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Volume Title: Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 3

Volume Author/Editor: NBER

iew metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/sarg76-1

Publication Date: 1976

Chapter Title: Interest Rates and Expected Inflation: A Selective Summary of Recent Research

Chapter Author: Thomas J. Sargent

Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9082

Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 23)

THOMAS J. SARGENT

University of Minnesota

Interest Rates and Expected Inflation:A Selective Summary of Recent Research

ABSTRACT: This paper summarizes the macroeconomics underlying Irving Fisher's theory about the impact of expected inflation on nominal interest rates. Two sets of restrictions on a standard macroeconomic model are considered, each of which is sufficient to imply Fisher's theory. The first is a set of restrictions on the slopes of the *IS* and *LM* curves, while the second is a restriction on the way expectations are formed. Selected recent empirical work is also reviewed, and its implications for the effect of inflation on interest rates and other macroeconomic issues are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

This article is designed to pull together and summarize recent work by a few others and myself on the relationship between nominal interest rates and expected inflation.¹ The topic has received much attention in recent years, no doubt as a consequence of the high inflation rates and high interest rates experienced by Western economies since the mid-1960s.

NOTE: In this paper I summarize the results of research I conducted as part of the National Bureau's study of the effects of inflation, for which financing has been provided by a grant from the American Life Insurance Association. Helptul comments on earlier versions of this paper were made by Phillip Cagan and by the members of the staff reading committee: Michael R. Darby, Juhn Lintner, and Robert J. Shiller. Thanks are also due the members of the Board reading committee. Gardner Ackley, James J. O'Leary, and Eli Shapiro, for their services. Ester Moskowitz provided able editorial assistance.

Most work on the topic has in one form or another been based on Irving Fisher's famous theory about interest and inflation (Fisher 1930). That theory holds that an increase in the rate of inflation expected by the public leads to an equivalent increase in the nominal rate of interest, thereby leaving the real rate of interest unaltered.

A central message of Keynes's *General Theory* is that the theory of interest is macroeconomic in content. It was because of its macroeconomic implications that Keynes (1936) objected to Irving Fisher's theory about the effect of expected inflation on nominal interest rates. Fisher's theory is "classical" in its macroeconomic content, being in the nature of a "neutrality" result, and to deduce it requires making a batch of classical assumptions about the way the economy is put together. It was those assumptions and their policy implications that no doubt prompted Keynes to take exception to Fisher's theory.

Unfortunately, Keynes's message has been disregarded in much of the recent empirical work that has purported to embrace Fisher's theory. "Interest rate equations" have been estimated that cannot be interpreted either as structural equations or reduced form equations of macroeconomic theory.2 Much of this work goes astray precisely because it fails to recognize the macroeconomic content of Fisher's theory and the alternatives to it. For that reason, this paper begins in section I with a review of the macroeconomic theory underlying Fisher's static proposition that a jump in expected inflation will be matched by an equivalent and immediate jump in the nominal rate of interest. Two alternative assumptions are entertained about the way expectations are formed. First, it is assumed that expectations are formed in an ad hoc, "adaptive" manner, and so is a certain distributed lag of past actual rates of inflation. This kind of assumption is used in most empirical work. The alternative assumption is that expectations are "rational" in Muth's (1961) sense, and so equal the predictions of economic theory. My exposition is in terms of a nonstochastic model; in that case, the natural way to represent rational expectations is to assume perfect foresight. Individuals are assumed accurately to perceive the actual (right-hand) time derivative of the log of the price level, and this is taken to be their expected rate of inflation.3 It happens that it makes a great difference how expectations are assumed to be formed. In the model with ad hoc, adaptive expectations, Fisher's static proposition emerges only under certain highly restrictive conditions on the values assumed by the model's parameters, in particular restrictions on the relative slopes of the IS and LM curves. On the other hand, with rational expectations, no such restrictions are required.4

While for purposes of simplicity my exposition of rational expectations is in terms of a nonstochastic model, it should be noted that a more plausible, stochastic version of the theory has been written down (Sargent 1973), one

that is "classical" in some respects, including the incorporation of a version of Fisher's static proposition, but is "Keynesian" in other respects, such as its ability to rationalize the existence of business cycles that are caused by fluctuations in aggregate demand. It is my view that such stochastic classical models provide the most robust foundations for Fisher's theory and certain other classical propositions. The nonstochastic version of the model in this paper captures the essence of what is going on in the rational expectations model, but fails adequately to indicate how models of this kind can be compatible with recurrent business cycles. In any event, the models described in this paper do show that wide-ranging implications flow from replacing the assumption of adaptive expectations with that of rational expectations.

Section II of the paper contains a short and very selective review of some empirical work that has been done on the topic. Most researchers have assumed some form of adaptive or fixed-weight-autoregressive expectations. Unfortunately, as will be shown, most models incorporating such an assumption have more parameters than can be estimated from the data, and so are not econometrically identifiable. The usual identifying restriction, that a certain sum of coefficients equals unity, is arbitrary and cannot be defended on any general principle. The most plausible way to crack this identification problem is to assume that expectations are rational. That is the approach taken in studies by Shiller (1972) and Fama (1973). They employ the simplest version of Fisher's theory and use the hypothesis that expectations are "rational" to deduce testable restrictions. Theirs is the most serious empirical work on the topic yet done.

[I] THE MACROSTATICS OF FISHER'S PROPOSITION

In this section I review the statics of Fisher's theory within the context of a standard one-sector Keynesian macroeconomic model. Time is continuous. I assume an aggregate production function that is linearly homogeneous in employment, N, and capital, K, and write it as Y/K = f(N/K), or

(1)
$$y = f(\lambda), f'(\lambda) > 0, f''(\lambda) < 0$$

where y = Y/K and $\lambda = N/K$; Y is real GNP, i.e., output per unit of time. The marginal product condition for employment can be written as

(2)
$$\frac{W}{P} = f'(\lambda)$$

which expresses the assumption that employers hire workers at each moment until the real wage equals the marginal product of employment. Here w is the money wage, and P is the price level, i.e., the price of the one good in the model.

