

This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research

Volume Title: The American Economy in Transition

Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, ed.

Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Volume ISBN: 0-226-24082-7

Volume URL: <http://www.nber.org/books/feld80-1>

Publication Date: 1980

Chapter Title: Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas

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Chapter URL: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11296>

Chapter pages in book: (p. 101 - 182)

2 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas

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Experience, some people say, is like a light on a caboose, illuminating only where we aren't going. But we scrutinize the past for its elements of prologue, and consolation. [George F. Will, 1979]

2.1 Introduction

The main issues in current discussions of macroeconomic theory and policy are very different from those of the late 1940s. Most shifts in economic opinion can be traced to the impact of changing events on ideas. For example, in some cases the evolution of the economic aggregates helped to decide a debate between schools of thought. In other cases events occurred that could not be understood within the context of existing paradigms and required the invention of new explanations.

The most useful framework for an analysis of postwar changes in macroeconomics is the familiar *microeconomic* dichotomy between demand and supply. Most questions in macroeconomics can be usefully divided between issues concerning (a) the determinants and control of aggregate demand and (b) those concerning aggregate supply, that is,

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This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation and is part of the NBER's research program in economic fluctuations. I am grateful to Jon Frye for research assistance, and to Martin N. Baily, Alan Blinder, Robert Eisner, Arthur M. Okun, Edmund S. Phelps, Joan Robinson, and Robert M. Solow for their helpful suggestions. Readers should note that the extensive references to "M2" in the text refer to the old definitions, not the new, more comprehensive definitions introduced in January 1980.

the factors that influence the division of changes in aggregate demand between prices and real output. In the early postwar years macroeconomics was almost exclusively concerned with the explanation of aggregate demand within a Keynesian framework that emphasized the need for an activist fiscal policy to offset the instability of private spending. By the end of the 1970s concern with demand management had been pushed aside by two central supply issues—that of explaining and controlling inflation and that of determining the causes and cures of the secular slowdown in the growth of aggregate labor productivity that had occurred in the past decade.¹

Until 1973 the central area of macroeconomic controversy was the determination and control of aggregate demand. Two main issues were the subject of debate: the relative potency of monetary and fiscal policy and the case for the activist use of discretionary policy as contrasted with a nonactivist policy stance relying on rules. Opinions on the first question shifted almost continuously, from the heavy emphasis on fiscal policy and low regard for monetary policy common in the late 1940s, to an intermediate view that incorporated both monetary and fiscal policy in discussions of the late 1950s and early 1960s, to a common tendency after 1968 to doubt the potency of fiscal policy and assign a strong causal role for monetary changes as initiating fluctuations in aggregate demand growth.

The debate between activists and nonactivists revolved around three further issues: differing beliefs in the inherent stability of private spending, differing beliefs in the potency of price flexibility as an automatic self-correcting force to offset the impact of instability in spending, and differing degrees of trust or distrust in the feasibility of stabilizing government policy actions. The fiscal-monetary and activist-nonactivist debates revolved around logically separate sets of issues. It would have been possible, for instance, to believe that monetary policy was potent and fiscal policy impotent to control aggregate demand, and yet still be in favor of activist monetary policy intervention. Nevertheless, American economists tended to coalesce around either a fiscal-activist or monetary-nonactivist position, with the adjective “Keynesian” often applied to the first group and “monetarist” to the second. Because they tended to believe in the potency both of money’s impact on spending and of price flexibility as an automatic stabilizing mechanism, monetarists tended to put more emphasis than Keynesians on variations in monetary growth as the most important cause of variations in the inflation rate, as summarized in Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (1963).

During most of the period before 1973 the intellectual tide shifted in a monetarist direction, both toward a belief in the potency of money and in the defects of policy activism. But since 1973 the advent of supply shocks as a major destabilizing force has caused the monetarist

tide to ebb. Supply shocks not only erode the case for the monetarist "rule" that money should grow at a constant rate, but they also open up a new role for fiscal policy in the form of cost-oriented changes in taxes and subsidies to counteract the effect of supply shocks on the overall price level. One element of the monetarist credo—distrust of government actions—remained strongly intact as the decade of the 1970s drew to a close, since the major impact of tax changes had thus far been to raise costs and prices and aggravate economic instability.

A review of the interaction between macroeconomic events and ideas over the 1947–79 era can be organized either by topic or by chronological period. This paper begins by comparing the behavior of important aggregate variables across four subperiods of the postwar era in order to identify the major changes that call for an explanation and that have been the source of changing ideas and doctrines. Subsequently the four subperiods (1947–57, 1957–67, 1967–73, and 1973–79) are examined in more detail. For each interval we identify the economic ideas about which there was a consensus at the beginning of the period, then examine major economic events and trace the impact of unexpected changes on the evolution of theory, policy, and private behavior. We regularly take advantage of historical hindsight by forming judgments on policy mistakes and the desirability of alternative policy actions.

2.2 Essential Features of the Postwar Era

The most important features of the postwar era are well known. In contrast to the century before World War II, the postwar economy has been characterized by much less instability in real output and unemployment together with a tendency toward chronic and persistent inflation. The growth of aggregate demand has been both faster and more stable during the postwar years, with no instance after 1949 in which annual nominal GNP growth actually declined. On the supply side, the responsiveness of prices to fluctuations in nominal GNP growth has gradually diminished (Cagan 1975), and price movements have more and more exhibited sluggish and inertia-dominated behavior that inhibits policy-makers from ending inflation through restrictive demand-management policies. Although the willingness of Americans to accept continuing inflation might seem astonishing to a visitor from earlier eras, the dominance of decentralized nonsynchronized wage-setting institutions has given households and firms every incentive to protect themselves against inflation rather than take unilateral action to stop inflation.

2.2.1 The Demand Side

Major features of the postwar era can be traced with the aid of table 2.1, which compares growth rates and ratios of important economic aggregates across seven subperiods spanning the interval between 1923

Table 2.1 Summary of Interwar and Postwar Developments in the American Economy

	1923- 29	1929- 41	1941- 47	1923- 47	1947- 57	1957- 67	1967- 73	1973- 79b	1947- 79b
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
I. Annual Growth Rates during Interval									
A. The Demand Side									
1. Nominal GNP	3.3	1.6	10.9	4.3	6.7	6.0	8.6	10.1	7.5
a. money (M2)	4.1	2.5	15.2	5.9	2.8	5.8	8.6	8.7	5.9
b. velocity of M2	-0.8	-0.9	-4.3	-1.6	3.9	0.2	0.0	1.4	1.6
2. Real GNP ^a	3.1	1.9	2.8	2.4	3.8	4.0	3.4	2.3	3.5
a. nondurable consumption	3.4	1.0	3.9	2.3	2.9	3.7	2.1	3.0	3.3
b. durable consumption and residential investment	1.0	0.5	5.3	1.8	4.3	3.9	7.6	1.7	4.3
c. nonresidential fixed investment	4.4	-1.7	8.3	2.3	3.0	4.6	4.0	1.7	3.5
d. federal expenditures	4.9 ^a	19.5	-6.7	9.3	9.5	3.4	-4.3	0.4	3.2
e. state and local expenditures	4.9 ^a	0.8	0.9	1.9	6.0	5.8	3.6	1.9	4.8
3. Real government transfers to persons	9.1	9.8	17.8	11.6	3.5	7.4	10.0	5.1	6.2
B. The Supply Side									
1. "Natural" real GNP	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.0	3.3
2. Real GNP	3.1	1.9	2.8	2.4	3.8	4.0	3.4	2.3	3.5
3. Real GNP in private business sector	3.5	1.8	2.9	2.5	3.5	4.5	3.7	2.5	3.6
a. hours	1.1	-0.3	1.1	0.4	0.3	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.1
b. output per hour	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.1	3.2	3.2	2.1	0.8	2.5
4. GNP deflator	0.2	-0.3	8.1	1.9	2.9	2.0	5.2	7.8	4.0

Table 2.1—continued

	1923- 29 (1)	1929- 41 (2)	1941- 47 (3)	1923- 47 (4)	1947- 57 (5)	1957- 67 (6)	1967- 73 (7)	1973- 79b (8)	1947- 79b (9)
II. Average Values during Interval									
A. Utilization Variables (Percentage)									
1. Real GNP "gap"									
a. mean	1.2	22.4	-7.6	9.6	0.8	0.8	-0.9	3.1	1.0
b. standard deviation	2.3	10.7	13.5	16.0	4.1	3.0	2.4	2.7	3.3
2. Unemployment rate									
a. mean	3.5	17.4	2.9	10.3	4.3	5.3	4.7	6.8	5.1
b. standard deviation	1.1	6.3	2.9	8.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.4
B. Other Ratios									
1. Nonresidential fixed investment/GNP	11.2	6.6	5.5	7.5	9.7	9.7	10.2	10.2	9.9
2. Government expenditures/GNP	8.8	17.2	34.3	19.4	22.6	26.4	29.7	31.3	26.8
a. goods and services	8.1	14.7	31.4	17.2	18.5	20.8	21.8	20.9	20.3
b. transfer payments	0.7	2.5	2.9	2.2	4.1	5.6	7.9	10.4	6.5

^a Breakdown of federal and state-local expenditures unavailable in 1920s.

^b 1979 figures refer to the second quarter.

and 1979. The averages for all series before 1947 are shown in column 4, and since 1947 in column 9. The table first examines variables relevant for the determination of aggregate demand growth and then examines the growth of nominal GNP from the supply side. Finally, several ratios are shown, including the mean and standard deviation of the GNP gap and the unemployment rate, as well as the share of investment and government spending in GNP.

It is easiest to think of "aggregate demand" as final sales measured in current dollars, or "nominal final sales." This concept is equal to nominal GNP minus inventory change. Because inventory changes are unimportant over the long intervals examined in table 2.1, line I.A.1 shows the growth rates of nominal GNP itself. It is evident that nominal GNP since 1947 has grown at almost double the rate of the earlier 1923-47 period, and that the difference is even more pronounced if World War II is ignored. Another important feature is the similarity of the growth rates of nominal GNP in the first two postwar subperiods, followed by a substantial acceleration during each of the last two subperiods. Thus, rapid and accelerating growth in aggregate demand stands as one of the most important features of the postwar era.

When we search for an explanation of the four percentage point acceleration in nominal GNP growth between the second and fourth postwar subperiods, we find in the next line that most can be accounted for by an acceleration in the growth of the money supply (the *M2* definition). But the behavior of the money supply is of no help at all in explaining the overall difference between the pre-1947 and post-1947 growth rates of nominal GNP, since monetary growth was exactly the same in the latter period as in the former. Thus an understanding of the reasons for the more rapid postwar growth of aggregate demand cannot simply point to the behavior of money but rather must be based on a more complete explanation in which monetary and nonmonetary factors interact.

The gradual shift in the emphasis on money in explanations of aggregate demand behavior in the last fifteen years reflects a transition in the relationship between nominal GNP and money that occurred at the same time. The postwar era began with monetary explanations in low repute, not a surprising development in light of the loose relation between nominal GNP and monetary growth, particularly in the immediate prewar years 1937-40.² During the first decade of the postwar period money played a relatively small role in explaining movements in nominal GNP, and the popularity of the Keynesian multiplier paradigm reflected this fact, with money a mere sideshow forced in most models to exert its full influence on spending through a narrow interest rate channel. But the simultaneous acceleration in nominal GNP and monetary growth begin-

ning in the 1960s gained many new advocates of the notion that money is the prime mover in the determination of aggregate demand.

The traditional multiplier models are built by a "bottom up" procedure that begins with components of spending. Economic instability originates with "autonomous" components of demand, while a major portion of consumption is "induced" and plays the passive role of an obedient child. The motivation for an activist fiscal stabilization policy is rooted in the belief that consumption fluctuations amplify rather than dampen the inherently unstable behavior of autonomous spending. Section I.A.2 of table 2.1 illustrates the erratic growth rate of nonresidential fixed investment in the pre-1947 period that provided the impetus for the dominance of Keynesian thinking, particularly the decade-long cessation in the growth of investment in the 1930s following the ebullient experience of the 1920s.

While nonresidential fixed investment has exhibited substantial fluctuations on a year-to-year basis throughout the postwar years, the *average* growth rates during the first three postwar subperiods exhibit a remarkable stability. In fact consumer investment (line I.A.2.b) has been less stable than business investment (line I.A.2.c), although the growth of both slumped after 1973. Before 1973 federal government expenditure was the primary source of instability across subperiods in the postwar era. In contrast to the 1930s when expanding government expenditures helped to fill the void left by the collapse of investment, postwar fluctuations in government spending have been an autonomous source of instability, largely in connection with the Korean and Vietnam war episodes.

The growing size of government has been associated in recent years with many evils. Thus it is surprising that when federal spending on goods and services is combined with that of state and local government, we find at the bottom of table 2.1 (section II.B) that their *share* in GNP exhibited no increase at all between the 1957-67 decade and the most recent 1973-79 subperiod, after the enormous growth in the share that occurred between the 1920s and the Korean War. The same section at the bottom of the table shows the remarkable stability of the average share of business investment, in contrast to the instability of the share during the interwar years.

If the share of government spending on goods and services has not increased in the 1970s, why has so much public attention been focused on the increasing role of government? The answer lies on the bottom line of the table (II.B.2.6) in the continuous and steady increase in the ratio of transfer payments to GNP, which has swollen from a mere 0.7 percent in the 1920s to more than 10 percent during 1973-79. Combining goods and services with transfer payments, we find that the total

share of government spending has increased from 8.8 percent during the 1920s to over 30 percent in the 1970s.

While the increased importance of government has debatable allocative consequences, there can be no doubt that the greater size of government has helped to stabilize the level of economic activity. When real income begins to fall, corporate and individual income tax revenues drop even faster, while transfer payments are either maintained in the case of social security or rise in the case of unemployment benefits and welfare payments. Thus, leaving aside its own contribution to instability during the Korean and Vietnam wars, government has introduced an inertia into the quarter-to-quarter changes in spending that may have made a greater contribution to stability than the commitment to discretionary activism embodied in the Employment Act of 1946.³

2.2.2 The Supply Side

Two of the most important measures of the nation's economic performance are real GNP and the unemployment rate. Throughout the postwar era both have been explicit targets of policymakers, and the actual level of each variable has been compared in public policy discussions to target values for each. In the early postwar years this target of policy was called "full employment," although policymakers did not set specific numerical goals for the unemployment rate or real output. Then in the Kennedy-Johnson era an official "interim full-employment unemployment rate" of 4.0 percent was adopted, and Okun (1962) devised a simple method to calculate the "potential" real GNP that was compatible with this numerical unemployment target. No specific behavior of inflation was predicted to accompany the state of full employment; as we shall see, economists in the late 1940s differed regarding the compatibility of full employment and price stability, while the post-1958 Phillips curve framework explicitly warned that a modest but chronic inflation might accompany the achievement of full employment.

Milton Friedman's landmark presidential address (1968), together with two insightful papers by Phelps (1967; 1968) warned that there was an equilibrium unemployment rate that was independent of the inflation rate and outside the control of aggregate demand policy. Friedman's label for this equilibrium condition, the "natural" unemployment rate, was gradually adopted in policy discussions to mean the unemployment rate below which inflation would continuously accelerate.⁴ Statistical studies found that the "natural" unemployment rate was higher than the previous 4.0 percent target and had risen considerably after 1963. Although in government documents the corresponding level of real GNP is still called "potential GNP," the overly optimistic record of past official potential GNP estimates, together with considerations of symmetry, suggest that the output which the economy is capable of pro-

ducing at the natural rate of unemployment be called "natural real GNP," as on line I.B.1 of table 2.1.⁵

Since 1923 the growth of natural real GNP has fluctuated in a narrow range, rising from its minimum annual rate of 2.5 percent achieved in the 1920s to its maximum of 3.7 percent during 1967-73. Actual real GNP grew somewhat more slowly than natural real GNP during the 1923-47 period and slightly faster thereafter, mainly reflecting the evaluation that 1947 did not represent a year of full utilization of capacity.⁶ As is shown next in the table, the modest slowdown in the growth of actual real GNP in the 1970s masks a greater deceleration in the growth rate of labor productivity (output per hour), due to the fact that hours have grown rapidly since 1967 while productivity growth has slackened off. The causes of this slowdown in secular productivity growth have eluded economists and stand as one of the major unexplained macroeconomic puzzles.⁷

The inevitable consequence of the acceleration of nominal GNP growth during successive postwar subperiods, combined with the slowdown in real GNP growth, has been an acceleration of inflation that has exceeded in magnitude the acceleration in nominal GNP growth. The entire postwar period has been characterized by a steady rise in prices that has no precedent in the history of the previous two centuries and is made even more remarkable by the observation that the consumer price level was no higher in 1940 than in 1778 (David and Solar 1977, p. 16). While the acceleration of inflation in the 1960s appears to be largely the result of faster monetary growth, the further upsurge in the 1970s cannot be explained solely by the behavior of the money supply.

Inflation, however, cannot be treated merely as a "residual" that by definition equals the difference between nominal GNP and real GNP growth; the acceleration of nominal GNP growth and deceleration of real GNP growth in the 1970s were not two completely independent and exogenous processes. Real output behavior can be influenced by the inflation rate through at least two routes. First, for any given growth rate of nominal GNP, more rapid inflation cuts real GNP growth and tends to induce a recession, reducing the ratio of actual to natural real GNP. Second, inflation has effects on the growth rate of natural real GNP itself, especially when most tax legislation is stated in nominal terms. Inflation tends to raise the real effective corporate tax rate, thus curbing the incentive to purchase business plants and equipment. Through this and other channels, inflation may be partly responsible for the decline in the growth of productivity and in real natural GNP during the latter part of the 1970s, although recent studies indicate that the slowdown in investment explains only part of the productivity story.

The final section (II) of table 2.1 displays means and standard deviations of two measures of the utilization of resources, the "gap" between

actual and natural output, and the unemployment rate. These measures contrast the enormous waste of resources during the 1929–41 decade with the much more intensive and stable utilization experience of the postwar years. The closeness of the subperiod mean values of the gap before 1973 to a zero value and the reduction of its standard deviation after 1977 is evident. The subperiod unemployment rate figures have tended to drift upward during the postwar years, reflecting the gradual shifting of the estimated natural unemployment rate used in the definition of natural real GNP, i.e., the unemployment rate considered compatible with the maintenance of stable inflation. An apparent anomaly (to be explored below) is the marked acceleration of inflation after 1973 despite a relatively slack utilization experience; this suggests either that the true level of natural real GNP may be even lower than assumed in the table, or that there is more to the avoidance of inflation than achieving a zero real GNP “gap.”⁸ For instance a supply shock can simultaneously boost the inflation rate and cause a contraction in real output relative to natural output.⁹

The higher and more stable level of the utilization of resources in the postwar years has been accompanied not just by faster inflation on average, but also by less variability of prices than in earlier decades. Although prices could be counted upon to fall in prewar recessions, there has been no actual decline in the GNP deflator (measured as a four-quarter change) since 1949. Just as the greater role of government has introduced an inertial tendency into aggregate demand behavior, so the greater confidence by firms and workers that severe setbacks will be avoided has led to an inertial tendency in United States wage and price behavior.

