of the government budget constraint as follows:

$$\widehat{b}_{t+1} = (1 + r)\widehat{b}_t + \widehat{G}_t - \widehat{T}_t \quad (28)$$

where  $\widehat{T}_t = \frac{T_t - \bar{T}}{\bar{Y}}$ . Since we are approximating around an initial steady state with a zero debt-GDP ratio, this approximation does not depend on the first order dynamics of the real interest rate. On its own however, (28) will involve non-stationary dynamics in the government debt-ratio. To avoid this, we assume that the fiscal authority chooses a tax rule so that the dynamics of aggregate government debt to GDP are stationary, for given government spending movements. In particular, we assume that net taxes have a discretionary and an automatic component, such that:

$$\widehat{T}_t = \widehat{T}_{1t} + t\widehat{b}_t \quad (29)$$

where  $t$  is constant, and is chosen such that  $\omega = 1 + r - t < 1$ . This ensures that following

a temporary shock to government spending or the discretionary component of taxes which leaves the long run real primary deficit unchanged, the debt level will return to its steady state.

## 5.2 Shocks to the the discount factor

A natural way to think about policy being constrained by the lower bound on interest rates is that an increased desire to save drives down the equilibrium flexible price real interest rate. Under an inflation targeting monetary rule, this requires a fall in the nominal interest rate. The variable  $\widehat{\nu}_t$ , representing a shock to the discount factor, increases the ex-ante savings rate of all generations. Assume that  $\widehat{\nu}_t$  is governed by the process:

$$\widehat{\nu}_{t+1} = \mu\widehat{\nu}_t + \varepsilon_{t+1},$$

$E_t(\varepsilon_{t+1}) = 0$ . An increase in the discount factor leads to a persistent fall in the equilibrium real interest rate. Using the interest rate rule (27), the impact of the shock can be obtained from the solution to (25)-(29). The increase in the discount factor increases the desire to save, reducing aggregate demand, causing a fall in both output and inflation. The responses of output and inflation are given by:

$$\widehat{Y}_t = -\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta\mu)}{\Delta_\mu}\widehat{\nu}_{t+1} \quad (30)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = -\frac{z\kappa}{\Delta_\mu}\widehat{\nu}_{t+1} \quad (31)$$

where  $z = \frac{(1-\alpha g_y)}{(1-g_y)}$ , and  $\Delta_\mu = (1-\alpha)(1-\beta\mu)(1-\mu+\sigma_y) + \kappa(\sigma_\pi - \mu)z > 0$ .

The impact of a discount factor shock is cushioned by the endogenous response of interest rates. The higher the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap, the smaller is the effect of the shock. In the framework of optimal monetary policy as presented in Woodford (2003), a discount factor shock can be fully accommodated by an optimal monetary response that goes beyond the interest rate rule, reducing nominal interest rates by the extent of the shock itself, fully stabilizing output and inflation. But this requires that the authorities have sufficient leeway to adjust the nominal interest rate downwards. For large enough shocks, the zero bound on the interest rate may apply, and some alternative monetary or fiscal policy needs to be employed in order to respond to the shock. Before we analyze the response of the economy under a zero bound, however, we investigate the impact of fiscal policy shocks when the nominal interest rate is positive, and the economy operates

under the monetary rule (27).

### 5.3 Government Spending, Debt and Tax Shocks Under a Taylor Rule

The effects of government spending shocks in this type of model have been analyzed in a number of previous papers. The only difference here, relative to the previous literature, is the failure of Ricardian equivalence, and the effects of government debt accumulation. In order to highlight this difference, we first examine the impact of a one time shock to government debt. It is easy to solve (25)-(29) to show that the effect of a increase in  $b_t$  on output and inflation is as follows:

$$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta\omega)\omega\Phi\widehat{b}_t}{\Delta_\omega} \quad (32)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = \frac{z\kappa\omega\Phi\widehat{b}_t}{\Delta_\omega} \quad (33)$$

where  $\Delta_\omega = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta\omega)(1 - \omega + \sigma_y) + \kappa(\sigma_\pi - \omega)z > 0$ . An increase in government debt is perceived as an increase in wealth for currently alive cohorts. This leads to an increase in consumption, and a fall in desired saving. Current aggregate demand rises, leading to a rise in inflation. The rise in inflation increases the real interest rate, via the interest rate rule, partly offsetting the impact of the higher debt on current output. The greater the response to inflation or the output gap in the interest rate rule, the greater the increase in the real interest rate, and the smaller the impact on output and inflation. Note also that the impact of a debt shock depends on the persistence in government debt generated by the government budget constraint. If the debt-sensitive tax rule is such that an initial debt shock is very transitory (i.e.  $\omega$  very low), the impact on output or inflation is small.

We can now focus on the effects of government spending and taxes. To provide a benchmark comparison with the Ricardian equivalence case, we focus first on a government spending expansion financed by a tax increase - that is, we calculate the balanced budget multiplier.

