

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

CHINA'S EXPERIENCE UNDER THE MULTIFIBER ARRANGEMENT (MFA)  
AND THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING (ATC)

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Working Paper 13346  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w13346>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
1050 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
August 2007

Special thanks to Ronald Foote of the U.S. Census Bureau and Ross Arnold and Keith Daly of the U.S. Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). We thank Judy Dean, Rob Feenstra, Joseph Francois and James Harrigan for helpful comments and suggestions. Excellent research assistance was provided by Matthew Flagg and Rocky Huarng. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0241474. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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NBER Working Paper No. 13346

August 2007, Revised February 2009

JEL No. F1,F13,F15

**ABSTRACT**

This paper analyzes China's experience under U.S. apparel and textile quotas. It makes use of a unique new database that tracks U.S. trading partners' performance under the quota regimes established by the global Multifiber Arrangement (1974 to 1995) and subsequent Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (1995 to 2005). We find that China was relatively more constrained under these regimes than other countries and that, as quotas were lifted, China's exports grew disproportionately. When the ATC finally ended in 2005, China's exports surged while those from nearly all other regions fell.

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## 1. Introduction

On January 1, 2005, restrictions on the fourth and final set of textile and clothing products regulated by the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), the successor of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), were removed. The gradual expiration of these quotas starting in 1995 ended decades of bilateral non-tariff-barrier protection in this industry and set the stage for a substantial reallocation of production and exports across countries. Though many analysts expected China's share of the United States' textile and clothing (T&C) imports to rise when the ATC expired in 2005, predictions varied widely.<sup>1</sup> In fact, China's overall T&C export quantities to the U.S. increased 39 percent in 2005, with exports of goods whose quotas were relaxed in the beginning of that year jumping 270 percent.

This paper uses a new dataset of U.S. import quotas to examine China's relative performance in the U.S. market under the ATC. Our analysis reveals that China's T&C exports to the U.S. were relatively restrained along three dimensions. First, China's quotas were more likely to be binding than the quotas imposed on other countries. Second, China's quotas grew at a slower rate than the quotas of most other countries. Finally, the U.S. appears to have placed relatively greater restrictions on China's ability to shift quota allocations across different categories of goods or across years.

China's rapid increase in U.S. market share as quotas were relaxed came at the expense of both domestic manufacturers and the United States' other trading partners. We show that T&C exports from virtually all countries decreased in 2005, and that for some regions, e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa, these declines represented an abrupt reversal of several years of previously robust T&C export growth. These reversals suggest that, over time, the MFA and ATC had evolved from a regime intended to protect domestic U.S. manufacturers into one which also guaranteed smaller developing countries access to the U.S. market. Among developing countries, only those from South Asia managed to defend market share in the face of substantial Chinese growth, but even South Asia's response was not uniform across products.

T&C quotas under the ATC were relaxed in four phases. Though China's response to the final phase of reductions was dramatic, it was predictable given China's reaction to earlier quota relaxations, particularly when one focuses on goods for which China's quotas were binding. China, being outside the WTO, was ineligible for the first two phases of quota reductions in 1995 and 1998. After joining the WTO in December 2001, its quotas on these goods, as well as its quotas on Phase III goods, were lifted simultaneously in January 2002.

The four panels of Figure 1 trace out China's U.S. exports of T&C goods according to

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<sup>1</sup>For example, the computational general equilibrium (CGE) study by Rivera et al (2003) predicted that China's textile and apparel exports would increase between 8 and 104 percent, respectively, following the elimination of quotas in developed countries. Nordas (2004) predicted that China's post-MFA/ATC textile and clothing market share in the U.S. would increase by 7 and 34 percentage points, respectively. Diao and Somwaru (2001) estimated a more moderate growth of 6 percent in Chinese T&C exports to the world.

the phase in which quotas were relaxed. *Solid* lines track the evolution of total exports, while *dashed* lines report China's exports in goods whose quotas were binding the year before removal. The vertical line in each panel notes the year in which China's quotas in each set of goods were relaxed. As indicated in the figure, China's exports of Phase I and II goods increased relatively modestly after quota removal (42 and 32 percent, respectively) compared with Phase III and Phase IV goods (305 and 271 percent, respectively). China's response in previously bound goods, by contrast, was substantially larger across the three Phases – II, III and IV – in which goods faced binding quotas, increasing 825, 322 and 330 percent, respectively. As we document below, China's Phase IV growth in 2005 appears to have had an especially large and negative impact on nearly all regions' exports that year.

