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MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/10

**Regulating International Finance and the Evolving
Imbalance of Capitalisms since the 1970s**

Thomas Kalinowski



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Abstract

In this paper, I put the ongoing G20 process of improving the regulation of international finance into a historically informed perspective. To understand the driving forces behind and obstacles to international cooperation in governing finance I combine concepts from international political economy and comparative political economy (IPE and CPE) that have previously been only loosely connected. Building on the IPE literature that highlights the historical and political embeddedness of financial regulation I depart from the IPE focus on the globalization of US–UK financial market capitalism. CPE studies show that, since the 1970s, different variations of capitalism have reacted in distinct ways to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, lower growth rates and saturated domestic markets. Most notably, there has been a divergence between the approaches of financializing countries (US, UK) and export-oriented countries (Germany, East Asian nations). The interdependence between financialized and export-oriented variations of capitalism has contributed to the dynamics and crises of international finance for the past four decades. This “imbalance of capitalisms” also became an obstacle to international cooperation in regulating finance. Faced with the “trilemma of economic policies,” the financialized and export-oriented variants of capitalism have chosen different combinations of macroeconomic policies, currency policies, and the regulation of financial flows and financial firms. This divergence has led to conflicting preferences with regard to international cooperation to regulate finance.

Zusammenfassung

Dieses Papier betrachtet die historischen Hintergründe der Schwierigkeiten und Konflikte bei der (Re-)regulierung der internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in der G20. Diese Konflikte lassen sich besonders gut bei dem Versuch der Koordinierung von Fiskal- und Geldpolitik, der Regulierung von Banken und Finanzströmen sowie der Reduzierung globaler wirtschaftlicher Ungleichgewichte beobachten. Hierzu werden bisher nur unzureichend verbundene Ansätze aus der Internationalen und der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie (IPÖ/VPÖ) kombiniert. Die IPÖ-inspirierte Betrachtung internationaler Kooperation verbunden mit dem VPÖ-inspirierten Fokus auf die pfadabhängig unterschiedlichen Spielarten des Kapitalismus ermöglicht ein besseres Verständnis der Hintergründe von Konflikten bei der Regulierung internationaler Finanzbeziehungen. Besonders berücksichtigt werden hierbei die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen verschiedener Spielarten des Kapitalismus seit dem Zusammenbruch des Bretton-Woods-Systems Anfang der 1970er-Jahre. Die Interdependenz von finanzmarktorientiertem Kapitalismus in den Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritannien sowie exportorientierter Kapitalismusvarianten in Europa und Ostasien haben die internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten entscheidend geprägt. Beide Modelle unterscheiden sich ganz erheblich bezüglich der institutionellen Arrangements bei der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen und der Fiskal-, Geld- und Währungspolitik. Diese Unterschiede wiederum führen zu divergierenden Präferenzen und Konflikten bei der internationalen Koordinierung der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen.

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Regulating International Finance and the Evolving Imbalance of Capitalisms since the 1970s

1 Introduction

The current global financial and economic crisis has brought the issue of a new global governance of finance into the political and academic mainstream. Four decades after the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in 1971, there is an intensive and controversial discussion ongoing within the G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the IMF and other international organizations on how to improve international cooperation in regulating finance and, thereby, preventing future financial crises. In this paper, I put this G20 process of improving the regulation of international finance into a historically informed perspective. I analyze the driving forces behind and obstacles to international cooperation in governing finance in a broad sense that includes the regulation of financial firms, financial flows, and currencies, and the coordination of macroeconomic policies.

I criticize functionalist approaches to the analysis of financial regulation and propose an eclectic political-economy approach combining concepts of international political economy and comparative political economy (IPE and CPE) that have previously been only loosely connected. Building on the IPE literature that highlights the historical and political embeddedness of financial regulation I depart from the classic IPE focus on US–British financial market capitalism. I bring in CPE concepts of a diversity of capitalism that reject the hypothesis of a global convergence towards US–British style financial capitalism. CPE studies on European coordinated market economies and East Asian developmental states have shown a remarkable path dependency. Since the 1970s, different variants of capitalism have reacted in distinct ways to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, lower growth rates, and saturated domestic markets. Most notably, there has been a divergence between the approaches of financializing countries (such as the US and the UK) and export-oriented countries (such as Germany and the East Asian nations).

Since the 1970s, financialized and export-oriented countries have become the two poles of the world economy, contributing both to its dynamism and crises. This dynamic has also created global economic imbalances that have contributed to the global financial

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and economic crisis that has been with us since 2007. More importantly for this paper, the “imbalance of capitalisms” is an obstacle to international cooperation in regulating finance. Faced with the “trilemma of economic policies” amid the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, different variations of capitalism chose different combinations of macroeconomic policies, currency policies, and regulation of financial flows and financial firms. This divergence has led to conflicting preferences with regard to international cooperation on regulating finance. This is not to say that governments have no leeway to shape financial regulation on the national and international level, but my approach implies the need to look beyond “national egoisms” and highlight the deeper, systemic causes of international conflicts.

If my hypothesis is correct, comprehensive global governance of finance is more difficult than might be expected. Governments in the G20 are constrained not just by national interests but also by the path dependency of different variations of capitalism that are interdependent on the global level. This imbalance of capitalisms is an obstacle to international cooperation to improve bank regulation, curb erratic financial flows through capital controls or taxes, reduce exchange rate volatility or stimulate the global economy through fiscal stimulus packages and other reforms discussed in the G20. It is not just the financialized countries but also the export-oriented countries that are responsible for four decades of failed international cooperation to regulate finance. International cooperation would require not just institutional reform and a readjusting of the “levers and buttons” of the world economy, but also a new arrangement of the international division of labor and deep structural changes to domestic political economies. Changes would be needed not just in the financialized countries, but also in the export-oriented countries in Europe, East Asia and the emerging world.

In section 2, I introduce my argument and the concepts of an “imbalance of capitalisms” and the “trilemma of economic policies” in more detail. In sections 3 and 4, I analyze the conflicting preferences, positions, and policies of financialized and export-oriented countries, respectively, in the global governance of finance. Section 5 draws conclusions from the empirical analysis.

