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Indicators of the Relative Importance of IPRs In Developing Countries¹

Sanjaya Lall and Manuel Albaladejo

There remains considerable controversy on the economic impact of TRIPS (interpreted here as the tightening of IPRs) in developing countries; needless to say, the new round of WTO negotiations adds considerable interest to this controversy. This paper focuses on the longterm structural issues concerning the impact of TRIPS on industrial and technology development in poor countries. It does not, therefore, deal with such important current issues as the cost of medicines, agricultural inputs or genetic materials. Even in the analysis of technology development, it has a limited objective. It seeks to indicate the potential significance of IPRs by differentiating developing countries according to the expected impact of stronger protection. It does not measure statistically the strength of IPR regimes or their impact on development as such.

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1. INTRODUCTION

There remains considerable controversy on the economic impact of TRIPS (interpreted here as the tightening of IPRs) in developing countries; needless to say, the new round of WTO negotiations adds considerable interest to this controversy. This paper focuses on the long-term structural issues concerning the impact of TRIPS on industrial and technology development in poor countries. It does not, therefore, deal with such important current issues as the cost of medicines, agricultural inputs or genetic materials. Even in the analysis of technology development, it has a limited objective. It seeks to indicate the potential significance of IPRs by differentiating developing countries according to the *expected impact of stronger protection.*² It does not measure statistically the strength of IPR regimes or their impact on development as such.³

It is widely accepted that the effects of TRIPS on industry and technology will vary according to countries' levels of economic development.⁴ The need for, and benefits of, stronger intellectual property protection seems to rise with incomes and technological sophistication. If this were so, there would be a case for adjusting TRIPS requirements to the specific conditions of particular countries. To quote a recent publication by the World Bank,

"Because the overwhelming majority of intellectual property ... is created in the industrialized countries, *TRIPS has decidedly shifted the global rules of the game in favour of those countries*... Developing countries went along with the TRIPS agreement for a variety of reasons, ranging from the hope of additional access to agricultural and apparel markets in rich nations, to an expectation that stronger IPRs would encourage additional technology transfer and innovation. However, the *promise of long-term benefits seems uncertain and costly to achieve in many nations, especially the poorest countries*. In addition, the administrative costs and problems with *higher prices for medicines and key technological inputs* loom large in the minds of policy makers in developing countries. Many are pushing for significant revisions of the agreement.

"There are reasons to believe that the enforcement of IPRs has a positive impact on growth prospects. On the domestic level, growth is spurred by higher rates of innovation – although this result tends to be *fairly insignificant until countries move into the middle-income bracket*. Nonetheless, across the range of income levels, IPRs are associated with greater trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which in turn translate into faster rates of economic growth. *The most appropriate level of IPRs enforcement therefore varies by income level.*" (World Bank (2001), p. 129, emphasis added).

The Bank concludes as follows: "the strength of intellectual property protection depends on economic and social circumstances, which in turn affect perceptions of the

² Since the focus here is on technological considerations in the classification, the aspect of IPRs it refers most directly to is *patents*. Copyrights and trademarks raise different sets of issues, and the case for strengthening them across the board is probably clearer than for patents. While some technological issues can also arise for copyrights (say, in software), and a case can be made for lax IPRs to promote local learning and dissemination, this is not considered separately here.

³ For such analysis, see references in Maskus (2000), Gould and Gruben (1996) and World Bank (2001).

⁴ See, for instance, Braga et al. (1999) and Maskus (2000).

appropriate trade-off between invention and dissemination... Countries with a high ratio of R&D in gross domestic product (GDP) or a high proportion of scientists and engineers in the labour force have markedly stronger patent rights than others... Interests in encouraging low-cost imitation dominate policy until countries move into a middle-income range with domestic innovative and absorptive capabilities... Least-developed countries devote virtually no resources to innovation and have little intellectual property to protect... Thus the majority of economic interests prefer weak protection" (World Bank, 2001, p. 131-2).

The Bank also notes that history does not provide a clear guide to the growth effects of IPRs: "at different times and in different regions of the world, countries have realised high rates of growth under varying degrees of IPR protection" (p. 135). Given the clear net short-term costs for less industrialised countries from IPRs – higher prices for technology and protected products – a valid economic case for them to accept TRIPS entails that they reap larger net long-term benefits (technology and FDI inflows and stimulus to local innovation). Moreover, the *present value* of these benefits – discounted at an appropriate interest rate – must more than offset the present value of these costs. Given the mechanics of compound interest, this requires that the benefits be very large and accrue in the medium term: any that accrue after, say, a decade would be practically worthless in terms of present value.

If these conditions are not met, other arguments can still be made for TRIPS, but these have little to do with the economic benefits to poor countries of stronger intellectual property protection *per se*. As the World Bank notes, many developing countries agreed to TRIPS in order to gain concessions from rich ones in *other* spheres of economic activity (or greater aid). Whether they actually did so remains an open question, since no one has quantified the costs of TRIPS and gains in related concessions.

These important issues remain largely unresolved. This paper is not intended to investigate them, but simply notes (section 2) some of the main arguments. It then analyses data on technological and related activity in 87 economies (developed, transition and developing), grouping them according to the expected effects of stronger IPRs. These are all the countries with significant industrial sectors on which comparable data are available for 1985-98.

2. THE IMPACT OF STRONGER IPRS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In economic analysis, intellectual property rights – a temporary monopoly on the use of knowledge – are a 'second best' solution to a failure in markets for knowledge and information. The nature of this failure is well known. Optimal resource allocation requires that all goods be sold at marginal cost, which in the case of new knowledge is assumed to be practically zero: its sale does not diminish the stock to the holder and information is assumed to be transmitted practically without cost. Optimisation thus demands that new knowledge be made available at marginal cost or for free to all those who can use it. Moreover, it is assumed that others can, if not legally prevented, easily imitate new knowledge at little or no cost. Thus, under perfectly competitive conditions, there would be no incentive on the part of private agents to invest in the creation of new productive knowledge.

Since the creation and diffusion of new knowledge are desirable for growth, it is necessary to trade off static optimisation in favour of dynamic considerations. The optimum solution would be for the governments of innovating countries to subsidise innovators until the costs of the subsidies equalled the benefits to society, and to then allow the dissemination of knowledge at marginal cost (Maskus, 2000, p. 30). It would be very difficult in practice to calculate the optimal research subsidy, and a practical second-best solution is to grant a temporary monopoly that enables innovators to reap 'rents' (profits in excess of normal competitive profits). Analysts admit that this does not yield a perfect solution to the market failure involved, but it is a compromise that has worked well in the past in the industrial countries that are the source of the overwhelming bulk of innovation.

In theory, society reaps *four kinds of benefits* from granting temporary monopoly rights to innovators. Each is subject to qualifications as far as developing countries are concerned, taken up later.

- The stimulation of private innovation, the primary economic benefit of IPRs. The importance of this benefit rises with the pace of technical change as at present and with the 'imitability' of new technology, particularly in such activities as software. It also grows with globalization, which leads innovators (in particular large transnational companies) to gear their R&D to world rather than national markets. However, where the country in question has little or no local innovative capabilities, the strengthening of IPRs does not, by definition, stimulate domestic innovation.⁵ The extent to which it stimulates global R&D then depends on its share of the market for particular innovative activities and its ability to pay for expensive new products.⁶ Where the economy undertakes technological activity of an absorptive and adaptive kind the great bulk of informal and R&D effort in newly industrialising countries stronger IPRs may have no effect in stimulating it. On the contrary, to the extent that such effort involves copying and reverse engineering innovations elsewhere, it can constrict a vital source of learning, capability building and competitiveness.
- The use of the new knowledge in productive activity (without such use, of course, there can be no financial reward to innovators in terms of higher prices and profits), leading to higher incomes, employment, competitiveness and so on for the economy as a whole. If the knowledge is not exploited within the economy, and its products are provided at higher prices than in with weak IPRs, the gains are correspondingly less and the costs correspondingly higher. There may still be gains, if innovation *per se* is stimulated by the existence of that country's market and the new products represent a real gain in consumer welfare. This gain has to be set against not just the higher prices induced by IPRs but also against reductions in local economic activity as a result of the monopoly and longer term growth potential (say, from the constriction of local technological development based on copying and reverse engineering).

⁵ Developing countries can undertake considerable technological activity to master, adapt and improve upon imported technologies. Indeed, as Lall (2001) notes, differences in such capability building are the main factor differentiating between success and failure in industrial development. However, this kind of technological activity does not lead to patentable innovation and so does not need strong IPRs; indeed, as noted later, lax IPRs may be beneficial because they permit a major form of learning: imitation and reverse engineering.

⁶ Note that this is a purely economic argument based on the social gains from innovation. It does not take into account the (non-economic) argument that it is 'fair' or 'just' to reward innovators, and that all users of innovations should share equally in providing these rewards. On these grounds, those who avoid their share are 'free riding' and should be penalised. This kind of moral argument is often explicitly or implicitly used in the debate on IPRs. However, it can be argued just as plausibly that poor consumers of innovations *should* pay less than rich ones on moral, distributional or humanitarian grounds. The issue then becomes whether aid, redistribution or charity should be given in this form – of lax IPRs that allow for lower prices – than in the form of direct financial flows between governments. Again, a good case can be made for innovative products consumed by large sections of poor populations (medicines, for example) that the impact via product prices is far greater and more effective than via aid channelled through the government. See UNDP (2001) for a discussion of some of the issues concerning the pharmaceutical industry and human development.

- > The dissemination of new knowledge to other agents, with IPRs providing the legal instrument on which to base contractual agreements (e.g. for procurement, licensing or sales). Stricter IPRs may facilitate the transfer of technology across national borders as well as increase local diffusion by providing an enforceable legal framework. This is likely to be of special significance for technology-intensive products and activities, where innovators are averse to selling technology to countries with weak IPRs, where leakage is a real possibility. It is also significant for large innovators that seek to enter into technology alliances and contracts with each other: this is the main reason why firms in industries like electronics (where IPRs are not important to protect innovation) take out patents (Cantwell and Andersen, 1996). Note that the legal framework raises the cost of technology to the *buyer* – otherwise it would be redundant: the payoff for buyers lies in the higher quantity and quality of knowledge flows. The economic benefit in a developing country depends on the presence of local agents capable of purchasing, absorbing and deploying new technologies, particularly complex high technologies. If no such agents exist, strict IPRs offer no benefit for technology transfer. If they exist, the size of the benefits depends on two things: the extent to which strict IPRs raise the cost of buying technologies, and whether the alternatives of copying and reverse engineering would have been feasible, cheaper and more rewarding in building up local technological capabilities.
- The stimulation of innovation by other enterprises based on information disclosed in the patent. This is a very important benefit of the IPR system, but clearly its value is primarily to economies where there is intense innovative activity by large numbers of competing enterprises. Innovation 'around' a particular patent is one of the most dynamic sources of technological progress. However, this is of little or no value to poor and unindustrialised countries that lack a local innovative base.

These qualifications are, of course, acknowledged in the IPR literature. It is widely accepted that the importance of IPRs varies considerably by two variables:

- The technological nature of the activity
- *The nature of the economy*

Technological nature of the activity: The role of patents in stimulating R&D varies by activity. In industries where it is relatively easy for a competent firm to copy new products – fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the best examples – patents are vital for sustaining the large and risky R&D expenditures needed for product innovation. However, in industries where copying is very difficult and expensive (these industries account for the bulk of manufacturing in most countries), patents *per se* are not important for appropriating the benefits from innovation. There is a high degree of 'tacit' knowledge (technology-specific skills, experience, learning, information and organisation needed to be competitive) in technological activities in these industries. The best examples are complex engineering, electronics and much of 'heavy' industry, but there are many others.

The classic analysis of this is by Mansfield (1986), who found large industry-wise differences in the innovation-promoting role of patents in the US. His analysis was based on responses from corporate executives about the share of innovative activity that would be deterred by the absence of patent protection. The results were: 65% in pharmaceuticals, 30% in chemicals, 18% in petroleum, 15% in machinery, 12% in metal products, 8% in primary metals, 4% in electrical machinery, 1% in other machinery and nil in office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber, and textiles. While executive responses may not always accurately reflect

underlying economic forces, Mansfield's survey is in line with the findings of other studies. In particular, the special role of patents in pharmaceutical innovation is universally accepted. It also reflects what is known about industrial differences in tacit knowledge (Cantwell, 1999). Thus, the need for IPRs to promote innovation (or technology transfer) cannot be identical across activities; correspondingly, the ideal IPR regime must depend on the structure of economic activities in each country. Countries with little productive investment in IPR-sensitive activities need less strict regimes than do those *with* such activities, at least as technological factors are concerned. Many developing countries have negligible industrial activities in the former category. In fact, to the extent that they have local pharmaceutical industries, they have much to gain by weak IPRs that allow them to build up domestic capabilities. It is only when they reach the stage of innovating that they need strong IPRs even in these activities.