The Keynesian investment schedule makes the rate of capital accumulation vary directly with the gap between the marginal product of capital, $f(\lambda)$ $-\lambda f'(\lambda)$, and the real cost of capital, $r + \delta - \pi$:

(3)
$$\frac{\vec{K}}{K} = i = i[\vec{t}(\lambda) - \lambda t'(\lambda) - (r + \delta - \pi)]; i' \rightarrow 0$$

Here r is the instantaneous rate of interest, δ is the instantaneous depreciation rate, and π is the instantaneous expected rate of inflation.

Consumption, C, is assumed to be a linear and proportional function of disposable income, $Y - T - \delta K$:

(4)
$$\frac{C}{K} = z \left(\frac{Y}{K} - \frac{T}{K} - \frac{\delta K}{K} \right); 0 < z < 1$$

or $c=z(y-\tilde{t}-\delta)$, where c=C/K, $\tilde{t}=T/K$. Here T is the rate of tax collections net of transfers, and z is the marginal propensity to consume.

The national income identity is

(5)
$$y = c + i + g + \delta$$

where g = G/K, G being government purchases of goods and services per unit of time.

Portiolio equilibrium is described by

(6)
$$\frac{M}{PK} = m(r, y)$$
 $m_r < 0, m_u > 0$

where M is the supply of money.

I posit that the evolution of money wages is governed by the Friedman-Phelps version of the Phillips curve

(7)
$$\frac{Dw}{w} = h(N/N^s) + \pi; h' > 0; h(1) = 0$$

where N^s is the full-employment labor supply and D is the right-hand time derivative operator. The full-employment labor supply is assumed to allow for normal hours worked, normal turnover rates, etc. Consequently, employment in man-years can exceed the full-employment labor supply if aggregate demand is high enough and if there is sufficient rigidity in the money wage. Given π_i equation 7 depicts a trade-off between the rate of employment relative to the labor supply and the rate of wage inflation. An increase in π shifts the Phillips curve upward by the amount of that increase.

I assume that the labor supply is exogenous and is governed by

(8)
$$N^s(t) = N^s(t_0)e^{n \cdot t}$$
 (8)

where n is the proportionate rate of growth of the labor supply. The model is completed by specifying the way in which expectations of

inflation are formed. The model will be analyzed first under the assumption that expectations of inflation are formed adaptively, and so are governed by the distributed lag

(9)
$$\pi(t) = \pi^0 + \pi(t_0)e^{-\beta(t-t_0)} + \beta \int_{t_0}^t e^{-\beta(t-s)} \frac{DP(s)}{P(s)} ds; \beta > 0$$

where $\pi(t_0)$ is an initial value of π at t_0 , π^0 is an ad hoc shift parameter, and β is a parameter.

The evolution of capital is of course governed by

(10)
$$K(t) = K(t_0) + \int_{t_0}^{t} i(s)K(s)ds$$

where $K(t_0)$ is the initial capital stock at t_0 . Collecting equations, the complete model is:

- (1) $y = f(\lambda)$ (2) $w/P = f'(\lambda)$
- (3) $i = i[f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) - (r + \delta - \pi)]$
- (4) $c = z(v - \tilde{t} - \delta)$
- (5) $y = c + i + g + \delta$
- (6)M/PK = m(r, y)
- (7) $Dw/w = h(\lambda K/N^s) + \pi$
- (8) $N^s(t) = N^s(t^n)e^{n(t-t_0)}$

(9)
$$\pi(t) = \pi^0 + \pi(t_0)e^{-\beta(t-t_0)} + \beta \int_{t_0}^t e^{-\beta(t-s)} \frac{DP(s)}{P(s)} ds$$

10) $K(t) = K(t_0) + \int_0^t i(s)K(s)ds$

(10)
$$K(t) = K(t_0) + \int_{t_0}^{t} i(s)K(s)ds$$

Given initial values for w, π , and K at t_0 , and given time paths for the exogenous variables M, g, and \tilde{t} for $t \ge t_0$, the model will generate time paths of the endogenous variables y, λ , K, i, C, w, P, r, π , and N^s . Notice that even though w, π , and K are exogenous or fixed at a point in time, being inherited from the past according to (7), (9), and (10), they are endogenous from a dynamic point of view. The model determines their evolution over time.

The momentary equilibrium of our system can be determined by solving equations 1 through 6 for IS and LM curves. The IS curve gives the combinations of r and y that make the demand for output equal to the supply. It is derived by substituting (3) and (4) into (5):

$$y = z(y - \tilde{t} - \delta) + i[f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) - (r + \delta - \pi)] + g + \delta$$

Since $f'(\lambda) > 0$, we can invert (1) and obtain

$$\lambda = \lambda(y)$$
: $\lambda'(y) = \frac{1}{f'(\lambda)} > 0$; $\lambda''(y) = \frac{-f''(\lambda)\lambda'(y)}{f'(\lambda)^2} > 0$

Substituting this into (5) yields the IS curve:

The slope of the B curve in the religioner's plane is plane

$$\frac{2}{2^{n}} \leq \frac{1}{2^{n}} \leq$$

which is of ambiguous sign since $\lambda(n) > 0$. The denominator of the above expression is Hicks's "supermultiplier" the term $-(\lambda\lambda)^n(\lambda)^n$ being the marginal propensity to invest out of income. I will assume that this term is less than the marginal propensity to save, therefore the 15 curve is downward sloping. The position of the 15 curve depends on the parameters g, f, and g in the usual way. An increase in g shifts the 15 curve upward by the amount of that increase, since at each g, g, g, g curve determines a unique value of g, g.

We can write the marginal productivity condition for labor as P = A[K]y). Substituting this expression for P into (6) yields the LM curve: M = A[K]y/Km(r, v), the slope of which is easily verified to be positive in the r-y-portfolio balance. Its position depends on M, W, and K, all of which are parameters at a point in time.

The momentary equilibrium of the system occurs at the intersection of the IS and LM curves. The momentary or static properties of the model are those of the standard textbook macroeconomic model.