2 The imbalance of capitalisms and the dilemmas of international financial regulation

The imbalance of capitalisms since the 1970s

Interpretations of financial and economic crisis and their management are dominated by economists and often shaped by an implicit functionalist-technocratic bias. Crises are interpreted as regulatory failures and their management is seen in terms of regulatory and institutional reform. The economy is viewed as a more (by orthodox econo-

mists) or less (by Keynesian economists) self-regulating machine that can be adjusted and optimized through the buttons and levers of economic policy. For example, financial markets can be brought under control by pulling the lever on the regulation of capital requirements for banks or derivatives. Global economic imbalances between the US and China are seen as a problem of “currency manipulation” that could be solved by adjusting the exchange rate button. In this functionalist view, conflicts in international cooperation to regulate finance are the result of “national egoisms” that prevent “best practice solutions.”

Scholars from the field of IPE challenge such a functionalist view by focusing not on individual “buttons and levers” but on the driving forces of the economic machinery and their embeddedness in domestic and international power struggles. The study of financial globalization, (de-)regulation, and crisis has a long tradition in the field of IPE. Particular attention has focused on the exponential growth of financial markets and international flows and the rise of “casino capitalism” (Strange 1986) since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971 (Enquete-Kommission 2002; Lütz 2002). Financial globalization was accelerated by competitive deregulation in which countries competed to become the most attractive base for financial services (Helleiner 1994). A process of “financialization” (Krippner 2005; Epstein 2005) can be observed in most countries, but was particularly accentuated in the US and Britain.¹ According to Epstein, financialization can be defined broadly as an “increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3).

Within the field of IPE, there is a strong focus on the US as the hegemonic or at least most powerful country in the global economy and its regulation. Financial globalization is often interpreted or criticized as a convergence towards Anglo-Saxon style financial market capitalism. IPE scholars have devoted particular attention to the role of international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO to disseminate US-style institutions and spread the gospel of a market-oriented growth model (Bullard/Bello/Kamal 1998; Woods 2006; Kalinowski 2005, 2008). During crises – such as the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis – the IMF has tended to make financial and capital account liberalization a precondition for rescue packages, which led to the development of the thesis of a “Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex” (Veneroso/Wade 1998; Bhagwati 1998). From this IPE perspective, international cooperation on regulating finance in the G20 since 2008 would constitute an at least partial departure from financialization. The importance of the financial industry for Britain and the US, as well as the opposition of the powerful financial lobby can thus be seen as an important obstacle to international cooperation (see section 3).

1 For example, in the 1990s, “rentier income” – that is, income derived from financial assets – was on average 33.5 percent of GDP in the US and 14 percent in Britain, compared to 11 percent in Japan and 7 percent in Germany (Epstein/Power 2003: 11–12).

Studies of CPE, on the other hand, cast serious doubt on the hypothesis of convergence towards a US/British style financial market oriented capitalism. It was an important contribution of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) debate (Hall/Soskice 2001) to challenge the modernization-theory perspective that there is a convergence to one “best practice” variation of capitalism and that different forms of capitalism merely represent different “stages of economic growth” (Rostow 1990). While to some degree financialization can be observed in most countries, fundamental differences between liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the US and Britain, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany, remain intact.² This strong path dependency of different variants of capitalism can be explained by an “institutional complementarity” that constitutes their “comparative institutional advantage” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 52).

Unfortunately, studies in CPE have remained focused on the Western world, with a few excursions into Japanese non-liberal capitalism (Streeck/Yamamura 2001; Vogel 2006). Given the importance particularly of the East Asian region – with G20 member countries China, Japan, and Korea – for the global economy and the negotiations on regulating global finance in the G20, it is necessary to include at least the East Asian countries in our analysis (see also Kalinowski 2011). After being outsourced to development or regional studies for too long, it is time to systematically bring the non-Western world into CPE studies (Nölke 2011). Case studies in the field of development studies on East Asian developmental states have revealed many similarities with European coordinated market economies (Johnson 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999; Kalinowski 2008). Most importantly for our purposes are the similarities in terms of strong government–business networks (Evans 1995) and the strong focus on national competitiveness. Most importantly for this paper, East Asian developmental states and European coordinated market economies share an export-oriented growth model. Unlike financialized countries, export-oriented countries remain dominated by an industrial sector that is dependent on exports to grow (see section 4).³

Different variations of capitalism tend to react differently to similar challenges (Gourevitch 1986; Stallings 1995). Since the 1970s, the capitalist world has faced the challenges of lower growth rates, saturated domestic markets, and economic globalization. Amid the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies, European coordinated market economies and East Asian developmental states reacted with different strategies. While liberal market economies revitalized economic growth through financialization and by becoming the “bankers of the world,” coordinated market economies and developmental states reacted by pursuing an export-oriented growth model and become the “workshops of the world.”

2 Vogel (2006) speaks of a “remodeling” of Japanese capitalism and Yamamura and Streeck (2003) talk of the “hybridization” of German and Japanese capitalism.

3 One indicator of export orientation is a current account surplus. Between 2000 and 2007, this averaged 4.9 percent of GDP in China, 3.4 percent in Japan, 3.2 percent in Germany, 2.8 percent in Indonesia and 1.7 percent in Korea. Financialized countries, on the other hand, suffer from chronic current account deficits: for example, averaging 2.4 percent of GDP in the UK and 5 percent in the US during the same period (IMF 2009).

Since the 1970s, financialized and export-oriented countries have been the two poles of the world economy, fuelling its dynamics and crises. The interdependence of the different variants of capitalism allows export-oriented countries to grow at a faster rate than domestic wages and consumption, while it allows financialized countries to borrow cheaply abroad and consume more than domestic production. The resulting global economic imbalances have contributed to the creation of asset bubbles in financialized countries. Starting with the subprime mortgage market, these bubbles started to collapse one by one in 2007, resulting in the worst global financial crisis since the 1930s.

National preferences with regard to international financial regulation and the conflicts between them must be seen in light of this dynamic of an imbalance of capitalisms. The failure to regulate international finance and the conflicting regulatory preferences are not just the result of malfunctions of the economic machinery and disagreements on which levers and buttons to adjust. The problem is rather the engine of the machine itself.