Nature of the economy: More relevant to the present discussion is that the significance of IPRs varies by the level of development. As the World Bank notes, the main beneficiaries of TRIPS are the advanced countries that produce innovations. There are few benefits in terms of stimulating local innovation in developing countries. On the contrary, while there certainly is technological activity in many such countries, it consists mainly of learning to use imported technologies efficiently rather than to innovate on the technological frontier. Weak IPRs can help local firms in early stages to build technological capabilities by permitting imitation and reverse engineering. This is certainly borne out by the experience of the East Asian 'Tigers' like Korea and Taiwan that developed strong indigenous firms in an array of sophisticated industries.

The available historical and cross-section evidence supports the presumption that the need for IPRs varies with the level of development. Many rich countries used weak IPR protection in their early stages of industrialisation to develop local technological bases, increasing protection as they approached the leaders.⁷ Econometric cross-section evidence suggests that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the strength of IPRs and income levels. The intensity of IPRs first falls with rising incomes, as countries move to slack IPRs to build local capabilities by copying, then rises as they engage in more innovative effort. The turning point is \$7,750 per capita in 1985 prices (cited in Maskus, 2000, and World Bank, 2001), a fairly high level of income for the developing world.

Theory also suggests that the benefits of IPRs rise with income and that at very low levels the costs of strengthening IPRs may well outweigh the gains. Maskus (2000) notes three potential costs.

- 1. Higher prices for imported products and new technologies under IPR protection.
- 2. Loss of economic activity, by the closure of imitative activities
- 3. The possible abuse of protection by patent holders, especially large foreign companies.

Maskus goes on to argue, however, that these costs are more than offset by the longer-term benefits of IPRs, even in developing countries. These benefits are (with qualifications noted):

⁷ Chang (2001), Rasiah (2001).

1. IPRs provide "an important *foundation for sophisticated business structures*" and indicate that private property rights in general are well enforced. There may certainly exist an important *signalling function* of IPRs, particularly in countries that previously had policy regimes inimical to private investment and property rights. Note, however, that while strong IPRs may well be associated with sophisticated business structures, the causation is likely to run from the latter to the former. It is difficult to believe that strong IPRs actually *cause* the business systems to become more complex: many countries with sophisticated industrial and corporate structures have had lax IPRs. On the signalling function, more research is needed before it can be asserted with confidence that IPRs *by themselves* are important. It is possible that other signals are considered more important by investors or technology sellers, and that the overall environment for business matters more than IPRs. Casual empiricism suggests that lax IPRs have not deterred FDI in China or Brazil, or held back technology licensing in Korea and Taiwan, when these countries had weak protection.

2. Other kinds of technological activity in developing countries (i.e. apart from innovation) also benefit from strong IPRs. This applies, however, more to copyright and trademark protection (where strong protection can encourage quality improvement) rather than to patenting. As far as patenting goes, it is mainly the advanced newly industrialising countries that will need TRIPS to boost local R&D. The least developed countries are unlikely to benefit in any technological sense. Those between the two, countries still building technological capabilities by imitating and reverse engineering, may lose. Remember that the rationale of TRIPS is letting innovators (overwhelmingly in developed countries) charge higher prices for their protected (physical and intellectual) products. If TRIPS is at all effective, it must lead to more costly and restricted technology for local firms in poor countries.

3. Economies without advanced technological capabilities may, by strengthening IPRs, stimulate global innovation by adding to effective demand for new products. This argument would apply to activities in which poor countries constituted a significant share of innovators' markets. However, in most activities in which patents matter for innovation, as in pharmaceuticals, the specific products needed by poor countries constitute a tiny fraction of global demand. So far, leading innovators have undertaken very little R&D of specific interest to poor countries – this is simply not profitable enough (UNDP, 2001, World Bank, 2001). There is therefore little reason to believe that global R&D would rise with stronger IPRs in these countries or that it would address their specific needs. The argument that strong IPRs in developing countries would promote global R&D has another fallacy. Small, poor countries are not only likely to remain irrelevant to innovation after TRIPS, they may suffer reduced industrial activity if industry leaders use IPRs to close local facilities and import the product from other production sites.⁸ This is actually happening in a number of developing countries, but its full incidence needs further investigation.

4. Strong IPRs will stimulate greater technology transfer over the longer-term to developing countries. This may apply to all its main forms: *capital goods, FDI* and *licensing*. The main evidence on this comes from some cross-country econometric tests (cited by Maskus, 2000) that suggest a positive correlation between the strength of IPRs and capital goods imports, inward FDI and licensing payments. These studies, however, are subject to caveats, and other studies have more ambiguous implications (World Bank, 2001). The correlation between IPRs and capital goods imports, for instance, may be due to unobserved variables that

⁸ The main recourse countries have is compulsory licensing, but the use of this instrument is constrained in many poor countries by other factors like economic pressures brought by the home countries of innovators.

tend to rise with IPRs. For instance, higher levels of income, stronger technological capabilities, greater ability to pay, and so on, may be the cause of greater equipment purchases rather than stronger IPRs *per se*. This is not to deny that the sale of some high-tech equipment may be affected by weak IPR regimes. Even where this is true, it is likely to be significant only for economies with advanced industrial capabilities rather than to typical developing countries. For the latter, if TRIPS raises the price of equipment (which is the purpose of the exercise), there is a net loss to productive capacity. In any case, anecdotal evidence does not suggest weak IPRs in countries like Korea and Taiwan prevented them from buying advanced capital goods in their most intense periods of industrialisation.

As far as FDI goes, most studies suggest that IPRs come fairly low on the list of factors affecting TNC location decisions.⁹ However, the general tightening of IPRs in recent years may itself have raised their signalling value to investors: countries with stronger property rights protection may, as a result, be regarded as more favourably inclined to private business. The extent to which this is so needs more empirical investigation. Even if this were found to be true, it would suggest failures in information markets affecting FDI location rather than the value to TNCs of intellectual property protection as such. Because of such unobserved variables, the cross-country econometric evidence on the positive and significant impact of IPR strength on FDI inflows is again of rather dubious value. What is more plausible is, as case study evidence suggests, that the deterrent effect of weak IPRs is fairly industry specific. As Mansfield (1994) notes in his survey of US TNCs, investment is likely to be sensitive to IPRs mainly in industries like pharmaceuticals. Other FDI - constituting the bulk of investment of interest to developing countries - is not likely to be affected by IPRs. In fact, the largest recipients of inward FDI in the developing world in the past two decades or so, led by China, have not been models of strong intellectual property protection. TNCs have had many other advantages that have served to effectively protect their proprietary intellectual assets.

Even in IPR-sensitive industries like pharmaceuticals, the evidence does not establish that TNCs have stayed away from developing countries with weak IPRs. TNCs have invested large sums in this industry in countries like Brazil or India, which have built up among the most advanced pharmaceutical industries in the developing world, in both local enterprises and TNC affiliates. Several pharmaceutical TNCs have been contracting R&D to national laboratories in India for the past 10-15 years. At the same time, weak IPRs have facilitated a massive growth of pharmaceutical exports by India, with bcal firms building capabilities in making generic products. It is difficult, therefore, to make a case that TRIPS would, by itself, lead to a significant surge in FDI to developing countries. It is possible to argue, however, that India has now reached a stage in pharmaceutical production where stronger IPRs would induce greater innovation by local firms (the benefits of which would have to be set off against the closure of other firms). This clearly does not provide a case for similar IPRs in countries in earlier stages of industrial development – if anything, it is an argument for lax IPRs to encourage the growth of local firms until they reach the stage of Indian firms today.

Note also that the TNC response to IPRs is likely to be *function specific*. Survey evidence suggests that high-level R&D is more likely to be affected by the IPR regime than basic production or marketing (Mansfield, 1994). The relocation of R&D is not of great practical significance to most developing countries, since very few can hope to receive such functions; it is only the more advanced NIEs that may suffer from lax IPRs.

⁹ See Braga et al. (1999), Luthria (1999), Chang (2001) and Rasiah (2001).

Similar arguments apply to *licensing*. Lax IPRs are likely to deter licensing mainly in the advanced activities of interest to the leading NIEs. They are unlikely to affect technology transfer to other developing countries, which generally purchase more mature technologies. At the same time, the higher costs of technology transfer inherent in TRIPS are likely to impose an immediate penalty on them. It is suggested, however, that local *diffusion* of technology will benefit from stronger IPRs because of the clearer legal framework it provides. This is certainly possible, but the evidence on this needs to be more closely investigated. Anecdotal evidence does not however suggest that lax IPRs held back licensing of local firms in such economies as Korea and Taiwan.

All the arguments suggest, therefore, that it is vital to distinguish between levels of development in assessing the impact of TRIPS in the developing world. As Maskus rightly suggests, the relationships between IPRs and growth remain 'complex' and 'dependent on circumstances' (Maskus, 2000, p. 169). On the whole, there is no clear case that most developing countries below the NIE stage will gain in net terms from TRIPS; the least developed ones are most likely to lose. The gains that might accrue through increased technological inflows are likely to be realised over the long term, while the costs will accrue immediately. *In present value terms, therefore, there is likely to be a significant net loss.* What is indisputable is that a differentiated approach to TRIPS is called for.

To conclude, the jury is still out on the benefits of TRIPS for developing countries *as a whole*. We can agree that stronger IPRs are probably beneficial for countries launching into serious R&D activity in terms of promoting local innovation and attracting certain kinds of FDI and other technology inflows. There does not, however, seem to be a case for applying stronger IPRs uniformly across the developing world. As the outcome is likely to be context specific, economic considerations call for a differentiated approach to TRIPS according to levels of industrial and technological capabilities. Some differentiation exists already, as the World Bank (2001) notes. Whether or not this is sufficient to take due account of the development needs of many countries is not clear. Without more detailed investigation, it may be premature to draw any general conclusions about the net benefits for TRIPS.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES BY IPR RELEVANCE

We now categorise countries (including mature industrial countries and some transition economies on which data are available) according to different schema, based on technological activity, industrial performance and technology imports. The classifications naturally have a great deal of similarity, but also some interesting differences. It is useful to consider each to see how the implications may differ with respect to IPRs. As noted, the focus here is on *technological factors* and the data used relate mainly to these elements of TRIPS (i.e. patents). There are, of course, many other important elements in TRIPS: copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs and so on. Some of these may be subject to similar technological considerations as patents (e.g. industrial designs, layout designs for integrated circuits). However, others, particularly copyrights and trademarks, may raise different issues with respect to costs and benefits for countries at low levels of development. This paper does not explore these aspects.

3.1 TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

The classification based on national technological activity is derived from two variables: R&D financed by productive enterprises¹⁰ and the number of patents taken out internationally (in the US)¹¹, both deflated by population to adjust for economic size. Most researchers on international technological activity use US patent data, for two reasons. First, practically all innovators who seek to exploit their technology internationally take out patents in the USA, given its market size and technological strength. The pattern of patenting in the USA is in fact a good indicator of technological activity and R&D spending in all industrialised (and newly industrialising) countries (Cantwell and Andersen, 1996). Second, the data are readily available and can be taken to an extremely detailed level. We follow this convention, using US patents as an indicator of commercially valuable innovation.

The two variables are standardised¹² and averaged to yield an index of 'technological intensity'. We can derive four groups from the index values.

- 1. The world *technological leaders*, with intense technological activity and considerable innovative capabilities as shown by international patenting. They are likely to benefit from (and most already have) strong IPRs.
- 2. Countries with *moderate technological activity*. These countries conduct some R&D, have medium levels of industrial development and are likely on balance to benefit from stronger IPRs. However, some countries in this group may bear significant adjustment costs in changing IPR regimes.
- 3. Countries with *low technological activity*. These countries are likely to have both significant costs and potential long-term benefits from stricter IPRs, depending on the level of domestic technological capabilities and their reliance on formal technology inflows. Those that are building their innovation systems on the basis of local firms copying foreign technology and importing technologies at arm's length would gain less than those with a strong TNC presence.
- 4. The fourth level comprises countries with *no significant technological activity*. These are the least industrialised countries with the simplest technological structures that are likely to gain least, and lose most, from strict IPR rules. They will tend to pay the costs (higher prices for protected products and technologies) but gain little by way of technology development or transfer.

