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Gender based prescriptions: evidence on altruism

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Gender based prescriptions: evidence for altruism*

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the way in which men and women are expected to behave differently in an experimental situation. To do so, we concentrate on a single topic: altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in

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the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently and both believe that women are more generous. These two premises affect their behavior.

Keywords: prescriptions, dictator game, beliefs, generosity, gender

1 Introduction

A vast amount of the literature in the Social Sciences analyzes differences in behavior between men and women. In this regard, experimental papers on cooperative/social issues have demonstrated the existence of gender biases. In fact, several papers report clear evidence of women's greater pro-social behavior, especially in settings where subjects are not conditioned by risk¹ and social issues are involved (see Brañas-Garza, 2006). As a result, experimentalists have become increasingly concerned about the consequences of these gender biases on experimental results. For instance, the percentage of females within the sample pool might affect results (see Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) or, likewise, the percentage of females in teams could be also relevant (see Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006). Moreover, it is a well-documented fact in psychology that males and females behave differently in a variety of situations.²

In sum, a large number of papers from a wide range of disciplines have provided evidence for differences in *behavior (in actions) between men and*

¹Eckel & Grossman (1998) and Andreoni & Vesterlund [4] report gender bias in favor of more generous women. Harbaugh et al. [20] obtain identical results using a pool comprised of children. See also Eckel and Grossman (2000).

²See for example Eagly and Crowley (1986), Goertzel (1983), Glover (1997) and Ones and Viswesvaran (1998).

women. In contrast, as far as we know, no previous experimental paper has explored how subjects perceive differences in behavior between men and women.

We study if subjects hold particular beliefs regarding gender identity when they are in an experimental situation. In other words, we explore if the categories of “man” and “woman” are unquestionably associated with *different ideal attributes and prescribed behaviors*. In the case that men and women are associated to different prescribed behaviors, we could then advance one step further to determine whether the gender effect observed in the lab is based on identity concerns (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).

This initial aim of this paper is to examine a clear and straightforward question: Do subjects hold special beliefs for females regarding altruism? This first approximation is related only to individuals’ perceived generosity.³ To do so we performed a highly intuitive design. Subjects (recipients) received detailed instructions explaining the dictator game and were then shown two boxes. The box on the left contained 20 dictatorial allocations made by 20 females, while the box on the right contained another 20 divisions made by 20 males. The experimental subjects were told that they would re-

³Perceived behavior in strategic environments remains an open question.

ceive the amount of money written on one, just one, of the slips of paper drawn randomly from one of the boxes. The subjects' task involved choosing one of the two boxes. They were also asked to fill out a questionnaire.

The results are substantial: *i*) only one-third of the subjects chose the "men" box; *ii*) most of them based their choice on a very "sensible" argument: *females are more generous*; *iii*) a minority consider that general generosity does not imply higher donations in the dictator game.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the theoretical framework is discussed in Section 2, while the design is described in Section 3. Results are shown in Section 4 followed by a discussion of the conclusions in Section 5.

2 The framework

A great many papers report that women behave more generously than men in a large variety of games: the trust game, the prisoner's dilemma, public good and, obviously, in the dictator game. Theorists have explained these deviations from the predicted Nash equilibrium in terms of reciprocity or fairness, among other reasons (see for instance, Bolton & Ockenfelds 2000;

Fehr and Schmidt 1999).

The model proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assumes that subjects value prescriptions⁴ in the sense that they suffer a loss of utility if they do not follow the prescribed behavior. This model therefore introduces a new way of explaining the observed result that women are more cooperative. This kind of utility function could explain the greater cooperative behavior of females based on the assumption that the *level of generosity in the behavior of women is socially prescribed as higher than in the behavior of men*. So, women have a higher decrease in their utility (than men) if they deviate from a generous behavior.

Let us focus on altruism, that is, in the context of the dictator game. In this game the dictator has to decide how to divide a pie between herself and a second subject (the recipient). The division she proposes is final, in the sense that it determines both her payoffs and the recipient's payoffs.

As noted above, previous results have clearly shown that women are more generous in this game. These results could be explained by women's greater

⁴Formally, i -subject is endowed with a utility function for subject as: $U_i = U_i(a_i, a_{-i}, I_i)$ with

$$I_i = I_i(a_i, a_{-i}, g_i, P_{g_i})$$

where a_i represents i 's actions, a_{-i} represents other's actions, I_i represents i 's identity; g_i is i 's gender and P_{g_i} is i 's prescription of behavior of i 's gender.

sense of fairness, but also, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), by the existence of a larger generosity prescription for women.

Let us assume that women believe that they must be generous at some level and that men perceive that they must be generous at a lower level than the level perceived by women. Therefore, in order for women to achieve a utility level that is equal to men, they must donate higher amounts in the dictator game.⁵

To apply this model, we must first check that the assumption that females are more generous than males is true; and, secondly, that the former assumption is common knowledge to both females and males.