Assume that both discretionary taxes and government spending increase by the same amount. In both cases, assume that after the initial increase, both discretionary taxes and spending converge back to their steady state levels at the rate  $\mu$ . Then, from (25)-(29), we may compute that:

$$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{(1 - \alpha) [(1 - \mu)(1 - \beta\mu) + \kappa(\sigma_\pi - \mu)/(1 - g_y)] \widehat{G}_t}{\Delta_\mu} \quad (34)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = \frac{\alpha\kappa(1-\mu) - (1-\alpha)\sigma_y/(1-g_y)}{\Delta_\mu} \widehat{G}_t \quad (35)$$

The first thing to note about (??) is that it is independent of  $\Phi$ , the coefficient on government debt in the aggregate Euler equation. The balanced budget multiplier is the same as that of the standard Ricardian equivalence model, because the policy has no consequences for the evolution of government debt. In addition, it is easily seen that the multiplier is less than unity. That is:

$$\text{Sign}\left(\frac{\widehat{Y}_t}{\widehat{G}_t} - 1\right) = -\text{Sign}[(1-\beta\mu)(1-\alpha)\sigma_y + \alpha\kappa(\sigma_\pi - \mu)] < 0.$$

Even though prices are sticky and adjust only slowly in face of changes in aggregate demand, the balanced budget multiplier is actually less than that of the purely flexible price equilibrium multiplier. The key reason is that under the (27) monetary policy rule, the real interest rate increases so much in response to a rise in fiscal spending (financed by taxation) that aggregate private consumption falls. Only in the special case of constant returns in production ( $\alpha = 0$ ), and no output gap in the interest rate rule ( $\sigma_y = 0$ ) will the multiplier be exactly unity - equal to that of the flexible price equilibrium.

This suggests that if the nominal interest rate is free to adjust and follows a standard rule (27), government spending is a particularly inefficient way to stimulate the economy. The most that a fiscal expansion can do is to leave aggregate private consumption unchanged, and in general consumption will fall. Equivalently, we can say that government spending expansion increases output, but output actually falls below the level it would attain in a flexible price equilibrium, in face of the same balanced budget government spending increase.

The impact of a balanced budget government expansion on inflation is given by (35). If  $\sigma_y = 0$  and  $\alpha = 0$ , the inflation rate is unchanged, because output responds exactly as in a flexible price equilibrium. With constant returns ( $\alpha = 0$ ) and  $\sigma_y > 0$ , inflation will *fall*, since output is below the flexible price equilibrium.

We now turn to the analysis of a tax cut in the model with an interest rate rule. A temporary discretionary tax cut will increase the primary government deficit and cause a persistent increase in government debt. How will this affect GDP? From (25)-(29) we can establish that:

$$\widehat{Y}_t = -\Phi \frac{(1-\alpha)^2(1-\beta\omega)(1-\beta\mu)(1+\sigma_y) - (1-\alpha)\kappa z(\beta\omega(\sigma_\pi - \mu) - \sigma_\pi(1-\beta\mu))}{\Delta_\mu \Delta_\omega} \widehat{T}_t \quad (36)$$

Note that with Ricardian equivalence, where  $\Phi = 0$ , this is negative by definition. For  $\Phi > 0$ , we would anticipate that the expression on the right hand side of (??) is negative

(tax increases are contractionary). Interestingly however, this is not necessarily true in this model. Take the case where  $\mu$  and  $\omega$  are very close to unity (tax cuts are highly persistent, and the deficit is closed only very slowly). Then expression (??) is positive for  $\sigma_\pi > 1$ , and therefore a cut in taxes will *reduce GDP* in the economy where the interest rate follows a Taylor rule!

What is the explanation for this? The reason is that, for  $\sigma_\pi$  greater than unity, and sufficiently large, a tax cut causes a large offsetting increase in interest rates, due to its inflationary effects. The impact of a tax cut on current inflation is always positive, and given by:

$$\hat{\pi}_t = -\kappa z \Phi \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 + \sigma_y - \beta \omega \mu) + \kappa z \sigma_\pi \hat{T}_t}{\Delta_\mu \Delta_\omega} \quad (37)$$

A very persistent tax cut signals a persistent increase in future government debt, which causes the forecast of future inflation to rise, increasing current inflation, and leading to a rise in current interest rates. This secondary effect can be actually large enough to reduce aggregate demand and lead to a fall in output. Thus, again, we may conclude that during ‘normal times’, when the nominal interest rate follows a conventional rule of the type given by (14), tax cuts are unlikely to be an effective stabilization tool.

Note that we have not yet given a quantitative analysis of the effects of tax cuts and government spending policies in this model. In the discussion of the calibrated model below, we show that for both policies, the multiplier effects of government spending and tax cuts (even if the latter are positive) are likely to be quite low.

## 5.4 Fiscal policies under a zero lower bound.

Now assume that the shock to the discount factor is large enough to push the economy into a liquidity trap - the nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound<sup>10</sup>. In this case, the dynamics of the economy are fundamentally different. The effects on inflation and the output gap both of the initial shock as well as the impact of policy measures to counter the shock operate through substantially different channels when the policy interest rate cannot respond.

In section 2 above, we analyzed the properties of a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound. By contrast, here we will focus on a situation where the lower bound constraint is temporary; the rise in the discount factor dissipates over time,

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<sup>10</sup>In order to ensure that the approximations remain accurate at the zero lower bound, it is necessary to place restrictions of the size of the discount factor shock which places to economy at the bound. See Eggertson and Woodford (2003).

and the economy's real interest rate returns to its steady state. In a crude way, this captures the impact of an aggregate demand shock coming from an unanticipated temporary rise in the savings rate<sup>11</sup>.