Table 1 shows the average technology performance data for each group of countries, and illustrates the striking differences between them. The value of R&D per capita in the high

¹⁰ The R&D data are in current US dollars. We prefer R&D financed by productive enterprises to total R&D because the latter includes expenditures on defence, agriculture and so on that are not directly relevant to innovation by private agents. However, both measures (in dollar terms) yield very similar national rankings, and the results would not change significantly if we used total R&D figures.

¹¹ Patents taken out internationally include those filed by affiliates of TNCs operating in the country. This does not matter for present purposes since local R&D by TNCs reflects the innovative capacity of the host country.

¹² The values for each variable are standardised according to the following formula.

 $Index = \frac{X_i value - \min unX_i value}{\text{Maximun}X_i value - \min unX_i value}, \text{ where the highest country in the rank scores 1 and the lowest}$

scores 0.

technology effort group is 21 times higher than in the moderate group, which in turn is 58 times higher than in the low effort group. The fourth group, as its name indicates, has negligible activity by all measures. Differences by international patenting are even greater,¹³ suggesting that the innovativeness of R&D rises with its intensity and that different countries may have different propensities to take out patents internationally.

Table 1: Aver	Table 1: Average technology effort (per country) by technology groups, 1997-98											
Technology	R&D per capita	Total R&D (US \$	Patents/1000	Total								
groups	(US\$)	b)	people	Patents								
High	293.25	14.93	0.99	6,803								
Moderate	14.01	0.41	0.02	50								
Low	0.24	0.08	0.00	11								
Negligible	0.00	0.00	0.00	0								

Source: Calculated from UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook*; OECD, *Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard* 1999; Iberoamerican *Network of Science and Technology Indicators*; various national statistical sources.

Note: R&D is only that financed by productive enterprises. Patents are those taken out in the US. Total R&D and patents are average for each country.

Let us now consider technological effort at the national level. Table 2 gives the data for productive enterprise R&D and international patents for 87 countries (those with significant industrial activity on which the necessary data are available). They come from the following groups:

- Industrialised (22): Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States,
- Transition (7): Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Romania, Albania and Slovenia.
- > Developing (58), consisting of the following sub-groups:
 - *East Asia (9)*: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
 - South Asia (5): India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.
 - Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) (18): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
 - Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (16): Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

¹³ However, the ranks according to R&D and international patenting are very similar overall, with a the correlation coefficient of over 0.9.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA)(10): Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen.

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per capita (US3) U I Japan		R&I)	-								
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$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1	Switzerland	859.9	USA	3.297	1	Japan	0.8649				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2	Japan	858.4	Japan	2.412	2	Switzerland	0.7858				
5 Germany 418.1 Sweden 1.421 5 Germany 0.4151 6 Finland 413.4 Israel 1.275 6 Finland 0.4099 7 Denmark 328.4 Germany 1.134 7 Denmark 0.3434 8 France 297.6 Finland 1.190 9 Netherlands 0.2743 10 Belgium 272.7 Denmark 1.005 10 France 0.2712 12 Austria 214.4 Belgium 0.669 12 Belgium 0.2645 HIGH 13 S Korea 214.4 France 0.650 14 Norway 2244 14 Singapore 198.4 France 0.650 14 Norway 2248 15 UK 174.5 UK 0.611 15 S.Korea 0.2225 16 Ireland 152.8 H Kong 0.540 16 Austraia 0.1738 <t< td=""><td>3</td><td>Sweden</td><td>653.9</td><td>Switzerland</td><td>1.884</td><td>3</td><td>USA</td><td>0.7709</td><td></td></t<>	3	Sweden	653.9	Switzerland	1.884	3	USA	0.7709				
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	4	USA	465.9	Taiwan	1.622	4	Sweden	0.5957				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	5	Germany	418.1	Sweden	1.421	5	Germany	0.4151				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	6	Finland	413.4	Israel	1.275	6	Finland	0.4099				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	7	Denmark	328.4	Germany	1.134	7	Denmark	0.3434				
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	8	France	297.6	Finland	1.118	8	Taiwan	0.3173				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	9	Norway	275.5	Canada	1.090	9	Netherlands	0.2743				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10	Belgium	272.7	Denmark	1.005	10	France	0.2716				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	11	Netherlands	258.8	Netherlands	0.817	11	Israel	0.2712				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	12	Austria	214.4	Belgium	0.699	12	Belgium	0.2645	HIGH			
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	13	S Korea	211.2	S Korea	0.657	13	Canada	0.2488				
15 UK 174.5 UK 0.601 15 S Korea 0.2225 16 Ireland 152.8 H Kong 0.540 16 Austria 0.2022 17 Australia 148.0 Austria 0.511 17 UK 0.1926 18 Canada 143.7 Norway 0.400 18 Singapore 0.1738 19 Israel 134.0 Australia 0.402 19 Australia 0.1470 20 Taiwan 122.5 Singapore 0.386 20 Ireland 0.1191 21 Italy 90.1 N Zealand 0.356 21 Italy 0.0986 22 Slovenia 73.3 Italy 0.305 22 N Zealand 0.0829 24 N Zealand 50.7 Slovenia 0.072 25 Spain 0.0431 26 Czech Rep 32.3 Spain 0.017 28 S Africa 0.0020 27 Brazil 13.7 S Africa 0.030 27 Hungary 0	14	Singapore	198.4	France	0.650	14	Norway	0.2344				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	15		174.5	UK	0.601	15	S Korea	0.2225				
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$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	17	Australia	148.0	Austria	0.511	17	UK	0.1926				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	18	Canada	143.7	Norway	0.490	18	Singapore	0.1738				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	19	Israel	134.0	Australia	0.402	19	Australia	0.1470				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	20	Taiwan	122.5	Singapore	0.386	20	Ireland	0.1191				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	21	Italy	90.1	N Zealand	0.356	21	Italy	0.0986				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	22	Slovenia	73.3	Italy	0.305	22	N Zealand	0.0835				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	23	Spain	55.2	Ireland	0.200	23	H Kong	0.0829				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	24	N Zealand	50.7	Slovenia	0.076	24	Slovenia	0.0541				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	25	Czech Rep	32.3	Spain	0.072	25	Spain	0.0431				
27Brazil13.7S Africa 0.030 27Hungary 0.0135 28Greece13.5Malaysia 0.017 28S Africa 0.0121 29S Africa12.8Greece 0.016 29Greece 0.0103 MODER30Hungary11.3Bahrain 0.016 30Portugal 0.0096 ATE31Argentina8.5Venezuela 0.012 32Argentina 0.0067 32Poland8.3Russian Fed 0.011 33Malaysia 0.0067 33Russian Fed7.5Argentina 0.011 34Russian Fed 0.0065 34Malaysia 6.7 Chile 0.011 34Russian Fed 0.0055 36Chile5.3Portugal 0.009 35Poland 0.0047 37Turkey4.8Mexico 0.008 38Venezuela 0.0033 39Venezuela2.3Saudi 0.006 39Turkey 0.0024 40H Kong1.8Ecuador 0.006 40Bahrain 0.0024	26	1	14.1	1	0.045	26		0.0200				
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$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	31		8.5	Venezuela	0.013	31	U	0.0087				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	32	Poland	8.3	Russian Fed	0.012	32	Argentina	0.0067				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	33	Russian Fed	7.5	Argentina	0.011	33	U	0.0065				
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	34	Malaysia	6.7	Chile	0.011	34	-	0.0062				
37 Turkey 4.8 Mexico 0.009 37 C Rica 0.0041 38 Romania 2.5 Czech Rep 0.008 38 Venezuela 0.0033 39 Venezuela 2.3 Saudi 0.006 39 Turkey 0.0029 40 H Kong 1.8 Ecuador 0.006 40 Bahrain 0.0024	35		5.5	Uruguay	0.009	35	Poland	0.0055				
38 Romania 2.5 Czech Rep 0.008 38 Venezuela 0.0033 39 Venezuela 2.3 Saudi 0.006 39 Turkey 0.0029 40 H Kong 1.8 Ecuador 0.006 40 Bahrain 0.0024	36	Chile	5.3		0.009	36	Chile	0.0047				
38 Romania 2.5 Czech Rep 0.008 38 Venezuela 0.0033 39 Venezuela 2.3 Saudi 0.006 39 Turkey 0.0029 40 H Kong 1.8 Ecuador 0.006 40 Bahrain 0.0024	37	Turkey	4.8	Mexico	0.009	37	C Rica	0.0041				
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Ŭ		venezuela					ĺ					
	40	H Kong	1.8	Ecuador	0.006	40	Bahrain	0.0024				
41 Mexico 1.3 C Kica 0.000 41 Mexico 0.0022	41	Mexico	1.5	C Rica	0.006	41	Mexico	0.0022				

Table 2: Technology Effort Index (1997-98)

42	Domorro	1 /	Dres =1	0.005	40	I Lun an an	0.0020	
42 43	Panama	1.4 1.1	Brazil Jordan	0.005 0.004	42 43	Uruguay Romania	0.0020 0.0015	
	Uruguay		Jordan					
44	China	0.9	Poland	0.004	44	Saudi Arabia	0.0009	
15	Indonesia	0.8	Jamaica	0.004	45		0.0009	
45 46	Indonesia India	0.8 0.4		0.004	45 46	Ecuador Panama	0.0009	
40 47	Mauritius	0.4	Philippines Thailand	0.003	40 47	Jordan	0.0008	
47	Thailand	0.3	Guatemala	0.002	47	China	0.0008	
48 49		0.3	Colombia	0.002	48 49	Jamaica	0.0006	
49 50	Egypt Colombia	0.2	Honduras	0.002	49 50		0.0000	
50 51	Jordan	0.2	Bolivia	0.002	50 51	Philippines Indonesia	0.0008	
51 52	Guatemala	0.2	Tunisia	0.001	51 52	Thailand	0.0005	
52 53	Algeria	0.1	Sri Lanka	0.001	52 53	Colombia	0.0003	
55 54	Saudi	0.1	SII Lailka	0.001	55 54	India	0.0004	
54	Arabia	0.1	India	0.001	54	mula	0.0004	
55	Peru	0.1	Morocco	0.001	55	Guatemala	0.0003	LOW
55 56	Morocco	0.1	China	0.001	55 56	Honduras	0.0003	
50 57		0.1	Turkey	0.001	50 57	Sri Lanka	0.0003	
58	Philippines Honduras	0.1	Indonesia	0.000	57	Bolivia	0.0002	
58 59		0.1	Peru	0.000	58 59	Mauritius	0.0002	
59 60	Nicaragua Sri Lanka	0.1		0.000	59 60	Morocco	0.0002	
00	Yemen	0.1	Kenya Egypt	0.000	60 61	Tunisia	0.0002	
-	I emen	0	Egypt	0.000	61 62		0.0002	
-	Tunisia	0	Nigeria	0.000	02	Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.0001	
	Malawi	0	Pakistan	0.000	63	Peru	0.0001	
-		0	Albania	0.000	63 64	Algeria	0.0001	
-	Madagascar Kenya	0	Algeria	0.000	65	Nicaragua	0.0001	
-	Jamaica	0	Bangladesh	0.000	66	Kenya	0.0001	
	Ecuador	0	-	0.000		i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	0.0001	NEGLIGI
-			Cameroon		-	Nigeria Dalviatar		
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-	Bahrain Bangladash	0 0			-	Albania Banaladaah	0.0000	
-	Bangladesh	0	Ethiopia	0.000	-	Bangladesh	0.0000 0.0000	
-	Bolivia Cameroon	0	Ghana Madagassar	0.000 0.000	-	Cameroon CAR	0.0000	
-	CAR	0	Madagascar Malawi		-	El Salvador		
-	El Salvador	0	Mauritius	0.000 0.000	-		$0.0000 \\ 0.0000$	
-	El Salvauol	0	Mozambiqu	0.000	-	Ethiopia Ghana	0.0000	
-	Ethiopia	0	-	0.000	-	Ullalla	0.0000	
_	Ghana	0	e Nepal	0.000	-	Madagascar	0.0000	
-	Mozambiqu	0	Nepai	0.000	_	Malawi	0.0000	
-	e	0	Nicaragua	0.000	-	Walawi	0.0000	
_		0		0.000	-	Mozambiqu	0.0000	
-	Nepal	0	Oman	0.000	-	e	0.0000	
_	Nigeria	0	Panama	0.000	-	e Nepal	0.0000	
-	Oman	0	Paraguay	0.000	-	Oman	0.0000	
-	Pakistan	0	Romania	0.000	-	Paraguay	0.0000	
-	Paraguay	0	Senegal	0.000	-	Senegal	0.0000	
_	Senegal	0	Tanzania	0.000	_	Tanzania	0.0000	
_	Tanzania	0	Uganda	0.000	-	Uganda	0.0000	
_	Uganda	0	Yemen	0.000	_	Yemen	0.0000	
_	Uganua	0	remen	0.000	-	i chich	0.0000	

-	Zambia	0	Zambia	0.000	-	Zambia	0.0000	
-	Zimbabwe	0	Zimbabwe	0.000	-	Zimbabwe	0.0000	
N	Note: - stands fo	or country	not ranked					

The choice of groups was based on getting a spread of more or less equal numbers in each, but there are clear 'breaks' in the technology index where the lines are drawn. The main features of the groups are as follows:

Group 1: This group has most industrialised countries, but there are interesting inclusions and exclusions. Perhaps the most important for the present discussion is the presence of the four mature Asian Tigers, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong (in order of ranking). These are technological newcomers, and have followed different strategies to build up their capabilities (Lall, 1996). Korea and Taiwan used considerable industrial policy: import protection, export subsidies, credit targeting, FDI restrictions and slack IPR rules. Singapore combined widespread government interventions with a free trade regime and heavy reliance on (targeted) FDI to build a very high-tech industrial sector. Hong Kong was the least interventionist, confining government policy to infrastructure, subsidised land and housing and support for export activity and SMEs.