Several important shifts in events and ideas stand out in this initial review of postwar trends. First, the increased correspondence between the growth rates of nominal GNP and money, in contrast to their much looser connection before 1947, helps to explain the emergence of monetarism and the diminished emphasis on the simple multiplier framework for the analysis of demand fluctuations. Second, the growth in the size of government after 1947 was mainly reflected in transfer payments rather than goods and services. Increases in transfers, and in the taxes that finance them, both have contributed to economic stability and to taxpayer resistance that has recently increased support for conservative politicians. Third, after 1967 the growth of labor productivity decelerated markedly, with the growth in natural real GNP buoyed only by rapid growth in hours. Together with the relatively high and stable level of utilization of resources achieved during most of the postwar period, the emergence of rapid inflation naturally shifted concern among economists and laymen from finding cures for unemployment to coping with inflation and its consequences. The role of supply shocks in contributing

to the high and unstable inflation rate of the 1970s, together with the slowdown in secular productivity growth, created a tilt in the concern and attention of economic thinking toward aggregate supply problems from the dominance of aggregate demand issues that characterized macroeconomics in the postwar years until the mid-1960s.

2.3 The First Postwar Decade, 1947–57

2.3.1 The Conceptual Framework

The central paradigm of macroeconomics as it emerged from the Second World War was the Keynesian multiplier theory and its endorsement of an activist fiscal policy to overcome the inherent instability of private investment. Monetary theory lurked in the shadows, ignored by most economists except in academic exercises based on the simplified Hicksian IS-LM apparatus that allowed an instructor to demonstrate how a low interest elasticity of investment or a high interest elasticity of the demand for money could render monetary policy impotent to cope with a depression.¹⁰

The major event that had discredited monetary policy was the juxtaposition between early 1938 and late 1940 of a weak economic recovery, explosive monetary growth, complete price rigidity, and a short-term interest rate that had dropped close to zero. Despite a monetary growth rate that was rapid and constant between early 1938 and late 1941, the economy's recovery floundered until defense spending began in earnest in late 1940, after which real GNP suddenly jumped by almost 20 percent in a single year, a chronology that ingrained a deep-seated belief in the potency of fiscal policy and the "pushing on a string" analogy for monetary policy. The acceptance of Keynesian doctrine led in turn to a retrospective deemphasis on the role of monetary factors in the Great Contraction of 1929–33, a view that now appears largely accurate for 1929–31 but seriously misleading for 1931–33.¹¹

By current standards monetary policy received little attention in the contemporary literature of the late 1940s. Money was not ignored totally, and many economists took note of the fact that the quantity of nominal money had tripled between 1940 and 1945. The enormous wartime increase in the quantity of money might not avert a postwar depression, however, because the experience of the late 1930s had demonstrated that "idle currency and idle bank deposits do not bid up prices. Someone has to spend to do this. The amount of cash and other liquid assets possessed by the public constitutes only one of the factors that influence the rate of the public's spending" (Seltzer 1945, p. 832). Nevertheless, despite the loose connection between money and income, "there is great risk that the deflationary effects of a radical rise in inter-

est rates might be so severe as to throw the whole economy into a crushing business depression" (p. 844).

This curious inconsistency, with a monetary expansion viewed as impotent and a monetary contraction viewed as too dangerously potent to risk, helped to maintain support for the Federal Reserve's policy of pegging the government bond rate in the late 1940s. Memories looked back not only to the period of monetary impotence in the late 1930s, but also the period after World War I when the economy plunged into a sharp recession in 1920 despite the doubling of the nominal money supply during the war. So great was the influence of the 1919–21 experience (and earlier postwar deflations) that the panel of business economists surveyed by Joseph Livingston (Carlson 1977, p. 33) expected a postwar deflation for six successive semiannual forecasts despite the rapid price increases that occurred through the end of 1948:

<i>Survey Date</i>	<i>Livingston Panel Expectation of 12-Month CPI Change</i>	<i>Actual Change over Following 12 Months</i>
June 1947	—6.64	8.09
December 1947	—0.03	5.82
June 1948	—1.52	0.02
December 1948	—2.48	—3.00
June 1949	—5.58	—1.43
December 1949	—2.25	3.68

In retrospect the exaggerated fears of a postwar depression, with predictions of eight million postwar unemployed common during 1945, reflected a failure to notice a crucial difference between the World War I and World War II experience. While the *nominal* money supply doubled between 1915 and 1920, price controls were sufficiently weak to allow the GNP deflator also to double, leaving the *real* money supply in 1920 slightly below its 1915 value. Controls on prices during World War II were tight enough to limit the 1940–45 increase in the GNP deflator to 30 percent, thus allowing the *real* quantity of money almost to double. As a result the postwar inflation was both inevitable and necessary to achieve a reduction in real balances. Similar statements can be made about the real public debt, which more than tripled between 1940 and 1945. In the context of the swing in opinion from the Keynesian to monetarist paradigm in the late 1960s, we might note that greater attention to the distinction between real and nominal magnitudes would have been helpful in the 1940s as well.

Issues involving aggregate supply received much less attention than those involving the determination and control of aggregate demand. Implicit or explicit in most discussions of aggregate supply was a knife-edge model describing an economy that suffered from either a "deflationary

gap” or an “inflationary gap” but was rarely at the delicate point of balance between them. The “gap” terminology was itself ambiguous because a “deflationary gap” was accompanied not by deflation of prices but rather by unemployment and fixed prices. Once again the experience of the late 1930s had been influential, particularly the period between mid-1938 and mid-1940 when an unemployment rate exceeding 15 percent was accompanied by virtually complete price stability.¹² The willingness to assume fixed prices in underemployment cut off the private economy’s automatic stabilizing rudder and led to the automatic conclusion that government intervention was necessary to avoid high unemployment.

Inflationary gaps occurred mainly as the result of wars and could be illustrated on the Keynesian multiplier diagram as the consequence of fiscal expansion.¹³ The possibility that unemployment and inflation might coexist in a normal situation was only rarely considered; the Phillips curve was still a decade in the future. The unfortunate coincidence of high unemployment and rising prices in the 1933–37 recovery had not been adequately explained or integrated into the basic Keynesian analytical framework.¹⁴ On the other hand, the notion that full employment would bring a transition to an inflationary condition led to considerable concern about the definition of full employment itself. An incorrect estimate of the knife-edge might lead to a “vicious spiral of wages and prices.”¹⁵

Perhaps on no topic does hindsight make the state of economic thinking in the late 1940s seem as archaic as in the area of productivity and economic growth. Productivity growth was not viewed primarily as the wellspring of economic progress, but rather as a source of unemployment. Excessive productivity growth was cited as explaining the paradox that in 1940 and 1941 the United States economy produced substantially more than in 1929 but had a much higher level of unemployment.¹⁶ It was little noticed that the same increase in productivity that had occurred in the 1930s made possible an increase in real private GNP per hour in 1946 of 43 percent over 1929, the last previous peacetime year with an unemployment rate below 4 percent. From our uncomfortable vantage point in the early 1980s with a trend rate of productivity growth of barely one percent, the ability of the economy to generate a two percentage point rate of increase in productivity between 1929 and 1941 must remain something of a mystery in light of the low rate of fixed investment that occurred during the 1930s. Contemporary critics who blame our poor productivity performance on government regulation and on the negative impact of inflation on the incentive to invest stemming from our nonindexed tax system must wonder how productivity managed to grow during the 1930s at double the rate of 1973–78 in spite of an investment/GNP ratio only two-thirds as large.

The lack of attention to productivity and long-term economic growth reflected the obsession with the possibility of underutilized resources and the doubt that the economy could remain along a full-employment path.¹⁷ The enormous achievements of the United States economy during the war must also have impressed economists and others with the high *level* of productive efficiency in the United States economy, particularly in contrast to war-ravaged Europe and Japan. Thus supply constraints and productivity slid well down on the list of economic concerns and became relegated to specialized courses in defense economics.

2.3.2 Major Surprises of the First Postwar Decade

Demand Fluctuations

Major events in the first postwar decade were roughly consistent with the Keynesian multiplier theory of aggregate demand fluctuations. As illustrated in figure 2.1a, where four-quarter rates of change of nominal GNP and money (*M2*) are compared for the 1947–58 interval, monetary growth was much less volatile than that of nominal GNP, so that shifts in nominal GNP were almost entirely accounted for in an arithmetic sense by shifts in velocity. In the context of the theoretical IS-LM paradigm, economic instability stemmed from movements of the IS curve back and forth along a relatively fixed LM curve.

The Korean War was overwhelmingly the most important source of economic instability during the 1947–57 decade. The unexpected North Korean invasion on 24 June 1950 added an explosion of defense spending on top of an already healthy recovery from the 1949 recession. While the Korean War was a *political* surprise, its economic consequences were similar to those of World War II and provided no impor-




Fig. 2.1a

tant reason to question prevailing economic doctrine. Surely the greatest *economic* surprise of the first postwar decade was the failure of anything resembling a postwar depression to occur, with mild postwar recessions in 1949 and 1954 roughly duplicating in magnitude the minor setbacks of 1924 and 1927. In retrospect the high postwar level of real balances and real government debt was probably the major factor that prevented the long-awaited postwar depression from occurring. Monetarists might note that the downturn in the four-quarter *M2* growth rate in 1948:2 occurred two quarters prior to the downturn in nominal GNP growth, indicating a possible causative role for money, while the absence of any absolute decline in money during 1949 helped to arrest the economy's decline. There was no similar pattern in monetary growth that helps to explain the timing of the 1954 recession. A monetarist might point to the relatively stable growth performance of *M2* between 1951 and 1955 as helping to explain why the 1953–55 decline in defense spending had such a short-lived impact on the economy and why the 1955 recovery was so robust.

The Keynesian components-of-expenditure analysis of the timing of economic fluctuations can be set forth with the aid of table 2.2, which illustrates shifts in components of real GNP between key quarters during the first postwar decade. Section B of the table splits real GNP into real final sales and inventory accumulation and points out that the 1949 recession was so mild that there was no decline at all in real final sales. The recession was entirely attributable to a small temporary adjustment in the level of inventories.

An important feature of the 1948–49 episode was the role of government spending in prolonging the length of the expansion through the end of 1948 by offsetting the 1947–48 decline in net exports. The mildness of the 1949 setback itself can be attributed not only to the fortuitous countercyclical swing in total government spending, but also to the timing of the first major postwar restyling of all “big-three” auto models in 1949. The appeal of the new models boosted real final sales of automobiles in 1949:2 fully 38 percent above the 1948 average. This episode stands in contrast to the procyclical swings in auto buying that marked subsequent recessions.

Since the 1949 recession resulted entirely from inventory behavior, a recovery in early 1950 was inevitable as soon as the temporary liquidation of inventories ceased. In fact the 1950 expansion was rapid even before the outbreak of war in June, with consumer investment in autos and houses at the forefront. Once the war began, consumers who had vivid memories of wartime shortages rushed to purchase all types of consumer goods, and the share of consumer durable purchases in real GNP reached a level (9.2 percent) that was not to be exceeded until the first quarter of 1973.

Table 2.2 Real GNP (1972 Prices) and Its Components, Selected Quarters during the First Postwar Decade

	Export Boom 1947:3 (1)	Cyclical Peak 1948:4 (2)	Cyclical Trough 1949:4 (3)	Buying Spree 1950:2 (4)	Cyclical Peak 1953:2 (5)	Cyclical Trough 1954:3 (6)	Auto Boom 1955:3 (7)	Cyclical Peak 1957:3 (8)
A. Natural Real GNP	507.3	524.8	539.2	550.9	601.4	621.0	646.3	691.6
B. Real GNP	468.0	495.9	489.2	542.4	626.2	605.6	660.3	685.6
1. Real final sales	470.9	490.6	496.9	534.4	621.1	609.7	652.5	681.9
2. Inventory change	-2.9	5.3	-7.7	8.0	5.1	-4.1	7.8	3.7
C. Consumption of Non-durables and Services	277.3	282.6	284.7	298.9	322.6	324.6	343.5	367.0
D. Fixed Investment	117.5	117.0	114.6	140.5	128.4	130.9	157.0	154.3
1. Consumer durables	30.3	33.5	38.3	49.9	42.7	42.5	53.9	49.0
2. Residential	21.5	24.2	27.1	35.2	28.4	29.3	35.2	29.3
3. Nonresidential	48.0	51.8	43.5	53.0	55.8	54.8	63.1	67.1
4. Net exports	17.7	7.5	5.7	2.4	1.5	4.3	4.8	8.9
E. Government Purchases	76.0	90.9	97.5	94.9	170.1	154.3	151.9	160.6
1. Federal	36.3	47.9	48.1	44.1	115.9	95.4	87.8	89.9
2. State and local	39.7	43.0	49.4	50.8	54.2	58.9	64.1	70.6

Sources: Natural Real GNP prior to 1955 from Gordon (1978, app. B) and after 1955 from Perloff and Wachter (1979). All other series from National Income and Product Accounts, table 1.2.

From late 1950 on, investment by consumers and businessmen fell back, and the expansion was carried along during its remaining years by a 279 percent increase in federal spending on goods and services which peaked—along with the cycle itself—in 1953:2. In real terms the subsequent recession was more severe than the 1949 episode. Residential construction, net exports, and state and local government all helped to stabilize the economy, and the drop in consumer and business fixed investment was very moderate. The role of monetary policy in converting residential buildings and state-local government into automatic stabilizers is particularly important; dropping nonmortgage interest rates caused funds to be channeled into mortgages and state-local borrowing. Housing starts rose by 40 percent between December 1953 and December 1954, and state-local real spending jumped by 9 percent in a single year.

1955 was a vintage year for the American economy. The automatic stabilizers and stable monetary growth policy had prevented the decline in defense spending from causing a serious setback. With both the Korean War and the danger of postwar depression in the past, households and business firms could contemplate a new era of business prosperity and set out with determination to acquire the higher stock of durable goods that was consistent with this new level of "peacetime permanent income." By mid-1955 real investment had jumped to a level 22 percent higher than had been achieved in the peak 1953 quarter, offsetting almost dollar-for-dollar the 1953–55 drop in federal spending. Further evidence of a fundamental change in expectations is provided by the stock market. The real value of the Standard and Poor's index rose by 102 percent between 1953 and 1959, compared with increases of less than 40 percent in the preceding and following six-year periods.

The 1955 investment explosion was led by consumer purchases of automobiles. Paul Samuelson once announced to an M.I.T. graduate class that he would "flunk anyone who could explain why auto sales in 1955 were so high." A complete quantitative explanation is never likely to be produced, because several of the sources of the 1955 auto boom cannot be quantified rigorously. In addition to the basic accelerator mechanism that makes auto sales depend on the growth of real income, and the effect on expectations of the mildness of the recession, the boom was amplified by a substantial easing in installment credit terms that introduced thirty-six-month installment contracts for the first time, and also by the timing coincidence that all of the "big three" makes introduced radically new models simultaneously in the 1955 model year for the first time since 1949.¹⁸

Between 1955 and 1957 the expansion changed in character. The countercyclical behavior of residential housing exerted a drag on the expansion, as did the slump in consumer durable sales from the unsus-

tainable 1955 level. The common practice of referring to the 1955–57 expansion as “an investment boom” is completely misleading. It should actually be labeled “an export boom,” reflecting the 27 percent surge in real exports between 1955:3 and the post-Suez peak in 1957:1. In contrast, real state-local spending rose by 7.6 percent over the same six-quarter interval, while real business investment grew only 4.4 percent.

Supply Phenomena

Before World War II, price movements mirrored the behavior of nominal GNP, instantaneously absorbing a substantial fraction of nominal spending changes. For instance, falling prices absorbed 51 percent of the 1929–33 drop in nominal GNP. In figure 2.1b we find that the four-quarter rate of change of the GNP deflator shows a similar tendency to mirror nominal GNP changes during the 1947–52 period, with a timing pattern that is virtually simultaneous. Perhaps the most important supply phenomenon of the first postwar decade was the change in the behavior of prices after 1952; the inflation rate no longer responded rapidly to nominal GNP change but rather seemed to be dominated by inertia. Prices hardly responded at all to the spending surge in 1953 and 1955, and to the drop in spending in 1954. Whereas a price decline had insulated real spending in the 1949 recession, the opposite occurred in 1954 when almost the full brunt of the nominal GNP decline was translated into real GNP.

After 1954 the inflation rate displayed the pattern that has become so familiar in the 1960s and 1970s. Price increases responded only sluggishly to the behavior of nominal spending, so that the peak 1957 inflation rate in figure 2.1b occurred six quarters after the peak growth in nominal spending. And over the entire decade between 1954 and 1964




Fig. 2.1b

the variance of inflation was astonishingly low when viewed from the perspective of earlier history. The reasons for this shift in behavior have never been adequately explained. One approach would point to the stability of expectations of the price level: between December 1954 and December 1965 the twelve-month rate of expected price increase by the Livingston panel never went outside the range of zero to 1.25 percentage points. But this observation is not an explanation, since the main reason for the stability of expected inflation must have been the stability of actual inflation.

The assignment of responsibility for the changing behavior of wages and prices remains an unfinished research task. Cagan's careful analysis (1975) of the cyclical behavior of wholesale prices in the 1920s and the postwar years confirms "a gradual decline in price response to recessions over the postwar period." His interpretation is that "an intensification of general anticipations of inflation over the postwar period has lessened the response of manufacturing prices to short-run variations in demand" (p. 55). Sachs (1980) restates Cagan's interpretation by asserting that the new postwar intention to pursue countercyclical stabilization policy shifted expectations toward the belief that recessions would be temporary and that business firms would feel less need to reduce prices to sell their goods. Sachs also emphasizes the growing importance of long-term wage bargaining. By these interpretations the change in the character of the inflation process evident in the 1952-54 period may be traced ultimately both to the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Employment Act of 1946.

The relation between inflation and nominal GNP growth displayed in figure 2.1b has another interpretation. This alternative viewpoint would state that nothing special happened to the inflation process in 1952-54; rather the earlier development of price inertia is disguised by the special events that dominated price behavior in the early postwar era. The immediate postwar disequilibrium between nominal money and the controlled price level led to a temporary surge of inflation after the termination of controls in 1946. And the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950 led to a speculative surge in raw materials prices that coincided with a wave of anticipatory buying, creating a short-lived coincidence between nominal GNP growth and price change. The stability exhibited by the inflation rate after 1952 reflected the termination of these special factors and the influence of Korean War price controls rather than any sudden change in underlying behavior. While this account is plausible, and reminds us that any discussion of price movements during 1946-52 must take account of special factors, it nevertheless cannot explain why price behavior was so different in the recessions of 1949 and 1954, and this difference remains the basis for the claim that price behavior underwent a basic change after 1952.¹⁹

Nominal GNP changes are divided by definition between changes in prices and in real GNP. Thus in figure 2.1b the distance between the upper and lower line represents increases in real GNP. A more revealing display of real GNP behavior is provided by figure 2.1c. The real GNP "gap" is the percentage difference between "natural" and actual real GNP and ranges between a maximum value of 9.2 percent in 1949:4 to a minimum value of -4.3 percent in 1953:1. When the gap is in negative territory the economy is utilizing its resources more intensively than is compatible with the avoidance of accelerating inflation, while a positive gap tends to occur during recessions. Figure 2.1c also displays the relationship of the actual unemployment rate to the "natural" rate of unemployment. Since a zero output gap is defined by the same criterion as the natural rate of unemployment, we find that the actual unemployment rate rises above the natural rate of unemployment in roughly the same quarters as the output gap rises above zero. The close relation between the output gap and the difference between the actual and natural unemployment rates has long been christened "Okun's Law," and ironically the "law" seems to work better after the publication date of Okun's original article (1962) than before.