The trilemma of economic policy

Before we embark on an empirical analysis of how the imbalance of capitalisms leads to incompatible preferences in regulating global finance, we need to introduce a rough scheme that groups countries according to their preferences. Conflicts in three policy areas have dominated the agenda of the G20 since the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis in 2007: macroeconomic coordination, regulation of finance, and currency policy.

A good starting point for structuring the policy preferences with regard to external economic policy is to modify the “Mundell-Fleming trilemma” (Mundell 1963; Obstfeld/Shambaugh/Taylor 2005). In contrast to the original treatment of the trilemma by Mundell and Fleming, I combine sovereign fiscal and monetary policies into sovereign macroeconomic policies targeted to achieve domestic goals, such as reductions in unemployment. In the original version of the trilemma, Mundell and Fleming argue that, under capital mobility and fixed exchange rates, sovereign fiscal policies are effective and sovereign monetary policies ineffective, whereas the effectiveness is the other way round under flexible exchange rates (Mundell 1963). However, in most cases, under the conditions of open capital accounts and stable exchange rates, sovereign fiscal policies have become ineffective as well, because governments fear that high public debt levels will create inflation and undermine the confidence of financial investors. This obsession with anti-inflationary policies is particularly dominant in Germany and in the EU Maastricht Treaty (see section 4), but is also part of the Washington consensus that is recommended for or even imposed on developing countries by the IMF and the World Bank. On the other hand, countries with flexible exchange rates, such as the US and Britain, have been able to maintain sovereign fiscal policies (as seen in their obsession

with tax cuts), partly because their role as “bankers of the world” has allowed them hitherto to finance huge deficits (see section 3).

According to this modified “economic policy trilemma,” there are clear tradeoffs between desirable economic policies, such as stable exchange rates, sovereign macroeconomic policies, and open capital accounts. Only two of these goals can be achieved at any one time. Originally, the concept of the trilemma was used to explain only the constraints imposed on the macroeconomic policies of small and open economies, but it has explanatory power with regard to all countries. The level of constraint varies according to the size of the economy. For smaller economies, the trilemma is an impossible trinity, while large economies such as the EU, the US, China, and Japan are able to manipulate it, even though they, too, have to accept tradeoffs.

This modified concept can help us to group countries according to the policy choices they made when faced with the trilemma. Under the Bretton Woods system up until 1971, countries combined fixed exchange rates with controls on private capital account flows, with the possibility of using the IMF to finance short-term current account deficits in order to maintain sovereign fiscal and monetary policies that would help to facilitate rapid economic growth and ameliorate economic crises. Under the conditions of freely flowing capital, which proliferated from the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and became the orthodoxy from the 1980s, governments had to move away from the “Bretton Woods corner” of the trilemma triangle (Figure 1) and choose either to stabilize their currencies or to maintain sovereign fiscal and monetary policies. In the former case, their monetary and fiscal policies merely react to the inflows and outflows of capital. In the latter case, they can use monetary and fiscal policies to govern the economy and allow the exchange rate to adjust to the inflows and outflows of capital. Different variants of capitalism have dealt with this challenge in different ways and in doing so have chosen different sides of the “trilemma triangle.”⁴ Financialized countries such as the US and the UK have been the most enthusiastic supporters of the free flow of capital while maintaining an autonomous monetary policy to stimulate the domestic economy in the case of an economic downturn. On the other hand, the US and the UK have let their currencies float freely and have not intervened in the currency markets, although the US has used its international political power to pressure other countries to revalue their currencies against the dollar. The US and the UK are closest to what I call the “neoliberal corner”⁵ of the triangle; however, due to their ability to implement

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- 4 The three different goals that make up the impossible trinity are ideal-types. No country is completely sovereign in its monetary policies, and few have been able to maintain inflexible fixed exchange rates for long. Most importantly, all countries have some form of explicit or hidden capital controls at least for the case of a capital account crisis. However, even though ideal-types cannot be found in reality, it is observable that some countries come closer to them than others.
- 5 I use the term “Bretton Woods corner,” “neoliberal corner,” and “Keynesian corner” to highlight the first priority of a certain set of policies, even though I am aware that, for example, the Keynesian solution is not limited to sovereign macroeconomic policies but also includes the strict control of capital, while the neoliberal solution is not exclusively focused on the free flow of capital but cares about monetary sovereignty as well.

sovereign monetary and fiscal decisions, they, interestingly, also remain closer to what I call the “Keynesian corner” of the triangle (see Figure 1).⁶

Export-oriented countries in the EU, notably Germany, have also opened their capital accounts, but at a much slower pace. In contrast to the US, the EU established a regional system of fixed exchange rates within the European Union (European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM) in 1979, which led to the introduction of a single currency, the euro, in 1999. The EU countries – with the exception of the UK – thus remain close to the Bretton Woods corner of the triangle while moving in the direction of the neoliberal corner.⁷

In contrast, Japan has continued its commitment to sovereign macroeconomic policy⁸ and exchange rate stability through managed floating, while private capital flows remain restricted through a combination of regulations and cultural factors, as we will see in section 4. The accumulation of foreign currency reserves in Japan and East Asian emerging markets also helped to protect their policy choices from the volatility of international financial markets because currency reserves provide a buffer against erratic capital flows (Aizenman/Chinn/Ito 2008).

Developing countries and emerging markets, unable to afford a completely free exchange rate, have copied either the European model (stable exchange rates plus open capital accounts) or the Japanese model (stable exchange rates plus a higher degree of sovereignty in macroeconomic policies). Concerning general tendencies, we can say that small developing countries or emerging markets that are export-dependent and/or have a strong financial sector – for example, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Korea since the 1990s – have preferred the “European model.” Developing countries and emerging markets with large domestic markets and/or active industrial policies – China, India, Brazil, and Korea until the 1990s), however, have preferred the “Japanese model,” including the tendency to use foreign currency reserves as a buffer for erratic private capital flows (see Figure 1).