Examination of export price changes under the ATC suggests a reallocation of exports within as well as across countries as quotas were relaxed. We find quota removal to be accompanied by large declines in export unit values across all U.S. trading partners. In the final phase, China's unit values in unbound versus bound products fell 31 and 41 percent, respectively. These declines, as well, were anticipated by previous phases of liberalization. Consistent with models of quality upgrading in response to quantitative restrictions, we also document evidence of relative quality downgrading within China's Phase IV products as their quotas were lifted.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly summarize the MFA and ATC regimes. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the contents of the U.S. MFA/ATC database constructed for this paper. Sections 4 and 5 examines countries quantity and unit value responses to quota relaxation. Section 7 concludes.

## 2. The MFA and the ATC

The Multifiber Arrangement grew out of a series of voluntary export restraints imposed, initially, by the United States on Japanese textile exports in 1955. By the end up the 1950s, the United Kingdom also began to limit imports from Hong Kong, India and Pakistan (Spinanger, 1999). Quotas on cotton textiles and apparel products were first institutionalized with the Short Term Arrangement in 1961, which was extended to two subsequent Long Term Arrangements throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. As the Asian economies' textile and apparel production continued to grow, developed countries sought a more systematic mechanism to deal with "market disruptions" in other fiber markets. This search lead to the signing of the Multifiber Arrangement, in 1974, which, although "temporary" at first, ultimately lead to an additional 30 years of protection. As a result of the MFA, T&C products were kept out of multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization

(WTO).<sup>2</sup>

A major development of the Uruguay Round was the signing of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) in 1994. The ATC ended the MFA and began the process of integrating textile and clothing products into GATT/WTO rules by removing their quotas. Integration occurred over the four phases outlined in Table 1. During each phase, importing countries were to integrate a portion of all T&C products covered by the ATC. The particular products integrated in each phase importing-country specific but subject to two rules. First, the products retired in each phase had to include goods from all four major textile and clothing segments, i.e., Yarn, Fabrics, Made-Up textile products (e.g., table linen, carpets and curtains), and Clothing. Second, the chosen products had to represent a set portion of each country's 1990 T&C imports, by volume. In Phase I, which began on January 1, 1995, countries had to integrate products representing 16 percent of their 1990 import volumes. An additional 17 and 18 percent of 1990 export volumes were integrated at the beginning of Phases II and III on January 1, 1998 and January 1, 2002, respectively. Finally, on January 1, 2005, Phase IV of the ATC culminated in the integration of the remaining 49 percent of export volumes and all quotas were abolished.

Perhaps unsurprisingly given countries' ability to choose which quotas to retire in each phase, quotas removed during the first two phases of the ATC were in general not very painful for producers in developed countries. In the United States, ATC products accounted for 17.1 billion square meter equivalents (SME) worth of imports in 1990.<sup>3</sup> However, U.S. imports of products actually subject to quotas in that year totalled just 12.2 billion SMEs (USITC, 2004). As a result, the U.S. found it relatively easy to defer removal of quotas on "sensitive" products until the third phase. Products such as tents and life jackets, for example, were included in the ATC but had not been subject to U.S. import quotas. The United States integrated these products in the first phase. As indicated in the final column of Table 1, the United States retired a total of 4,875 ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) product codes across the four phases, of which 62 percent were retired in 2005. In this paper, these HS codes are our definition of the set of T&C products imported by the United States and governed by the ATC.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to gradually removing quotas, the ATC improved developing countries' access to developed-country markets by accelerating quota growth over the four phases of quota removal. These changes were governed by what is referred to as the ATC's "growth-on-growth" provision and are summarized in the third column of Table 1. At the beginning of Phase I, existing quota growth rates were accelerated 16 percent per year, while they

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<sup>2</sup>For a more extensive discussions of the road to the ATC, see Spinanger (1999) and Francois and Worz (2006).

<sup>3</sup>Product quotas under the MFA and ATC were set in terms of square meter equivalents (SME), with each product having an explicit "conversion factor" to determine the SME of their native units (e.g., pairs of socks). Examples of SME are provided in Table 4.

<sup>4</sup>We are grateful to Keith Daly at OTEXA for providing us with this list.

were accelerated by 25 and 27 percent in Phases II and III, respectively. A group with a base quota growth rate of 6 percent in 1994, for example, would grow at 6.96 percent ( $0.06 \times 1.16$ ) per year during Phase I, 8.7 percent ( $0.0696 \times 1.25$ ) per year over Phase II, and 11.05 ( $0.087 \times 1.27$ ) percent per year during Phase III.<sup>5</sup>

China's exclusion from the WTO prior to 2001 rendered it ineligible for ATC integration benefits during its first two phases. After China was admitted formally into the WTO on December 11, 2001, the United States removed its quotas on China's Phase I and II imports simultaneously with the quotas on its Phase III goods on the scheduled Phase III removal date, i.e., January 1, 2002. After WTO accession, China also received growth rate increases consistent with the ATC.<sup>6</sup>