To make the analysis concrete, we follow Eggerston and Woodford (2003, 2005) and Eggertson (2009) in assuming that the discount factor shock drives the economy to the zero lower bound for an uncertain number of periods. We assume a one time shock to the discount factor that continues with probability  $\mu$  per period. So in each future period, the discount factor reverts to the steady state with probability  $1 - \mu$ . In the intervening time, the discount factor is at its post-shock level, and is sufficiently high that the policy implied by the original interest rate rule would require a zero interest rate. As in Eggerston and Woodford (2003,2005), Eggerston (2009), and Christiano et al. (2009), we investigate both the impact of the original shock, as well as the impact of an alternative series of monetary and fiscal policies when the economy operates at the zero interest rate bound.

Solving the model (25)-(29) when  $i_t^R = 0$ , under the assumption that the shock reverts back to steady state with probability  $1 - \mu$ , we obtain the impact of the discount rate shock on the output gap and inflation as:

$$\widehat{Y}_t = -\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta\rho)}{\Delta_\mu^z} \widehat{v}_{t+1} \quad (38)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = -\frac{z\kappa}{\Delta_\mu^z} \widehat{v}_{t+1} \quad (39)$$

where  $\Delta_\mu^z = (1-\alpha)(1-\beta\mu)(1-\mu) - \kappa\mu z$ . A condition for stability is that  $\Delta_\mu^z > 0$ <sup>12</sup>. Note however that  $\Delta_\mu - \Delta_\mu^z = (1-\alpha)(1-\beta\mu)\sigma_y + \sigma_\pi\kappa\mu z > 0$ . Hence in comparing (30) and (38), the impact of a rise in the discount factor on both inflation and the output gap is larger in an economy constrained by the zero lower bound. This is not surprising, and follows as a converse argument to the logic presented above, outlining the response of inflation and the output gap under an interest rate rule. Since the nominal interest rate cannot respond, the fall in demand leads to a fall in output, which reduces inflation, and given the persistence of the shock, the fall in anticipated inflation leads to a rise in the real interest rate, a further

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<sup>11</sup>In the case of a permanent zero lower bound, the conditions for a unique stable path of adjustment of inflation, output and government debt are not always met. In particular, in the Ricardian equivalence version of this model (when  $\Phi = 0$ ), the conditions for uniqueness in the zero interest rate case are not met for familiar reasons (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999). But with  $\Phi > 0$  and allowing for a non-zero initial nominal government debt, there is a 'real balance effect' which may be sufficient to restore uniqueness (Ireland 2005), even if the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero forever. Nevertheless, because we are primarily concerned with the analysis of short run stabilization policies, we follow the recent literature and analyze the (somewhat more realistic) case of a temporary liquidity trap.

<sup>12</sup>See Eggertson (2009).

fall in demand, and a larger fall in output. So long as  $\Delta_\mu^z > 0$ , this process converges, but to a much lower level of output than would occur under a positive interest rate rule.

How do monetary and fiscal policies operate when the interest rate is zero? Again, we focus on the importance of debt and deficit related policies, given that the key aspect of the analysis is the failure of Ricardian equivalence. In order to make the analysis simple and easily comparable with the previous section, we initially make the special assumption that the fiscal policies enacted during the period where the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound are eliminated completely when the constraint is no longer binding, and the economy then reverts immediately to its steady state. This involves the assumption that at the period of the return to positive interest rates, taxes are raised so as to eliminate completely the accumulated government debt that resulted from the fiscal policy expansions. Hence, that the government debt buildup from its initial steady state (or zero) is wiped away, and debt reverts back to zero in the period following the return to positive interest rates. This allows the economy to return to a steady state. This assumption makes the algebraic comparison with the previous section very simple, but it is not a critical feature of the argument. We explore an alternative case below, where the accumulated debt is only gradually eliminated, following the return to a path of positive nominal interest rates. There we see that all of the points made in this section still remain valid. In fact, because the accumulated debt continues to be treated as net wealth by the cohorts who hold it after the return to positive interest rates, this alternative path of convergence make the impact of current fiscal policies even stronger.

First, we may analyze the impact of an arbitrary rise in government debt, in a manner similar to (32) and (33) above.

$$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta\omega\mu)\omega\Phi\widehat{b}_t}{\Delta_{\omega\mu}^z} \quad (40)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = \frac{z\kappa\omega\Phi\widehat{b}_t}{\Delta_{\omega\mu}^z} \quad (41)$$

where  $\Delta_{\omega\mu} = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta\mu\omega)(1 - \omega\mu) - \kappa\mu\omega z$ . Again, for stability, it is necessary that  $\Delta_{\omega\mu} > 0$ .

As in the case of a positive nominal rate, an increase in government debt leads to a rise in the output gap and a rise in the inflation rate, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails ( $\Phi > 0$ ). The quantitative impact may be greater or less than (32) and (33). On the one hand, the nominal interest rate does not respond here, leading to a larger impact on both inflation and the output gap. However, in this experiment, the interest rate rule reverts back to

(14) with probability  $1 - \mu$ . In the quantitative analysis below, it is shown that the effects of increasing government debt may be greater or less during a liquidity trap than under a positive interest rate rule.