Countries with different variants of capitalism take different sides of the trilemma triangle, depending on their level of export orientation and financialization. Taking one side or another leads to distinct and partly conflicting preferences with regard to

6 The ability of liberal market economies like that of the US to implement more expansive macroeconomic policies than coordinated market economies such as Germany has also recently been described from a domestic political-economic perspective by Carlin and Soskice (2009; Soskice 2007).

7 Since the introduction of the euro as a common currency, the euro area (eurozone) seems to have moved away from the Bretton Woods corner because the external value of the euro is not among the goals of the European Central Bank (ECB). However, the priority of the internal stabilization of the eurozone (plus the so-called ERM 2 countries) has left little room for more Keynesian sovereign macroeconomic policies. In effect, the eurozone remains within the path dependency of the ERM.

8 For example, in 2006, the Japanese central government debt was 161 percent of GDP, nearly three times higher than what is considered “excessive” under the Maastricht Treaty (OECD 2009).

Figure 1 The imbalance of capitalisms and the “trilemma triangle” of economic policies



LMEs: liberal market economies; CMEs: coordinated market economies; DSs: developmental states. The countries mentioned are examples.

international economic cooperation. These conflicts can be observed over the past forty years and currently constitute a formidable obstacle to reaching agreement in the G20. We can observe such conflicts in, for example, the main discussions in the G20 during 2008–10 on improving the financial regulation of banks, the regulation of international financial flows, solutions with regard to erratic exchange rates, and ways of stimulating global growth through coordinated fiscal stimulus packages.⁹

Again, this is not to say that governments have no political room to maneuver at all. The constraints of path dependency are persistent but not rigid. Many other factors also play a role that may further limit governments' political leeway or that may allow them to take a right or left turn at an intersection. Persistent changes over a longer period of time might also lead to a switch of sides in the trilemma triangle or even the adoption of a new growth regime.

⁹ These are the broad categories of issues related to financial regulation discussed in the five G20 summits so far (G20 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b).

3 Financialization of capitalism in the US and the UK

Since the 1970s, financial markets and private capital flows have grown at a rapid pace, much faster than the real economy. This trend has gone hand in hand with and has been supported by financial and capital account liberalization (Helleiner 1994; Enquete-Kommission 2002). In this process of financialization, financial investors and the financial industry have increasingly come to dominate the whole economy, a trend that was particularly accentuated in the UK and the US during – and as legacies of – the tenures of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The financial industry – consisting of banks and non-bank financial firms – was transformed from a service industry facilitating real economic activities to the economy's center of gravity. Not the production of capital but the global reallocation of capital through financial markets accounts for the economic dynamism of financialized countries. Financial firms offer an increasing number of “financial innovations” that allow investors to increase their share of the profits distributed by the financial markets. This path of development offers a specific solution to the problem of weak domestic growth by providing financial services to countries around the world that have faster-growing real economies. In short, the UK and the US became the “bankers of the world.”

International finance plays a crucial role in any advanced economy by providing the service of reallocating capital from those who have it (savers) to those who need it (investors, consumers). An efficient financial system can be compared to other infrastructural services, such as public transport or sewage systems that do not produce a tangible product but increase the productivity of the real economy. International finance is driven by and facilitates economic globalization, as it allows corporations to manage international production chains and creates what Saskia Sassen calls “global control ability” (Sassen 2001: 11). Despite its central role, the financial sector always depends on a functioning real economy that creates savings and requires investment. Some financial centers provide their services primarily to the domestic economy (for example, Frankfurt for Germany and Tokyo for Japan). Financialized countries, however, are characterized by the fact that their financial sectors provide these services globally (for example, Wall Street in New York and “the City” in London) or at least regionally (for example, Hong Kong and Singapore for China and Southeast Asia).

Whether financialization is an economically sustainable strategy or not is beyond the scope of this paper. The global financial crisis, which commenced in 2007, has cast strong doubt on the viability of this “business model.” What is certain is that the dominance of financial over manufacturing (“real”) capital is not entirely new and has been discussed at least since Rudolf Hilferding analyzed the “first wave of financialization” before World War 1. In his seminal work *Das Finanzkapital* (Hilferding 1910) he realized that financialization was not just a certain set of economic policies but a specific stage of capitalism with a regulatory system shaped by the dominance of the interests of financial investors and financial institutions and legitimized by a distinct ideology. While this first wave of financialization differed from the one which started in the 1970s,

because it was dominated by universal banks, it is important to realize that the relationship between financial and real capital has changed over time (see also Chernow 1997). World War 1 ended the first wave of financialization but financial capital enjoyed a revival during the stock market bubble and the profitable but ultimately disastrous management of war debts in the 1920s that led to the Great Crash of 1929 and the banking crisis of the early 1930s (Galbraith 1997: 191–232; Chancellor 1999). Financialization was pushed back during the New Deal of the 1930s and remained subordinate to industrial capital during the Keynesian era of the “new industrial state” (Galbraith 1967) from the 1930s until the 1970s. In the US, the “New Deal coalition” of big business, labor unions, and the Roosevelt administration singled out the financial sector as the main culprit with regard to the Great Depression of the 1930s.¹⁰ The US government strongly limited the influence and power of Wall Street through the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which required the separation of commercial and investment banking, thereby mandating the breakup of previously untouchable banks, such as JP Morgan (Chernow 2001). Many other regulations that limited banking activities and competition were implemented while, at the same time, the banking system was given a safety net against bank runs through the newly introduced deposit insurance systems. The “financial innovations” of the 1920s – including stock market pools, insider trading, market manipulation, and short selling in falling markets – were forbidden by the Security Exchange Act, and the Security and Exchange Commission was established to police financial markets (Kroszner/Strahan 2007; Chancellor 1999: 220–222).

Attempts to limit the influence of the financial industry were made throughout the world. After the collapse of the boom experienced by stock markets and financial markets in the 1920s, financial activities were seen as damaging to the real economy. This transformation was not peaceful and grounded in rational policies in all countries. In Germany, the Nazi government that came to power in 1933 promised the end of “interest slavery” and applied its pseudo-scientific “racial theory,” blaming Jews – who were strongly represented in the financial community – for the “parasitic” character of the financial industry (Neumann 1981: 186–197). The racist separation between “parasitic Jewish financial capital” and “productive German capital” provided a pretext for expropriating Jewish bankers and utilizing the financial industry for the “military Keynesianism” of the Nazis.

Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and since the financial market liberalization of the following decades, the political influence of the financial industry has increased dramatically, although to differing degrees in different world regions. The trend towards financialization was stronger in the UK and the USA, where the “mil-

10 In his inauguration address, Roosevelt stated that “[p]ractices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men. ... [I]n our progress toward a resumption of work we require two safeguards against a return of the evils of the old order; there must be a strict supervision of all banking and credits and investments; there must be an end to speculation with other people’s money, and there must be provision for an adequate but sound currency” (Roosevelt 1938: 13).

itary industrial complex” that President Eisenhower had warned about in 1961 was supplemented, from the 1970s onwards, by the ”Wall Street–Treasury–IMF Complex” (Veneroso/Wade 1998; Bhagwati 1998).

The interests of financial firms and financial investors began to dominate the agenda of economic and financial reform, as well as academic and ideological discussions. Financial markets and the sum of the decisions of financial investors became simply “the market,” and “gaining the confidence of ‘the market’” became the primary goal of business and politics alike. Losing “market confidence” and the outflow of capital became capital punishments for businesses and whole countries. Finance became the point of reference for the economy and even non-financial companies started to behave like financial firms (Krippner 2005).

The power of the “financial oligarchy” (Johnson 2009) is personalized by the revolving door between Wall Street and the US administration. For example, about half of the US Treasury Secretaries since the 1970s worked at financial firms before and/or after their public service.¹¹ Jobs in the financial industry were particularly attractive due to their high salaries and bonuses compared with other industries.¹² Suddenly, working in the financial sector, which until the 1970s had been considered a dull job for the less ambitious, became attractive, and more and more of the top college graduates went into banking.

Finally, economic data support the financialization thesis: in the US in 2007, the financial industry accounted for 31.3 percent of corporate profits (my own calculation from US Department of Commerce 2008) compared with 13 percent in 1980 (Lahart 2008). Manufacturing became less important and less attractive for college graduates and, consequently, the traditional industrial heartlands like the rustbelt in the US and various parts of the UK (for example, the north of England) suffered from deindustrialization.

Financialization was weaker in continental Europe and Japan, and it practically did not exist in the newly industrialized East Asian countries until the 1990s.¹³ European banks maintained their close relationships with industrial capital, which continues to rely on long-term credits to finance investments. The East Asian model of capitalism, in which banks played a subordinate role in economic development, is an even stronger coun-

11 More precisely, six of the thirteen Treasury Secretaries since 1972 came from or went into the financial industry: William Simon (Salomon Brothers), Donald Regan (Merrill Lynch), Nicholas Brady (William E. Simon), Lloyd Benson (Lincoln Consolidated), Robert Rubin (Goldman Sachs, Citigroup), and Henry Paulson (Goldman Sachs).

12 Jobs in the financial sector paid a premium of about 50 percent over non-financial jobs in 2005. In 1980, the premium was just 10 percent (Lahart 2008).

13 If we take the share of rentier income (income from financial activities plus interest incomes) in all incomes as a rough estimate of financialization, we find that Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey have the lowest share, whereas the US, the UK, Italy and France have the highest (Epstein/Power 2003: 11–12).

terpoint to financialization. In East Asia, developmental states used domestic banks to channel credits into the sectors earmarked for development, regardless of the banks' profitability (Woo-Cumings 1991, 1999). The financial sector has evolved as an independent, profit-oriented sector in East Asian developmental states only since the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. It is hard to measure the degree of financialization, but the scale and scope of financial markets, the growth of the banking industry, the share of bank profits in overall corporate profits and, more generally, the share of rentier income (income derived from financial activities) all underline this trend.¹⁴

One consequence of the specific structure of financialized countries is that they have a distinct interest in international negotiations concerning the global governance of finance. Financialized countries obviously put a high priority on the free flow of capital, and they are thus closest to the "neoliberal corner" of the trilemma triangle (Figure 1). Massive profits can be realized in the financial sector only if capital can be allocated freely to the sectors and regions that promise the highest short-term returns. The bigger and more numerous the transactions, the more income financial firms can generate from the fees they charge for such transactions. In this context, financial deregulation or "light touch regulation" constitutes a competitive advantage over relatively more strictly regulated systems. Indeed, threats by financial firms to move their operations abroad have been one of the major driving forces behind the "competitive deregulation movement" (Helleiner 1994: 146–168). The US, both directly and indirectly, through its dominance of international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank), put pressure on countries around the world to open and liberalize their financial markets and thus allow US financial service companies to enter those markets (Bullard/Bello/Kamal 1998; Veneroso/Wade 1998; Stiglitz 2003; Woods 2006; Cho/Kalinowski 2010; Kalinowski/Cho 2009). Also key is the soft power of US universities that educate a large percentage of the international financial and economic elites around the world, disseminating the notion that the US financialized market economy is the most advanced form of capitalism on earth and the one that other countries should emulate.

Within the group of financialized countries, we can distinguish between small and large economies. Small countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore tend to combine open capital accounts with fixed exchange rates in order to eliminate the exchange rate risk for financial investors. Hong Kong institutionalized this in a currency board system, while Singapore opted for an active exchange rate management system. As a trade-off, such economies lose their monetary and fiscal sovereignty because monetary and fiscal interventions have to react to the inflows and outflows of capital regardless of the needs of the domestic real economy. On the other hand, large financialized countries, such as the UK and the US, neglect exchange rate management and prefer to intervene actively in the domestic economy in order to stimulate growth and create jobs through monetary and fiscal policies. This preference has become particularly evident as a result of the global financial and economic crisis in which the US and the UK spearheaded

14 For a discussion of rentier income and its development, see Epstein (2005: 46–74).

loose monetary policies and deficit spending. Within the G20, financialized countries pushed for larger and internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus packages. In this sense, the more financialized “neoliberal” countries, ironically, are much closer to the Keynesian corner of the trilemma triangle than more social democratic countries such as Germany that have relied on exports to revive their economies.