Taiwan appears in the technology index at an unexpectedly high position (8), largely because of its high rank in international patenting. Korea is in 15th place, with greater R&D than Taiwan but less US patenting; even so, it comes ahead of mature OECD countries like Austria, UK or Italy. Singapore comes 18th, which may be unexpected in view of its heavy TNC dependence. While it is generally the case that TNCs are slow to transfer R&D to developing host countries, Singapore has managed, by dint of targeted policies and a strong skill base, to induce foreign affiliates to set up significant R&D facilities there. At number 23, Hong Kong brings up the rear among the Tigers and in the group as a whole. Its R&D rank is very low (40) but its index position is pulled up by its patent rank (16); it is not clear what accounts for this discrepancy between R&D and patenting.

Note again that weak IPRs played a vital role in the technological development of Korea and Taiwan, the two leading Tigers. They are the best recent examples of the use of copying and reverse engineering to build competitive, technology-intensive industrial sectors with considerable innovative 'muscle'. However, unlike many other developing countries that had weak IPRs, they were able to use the opportunities offered effectively because of investments in skill development, strong export orientation, ample inflows of foreign capital goods and strong government incentives for R&D (Lall, 1996). It may also be the case that the political economy that allowed such strong industrial policy to work was difficult to replicate in other countries. Singapore, by contrast, had strong IPR protection. It is unlikely that it would have been able to build up TNC-based R&D without this. Note also that in recent years Korea and Taiwan have also moved to strong IPR regimes, partly under pressure from trading partners but also because their enterprise have now reached the technological stage where they need greater protection.

Among the interesting exclusions from Group 1 are South European countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal: the technological laggards of West Europe. The Russian Federation is also excluded. Not only has its R&D declined recently, it ranks low in terms both of enterprise funded R&D and of patents taken out in the US. Ireland is at the low end of the group, but its presence is creditable given its historic industrial backwardness. Its relatively recent entry into technology-intensive industrial activity has, like Singapore, been driven by electronics TNC

(together with a substantial pharmaceutical presence), and its technological effort is also dominated by foreign affiliates.

In this context, it is interesting to look at the (patchy) data on the role of TNCs in host country R&D (Figure 1).¹⁴ As expected, the technological kaders in the OECD, like Germany and USA, despite open FDI regimes, have a relatively low share of affiliate R&D. Japan has been traditionally hostile to FDI, so the share is particularly low (the same is probably true of Korea, but data are not available). At the other extreme, Ireland in the developed, and Singapore and Malaysia in the developing, world depend highly of affiliate R&D. We return to the role of FDI as such below.



Italy is known to be a relatively weak R&D performer (this also shows up in rank in international patenting) despite its advanced industrial sector. This is, however, in line with its specialisation in (skill intensive) fashion products and heavy industries (automobiles and machinery) of moderate R&D intensity. Australia and New Zealand also lag in the high technology group.

Group 2. This group of moderate technology performers includes, as noted, the South European countries and Russia. It also contains other CEE countries like Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. From the developing world it has the main Latin American economies: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico, along with Costa Rica, Venezuela and Uruguay. Only Malaysia appears here from Asia, South Africa from SSA, and Turkey and Bahrain from MENA. Most of these countries have fairly large industrial sectors, and some have a significant TNC presence.

Group 3: The group of low technology performers is very diverse. On the one hand it has large countries with heavy industrial sectors like China, India and Egypt, along with dynamic export oriented economies (with a high reliance on TNCs) like Thailand and Indonesia. On the other it has countries with small industrial sectors and weak industrial exports like Panama, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Bolivia or Kenya. Some countries have fairly large and impressive technological activity in absolute terms – India and China stand out – but are lumped with

¹⁴ The data are drawn from OECD (1999) and various national sources.

economies that have very little (financed by the productive sector). The use of population to deflate the variables may distort the picture somewhat for such large countries, though it may be argued that technological effort in China and India is quite low relative to their economic size. These problems are inevitable in any such classification exercise, particularly as one approaches the lower limits.

In this group, therefore, the implications of stronger IPRs are likely to be fairly varied. Economies with significant technological effort and/or strong local enterprises (e.g. India, China or Thailand) are likely to benefit from slack IPRs in some aspects and gain from them in others. Those with little 'real' innovative capabilities or competitive enterprises may not be able to utilise slack IPRs to build up local technology, and may gain from FDI inflows by strengthening IPRs. At the same time, TRIPS may lead to net costs for some countries with no corresponding benefits. At this stage it is difficult to discern the net outcome.

Group 4: This group has no meaningful technological activity by either measure (and the countries are not ranked individually). It contains all the least developed countries (by the UN definition) in the sample, as well as South Asian countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, several countries in SSA, one East European economy (Albania) and El Salvador from LAC. The distinction between these countries and those at the bottom of Group 3 should not, for obvious reasons, be pushed too far. In essence, they can be considered together as the set of economies for whom IPRs are irrelevant for technology development and transfer and where the costs are likely to outweigh the benefits.

3.2 COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE

We now use 'competitive industrial performance' to rank countries and then combine the technology index with the performance index. The performance measures used here are MVA per capita, manufactured exports per capital, the share of medium and high technology (MHT) products in MVA and the share of MHT in manufactured exports. All the data are for 1998 (for further analysis and explanation see UNIDO, 2002). For a classification of traded products by technology levels see Annex Table 1.

In general, there is a strong relationship between the technology and industrial performance indices (correlation coefficient of 0.80). This is to be expected, since technological effort is intimately related to levels of industrialisation, success in export activity and the sophistication of the production and export structures. The causation runs both ways, of course, but most analysts would agree that strong technological capabilities contribute to all these aspects of performance. The elements of the industrial performance index are also strongly correlated with each other, with coefficients ranging between 0.57 and 0.81.

Table 3 shows the industrial performance index with all its components. There are five groups here, according to 'natural' breaks in the final performance index. There is little need to discuss the groups in detail, as the patterns are fairly self-evident.

		MVA/capita (\$)	Exports/c apita (\$)	MHT share in MVA (%)	MHT share in manufacture d exports (%)	Industrial performanc e index	Industrial performance groups
1	Singapor	6,178	32,713	80.00%	74.30%	0.883	
2	e Switzerla nd	8,315	10,512	63.00%	62.90%	0.751	
3	Ireland	7,043	,	65.00%	51.20%	0.739	
4	Japan	7,084		66.00%	81.10%	0.696	
5	Germany	5,866			64.80%	0.632	
6 7	USA Swadan	5,301	2,035	63.00%	65.40% 58.20%	0.564 0.562	
8	Sweden Finland	5,295 5,557		61.00% 53.00%	49.80%	0.502	
8 9	Belgium	4,446	,	51.00%	49.80%	0.338	
10	-	4,179	,	62.00%	62.90%	0.473	
	France	4,762		53.00%	58.40%	0.465	High
	Austria	5,191	6,615	50.00%	49.10%	0.453	8
13	Denmark	4,776		51.00%	39.50%	0.443	
14	Netherlan	3,953	8,894	60.00%	50.00%	0.429	
	ds						
	Taiwan	3,351	4,834	57.00%	61.30%	0.412	
	Canada	3,489		51.00%	47.10%	0.407	
	Italy	4,082	,	52.00%	50.90%	0.384	
18		2,108		60.00%	62.30%		
19	1	2,365		49.00%	52.50%	0.319	
	Israel	2,599	,	54.00%	46.10%	0.301	
-	Norway	3,803 937		50.00% 60.00%	<u>21.00%</u> 65.10%	0.301 0.278	
22	Malaysia Mexico	855	,	36.00%	65.50%	0.278	
	Czech	1,612	,	48.00%	51.90%	0.243	
21	Republic	1,012	2,307	10.0070	51.9070	0.213	
25	Philippin es	190	374	36.00%	74.70%	0.241	
26	Portugal	2,631.20	2,336	31.00%	39.70%	0.240	Medium-high
27	Hungary	947		46.00%	58.80%	0.239	
	Slovenia	2,365	,	50.00%	27.80%	0.221	
29	Australia	2,488		51.00%	14.60%	0.211	
30	H Kong	1,411	3,460	52.00%	36.80%	0.204	
31	N	2,611	1,626	40.00%	14.50%	0.186	
	Zealand						
	Thailand	585		39.00%	44.90%	0.172	
	Brazil	912		58.00%	34.30%	0.149	
	Poland	779		45.00%	35.70%	0.143	
	Argentina	1,475		37.00%	23.30%	0.140	
	C Rica	557		30.00%	32.60%	0.129	
51	China	287	135	51.00%	36.60%	0.126	

Table 3: Industrial Performance Index

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38 S Africa	557	322	44.00%	25.90%	0.108	
39 Turkey	695	361	38.00%	23.50%	0.108	
40 Greece	928	758	31.00%	17.90%	0.102	
41 Romania	466	339	34.00%	23.60%	0.095	
42 Bahrain	1,577	688	22.00%	5.70%	0.089	
43 Uruguay	1,125	472	21.00%	14.60%	0.087	
44 Russian	663	202	41.00%	16.30%	0.077	
Fed						
45 Tunisia	390	554	19.00%	15.50%	0.068	
46 Venezuel	607	337	32.00%	10.30%	0.060	
a						
47 Chile	749	443	26.00%	6.30%	0.056	
48 Guatemal	237	129	35.00%	15.00%	0.056	
a						
49 India	65	26	59.00%	16.60%	0.054	
50 Indonesia	115	132	40.00%	15.50%	0.054	Medium-Low
51 Zimbabw	77	75	27.00%	15.30%	0.052	
e						
52 El	426	134	28.00%	11.50%	0.051	
Salvador						
53 Morocco	219	112	25.00%	12.40%	0.048	
54 Saudi	605	702	54.00%	5.20%	0.047	
Arabia						
55 Colombia	322	104	35.00%	8.90%	0.041	
56 Mauritius	739	1,434	12.00%	1.40%	0.041	
57 Egypt	326	37	39.00%	8.80%	0.038	
58 Peru	585	91	25.00%	4.60%	0.035	
59 Oman	293	406	20.00%	5.80%	0.032	
60 Pakistan	73	56	34.00%	9.20%	0.031	
61 Ecuador	354	78	11.00%	4.20%	0.025	
62 Kenya	37	28	24.00%	7.60%	0.025	
63 Jordan	189	103	31.00%	5.00%	0.024	
64 Honduras	138	48	12.00%	6.00%	0.023	
65 Jamaica	372	446	25.00%	1.50%	0.022	
66 Panama	271	80	16.00%	4.00%	0.022	
67 Albania	184	53	19.00%	4.20%	0.021	
68 Bolivia	178	81	11.00%	5.00%	0.021	Low
69 Nicaragu	67	30	15.00%	3.90%	0.017	
a			1 - 00		0.01-	
70 Sri Lanka	125	162	16.00%	4.00%	0.017	
71 Paraguay	247	66	11.00%	2.20%	0.015	
72 Mozambi	22	4	12.00%	3.40%	0.013	
que	C 0		2 0.000/		0.011	
73 Banglade	60	37	28.00%	2.90%	0.011	
sh		o =	2 0.00±	0.00	0.000	
74 Algeria	154	95	29.00%	0.80%	0.009	Very low
75 Cameroo	65	34	11.00%	1.80%	0.008	
n Té a l	~ -	a -	1 - 00		0.000	
76 Senegal	82	35	16.00%	1.40%	0.008	
77 Zambia	40	11	24.00%	1.80%	0.007	

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78 Nepal	18	16	15.00%	1.90%	0.006	
79 Nigeria	62	2	38.00%	1.50%	0.006	
80 Tanzania	16	3	25.00%	1.50%	0.005	
81 CAR	26	15	20.00%	0.80%	0.003	
82 Madagas	27	9	10.00%	0.90%	0.003	
car						
83 Malawi	21	6	29.00%	1.00%	0.003	
84 Uganda	24	1	15.00%	0.80%	0.003	
85 Ghana	9	22	17.00%	0.10%	0.001	
86 Yemen	34	2	20.00%	0.10%	0.001	
87 Ethiopia	8	1	9.00%	0.10%	0.000	
Source: Calculated	from UNIDC) databas	e and UN Con	ntrade.		