A comparison of figures 2.1b and 2.1c suggests three outstanding puzzles about aggregate supply behavior in the first postwar decade. First, why was the output gap so high in 1947–48 when unemployment was so low? Second, why was there no acceleration of inflation in 1952–53 in light of the low levels of unemployment and the negative output gap? Third, why was unemployment so much more stable than the output gap in 1955–57?

The first puzzle about the low level of output in 1947–48 can be restated in another way: the unemployment rate was roughly the same in




Fig. 2.1c

1948:2 and 1951:1, but real GNP was 15.7 percent higher in the later quarter. The compound *annual* growth rate between the two quarters was 5.4 percent, much faster than anyone's estimate of the long-term growth rate of the economy's "natural" or "potential" real GNP. Because of the absence of any reason why long-term economic growth should have been so much faster between 1948 and 1951 than either before or after, the natural output series used to compute the GNP gap is based on a linear interpolation between 1929 and 1950, accounting for the peculiarity in figure 2.1c that the output gap was large in 1947–48 despite the low level of actual unemployment.²⁰ Given the fact that the 1948–51 increase in manufacturing real output was 20 percent and in the government sector was 30 percent, I conjecture that a great deal of private and government capital constructed during World War II was temporarily underutilized in 1947–48, due to the low level of defense spending, and that labor was temporarily absorbed in low-productivity service occupations.

The second supply puzzle centers on the low level of inflation in 1952–53 when the unemployment rate was only 3 percent, in contrast to the acceleration of inflation in 1955–57 when unemployment was 4 percent. The only available explanation is that wage and price controls during the Korean War must have been quite effective. While Schultz (1959) proposed an explanation of the acceleration of inflation between 1955 and 1957 based on structural imbalances in the economy, subsequent econometric work finds little in the 1955–57 experience that cannot be explained within a Phillips curve framework.²¹ The third puzzle, the failure of unemployment to increase between late 1955 and mid-1957 when the output gap was rising, can be explained by a consistent tendency of business firms to become overstaffed in the last stages of every postwar business expansion.²²

2.3.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy

Herbert Stein (1969) has labeled the postdepression commitment to fiscal *stabilization* policy as the "fiscal revolution in America." Yet in the broadest sense fiscal policy has been the most important *destabilizing* influence in the postwar economy. In the first postwar decade the enormous magnitude of the rise and subsequent fall in defense expenditures was the dominant feature of aggregate demand fluctuations, and the expansion of spending for the Vietnam War in 1965–68 destabilized the economy again. By a narrower criterion that takes defense spending as exogenous and outside the purview of discretionary stabilization policy, however, fiscal policy deserves relatively high marks in the 1947–57 decade. Several actions were taken that helped to reduce the variance of income growth, and there were no actions that worked in the opposite direction.

The most important stabilizing action was the rapid move to raise tax rates immediately after the outbreak of war in mid-1950. The natural-employment federal surplus (NES) reached 6 percent of GNP during the last half of 1950, and this helped to dampen the surge of anticipatory buying and accounted for part of the reduction of consumer durable spending that occurred in 1951. After 1950 the NES was allowed to slide from +6 percent of GNP to -3 percent by early 1953, a fiscal stimulus that might have been extremely inflationary were it not for the influence of price controls.²⁸

Two other stabilizing actions were taken, but in each case the cyclical timing was fortuitous rather than deliberate. Only six months before the 1948 business-cycle peak, Congress passed a large tax reduction over President Truman's veto, but there is no evidence that the proponents of the tax cut foresaw the downturn. Then in 1954 there was a cut in income and excise taxes, but this represented the expiration of wartime-related taxes rather than an activist initiative designed for stabilization purposes. If there was a "fiscal revolution" in the first postwar decade, it was in the willingness to allow the government budget to move into deficit during recessions, thus allowing the automatic stabilizers to work, in contrast to the destructive tax increases engineered by Herbert Hoover in 1932 under the budget-balancing rulebook of pre-Keynesian fiscal policy.

Most discussions of monetary policy in the first postwar decade center on the contrast between the Federal Reserve's pre-Accord-pegging policy and its post-Accord shift to a countercyclical stabilization policy. We have already noted the relative stability of the growth rate of $M2$ in figure 2.1a during the post-Accord 1951-55 period, in contrast to the destabilizing drop in monetary growth during late 1948 and early 1949 as the Fed "accommodated" the economy's decline. The timing of monetary growth between 1953 and 1957 cannot be faulted, with a stabilizing boost in monetary growth in 1954 and decline in 1955-56. Perhaps the main flaw in monetary policy was the acceleration in monetary growth in late 1951 and 1952, which may have partially accounted for the intensity of the last stage of the business cycle expansion in early 1953.

Another view of monetary policy is presented in figure 2.1d, which compares the detrended level of the real money supply ($M2$) with the ratio of actual to natural real GNP (the latter is equal to unity minus the GNP "gap"). To achieve economic stabilization the detrended real money supply should drop when the economy is expanding and should rise during recessions, and so we would hope to find a negative relation between the two series in figure 2.1d. Despite the pegging of interest rates in the pre-Accord period, we see that the negative relation was quite strong throughout the first postwar decade, with real money being allowed to drop substantially during the 1947-48, 1950-51, and 1955-




Fig. 2.1d

57 expansions. The expansion in real money in 1949 and 1954 also operated in a stabilizing direction. Once again, the major flaw in the timing of monetary policy was the 1951–53 expansion in real balances.

In retrospect the record of stabilization policy in the first postwar decade, while not perfect, stands out as the best of the four postwar subperiods. The prompt increase in tax rates in 1950 to finance Korean War expenditures contrasts with the failure to take decisive action to reduce the government deficit in 1966. With the exception of the overall destabilizing role of government military expenditures, the basic effect of fiscal and monetary actions was to stabilize the economy. Hindsight allows some quibbling with the behavior of the monetary authorities, but these actions did not have long-run adverse consequences for economic performance as did the mistakes of subsequent postwar subperiods.

2.4 The Second Postwar Decade, 1957–67

2.4.1 The Conceptual Framework

There was no quantum change in the consensus paradigm of aggregate demand behavior in the first two postwar decades. Rather there was a gradual but continuous shift in opinion toward an increased role for money and monetary policy, marked by mileposts including the Patman Committee Inquiry, the report and study papers prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit, the negative reaction of many economists to the downgrading of money in the Radcliffe Report, and the influence of the monetary research of Milton Friedman, his students, and others.²⁴ As in the case of any body of opinion about the operations of the “real world,” the growing belief in the importance of money can be traced to

several episodes in the first postwar decade. Those who believed that the large outstanding stock of public debt prevented effective monetary action and required the pegging of interest rates either lost credibility or changed their opinions when the higher interest rates that followed the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord failed to have any disastrous consequences for debt management of the economy's performance in general.²⁵ The relative mildness of the 1954 recession was due partly to countercyclical monetary policy and helped to lessen the belief that monetary policy was only effective in countering inflation and suffered from an asymmetric impotence in dealing with slack demand. The continued acceleration of inflation despite rising interest rates in 1956-57 tempered the belief that monetary policy had unique curative powers to combat inflation. By 1962 Harry Johnson was able to observe that "the wheel has come full circle, and prevailing opinion has returned to the characteristic 1920s view that monetary policy is probably more effective in checking deflation than in checking inflation."

In contrast to the steady process of change in the consensus analysis of aggregate demand, the supply-side framework was completely dominated by the influence of the Phillips (1958) article on the historical United Kingdom relation of wage change and unemployment, together with the Samuelson-Solow (1960) popularization of the "Phillips curve" relation between inflation and unemployment for the American audience. In retrospect the instant success of the Phillips curve framework reflects the inability of the previous "knife-edge" inflationary gap analysis to explain, without resort to ad hoc stories about "cost-push," why inflation accelerated in 1956-57 without excessive overall demand pressure or why it continued at a significant rate during the 1957-58 recession. For the first time since the 1946 Employment Act, economists came generally to recognize that two of the goals of the act, full employment and price stability, might not be compatible. Only if by happy coincidence the negatively sloping Phillips curve crossed the zero-inflation point at an unemployment rate generally regarded as "full" would no policy problem arise. If, however, full employment and price stability were not compatible, policymakers would be forced to choose among a set of second-best points along the Phillips curve. The history of economic policy between 1957 and 1967 can be summarized in the choice during 1957-60 by Republican policymakers of a point relatively far to the southeast along the curve, and the rejection of that point by Democratic policymakers after 1961 in favor of a stimulative "new economics" designed to reach a point further to the northwest.

Another area of change in aggregate supply analysis was the increased attention to growth in output and productivity, and the interrelations between growth, investment, and economic policy. Although little attention was paid to the rapid rates of economic growth being achieved in

most European countries, there was great concern—especially after the launching of Sputnik in late 1957—over the rapid growth rate achieved by the Soviet economy and the possibility that the Soviet Union might overtake the United States as an economic power. This new attention to growth as a policy problem brought the theoretical models of Tobin (1955) and Solow (1956) and the empirical work of Solow (1957) and Denison (1962) quickly into the mainstream of the economics curriculum, and the interest in growth went so far that in 1964 James Tobin could write, “in recent years economic growth has come to occupy an exalted position in the hierarchy of goals of government policy” (1964, p. 1).

2.4.2 Major Surprises of the Second Postwar Decade

Demand Fluctuations

In contrast to the first postwar decade when nominal GNP fluctuations were extremely large in relation to fluctuations in monetary growth, and were explained in an arithmetic sense by contemporaneous movements in velocity, in the second postwar decade money ($M2$) and nominal GNP exhibited a much tighter relation, as is illustrated in figure 2.2a. Beginning in the 1960s the velocity of $M2$ (that is, nominal GNP divided by $M2$) displayed a remarkable constancy that lasted until 1977.²⁶ Another important feature of figure 2.2a is the tendency of money to exhibit a significant lead in advance of turning points in nominal GNP. During the 1958 recovery, 1959 decline, 1961 recovery, 1966 setback, and 1967 expansion, $M2$ displayed a consistent lead of about two quarters, suggesting that money was no longer a sideshow in explaining fluctuations in economic activity but rather was a central driving force.




Fig. 2.2a

The change in the relation between money and nominal GNP after 1957, which is surely the most surprising aggregate demand event of the second decade by any *ex ante* criterion, has been little discussed in the literature. Although at first glance the main difference between figures 2.1a and 2.2a might appear to be the decline in *trend* velocity growth after 1957, in fact the *deviations from trend* of nominal GNP and money are much more closely associated in the latter period than the former.

The timing lead of monetary change before nominal GNP change illustrated in figure 2.2a is presumably the source of the finding of the "St. Louis equation," first estimated for this period by Anderson and Jordan (1968), that monetary change is an independent cause of nominal GNP change. The alternative explanation for the close relation between money and spending is that the Federal Reserve "accommodated" autonomous changes in spending as it attempted to maintain a stable interest rate. This second explanation emphasizes the "reverse feedback mechanism" from spending to money that has played a major role in debates regarding the causes of the Great Contraction of 1929–33 (Temin 1976). The timing relationships seem to support a money-to-GNP chain of causation during most of the 1957–67 decade, and a search for independent actions by the Federal Reserve leads to the conclusion that the Fed deliberately tightened money and raised interest rates in 1957, 1959–60, and 1966. But the interpretation of the 1961–66 expansion is more ambiguous.

The standard interpretation of Federal Reserve actions in the early 1960s concentrates on interest rates rather than monetary aggregates as indicators of the tightness or looseness of monetary policy. Thus the most popular explanation of the simultaneous acceleration in money and nominal GNP growth in 1961 is that the Fed passively accommodated an expansion caused by nonmonetary factors. Yet a closer examination casts some doubt on this interpretation of passive accommodation. Far from holding interest rates constant, the Fed allowed the Federal Funds rate to drop from its late 1959 peak of 4.5 percent to below 2 percent in mid-1961 by boosting the growth rate of the monetary base. Then short-term rates were allowed to increase in steps that were compatible with a steady but gradually accelerating growth rate of money until early 1966, when a sudden sharp jump in interest rates was accompanied by an immediate slowdown in monetary growth.

We turn now to table 2.3, which shows the main components of expenditure during the second decade in the same format as table 2.2. The 1958 recession appears to have been almost identical to the 1954 episode in its overall magnitude, as measured by the peak-to-trough decline in real GNP. The two episodes were also virtually identical in the magnitude of the decline in real final sales. The most important difference was in the composition of the decline in expenditures; in 1958 govern-

Table 2.3 Real GNP (1972 Prices) and Its Components, Selected Quarters during the Second Postwar Decade

	Cyclical Peak 1957:3 (1)	Cyclical Trough 1958:1 (2)	Cyclical Peak 1960:1 (3)	Cyclical Trough 1960:4 (4)	Normal Output Reached 1964:2 (5)	Growth- Cycle Peak 1966:1 (6)	Housing Slump 1967:1 (7)
A. Natural Real GNP	691.6	698.6	748.8	766.7	872.0	928.8	968.6
B. Real GNP	685.6	663.4	740.7	731.9	872.0	969.6	994.4
1. Real final sales	681.9	670.2	727.2	735.8	864.0	956.1	979.8
2. Inventory change	3.7	-6.8	13.5	-3.9	8.0	13.5	14.6
C. Consumption of Nondurables and Services	367.0	365.8	397.0	402.5	460.7	501.3	517.6
D. Fixed Investment	154.3	140.2	160.9	157.8	199.9	233.9	218.0
1. Consumer durables	49.0	46.1	52.2	51.5	65.6	80.4	77.5
2. Residential	29.3	28.7	38.2	33.4	44.1	42.7	32.7
3. Nonresidential	67.1	61.2	66.7	65.2	79.9	104.7	103.7
4. Net exports	8.9	4.2	3.8	7.7	10.3	6.1	4.1
E. Government Purchases	160.6	164.2	169.2	175.4	203.5	220.7	244.3
1. Federal	89.9	90.2	89.3	91.7	101.7	106.5	122.6
2. State and local	70.6	74.0	79.9	83.7	101.8	114.2	121.7

ment expenditures rose, whereas in 1954 they had fallen precipitously. The 1958 decline in real *private* final sales was much greater than in 1954.

The 1958–59 recovery in the economy was extremely rapid but was cut short by the steel strike that began in the third quarter of 1959. While the strike doubtless interfered with the momentum of the recovery, it appears in retrospect that the deflationary impact of monetary and fiscal policy during this period was so intense that the expansion would have aborted even without a steel strike.

The most important feature of the 1957–62 period was the sluggish behavior of investment. Consumer durable expenditures did not reach the 1955 peak level again until 1962:1. Nonresidential business fixed investment slumped below its 1957:3 peak until late 1961. In the 1958–60 expansion only residential investment showed any buoyancy.

The 1958–60 expansion presents fascinating problems for proponents of alternative theories of income and investment determination. Present critics who decry the impact of government deficits on investment would find little solace in the laggard 1960 investment performance in light of the high ratio of the NES to GNP reached in 1960. The episode seems to point to a high real interest rate as a major hindrance to investment.²⁷

The literature devoted to the 1961–66 business expansion would fill several libraries. The remarkable inertia displayed by the inflation process in the early 1960s allowed virtually all of the faster nominal GNP growth to be transmitted directly to real GNP. And rapid GNP growth over a sustained period of five years (through mid-1966) created an enormous investment boom, as is illustrated in table 2.3. Total real fixed investment rose by 48 percent between the 1960:4 cyclical trough and the 1966:1 peak in the growth cycle (achieved when the ratio of actual to natural real GNP reaches its peak). Both components of real nonresidential investment shared this experience. In their usual fashion both residential investment and net exports peaked relatively early in the expansion.

The second postwar decade ended with a period of monetary restriction. A much discussed and publicized increase in interest rates initiated by the Fed in late 1965 carried the Moody's Aaa rate up from 4.60 percent in November, 1965 (roughly equaling the early 1960 peak) to a temporary peak of 5.49 percent in September, 1966. M2 growth slowed modestly, although not nearly by so much as 1959–60, and nominal GNP growth followed with only a one-quarter lag.

In the language that was soon to be adopted, the 1966 housing slump represented a classic example of "crowding out" caused by an expansion in government spending during a period of a constant or declining real money supply. The behavior of real money may be determined in turn either by nominal money or the price level, and in 1966 both operated

to cause a marked slowdown in real $M2$ growth in the four quarters ending in 1967:1. The sum of real government and fixed investment spending grew only 1.7 percent over this same four-quarter period, with most of the increase in real government spending canceled out by a drop in fixed investment, mainly housing expenditures.²⁸

Supply Phenomena

Several crucial issues in current macroeconomic debates are dependent on the data displayed in figure 2.2b. Most important, the econometric message that United States inflation fluctuations are dominated by inertia, and depend little on current policy or nominal GNP movements, stands out clearly in the diagram. The 1957–64 period also represents the classic example within the Phillips curve context that high unemployment has only a modest impact on inflation. Despite the fact that unemployment was above the “natural” rate continuously between late 1957 and late 1964, nevertheless the inflation rate decelerated only from 3.3 percent in the four quarters ending in the cyclical peak quarter of 1957:3 to a minimum of 1.3 percent in 1964:1.²⁹ This small extent of deceleration plays an important role in the objections of those who opposed (in 1969, 1974, and 1979) a rapid deceleration in nominal demand growth to combat inflation. If inertia truly dominates the behavior of inflation, then a slowdown in nominal demand growth that is faster than the maximum possible slowdown in the inflation rate will lead to a slump in real GNP and a period of high unemployment and underutilized resources.

The rapidity of the 1961–66 expansion in real GNP can be viewed from the perspective of figure 2.2c, which compares the behavior of unemployment with that of the real GNP “gap.” From a level of +5.1




Fig. 2.2b

percent in 1961:1, the gap declined to -4.4 percent in 1966:1, implying that real GNP grew by 9.5 percent relative to its “natural” or trend level over that five-year interval. At first glance there is nothing in the juxtaposition of figures 2.2b and 2.2c to contradict the reigning Phillips curve paradigm of the 1960s, because the acceleration of inflation from about one percent to roughly 3 percent between 1961 and 1967 would appear to be compatible with a northwest movement up the stable Phillips curve associated with a decline in unemployment over the same period from 7 percent to 3.8 percent.