If a rise in the discount factor has a greater negative impact on the output gap in a liquidity trap, it is reasonable to consider that compensating fiscal policies would also be more powerful in their ability to stabilize the economy, since an expansion in government spending or a tax cut in this environment does not elicit automatic interest rate responses that limit the extent to the fiscal instruments. In this vein, Christiano et al. (2009) and Eggerston (2009) show that government spending policies may have significantly higher multiplier effects in a liquidity trap than during normal times. But again, their analysis was confined to the situation of full Ricardian equivalence, where a balanced budget expansion in government spending is identical to a debt financed expansion. We now wish to revisit this question, allowing for debt versus tax financed spending policies to have different effects. As a corollary, we can investigate, as we did above for the case outside the liquidity trap, the effect of tax cuts compared to government spending expansions.

Using (25)-(29) we can establish that a *balanced budget* increase in government spending has the following impacts on the output gap and inflation.

$$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{(1 - \alpha) [(1 - \mu)(1 - \beta\mu) - \mu\kappa/(1 - g_y)]}{\Delta_\mu^z} \widehat{G}_t \quad (42)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = \frac{\alpha\kappa(1 - \mu)}{\Delta_\mu^z} \widehat{G}_t \quad (43)$$

$(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta\mu)(1 - \mu) - \kappa\mu z$ . From (42) we see that the multiplier effect on output exceeds unity whenever  $\alpha(1 - g_y) > 0$ . Hence, the balanced budget government spending multiplier is always greater in a liquidity trap than in the case where the nominal interest rate is positive and responds according to a Taylor rule. But it is not necessarily true that the multiplier is large. When  $\alpha = 0$ , the multiplier is exactly unity - a balanced budget expansion has no impact at all on private consumption. In addition, we note that the inflationary effects of a balanced budget increase in spending also exceed those under the Taylor rule. This is for two reasons - first, in the absence of endogenous interest rate adjustment to the output gap (i.e.  $\sigma_y = 0$ ), the multiplier impacts of shocks are greater in the zero lower bound economy anyway, since  $\Delta_\mu^z < \Delta_\mu$ . But in addition, when  $\sigma_y > 0$ , as we saw in expression (34) above, the interest rate response to a government spending increase in the Taylor rule economy will mitigate the impact on inflation in a way that is not present in the zero lower bound economy.



In the economy with the Taylor rule, we saw paradoxically that a tax financed spending increase could be more or less expansionary than the equivalent increase financed by deficits. In the recent rounds of stimulus packages enacted in many countries, an important feature of the spending policies was that they were specifically not financed by tax increases but by debt issue. In fact, an essential part of the rationale behind the intervention was to combine spending increases with tax cuts so as to stimulate overall spending. When nominal interest rates cannot be lowered further, this was seen as the last possible channel for stabilization policy. Again however, in the context of our framework, this only makes sense if Ricardian equivalence fails. To examine this argument, we now focus on the effects of tax cuts in the model constrained by the zero lower bound. Again, using (25)-(29), we can derive the responses of the output gap and inflation as:

$$\widehat{Y}_t = \frac{-\Phi(1-\alpha)[(1-\alpha)(1-\omega\mu)(1-\beta\omega\mu) + \beta\omega\mu^2z]}{\Delta_\mu^z \Delta_{\omega\mu}^z} \widehat{T}_t \quad (44)$$

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = -\kappa\Phi \frac{z(1-\alpha)(1-\beta\omega\mu^2)}{\Delta_\mu^z \Delta_{\omega\mu}^z} \widehat{T}_t \quad (45)$$

The expression in (44) is always negative. Hence, in contrast to the case with positive interest rates, tax cuts are always expansionary at the zero lower bound, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails. Tax cuts increase private sector wealth, leading to a fall in private saving and an increase in aggregate demand and output. Tax cuts also increase the growth of government debt. At the same time, tax cuts are also inflationary, as the output gap increases in response to the increase in aggregate demand, as confirmed by (45). Unlike the case where the Taylor rule applies, however, there is no compensating increase in the policy interest rate resulting from the increase in inflation. This allows the possibility that tax cuts may be substantially more expansionary in the economy stuck at the zero lower bound. In order to assess the validity of the arguments for deficit financing as an important tool of stabilization, however, we must turn to a quantitative assessment of the strength of these effects.

## 5.5 Quantitative Comparison of Policies

How big are the effects of fiscal policy in the economy within a liquidity trap? We take the calibration presented in Table 4. The parameter values are quite standard and follow the assumptions made in the recent literature in this area, save for the particular assumptions we have made so as to allow for aggregation in the OLG model (log utility, and linear disutility of leisure). We look at two versions of each model, one with constant returns to scale, and

another with decreasing returns to labor, assuming that  $\alpha = 0.3$ . In the first model, we follow Christiano et al. (2009) in setting the discount factor is 0.99, and the Calvo price adjustment is parameter  $\kappa$  at 0.85, so that  $\lambda = 0.028$ . In the second version, with  $\alpha = 0.3$ , the definition of  $\lambda$  is different, so we choose  $\kappa$  at a different value (0.7), and  $\theta = 10$ , so as to reproduce  $\lambda = 0.025$ . We initially set the parameters of the interest rate rule at  $\sigma_\pi = 1.5$  and  $\sigma_y = 0$ , but we also look at variations on these settings. In addition we set the steady state government spending ratio equal to 0.15, approximately the relevant value for the US economy.