Note: 'MHT' stands for medium and high technology products. Classification taken from Lall (2001), Chapter 4.

What is the implication of industrial performance for IPRs? There is clearly a positive correlation between IPRs, industrial performance and technological effort. This does not mean, however, that IPRs are *causally* related to growth and development: each rises with development levels. As noted, the causation can run both ways. Moreover, there is probably a strong *non-linearity* involved. Strong IPRs are probably beneficial *beyond a certain level* of industrial sophistication, while *below* this level their benefits for development are unclear. Moreover, the further down one goes in the scale the less evident the benefits become. In terms of the performance index, the 'very low' and 'low' performance groups are, on average, unlikely to benefit from TRIPS. In both 'medium' groups there is probably a mixture of beneficial and non-beneficial effects depending on the country, with a case for strengthening IPRs in the medium term. In the 'high' performance group the benefits are more unambiguous.

There is one important factor here that may have a bearing on IPRs: the growth of *'international production systems'* under the aegis transnational companies (UNCTAD, various). While TNCs have had export platforms in developing countries making complete products for some time, the emerging trend has been for them to locate (tightly linked) processes in different countries to serve global or regional markets. This trend is particularly marked in high-tech activities, led by electronics, where the high value-to-weight ratio of the products makes relocations of large numbers of processes economical. For instance, a semiconductor may be designed in one set of facilities (say, in the USA and Europe), the wafer fabricated elsewhere, and the assembly and testing done in others. Such shipping of intermediate electronics products across countries has made them the fastest growing segment of world trade, in conjunction with rapidly rising demand (Lall, 2001, chapter 4).

	Tabl	e 4: High	n technolog	gy expor	ts per ca	pita and to	otal elect	tronics e	xports, 199	8	
	High-	Electro		High-	Electron		High-	Electro		High-	Electr
	tech	nics		tech	ics		tech	nics		tech	onics
	-	exports		-	exports		-	exports		exports	-
	per	(\$ m.)		per	(\$ m.)		per	(\$ m.)		per	s (\$
	capita			capita			capita			capita	m.)
	(\$)			(\$)			(\$) Group 3		C	(\$)	
Japan	Group 1	07 573	Slovenia	Group 2	577 8		1.00	15.9	Nicaragua	roup 4	3.2
Japan	908.75	2	Slovenia	545.15	577.8	S Alabia	1.00	13.9	Micalagua	0.90	5.2
Switzerla	2,574.3	5,303.4	Spain	258.54	6,758.0	Ecuador	2.80	5.5	Peru	1.79	11.1
nd	9										
USA	728.28	114,757		317.45	2,341.6	Jordan	5.58	11.8	Albania	1.11	3.0
Swadan	2 202 7	.0	Rep	471 21	1 221 9	Donomo	6.07	0.0	Donaladaa	0.10	4.2
Sweden	2,303.7	14,475. 2	Hungary	4/1.21	4,334.8	Panama	0.07	0.0	Banglades h	0.10	4.2
Germany	, 1,129.5	-	S Africa	22.31	510.7	China	27.02	28,605.	Cameroon	0.08	0.9
•	9	8						5			
Finland	2,046.1	9,727.3	Greece	45.85	253.1	Jamaica	0.36	0.1	CAR	0.06	0.2
Denmark	5 1 437 8	4 267 6	Portugal	150.23	1 041 0	Philippin	252.26	18 673	Fl	11.86	12.8
Dennark	4	7,207.0	Tontugui	150.25	1,041.0	es	252.20	5	Salvador	11.00	12.0
Taiwan		37,259.	Brazil	19.25	1,476.4	Indonesia	12.80	2,381.3	Ethiopia	0.00	0.0
Netherlan	3 2 598 1	0 33 239	Argentina	17 81	195.7	Thailand	254 76	14,593.	Ghana	0.04	0.5
ds	9	5	7 ingentina	17.01	175.7	Thanana	234.70	9	Onana	0.04	0.5
France	1,105.4	35,797.	Malaysia	1,547.7	32,276.	Colombia	6.61	63.7	Madagasc	0.06	0.6
	9	6		7	3				ar		
Israel	1,107.1 2	4,857.9	Russian Fed	16.61	1,077.7	India	1.74	708.5	Malawi	0.01	0.1
Belgium		10,300.		58.59	1.871.1	Guatemal	9.50	15.1	Mozambi	0.15	1.9
Deigium		5	I onulla		1,07111	a	100	1011	que	0.12	1.7
Canada	784.90	15,410. 2	Chile	7.08	39.2	Honduras	0.72	2.3	Nepal	0.03	0.7
Norway	514.41	3 1,556.4	C Rica	363.21	1,176.8	Bolivia	3.09	4.3	Nigeria	0.03	3.0
S Korea	775.72		Venezuel		29.1	Mauritius		3.6	Oman	45.49	47.3
		6	a		_,						
Austria	916.77	4,784.1	Turkey	22.66	1,156.3	Morocco		3.7	Pakistan	0.40	4.4
UK	,	50,237.	Bahrain	20.95	5.6	Sri Lanka	3.12	55.4	Paraguay	1.23	2.3
Cinconoro	3	4	Mariaa	226 12	20 055	Tunicio	26 50	219.0	Sanagal	0.00	06
Singapore	19,699. 59	59,674. 4	IVICXICO	326.12	28,055. 0	i uilistä	26.58	219.0	Senegal	0.09	0.6
Australia		-	Uruguay	16.78	26.7	Algeria	0.25	2.5	Tanzania	0.20	6.3
Ireland	6,805.5		Romania	11.21	189.5	Egypt.	1.11	4.8	Uganda	0.02	0.3
T . 1	9	0					1.0-	a =	T 7	0.00	0.0
Italy	425.52	14,537. 7				Kenya	1.05	2.7	Yemen	0.00	0.0
Ν	133.72								Zambia	0.06	0.5
Zealand											
H Kong	899.60	4,920.1							Zimbabw	1.49	6.9
Average	2,251.6	27 241		212.03	4,169.6		29.53	3,113.0	e	2.84	4.8
Average	2,251.0 8	27,241. 1		414. UJ	т,107.0		47.00	3,113.0		2.04	J. O
	<u>ا</u>	-							Ī		

Table 4 shows the per capita value of total high technology exports and of total electronics exports by each country in 1998. There is the usual dispersion of national performance, and the group averages are distorted by the performance of a few countries. Take for example the average for Group 3, where China, Philippines and Thailand are completely out of line with the rest.

The emergence of international production systems has made it possible for countries to move up the production, export and technological complexity ladder rapidly without first building a domestic technology base. Again, the East Asian economies bear this out. With the exception of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, none has a strong domestic technology base in electronics. The electronics production system, however, only encompasses a small number of developing countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and China in East Asia, and Mexico in Latin America. The implications of this for industrial and technological development are analysed at greater length in UNIDO (2002).

Does the promise of integrated systems mean that developing countries should adopt stronger IPRs in the hope of attracting export-oriented TNCs? In the short term the answer is probably 'no'. Most TNC assembly activity has been attracted to developing countries without changing the national IPR regime by isolating export-processing zones from the rest of the economy. China is a good example. In the longer term, however, the answer is likely to be 'yes' – at least for the countries that seek to attract high-tech production systems. Inducing TNCs to invest in such activities when competitors are offering stronger IPRs would force all aspirants to also have equally strong protection. Moreover, countries that are already have high-tech assembly operations would need to strengthen IPRs to induce TNCs to deepen their operations into more advanced technologies and functions like R&D and design. At the highest end of TNC activity, where developing countries compete directly with advanced industrial countries, the IPR regime would have to match the strongest one in the developed world.

However, as integrated systems are highly concentrated geographically, these considerations may not apply to many developing countries. There is also little reason to believe that the level of concentration will decline significantly in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, in a globalizing world with low trade and investment barriers, there may be strong economic reasons for TNCs to centralise production and R&D bases in a few sites to reap economies of scale, scope and agglomeration. Countries far from centres of activity, and with low technological capabilities, may continue to be marginalised to most TNC activities (marketing and resource procurement apart). The strengthening of IPRs may actually reinforce the tendency to concentrate high value functions in a few efficient, well-located sites, making it easier to use these to sell to other countries. This may imply that these other countries would, as a result of TRIPS, have fewer tools to build local capabilities in the future.

		cennology	una maas	capabili		ndex	omoniou		coure
		Technolo	Industrial	-			Technolo	Industrial	Combin
		gy effort	per.	d index			gy effort	per.	ed
		index	Index				index	Index	index
1	Japan	0.8649	0.6964	0.7806	41	Romania	0.0015	0.0954	0.0484
2	Switzerlan	0.7858	0.7512	0.7685	42	Bahrain	0.0024	0.0891	0.0458
_	d				· -				
3	USA	0.7709	0.5641	0.6675	43	Uruguay	0.0020	0.0867	0.0444
4	Sweden	0.5957	0.5622	0.5789	44	Russian	0.0062	0.0774	0.0418
-						Fed			
5	Singapore	0.1738	0.8832	0.5285	45	Tunisia	0.0002	0.0676	0.0339
6	Germany	0.4151	0.6320	0.5235	46	Venezuela	0.0033	0.0597	0.0315
7	Finland	0.4099	0.5381	0.4740	47	Chile	0.0047	0.0557	0.0302
8	Ireland	0.1191	0.7392	0.4292	48	Guatemala	0.0003	0.0557	0.0280
9	Denmark	0.3434	0.4430	0.3932	49	Indonesia	0.0005	0.0543	0.0274
10	Belgium	0.2645	0.4949	0.3797	50	India	0.0004	0.0539	0.0272
11	France	0.2716	0.4650	0.3683	51	Zimbabwe	0.0000	0.0517	0.0259
12	Taiwan	0.3173	0.4123	0.3648	52	El Salvador	0.0000	0.0507	0.0254
	Netherland	0.2743	0.4287	0.3515	53	Morocco	0.0002	0.0476	0.0239
10	S	0127.10	011207	0.0010			0.0002	010170	010207
14	UK	0.1926	0.4725	0.3326	54	Saudi	0.0009	0.0467	0.0238
						Arabia			
15	Canada	0.2488	0.4072	0.3280	55	Colombia	0.0004	0.0413	0.0208
16		0.2022	0.4528	0.3275	56	Mauritius	0.0002	0.0405	0.0204
17	S Korea	0.2225	0.3700	0.2962	57	Egypt	0.0001	0.0381	0.0191
	Israel	0.2712	0.3014	0.2863	58	Peru	0.0001	0.0348	0.0174
19	Norway	0.2344	0.3005	0.2675	59	Oman	0.0000	0.0320	0.0160
20	Italy	0.0986	0.3844	0.2415	60	Pakistan	0.0000	0.0312	0.0156
21	Spain	0.0431	0.3194	0.1813	61	Ecuador	0.0009	0.0251	0.0130
22		0.1470	0.2113	0.1792	62	Jordan	0.0008	0.0241	0.0124
23	H Kong	0.0829	0.2041	0.1435	63	Kenya	0.0001	0.0246	0.0124
	Malaysia	0.0065	0.2783	0.1424	64	Honduras	0.0003	0.0231	0.0117
25	•	0.0541	0.2210	0.1376	65	Panama	0.0008	0.0221	0.0114
	N Zealand	0.0835	0.1861	0.1348	66	Jamaica	0.0006	0.0222	0.0114
27	Czech	0.0200	0.2426	0.1313	67	Bolivia	0.0002	0.0214	0.0108
	Republic	0.0200	0.2.20	0.1010	0,	201111	0.0002	01021	010100
28	Hungary	0.0135	0.2392	0.1263	68	Albania	0.0000	0.0214	0.0107
29	Portugal	0.0096	0.2399	0.1247	69	Sri Lanka	0.0002	0.0174	0.0088
30	Mexico	0.0022	0.2457	0.1240	70	Nicaragua	0.0001	0.0169	0.0085
31	Philippines	0.0006	0.2411	0.1209	71	Paraguay	0.0000	0.0151	0.0076
32		0.0005	0.1721	0.0863	72	Mozambiq	0.0000	0.0129	0.0064
02		010000	0.11/21	0.00000	. –	ue	0.0000	0.012	0.0001
33	Brazil	0.0087	0.1491	0.0789	73	Bangladesh	0.0000	0.0109	0.0054
	Poland	0.0055	0.1434	0.0745	74	Algeria	0.0001	0.0092	0.0047
	Argentina	0.0067	0.1395	0.0731	75	Cameroon	0.0000	0.0076	0.0038
	C Rica	0.0041	0.1294	0.0667	76	Senegal	0.0000	0.0076	0.0038
37		0.0006	0.1256	0.0631	77	Zambia	0.0000	0.0066	0.0033
38	S Africa	0.0121	0.1075	0.0598	78	Nigeria	0.0000	0.0062	0.0031
39		0.0103	0.1023	0.0563	79	Nepal	0.0000	0.0062	0.0031
		0.0100	J.I. J	0.0000	1. /	- · · P.m.		0.000 <i>L</i>	0.0001