As already mentioned, the US and the UK show little interest in the external value of their currencies and stable exchange rates in general. On the contrary, they use their international influence to pressure other countries – like Japan in the 1980s (Plaza and Louvre Accords) and China today – to stop “manipulating” their currencies and let the markets determine exchange rates. For financialized countries, volatility of exchange rates and financial markets in general are of little concern and even constitute a major source of revenue because investors and export-oriented firms alike have to hedge against risks by purchasing financial products such as options or currency swaps from financial firms. The UK and the US, thus, are not interested in international or regional institutions that would coordinate exchange rates or regulate the flow of capital because this would limit business opportunities and diminish their competitive advantage. This explains why the current discussions in the G20 and the FSB largely neglect the very issues that were at the core of the Bretton Woods system: fixed exchange rates and capital controls.

However, while the group of financialized countries opposes the regulation of financial flows, they are far less opposed to the regulation of market actors and financial products. Their experience with frequent market failures and financial crises has nurtured a pragmatic approach to financial regulation that acknowledges the need for a strong regulatory framework for financial actors and products. In fact, the current global financial and economic crisis has revealed that market actors and products were often even worse regulated in less financialized countries than in financialized countries. Financial firms in countries that have only recently started to liberalize their financial markets – such as the Central and Eastern European countries (and, to a lesser extent, Germany) – were hit hard by defaulting financial products because their regulatory systems had not caught up with the “financial innovations” available on globalized markets.¹⁵

15 In Germany, for example, 400,000 “Lehman certificates” were sold for 140 billion euros. These “certificates” were bets on the price development of various assets sold to small investors, a practice which is forbidden in the US and many other countries (Wilhelm 2009). Credits by text message (“SMS-credits”), with high interest rates, were an innovation in Scandinavian countries and are a significant problem in the financial crisis in the Baltic states (Koesch/Magdanz/Stadler 2009).

4 Export-oriented capitalism in Europe and East Asia

Less financialized countries have taken a different path in the post-Bretton Woods world. Despite their limited reliance on the financial sector for growth, their alternative, export-oriented strategy also sets up obstacles to the global governance of finance. As in financialized countries, economic growth rates declined and the bargaining power of labor unions weakened from the 1970s. However, it was not the financial sector but the export sector that became the new center of the economy and the engine of growth. Unlike in financialized countries the financial industry remains just one industry among many and cannot claim a dominant position. Consequently, the main debate in these countries is not about how to attract investment deals that enable financial firms to grow but about how to improve national competitiveness while ensuring the profitability and stability of international savings earned from exports. For governments the challenge became how to prevent the outflow of capital and become attractive for real investments in order to create or at least preserve jobs. Consequently, these countries did not deindustrialize, but increased productivity by becoming more capital- and technology-intensive. Profitability was not achieved primarily through financialization and downsizing but by incremental upgrading to capital- and technology-intensive industrial production, particularly in Europe and Japan, as well as in – albeit to a lesser degree – emerging Asia. The sophistication of this transformation varied within the export-oriented camp, ranging from the cheap mass production of consumer goods in China to the “diversified quality production” (Streeck 1995) in Germany and Japan.

This gradual transformation was facilitated by their “organized capitalism” (Vogel 2003) or “coordinated market economies” (Hall/Soskice 2001) favoring incremental changes and innovations over radical ones. Organized capitalism is characterized not by the power of financial markets, but by the close connection between industrial capital and house banks. The stronger corporatism in these countries in the form of tripartite cooperation between labor unions, employer organizations and government (*konzertierte Aktion* and *Bündnis für Arbeit* in Germany, *Sanrokon* in Japan) made possible wage moderation that ensured profitability and export competitiveness. This focus on national competitiveness had its price as repressed wages and unemployment led to sluggish domestic demand for consumer products. Weak domestic demand further aggravated the structural dependency on exports due to the specialization on high-quality consumer products and machinery that, naturally, have more globalized markets. For example, in Germany, one-fifth of all employment directly or indirectly depends on exports. In the important manufacturing sectors it is much higher: about 65 percent in machinery, 68 percent in vehicles, and 82 percent in chemical products (Schintke/Staeglin 2003: 144). In these countries, the term “markets” is not synonymous with financial markets, but with export markets and the ability to gain market share from competitors. The focus on national competitiveness and the dependence on exports create and are reinforced by a distinctive ideology of thrift, high savings rates, a reluctance to consume, and stability of prices and exchange rates.

Like financialization, export-oriented capitalism is not a new phenomenon; if anything, it can be traced back even further, to the mercantilism of early capitalist development. Already in the mid-nineteenth century, Friedrich List (1856) criticized David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, arguing that late developers needed to protect their infant industries. He recommended that government policy should abandon free trade and focus on nurturing national competitiveness. These strategies were implemented successfully by rising exporters such as Germany and, later, Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like financialization, two world wars and the world economic crisis of the 1930s undermined the export-oriented development model. The attempted militaristic expansion of Germany and Japan that would have secured access to natural resources and export markets was defeated in 1945.

The Bretton Woods system from 1945 to 1971 saw a massive increase in global trade, but trade imbalances declined due to the rapid rises in domestic demand in all countries due to reconstruction after the war and the transformation of Europe and Japan into "Fordist" mass consumption societies. Only towards the end of the Bretton Woods system did the US start to run a trade deficit and European countries and Japan transformed their growth models from inward-looking reconstruction to outward oriented expansion of global market share. Since the 1970s, newly industrializing East Asian countries (particularly Taiwan, South Korea, and, since the 1990s, China) have joined the export-oriented camp, specializing in the mass production of cheap consumer goods and transport equipment. Most of these developmental states have borrowed from Japanese and German development strategies (Woo-Cumings 1999; Wade 2004) or, in the case of China, have combined these experiences with state ownership of industry (Cho 2005).