The collapse of the stable Phillips curve after 1967 is sometimes allowed to obscure the preponderance of data points during 1967 that supported the policy stance of the administration. Ignoring the lone voices of Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps to whom few listened in 1966, a “natural” unemployment rate is a creation of hindsight wisdom that should not blind us to the environment faced by policy-makers.³⁰ While recognizing that the overall unemployment rate had been allowed in 1966 and 1967 to slip below the longstanding “full employment goal” of 4.0 percent, there was little in the behavior of prices in 1967 to invalidate the notion that the full employment target was attainable on a permanent basis.

Many features of aggregate economic data in the mid-1960s that then appeared to represent the dawn of a new era now appear to be the results of a transient overexpansion of the economy. The high levels of productivity, the profit share, and stock prices reached in 1965–66 were particularly ephemeral, both because the overall level of capacity utilization that had made them possible was unsustainable, and also because both productivity and profits enjoy temporary bulges when output growth is rapid as a result of lags in hiring and in wage adjustment.




Fig. 2.2c

2.4.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy

A judgment on the merit of fiscal policy in the second postwar decade naturally begins with the evolution of the NES. Between 1956 and 1963 the NES fluctuated between zero and two percent of GNP, with most quarters recording the higher rather than the lower value. The only major fluctuation over this interval was a brief drop into negative territory during 1958, reflecting the remarkable temporary stimulative expansion of government expenditures.³¹ The sharp increase in the NES from -0.5 percent to $+2.5$ percent of GNP between late 1958 and early 1960 later led to the accusation by Walter Heller (1966) and others that tight fiscal policy had caused the business expansion to abort prematurely through the “drag” of overly high progressive tax rates.

One man’s “fiscal drag” is another man’s policy to stimulate investment by maintaining the federal budget in surplus. The budget-balancing emphasis of the Eisenhower administration was at least partly based on the desire to encourage business investment and long-term economic growth.³² There is no necessity for a high natural employment surplus to exert a “drag” on the economy if it is combined with an appropriate monetary policy designed to maintain the economy at its “natural” level of resource utilization. This possibility of tight fiscal and easy monetary policy could have been put into practice in the last two years of the Eisenhower administration but was not, because of the drastic tightening of money that occurred in 1959–60. Thus Heller’s critique must be reinterpreted as stating that a high natural employment surplus can be a drag on the economy *if* monetary policy fails to provide the necessary economic stimulus.

The history of fiscal policy during the rest of the second postwar decade consists of the much heralded strategy of the “new economics” of cutting the natural employment surplus by a series of tax reductions, including a major cut in the personal income tax in early 1964, reductions in both excise and personal income taxes in 1965, and new tax incentives for investment introduced in 1962. Between mid-1963 and late 1965 the NES fell from $+1.5$ to -1.0 percent of GNP in response to the series of tax cuts, and then dropped to -2.2 percent in 1967 as a result of the failure of the administration and Congress to raise taxes promptly to pay for Vietnam expenditures.

There are two available interpretations of the relative roles of monetary and fiscal policy in achieving the vigorous economic expansion of 1961–66, depending on one’s view of monetary behavior in 1961–66 as active or passive. The juxtaposition of nominal GNP and monetary growth rates in figure 2.2a could be interpreted as suggesting that the expansion was basically a monetary phenomenon, with the impact of fiscal stimulus evident only in the temporary surge of velocity growth that occurred in late 1965 and 1966. Yet the proponents of fiscal ac-

tivism would claim that the growth of the money supply was a passive variable that depended on the vigor of the economic expansion. Thus expansionary fiscal policy had its main impact not solely through its *direct* stimulative effect on spending but also *indirectly* by allowing the administration to gain control of the money supply and foster a more vigorous monetary expansion after 1962.

While it is doubtless true that fiscal policy forced the Federal Reserve to accelerate monetary growth, nevertheless the distinction between the direct and indirect multiplier effects of fiscal policy was not sufficiently appreciated in the mid 1960s. Policymakers took literally Arthur Okun's (1968) finding that the multiplier for the 1964 tax cut had been a very large 2.8, not realizing that this figure encompassed not only the direct impact of the tax cut but the indirect effect accomplished by accommodative passive response of the money supply. This misunderstanding had unfortunate consequences in 1968, when the Fed failed to play the accommodative role in supporting tighter fiscal policy upon which the Okun multiplier estimate depended.³³

The comparison in figure 2.2d between the real money supply and the output ratio provides a simple measure of the stabilizing or destabilizing role of monetary policy. But in the second postwar decade monetary policy deserves failing marks, particularly for the extent of the decline in real balances in 1959–60 even after the economy slumped into recession, for the sluggish growth of real balances in 1960–63 despite the low level of the output ratio, and most notably for the irresponsible expansion of real balances between 1965 and 1968 after real GNP had exceeded its "natural" level.

Throughout the first two decades most discussions of macroeconomic issues assumed tacitly that the United States was a closed economy.




Fig. 2.2d

There were two main sets of influence exerted by the external world on the United States economy. First was the destabilizing effect of two temporary export booms in 1947 and 1956–57 that helped determine the timing and also added to the intensity of the 1949 and 1958 recessions. Second was the shift in 1958 from a long period of dollar shortage to one of dollar surplus, with a continuous loss of official United States reserves over most of the decade after 1958. Because the United States current account was in surplus in every year between 1954 and 1969 with the single exception of 1959, there was general agreement that the balance-of-payments “problem” arose from capital outflows, and that the only solution to the problem was the maintenance of high short-term interest rates. To prevent the balance-of-payments policy objective from interfering with the goal of achieving long-term economic growth, the Kennedy administration fostered the Operation Twist policy of using debt management simultaneously to boost short-term rates while lowering long-term rates.

Subsequent research suggested that Operation Twist had not achieved its objective, and the raw numbers support this conclusion, as for instance the fact that three-month Treasury bill rates were the same in 1956 and 1962 while the Moody’s corporate Aaa rate in the latter year was almost a full percentage point higher (not lower as intended). And, in an important reinterpretation of the United States international situation, Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966) concluded that there had been no problem at all. Rather, the United States for many years had been operating as a giant financial intermediary, simultaneously borrowing from foreign governments in a form that created an official balance-of-payments deficit while lending back to foreign nations by buying up long-term foreign assets. The United States came out ahead in this set of transactions when it could earn a higher rate of return on its foreign assets than it paid out in interest on its reserves.

2.5 The Third Postwar Subperiod, 1967–73

2.5.1 The Conceptual Framework

At its zenith in early 1966, an activist view of fiscal policy appeared to have achieved an unassailable victory over its critics. Few in the profession disagreed with Walter Heller’s proclamation that “we now take for granted that the government must step in to provide the essential stability at high levels of employment and growth that the market mechanism, left alone, cannot deliver” (1966, p. 9). Since the use of changes in government expenditures for stabilization purposes interfered with allocative considerations, frequent changes in income tax rates became the central policy tool. While the consensus policy paradigm did not

neglect monetary policy or deny that monetary tightness could interfere with the pace of economic expansion, monetary policy was basically kept in the background and relegated to a role of maintaining a low and stable level of long-term interest rates to foster the goal of stimulating long-term economic growth. The Democratic advisers in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations had argued that a substantial reduction in the unemployment rate could be achieved at the cost of only a moderate acceleration of inflation, and with an inflation rate of only 3.0 percent in the four quarters ending in 1967:4 their gamble appeared to have paid off.

This policy framework collapsed with amazing speed after 1967 as the result of the interaction of events and economic writings. My graduate school classmates and I were acutely aware of the timing of this turn in the intellectual tide, as we began our first teaching jobs in the fall of 1967 and almost immediately found our graduate school education incapable of explaining the evolution of the economy. The most important ingredient in this intellectual revolution was the influence of the Friedman-Phelps "natural rate hypothesis" (NRH), which denied the ability of policymakers arbitrarily to select any inflation-unemployment combination along a stable tradeoff curve.³⁴ Instead, below a critical "natural" rate of unemployment the inflation rate would continuously accelerate, adding new urgency to Brainard's contemporaneous warning (1967) that policymakers could not know precisely the multiplier impact of their actions and had to take care to avoid overshooting the target level of real GNP.

Soon after the Friedman-Phelps demonstration that the full employment target of the policy activists might be unsustainable, Andersen and Jordan (1968) struck another blow with empirical equations that implied that fiscal policy had no impact at all on nominal spending over as short a period as a year. Although activist advocates eventually regrouped and presented convincing evidence of fatal statistical flaws in the St. Louis procedure (e.g., Goldfeld and Blinder 1972), their disarray lasted long enough partially to discredit fiscal activism. To add to the overall indictment of fiscal policy provided by the St. Louis equation, Robert Eisner (1969) made an important attack on the efficacy of the temporary tax changes favored by mid-1960s policy activists. Using the framework of Friedman's permanent income hypothesis of consumption, Eisner argued that a temporary income tax cut or surcharge would fail to alter permanent income and thus would have a low spending multiplier. Further, the lag in the effect of fiscal policy might be long and/or unpredictable, with the length of the lag depending on the public's subjective assessment of the likelihood that the tax change soon would be reversed.

These academic criticisms of the activist case might not have been so persuasive if they had not been accompanied by supporting events. Inflation accelerated between 1967 and 1969 far beyond the expectations of activist proponents. Further, inflation failed to slow down in the recession of 1970 and early 1971, as would have been expected along a fixed Phillips curve. The dramatic drop in the personal saving rate in late 1968 and the failure of spending growth to slow appreciably in response to the temporary tax surcharge was consistent both with the St. Louis claim that monetary multipliers had previously been underestimated and fiscal multipliers overestimated, as well as with the Eisner critique.

The continued economic expansion of 1968, even in the last half of the year after the tax surcharge had been introduced, also helped to lead to the de-emphasis of the interest rate as a monetary instrument and to the increased emphasis on monetary aggregates. Once again, it was an economic event that helped popularize an economic idea, in this case Irving Fisher's (1930) distinction between nominal and real interest rates, revived by Mundell (1963) and Friedman (1968). Conventional econometric models, even the newly devised MIT-FRB model with its carefully constructed monetary sector, had neglected the fact that while the demand for money should depend on the *nominal* interest rate, the demand for investment goods should depend on the *real* interest rate. The models thus were unable to explain why investment did not slump in 1968 in response to an increase in the Moody's Aaa rate from the 5.1 percent level recorded in early 1967 to the 6.0–6.5 percent range recorded during 1968.³⁵

2.5.2 Major Surprises of the 1967–73 Period

Demand Fluctuations

The relation between money and nominal GNP growth during the 1967–73 interval shared the main features of the 1957–67 decade. A sharp deceleration in the monetary growth rate beginning in early 1969 was followed with about a two-quarter lag by a marked (but less sharp) deceleration in nominal GNP growth. The 1969–70 episode in figure 2.3a seems to repeat the basic pattern of 1959–60, with the minor deceleration of 1966–67 significantly less severe in intensity. The recoveries in monetary growth in 1967–68 and in 1971–72 were also followed with a short lag by recoveries in nominal GNP growth. The major irregularity concerns the period between 1971 and 1973, when two years lapsed between the peak growth of *M2* in mid-1971 and the peak growth in nominal GNP in early 1973. The overall trend growth in *M2* and nominal GNP was about the same over the period, reflecting the con-

stancy in the velocity of *M2* exhibited by the data for the entire period between 1960 and 1977.

Table 2.4 exhibits the main components of real GNP in the same format as for the first two postwar decades. After early 1967 the economy resumed a rapid expansion, with growth in real final sales of about 7.5 percent in the six quarters ending 1968:3. During this interval the growth in federal spending decelerated, and the expansion was fueled by a rapid increase in consumer investment (durables plus housing), an increase that can be explained mainly as a result of the vigorous growth in monetary aggregates over the same period.

The most important issue concerning the behavior of aggregate demand during the 1967–73 period concerns the temporary income tax surcharge that was introduced in July 1968, and since has come to represent the Waterloo of activist fiscal stabilization management. While the charge that the surcharge failed to dampen consumer spending has been debated in a series of econometric articles, the following crude facts of the episode given for the first and last halves of 1968 are suggestive (all dollar amounts are in current prices).

	<i>First Half</i>		<i>Last Half</i>	
	<i>Dollars in Billions</i>	<i>Percentage of Personal Income</i>	<i>Dollars in Billions</i>	<i>Percentage of Personal Income</i>
Consumer durable expenditures	77.3	11.6	82.7	11.8
Consumer nondurable expenditures	445.8	66.6	466.1	66.4
Consumer interest and net transfers to foreigners	13.8	2.1	14.5	2.1
Personal saving	42.4	6.3	33.8	4.8
Personal tax and nontax payments	89.7	13.4	104.4	14.9
Personal income	669.0	100.0	701.5	100.0

The most important finding in this table is that a drop in the share of personal saving in personal income exactly offsets the increase in the share of tax payments. There was no change at all in consumer spending out of personal income, although the share of consumer spending in personal *disposable* income increased from 90.3 to 91.9 percent. A more complete verdict on the episode requires a model to predict what would have been expected to happen to consumer spending, given the behavior of income, wealth, and other variables. The latest conclusion by Blinder (1978) is that “over a one-year planning horizon, temporary taxes are

Table 2.4 Real GNP (1972 Prices) and Its Components, Selected Quarters during the 1967-73 Interval

	Housing Slump	Growth- Cycle Peak	Cyclical Peak	Cyclical Trough	End of Slow Growth	Growth- Cycle Peak	Cyclical Peak
	1967:1 (1)	1968:3 (2)	1969:3 (3)	1970:4 (4)	1971:4 (5)	1973:1 (6)	1973:4 (7)
A. Natural Real GNP	968.6	1,021.0	1,052.0	1,098.0	1,130.0	1,188.0	1,219.0
B. Real GNP	994.4	1,061.8	1,083.4	1,071.4	1,120.5	1,229.8	1,242.6
1. Real final sales	979.8	1,052.6	1,070.0	1,068.1	1,116.8	1,218.1	1,217.2
2. Inventory change	14.6	9.2	13.4	3.3	3.7	11.7	25.4
C. Consumption of Nondurables and Services	517.6	550.3	565.2	583.5	598.6	642.8	647.7
D. Fixed Investment	218.0	241.4	249.1	234.2	273.4	320.1	317.4
1. Consumer durables	77.5	90.5	91.6	84.5	103.7	124.9	118.1
2. Residential	32.7	42.8	42.9	43.4	56.4	64.4	54.0
3. Nonresidential	103.7	107.9	115.2	106.0	109.6	128.5	132.4
4. Net exports	4.1	0.2	-0.6	0.3	3.7	2.3	12.9
E. Government Purchases	244.3	260.9	255.7	250.3	251.0	255.2	252.0
1. Federal	122.6	129.5	120.6	108.0	103.2	100.7	94.3
2. State and local	121.7	131.4	135.1	142.4	147.7	154.5	157.7




Fig. 2.3a

estimated to have only about 20–60 percent of the impact of permanent taxes of the same magnitude, and rebates are estimated to have only about 10–50 percent of the impact.” Both the facts in the table and Blinder’s evaluation would appear to support Eisner’s initial point that the effects on consumption of temporary tax changes are likely to be weak, uncertain, or both.

After the peak of the growth cycle was reached in 1968:3, the economy moved sideways for the next year. Defense spending had peaked in the summer of 1968, and the modest drop in federal spending over that year was roughly canceled out by a further increase in investment. A surprising feature of the evolution of spending during 1969 and 1970 was the more moderate extent of the decline in housing expenditure than occurred in 1966–67 despite the drastic extent of “disintermediation” that drained money from commercial bank time deposits and from savings institutions. Government spending expanded rapidly in 1966–67 and slumped continuously between mid-1968 and mid-1971, thus “crowding out” housing in the earlier period and “crowding in” housing in the later period.

The mildness of the 1970 recession is evident in table 2.4, with a peak-to-trough decline in real final sales of only \$1.9 billion, all of which can be accounted for by the General Motors strike of 1970.³⁶ In fact the behavior of the economy in 1970 is better described as a “hiatus” than as a recession, and is more than accounted for by the drop in federal defense spending. In the league table of postwar recessions measured by the change in real final sales between the NBER peak-and-trough quarters, 1970 on a strike-adjusted basis was more severe than 1949 or 1960, but less severe than 1954, 1958, or 1975. The automatic stabilizers worked with a vengeance: real personal income in the trough

quarter was up 2.2 percent over the peak quarter; real personal disposable income was up even more due to the partial expiration of the tax surcharge.

The subsequent expansion was relatively sluggish in real terms throughout 1971 but then exploded at a frenetic pace through the growth-cycle peak in 1973:1. By far the most remarkable aspect of the expansion was the behavior of real consumer investment, including both consumer durable expenditures and residential investment, which leaped at an enormous annual rate of *16.8 percent* between the trough and growth-cycle peak (adjusted for the 1970 auto strike). Juxtaposing this record with the behavior of monetary growth in figure 2.3a, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the boom of 1972–73 was primarily due to the influence of the acceleration of monetary growth in 1971, although some credit is due to consumer optimism engendered by the price control program of 1971–72.

By all standards (except the long-run implications of excess demand) 1973:1 was a vintage quarter for the American economy. The ratio of actual to natural output reached almost as high a level as the previous peaks achieved in 1966:1 and 1968:3. Consumer and business investment reached the highest all-time level of the postwar era when expressed as a ratio to natural real GNP. The record achieved in 1973:1 exceeds that of other peak quarters which have been highlighted in this paper.⁸⁷ The following figures show the ratio of real consumer and business investment (excluding net exports and inventory accumulation) to real “natural” GNP in percentages for selected quarters.

1973:1	26.8
1950:2	25.1
1978:4	25.0
1966:1	24.5
1968:3	23.6
1955:3	23.5
1960:1	21.0
1948:3	20.9

Several other interesting features of the spending components are evident in table 2.4. After two decades of roughly 6 percent growth in real terms, state and local real spending increased at only 4 percent during 1967–73, and 2.3 percent between early 1973 and late 1978, leading one to ask why the Proposition 13 revolt against excessive spending did not occur earlier. Net exports were much lower during 1968–70 than at any previous time during the postwar period, reflecting the overvaluation of the dollar that culminated in the dollar crisis and Smithsonian Agreement of 1971. The fact that net exports were higher in the peak quarter 1973:1 than in the trough quarter 1970:4 suggests that the intervening

devaluations of the dollar had begun to stimulate the United States trade balance.

After early 1973 the economy faltered. A boom in net exports did not succeed in offsetting the continued decline in federal spending and a reduction in consumer investment, so that real final sales were lower in 1973:4 than in 1973:1. The NBER cyclical peak is set in late rather than early 1973 only because of a massive accumulation of inventories that temporarily maintained real GNP, threw the economy's inventory-sales ratio out of equilibrium, and partially explains the severity of the recession during the winter of 1975.