 Table 5: Technology and industrial performance indices combined – the domestic capabilities index

40 Turkey	0.0029	0.1080	0.0555	80	Tanzania	0.0000	0.0047	0.0024
				81	Malawi	0.0000	0.0033	0.0017
				82	Madagasca	0.0000	0.0033	0.0017
					r			
				83	CAR	0.0000	0.0031	0.0015
				84	Uganda	0.0000	0.0028	0.0014
				85	Yemen	0.0000	0.0014	0.0007
				86	Ghana	0.0000	0.0008	0.0004
				87	Ethiopia	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Let us now combine the technology and industrial performance indices to derive a combined index, an indicator of overall 'domestic capabilities'. Table 5 shows the three indices, with countries ranked by the combined capability index. Countries are now divided into five groups. The implications are very similar to those drawn earlier and need not be repeated.

3.3 TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS: FDI, LICENSING AND CAPITAL GOODS

Table 6 shows the average values of FDI inflows and licensing payments overseas by the four groups of countries, and Table 7 gives the values of the individual countries ranked by the technology effort index.¹⁵ Capital goods imports are shown separately below.

Table 6: A	verage FD	I inflows and	l Licensii	ng Paym	ents Abro	ad by Techi	nology
			Groups				
Technology	FDI/cap	Total FDI	FDI	FDI	Licensi	Total	Licensi
groups	ita (\$)	(\$ b)	%	%	ng/	licensing	ng %
			GDI	GNP	capita	(\$b)	GNP
					(\$)		
1. High	503.88	8.87	10.0%	2.1%	170.99	2,582.76	0.798%
2. Moderate	103.15	2.59	9.2%	2.2%	14.42	378.05	0.280%
3. Low	34.21	2.40	8.9%	2.2%	2.79	150.03	0.203%
4. Negligible	7.94	0.14	7.5%	1.3%	0.13	2.66	0.028%

Source: Calculated from UNCTAD *WIR* (various), IMF, World Bank and various national statistical sources.

Note: GDI stands for gross domestic investment.

It appears that on average, both FDI and foreign licensing in per capita terms decline with the intensity of national technological effort. This is also true of FDI as a percentage of gross domestic investment and licensing as a percentage of GNP, but not of FDI as a percentage of GNP. At the country level, however, the correlation between the technology effort and technology import variables is less strong or absent. For instance, FDI per capita is positively related to the technology index, but not very strongly (coefficient of 0.31), while royalty payments per capita are insignificant (coefficient of 0.11). When expressed as percentages of GNP the correlation is even lower (-0.11 for FDI and 0.01 for royalties).

¹⁵ Licensing payments are taken from published national balance of payments statistics (from the IMF and national sources), and cover all types of royalty and technical fees paid abroad, as well as payments for trademarks and possibly consultancy services. Some countries do not break down their invisible payments overseas in detail; for these we estimated the figures based on proportions of service payments accounted for by licensing payments in other countries at similar levels of development and with similar trade and FDI policies.

A moment's reflection would suggest that the lack of correlation between technology effort and technology imports is not surprising. There is no *a priori* reason to expect that countries that do more R&D would also receive larger amounts of FDI relative to their economic size or spend more on foreign technology than other countries. In some cases, there is good reason to expect the opposite – a strong technology base may lead to more outward rather than inward FDI relative to GNP and to greater royalty receipts than payments. In other cases, strong FDI inflows and royalty payments may go with a weak local technology base. This gives rise to a fairly random pattern that is reflected in the national figures and correlations.

,	Table 7: Inward FDI and technology licensing payments overseas by technology groups EDI 1002 7 Technology Licence Payments											
			EDI 1	1993-7		Technolo	ogy Licence	Payments				
			I'DI .	1993-7			1998					
		Per	Total	As % of	As % of	Per	Total	As % of				
		capita (US\$)	(US\$ b)	GDI	GNP	capita (US\$)	(US\$ m)	GNP				
1	Japan	7.1	1.07	0.07	0.02	70.8	8,947.30	0.219				
2	Switzerland	529.8	4.47	6.6	1.37	151.7	1,078.20	0.38				
3	USA	271.3	70	5.67	0.99	41.8	11,292	0.143				
4	Sweden	922.5	8.1	25.25	3.66	106	938.5	0.414				
5	Germany	77.1	6.81	1.32	0.28	59.6	4,893.40	0.224				
6	Finland	260.2	1.46	7.57	1.21	79.8	411.4	0.329				
7	Denmark	551.8	2.99	9.6	1.78	8.5	45.3	0.026				
8	Taiwan	74.5	1.74	2.78	0.66	65	1,419.00	0.527				
9	Netherlands	711.6	11.92	15.5	3.01	188.8	2,964.50	0.762				
10	France	362.1	22.89	8.59	1.49	46.2	2,716.70	0.185				
11	Israel	191.1	1.11	5.08	1.22	35.2	209.6	0.217				
12	Belgium	1,116.2	10.58	24.16	3.91	107.7	1,099.20	0.424				
13	Canada	292.8	8.06	8.08	1.49	68.4	2,073.20	0.357				
14	Norway	589.3	2.62	7.73	1.81	76.9	341	0.224				
15	S Korea	36.8	1.61	0.99	0.36	51	2,369.30	0.594				
16	Austria	304.6	2.65	4.8	1.15	100.4	810.9	0.374				
17	UK	367.6	20.91	12.07	1.9	103.7	6,122.70	0.484				
18	Singapore	2,536.0	8.2	26.54	9.57	559.2	1,769.00	1.852				
19	Australia	376.9	6.35	8.82	1.88	53.8	1,009.70	0.261				
20	Ireland	484.2	1.47	15.11	2.64	1,683.1	6,235.80	8.998				
21	Italy	63	3.55	1.9	0.33	20.1	1,154.90	0.1				
22	N Zealand	735	2.69	22.31	4.79	70.4	266.9	0.482				
23	H Kong	727.7	2.75	10.24	1.96	184.7	1,235.00	0.781				
	Average	503.88	8.87	10.0%	2.1%	170.99	2,582.76	0.798				
	Group 1	303.00	0.07	10.0 /0	2.1 /0	170.33	2,302.70	0.790				
24	Slovenia	92.9	0.21	4.88	1.09	19.5	38.6	0.199				
25	Spain	182.3	7.65	6.77	1.38	47.4	1,866.30	0.336				
26	Czech	132.1	1.3	8.58	2.77	10.9	112.6	0.213				
	Republic											
27	Hungary	236.1	2.39	23.57	5.58	21.2	214.6	0.47				
28	S Africa	37.1	1.33	6.28	1.01	4	165.4	0.121				
29	Greece	96.7	1.08	4.81	0.93	5.5	58	0.047				

	_							
30	Portugal	149	1.53	6.32	1.54	29.1	290	0.273
31	Brazil	49.6	7.28	5.06	1.08	6.5	1,075.00	0.14
32	Argentina	149.1	5.39	10.34	1.94	11.7	422	0.145
33	Malaysia	229.5	4.63	14.1	5.73	107.8	2,392.00	2.942
34	Russian Fed	15.4	1.98	2.52	0.56	Neg.	2	0.001
35	Poland	86.3	3.13	13.27	2.65	5	195	0.129
36	Chile	229.4	3.38	20.23	5.26	3.8	56	0.076
37	C Rica	110.4	0.37	15.94	4.18	6.1	21.5	0.219
38	Venezuela	88.4	1.89	15.05	2.53	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
39	Turkey	12	0.74	1.76	0.43	1.9	124	0.062
40	Bahrain	1.7	0.01	0.76	0.14	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
41	Mexico	102.4	6.81	11.04	2.49	5.2	501	0.136
42	Uruguay	42	0.14	6.1	0.81	1.8	6	0.03
43	Romania	20.6	0.51	6.21	1.44	0.9	21	0.069
	Average	103.15	2.59	9.2%	2.2%	14.42	378.05	0.280
4.4	Group 2							
44	S Arabia	13.8	0.42	1 15 75	0.33	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
45	Ecuador	46.3	0.51	15.75	3.04	5.6	68	0.37
46	Panama	189	0.46	20.74	6.13	6.4	17.6	0.212
47	Jordan	16.1	0.07	3.84	1.01	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
48	China	30.1	37.81	13.54	5.51	0.3	420	0.045
49	Jamaica	58.7	0.14	10.59	3.63	11.6	30	0.667
50	Philippines	20.1	1.54	8.46	2.01	2.1	158	0.2
51	Indonesia	19.8	3.66	6.16	1.9	4.9	1,002.00	0.767
52	Thailand	38	2.45	4.07	1.48	13.1	804	0.61
53	Colombia	62.2	1.98	11.29	2.54	1.3	54	0.054
54	India	2.1	1.64	2.16	0.51	0.2	200.8	0.047
55	Guatemala	9	0.09	4.2	0.64	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
56	Honduras	11.2	0.06	4.92	1.57	0.8	5.1	0.111
57	S Lanka	10.6	0.19	5.91	1.49	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
58	Bolivia	49.5	0.3	30.89	5.22	0.6	5.2	0.065
59	Mauritius	25.7	0.03	2.65	0.74	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
60	Morocco	19.4	0.51	7.72	1.63	6.2	171.5	0.498
61	Tunisia	41.2	0.38	8.39	2.22	0.2	2.6	0.014
62	Egypt, Arab	13.3	0.78	7.83	1.32	6.4	392	0.495
63	Rep. Peru	91.1	2.2	16.91	3.85	3.2	80	0.132
64	Algeria	0.4	0.01	0.07	0.02	Neg.	Neg.	0.132 Neg.
65	Nicaragua	0.4 18.8	0.01	16.79	0.02 4.5	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
65 66	Kenya	0.5	0.07	0.92	4.3 0.15	1.3	39.9	0.391
	Average							
	Group 3	34.21	2.40	8.9%	2.2%	2.79	150.03	0.203
-	Nigeria	13.5	1.23	30.72	5.36	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Pakistan	5.1	0.65	5.66	1.06	0.1	19.7	0.032
-	Albania	19.7	0.08	20.24	3.15	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Bangladesh	0.3	0.03	0.44	0.09	Neg.	5.1	0.012
-	Cameroon	1.2	0.01	1.13	0.18	0.1	1	0.012
-	CAR	0.4	Neg.	3.02	0.2	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	El Salvador	2.1	0.01	0.71	0.14	1.1	6.9	0.061
-	Ethiopia	0.1	0.01	0.58	0.09	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.