Fisher's theory amounts to an assertion that the IS curve determines only the nominal interest rate and does not influence employment or the rate of output at any point in time. Rewrite the IS curve as

$$\frac{d(\lambda_t - \lambda)^2(\lambda_t + (t + \delta - \pi))}{d(\lambda_t - \lambda)^2(\lambda_t + (t + \delta - \pi))} = (1 - z)(t - \delta) - g + z\overline{z}$$

Since $\ell > 0$, the above equation can be inverted and rearranged to yield

(11)
$$z + \delta = \pi + f(\lambda) - \lambda f(\lambda) + \xi [(1 - z)(v - \delta - g - zi])$$

$$\xi' = \frac{-1}{i'} < 0$$

Now Fisher's theory asserts that a jump in π at some instant t causes r to jump by the same amount. Using (11), we can compute the response $\partial r/\partial \pi$ of r to a jump in π as:

(12)
$$\frac{\partial r}{\partial \pi} = 1 - \lambda I''(\lambda) \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial \pi} + \xi'(1-z) \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial \pi}$$

Equation 12 gives, in effect, the partial derivative of the reduced form for r with respect to π in terms of the reduced form partial derivatives $\partial \lambda / \partial \pi$ and $\partial v / \partial \pi$. The derivative $\partial r / \partial \pi$ will equal unity only under the special circumstance that the reduced form derivatives $\partial \lambda / \partial \pi$ and $\partial v / \partial \pi$ both

equal zero. In general, both derivatives exceed zero. In this case $\partial r/\partial \pi \le 1$, for an increase in π shifts the IS curve upward by the amount of the increase and causes r and y both to increase, so long as the LM curve has a positive but finite slope. It follows that r in general increases by less than the increase in π . How closely the increase in r approximates the increase in π depends on the relative slopes of the IS and LM curves. The flatter the IS curve is relative to the LM curve, the more closely $\partial r/\partial \pi$ will approximate unity. It is obvious that $\partial r/\partial \pi$ equals unity in the special case in which the slope of the portfolio balance schedule m_r equals zero, with the result that the LM curve is vertical. In that case, the LM curve determines y while the LS curve determines only the nominal interest rate.

To put the matter a little differently, in equation 11 the term $f(\lambda) = \lambda f'(\lambda) + \xi[(1-z)(1-\delta) - g + z\overline{t}]$ can be interpreted as the real rate of interest. Unless the *LM* curve is vertical, jumps in π will cause partially offsetting jumps in the real rate of interest as λ and y expand in response to increases in π .

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that there is a sense in which there obtains a long-run, steady-state version of Fisher's proposition in the above model, regardless of the particular parameter values.⁵ It can be verified easily that the model possesses a steady-state value of y, call it y*, given by:⁶

$$y^* = \frac{n+g+\delta(1-z)-z\tilde{t}}{(1-z)}$$

The steady-state value of y depends only on the fiscal policy variables g and \tilde{t} , and is independent of DM/M, DP/P, and π . Steady-state values of the nominal interest rate are computed from the inverted IS curve 11 by evaluating y and λ at their steady-state values. Given fixed values of g, \tilde{t} and DM/M and given stability, the system will over time approach such a steady state. Notice that given g and \tilde{t} , a switch to a money supply path with higher DM/M will leave the steady-state values of y, λ , and $r-\pi$ unaltered. This invariance of the steady-state value of $r-\pi$ to DM/M and so to π amounts to a long-run version of Fisher's theory.

However, to justify the econometric procedures of Fisher and his followers, it is the static version of the proposition that must obtain. That is the version of the proposition needed to rationalize the usual interpretation assigned by the authors to their regressions.

Perfect Foresight

For Fisher's static proposition to emerge in the preceding version of the model, special restrictions must be placed on the values of the parameters

of the model, namely, a steep LM curve (or a very flat IS curve). Here I show an alternative way enabling Fisher's proposition to emerge in this model, a way not dependent on assuming particular parametric values. The method is to abandon the assumption of ad hoc or adaptive expectations and instead assume perfect foresight. I now abandon (9) and for it substi-

$$(9') \quad \pi(t) = DP(t)/P(t)$$

where I continue to interpret D as the right-hand time derivative operator. Equation 9' asserts that people accurately perceive the right-hand time derivative of the log of the price level, i.e., the rate of inflation over the immediate future. In conjunction with the Friedman-Phelps form of the Phillips curve that I have assumed, (9') will play a key role in making $r=\pi$ and other real variables invariant with respect to movements in π , regardless of the particular parameter values assumed.

To solve the model, I begin by substituting (9') into (7) to obtain

(12)
$$\frac{Dw}{w} = h \frac{\lambda K}{N^s} + \frac{DP}{P}$$

Differentiating (2) logarithmically with respect to time gives

(13)
$$\frac{Dw}{w} = \frac{f''(\lambda)}{f'(\lambda)} D\lambda + \frac{DP}{P}$$

Equating (13) with (12) gives

(14)
$$h \frac{\lambda K}{N^s} = \frac{f''(\lambda)}{f'(\lambda)} D\lambda$$

where $f''(\lambda)/f'(\lambda)$ < 0. Now (14) is a differential equation in the employment-capital ratio λ , which may be solved for λ in terms of past values of K and N^s . To illustrate, suppose that $f(\lambda)$ is Cobb-Douglas, so that

$$y = f(\lambda) = A\lambda^{(1-\alpha)}; 0 \le \alpha < 1$$

Then we have

$$f'(\lambda) = A(1 - \alpha)\lambda^{-\alpha}$$

$$f''(\lambda) = -\alpha(1 - \alpha)A\lambda^{-\alpha-1}$$

$$\frac{f''(\lambda)}{f'(\lambda)} = \frac{-\alpha}{\lambda}$$

Also suppose that $h(\lambda K/N^s)$ takes the form

$$h(\lambda K/N^s) = \gamma \log (N/N^s)$$

$$= \gamma \log N - \gamma \log N^s$$

where "log" denotes the natural logarithm. Then (14) becomes

(15)
$$\gamma \log N - \gamma \log N^s = -\alpha \frac{D\lambda}{\lambda} = -\alpha D \log N + \alpha D \log K$$

Rearranging, we have

$$(\gamma + \alpha D) \log N = \gamma \log N^s + \alpha D \log K$$

or

$$\left(\frac{\gamma}{\alpha} + D\right) \log N = \frac{\gamma}{\alpha} \log N^{s} + D \log K$$

This is a linear, first-order differential equation in log N. Its solution is

(16)
$$\log N(t) = \frac{\gamma}{\alpha} \int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{(s-t)(y/\alpha)} \log N^{s}(s) ds + \int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{(s-t)(y/\alpha)} \frac{DK(s)}{K(s)} ds$$

Equation (16) is the solution to equation (15) and expresses $\log N$ at t as distributed lags of past values of the labor supply and capital stock. Since these are predetermined at time t, we immediately know that employment and hence output will not respond at t to the imposition of shocks to the system in the form of changes in g, \bar{t} , or M at t.