The parameters governing the cohort time-horizon are very important in assessing the degree to which government deficits have any affect on real allocations. It is well known that if the household planning horizon in the Blanchard Yaari model is too great, then the results are quantitatively equivalent to a model with an infinite horizon (e.g. Evans 1991). As a result of this, the quantitative literature exploring the impacts of deficits using the Blanchard Yaari model have usually interpreted the probability of death in a broader manner than that implied by straightforward demographic data. Bayoumi and Sgherri (2008) directly estimate the Blanchard Yaari parameters from a reduced form consumption function coming from the model, and find estimates of  $\gamma$  below 0.8 at an annual frequency. This implies a five year horizon to the consumers in their planning decision. We choose  $\gamma$  to match this at the quarterly frequency. As regards the parameter  $\phi$ , governing the rate of earnings decline over the lifetime, we have little direct evidence to match this. We simply take as a rough estimate the fact that agents spend about two third of adult lives working and one third retired, so we set  $\phi = 0.6$ . In combination with the assumption for  $\beta$ , these assumptions imply that  $\Phi$  is about 0.011 at the quarterly frequency. We should note that this calibration is not guaranteed to enlarge the impact of government deficits. Even with these assumptions on the planning horizon and wage distribution, we will show that the effects of deficits under a Taylor rule are very slight.

The parameter  $\mu$ , governing the number of periods for which it is anticipated that the zero lower bound on interest rate will apply, is a critical feature of the dynamics. If this is too large, then the stability condition is not satisfied. We set  $\mu = 0.8$ , so that nominal interest rates are anticipated to be zero for 5 quarters<sup>13</sup>. To make the comparison with the economy under the Taylor rule, we also assume that all shocks in that case have persistence equal to 0.8.

Table 5 presents quantitative results comparing the effects of policies under the Taylor

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<sup>13</sup>This is not a necessary feature of the solution. It would be possible to allow the zero lower bound to be operative for a finite but known number of periods, after which the economy converges back to steady state. In this case, the duration of the zero interest rate phase could be extended arbitrarily.

rule in comparison with the economy constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates. In the baseline calibration, we see that the impact of a discount factor shock in the economy at the zero lower bound is orders of magnitude more than that of in the economy operating under a Taylor rule. This shock increases the desire to save, reducing current demand and output and inflation. In the economy operating under a Taylor rule, the nominal interest rate will fall, leading to a fall in the real interest rate, reducing the incentive to save. The equilibrium real interest rate falls. By contrast, when the nominal interest rate cannot respond, the way the increased desired savings is satisfied in equilibrium is for current output to fall relative to expected future output. But the fall in current output leads to a fall in current inflation, which raises the real interest rate, increasing the desire to save. When  $\mu < 1$ , and the stability conditions on the model under the zero lower bound are satisfied, this process has an eventual equilibrium leading to a very large fall in current output.

The second panel of Table 2 illustrates the impact of fiscal policies in both interest rate scenarios, under the baseline calibration with  $\alpha = 0$  (constant returns to scale). In both cases, the balanced budget multiplier is unity. Even though the impact of demand shocks is potentially much greater in the zero lower bound economy, in which the real interest rate may respond pathologically, this is a case in which a demand shock requires no real interest rate responses at all. When the government spending expansion is financed by current taxation, there is no consequence at all for government debt. Output responds one for one to the expansion both in the current period and all future periods in which the expansion continues. Consumption is unaffected. As a result, there is no need for the real interest to move. Thus, under this calibration, the zero lower bound has no implication at all for the effects of balanced budget fiscal expansions (although as we see below, this conclusion may be substantially altered with different monetary rules or decreasing returns to scale).

Now take the same calibration, but assume that the government spending expansion is deficit financed. This leads to a simultaneous increase in government spending and government debt. The rise in government debt leads to a wealth induced increase in private consumption, as in the aggregate, households choose to save less. As a result, the government spending multiplier exceeds unity in both the economy with positive and zero interest rates. But the scale of the responses differs dramatically between the Taylor rule economy and the zero lower bound economy. In the Taylor rule case, the expansion in aggregate demand causes an increase in inflation which leads to a rise in the real interest rate. This substantially reduces the impact of government debt on private consumption. The government spending multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to only 1.07 in the economy with deficit financing.

In the economy constrained by the zero lower bound, the inflation generated by the increased government spending leads to a fall in the real interest rate. This substantially increases the government spending multiplier. In the baseline case, the multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to approximately 2 under deficit financing of government spending. Thus, while tax-financed government spending has no additional expansionary effects in a liquidity trap, deficit financed spending is far more expansionary. When the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound, there is a very large difference in the predicted effects of fiscal expansions depending on whether they are financed with debt or with taxes. Deficit spending has a much greater impact on output than tax financed spending.

An immediate corollary of these results is that the impact of pure tax cuts, holding the path of government spending fixed, is substantially different in the Taylor rule economy to that constrained by the zero lower bound. In the first case, tax cuts generate an expansion by increasing private wealth, and raising aggregate household saving. Although the economy does not exhibit Ricardian equivalence under the Taylor rule, the scale of the response to tax cuts is very small. A tax cut of 1 percent of GDP generates an increasing in output of only 0.08 percent of GDP. Hence as a first approximation, the economy with a Taylor rule has negligible departures from Ricardian equivalence, and tax reductions have little stimulatory effect.