Supply Phenomena

The collapse of the policy paradigm that relied on a fixed Phillips curve occurred in three stages during the period between 1968 and 1971. First, the economy's 1968 recovery from the 1967 slowdown carried inflation up to the 4.5 percent region, in contrast to the inflation rates of 3.2–3.5 percent that had been experienced in 1966 at roughly the same rates of unemployment and resource utilization. This outcome led to general recognition that lags in the inflation process might have been ignored, that the position of the Phillips curve might be sensitive to expectations of inflation, and that there was a long-run Phillips curve with a steeper slope than the short-run schedule. Nevertheless, as long as the steeper long-run curve had a negative rather than vertical slope, there was still a policy tradeoff to be exploited by the policymakers.

The second stage of the collapse occurred during the recession of 1969–70. In contrast to the drop in inflation recorded in each preceding postwar recession and in the growth slowdown in 1967, there was no noticeable decline in inflation during 1970. The change in the GNP deflator over the four quarters ending in 1970:4 (the trough quarter) was 5.0 percent, little different than the 5.2 percent rate recorded during the four quarters of 1969.

Finally, the last stage in the collapse occurred during the first two quarters of the 1971 economic recovery. Despite a sluggish rate of real GNP growth that failed to bring unemployment down from its 6.0 percent peak rate, inflation still refused to abate, and in fact accelerated to a 5.9 percent annual rate. Wage growth accelerated as well, leaving little hope that policymakers could rely merely on high unemployment to achieve any significant deceleration in the inflation process. The early 1971 experience was soon reflected in the verdict of econometric studies that there was no longer any basis for belief that the long-run Phillips curve was negatively sloped rather than vertical.³⁸ And a more important immediate consequence was that the behavior of wages and prices in the first half of 1971 caused the Nixon administration to give up on




Fig. 2.3b

its policy of “gradualism” and to reverse its previous disavowal of controls by instituting a wage and price freeze on 15 August 1971.

The initial three-month freeze in wages and prices was followed by several further “phases” of controls with varying rules. A crude verdict that the program had a temporary impact is provided in figure 2.3b, which shows that the inflation failed to slow down to any significant degree in response to the 1969–70 deceleration of nominal GNP growth, but then dropped substantially in 1972 despite the rapid acceleration of nominal GNP growth. Another crude verdict can be provided by an inspection of the annual percentage rates of change over selected intervals of three different measures of consumer prices:

	<i>CPI</i>	<i>Personal Consumption Deflator</i>	<i>Personal Consumption Deflator Net of Food and Energy</i>
1969:3–1970:2	5.9	4.6	4.6
1970:3–1971:2	4.3	4.4	4.5
1971:3–1972:4	3.3	3.4	3.0
1973:1–1974:1	8.7	8.2	5.0
1974:2–1975:1	10.5	9.9	9.8

Some early evaluations of the control program focused on the behavior of the CPI. Since the CPI had already decelerated very substantially in the year ending in 1971:2, it was claimed that the controls had no special effect and the relatively low inflation rate of late 1971 and 1972

just represented the continuation of a process of deceleration that was already under way.³⁹ But the picture is very different if we look at an alternative and generally superior measure, the deflator for personal consumption expenditures. By this measure there was virtually no slowdown in inflation prior to the onset of the controls, and then a sudden drop by about 1.5 percentage points over the next six quarters when the influence of food and energy prices is excluded from the deflator.

The subsequent history of consumer prices also leads to differing evaluations, depending on which index is used. The rules of the control program were loosened in the transition from Phase II to Phase III at the beginning of 1973. According to the CPI, the acceleration of inflation in 1973 to rates faster than any experienced in the post-Korean period indicates that the controls had ceased to have any impact and that inflation reflected the excessive expansion of aggregate demand. On the contrary, the "net" personal consumption deflator rose in 1973 and early 1974 at a rate little different from the 1969-70 experience and suggests that any stimulative impact of demand was canceled out by a lingering effect of the controls.

Subsequent econometric evaluations tend to conclude that the price controls did succeed temporarily in holding down the price level by two to three percentage points during 1972 relative to what would have been expected to occur in the absence of controls *with the same level of resource utilization*. In 1973 the controls had little impact either way, and then after the formal abandonment of controls in 1974:2, the entire earlier effect of controls was dissipated by a rebound in the price level. There was virtually no impact of the controls on wage inflation (except perhaps in the construction industry), so that the controls exerted their effect on inflation only by squeezing profit margins rather than by causing a deceleration of the entire inflationary process.

Between late 1972 and the spring of 1974 there was a rapid acceleration in the overall inflation rate, more than half of which appears to have been caused by an acceleration of food and energy prices, and the remainder by some combination of nominal demand growth and the loosening of controls. Farm prices almost doubled between early 1972 and the summer of 1973 as the result of the simultaneous occurrence of several adverse factors, including the delayed impact of the 1971 dollar devaluation, crop failures in many parts of the world combined with massive sales of United States wheat to the Soviet Union, and a peculiar disappearance of Peruvian anchovies from their normal feeding grounds. The reference to this episode as a "supply shock" here and in other papers does not deny that the worldwide economic boom of 1972-73 may have had some impact on the relative price of food, but rather represents the judgment that most of the unprecedented jump in this relative price stemmed from the upward shift of a supply curve rather

than the movement of a demand curve outward along a fixed supply curve. The formation of the OPEC cartel and its impact on oil prices in 1973–74 also seems to have been mainly an autonomous supply shift.

The appearance of supply shifts as a source of changes in the inflation rate, first in the form of price controls and then in the form of an explosion of food and oil prices followed by a postcontrols rebound, was by far the most important economic event of the 1970s. No longer could stable aggregate demand growth insure a stable path of real GNP or unemployment, nor could unstable behavior of real GNP or unemployment be blamed solely on the policymakers controlling aggregate demand. Policy discussions now had to be framed in terms of the optimal degree of “accommodation” of supply shifts by policymakers, who had to be viewed as much less autonomous and powerful in light of the new constraints they faced.

While most of the story of policy responsiveness to supply shocks belongs in the history of the post-1973 subperiod, the issue first becomes relevant during the 1971–73 control interval. Because the temporary success of the controls allowed the inflation rate to slow while demand growth was accelerating, a large gap was opened between the growth rates of nominal GNP and inflation. Real GNP surged ahead, the GNP gap fell close to its postwar minimum, and unemployment declined as well, as shown in figure 2.3c. Far from accommodating the controls program by decelerating the growth of nominal GNP, monetary policymakers allowed the growth of money and nominal GNP to accelerate. In this sense the output boom was caused both by the effects of controls in shifting the division of a given rate of nominal GNP growth toward faster real GNP growth and less price change, and as well by the Federal Reserve in allowing nominal GNP growth to accelerate.




Fig. 2.3c

The 1967–73 period witnessed a substantial increase in the estimated “natural rate of unemployment,” the unemployment rate believed to be compatible with steady inflation. The natural rate concept in this paper, based on the work of Perloff and Wachter (1979), shifts upward after 1963 as a result of the demographic changes that raised the overall unemployment rate relative to the rate for “prime-aged” adult males. For instance the unemployment rate of males aged twenty-five and over was an identical 3.0 percent in 1955 and 1974, but the aggregate unemployment rate increased between the two years from 4.2 to 5.6 percent.⁴⁰ To the extent that it is valid to infer that the tightness of the prime-aged male labor market has a disproportionate impact on wage and price behavior, this demographic shift helps to explain why the 6.0 percent unemployment rate experienced during 1970 and 1971 had so little downward impact on the inflation process.

It was during the 1967–73 period that concern first surfaced about the behavior of United States productivity growth. Indeed the 1967–73 average growth in output per hour in the private business sector was at an annual rate of 2.1 percent, down from 3.2 percent in the 1957–67 decade. It now appears, however, that this slowdown mainly reflects cyclical phenomena. The rapid growth of productivity between 1957 and 1967 can be partly accounted for by the higher level of resource utilization in the latter year, and productivity in 1973 appears to have been held down by a tendency that seems to surface in the last stage of every business cycle for firms to allow themselves to become overstaffed.⁴¹

2.5.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy

Almost nothing can be said on behalf of stabilization policy in the 1967–73 period. Nominal GNP growth was allowed to become much too rapid in both 1968 and again in 1972–73. Both of these accelerations of demand growth were preceded by accelerations of the growth of the money supply that could have been avoided by adherence to a monetary growth “rule” of the type long advocated by Milton Friedman, and both periods of monetary acceleration were clearly irresponsible in light of the overly high level of resource utilization in 1968 and of the need for a monetary deceleration to accommodate the 1971–72 price controls. The 1969 monetary slowdown was needed, but its severity would not have been required if the prior 1968 acceleration had not occurred.

Throughout this paper we have inspected the relation between the detrended level of real $M2$ and the ratio of actual to “natural” output to form a judgment on the stabilizing or destabilizing role of monetary policy. Figure 2.3d shows the extremely strong positive relation between the two indexes over the 1967–73 period, with an autonomous expan-




Fig. 2.3d

sion of real balances in 1968 when the output ratio was already too high, a rapid drop in real balances that brought the output ratio below unity, and then another expansion that continued after the output ratio had risen above unity.

The overheated expansion of 1972–73 is perhaps the leading postwar example of Nordhaus's (1975) "political business cycle" in action. The temporary success of the controls in holding down the price level in 1971–72 would have generated rapid growth in real GNP even if nominal GNP had been maintained along a constant-growth-rate path. But the Fed's expansionary monetary policy allowed nominal GNP growth to accelerate, perhaps in the belief that the controls program had allowed an abandonment of caution and the generation of a full-fledged preelection boom. The political business cycle model predicts that policy shifts to restriction immediately after an election, and indeed within three months the controls program had been partially dismantled and monetary growth began to decelerate.

Fiscal policy receives demerits during 1967–73 as well. Real federal government expenditures on goods and services were allowed to drop continuously between mid-1968 and mid-1973, but the speed of decline was most rapid between mid-1969 and mid-1970, thus aggravating the recession, and the decline ceased between mid-1971 and mid-1972, thus intensifying the expansion in total demand. Tax policy appears superficially to have contributed to stability, since the effective personal income tax rate dropped in 1970 and increased in 1972, but there is no visible stabilizing impact of these changes because they were completely offset by opposite movements in the saving ratio. Just as the temporary tax surcharge had not affected consumption appreciably in 1968, so its

termination in 1970 had no effect, and taxpayers were smart enough to “pay for” the higher tax collections due to overwithholding in 1972 by cutting their saving rather than their consumption.⁴²

2.6 The Fourth Postwar Subperiod, 1973–79

2.6.1 The Conceptual Framework

The year 1973 represents the high-water mark of monetarism. Almost every change in the intellectual consensus in the late 1960s had favored the monetarist position on the issues of both monetary potency and antiactivism, from the accumulating body of evidence that the major source of changes in nominal demand had been prior movements in the money supply, to the demise of the short-run Phillips curve that eliminated the scope for any long-run effect of activist policy on the unemployment rate, to the debacle of the 1968 tax surcharge episode.⁴³ It is fitting that 1973 ended with the publication of Goldfeld's much cited empirical study that showed the demand for money to be a stable and predictable function of income and interest rates, thus appearing to eliminate instability in money demand as a qualification to the case for a constant-growth-rate rule.

The major effect on economic ideas of the 1973–74 supply shocks was to undermine the case for a constant-growth monetary rule. The theoretical analysis of policy responses to supply shocks, developed by R. J. Gordon (1975a) and Phelps (1978), starts with an appeal to arithmetic—a common feature of all adverse supply shocks is that the division of any given level of nominal GNP is shifted toward a higher price level and a lower level of real GNP.⁴⁴ An expansive or “accommodating” demand policy can moderate the impact on real GNP only at the cost of raising the price level and aggravating inflation. Restrictive or “extinguishing” demand policy can moderate the price increase only at the cost of further aggravating the shortfall of real GNP. The choice between an accommodative, extinguishing, or neutral demand policy depends primarily on the nature of wage-setting institutions, on the openness of the economy, and on the relative welfare costs of inflation and unemployment.

The initial impact of an adverse supply shock—e.g., an OPEC price hike—is to raise the share of total spending on the product in question (energy), if its demand is price inelastic. The automatic consequence is that a fixed level of nominal GNP will be devoted more to spending on energy and less to spending on nonenergy goods and services. The reduced amount of nonenergy spending in nominal terms could be reflected in lower real nonenergy output, lower nonenergy prices, or both.

Imagine first that the domestic wage rate is fixed, and nonenergy prices are "marked up" over that wage rate by a constant fraction. Then all of the impact of the supply shock will fall on nonenergy real output. Because the wage rate is unresponsive to aggregate demand, stabilization policy can boost nominal income and thus real nonenergy output without raising nonenergy prices. Policy cannot prevent the overall price level (of energy and nonenergy products together) from rising, but it can prevent the wasteful loss of nonenergy output. The crucial feature allowing this beneficent impact of stabilization policy is the willingness of workers to accept a loss in real wages, that is, in the ratio of their fixed nominal wage to the higher overall price level.

At the opposite extreme, assume that domestic wages are fully and instantly indexed to the overall price level, and the change in the real wage depends only on the pressure of real nonenergy demand in the economy. Then the decline in the real wage required to balance the adverse impact of the supply shock on labor productivity is inhibited by the indexing formula and can be achieved only if stabilization policy allows real nonenergy demand to decline. Complete cost-of-living escalation of the wage rate (or *de facto* real wage rigidity in wage bargaining) thus makes a potentially serious recession and climb in the unemployment rate inevitable in the wake of a supply shock, a feature that several authors have pointed to as explaining the failure of European economies to recover after 1975 as rapidly as in the United States. In such an economy with real-wage rigidity, the economy's short-run aggregate supply schedule is steep, and stimulative aggregate demand policy will cause extra inflation with little benefit in the form of extra real output.

One of the most important phenomena in the United States economy is the inertia displayed by year-to-year changes in the nominal wage rate, resulting from the institution of long-term overlapping wage contracts with decentralized bargaining. While only part of the economy is unionized, the three-year contracts set in the unionized sector tend to set a pattern for important parts of the nonunionized sector. Because the aggregate nominal wage index depends mainly on its own past values, and responds only partially to consumer price inflation and real demand pressure, the aggregate real wage tends to be quite flexible. This creates a case for partial accommodation of supply shocks within the United States institutional framework; the degree of additional inflation caused by such accommodation is modest compared to the real output gained. A serious qualification to accommodation comes mainly from the fact that the United States is not a closed economy, and a greater degree of monetary expansion in the United States than abroad tends to cause a depreciation of the dollar and add extra inflationary pressure

to the initial impact of the supply shock. Depending on policy responses in other countries, the United States nevertheless may obtain a real welfare gain by accommodation.

During the 1973–79 decade the analysis of supply shocks consumed relatively little space in academic journals compared to the implications for economic policy of the “rational expectations hypothesis” that firms and households base their decisions on all available information including the past behavior of policymakers. When combined by Sargent and Wallace (1975) with the “Lucas supply hypothesis” (Lucas 1973) that explains output changes by current and prior unexpected changes in prices, the idea of rational expectations led to a theorem that nominal demand policy is impotent to affect real output by any kind of systematic policy that responds regularly to past values of economic variables. Although it caused much ferment in academic circles and many heated conference exchanges, the Sargent-Wallace theorem had little impact on policymakers, because its underlying supply hypothesis depended on instantaneous price flexibility and thus seemed more applicable to price-taking yeoman farmers than to the price-setting institutions of the post-war United States. Since 1954 United States price changes have been dominated by inertia, and it is hard to explain the volatile movements of real GNP by “surprise” changes in the slow-moving aggregate price series.⁴⁵

Another aspect of post-1973 economic performance that influenced prevailing opinion was the inability of earlier studies of the demand for money to explain the evolution of monetary aggregates. These unexplained movements in velocity that Goldfeld soon labeled “The Case of the Missing Money” eroded part of the intellectual underpinning of the case for a constant-growth-rate monetarist rule. As Poole (1970) had shown, instability in the demand for money provides a justification for using interest rates as well as a monetary aggregate as instruments of monetary policy.

2.6.2 Major Surprises of the 1973–79 Period

Demand Fluctuations

The relation between the four-quarter changes in nominal GNP and money displayed in figure 2.4a are not nearly as close as during 1960–73. Not only did the trend velocity of $M2$ begin again to grow after a long period of constancy, but the timing of growth peaks in nominal GNP was quite different from that of peaks in money. Between early 1976 and early 1979 $M2$ growth was fastest in just the period when nominal GNP growth was slowest, i.e., between late 1976 and mid-1977. On the basis of the widespread prediction in early 1976 that the velocity of $M2$ would continue to be stable, monetary policy performed quite




Fig. 2.4a

admirably in keeping the four-quarter change of $M2$ growth between early 1976 and early 1979 within the relatively narrow range of 8.5 percent to 10.5 percent. Nevertheless this record of monetary stability did not prevent nominal GNP growth from accelerating to a four-quarter change ending in 1979:1 of 13.3 percent, faster than any similar change recorded during the previous twenty-seven years.

A comparison with similar figures for the earlier postwar subperiods suggests that both nominal GNP and monetary growth were more stable during 1973–79 than before. There were no sharp decelerations in monetary growth as had occurred in 1959–60 or 1969–70. In fact the modest 1975 slowdown in the growth rate of $M2$ was less marked than the 1948 and 1966 episodes. The fact that nominal GNP growth slowed down so much more than monetary growth, and rebounded more at the end of the recession, resembles the pro-cyclical fluctuations in velocity that occurred in the 1950s and probably results from the extent of the inventory correction that was required in 1974–75. In any case, nothing in the *nominal* figures plotted in figure 2.4a would indicate to an uninformed reader that the 1974–75 recession was the most serious of the postwar era. The real story of that recession is of instability of prices in one direction and real GNP in the opposite direction.

The components of real GNP in key quarters during the 1973–79 interval are displayed in table 2.5. The severity of the 1973–75 recession is evident both in the behavior of real GNP and real final sales. The final sales decline between the cyclical peak and trough amounted to 3 percent of GNP, as compared to less than 2 percent in both 1954 and 1958. On top of that the shift from inventory accumulation in the peak quarter to nonaccumulation in the trough quarter amounted to 3.5 percent of real GNP, again higher than in any previous recession. The

Table 2.5 Real GNP (1972 Prices) and Its Components, Selected Quarters during the 1973–79 Interval

	Cyclical Peak 1973:4 (1)	Cyclical Trough 1975:1 (2)	Growth- Cycle Peak 1978:4 (3)	Latest Quarter 1979:3 (4)
A. Natural Real GNP	1,219.0	1,262.0	1,428.0	1,461.9
B. Real GNP	1,242.6	1,161.1	1,426.6	1,430.8
1. Real final sales	1,217.2	1,181.6	1,414.6	1,420.8
2. Inventory change	25.4	-20.5	12.0	10.0
C. Consumption of Nondurables and Services	647.7	648.6	768.2	777.8
D. Fixed Investment	317.4	275.9	370.5	370.6
1. Consumer durables	118.1	106.0	152.1	147.0
2. Residential	54.0	35.4	60.0	56.0
3. Nonresidential	132.4	114.4	145.5	148.2
4. Net exports	12.9	20.1	12.9	19.4
E. Government Purchases	252.0	257.1	276.0	272.6
1. Federal	94.3	94.8	99.3	97.6
2. State and local	157.7	162.2	176.6	175.0

decline in real final sales was uniformly severe in each component of consumer and business investment. Because the peak-to-trough growth in state and local government spending was unusually slow by past historical standards, and because federal spending did not increase, the only stabilizing component of expenditure was net exports.