In sum, does everyone believe that women give more money in the dictator game than men?⁶ We will now provide some experimental evidence on this issue by adding a second step to the dictator game in which the recipients are asked to choose between a female dictator and a male dictator.

⁵For instance, using a utility function such as $U_i = \pi_i(a_i, a_{-i}) - \varphi_i d_i$ with $d_i = P_{g_i} - a_i$ we just need a larger value of the prescriptions (P_{g_i}) for women than for men.

⁶This paper does not analyze if behavior prescriptions are correlated to the donations in the dictator game. It only studies if these prescriptions truly exist.

3 Experimental design and procedures

Two different sessions were conducted at the University of Granada with 40 and 28 participants, respectively. Subjects were recruited via posters placed throughout the University announcing the experiment. Individuals confirmed their attendance via e-mail. The two experimental sessions were conducted consecutively. Both experimental sessions were controlled in such a way as to prevent participants from communicating with one another.⁷ On average, each subject earned 8 euros (including a 2.5 euro show-up fee) for a one-hour session.

Subjects were given written instructions (see the Appendix) which were also read aloud by the experimenter to ensure that all the participants received the same information. Communication between subjects was not allowed.

The experiment was conducted in two different phases. In the first phase subjects were required to make four sequential decisions⁸. The subjects were then asked to answer two questions. The first one regarded the reasons for

⁷There are no statistical differences between participants' behavior in the sessions regarding the main task of the experiment (Mann-Whitney $Z = -0.149, p = 0.881$).

⁸The first part of the experiment involved four steps: choosing a box, drawing a payment card and making two guesses regarding the money they expected to earn. However, only the first step is analyzed in this paper. We focus solely on the first step and on the questionnaire.

their decisions (in the first task), while the second question was related to their beliefs about the population in general terms.

Let us now focus on the basic task. Two different boxes labeled “women” and “men” were placed at the front of a classroom. Each box contained 20 slips of paper. Each slip was printed with the donation made by each of 40 dictators (20 women + 20 men) which were randomly selected from an entire subject pool that had participated in previous sessions of a standard dictator game.⁹

The only decision that participants had to make in the task was to select the box they preferred (either the “women” or the “men” box). A slip of paper was then randomly drawn from the box for each participant. The number printed on the slip of paper determined the money to be earned by that subject.

The initial intuition underlying this design is based on the assumption that subjects want to maximize their expected payoffs and therefore participants tend to choose the box in which they expect to obtain a higher average payoff. Thus, subjects’ choices will reveal their beliefs about which sex is

⁹The above-mentioned dictator game was conducted at the University of Granada in January 2006. In that game each participant received ten 50-cent coins and was asked to divide this amount of money between herself and another unknown person. For more information about the experimental procedures see Brañas-Garza (forthcoming).

more generous in the dictator game.

Once the subjects finished the first task, they were given a questionnaire. The questions were arranged sequentially on different pages so that the participants could not read the second question until they had answered the first one. Also, they could not go back to the first question once they had answered the second one. The first question asked participants about the reason for their decision in the previous task. The second question asked participants, in general terms, about which sex they thought was more generous.

After answering the questionnaire, payoffs were calculated and subjects were paid privately.

4 Results

We will now explore both the decisions and the beliefs of the participants. The results are summarized in Table 1 which shows the number of males choosing males and females and the number of females choosing females and males. Table 1 contains only the 61 subjects who answered the questionnaire. The remaining 4 males (3 of whom chose the "men" box) and 3 females (all of whom chose the "women" box) were excluded because, unfortunately, we

do not have information regarding their beliefs.

As reported in Table 1, the "women" box was chosen in 62.3% of the cases. This effect is even more evident when differentiating by sex (of subjects choosing the box). We observe that 73.3% of the females chose the "women" box. In contrast, only 51.6% of the males chose the "women" box. The χ^2 -Pearson test supports the assumption that the decision-maker's sex weakly affects the choice of box ($\chi^2 = 3.06$, $p = 0.08$).

Table 1: SUBJECTS DECISIONS

		<i>females</i>	<i>males</i>	<i>total</i>
<i>Gender Chosen</i>	<i>women</i>	22(73.3%)	16(51.6%)	38(62.3%)
	<i>men</i>	8	15	23
	<i>total</i>	30	31	61

In cases where subjects' choices were motivated by their desire to maximize the expected payoffs, the results might be indicative of the belief that women are more generous than men, especially within the female pool.

We asked subjects about the "reasons for their choice" (Item 1) in the first task. We will now focus on this issue.

Interestingly, 54 (out of 61) subjects declared that their decisions were

motivated by a gender-based prescription regarding altruism¹⁰. The remaining 7 subjects provided several arguments: 4 gave an irrational explanation (3 women); two men chose the "men" box because they are men and 1 woman chose the "women" box due to an analogous “*gender pride*”. These findings are summarized in the following result:

Result 1: 88% of the subjects’ explanations are rational arguments based on prescriptions.