Given the value of N at t determined from some version of (16), and given the quantity of K inherited from the past, output is determined by equation 1, the real wage by (2), and c by (4). Given c and y, (5) then determines i. Given i and λ , equation 3 determines $r - \pi$ at t. Equation (7) determines (Dw/w) - (DP/P). So $r - \pi$ is predetermined, and thus invariant with respect to $\pi(=DP/P)$. So Fisher's static proposition holds.

All real variables have now been determined, and it remains only to determine the values of P and DP/P at instant t. They are determined by the portfolio balance condition in the following manner. We know that in this system r is determined by (3), which we express by inverting (3) and writing

$$r = f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) - \delta + (DP/P) + \theta(i) \qquad \theta' = -\frac{1}{i'} < 0$$

Substituting this into (6) gives

(17)
$$\frac{M}{PK} = m[f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) - \delta + (DP/P) + \theta(i), y]$$

This is a differential equation in P with forcing variables M, λ , and i. To illustrate a solution, suppose that m(r, y) has the special form

$$m(r, y) = e^{\alpha r} y$$
 $\alpha < 0$

Then (17) becomes

$$\log M - \log P - \log K = \log y + \alpha [f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) - \delta + (DP/P) + \theta(i)]$$

Rearranging gives

$$[(1/\alpha) + D] \log P = (1/\alpha) \{ \log M - \log K - \alpha [f(\lambda) - \lambda'(\lambda) - \delta + \theta(i)] \}$$

The solution of the above differential equation is

(18)
$$\log P(t) = -\frac{1}{\alpha} \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{is-t \operatorname{Mix}} \left(\log M(s) - \log K(s) - \alpha \{ f[\lambda(s)] - \lambda(s) f[\lambda(s)] - \delta + \theta(t) \} \right) ds$$

Equation (18) expresses the current price level as a function of the entire future path of the money supply, the capital stock, the employment-capital ratio λ , and the rate of investment. The value of π is also determined by (18), and can be obtained by differentiating (18) with respect to time from the right. Notice that the complete time paths of the variables appearing on the right side of (18) can be determined before the current price level is determined; that is, a version of equation (16) determines the values of N and λ at t, and this enables calculation of the rate of growth of capital i. The capital stock can then be updated, and subsequent values of N then determined. Proceeding in this way, given the time paths for the exogenous fiscal policy variables, the complete time paths of all the real variables can be determined before determining the price level at any moment.

In this model, Fisher's static proposition clearly holds, since all real variables, including $r-\pi$, are determined independently of π and P at any moment. If at a point in time the monetary authority suddenly and unexpectedly announces a move to a new planned future money supply path involving a higher rate of growth, DM/M, over the entire future, π will immediately jump to a new higher value, as differentiation of (18) with respect to time verifies. But all real variables including $r-\pi$ will remain unaffected. Consequently r will increase by the same amount as π . Notice that this result does not depend on assuming any special parameter values, as it did under ad hoc or adaptive expectations.

In the adaptive expectations scheme (9), the model must be manipulated under the "Keynesian" assumption that the money wage does not jump at a point in time; so the Phillips curve (7) gives the time derivative of the wage (= the right-hand time derivative = the left-hand time derivative). Essentially, that is because at any moment t, equations (8), (9), and (10) make $N^s(t)$, $\pi(t)$, and K(t) predetermined from past variables. Equations (1) through (7) then form a system of seven equations in the seven endogenous variables y(t), $\lambda(t)$, i(t), c(t), P(t), r(t), and Dw(t)w(t). The model is incapable of restricting any additional variables, in particular w(t), at moment t. So w(t) must be regarded as fixed and inherited from the past at each point in time.

However, in the system with $\pi = DP/P$, it is employment that is predetermined at any moment in time by the differential equation 14. Since employment is predetermined at t, say by (16), y, λ , and w/P are also predetermined and constrained to change continuously as functions of

time. They cannot jump at a point in time. But if w/P cannot jump, and neither can K or y, then if M jumps at a point in time, we know that P and w must jump in order to satisfy the portfolio balance equation at each moment.

Heuristically, what is going on under rational expectations can be described as follows. Under rational expectations the demand schedule and "supply" (Phillips) curve for labor are, respectively,

$$\log w(t) - \log P(t) = \log f'[N(t)/K(t)]$$

$$D \log w(t) - D \log P(t) = h[N(t)/N^{s}(t)]$$

Integrating the supply equation gives

$$\log w(t) - \log P(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{t} h[N(s)/N^{s}(s)]ds$$

Equating this expression for $\log w - \log P$ to the one from the demand curve gives

$$\log f'[N(t)/K(t)] = \int_{-\infty}^{t} h[N(s)/N^{s}(s)]ds$$

an expression that determines N(t) solely in terms of the predetermined variables K(t) and current and past values of N^s and past values of N. The assumption of rational expectations, in conjunction with the Phelps-Friedman form assumed for the Phillips curve, serves to make the labor market equations alone capable of determining employment at any point in time. This is what delivers the "classical" features of the model, including among them Fisher's static proposition about the impact of expected inflation on the nominal rate of interest.

Some may regard as implausible and uninteresting both the assumption that individuals have perfect foresight and its implication in this model that wages and prices jump instantaneously, thereby isolating the workings of the labor market from any disturbances to portfolio balance or aggregate demand. In particular, this model seems to imply that there can be no business cycle produced by shocks to aggregate demand. However, this implication of the model is a consequence of my having chosen to describe it in a nonstochastic form. It is important to note that there exist stochastic (random) versions of the model in which individuals do not possess perfect foresight but instead are assumed to have expectations that are "rational" in Muth's sense: Expectations are assumed only to be distributed about the variable people are trying to predict, and so deviate from being "perfect" by what may be a very large random term. The assumption that expectations are rational is much weaker and more plausible than the assumption of perfect foresight. Stochastic models with rational expectations have been constructed that share the main "classical" policy implications of the nonstochastic, perfect-foresight model described above. In particular, a version of Fisher's static proposition holds in such models. On the other hand, such a model is consistent with the presence of swings in unemployment and even a business cycle induced by fluctuations in aggregate demand. Models of this class are described by Sargent (1973b) and are the stochastic cousins of the perfect-foresight model described here. I have chosen to describe the nonstochastic version here only to simplify to the exposition. That simplification is purchased at the cost of hiding some of the ability of such models to describe the fluctuations of output and unemployment observed in the real world.