The 1975–78 recovery can be contrasted to the recovery between the 1970 cyclical trough and the 1973 growth-cycle peak. In both cases the recoveries proceeded without any push from federal government spending and were led by consumer and business investment. The main differences between the two expansions were in their intensity and duration; while nominal GNP growth was as rapid during most of the 1975–78 expansion as during 1972–73, there was no controls program to hold down inflation, so that more of the recent expansion took the form of price increases and less the form of real GNP growth. The evolution of the economy after 1978:4 was very similar to that after 1973:1. In both cases there was a sideways movement of real GNP that occurred as a supply-induced acceleration of inflation “used up” the available growth in nominal GNP. The 1979 situation was healthier than that in 1973, however, because there was no spurt of excessive inventory accumulation such as occurred in 1973:4. Nevertheless, the economy collapsed in March 1980, eighteen months after the growth-cycle peak,

repeating almost exactly the lag between the 1973:1 growth-cycle peak and the collapse in October 1974.

Supply Phenomena

The role of supply shocks in determining the behavior of inflation and real output growth in the 1973–75 recession stands out quite clearly in figure 2.4b. The four-quarter inflation rate steadily accelerated between early 1973 and early 1975 and then decelerated even faster. A rough estimate is that the peak four-quarter inflation rate of almost 12 percent can be broken down as follows: an underlying 5 percent inflation rate, plus the delayed impact of excessive demand growth in 1973 amounting to about 2 percent, plus an effect of energy and food prices of about 3 percent, plus the effect of the postcontrols rebound of another 2 percent. The precise allocation of these estimates depends on the particular quarter in question, since the direct impact of higher energy and food prices reached its peak at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, while the postcontrols rebound had its greatest effect in the last half of 1974.

Some commentators argue that the rapid deceleration of inflation after the recession trough proves that restrictive demand management can be a very effective anti-inflationary policy within a short period of time. But this interpretation of the inflation slowdown of 1975–76 flies in the face of everything else we know about the postwar period, including the extremely gradual slowdown in inflation during the 1958 and 1960 recessions, the absence of any significant slowdown in 1970–71 prior to the controls, and the transient nature of several components of the 1974 inflation. If OPEC raises the level of the relative price of oil, the




Fig. 2.4b

rate of change of that relative price will temporarily increase and then later decrease. Similarly, the postcontrols rebound was temporary by nature. Thus most of the moderation of inflation in 1975–76 had little to do with restrictive demand policy, although it does seem clear that there was a remaining component that can be attributed to the recession itself.⁴⁶

In 1978–79 inflation accelerated once again almost to the level reached in late 1974 and early 1975. Although the precise details of timing were different, the basic nature of the 1978–79 episode was similar. There was no price controls program to produce a rebound, but there were increases in relative prices of food and energy once again, as well as some effect of the increasing utilization of resources during 1968. But most popular discussions exaggerated both the intensity of the 1979 inflation and the role of excessive demand growth causing it. In 1979:3 the National Income Accounts personal consumption deflator (PCD) increased at an annual rate of 10 percent, of which fully 3.3 percentage points were due to the direct effect of the higher relative prices of food and energy. The net, or energy-and-food-consumption deflator, increased at a rate of 6.7 percent, only about one percentage point faster than its 1976–77 pace, far less of an acceleration than the misleading eight percentage point speedup in inflation as registered by the CPI. Most commentaries on the unprecedented discrepancy between the PCD and CPI emphasized the flaws of the latter rather than the former. As of the third quarter of 1979 there had not yet been any decline in real GNP on a four-quarter change basis as had occurred throughout 1974 and the first half of 1975, reflecting the fact that nominal GNP growth had been faster during 1979 and inflation slower than at the same stage of the 1974–75 cycle. The decline in real GNP finally occurred in 1980:2.

The behavior of unemployment and the GNP gap are displayed in figures 2.4c and d. The duration of the recovery between early 1975 and late 1978 is similar to that between early 1961 and late 1964. Each period finished with the economy arriving at its natural rate of unemployment and output, with the magnitude of reduction in unemployment and the GNP gap greater in the 1975–78 recovery because of the deeper trough of the preceding recession. Then after late 1978 the economy took a totally different turn that after late 1964. Whereas the slow and steady expansion in the earlier episode had been followed by a rapid drop in the GNP gap as Vietnam War spending began, in 1979 the supply inflation used up most of the available nominal GNP growth and caused the GNP gap to increase.

The laments of economic policymakers at their inability to stop supply inflation in 1979 echoed those of 1974. But now in 1979 there was a new supply-side problem. The pace of productivity expansion had progressively slowed during the 1975–78 economic recovery in comparison




Fig. 2.4c

with the experience in previous recoveries. By late 1979 it appeared that the secular growth rate in productivity might be less than one percent, and a search for the causes of the secular slowdown stimulated a number of studies that were as interesting as they were inconclusive.⁴⁷ Because some foreign nations had not suffered as great a slowdown in productivity or as great an acceleration in inflation, the unfortunate supply events of 1978–79 had the healthy effect of forcing chauvinistic United States economists to pay more attention to the condition of the outside world. There was no agreement, however, as to whether the poor United States productivity and inflation performances were related, or whether there was some deeper social problem in American society.⁴⁸

2.6.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy

Different standards must be applied in judging policymakers who are forced to react to supply shocks and those who live in a relatively peaceful world in which demand instability is the only problem. Since a supply shock in the form of higher prices of food or energy must worsen either inflation or unemployment, and usually both, policymakers cannot hope to escape criticism. Recent evaluations of this policy problem have pointed to the relative rigidity of the United States nominal aggregate wage rate as the central factor allowing an accommodative monetary policy in response to shocks like those faced by the United States in 1973–74 and 1979. And Gramlich's (1979) calculations show that a reasonable weighting of the relative welfare costs of unemployment and inflation makes an accommodative reaction yield a much higher level of social welfare than does an "extinguishing" reaction that attempts to beat the inflation out of the system.

Even among those who do not agree with the details of these studies there appears to be little disagreement that policymakers made a serious mistake in allowing monetary growth to decelerate in 1974–75. The remaining question is whether an acceleration should have been allowed to occur, and if so how much. This debate is unlikely ever to be settled, because it depends not only on one's ability to trust econometric evaluations of the consequences of alternative policies, but one's guess as to whether there would have been a wage acceleration in response to more accommodative policies as occurred in Sweden, Italy, and the United Kingdom.⁴⁹ Those who thought that the greater public awareness of inflation would substantially increase the low degree of "pass through" of commodity prices into wages must be amazed by the incredible inertia displayed by data on aggregate wage change in 1979 and 1980. Despite a doubling of the rate of consumer price inflation since 1977 (by the GNP measure), there has been barely one percentage point of acceleration of wage change.

To add to the humility forced upon United States policymakers by their vulnerability to supply shocks and the slow rate of secular productivity growth compared to other nations, the 1978–79 period demonstrated that United States policy can no longer be made on the basis of domestic considerations alone. The Federal Reserve no longer has the latitude to make its decision on the degree of supply-shock accommodation in isolation, because the pursuit of tighter monetary policies in Germany and elsewhere may make it impossible for the Fed to accommodate without causing a substantial erosion in the value of the dollar. Not only does a dollar depreciation directly reduce the real income of United States citizens, but it also tends to have unfortunate political side effects, especially when it induces OPEC oil ministers to increase the posted oil price once again. Nevertheless the stimulus of accommodation to United States real income may still be a wise choice to maximize United States welfare, especially if OPEC sets oil prices in relation to the price of a market basket of its imports from all industrialized nations.

While there was no discretionary increase in government spending on goods and services during the 1974–75 recession, as had occurred in 1958, nevertheless fiscal policy deserves credit for the size and timing of the temporary tax rebate and permanent tax reduction introduced in 1975:2. The criticisms leveled at the 1968 tax surcharge apply as well to the 1975 rebate, although recent studies by Blinder (1978) conclude that there was a nonnegligible stabilizing effect. One may also argue that the tax rebate was larger than would otherwise have occurred because policymakers had absorbed the message of the criticism of the earlier episode. Finally, it might be argued that a tax rebate may have a greater effect than a surcharge even if both are equally recognized as temporary,




Fig. 2.4d

because some consumers in a recession may face a liquidity constraint.

The increased attention in macroeconomics to the supply side also applies to fiscal policy. Analysts have pointed to the “wedge” that taxes drive between market prices charged by firms and the take-home pay received by workers. To the extent that after-tax wage increases are relatively slow to adjust to the pressure of restrictive demand policy, there may be room for cost-reducing fiscal changes as an anti-inflation device. For instance, if the social security payroll tax tends to be shifted forward to prices to a greater extent than the personal income tax, then a substitution of income-tax for payroll-tax financing of social security would help to decelerate the inflation rate. The Carter administration’s economic advisers understood this point well but nevertheless allowed major increases in the payroll tax to take place. This and other cost-increasing measures, sometimes called “self-inflicted wounds,” added to the upward pressure on food and energy prices on aggregate inflation. These government-induced supply shocks, including increases in the minimum wage and in the tightness of regulations, as well as in farm price supports, have added to the dilemma faced by the Federal Reserve and increased the chance that the administration will find both inflation and unemployment at record levels (for an election year) in 1980.

Not only did the government inflict wounds on itself and the economy in the late 1970s, but it failed to use fiscal policy creatively to reduce American dependence on imported oil. In Europe and Japan high indirect taxes on energy had long been in effect. These high taxes encouraged energy conservation. In addition, OPEC price increases created a smaller percentage increase in final energy prices—and hence less economic disruption—in Europe and Japan than in the low-tax United

States. As early as 1974 American economists had urged adoption of policies to put heavy taxes on energy and to use the revenue to reduce nonenergy prices (either by subsidies or sales tax rebates).⁵⁰

2.7 Conclusion

In contrast to the interwar period when fiscal policy was faced with the problem of offsetting both a collapse in private spending and the destabilizing impact of monetary restriction and bank failures, in the postwar period external events were the most important single destabilizing force, most obviously in the direct impact of Korean and Vietnam defense expenditures on real GNP and in the effect of the formation of the OPEC oil cartel in the 1970s on inflation and unemployment. The record of stabilization policy is mixed. The three most successful episodes of fiscal stabilization were the prompt increase in taxes to finance the Korean War in 1950, the countercyclical expansion of government expenditures in 1958, and the tax rebate and permanent tax reduction of 1975. Although the 1958 and 1975 episodes had stabilizing effects, nevertheless they were both too little and too late. The most destabilizing fiscal episode was the failure to raise taxes to finance the Vietnam War promptly in 1965–66, leading to deficits and pressure on the Federal Reserve to expand the money supply excessively in 1967 and 1968.

A major theme of this study has been the changing relation between changes in nominal GNP and money. Over the middle part of the postwar era, roughly between 1958 and 1973, accelerations and decelerations in monetary growth regularly preceded movements in nominal GNP growth of roughly the same magnitude. Monetary policy has not only been potent but also inept, bearing responsibility for the unnecessary recession of 1960, the excessive expansion of nominal GNP growth in 1967–68, the recession of 1969–70, and the second episode of excessive growth in 1972–73.

The character of business fluctuations differed both before 1958 and after 1973. In the first postwar decade monetary policy provided a stable framework for an economy that suffered from business cycles as a result of unstable government defense expenditures and to a lesser extent because of autonomous fluctuations in exports. Only during the pre-Accord period did monetary policy aggravate a business cycle, as when it allowed monetary growth to decelerate substantially in 1948. After 1973, demand fluctuations lost their central role as an explanation of business cycles and took second place to supply shocks. Monetary authorities made a mistake in slowing monetary growth in response to the first supply shock episode in 1973–74 but do not bear a major responsibility for the timing of that recession. In 1979 obsolete operating rules for monetary policy (abandoned in October 1979) caused overly

slow monetary growth rates in the winter and overly rapid rates in the summer; a relatively stable performance when measured by four-quarter changes was not viewed as stable by speculators, so that the Fed found its freedom of choice regarding the desirable degree of accommodation of the 1979 supply shock was impeded by its sensitivity to external events and opinion.

Economic ideas rarely lead economic events but usually follow them. Although the relation between money and income was quite close after 1958, the monetarist case for policy rules and against discretionary activism did not make much progress as an intellectual framework until the simultaneous coincidence in 1968 of an inflation that accelerated beyond the predictions of existing models, a tax surcharge that failed in its announced mission of slowing the economy, and a presidential address by the most articulate and influential monetarist thinker. After a brief hegemony events once again caused a shift in opinion, and the monetarist tide ebbed under the pressure of supply shocks that added a new reason to question the optimality of fixed monetary growth rules and as new "money demand puzzles" were discovered. Not only were variations in the monetary growth rate incapable of explaining the variations in the inflation rate during the 1970s, but monetarists were forced to cede the frontier of creative policy thinking to nonmonetarist schemes for using taxes and subsidies to counter the impact of the OPEC cartel.

Despite the multitudes of economists who make their living by forecasting the future, and despite the brilliance of a small minority among them, virtually all the "surprises" recorded in this paper have eluded prediction. The predicted postwar deflation and depression failed to occur; the flexibly responding price level that dropped in recessions gave way to the stable Phillips curve tradeoff which in turn gave way to the natural rate hypothesis; the "new economics" of fiscal activism brought not permanent high employment but rather transient job gains at the cost of permanent inflation; an OPEC oil cartel that was initially dismissed as about to collapse and irrelevant for macroeconomics actually ushered in an entirely new way of thinking about economic fluctuations in which aggregate-demand policymakers are hapless passive agents and must cede center stage to supply-side policymakers with their redistributive tax and subsidy schemes; the arrival of flexible exchange rates brought not a new autonomy for the United States but rather a new dependence on the opinions of foreign bankers and speculators.

Nevertheless as the 1980s began it was hard to avoid the conclusion that pessimism had been carried too far. Many United States commentators were so immersed in lamenting American problems that they neglected to notice a different environment in some other nations. Life went on in France and Italy with gasoline at three dollars per gallon, suggesting great potential in the United States for a massive tax on

imported oil to be rebated in the form of subsidies or tax reductions on nonenergy goods and services. Productivity growth continued, albeit at a slower rate than before 1973, everywhere but in the United States and the United Kingdom, suggesting that the solution to the United States productivity puzzle might begin by dismantling United States policies that raised costs, discouraged saving, and protected lame-duck industries and companies. Ironically the United States institution of staggered and decentralized wage bargaining which in 1970–71 had impeded the government's fight against demand-induced inflation actually proved to be a blessing in dealing with supply-induced inflation, since sluggish nominal wage adjustment made the United States real wage more flexible than that in most other industrialized countries. As the United States entered the 1980s, a long agenda of positive and forceful economic actions lay gathering dust, awaiting the new broom of a positive and forceful politician.

Notes

1. The dichotomy between aggregate demand and supply factors, while useful for expository purposes, should not blind us to the numerous interactions between demand and supply factors. For instance, how strong are the forces that tend to bring about an equality between aggregate demand and supply? What is the optimal demand management policy in response to a supply shock? R. J. Gordon (1975b) has emphasized the two-way interaction between wage-setting institutions and monetary policy, while Lucas (1976) has stated the general principle that private behavior (on both the demand and supply sides) should depend on policy actions and more generally on the evolution of all economic variables.

2. The loose connection between money and nominal GNP throughout the 1929–41 period is particularly evident in quarterly data, as demonstrated by R. J. Gordon and Wilcox (1980).

3. The increased role of government has reduced the multiplier effect of autonomous changes in spending and thus stabilized the economy. Hickman and Coen (1976, p. 194) estimate a multiplier for changes in real autonomous spending (for five years after the change) of 5.09 under the conditions of 1926–40 and only 2.10 under the conditions of 1951–65. R. J. Gordon (1978, p. 494) has calculated that the automatic fiscal stabilizers absorbed only 5.5 percent of the decline in GNP in 1932, but 36.9 percent in 1975.

4. Many competing labels have been suggested for the state of unemployment that is compatible with steady inflation. Next to Friedman's "natural rate" label, the next most frequently used is probably the NAIRU (Non-accelerating-inflation-rate-of-unemployment) coined by Modigliani and Papademos (1975) and Michael Wachter (1976).

5. Starting with the 1977 *Economic Report of the President* the official Council of Economic Advisers' estimate of potential real GNP has been revised downward by a large amount. For instance, the estimate of potential real GNP in the 1979 report for 1976 is about \$90 billion (or 6 percent) lower than the estimate for the

same year in the 1976 report. See *Economic Report of the President* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1979), chart 7, p. 75. This revision consists partly of a more pessimistic estimate of the long-term growth of labor productivity and partly a less ambitious 5.1 percent unemployment rate criterion in contrast to the old 4.0 percent criterion. The figures shown in table 2.1 for natural real GNP were created by Perloff and Wachter (1979) for 1955–79 and by R. J. Gordon (1978) for earlier years.

6. This judgment is related to the absence of any other explanation of the remarkable growth of real GNP between 1948 and 1951.

7. The most accessible discussion of the puzzle is Denison (1979).

8. Modigliani's (1977) presidential address emphasizes the inability of monetary aggregates to explain the instability of the inflation rate in the 1970s.

9. The consequences of supply shocks are studied in Gordon (1975a) and Phelps (1978).

10. While it does not use the IS-LM apparatus, the discussion of monetary policy in the second edition of Samuelson's textbook (1951, pp. 372–75) is titled "The Inadequacies of Monetary Control of the Business Cycle" and states that "superhuman efforts" are necessary to reduce long-term interest rates and that "investment is likely to be inelastic with respect to the interest rate." Included in the discussion (without qualification) is the famous phrase, "You can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink" (p. 373).

11. An attempt to provide a statistical estimate of the role of money in the Great Contraction, quarter by quarter, is provided by R. J. Gordon and Wilcox (1980).

12. This stability of prices is particularly evident in the monthly CPI figures for the period between the summers of 1938 and 1940.

13. See Samuelson (1951, pp. 287–88).

14. To Samuelson's credit, he noted this problem (albeit briefly), and wrote: "Even more ominous is the possibility that prices may begin to shoot up long before full employment is reached. As a result full employment may never be reached" (1951, p. 303).

15. Beveridge (1945, p. 200). For a hopeful view that administered contracts and wage bargaining would make prices relatively inflexible and prevent an inflationary spiral at full employment, see Dunlop (1947), a paper that can be cited as a precursor of recent attempts by Phelps and Winter (1970) and Okun (1975) to explain why some wages and prices are administered rather than set in continuously clearing auction markets.