The group of export-oriented countries has reacted very differently to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. As export-oriented economies, they are interested in stable exchange rates in order to allow their exporters predictable prices. Most export-oriented countries thus opted to replace the Bretton Woods arrangement with regional or national mechanisms to stabilize currencies. They joined the eurozone, adopted the dollar (dollarization) or fixed their currencies to one (or several) of the major currencies (currency pegs or currency boards), thus remaining close to the "Bretton Woods corner" of the trilemma triangle (see Figure 1). This choice means that, under the condition of an open capital account, these countries have had to surrender their monetary and fiscal sovereignty. Either they have delegated it to regional level, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) within the eurozone, or they have transferred it to another country, in the cases of dollarization, currency boards or unilateral currency pegs. Managed floating systems – as in China, Singapore, Korea and many developing countries – represent a compromise between exchange rate stability and fiscal and monetary sovereignty.

A surrender of monetary and even fiscal sovereignty is less dramatic for export-oriented economies because they depend less on active macroeconomic policies. They rather rely on their export competitiveness to profit from demand created abroad, and in

this way compensate for low domestic demand in the case of an economic downturn. Export-oriented countries have reacted to the instability on the financial markets and the declining growth rates since the 1970s by expanding into foreign markets and concentrating on national competitiveness. Export orientation thus was an effective means of overcoming the limitations of saturated domestic markets. The successful macroeconomic turnaround in East Asia after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis is a good example of export-oriented crisis-recovery strategies, the contribution of monetary and fiscal stimuli to that recovery having been relatively small (Kalinowski 2008, 2005). In the current crisis, Germany, which had the world's second largest current account surplus in 2008, has been much more cautious than the US or other European countries with current account deficits in introducing fiscal stimulus packages. Countries more open to foreign trade also tend to have stronger social security systems (Rodrik 1998) that reduce the urgency of fiscal sovereignty, in that social spending acts as an automatic stabilizer by increasing public spending in the form of unemployment payments and other instruments for protecting people's livelihoods during economic downturns.¹⁶

The European Union and particularly the eurozone (EU17) has continued to pursue German-style conservative monetary and fiscal policies. Germany has pushed through its demands for ECB independence and fiscal austerity. The German central bank (*Bundesbank*) and, since 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) are de facto (*Bundesbank*) and de jure (ECB) independent from the sovereign political decision-making process (EU 1992a: Art. 7). They both have the primary goal of maintaining price stability (EU 1992a: Art. 2), which limits a government's ability to manage the economy through monetary policies.¹⁷ The ECB is not formally part of the political decision-making process but a seemingly technocratic institution that merely reacts to developments determined by markets. The sovereignty of fiscal policies has also been severely restricted in the eurozone by the Maastricht Treaty, which formulated the preconditions for entering the eurozone and was pushed through by the German government. The Maastricht Treaty specifies that "Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits." In the annex "Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure," the Treaty limits the fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP and the total amount of public debt to 60 percent of GDP (EU 1992b: Art. 104c).

There are distinct positions in the "trilemma triangle," even within the EU. As discussed in section 3, the UK has followed the US approach and stayed outside the eurozone while continuing to stimulate the economy, when necessary, through interest-rate policies and fiscal stimuli. Even within the eurozone, France has not fully accepted German monetary leadership and the fiscal restraints of the Maastricht criteria. This conflict can

16 There are important exceptions, for example Japan and Korea, that still rely mostly on corporation-based social security and have only recently begun to improve their social security systems.

17 Both principles are also part of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 130). Some EU countries, such as Germany, have even changed their constitutions accordingly, so as to leave no doubt about their surrender of sovereign monetary policies (Art. 88 of the German Constitution [Grundgesetz] was changed on 21 December 1992).

be seen very clearly in the struggle within the EU over fiscal stimulus packages and ECB monetary policy amid the current global financial and economic crisis (Barber 2009). France, instead, has continued with some degree of fiscal sovereignty, safeguarded by an economic nationalism that does not amount to capital account controls but limits the exposure to foreign international capital.

The distinct positions of export-oriented countries on the trilemma triangle have resulted in the emergence of certain sets of priorities concerning the global governance of finance. While currency stability is a high priority for this group of countries, they have largely abandoned global solutions. With the euro and the ERM, the EU has found a successful regional solution for the problem of currency volatility, which diminishes the pressure at least on European countries to seek global solutions. Most of the remaining countries – and particularly the East Asian region – remain in desperate need of a solution for currency volatility. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of bilateral and multilateral currency swaps is a first step towards regional currency cooperation, but for now East Asian countries have to rely on the very expensive national self-help strategy of accumulating currency reserves (Park/Wang 2005).

In contrast to financialized countries, export-oriented countries are interested in curbing erratic short-term financial flows that lead to currency volatility, put pressure on their exchange rate regimes and undermine their competitive industrial structure (Zimmermann 2010). While export-oriented countries have also followed the trend of capital account liberalization they have done so later and more slowly. They are more cautious about opening up their own financial markets because they fear that financial liberalization would undermine their export competitiveness: in a system of floating exchange rates, capital inflow leads to currency appreciation. This “financialization curse” can be observed, for example, in the deindustrialization of the US since the 1980s and the exit of the British pound from the ERM in 1992.¹⁸ In the case of a fixed exchange rate system, an inflow of foreign capital leads either to inflation or to current account deficits. The latter development was symptomatic in the East Asian countries before the Asian financial crisis, when massive capital inflows pushed current accounts into deficit (Kalinowski/Cho 2009).

Among export-oriented countries we can distinguish two groups that react differently to the financialization curse and thus occupy different sides of the trilemma triangle (see Figure 1). Late developers, such as East Asian newly industrialized countries until the 1990s and China, have relied on formal capital controls to nurture national competitiveness. Japan has formally liberalized its capital accounts but remains somewhat insulated from global financial markets due to informal barriers to capital inflows (but not outflows), such as industrial policies favoring “national champions” or structural and cultural barriers (for example, the system of cross shareholding, strong majority

18 Interestingly, financialized countries appear to have similarities with countries suffering from the “resource curse” and in which dominant extraction industries crowd out other economic activities.

shareholders and a rejection of hostile takeovers). All these aspects of Japanese capitalism not only discourage long-term investment but also reduce the profitability of short-term investments. In contrast, European countries have fully liberalized their financial markets, although they, too, are to some degree protected by cultural barriers, such as strong majority shareholders in SMEs and cross shareholding in Germany or economic nationalism in France.