In summary, Fisher's proposition is an aspect of the classical theory of interest. That theory asserts that the *IS* curve can be inverted to obtain the reduced form for the interest rate, e.g., our equation 11:

(11)
$$t + \delta = \pi + f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) + \xi[(1-z)(y-\delta) - g + z\tilde{t}]$$
 $\xi' < 0$

In order for this to be the classical reduced form for the interest rate, the real variables λ and y must be predetermined with respect to r, and should not respond to disturbances in π , g, or \tilde{t} . In the classical theory, such shocks to aggregate demand lead to equilibrating changes in the nominal rate of interest and leave output and employment imaffected. The key to delivering the classical interest theory and Fisher's proposition is some device capable of rendering output and employment invariant to shocks in aggregate demand. The standard classical device for doing that relies on instantaneously flexible money wages and prices, the kind of device operating in the above model with perfect foresight. Such a device also has the effect of making the real rate of interest invariant with respect to movements in the supply of money. With such a device, increases in the supply of money are prevented from exerting any downward "liquidity effects" on the interest rate. The other side of the coin is that, at least in models in which the interest elasticity of the demand for money is not zero, if there exist negative liquidity effects of money on the interest rate, then an increase in expected inflation will give rise to a less than equivalent increase in the nominal rate of interest.

Despite the preceding, the recent literature is full of empirical work with equations that purport to support a full and immediate Fisher effect of expected inflation on interest rates, but at the same time find an inverse liquidity effect of money on interest rates. With a few exceptions, such equations have no interpretation within the context of standard macroeconomic models of the kind studied above. For example, the DRI (Data Resources Incorporated) econometric model includes a version of an equation by Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) for the nominal interest rate that combines a full Fisher effect with a potent liquidity variable. At the same time, the DRI model has nominal, not real, interest rates in expenditure

schedules, with the result that expected inflation does not appear in the *IS* curve. Furthermore, the DRI model purports to indicate potent effects of fiscal policy on real output and employment, despite the presence of an approximately full Fisher effect on the nominal interest rate. It is difficult to understand how such a model relates to the standard textbook macroeconomic model described above.

A Digression on the Pigou Effect

It is appropriate to mention here the point made by Lloyd Metzler (1951) that inclusion of a consumption function incorporating a wealth or Pigou effect alters the "real" character of the classical theory of interest, and in particular causes Fisher's static proposition to fail to hold in a model that relies on instantaneous wage and price flexibility to make output invariant with respect to aggregate demand.8 For example, suppose that consumption function 4 is replaced by the Pigouvian consumption function,

(4')
$$c = c(y - \bar{t} - \delta, M/PK); 1 > c_1 > 0, c_2 > 0$$

Substituting (4'), (6), and (3) into (5) then gives the appropriate IS curve:

(19)
$$y = c[y - \overline{t} - \delta, m(r, y)] + i[f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda) - (r + \delta - \pi)] + g + \delta$$

Suppose that y and λ are invariant with respect to movements in g, t, and π , so that (19) is in effect the reduced form for r. On that assumption, the reduced form partial derivative of r with respect to π is easily calculated to be $\partial r/\partial \pi = -i'/(c_2m_r - i')$. Since $c_2 > 0$, then unless $m_r = 0$, $\partial r/\partial \pi$ will be less than unity. This happens because an increase in π , by driving r up, causes real balances per unit of capital to fall, thereby lowering consumption demand at each real rate of interest. The real rate of interest must therefore fall when π increases in order to stimulate investment demand and thereby keep aggregate demand equal to the predetermined level of aggregate supply.

But there are versions of the classical model in which Fisher's static proposition holds even if the consumption function incorporates the Pigou effect. I have in mind a version of Tobin's dynamic aggregative model (Tobin 1955), which differs from the Keynesian model above only in that it replaces the Keynesian investment schedule with a marginal productivity condition for capital:

(3')
$$r + \delta - \pi = f(\lambda) - \lambda f'(\lambda)$$

In Tobin's model, capital and labor are treated symmetrically, unlike in the Keynesian model. There is a market in stocks of physical capital which permits firms instantaneously to trade capital until the marginal condition

(3') is fulfilled. In this model, the role of the IS curve is taken over by the curve obtained by substituting $\lambda(y)$ for λ in (3'):

(20)
$$r + \delta - \pi = f[\lambda(y)] - \lambda(y)f'[\lambda(y)]$$

The foregoing curve shows the combinations of r and y that guarantee equilibrium in the market for existing capital. In the version of this model with ad hoc adaptive expectations, momentary equilibrium is determined at the intersection of the LM curve with curve (20). Notice that neither \tilde{t} nor g appears as a determinant of y, λ or $r - \pi$ at a point in time. The consumption function and national income identity only serve to determine the allocation of output among uses, and play no role in determining the level of output at a point in time.

As in the Keynesian model, if either $m_r = 0$ or rational expectations are assumed, the effect will be to make y invariant with respect to jumps in π at a point in time. Under such a device, then, (20) becomes the reduced form for the interest rate. Where this is so, the reduced form partial derivative $\partial r/\partial \pi$ is unity, regardless of the form of the consumption function. Thus, in that model, Fisher's static proposition that a jump in π leads to an equivalent jump in r at the same moment holds. Pigou effect or

[II] EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Most recent empirical work on this topic amounts to an attempt to replicate, in one form or another, Irving Fisher's empirical results. Fisher implicitly assumed that the real rate of interest is statistically independent of the expected rate of inflation π_t ,

(21)
$$r_t = \alpha + \pi_t + \epsilon_t$$

where α is a constant and ϵ_t is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero, and is assumed to be statistically independent of past and present values of the determinants of π_t . The parameter α is the mean real rate of interest. The orthogonality of π_t and ϵ_t amounts to a very severe macroeconomic restriction, since even classical interest rate theory suggests that fiscal variables will influence r and not in general be orthogonal to π . Fisher also posited the extrapolative expectations scheme:

(22)
$$\pi_t = \sum_{i=0}^{n} w_i (\log P_{t-i} - \log P_{t+i-1})$$

where the w_i 's are parameters. Substituting (22) into (21) gives Fisher's equation, which he estimated by a variant of the method of least squares:

(23)
$$r_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=0}^{n} w_i (\log P_{t-i} - \log P_{t-i-1}) + \epsilon_t$$

Notice that on the basis of estimates of the parameters of Fisher's equation, the parameters w_i of the expectations-generating function (22) are identified only because in (21) it is assumed that the coefficient on π_t is unity; that is, to identify the w_i 's from estimates of Fisher's equation, it is necessary to assume a full Fisher effect of expected inflation on the nominal interest rate. In order to be able to test empirically for the presence of a full Fisher effect (e.g., see Feldstein and Eckstein 1970), some followers of Fisher have implicitly modified (21) to become

(21')
$$r_t = \alpha + \beta \pi_t + \epsilon_t$$

where β is a parameter measuring the extent of the Fisher effect. Substituting (22) into (21'), we obtain

(23')
$$r_t = \alpha + \beta \sum_{i=0}^{n} w_i (\log P_{t-i} - \log P_{t-i-1}) + \epsilon_t$$

Least-squares estimation of (23') delivers estimates of only the n+2 parameters α , βw_0 , βw_1 , ..., βv_n , with the result that in the absence of a restriction on the w_i 's, β is not identifiable. The standard identification restriction imposed has been

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n} w_i = 1$$

which is unfortunately an arbitrary and possibly "irrational" restriction to impose on the w_i 's. Ironically, that restriction has itself been defended on the basis of an appeal, albeit a misplaced one, to rationality. It is held that if a constant x percent inflation were to occur over a very long period of time, individuals would eventually catch on and expect inflation to occur at x percent per year. But if expectations are governed by (22), this requires that

$$\chi = \sum_{i=0}^{n} w_{i} \chi$$

or

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n} w_i = 1$$

But suppose, instead, that actual inflation were to be governed by the Markov process:

$$\log P_t - \log P_{t-1} = 0.3 (\log P_{t-1} - \log P_{t-2}) + U_t$$

where U_t is a serially independent, unpredictable random variable with a mean of zero. By the same logic applied above, it would seem reasonable to expect that individuals would eventually catch on and form their (one-period forward) expectations according to

$$\pi_{t-1} = 0.3 (\log P_{t-1} - \log P_{t-2})$$

since this is the best possible forecasting scheme. Here the w_i 's do not sum to unity. The message of this example is that the choice of the most reasonable identifying restriction to impose on the w_i 's in (22) depends on how actual inflation seems to be evolving, at least if some standard of rationality is expected for individual's forecasts. The assumption $\sum_{i=0}^n w_i = 1$ will not in general be the appropriate restriction to impose, since during the estimation period it could very well be foolish to form expectations subject to such a restriction. Estimates of β identified by such a restriction ought therefore to be regarded with appropriate suspicion.¹⁰

In addition to the identification problem present, proceeding under the hypothesis of extrapolative expectations (22) makes it difficult to determine what patterns of estimated w_i 's ought to be taken as confirming the theory. Generally, positive estimated w_i 's and high R^2 's have been the ad hoc criteria for acceptance. But there are many patterns of w_i 's that might meet these vague criteria; and such criteria could be met when calculating regression (23) even if the theory in (21) were dead wrong, since interest rates and the price level could be highly correlated for causes having nothing to do with the effects of expected inflation on interest rates. What is badly needed here is some more rigorous standard for determining what pattern of w_i 's confirms the theory embodied in equation (21). The hypothesis that expectations are "rational" provides such a standard. This hypothesis also provides a convenient way of solving the preceding identification problem. Expectations are said to be rational it they equal the pertinent predictions of economic and statistical theory. In this case, positing rationality amounts to assuming that the expected rate of inflation equals the mathematical expectation of subsequent inflation based on available information. If the pertinent horizon for the expectations is, say, one period forward, rationality requires

$$(24) \quad \boldsymbol{\pi}_t = E[\boldsymbol{x}_{t+1} | \boldsymbol{\theta}_t]$$

where $x_{t+1} = \log P_{t+1} - \log P_t$, i.e., the rate of inflation, and θ_t is the set of information available at time t pertinent for forecasting inflation. Here E is the mathematical expectation operator. Define the prediction error η_{t+1} as

$$\eta_{t+1} = \chi_{t+1} - E[\chi_{t+1} | \theta_t]$$

Notice that

$$E[\eta_{t+1} | \theta_t] = F[x_{t+1} | \theta_t] - E[x_{t+1} | \theta_t] = 0$$

Therefore, it is not possible to predict the prediction error. Assuming that r_t is the yield on a one-period bond and substituting (24) into (21) gives

(25)
$$r_t = \alpha + E[\chi_{t+1} | \theta_t] + \epsilon_t$$

Above it was assumed that ϵ_t is statistically independent of the determinants of π_t . That assumption must be modified somewhat in order to make the model sensible where expectations are assumed to be rational. Under rational expectations, it is conceivable that r_t itself might be used to help forecast x_{t+1} . That makes it impossible to assume $E[\epsilon_t | \theta_t] = 0$, i.e., that ϵ_t is independent of all components of θ_t , since θ_t includes r_t , implying from (25) that

$$E[\epsilon_{t} | \theta_{t}] = E[\{r_{t} - \alpha - E[x_{t+1} | \theta_{t}]\} | \theta_{t}]]$$

$$= E[r_{t} | \theta_{t}\} - \alpha - E[x_{t+1} | \theta_{t}]]$$

$$= r_{t} - \alpha - E[x_{t+1} | \theta_{t}]$$

$$= \epsilon_{t}$$

Therefore, $E[\epsilon_t | \theta_t]$ cannot be zero. It is however permitted instead to assume that ϵ_t is statistically independent of all components of θ_t except r_t , with the result that $E[\epsilon_t | \{\theta_t - r_t\}] = 0$, where $\{\theta_t - r_t\}$ is the set of all variables in θ_t except the value of r at time t. So it is now assumed that ϵ_t is statistically independent of all determinants of π_t , with the exception of r_t itself. Following Shiller (1972), I now use (25) to calculate the regression of r_t against any subset θ_{1t} of $\{\theta_t - r_t\}$:

$$(26) \quad E[r_t|\theta_{1t}] = \alpha + E[x_{t+1}|\theta_{1t}]$$

Equation 26 states that the regression of r_t on any subset θ_{1t} of the information $\{\theta_t - r_t\}$ used in forming expectations of inflation equals the regression of the rate of inflation, x_{t+1} , on the same variables, except for a constant term. In particular,

(26')
$$E[r_t|x_t, x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \ldots] = \alpha + E[x_{t-1}|x_t, x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \ldots]$$

so long as the inflation rates $x_t, x_{t-1}, x_{t-2}, \ldots$ are included in θ_t . Thus, the theory can be tested by computing the regressions on either side of (26) and testing for their identity. Alternatively, notice that the theory implies the regression $E[(r_t - x_{t+1})|\theta_t] = \alpha$, which can be computed to test the theory.