16. See especially Graham (1947).

17. There is no discussion at all in Samuelson (1951) of productivity, economic growth, or economic development, except for treatments of Malthus, depopulation, and secular stagnation.

18. The 1955 model change did not just involve a face-lift. Chevrolet and Plymouth introduced V-8 engines for the first time. The hedonic price literature identifies a very substantial increase in automobile quality relative to price in 1955.

19. A full exploration of this topic is outside of the scope of this paper. For a more complete discussion see Sachs (1980) and Gordon (1980).

20. This interpolation procedure is more intricate than is described in the text and is described in R. J. Gordon (1978, app. C).

21. A unique feature of inflation in 1956–57 is that the acceleration in wages occurred before that in consumer prices. This timing pattern can be explained by wage-price models in which the effective minimum wage is a determinant of wage change, since the largest postwar increase in minimum wage occurred in 1956:1.

22. See R. J. Gordon (1979).

23. The postwar history of the full-employment surplus is given in R. J. Gordon (1978, p. 491).

24. A concise guided tour of contemporary opinion would include Tobin's (1953) review of the Patman Inquiry documents, Gurley's (1960) review article on the Radcliffe Report, Brunner's (1961) review article on the Report of the Commission on Money and Credit, and Harry Johnson's (1962) review article on monetary theory and policy. Prior to the publication of the Friedman-Schwartz monetary history (1963), probably the most influential pieces by Friedman were his original policy statement (1948), the book with his student that helped to revive a new version of the quantity theory (1956), the article on money demand that minimized the role of the interest rate (1959), and the work with Meiselman that set the quantity theory in competition with the Keynesian multiplier approach (1963).

25. A concise contemporary critique of those who opposed flexible monetary policy is contained in Friedman (1951).

26. The velocity of $M2$ was 2.38 in 1960, and 2.43 in 1977. Afterwards velocity rose to 2.51 in 1978 and 2.59 in 1979:3. An adjusted measure of $M2$ that incorporates financial innovations in the late 1970s retains the earlier characteristic of constant velocity—see R. J. Gordon (1979a).

27. Nevertheless, Clark (1979) has recently concluded that the simple accelerator theory outperforms other theories of investment behavior that emphasize the importance of changing interest rates and tax incentives.

28. A diagrammatic illustration of "crowding out" in 1966 is provided in R. J. Gordon (1978, pp. 127–29).

29. The extremes in the four-quarter change in the GNP deflator over the 1957–67 period were a peak of 3.9 percent in 1957:1, trough of 1.3 percent in 1958:3, peak of 2.4 percent in 1959:2, trough of 0.6 percent in 1961:1, peak of 2.1 percent in 1962:4, and trough of 1.3 percent in 1964:1, peak of 3.7 percent in 1966:4, and trough of 2.5 percent in 1967:2. The 1961–62–64 fluctuation provides part of the foundation for the current econometric conclusion that part of the influence of demand on prices represents the effect of the rate-of-change of output, not just the size of the output gap, as shown in R. J. Gordon (1979a). The same paper examines implications of econometric estimates from the 1954–77 period for economic policy in 1979–80.

30. Edmund Phelps reports that his first (1967) paper was written in the first half of 1966.

31. We note that real federal expenditures on goods and services rose by 6.1 percent between the 1957:3 peak cyclical quarter and 1958:4, and then declined by 6.4 percent between 1958:4 and 1960:1. Perhaps more surprising and remarkable is the record of state-local real spending on goods and services, with a 12.6 percent expansion in the first period and only a 0.5 percent rise in the second period, a record that presumably reflects the influence of monetary policy on state-local spending rather than any conscious attempt to pursue an activist countercyclical policy. The combined effect of government spending was thus strongly stabilizing, and I believe that the negative correlation of real GNP and real government spending during this episode accounts for much of the finding in reduced-form "St. Louis regressions" of GNP on money and government expenditures that fiscal policy is impotent. In my 1971 article I drew attention to the stabilizing role of government spending in 1958 and the negative correlation of private investment and government spending in 1953–55 as events that explain the low multipliers on fiscal variables in St. Louis-type reduced-form equations. A more general analysis

of the consequences of endogenous monetary and fiscal policy for such equations is presented by Goldfeld and Blinder (1972).

32. See Bach (1971, p. 100), and R. A. Gordon (1974, pp. 133–36).

33. I have previously (1970, pp. 501–5) presented in more detail the argument that the lack of careful specification of the role of monetary policy in contemporary econometric models was directly to blame for the excessive rate of monetary expansion in 1968.

34. Phelps (1967) and Friedman's December 1967 Presidential Address to the American Economics Association made essentially the same point. Although Friedman's presentation had a greater impact and was responsible for the coinage of the "natural rate" terminology, Phelps' 1968 paper attracted considerable attention at the August, 1967, conference of the American Bankers Association.

35. Credit for the distinction between the investment dependence on the real interest rate and money-demand dependence on the nominal interest rate belongs with Mundell (1963).

36. If the auto output figures for 1970:4 and 1971:1 are simply averaged together to eliminate the effects of the strike, we conclude that real GNP would have been \$9.9 billion higher and real final sales \$5.8 billion higher in 1970:4, thus making aggregate real final sales in that quarter about \$4 billion higher than in the peak 1969 quarter.

37. Thus perhaps Paul Samuelson's old challenge to his students to explain automobile sales in 1955 should be replaced by a challenge to a newer generation of econometricians to explain the configuration of investment in 1973:1.

38. In R. J. Gordon (1972, p. 402) I showed that the data points accumulated during 1969 and 1970 had made the econometric wage equation unable to reject the hypothesis that past price change fed through completely to wages, i.e., that the long-run Phillips curve was vertical.

39. Feige and Pearce's (1973) early evaluation that the controls had little effect on prices was based on the behavior of the CPI. R. J. Gordon (1972) and Blinder and Newton (1978) based their evaluations on the behavior of the GNP deflator, especially for the nonfarm sector.

40. These figures come from R. J. Gordon (1978, p. 251), where adjustments in the figures are explained and citations given.

41. In R. J. Gordon (1979b) the slowdown in productivity growth in the 1966:1–1972:4 period relative to the preceding 1947–65 era is only 0.4 percentage points once cyclical corrections are made, and this difference is not statistically significant.

42. Policy actions during this period are examined in detail in Blinder (1979).

43. The major problem for monetarists was the lack of inflation response to slower monetary growth in 1969–70, thus indicating that the economy's automatic powers of "self-correction" were weak.

44. Gramlich (1979) provides a clear exposition of what he calls the Gordon-Phelps model and sets it in the context of a welfare-maximizing policymaker. Blinder (1980) extends the analysis to deal with alternative OPEC pricing regimes.

45. It is evident from figures 2.1b, 2.2b, 2.3b and 2.4b that changes in real output have *preceded* price changes, leaving little room for unexpected price movements to *explain* output changes.

46. The wage and price equations presented in R. J. Gordon (1979a) indicate that roughly half of the impact of a recession on the inflation process is proportional to the rate of change of unemployment, and the other half to the level of unemployment relative to natural unemployment. Thus inflation tends to decelerate when unemployment is rising, while in the first stages of the recovery, when

unemployment is falling but still well above the natural rate, inflation tends to be relatively constant, as in 1961–63 and 1976–77.

47. See Denison (1979) for the widest ranging discussion of the problem. Other papers either appear in or are cited in the second 1979 issue of the *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*.

48. Symptomatic of the new concern was the press attention given to Vogel (1979).

49. For such econometric evaluations, see Eckstein (1978). Other studies are discussed in Blinder (1979).

50. A discussion of fiscal devices to offset supply shocks is contained in R. J. Gordon (1975a, pp. 194–96). An early advocate of a tax on imported oil to extract part of OPEC's monopoly profit was Houthakker (1976).

2. Arthur M. Okun

Postwar Macroeconomic Performance

I would emphasize the following salient features of the postwar macroeconomic record:

1. Throughout the postwar era, real economic activity has displayed much more stability than it did in earlier United States history.

2. For the first twenty or twenty-five years of the postwar era—but not since then—that greater stability was accompanied by more rapid progress with especially strong growth of both output and productivity.

3. While the superior real performance from the mid-forties to the mid-sixties was not achieved at the expense of a serious departure from price stability, the record since then shows a dramatic and unprecedented chronic inflation accompanying the deterioration of real performance.

4. In subtle but important ways, both the good news and the bad news of the postwar era reflect the categorical imperative of policymaking established at the beginning of that era—namely the avoidance of an encore of the Great Depression.

The Stability of Real Activity

Throughout the postwar era including the seventies, economic activity has been far more stable than it was in previous United States history. The standard deviation of real GNP around its growth trend in 1946–76 was about one-fourth as large as it had been in 1900–45, and only half

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The views expressed are the author's and are not necessarily those of the officers, trustees, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution.

as large as in the "golden age" of 1900–16, 1920–29, omitting wartime and depression years in the prewar era (Baily 1978). The contrast in the cyclical chronology is equally striking: the average duration of business-cycle expansions between 1854 and 1937 was twenty-six months, and that of recessions twenty-one months. From 1945 to 1975, expansions averaged forty-eight months in length and recessions, eleven months. Thus, the economy spent only 19 percent, rather than 45 percent, of the elapsed time in recession. The longest and deepest postwar recession (1973–75) was shorter than the median prewar recession and less severe than four of the nine recessions of the 1900–38 period.

This quantum jump in stability—this taming of the business cycle—must, in my judgment, be credited to public policy. It was made in Washington. I suspect that the largest single stabilizing development stemmed from a change that was not designed to enhance macroeconomic stability, namely the increased size of the public sector as a share of GNP. That compositional shift created a large component of the total economy that was not sensitive to cyclical fluctuations and that resisted multiplier-accelerator interactions. On the income side, the counterpart to the growth in the public sector was the increase in marginal tax rates, which cut the size of investment multipliers. The growth of transfer payments also created important automatic stabilizers: unemployment insurance benefits alone have bolstered private purchasing power *during recession periods* by more than the total of discretionary stimulative fiscal actions of the postwar era. The absence of the financial panic element that was a hallmark of prewar recessions reflects, in part, the development of federal deposit insurance and other types of federal financial regulation as well as the willingness and ability of the Federal Reserve to contain the ripple effects of major failures and defaults.

Private decision makers gradually realized that the government had the tools of demand management to prevent catastrophes of depression magnitude. And that recognition helped to alleviate, and ultimately to end, the fears of an encore of the thirties, which were intense at the beginning of the postwar era. The perceived reduction of catastrophe risks, in turn, contributed to less volatile shifts by decision makers in response to those fluctuations that did emerge, as Baily suggests.

Fiscal and monetary policy were geared up appropriately to avoid catastrophes, but their record in dealing with the relatively minor accidents that in fact occurred is mixed. Gordon ably traces that experience in his background paper. I shall merely underline a few of the lessons. Some of the better stabilization performances came early in the postwar era. An appropriately large federal surplus was maintained during 1947 and 1948. In terms of macroeconomic stabilization, the Korean War was by far the best managed military emergency in United States history

—presenting a sharp contrast with the subsequent Vietnam experience. But, during recession periods, fiscal policy was uniformly slow on the trigger. Indeed, it is fair to conclude that no significant discretionary stimulative fiscal action was adopted while the economy was still in recession. A borderline case was the tax cut enacted in March 1975, which was the month of the business-cycle trough. Most of the strongly stimulative fiscal actions were taken in the first year of recovery. On occasions, these worked effectively to promote the restoration of prosperity; on others, they may have overdone the job—providing a stimulus that was too much too late. Antirecessionary expenditure programs like public works seem to have operated with a lag of half a cycle. (It may be easier to stretch the lag to a full cycle than to cut it appreciably!)

The outstanding applications of restrictive budgetary policy occurred in the fiscal years 1957, 1960, and 1974. And all of these were cases of too much too late. At the end of the fiscal years 1957 and 1960, celebrations on the achievement of federal budgetary surpluses were followed immediately by mourning over the onset of recession. The lessons inferred from those experiences contributed to the general acceptance of federal deficits as a normal and appropriate state of affairs in the sixties and the seventies.

Monetary policy as well was too slow on the trigger in reacting to recessions. The growth rate of money remained below average right through the trough of most recessions, even in those cases when (as Gordon emphasizes) it accelerated relative to the peak of the previous expansion. Often, like fiscal policy, monetary policy turned markedly expansionary during the first year of recovery. A generally accommodating stance was maintained for too long during several expansions, followed by shifts to restraint that were too much too late.

The record provides some illuminating examples of bad and good applications of the fiscal-monetary mix. In the face of the massive fiscal stimulus of butter and Vietnam guns, the Federal Reserve in 1966–67 demonstrated that it could do the whole macro job. Tightening enough to generate a virtual cessation of money growth, it achieved a nonrecessionary slowdown that cooled inflation. But the macro success was accompanied by serious micro distortions: a collapse in homebuilding, an acute mortgage famine, a general contraction of availability in credit markets, and major capital losses on bonds and equities. Then in late 1967 and 1968, monetary policy was clearly too stimulative because the Federal Reserve refused to risk an encore of these distortions. A good mix performance is illustrated by the 1964–65 tax cuts, when fiscal policy played an active role and monetary policy carried an accommodative role. That strategy was superior to the alternatives of relying on a unilateral fiscal stimulus or on a unilateral monetary stimulus. In the latter

case, in order to provide an equivalent stimulus, interest rates would have had to be reduced substantially, thereby risking an overstimulus to homebuilding and exacerbation of the balance-of-payments problem.

I read the undistinguished record of cyclical stabilization as suggesting ample opportunities for improvement. We have to try harder—not cease the effort.

Deteriorating Growth Performance

Until recently, the greater stability of the postwar era was accompanied by more rapid progress. The average annual growth rate of real GNP was 3.8 percent from 1948 to 1973, far surpassing the average rate of 2.8 percent for 1909–29 and 2.3 percent for 1929–48. Moreover, when allowances were made for the size of the “net gap” under these trend lines connecting prosperity years, the superiority of postwar performance is even clearer: the net gap averaged zero for 1948–73; it averaged 5 percent of GNP in 1909–29 and 12 percent of GNP in 1929–48. Finally, output per hour worked rose at an average rate of 3 percent per year through most of the postwar era, a substantial improvement over the 2 percent par for the course in the earlier periods.

For 1973–78, however, the annual growth rate of real GNP averaged only 2.5 percent. And that growth was accomplished only as the result of an especially rapid increase in the labor force and employment, while the trend growth of output per hour worked apparently slowed to a mere one percent a year. The productivity slowdown has generated a vast amount of interesting economic research, which is often inconclusive. One important consensus finding is that slower growth of capital per unit of labor accounts for *part but only part* of the slowdown. That slower growth of the capital-labor ratio in turn has two components. If the ratio of investment to GNP in recent years had matched its historical average, the capital-labor ratio would have displayed unusually slow growth in view of the especially rapid growth of the labor force. In fact, in the latter part of the 1973–75 recession and for some considerable time in the subsequent recovery, the ratio of business fixed investment to GNP ran considerably below its historical average.

Chronic Inflation

The other outstanding dimension of deteriorating economic performance in recent years is the rapid and accelerating pattern of inflation since the mid-sixties. The chronic inflation that has survived slack and recession is an unprecedented experience for Americans. Fourteen years ago, when the United States economy (and, incidentally, the reputation of economists) looked brightest, Gardner Ackley (1966, p. 176) warned: “It is easy to prescribe expansionary policies in a period of

slack. Managing high-level prosperity is a vastly more difficult business and requires vastly superior knowledge." The price record demonstrates that we have not had the skill to manage high-level prosperity.

Actually, in terms of the ability of the federal government to forecast and control the course of *nominal* GNP, demand management has been especially successful in the past decade. The official annual "Troika" forecasts of nominal GNP were distinctly more accurate in the seventies than they had been in the sixties—with an average absolute error of 0.75 percent compared to 1.3 percent. (This brings up to date a fact previously noted by William Fellner. I assure you that the improvement should not be attributed to a lower quality of the people doing the Troika forecasting in the sixties!)

In fact, control over nominal GNP is all that monetary and general fiscal policy can be expected to achieve. They cannot control the "split" of the growth of nominal GNP between its real and its inflation components. But errors in forecasting the split have been serious and costly. In 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, and 1979, inflation was *under*predicted by a percentage point or more while the growth of real GNP was *over*predicted by a point or more. The year 1974 is the most egregious case: the nominal GNP forecast was nearly perfect, with offsetting errors of about two and a half percentage points each for the GNP deflator and real GNP.

The big errors in assessing the split stemmed initially from continued econometric reliance on the short-run Phillips curve. It was hard to cast aside a tool that had traced the United States record so well from 1954 through the late sixties. And it was easy to ignore the Friedman and Phelps attack on the stability of the short-run Phillips curve, and their prophetic warning (issued at a time when the Phillips curve was still performing admirably) that the curve would come unstuck in a prolonged period of excess demand. Unfortunately, most of the profession (including me) took too long to recognize that. Since 1970, the Phillips curve has been an unidentified flying object and has eluded all econometric efforts to nail it down.

A second major contributor to the split errors was the widespread misassessment of the inflationary significance of supply shocks, such as those in food during 1973 and in fuel during 1974 and 1979. Paradoxically, the theory that correctly predicted the shifting Phillips curve implied incorrectly that the rising prices of these items would be offset by reductions in other prices—with no significant effect on the price level at given utilization rates. Indeed, it is now clear that the shocks generate not merely a "one-shot" rise in the price level but a further inflationary chain reaction through the influence of consumer prices on wages. Here again, the policymakers and much of the profession ignored timely warn-

ings and constructive policy prescriptions, offered, in this case, by Gordon, Perry, and me.

The third major source of split errors was the inadequate recognition of the inertial patterns of wages (and prices) in the sectors governed by implicit and explicit contracts. The experience of 1974–75 reinforced previous evidence that the first-year effect of cutting nominal GNP by \$1 is a reduction between 10¢ and 20¢ in the inflation bill and a reduction in output between 80¢ and 90¢. The stark verdict emerges that, unless that split can be improved, an attack on inflation pursued solely by monetary-fiscal restraint would cost roughly \$200 billion of production per point of reduction in the inflation rate.

Policymaking has suffered even more from an incorrect qualitative assessment of the broader implications of inflation than from the quantitative errors in forecasting inflation. The costs of perceived inflation are not extra trips to the bank, as most models would have it, but rather a crawl away from money. The entire system of transactions in the United States economy has been built on the dollar as a unit of account and a yardstick. Because the price level at the start of World War II was just about where it had been at the end of the Civil War, people took money seriously. The nominal unit became the foundation of our financial system, our accounting system, our corporate and personal planning and scorekeeping, our tax system, and our explicit and implicit contracts.

The crawl away from money proceeds along many lines: pressures for cost-of-living escalators; the erosion of model-year pricing and orders with guaranteed prices at delivery; the scrapping of pricing formulas that rest objectively on historical costs; the agonizing, slow shift to last-in–first out (LIFO) accounting; and the transformation of capital budgeting to incorporate explicit though highly uncertain inflation forecasts.