By contrast, at the zero lower bound, the tax cuts have a very big effect. A tax cut of 1 percent of GDP lead to an increase in output equal to about 1 percent of GDP - the tax multiplier is unity. Tax cuts, even though they leave the presented discounted value of tax government tax revenues unchanged, lead to an increase in perceived lifetime wealth or currently alive generations. This increases current demand and output. But this in turn leads to an increase in inflation, which causes a fall in real interest rates, further increasing present aggregate demand.

One aspect of the model that seems somewhat counterfactual is the responses of inflation in a zero lower bound. Since in the model, inflation is purely forward looking, fiscal policies can generate substantial effects on inflation, even in a liquidity trap. In fact, the effects of fiscal policies on inflation are greater with zero interest rates than the responses under a Taylor rule. We could improve the performance of the model in this respect by introducing some backward looking elements into the inflation process.

Table 6 also provides some alternative calibrations. In particular, if the interest rate rule is extended to allow for the output gap, setting  $\sigma_y = 0.25$ , a value close to empirical estimates, then the multiplier impact of all shocks on the output gap is scaled down in the economy

governed by the interest rate rule, but the results under the zero lower bound are completely unaffected. The impact of a discount factor shock on output is smaller, because nominal and real interest rates respond more to the shock. The government spending multiplier is also reduced, because real interest rates rise by more in response to the shock. Interestingly, the government spending shock is now deflationary, because the fall in household consumption causes a fall in real marginal costs. In addition, note that tax cuts become even less expansionary in this case than in the baseline calibration.

Table 7 illustrates the case with decreasing returns to scale, setting  $\alpha = 0.3$ , approximately the measure of capital income share, with the alternative calibration for  $\kappa$ . The impact of shocks on output is altered significantly under both interest rate scenarios. Under a Taylor rule, the impact of both discount factor shocks and fiscal shocks on the output gap is reduced. The reason is that, with decreasing returns to scale, the effect of the output gap on inflation is magnified. This precipitates greater compensating responses of nominal and real interest rates, reducing the real effects of shocks. Again, the government deficit spending multiplier is less than unity, and the impact of tax cuts is only half that of the baseline case.

By contrast, the introduction of decreasing returns dramatically magnifies the effects of government spending policies in the economy with a zero lower bound. The balanced budget multiplier now increases to 1.9. The deficit spending multiplier is 3.6, and the tax cut multiplier is 1.8. In this case, the fiscal expansions have a larger effect on inflation, as marginal cost is more responsive to output movements. This leads to bigger negative effects on real interest rates, generating a much bigger expansion in equilibrium output.

To some extent, the very large responses of real variables under the zero lower bound is generated by the absence of capital in the model. It would be interesting to extend the model to allow for endogenous capital accumulation. The results of Christiano et al. (2009) however suggest that this would not alter the main message of the paper - there is likely to be a very big difference between tax financed spending and debt financed spending in an economy where the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero.

One assumption we have made is that all the accumulated debt during the zero lower bound phase is immediately retired following a return to positive interest rates. This makes the comparison of the two cases of positive and zero interest rates simple to present. What if we make the alternative assumption; that the debt is retired gradually according to the rule described by (29)? In that case, it turns out that the multiplier effects of debt are larger than under the baseline case above. This is described in Table 8. While the balanced budget multiplier is still unity, the deficit financing multiplier is over 3, and the tax cut multiplier is

over 2. Because debt is expansionary, even in an economy with positive interest rates, the expectation of higher debt in the future is even more expansionary. Note however, unlike the previous case, where the impacts of fiscal policy under the zero lower bound did not depend at all on the parameters of the interest rate rule, these effects will be influenced by the rule. The more sensitive is the interest rate to the inflation rate or the output gap in the future, after the Taylor rule has been restored, the smaller will be the multiplier effects of current debt financed government spending or tax cuts.

## 5.6 Monetary policy options

In the standard New Keynesian model discussed by Christiano et al. (2009), Woodford and Eggerton (2003, 2005), Eggertson (2009), monetary policy has no direct leverage once the economy is at the zero lower bound, since monetary policy is described completely by the use of an interest rate rule. In this case, the only way monetary policy can be used in a liquidity trap is by the announcement of an expansionary monetary policy to follow, after the economy returns to positive nominal interest rates. These policies have been explored extensively by Woodford and Eggerton (2003) and by Jung et al. (2005). In the current model however, there is an additional lever of monetary policy, coming from a ‘real balance’ effect<sup>14</sup>. The monetary authority can print currency or increase bank reserves, and by doing so increase the size of public sector liabilities. At the zero lower bound, this is equivalent to issuing debt. Since the experiment we have looked at above consisted of issuing debt to finance tax cuts (or spending expansion) which is retired once the economy returns to a positive nominal interest rate, it turns out that the impact of a debt financed tax cut described above is in equivalent to to a policy of increasing the money base in order to finance fiscal transfers to the private sector, and then having this operation reversed once the economy returns to a positive nominal interest rate. Thus, to the extent that deficit financing of tax cuts is an effective macroeconomic tool in dealing with a zero interest rate environment, this is also true of a monetary policy expansion as described in this way<sup>15</sup>.