Shiller (1972) has applied such a test to quarterly long-term interest rates for the United States for the postwar period. While he did not report formal statistical hypothesis tests, he found that the theory provides a tolerable approximation to the data. For annual U.S. data spanning the period 1870–1940, I reported the results of comparing the two regressions in (26'), and found it difficult to accept the theory (Sargent 1973a). The regression $E[x_{t+1}|x_t,x_{t-1},\ldots]$ was typically a short distributed lag, while the regression is a manifestation of the Gibson paradox, the positive correlation between nominal interest rates and the price level that Keynes and Fisher had detected and tried to explain. The remarkable thing about these results

is not the finding that the model failed for the 1870-1940 data, but Shiller's finding that the model does adequately well for the postwar U.S. data, for the model is an extraordinarily simple one that, as mentioned above, is severely restricted by the assumption of zero correlation between ϵ_i and (almost all) determinants of π_t in (21). One way of looking at some explanations of the Gibson paradox is as advancing models of the correlations between ϵ_t in (21) and the determinants of π_t . For example, in the context of equation (21), ϵ_i stands in for all of the fiscal policy variables that are asserted to help determine the rate of interest according to the classical theory of interest. That theory asserts that an increase in, say, government purchases will increase both the interest rate and the price level, P_{t} . Hence there is reason to expect a positive correlation between ϵ_{t} and P_t . Since the latter enters on the right side of (26) or (26), the orthogonality of ϵ_t to the determinants of π_t , which was used to derive equalities (26) and (26'), does not hold, and therefore the equalities themselves fail to hold. Furthermore, it is possible for such a mechanism to set up a strong positive correlation between r_t and the level of P_t , thus in principle providing a way to explain the Gibson paradox even in the face of expectations of inflation that are short distributed lags of the actual rate of inflation 11

In any event, what seems to bear emphasizing is that while macroeconomic theory, even classical macroeconomic theory, provides ample reason to expect correlations between ϵ_t and the determinants of π_t . Shiller's model apparently performs adequately for the postwar years even though one of its assumptions is that such correlations are not there.

Eugene Fama (1973) tested an even more restrictive version of the model, and like Shiller, found that the model seems acceptable for describing the post–World War II U.S. data. Fama further restricted the ϵ_i 's in (21) by assuming that they are not present. Thus, he assumed the exact (nonstochastic) relationship

$$(21') \quad r_t = \alpha + \pi_t$$

Then, using the rationality hypothesis and the definition of the prediction error η_{t-1} , Fama rewrote (21') as $r_t = \alpha + \chi_{t+1} - \eta_{t+1}$ or

(27)
$$x_{t+1} = -\alpha + r_t + \eta_{t+1}$$

Since $E[\eta_{t+1}|\theta_t] = 0$, as we have seen, (27) implies that for a subset of θ_b θ_{2t} , including r_t , the following regression holds:

$$E[x_{t-1}|\theta_{2t}] = -\alpha + r_t$$

That is, a regression of subsequent inflation on a set of variables including the current one-period bond rate, ought to have a unit coefficient on the bond rate and zero coefficients on all the other variables except for the constant. This is so because according to (21') the interest rate equals, apart from a constant, the public's expectation of subsequent inflation; and by rationality, that forecast is the best one that can be made on the basis of information available at time t.

Fama tested his model using rates on Treasury bills of from one to six months' maturity, and using the rate of inflation in the Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure inflation, x_t . Fama regressed x_{t+1} against r_t and x_t for bills of various maturities. He was unable to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on r_t is 1.0 while that on x_t is zero. Thus, Fama's tests fail to support rejection of the very strong version of Fisher's theory he assumed. As with the results of Shiller's tests, the remarkable thing is that so simple and restrictive a model should prove approximately adequate for the postwar years.

In summary, the evidence on Fisher's theory remains mixed. On the one hand, Fama and Shiller have offered evidence that Fisher's theory provides a tolerable approximation for explaining the behavior of interest rates and inflation in the United States in the post-World War II period. Against this there is evidence that Fisher's theory is not so adequate for explaining the pre-World War II data. Those data seem to display the Gibson paradox, the tendency of interest rates to be highly correlated with the price level rather than with the (expected) rate of change of the price level as predicted by Fisher's theory (see Fisher 1930 and Sargent 1973a). Explanations can be concocted for the apparent break in behavior between the prewar and postwar periods, one being that the higher rate of inflation characterizing the postwar period makes it more imperative for investors to devote resources to forecasting inflation properly, thereby strengthening the Fisher effect and making it easier to detect econometrically. But as yet, such an explanation is speculative since we do not now have an empirically confirmed explanation for the Gibson paradox in the prewar period. Some of my own earlier work (1973a, 1973d) was directed toward showing how the Gibson paradox could arise in a "plausible" stochastic macroeconomic model. Such demonstrations, while suggestive, are not themselves substitutes for an explanation of the Gibson paradox that has been subjected to a detailed empirical test.

[III] CONCLUSION

Irving Fisher's proposition is a classical "neutrality" result, asserting the independence of the real rate of interest with respect to movements in anticipated inflation. It is hardly surprising, then, to find that the recent iricrease in attention paid to Fisher's proposition has not led Keynesian

economists to accept it. Tobin (1974) has pointed out that the behavior of the stock market in recent years does not seem consistent with Fisher's theory and with the theory of stock prices implicit in the standard macroeconomic model, 12 taken together. According to classical theory, a change in expected inflation π that leaves the real rate of interest $r - \pi$ unchanged will by itself leave unaffected Tobin's q, the ratio of the capital stock as evaluated in the equity and bond markets to physical capital evaluated at its reproduction price. But q fell dramatically in recent years, especially in 1974, making it difficult for Tobin to believe that the rise in nominal interest rates in recent years was simply a "neutral" response to higher expected inflation. Instead, it is possible to interpret the fall in q and the rise in r both as due to a rise in the real rate of interest $r - \pi$, a rise engineered by tight monetary policy and the prospects for further tight monetary policy.