In asset markets, portfolios shift away from long-term, fixed-interest nominal assets toward the time-honored refuges from inflation—readily resalable tangible assets such as real estate, precious metals, and art objects. But the inflation hedges are far less liquid and involve much higher transactions costs than do nominal assets. And even the most sophisticated investor cannot construct a portfolio whose real value will be neutral with respect to the inflation rate. Moreover, because various categories of prices and wages respond with differential sensitivity to the general price level, inflation is inevitably nonneutral in its micro effects: it must change relative prices and relative wages and must reshuffle real incomes in an arbitrary and haphazard way.

The obsolescence of the capital invested in the dollar as a yardstick and the enforced lottery in the income distribution make inflation extremely unpopular. Yet the government seems incapable of solving the problem; and rationally grounded fears grow that the era of chronic

inflation will end ultimately only through either a prolonged deep recession or a prolonged application of stultifying price and wage controls. In this environment of uncertain and pessimistic expectations, is it really a mystery why common stocks are depressed, why capital spending is not ebullient and why it is focused on short-term projects, or why the public's confidence in our basic institutional structure and its future has plummeted?

There are ample grounds for the suspicion (previously voiced by Denison and Fellner) that various aspects of our chronic inflation may account for some of the puzzle of the productivity slowdown. In coping with the uncertain value of the dollar, buyers and sellers face genuine increases in their real transactions costs. Managerial effort is diverted from the promotion of productivity to the development of nonmonetary yardsticks. The search for inflation hedges may distort the composition of investment. Uncertainty shrinks the time horizon and creates an aversion to long-lived projects, which may embody particularly large elements of technical change. Research and development budgets may get squeezed as well in an era of mounting inflation for the same reason that desserts vanish from table d'hôte dinners. These are all conjectures, but they deserve serious investigation in the continuing effort to resolve the productivity puzzle.

A Concluding Perspective

The postwar era began with widespread anxiety about a relapse into another Great Depression. The categorical imperative of policy was to avoid such a relapse; and the success must be measured, not in dollars of real GNP, but in the very survival of United States capitalism. The formulators of the Employment Act of 1946 focused on avoiding catastrophe, but they achieved much more than that: the taming of the business cycle.

Did the crusading zeal to prevent depression bring on the subsequent disease of chronic inflation? Not in the gross ways sometimes alleged. The economy was not generally overheated: Gordon shows a net average gap of real GNP in each of the three postwar decades, relative to his estimates of the "natural" unemployment rate. Nor were investment and saving shortchanged in favor of public or private consumption: the ratio of business fixed investment to GNP compares favorably with the prewar era, and the ratio of gross private saving to GNP in years of prosperity has faithfully obeyed Denison's Law. (I note with envy that that is the one law of an economist that survived the seventies.)

But, in subtle ways, I believe that depression mentality fostered inflation vulnerability. There was an imbalance in policy: it is inconceivable that a four-year recession would have been tolerated in the way that a four-year boom was tolerated in the late sixties. And when an economy

is made depression-proof and deflation-proof, private expectations and conventions become asymmetrical, introducing an inflationary bias into the system. Moreover, there was an asymmetry in the development and deployment of the macroeconomics: our analysis of the determinants of employment and output was and remains far superior to our understanding of fluctuations in the price level and their consequences. There was an imbalance, and it must be corrected through greater emphasis on the price level in the economic policymaking (and the economic analysis) of the eighties.

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3. *Herbert Stein*

Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions

One of the changes that has come over macroeconomics in the postwar period is indicated by the fact that this session is the last on the program. Surely that would not have happened ten or fifteen years ago. Then macroeconomics was the centerpiece of economics. It was the thing we understood and knew how to manage. Now we know that we don't do it very well, either as science or as policy. Moreover, and this is more important for economists, the suspicion is growing that there may not be any macroeconomics. Macroeconomics may only be a lot of microeconomics, the statistically aggregated consequences of microeconomic decisions.

Despite these uncertainties, I will talk about what we have been talking about as macroeconomics for the past thirty or forty years. I would like to relate some of the experiences of one who has been preaching macroeconomic policy during the whole postwar period under review here and from that standpoint explain some of the changes that have occurred in common thinking about the subject. I shall start with the early statements about macroeconomic policy by the Committee for Economic Development, which is a convenient approach for several reasons. The timing is appropriate because these statements came out mostly in the years from 1944 to 1948. The statements were more explicit in their economic and political reasoning than most of that time. They were representative of a certain school of thought, which used to be called "modern conservative" or some such combination of words, and the evolution of this brand of thinking is itself a matter of some contemporary interest. Also, of course, I have more personal contact with this body of thought than with any other of that period.

We were, in the first place, obsessed with the unemployment problem and with high employment as a target of economic policy. This was, of course, the common condition, and the Committee for Economic Development (CED) was less obsessed than others. In fact, after the earliest statements the CED always insisted on using the term "high employment" rather than "full employment," because full employment seemed too ambitious an objective, entailing too much danger of inflation and of government intervention in the free market. Nevertheless, CED did accept the primacy of the employment objective. For example, when it wrote about reform of the tax structure it called its proposal a tax pro-

gram for high employment, and it discussed international economic policy with primary emphasis on its effects on domestic employment.

Moreover, the CED, like almost everyone else at the time, believed that the condition of high employment could be defined by a single statistic, the unemployment rate as then measured, and that the rate corresponding to high employment would, for all practical purposes, remain constant. They also thought that they knew what the number was, within a narrow range. When the committee was working on its key statement on budget policy, which called for running a small surplus at high employment, it debated whether it should define high employment as 4 percent or 5 percent unemployment. Almost twenty years had passed since the last period of extended peacetime high employment, and we had no reliable employment-unemployment statistics for the earlier periods. All we had were some horseback estimates by Sumner Slichter that the sum of seasonal and frictional unemployment would be 4 percent of the labor force. This was not, however, compelling evidence, and the committee could just as well have said 5 percent as 4 percent. The way the committee picked on 4 percent illustrates how such things are done by practical people. The committee wanted to recommend that there should be a surplus at whatever level of employment it defined as high employment. The reason it felt obliged to recommend a surplus was that it wanted to recommend use of the cash-consolidated budget, rather than the administrative budget which excluded the trust accounts and which was in more common use. But if it recommended only balancing the cash-consolidated budget it would be accused of wanting a deficit in what many people still considered the true budget, and the committee was unwilling to face that. But, given its desire to show a moderate surplus, doing that at 5 percent unemployment would require higher tax rates than doing it at 4 percent unemployment, and the committee, which included some big taxpayers, was unwilling to recommend higher taxes. So they settled for 4 percent unemployment as the definition of high employment.

This was one of the early identifications of 4 percent unemployment as the high employment target and was, I think, highly influential. By the mid-1950s, and possibly earlier, this number had become firmly established in public thinking, for no other reason, as far as I can see, than that it was conventional and to challenge it was to risk being called hardhearted. This fixation on the 4 percent unemployment rate, from which we became liberated only slowly, and are not yet fully freed, has been a major obstacle to clear thinking about macroeconomic policy during the years when I was in the government as well as at other times.

Of course, we later learned that, whatever confused idea we may have had about the meaning of high employment at the beginning, we had no good reason ever for thinking it was 4 percent. Also, if it ever had been

4 percent, it undoubtedly changed, and increased, substantially after 1955. Moreover, the changes resulted not only from exogenous forces but also from policy measures, like unemployment compensation. Moreover, the amount of misery connected with unemployment, and the feeling of guilt and responsibility on the part of the community as a whole, all changed. We also came to see that the measurement of unemployment, as disclosed by our survey techniques, had little economic significance and that the distinction between being unemployed and being out of the labor force was slight.

For all of these reasons the use of unemployment as a target of macroeconomic policy became much more controversial, uncertain, and ad hoc than it had seemed to us in 1947. In fact, subsequent developments raise the question whether we did not make a fundamental mistake then in taking unemployment or any other real magnitude as a target of macroeconomic policy. We would probably have done better to fix our attention on stabilizing some nominal variable, like nominal GNP or the price level or the rate of change of either. If we had done that the market would have given us whatever rate of employment could be permanently achieved and we would have escaped the inflationary consequences of trying to achieve an employment rate that was not permanently sustainable.

Contrary to the impressions given by some recent writing, the people of the early postwar period knew that the economy grows, that its growth is a good thing and that its growth can be influenced by public policy. That is, they were not ignorant of the supply side of the economy, even though they were understandably preoccupied, after the 1930 experience, with getting the supply utilized.

The attitudes of the CED differed from presently fashionable notions about the supply side in important respects. CED regarded the demand-side and supply-side problems as existing in two separate boxes. The demand-side problem was one of short-run stabilization. The CED did not believe that any significant contribution to the short-run problem could come from the supply-side measures because their effects would be too small and too slow.

Businessmen have a strong propensity to argue for supply-side solutions to demand-side problems because they like to argue that if you will cut taxes on us we will produce more and that will cure both unemployment and inflation. The supply-side argument is a way of arguing that what is good for us is good for you. I always remember a discussion of this at a CED meeting in 1947 or 1948 when some of the businessmen were arguing for productivity-increasing measures as the solution for inflation. Jacob Viner made what still seems to me the cogent point that the Federal Reserve could do more to create inflation by a stroke

of a pen in one day than all their productivity-increasing effort could do to check inflation in a decade.

In the business community outside the CED and in the Republican party at that time there were people who took what is now the standard supply-side view. That is, during the debates over tax reduction they argued that tax cuts would increase production, cure inflation, prevent a recession, and raise the revenue. They were Lafferites before there was a Laffer curve and possibly before there was a Laffer. Insofar as there was any basis for this, other than wishfulness, it was a romantic memory of the days of Andrew Mellon, just as today's Lafferism is based on a romantic memory of the days of John Kennedy. However, CED did not go along with this.

Even if we leave aside the more extravagant claims of supply-side economics there are important issues about national policy towards growth which have persisted throughout the postwar period. These issues became especially prominent in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have come to the fore again in the last few years.

Some of you may remember this earlier period when there was a competition among presidential hopefuls to see who could promise the highest growth rate. As I remember, the competition was won by Nelson Rockefeller, who offered 5 percent a year, which did not, however, get him the presidency. Around this time CED produced a statement on economic growth which deserves a footnote in the history of economic thought because Edward Denison did the background research. Drafting this statement was a long struggle between the businessmen who wanted to make vague but expansive promises of the addition to growth that would result from certain policy changes, especially in the field of taxation, and the economists who were more reserved and skeptical. This stimulated Denison to try to measure the determinants of economic growth and led to the Denison studies that are now familiar to all of you.

The first publication of Denison's results was in a paper that he and I wrote in 1960 for President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals. The main point was that the difference between a growth rate of 3 percent and a rate of 4 percent was not one percent as commonly thought at the time but 33.3 percent. This meant that in some sense we would have to increase the total of resources devoted to producing growth—the investment, the research, the education, and so on—by one-third, which seemed a tall order and raised the question whether it would be worthwhile. In fact, we concluded in 1960 that making the American economy grow faster was not one of our top-priority objectives.

This question looks a little different today than it did twenty years ago. Then we thought we had a built-in growth rate of 3 percent a year.

Today we don't know what we have. One can, I think, make a stronger case for trying to promote growth now than in 1960. Also, there are a number of measures that would be desirable on other grounds and that would also promote growth—such as tax changes to reduce the discrimination against investment and anti-inflationary policy. However, beyond that it is not easy to find growth-promoting measures that are clearly worth their cost—especially in view of the mystery about the causes of the slowdown in productivity growth.

Of course, the big problem which we did not adequately assess in the immediate postwar years was the inflation problem. It would be wrong to think that we were unaware of the problem. In fact, much of what we said was dictated by fear of it. A primary reason for our resistance to functional finance and discretionary fiscal policy was that, in the political process, it would lead to endless inflation. But in our naïveté we meant by endless inflation an endless rise of the price level, not an endless increase in the rate of increase of the price level.

Neither were we ignorant of the possibility of having inflation and excessive unemployment at the same time. The people in CED in the early days were much impressed with the experience of 1936–37 in this respect, and one of the first items on CED's research agenda was a study of what we then called the inflationary dilemma. Our efforts in this field never came to any fruition, however, because we never discovered anything very convincing, or perhaps because we were too reluctant to say what had to be said.

But in any case, we thought we were talking about inflation rates of 2 or 3 percent as a possible cost of high employment. I remember an occasion, I believe in 1950, when Sumner Slichter wrote a newspaper article saying that we should accept an inflation rate of 3 percent in order to have high employment. To the CED this was shocking, and also embarrassing because Slichter was chairman of our Research Advisory Board.

The critical question is how we got from such a situation in which 2 or 3 percent inflation was necessary for high employment, if we were ever in such a situation, to one in which a much higher and possibly accelerating rate is necessary. I have not heard anything in yesterday's or today's discussion of the structure of the American economy to explain that. I remain of the opinion that the main reason we have such a high rate of inflation, and find it so difficult to reduce, is that we now have a history of a high rate of inflation and that the announcement of government intentions to curb the inflation has little credibility. Therefore, I think that the early CED emphasis on fiscal and monetary restraint against inflation was correct and our mistake was in not realizing how critical it was. We did not recognize how difficult it would be to reverse course once we had gotten on the inflationary path, and there-

fore how essential it was not to set foot on that path. This is, to me, a reminder of how essential it is to get off that path before we move much further along it.

I must confess that the businessmen who were the members of the CED had a hankering to deliver sermons about the necessity for business and labor to behave responsibly, which translated to mean that labor should not demand such big wage increases. The staff did manage to keep such sermons muted, at least while I was there, but I nevertheless regret them.

CED was in those early days a strong believer in the effectiveness of monetary policy. We felt confirmed in that view by the behavior of the economy immediately after the war ended. The prevailing expectation of economists who belittle the importance of money was that there would be a severe postwar depression. CED held the contrary opinion that the large stock of money and other liquid assets accumulated during the war would sustain demand when wartime controls were relaxed. This turned out to be correct.

Although CED continued to emphasize the role of monetary policy it never proposed any rule of monetary policy that would complement the rule of budget policy on which it set so much store. My explanation for this may be too cynical, but I think not. The difference was that the businessmen of CED felt themselves to be outside the budget-making process and unrepresented in it. On the other hand, many of them were bankers. Many were directors of Federal Reserve Banks. All were friends of directors. That is, they wanted rules to govern a budgetary process from which they felt excluded but not to govern a monetary process of which they felt themselves a part. Still, I think that the logic of the general CED outlook, with its skepticism of the political process and mistrust of forecasting, pointed to having a monetary rule as well as a budgetary rule.

I had an opportunity to observe at first hand the possibility of running fiscal and monetary policy by rules when I came into the government in January 1969. Paul McCracken, who was the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, believed in a rule of budget policy much like the CED rule and he admitted, in an early press conference, to being Friedmanesque. I agreed with him on both scores. This kind of thinking was congenial to Mr. Nixon. In fact, he was an early believer in rational expectations. That is, he didn't believe that the government could fool the private sector for long.

Nevertheless, as you all know, we didn't follow any consistent rule. Of course, we weren't responsible for monetary policy, but we had ideas about it, and we couldn't even keep these ideas in line with any rule. There were several reasons for this. For one thing, the behavior of the statistics was disconcerting. During the first six or seven months of 1969

we wrote the president a number of memos saying that it would soon be necessary to get the Federal Reserve to raise the rate of growth of the money supply from 2 percent to 4 percent a year. But when the revised money supply figures came out in August we learned that they had been growing at more than 4 percent during the first half, which gave us the feeling of shooting at an erratically moving target.

There were, however, more important difficulties.

First, while you can show advantages to staying on a steady fiscal monetary path once you are on it, if you are not on it or have never been on it the movement to the path is not prescribed by the rule, and it rarely seems a good time to make that movement.

Second, even though one can demonstrate that adherence to some rule may give the best results on the average over a long period of time the policymaker is responsible for only a short period of time and the temptation to try to beat the system and do better than the rule during that period is irresistible.

Third, in our case, after the president was led by George Shultz to enunciate a rule of budget policy something like the old CED rule, which unfortunately caused Mr. Nixon to announce that he was now a Keynesian, that rule found no support in the country. The business and financial leaders, who should have welcomed the rule, hooted and hollered that it was just an excuse to run a deficit and returned to muttering about balancing the budget.

Fourth, this left the administration all alone, deserted by the fiscal conservatives and attacked by the Democrats and most economists in 1972 for not expanding the economy fast enough. The pressure to bend a rule which nobody but us cared about was too strong.

I do not say these things to excuse our failure to make a more determined effort to establish durable rules of fiscal and monetary policy but rather to try partially to explain it. Our experience with rules of macroeconomic policy raises one of the two main questions I would like to close with. I think that the history of the past twenty years shows the need for rules and limits of policy to be even greater than it seemed in the early postwar days. That is because the cure of inflation is now very much tied up with the credibility of policy. It will be necessary now not only to follow an anti-inflationary policy but also to convince the country and the world that we will follow such a policy continuously. The question is how can we show that. How can we establish new rules of policy and show that we will stick by them? Is there any middle ground between completely ad hoc discretionary policy and constitutional amendments that, even if they could be achieved, would be much cruder than we would like? Is it possible to achieve a degree of public understanding, political self-restraint, and responsible national leader-

ship which will support a consistent credible policy? I don't know the answer to that.

My second and final question, which I can't answer either, is whether it is possible to preserve the free economic system by moderation and gradualism. The basic philosophy of CED in its early days was that it would sustain the free system by correcting its defects and abandoning its shibboleths. Thus, we would abandon traditional rules of budget balancing in order to help stabilize the system. We would support a progressive income tax in order to make the system more acceptable to the public. We would seek responsible—i.e., nonmarket—behavior of labor and business in order to forestall government controls.

Arthur Smithies once said that we in the CED were Fabians. He meant, I believe, that we, like the Fabians, were going to socialism slowly. The Fabians wanted to get there and the CED did not want to get there. But the end would be the same, and CED would have helped to reach it. CED's budget rule would not have prevented fine tuning but would have paved the way for it. CED's concession to progression in the tax system would have legitimized demands for more. CED's talk about responsible private behavior would have provided the rationale for controls and quasi controls.

I don't know whether another strategy would have been more effective. Would a more extreme and doctrinaire stance have slowed down the trend of policy to which many around this table have objected in the last two days or would it simply have left the arena of decision making exclusively to those who preferred that trend? On another day I would like to hear some wise discussion of that question.

Summary of Discussion

Alan Blinder noted that the links between inflation and relative price changes occur in two directions. Inflation probably changes relative prices, for as Okun has indicated, some prices can adjust more rapidly than others. But on the other hand, relative price changes, such as the oil price increase, also tend to exacerbate inflation. There is a facile tendency, Blinder indicated, to blame inflation for the costs of the relative price change. Blinder also held that indexation in the tax rules and the financial system could substantially reduce the costs of inflation and make it easier to fight inflation through contractionary policy.

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