Quantitatively however, it is immediately obvious that the real balance effect cannot be of significance in affecting real GDP. For instance, take a monetary policy operation which directly increases M1, through increasing the money base. In the US, money base has more than doubled in the last two years as a result of the emergency procedures put in place by the Fed. But the total net wealth effects of this are negligible since even after the recent

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<sup>14</sup>See Ireland (2005) for an analysis of this lever of monetary policy in an OLG model with flexible prices.

<sup>15</sup>Note that this is not equivalent to an ‘unconventional’ monetary policy whereby the Central Bank purchases private sector obligations with government debt. Our model does not have enough heterogeneity or the presence of risk premia to allow for a complete analysis of such an operation.

operations, M1 and Money base represent very small fractions of total US private sector net wealth. Thus, the impact of monetary operations via direct real balance effects alone would be small fractions of the debt multipliers reported in Tables 4-8. As a result, while in principle the model allows for a real balance effect of monetary policy, practically speaking, even in a liquidity trap, increasing monetary aggregates alone would have very small effects, as measured by the present model.

## 5.7 Conclusions

This paper has analyzed the impact of government spending, tax cuts, and government deficits in an economy where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates. We show that government spending financed by deficits may be far more expansionary than that financed by tax increases in such a situation, even if the difference between the two modes of financing is small during ‘normal’ times, when the policy rate is governed by a Taylor rule. From a different perspective, the paper makes the case that tax cuts alone may be highly expansionary in a liquidity trap, even if they have almost no impact on aggregate demand during normal times. The results have some substantial implications for the recent debate about the design of fiscal stimulus programs to respond to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. It has been argued that successful fiscal stimulus requires direct government spending rather than tax cuts. The results here suggest that deficit financed tax cuts alone can be quite successful in targeting aggregate demand. To the extent that a large part of the downturn in the real economy came from a substantial increase in the savings rate, pushing the equilibrium real interest rate below zero, the increase in government debt provided by tax cuts may be seen as directly providing a vehicle for saving on the part of the private sector. This stems the deflationary forces and prevents the perverse response of real interest rates following the initial shock.

One important issue that has not been analyzed is the welfare consequences of fiscal policy. There are a number of subtle and difficult features associated with welfare evaluation in the present model. First, the model allows for dynamic inefficiency, which in this context, implies that the steady state net real interest rate may be negative. In that case, it is well known that an increase in government debt can be Pareto improving. But this argument is not relevant for the analysis of section 5, since the fall in real interest rates in our experiment is a temporary phenomenon. Secondly, an analysis of welfare in the present model would be limited because the model does not incorporate capital accumulation. Hence, the standard crowding out effects of government debt on the long run capital stock is absent in the analysis. As shown in section 4 above, government debt has no impact on steady state

output or consumption, but simply increases the steady state real interest rate, tilting the time profile of spending for each generation. Thus, it is likely that the first order effects of government debt on steady state welfare would be missing from the analysis.

Nevertheless, there is still a possibility for increasing welfare through various fiscal policy instruments when the economy is in a liquidity trap. In particular, Christiano et al (2009) show that in a liquidity trap, an increase in direct government spending above the flexible price optimum value of spending can increase welfare. Pursuing this analysis in our model is more difficult, because we do not have a natural social welfare function with which to compare utilities across generations. Calvo and Obstfeld (1989) demonstrate that if a government in the Blanchard Yaari economy has access to a full menu of redistributinal fiscal instruments, the social welfare function in the economy becomes equivalent to that of the Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model. In that case, we can directly apply the results of Christiano et al. (2009) to establish that government spending expansion could increase welfare in our model, when the economy is in a liquidity trap. But in such an environment (i.e. using the results of Calvo and Obstfeld 1989), there is no longer a deviation from Ricardian equivalence, so the main focus of interest in the present paper would be lost. Analysis of the impact of short run stabilization policy on welfare while incorporating departures from Ricardian equivalence would require both a social welfare function which takes into account intergenerational heterogeneity, as well as a means of taking an approximation to this function along the lines of Eggertston and Woodford (2003). Clearly the full exploration of short run welfare trade-offs in the present model represents an interesting research question. Nevertheless we defer such an analysis to future research.

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Table 1				
	2009 stimulus		Total Stimulus	
	%(2008)GDP	Tax Cut	%(2008)GDP	Tax Cut
Argentina	1.3	0	1.3	0
Australia	0.8	47.9	1.8	41.2
Brazil	0.3	100	0.5	100
Canada	1.5	40.4	2.8	45.4
China	2.1	0	4.8	0
France	0.7	6.5	0.7	6.5
Germany	1.5	68	3.4	68
India	0.5	0	0.5	0
Indonesia	1.3	79	2.5	79
Italy	0.2	0	0.3	0
Japan	1.4	30	2.2	30
Korea	1.4	17	2.7	17
Mexico	1	0	1	0
Russia	1.7	100	1.7	100
Saudi Arabia	3.3	0	9.4	0
South Africa	1.3	0	2.6	0
Spain	1.1	36.7	4.5	36.7
Turkey	0	N/A	0	N/A
UK	1.4	73	1.5	73
US	1.9	44	5.9	34.8