Table 2 explores the relationship between subjects’ choices (by gender) and their arguments based on prescriptions (by gender). Note that the 7 subjects who did not provide rational arguments have been omitted.

Table 2: SUBJECTS DECISIONS & BELIEFS

		<i>females</i>	<i>males</i>	<i>total</i>
<i>Gender Chosen</i>	<i>women</i>	20 (76.9%)	16 (57.1%)	36 (66.6%)
	<i>men</i>	6	12	18
	<i>total</i>	26	28	54

A salient result was obtained from Table 2:

¹⁰Recall that we first asked subjects about their decisions without making any reference to altruism or generosity (item 2).

Result 2 (main): Two-thirds of the subjects believe that women are more generous.

Note that the percentage of females (77%) who chose the "women" box is considerably larger than the men choosing this box (57%). However, the Pearson- χ^2 test does not support any differences ($\chi^2 = 2.37$, $p = 0.12$). Hence, the choice of box is not different for males and females.

Result 3: There are no gender differences regarding the perception of the gender-based prescription.

Finally, we study the correlation between generosity in the dictator game and generosity in general terms. To do so, we explore the answers given for Item 1 (Why did you chose the box?) and Item 2 (Which sex is more generous?).¹¹ In order to explore this correlation we focus only on the 54 subjects who based their choices on prescriptions regarding altruism. Interestingly, 11 (out of 54) of these participants consider that women (men) are more cooperative/generous in general terms without expecting more altruist behavior for males (females) in the specific context of the dictator game.

¹¹Note that although this second question is related to a more general generosity and not only to the dictator game, the answer could be influenced by previous decisions.

Result 4: Around 20% of the participants consider that altruism in the dictator game is not correlated with general generosity.

5 Conclusion

This paper explores a very interesting issue in experimental economics: which sex is expected to be “more generous”? With this aim we design a very simple mechanism. Subjects have to choose between two different boxes labelled "men" and "women" placed in a classroom. The boxes contain slips of paper printed with the decisions made by players in a previous dictator game. Subjects’ payoffs depend on the number printed on the slip of paper. Subjects only have to choose which box (men or women) they want their slip of paper to be randomly drawn from. At the end of the decision, the subjects are given a questionnaire to fill out.

Our results are quite interesting: *i*) a very large percentage (88.5%) chose in order to maximize their expected payoffs; *ii*) the majority of the population (66%) consider that women are more generous and, *iii*) only a minority (11 out of 54 subjects) consider that general generosity does not imply higher donations in the dictator game.

These results are relevant to the literature in three ways:

First, previous papers in the literature –Andreoni and Versterlund (2000) or Muren and Dufwenberg (2006) among others– have shown that the number of women within the subject pool is relevant because they behave differently. This paper highlights a further salient topic: the presence of females in the experimental sample could influence results not only because women behave differently, but because **women are expected to behave differently**.

Second, our results support the prescription that women are more generous. Observe that this result also supports an alternative explanation for altruism which is not based on other-regarding preferences, but on **selfish preferences which include prescriptions** *a là* Akerlof–Kranton.

Finally, the high correlation between general altruism and generosity in the dictator game is important because it reinforces the **validity of previous experimental** results which associate dictator givings with real altruism.

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6 Appendix: Experimental Instructions

The purpose of this Class Experiment is to study how individuals make decisions in certain contexts. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully you will receive a given number of coins at the end of the experiment. This will be done in a confidential manner as no one will know how many coins the rest of the participants have received. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Aside from these questions, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants in the experiment. If you do so, you will be immediately expelled from the Class Experiment. The experiment consists of a series of phases that are described in greater detail below. Each phase is printed on one of the sheets on the table in front of you. Do not pick up the sheets until the experimenter tells you to do so.

Decision 1: You will see two boxes at the front of the class. One of the boxes is labelled “women” and the other is labelled “men”. Each box contains twenty slips of paper. Each slip has a number printed on it. The numbers correspond to the money assigned by different individuals, both men and women, who participated in a previous experiment. How that money was assigned is described below.

In the previous experiment, each participant was given ten 50-cent coins. Participants were then asked to assign the money to themselves and another person.

The number that is printed on the slip of paper represents the number of coins (from 0 to 10 coins, or 0€ to 5€) that the subject in question gave to the other subject.

Your decision involves choosing one of the boxes to take out a slip of paper for you. The number that is printed on the slip of paper corresponds to the number of coins that you will receive in this part of the experiment.

Decision 1		
Of the two boxes I choose:	"Men" box	"Women" box

When you have finished, please wait.

Finally, please answer the questions below.

1) Why did you choose the box that you did in the first phase of the experiment?

2) Who do think are more generous, men or women? Please put a cross in the box that corresponds to you answer.

Men	Women

Why do you think so? You can write as much as you like in the space available.