Unlike financialized countries, export-oriented economies are less interested in channeling capital through their own economies because, as capital exporters, they have an abundance of capital and lack the global financial deal makers based in London's "City" and New York's Wall Street.

Even though export-oriented countries do not depend on financial liberalization for growth and have a stronger interest in curbing financial volatility, they are not generally more cooperative at the international level when it comes to the global governance of finance. They are themselves partly responsible for destabilizing financial flows because much of those flows originate in their export of capital to deficit countries either in the form of private foreign savings in the case of Europe or currency reserves in the case of East Asia and, in particular, China ("sinodollars"). The main concern of capital exporters is not the free flow of short-term capital that creates vast numbers of deals for the global financial players but the ability to invest excess capital abroad and the security that these foreign investments create returns or at least do not lose their value. Unlike financialized economies that profit from financial transactions as such because they charge fees for making deals, capital exporters are stability-oriented and interested in preserving the long-term value of their foreign savings. International creditor countries are thus in favor of stabilizing erratic financial markets by curbing short-term financial flows, but on the other hand they oppose any regulation that would undermine their ability to manage their international assets. Another concern of international creditors is that international debtors such as the US will use inflationary policies to reduce their debt burdens, rendering their foreign savings worthless. Their focus on anti-inflation policies means that they will resist any comprehensive international cooperation in macroeconomic policies and a return to the "Keynesian corner."¹⁹

Export-oriented countries' obsession with national competitiveness is another factor that makes them unlikely to champion global governance of finance. Comprehensive global governance of finance would not just reduce profits from speculative and short-term financial deals but would also require a reduction of global imbalances and thus export surpluses in Europe and East Asia. Export-oriented countries will be very reluctant to give up their economic stimulus from abroad, for example by appreciating their currencies or by stimulating domestic consumption through wage increases or public

19 This explains particularly well the constant warnings against inflationary policies from German Chancellor Merkel and her push to put fiscal consolidation on the agenda of the G20 summit in Toronto in June 2010.

investment. The ideology of national competitiveness, wage restraint and thrift that have formed over decades will not disappear overnight. The reliance of export-oriented countries on foreign consumption is likely to provoke a protectionist backlash with the potential to further undermine global cooperation.

5 Conclusions

The four lost decades of failure to establish a new regime for global governance of finance after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system cannot be explained merely by the lack of political actors and institutions willing and able to develop new visions and overcome national egoisms and collective action problems. The different interests in international discussions and negotiations on regulating finance in the G20 also have systemic origins. Countries with different variants of capitalism have reacted in different ways to the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the challenge of low real growth rates and saturated domestic markets since the 1970s. Most importantly, we have presented financialized countries (the US, the UK) and export-oriented countries in Europe and East Asia as forming a relationship of mutual dependence. This partnership has been far from harmonious but has created gigantic global economic imbalances that have contributed to the global financial and economic crisis since 2008. These global economic imbalances are not just technical problems of current account surpluses and deficits, but the result of a much deeper rooted imbalance of capitalisms. Both variations of capitalism include distinct economic structures, complementary institutions and ideologies that create a strong path dependency.

The divergence of policy responses since the 1970s was highlighted particularly in the currency policies by which countries switched from the internationally coordinated Bretton Woods system to floating exchange rates, regional monetary systems or unilateral exchange rate pegs. In other areas, including macroeconomic policies, financial regulations and market ideology, different paths were also taken. Concerning the regulation of financial markets and financial flows, countries moved in the same direction, that of financial liberalization and the opening of markets, albeit with very different scopes and at various speeds. As a result, countries moved from a position between the Bretton Woods corner and the Keynesian corner of the trilemma of economic policies, closer to the neoliberal corner. However, financialized countries remained closer to the Keynesian corner, while export-oriented countries remained in proximity to the Bretton Woods corner (see Figure 1).

Consequently, financialized and export-oriented countries developed different preferences for the global governance of finance. Financialized countries pressured for financial liberalization and capital account opening (“structural adjustment”) in order to facilitate the expansion of their financial industries. Export-oriented countries were

less enthusiastic about financial market opening and remained more focused on increasing national competitiveness and stabilizing exchange rates. While financialized countries are strictly opposed to regulation of financial flows, they are far less dogmatic about the regulation of financial actors and products due to their frequent experience with financial crises. Financialized and export-oriented countries have also differed fundamentally in their interpretation of global economic imbalances, which observers in export-oriented countries see as a consequence of over-consumption in financialized countries, and which observers in financialized countries see as a consequence of under-consumption in export-oriented countries.

My research offers some important clues with regard to the prospects for a new system of global governance of finance or a “new Bretton Woods” now being discussed within the G20. Due to their different positions on the trilemma triangle, countries have taken different positions within the G20. The resulting deadlock has shaped the last four decades since the 1970s and continues to influence the G20 process today. Financialized countries exert pressure for internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus packages; are open to improved regulation of market actors; are uninterested in international currency coordination; and oppose the regulation of financial flows. Export-oriented countries, by contrast, push for tighter regulation of financial actors and markets and want to discuss an international currency regime but are reluctant to increase government spending or reduce their dependence on exports. This divergence of interests is deeply embedded in the distinct forms of capitalisms, including economic structure, institutions, consumption patterns, and ideology.

Mere institutional reforms and a fine-tuning of the levers and buttons of financial regulation will not be enough. Any successful agreement on the comprehensive and internationally coordinated regulation of finance in order to prevent future potential crises will be realistic only if there are more fundamental changes in the organization of the global economy. Financialized countries would have to reduce their dependence on their financial industries and give up their ideology of capital account liberalization. Export-oriented countries would have to reduce their dependence on current account surpluses and overcome their obsession with national competitiveness. Such a change would be difficult and will take time but it is not impossible. While these structural changes have to go hand in hand with regulatory reforms, they are not a precondition for political action. We have seen in the past that the trilemma triangle is not static but dynamic. Countries have switched sides in the past and there is no reason to assume that a convergence of interests similar to the one under the Bretton Woods system cannot re-emerge if it is possible to curb the power of the financial oligarchy and the export lobby alike.

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