The observations cited by Tobin certainly constitute a puzzle. But I would not rely on those observations alone to reject Fisher's theory for the postwar U.S. data, in view of the empirical findings of Shiller and Fama described above. My own guess is that the puzzle instead symptomizes deficiencies in the theory of the stock market implicit in the standard macroeconomic model. For the reasons laid bare by Keynes's famous metaphor of the "pretty girl contest" (1936, p. 156), we do not seem to have much of a theory about Tobin's q, one capable of sorting out the objective causes of a given movement over time in q. Still, there is much appeal to Tobin's essential point that the sharp movements in q that have occurred in recent years make it hard to believe that expected real rates of return have remained approximately constant while inflation has accelerated. The importance of Shiller's and Fama's tests is that, on the contrary, they suggest that assuming that the real rate is approximately constant provides an acceptable approximation for the behavior of bond yields in the postwar period.

There remains another puzzle, namely, the apparent success of Fisher's theory for the postwar U.S. data as opposed to scattered evidence, mainly the repeated observation of the "Gibson paradox" over long periods of time for U.S. and British data, that the theory is not borne out for pre-World War II data. I have no satisfactory explanation for this apparent observations suggesting that the postwar behavior. This is but one of several observations suggesting that the postwar period has been more "classical" than was the prewar period, the mild character of postwar business cycles being the central such observation. A standard explanation for such observations, along the lines of Samuelson's neoclassical synthesis, holds that the postwar period has been characterized by a tame business cycle because activist monetary and fiscal policies were pursued. Such policies could conceivably have been responsible for the apparent constancy of the

real rate of interest uncovered by Fama's and Shiller's tests. If such policies were indeed that much responsible for a stable real rate, it would be a mistake to draw any far-reaching "classical" policy implications from such tests. 14

NOTES

- 1. Examples of recent work are Gibson (1970), Yohe and Karnosky (1969), Carr and Smith (1972), and Feldstein and Eckstein (1970). This list is far from exhaustive.
- 2. I have earlier claimed (Sargent 1973c) that Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) have an example of such an equation.
- 3. Let p(t) be the price level at time t. Then the right-hand time derivative of p(t) is defined as

$$\lim_{t'\to t} \frac{p(t') - p(t)}{t' - t}$$

The time paths of prices described by some of the models below are not continuous, but are "continuous from the right," with the result that

$$\lim_{t' \to \bar{t}} p(t') = p(\bar{t})$$

$$t' \to \bar{t}$$

$$t' > \bar{t}$$

always, even though p(t) may be discontinuous at t. Since p(t) is not necessarily continuous, its derivative is not defined, though its right-hand derivative may be if there are not too many discontinuities. Notice that equating the right-hand derivative of the log of p(t) to expected inflation is the natural way to represent perfect foresight.

- That fewer restrictions on parameter values are required for Fisher's theory where expectations are rational was claimed on the basis of a stochastic macroeconomic model in Sargent (1973).
- 5. This point is made for a similar model in Sargent (1972).
- 6. From the national income identity, the rate of growth of capital is

$$i = y - z(y - \tilde{t} - \delta) - g - \delta$$

In the steady state, i = n. Equating the above expression for i to n and solving for y gives the expression for the steady-state value of y reported in the text.

7. Such solutions for the price level in terms of future values are discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1973); a certain terminal condition is imposed, and is discussed by them. In (16) a solution for the differential equation (15) is given in terms of past values of the forcing variables, while in (18) a solution of the differential equation (17) is given in terms of future values of the forcing variables. In general, a first-order differential equation can be solved two ways. In one, the dependent variable is expressed as a function of past values of the forcing variables and an initial condition; in the other, the dependent variable is expressed in terms of future values of the forcing variables and a terminal condition. In general, the solution in one direction is stable, while in the other direction it is unstable. I have chosen the stable solution in each case, an application of the "correspondence principle" of Samuelson. In the money and growth literature, equations like (17) are sometimes solved in terms of past values of the forcing variables, which is the unstable direction. Neil Wallace and I have argued that that is the wrong direction in which to solve such an equation (Sargent and Wallace 1973).

- 8. Mandell (1963) has emphasized this point.
- 9. Clearly, with a Pigou effect, an increase in π is not "neutral," since it affects the allocation of output, the rate of investment, and therefore the rate of growth over time of output and the real rate of interest. But Fisher's static or point-in-time proposition continues to hold.

In "Money and Economic Growth," Tobin (1965) includes the expected rate of depreciation of the public's real holdings of outside money in the disposable income term that appears in the consumption function. Like the Pigou effect, this makes the expected rate of inflation influence the rate of capital accumulation and therefore steady-state capital intensity and the real rate of interest. But where the wage and price level are instantaneously flexible, as they are in Tobin's growth model, it can be shown, by an argument like that in the text, that Fisher's static proposition characterizes Tobin's model, despite the long-run nonneutral character of changes in π .

- Imposing the unit sum identifying restriction has been criticized on these grounds by Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1971) in the context of estimating Phillips curves.
- Such an explanation of the Gibson paradox is implemented in Sargent (1973a, 1973d).
- 12. That theory of stock prices states that the value of firms' bonds and equities, S, is given

$$S = \frac{P[MP_k - (r + \delta - \pi)]K}{r - \pi} + PK$$

where MP_k is the expected marginal product of capital. (See Sargent 1973a, p. 430, for one derivation of this formula.) Tobin defines q as the ratio S/PK:

$$q = \frac{[MP_k - (r + \delta - \pi)]}{r - \pi} + 1$$

which, given MP_k , varies inversely with the real rate of interest, $r=\pi$.

- An explanation could be constructed by referring to equation 17 in Sargent (1973d), and positing that the relative importance of the first term on the right side increases during periods of high inflation, such as those experienced in the postwar, It would require more empirical evidence than is now available to confirm such an explanation,
- This is an example of the old point that use of optimal policy feedback rules can make goal variables look approximately constant, and so seem invariant with respect to movements in the policy variables even when the goal variables are not invariant with respect to the policy variables.

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