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-	Ghana	7.9	0.13	9.73	2.19	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Madagascar	0.8	0.01	2.81	0.32	0.6	9.8	0.264
-	Malawi	0.1	Neg.	0.34	0.06	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Mozambiqu e	3.1	0.02	10.24	1.88	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Nepal	0.6	0.01	1.18	0.28	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Oman	37.3	0.07	3.43	0.63	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Paraguay	40.6	0.2	9.93	2.27	0.1	0.5	0.006
-	Senegal	6.6	0.06	7.58	1.34	0.2	2.2	0.047
-	Tanzania	3.3	0.09	9.2	1.77	0.1	4.7	0.065
-	Uganda	5.8	0.12	13.8	2.16	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Yemen	7.3	0.14	12.03	2.11	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Zambia	6.7	0.06	12.18	1.75	Neg.	Neg.	Neg.
-	Zimbabwe	4.2	0.04	3.06	0.61	0.5	6	0.084
	Average Group 4	7.94	0.14	7.5%	1.3%	0.13	2.66	0.028

This reinforces the conclusion that countries will face different outcomes from strengthening IPRs, not just at different levels of development but also even at similar levels of income, depending on their pattern of technology development and imports. It may, of course, be argued that *all* countries should in the future be more receptive to FDI and licensing and that stronger IPRs will (if we accept the Maskus reasoning) promote both. In fact, countries with exceptionally low levels of technology inflows should make special efforts to raise them. More evidence is needed, however, before we can say with certainty that FDI and licensing respond positively to IPRs. As noted above, 'the jury is still out' in these matters.

Let us now consider technology imports in the form of capital goods. These are shown in Table 8, with countries again ranked by the technology effort index. The pattern is very similar to other forms of technology imports: group averages change in line with the technology index, but with large variations between individual countries. Much of the variation has to do with the size of the economy (apart, obviously, from the level of development), with larger countries less dependent on imported equipment than smaller ones.

Tab	Table 8: Capital goods imports per capita (average 1995-98, current dollars)						
Gro	up 1	Group	o 2	Group 3		Group 4	
Japan	305.98	Slovenia	741.28	Saudi Arabia	153.95	Nicaragua	47.07
Switzerland	1,905.21	Spain	468.31	Ecuador	84.11	Peru	77.97
USA	570.36	Czech	529.98	Jordan	107.72	Albania	24.38
		Republic					
Sweden	1,337.17	Hungary	313.68	Panama	166.68	Bangladesh	5.85
Germany	796.17	S Africa	168.91	China	25.02	Cameroon	9.62
Finland	1,090.87	Greece	434.90	Jamaica	139.49	CAR	12.59
Denmark	1,439.22	Portugal	498.04	Philippines	65.93	El Salvador	71.26
Taiwan	992.28	Brazil	76.26	Indonesia	43.16	Ethiopia	3.29
Netherland	1,784.49	Argentina	191.58	Thailand	209.67	Ghana	0.01
S		-					
France	745.41	Malaysia	716.81	Colombia	92.45	Madagascar	6.28
Israel	871.98	Russian Fed	55.12	India	4.50	Malawi	7.38
Belgium	1,694.51	Poland	191.37	Guatemala	63.68	Mozambique	8.18
Canada	1,221.36	Chile	323.19	Honduras	68.31	Nepal	3.02
Norway	1,800.96	C Rica	191.27	Bolivia	73.65	Nigeria	10.14

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S Korea	534.74	Venezuela	123.46	Mauritius	258.89	Oman	228.50
Austria	1,366.98	Turkey	162.09	Morocco	41.01	Pakistan	11.28
UK	858.41	Bahrain	244.61	Sri Lanka	13.71	Paraguay	133.69
Singapore	8,803.54	Mexico	178.05	Tunisia	130.33	Senegal	8.35
Australia	836.07	Uruguay	198.38	Algeria	43.20	Tanzania	8.43
Ireland	2,179.62	Romania	78.40	Egypt, Arab	34.11	Uganda	0.00
				Rep.			
Italy	486.72			Kenya	22.11	Yemen	5.80
N Zealand	815.89					Zambia	11.16
H Kong	4,599.10					Zimbabwe	62.18
Average	1,610.31		294.28		87.70		32.89
Source: Ca	lculated fro	m UN Comtra	ade databa	ase.			

The three forms of technology imports can be combined into a composite *technology import index* (Table 9). This index has some correlation with the domestic capability index (coefficient of 0.56), but there are many individual differences in ranking for reasons noted above. For instance, India ranks low in the technology import index but does better on the domestic capability index.

		Table	e 9: Techr	ology import i	ndex		
Singapore	0.777 4	Germany	0.0521		0.0135	Guatemala	0.0036
Ireland	0.479 5	Spain	0.0511	Uruguay	0.0134	Albania	0.0035
H Kong	0.306 4	Hungary	0.0471	Mauritius	0.0132	El Salvador	0.0032
Belgium	0.232 2	Portugal	0.0442	S Africa	0.0121	Zimbabwe	0.0030
Netherlands	0.198 5	Slovenia	0.0441	Colombia	0.0119	Nigeria	0.0021
Sweden	0.192 9	Chile	0.0431	Brazil	0.0107	Sri Lanka	0.0019
Switzerland		Czech Republic	0.0396	Paraguay	0.0104	Algeria	0.0017
Norway		S Korea	0.0352	Tunisia	0.0104	Zambia	0.0013
N Zealand	-	Panama	0.0324	Ecuador	0.0104	Senegal	0.0012
Denmark	0.128 7	Italy	0.0307	Bahrain	0.0095	Yemen	0.0012
Austria		Greece	0.0303	Bolivia	0.0094	Kenya	0.0011
UK	•	Argentina	0.0292	Turkey	0.0081	Pakistan	0.0011
Canada		Japan	0.0265	Saudi Arabia	0.0076	Ghana	0.0010
Australia	-	C Rica	0.0229	Jordan	0.0062	Tanzania	0.0008
Finland		Mexico	0.0212	Romania	0.0058	Uganda	0.0007
France	-	Poland	0.0196	Philippines	0.0055	Mozambique	0.0007

Malaysia	0 0.078 6	Venezuela	0.0163	Morocco	0.0053	Cameroon	0.0005
USA	0.065 5	Peru	0.0155	Indonesia	0.0052	CAR	0.0005
Israel	-	Thailand	0.0155	China	0.0049	India	0.0005
Taiwan	0.060 2	Jamaica	0.0153	Egypt	0.0043	Madagascar	0.0004
				Nicaragua	0.0042	Malawi	0.0003
				Honduras	0.0042	Bangladesh	0.0002
				Russian Fed	0.0041	Nepal	0.0002
						Ethiopia	0.0001

The countries in Table 9 are ranked according to the technology import index, and divided into four groups. There are a relatively large number of countries with very low use of foreign technology. The implications for IPRs are, as before, mixed. Countries with relatively high reliance on foreign technologies may need to strengthen IPRs to ensure continued access (if at higher prices), particularly for advanced proprietary technologies and high-tech capital goods. For other countries, with a need for more mature equipment, stronger IPRs would bring no benefit.

3.4 SKILLS AND ICT INFRASTRUCTURE

Let us end with national figures on technical skills and modern (information and communication, ICT) infrastructure. Technical skills are measured here by *technical enrolments at the tertiary level in pure science, engineering and mathematics and computing*. This measure is, however, strongly correlated with other measures like years of schooling, so the choice of skill indicators does not matter greatly. ICT is measured by *telephone mainlines*, which is also highly correlated with other ICT indicators like mobile telephones, personal computers and Internet servers. The picture is very similar to that yielded by other indices of technological effort and industrial performance (Table 10).

	Table 10: Tertiary technical enrolments and telephone mainlines (1997-98)							
	Tertia	ary Technical	Enrolment	Te	Telephone Mainlines			
		%	Numbers		Per 1,000	Total number		
		Population	(thousand)		people	(thousand)		
1	S Korea	1.65%	742.5	Switzerland	675.4	4,799.30		
2	Finland	1.33%	68	Sweden	673.7	5,963.30		
3	Russian	1.18%	1,749.20	USA	661.3	178,751.00		
	Fed							
4	Australia	1.17%	212	Norway	660.1	2,925.70		
5	Taiwan	1.06%	226.8	Denmark	659.7	3,497.00		
6	Spain	0.97%	379.7	Canada	633.9	19,206.00		
7	Ireland	0.91%	32.6	Netherlands	593.1	9,310.60		
8	Austria	0.78%	63	France	569.7	33,524.00		
9	Germany	0.77%	631.1	Germany	566.8	46,505.00		
10	UK	0.75%	439.1	Singapore	562	1,777.90		
11	Sweden	0.73%	64.5	H Kong	557.7	3,729.20		
12	Portugal	0.73%	72.6	UK	556.9	32,889.00		
13	Chile	0.73%	103.1	Finland	553.9	2,854.50		

	Greece	0.72%	75	Greece	522.2	5,491.10
	Canada	0.69%	203.2	Australia	512.1	9,601.40
	USA	0.68%	1,792.90	Japan	502.7	63,540.00
17	N Zealand	0.68%	24.8	Belgium	500.3	5,104.60
18	Israel	0.68%	37.4	Austria	491	3,966.10
19	Norway	0.67%	29.3	N Zealand	479.1	1,816.80
20	Japan	0.64%	808.2	Israel	471.1	2,809.10
21	Italy	0.64%	364	Italy	450.7	25,954.00
22	France	0.61%	355.1	Ireland	434.7	1,610.40
23	Denmark	0.60%	31.4	S Korea	432.7	20,088.00
24	Panama	0.59%	15.6	Taiwan	420.1	9,174.80
25	Netherland	0.56%	86.6	Spain	413.7	16,288.00
	S					
26	Philippines	0.55%	387.3	Portugal	413.5	4,121.40
27	Bahrain	0.52%	3	Slovenia	374.8	742.9
28	Switzerlan	0.51%	36	Czech Republic	363.9	3,746.20
	d					
29		0.51%	197.1	Hungary	335.9	3,396.80
30		0.49%	9.7	Turkey	254.1	16,125.00
	Romania	0.49%	111.2	Uruguay	250.4	823.5
	H Kong	0.49%	30.2	Bahrain	245.5	157.8
33	Singapore	0.47%	14.1	Poland	227.6	8,800.40
34	U	0.47%	162.3	Mauritius	213.7	247.8
35	Peru	0.46%	108.2	Chile	205.5	3,045.80
36	Czech	0.46%	47.9	Argentina	202.7	7,323.60
	Republic					
37	Venezuela	0.45%	97.9	Malaysia	197.6	4,383.70
38		0.44%	400.1	Russian Fed	196.6	28,879.00
39	Belgium	0.43%	43.6	Colombia	173.5	7,078.70
40		0.42%	17.5	C Rica	171.8	605.9
41	Algeria	0.41%	115.1	Jamaica	165.7	426.8
	Poland	0.39%	151.9	Romania	162.4	3,653.40
	C Rica	0.34%	11.5	Panama	151.3	418.3
	Bolivia	0.34%	25.4	S Arabia	142.6	2,957.80
	Turkey	0.33%	198.3	Brazil	120.5	19,989.00
	Uruguay	0.29%	9.3	Venezuela	116.7	2,712.00
	Ecuador	0.29%	32.7	S Africa	114.6	4,743.00
	El Salvador	0.26%	15	Mexico	103.6	9,928.70
	Morocco	0.25%	66.7	Oman	92.3	212.6
	Tunisia	0.24%	21.4	Jordan	85.5	390.2
	Indonesia	0.23%	439.1	Thailand	83.5	5,112.80
	Nicaragua	0.22%	9.7	Tunisia	80.6	752.2
	Honduras	0.20%	11.3	El Salvador	80	484.7
	Thailand	0.19%	110.5	Ecuador	78.3	953
	Brazil	0.18%	289.3	China	69.6	86,230.00
	S Africa	0.17%	68.1	Bolivia	68.8	547.1
	Guatemala	0.17%	17	Peru	66.7	1,654.80
	Hungary	0.16%	16.7	Egypt, Arab Rep.	60.2	3,696.10
	Malaysia	0.13%	26.7	Paraguay	55.3	288.4
60	S Arabia	0.12%	23.4	Morocco	54.4	1,509.90