Source: Prasad and Sorkin, 2009

Table 2				
Overall Fiscal Balance (percentage of GDP)				
	2007	2009	2010	2014
Argentina	-2.1	-3.9	-2.4	-1.7
Australia	1.5	-4.3	-5.3	-1.1
Brazil	-2.8	-3.8	-1.2	-1
Canada	1.6	-4.9	-4.1	0
China	0.9	-3.9	-3.9	-0.8
France	-2.7	-8.3	-8.6	-5.2
Germany	-5	-4.2	-4.2	0
India	-1.2	-10.4	-10.0	-.8
Indonesia	-1.2	-2.6	-2.1	-1.3
Italy	-1.5	-5.6	-5.6	-5.3
Japan	-2.5	-10.5	-10.2	-8
Korea	3.5	-2.8	-2.7	2.6
Mexico	-1.4	-4.9	-3.7	-3.1
Russia	6.81	-3.6	-3.2	2.2
Saudi Arabia	15.7	5	10	14.5
South Africa	1.2	-4.4	-4.7	-2.5
Turkey	-2.1	-7.0	-4.3	-4.8
UK	-2.6	-11.6	-13.2	-6.8
US	-2.8	-12.5	-10	-6.7
Source: IMF, 2009				

Table 3				
General Government Debt, Gross (percentage of GDP)				
	2007	2009	2010	2014
Argentina	67.9	60.5	58.1	46.4
Australia	9.8	16.9	22.7	27.8
Brazil	66.8	68.5	65.9	58.8
Canada	64.2	78.2	79.3	68.9
China	20.2	20.2	22.2	20
France	63.8	78	85.4	96.3
Germany	63.4	78.7	84.5	89.3
India	80.5	84.7	85.9	78.6
Indonesia	35.1	35.1	31.2	27.1
Italy	103.5	115.8	120.1	128.5
Japan	187.7	218.6	227	245.6
Korea	29.6	34.9	39.4	35.4
Mexico	38.2	47.8	47.9	44.3
Russia	7.4	7.2	7.7	7.2
Saudi Arabia	18.5	14.5	12.5	9.3
South Africa	28.5	48.1	49.6	52.8
Turkey	39.4	48.1	49.6	52.8
UK	44.1	68.7	81.7	98.3
US	61.9	84.8	93.6	108.2
Source: IMF, 2009				

Table 4	
$\beta$	0.985
$\phi$	0.011
$\lambda$	.028, .025
$\alpha$	0, 0.3
$\sigma_{\pi}$	1.5
$\sigma_y$	0, 0.25
$\bar{g}_y$	0.15
$\mu$	0.8

Table 5					
Taylor Rule Model					
Shock					
	$\hat{v}$	$\hat{b}$	$\hat{G}$	$\hat{G}-\hat{T}$	$\hat{T}$
$\hat{Y}$	-3.2	0.04	1.07	1	-.07
$\hat{\pi}$	-.05	0.01	0.07	0	-.07
$\hat{R}$	-.36	0.01	0.03	0	-0.03
Zero Lower Bound Model					
Shock					
	$\hat{v}$	$\hat{b}$	$\hat{G}$	$\hat{G}-\hat{T}$	$\hat{T}$
$\hat{Y}$	-13.8	0.05	2.01	1	-1.01
$\hat{\pi}$	-2.68	0.01	0.23	0	-0.23
$\hat{R}$	2.15	-0.0	-0.19	0	0.19

Table 6					
Taylor Rule Model $\sigma_y=0.25$					
Shock					
	$\hat{v}$	$\hat{b}$	$\hat{G}$	$\hat{G}-\hat{T}$	$\hat{T}$
$\hat{Y}$	-1.75	0.02	.59	.56	-.03
$\hat{\pi}$	-.3	0.01	-0.04	0	-.035
$\hat{R}$	-.36	0.01	0.035	0	-0.035

Table 7					
Taylor Rule Model $\alpha=0.3$					
Shock					
	$\hat{v}$	$\hat{b}$	$\hat{G}$	$\hat{G}-\hat{T}$	$\hat{T}$
$\hat{Y}$	-3.0	0.032	0.94	0.89	-0.05
$\hat{\pi}$	-0.57	0.01	0.1	0.03	-0.07
$\hat{R}$	-0.72	0.01	0.027	0	-0.027
Zero Lower Bound Model					
Shock					
	$\hat{v}$	$\hat{b}$	$\hat{G}$	$\hat{G}-\hat{T}$	$\hat{T}$
$\hat{Y}$	-21	0.06	3.62	1.86	-1.76
$\hat{\pi}$	-4.0	0.01	0.58	0.215	-0.36
$\hat{R}$	4.14	-0.01	-0.6	-0.21	0.39

Table 8					
Zero Lower Bound Model (gradual debt elimination)					
Shock					
	$\hat{v}$	$\hat{b}$	$\hat{G}$	$\hat{G}-\hat{T}$	$\hat{T}$
$\hat{Y}$	-13.7	0.12	3.72	1	-2.72
$\hat{\pi}$	-2.68	0.02	0.635	0	-0.635
$\hat{R}$	2.15	0.02	-0.533	0	0.533





Figure 2