61	India	0.12%	1,086.30	Algeria	53.2	1,591.50
-	Egypt,	0.12%	69.6	Guatemala	40.8	441.1
-	Arab Rep.					
63	-	0.11%	5.5	Honduras	38.1	234.8
64	•••	0.11%	2.9	Philippines	37	2,782.60
65	Albania	0.11%	3.6	Nicaragua	31.3	150.3
66	China	0.10%	1,221.00	Albania	30.5	101.9
-	Zimbabwe	0.09%	9.5	S Lanka	28.4	532.7
-	S Lanka	0.08%	15.4	Indonesia	27	5,499.90
-	Nepal	0.08%	16	India	22	21,538.00
-	Bangladesh	0.08%	90	Pakistan	19.4	2,549.80
-	Nigeria	0.06%	63.3	Zimbabwe	17.3	201.6
-	Madagasca	0.06%	8.2	Senegal	15.5	140.1
	r					
-	Cameroon	0.06%	8.4	Yemen	13.4	221.9
-	Senegal	0.05%	4.4	Kenya	9.2	269.9
-	Pakistan	0.05%	63.4	Zambia	8.8	85.5
-	Oman	0.04%	0.9	Nepal	8.5	194
-	Mauritius	0.04%	0.5	Ghana	7.5	138.9
-	Zambia	0.03%	2.7	Cameroon	5.4	77.2
-	Yemen	0.02%	3.2	Mozambique	4	67.6
-	Kenya	0.02%	4.6	Nigeria	3.8	462.1
-	CAR	0.01%	0.4	Tanzania	3.8	121.9
-	Uganda	0.01%	2.5	Malawi	3.5	36.6
-	Tanzania	0.01%	3.6	Bangladesh	3	380.6
-	Mozambiq	0.01%	2.1	Madagascar	2.9	42.1
	ue					
-	Malawi	0.01%	0.8	Ethiopia	2.8	168.6
-	Ghana	0.01%	2.1	Uganda	2.8	57.9
-	Ethiopia	0.01%	6.5	CAR	2.7	9.5

4. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This review has illustrated the significant variations both between rich and poor countries and within the developing world itself in the variables that may affect the technological impact of TRIPS: domestic technical effort, imports of foreign technology and industrial performance. It has sought to put empirical flesh and bones on the intuition that different countries may face different outcomes by strengthening their IPR regimes, but without trying to measure what the costs and benefits might be. It has noted that costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, since the result depends on several complex factors, some of which are not open to assessment on the basis of past evidence. In a dynamic world, a certain amount of subjectivity – even crystal ball gazing – may be inevitable.

We concur with the World Bank (2001) that the application of TRIPS should take account of national economic and technological differences. The World Bank conducts a similar exercise to the one attempted here, and divides countries into three groups based only incomes – low, middle and high – and 'lists IPR standards that are likely to be most appropriate for each group' (p. 140). It suggests that even as it stands, TRIPS 'contains considerable flexibility in implementing and enforcing standards that are conducive to development' (139). It recommends that this flexibility be fully exploited to encourage development and allow longer periods for adjustment. This is certainly the right approach; we cannot, however, assess how far it should be taken and whether it will be sufficient to meet the technology development needs of poorer countries. It is quite possible that more action may be needed, calling for an examination of the TRIPS provisions *per se*.

For instance, investigation may focus on measuring, even roughly, the immediate effects of TRIPS in terms of the higher costs of technology and capital goods and the restriction of imitation and reverse engineering as a source of technological learning. It is also necessary to investigate the real impact of stricter IPRs on promoting technology inflows: cross-country econometric analysis is not the most reliable instrument for doing this. It may conceal more than it reveals, and it certainly does not show the strong inter-industry differences in the propensity to rely on IPRs for innovation or technology transfer. It also confuses the signalling effect of IPRs with that of other policies. If a positive effect of IPRs on technology transfer to the poorest segment of countries is actually found, it is important to assess if these gains outweigh, in present value terms, the more immediate costs.

If it is found, as is quite likely, that the present value of the benefits of TRIPS does not outweigh its costs for many poor countries, the other arguments for accepting TRIPS should be clearly stated. As noted, there may well be such arguments, but they should be presented clearly and not conflated with those based on economic benefits of stronger IPRs.

A final word of caution: it is not possible to pick the countries that will lose or gain from TRIPS from the above indices. Their use lies mainly in illustrating just how wide the differences are between developing countries in practically every aspect of technological and industrial performance. To the extent that there are theoretical grounds to expect the economic impact of TRIPS to vary on these grounds, the data provide some signposts for further investigation. They do not presume to do more.

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ANNEXES

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Annex Table 1: Technological classification of exports (SITC 3-digit, revision 2)

PRIMARY PRODUCTS	RESOURCE BASED	LOW TECHNOLOGY
(PP)	MANUFACTURES	MANUFACTURES

001 LIVE ANIMALS FOR FOOD **011 MEAT** FRESH, CHILLD, FROZEN 022 MILK AND CREAM 025 EGGS, BIRDS, FRESH, PRSR VD 034 FISH, FRESH, CHILLED, FR OZN 036 SHELL FISH FRESH, FROZEN 041 WHEAT ETC **UNMILLED** 042 RICE 043 BARLEY UNMILLED 044 MAIZE UNMILLED 045 CEREALS NES UNMILLED 054 VEG ETC FRSH, SMPLY PRSVD 057 FRUIT, NUTS, FRESH, DRIE D 071 COFFEE AND **SUBSTITUTES** 072 COCOA 074 TEA AND MATE 075 SPICES **081 FEEDING STUFF FOR** ANIMLS 091 MARGARINE AND **SHORTENING 121 TOBACCO** UNMNFCTRD,REFUSE 211 HIDES, SKINS, EXC FURS.RAW 212 FURSKINS, RAW **222 SEEDS** FOR'SOFT'FIXED OIL 223 SEEDS FOR OTH FIXED OILS 232 NATURAL RUBBER, GUMS 244 CORK,NATURAL,RAW,W ASTE 245 FUEL WOOD NES, CHARCOAL 246 PULPWOOD, CHIPS, WOOD WASTE 261 SILK 162 COTTON

RB 1: AGRO-BASED 012 MEAT DRIED,SALTED,SMOKED **014 MEAT** PREPD, PRSVD, NES ETC 023 BUTTER 024 CHEESE AND CURD 035 FISH SALTED, DRIED, SMOKED 037 FISH ETC PREPD, PRSVD NES 046 WHEAT ETC MEAL OR **FLOUR** 047 OTHER CEREAL MEALS, FLOUR 048 CEREAL ETC PREPARATIONS **056 VEGTBLES ETC** PRSVD, PREPD **058 FRUIT** PRESERVED.PREPARED 061 SUGAR AND HONEY 062 SUGAR CANDY NON-CHOCLATE 073 CHOCOLATE AND PRODUCTS 098 EDIBLE PRODCTS, PREPS NES 111 NON-ALCOHL **BEVERAGES NES 112 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES** 122 TOBACCO, MANUFACTUR ED 233 RUBBER,SYNTHTIC,RECL AIMD 247 OTH WOOD ROUGH, SQUARED 248 WOOD SHAPED, SLEEPERS 251 PULP AND WASTE PAPER 264 JUTE, OTH TEX BAST **FIBRES** 265 VEG FIBRE, EXCL **COTN.JUTE 269 WASTE OF TEXTILE** FABRICS 423 FIXED VEG OILS, SOFT 424 FIXED VEG OIL NONSOFT 431 PROCESD ANML VEG

LT1: TEXTILE, GARMENT AND FOOTWEAR

611 LEATHER **612 LEATHER ETC** MANUFACTURES 613 FUR SKINS TANNED, DRESSED **651 TEXTILE YARN** 652 COTTON FABRICS, WOVEN 654 OTH WOVEN TEXTILE FABRIC 655 KNITTED, ETC FABRICS 656 LACE, RIBBONS, TULLE, ET С 657 SPECIAL TXTL FABRC.PRODS 658 TEXTILE ARTICLES NES 659 FLOOR COVERINGS.ETC 831 TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS 842 MENS OUTERWEAR NOT KNIT 843 WOMENS OUTERWEAR NONKNIT 844 UNDER GARMENTS NOT KNIT 845 OUTERWEAR KNIT NONELASTC 846 UNDER GARMENTS **KNITTED** 847 TEXTILE CLTHNG ACCES NES 848 HEADGEAR, NONTXTL CLOTHNG 851 FOOTWEAR

LT2: OTHER PRODUCTS

642 PAPER,ETC,PRECUT,ARTS OF 665 GLASSWARE 666 POTTERY 673 IRON,STEEL SHAPES ETC 674 IRN,STL UNIV,PLATE,SHEET

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MEDUIM TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURES	MT 3: ENGINEERING	HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURES
MANUFACIUNES	711 STEAM BOILERS &	HT 1: ELECTRONIC AND
MT 1: AUTOMOTIVE	AUX PLNT	ELECTRICAL
781 PASS MOTOR VEH	713 INTRNL COMBUS	
EXC BUSES	PSTN ENGIN	716 ROTATING ELECTRIC
782 LORRIES,SPCL MTR	714 ENGINES AND	PLANT
VEH NES	MOTORS NES	718 OTH POWER
783 ROAD MOTOR	721 AGRIC MACHY,EXC	GENERATG MACHY
VEHICLES NES	TRACTORS	751 OFFICE MACHINES
784 MOTOR VEH	722 TRACTORS NON-	752 AUTOMTIC DATA
PRTS,ACCES NES	ROAD	PROC EQUIP
785 CYCLES,ETC MOTRZD	723 CIVIL ENGNEERG	759 OFFICE, ADP MCH
OR NOT	EQUIP ETC	PTS,ACCES
	724 TEXTILE,LEATHER MACHNRY	761 TELEVISION
MT 2: PROCESS	725 PAPER ETC MILL	RECEIVERS
266 SYNTHETIC FIBRES	MACHINERY	764 TELECOM
TO SPIN	726 PRINTG, BKBINDG	EQPT, PTS, ACC NES
267 OTHER MAN-MADE	MACHY,PTS	771 ELECTRIC POWER
FIBRES	727 FOOD MACHRY NON-	MACHY NES
512 ALCOHOLS, PHENOLS	DOMESTIC	774 ELECTRO-
ETC	728 OTH MACHY FOR	MEDCL,XRAY EQUIP
513 CARBOXYLIC ACIDS	SPCL INDUS	776 TRANSISTORS,
ETC	736 METALWORKING	VALVES, ETC.
533	MACH-TOOLS	778 ELECTRICAL
PIGMENTS,PAINTS,ETC	737 METALWORKING	MACHINERY NES
553	MACHNRY NES	
PERFUMERY,COSMETICS,	741 HEATING,COOLING	HT 2: OTHER
ETC 554 SOAP,CLEANSING	EQUIPMNT	
ETC PREPS	742 PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS	524 RADIOACTIVE ETC
562	ETC	MATERIAL
FERTILIZERS, MANUFACT	743 PUMPS	541 MEDICINAL,PHARM PRODUCTS
URED	NES,CENTRFUGES ETC	712 STEAM
572	744 MECHANICAL	ENGINES, TURBINES
EXPLOSIVES, PYROTECH	HANDLING EQU	792 AIRCRAFT ETC
PROD	745 NONELEC	871 OPTICAL
582 PROD OF	MACHY, TOOLS NES	INSTRUMENTS
CONDENSATION ETC	749 NONELEC MACH	874
583 POLYMERIZATION	PTS,ACC NES	MEASURNG,CONTROLNO
ETC PRODS	762 RADIO BROADCAST	INSTR
584 CELLULOSE	RECEIVRS	881 PHOTO
DERIVATIVS ETC	763 SOUND	APPARAT, EQUIPT NES
585 PLASTIC MATERIAL	RECORDRS, PHONOGRPH	
NES	772 SWITCHGEAR	
591	ETC, PARTS NES	
DESTICIDES DISINEECTA	773 ELECTR	
PESTICIDES, DISINFECTA	DISTRIBUTNIC EQUID	
NTS	DISTRIBUTNG EQUIP	
NTS 598 MISCEL CHEM	775 HOUSEHOLD TYPE	
NTS 598 MISCEL CHEM PRODUCTS NES	775 HOUSEHOLD TYPE EQUIP NES	
NTS 598 MISCEL CHEM PRODUCTS NES 653 WOVN MAN-MADE	775 HOUSEHOLD TYPE EQUIP NES 793 SHIPS AND BOATS	
NTS 598 MISCEL CHEM PRODUCTS NES 653 WOVN MAN-MADE FIB FABRIC	775 HOUSEHOLD TYPE EQUIP NES 793 SHIPS AND BOATS ETC	
NTS 598 MISCEL CHEM PRODUCTS NES 653 WOVN MAN-MADE	775 HOUSEHOLD TYPE EQUIP NES 793 SHIPS AND BOATS	

Note: Excludes 'special transactions' like electric current, cinema film, printed matter, special transactions, gold, works of art, coins, pets.