As part of its entry into the WTO, China agreed to special safeguard provisions, subject to "consultations," that would limit its exports to countries experiencing market disruptions after the ATC was phased out. Under the guidelines governing China's accession into the WTO, WTO members could enter negotiations for new safeguards on Chinese products provided those countries could show evidence of the existence or threat of a market disruption and a role for Chinese goods in that disruption (WTO 2001). The safeguard provision is applicable until December 31, 2008.<sup>7</sup>

When quotas on the final set of products expired on January 1, 2005, domestic textile and apparel industry groups successfully lobbied for new safeguards against China on 22 MFA groups of products, and they remain effective until the end of 2008. However, the U.S. and China reached a memorandum of understanding that the U.S. would "exercise restraint" on additional safeguards. Table 2 lists the quota levels that are operative until 2008.

### 3. The U.S. MFA/ATC Database

This section describes our construction of the U.S. MFA/ATC database and summarizes its contents. The database is assembled from U.S. trading partners' Expired Performance Reports, which were used by the U.S. Office of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA) to monitor trading partners' compliance with the MFA and ATC quotas. Generously provided by Ron Foote of the U.S. Census Bureau, they document imports, base quotas and quota adjustments (defined below) by groups of products (referred to as "MFA groups") and year for all countries with which the United States negotiated bilateral quota arrangements. The

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<sup>5</sup>Quota growth acceleration was advanced one phase for countries with less than 1.2 percent of the importing country's total quotas in 1991.

<sup>6</sup>China's growth rates were increased by 27 percent plus an additional pro-rated increase to account for its 3 weeks of WTO membership in 2001 (USITC, 2004).

<sup>7</sup>For additional details regarding the post-ATC Chinese safeguards, see Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda (2007).

database covers 1984 to 2004.<sup>8</sup>

Between 1984 and 2004 the U.S. signed bilateral MFA/ATC agreements with the 71 countries listed in Table 3. Seven of these countries—Barbados, Canada, Lebanon, Pacific Islands, Portugal, Spain and Trinidad and Tobago—were not subject to what is known as “specific limits,” the most restrictive quota classification and the focus of our analysis (see discussion below). The details of an agreement were negotiated over an “agreement term” which typically lasted several “agreement periods.” For most countries, an agreement period corresponded to a full calendar year.<sup>9</sup> The United States negotiated quotas on 149 three-digit MFA specific-limit groups; on average, each group contains 17 HS products. The MFA groups span four T&C “segments:” Yarn, Fabric, Made-Ups and Clothing. Examples of MFA groups in each segment are provided in Table 4.

Quotas were negotiated on individual MFA groups as well as on both aggregations and subsets of groups, which are known as “merged” and “part” groups, respectively. As a result, country-year-group observations in the database actually encompass a mixture of groups, merged groups and part groups. For simplicity, we refer to all of these observations as being at the “group” level for the remainder of the paper.

The negotiated quota for any particular group is stated in terms of square meter equivalents (SME) of fabric. To pool potentially diverse groups with different native units—e.g., pairs of gloves and dozens of shirts—the ATC established “conversion factors” to concord native units into square meter equivalents. These conversion factors are used to aggregate base quotas and import levels and to provide a means of shifting quotas across groups with different units (e.g., shirts to socks).

The Expired Performance Reports refer to nine possible classifications of negotiated quantities. In this paper, we focus exclusively on “specific limit” quotas, which, according to OTEXA, were the most restrictive quotas used under the MFA/ATC. The other classifications are designated consultation levels, minimum consultation levels, other groups, restraint limits, guaranteed access levels, designated consultation provisions, agreed limits and tariff preference levels. Several of these designations are not actually quotas, but rather served as watch lists. Their application is noted in the MFA/ATC Database.<sup>10</sup>

Specific quotas grew at fixed, known rates over an agreement term. Overall, they grew

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<sup>8</sup>Data for 1986 are missing. Refinement of the raw data is discussed in a technical Appendix available from the authors on request.

<sup>9</sup>For some countries, including Brazil, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the agreement period in early years covered overlapping calendar years. All periods were standardized to match the calendar year under the ATC.

<sup>10</sup>For some countries, there was another layer of quotas known as “aggregate group limits.” A specific limit was a group-specific quota while the group limit imposed an aggregate quota over several MFA groups. A group could therefore be bound by a specific limit (individual, merged or part), subject to an aggregate specific limit, or both. One potential explanation for aggregate limits is that it limited the use of flexibilities across MFA groups (see below). We ignore these aggregate limits in this paper but they are available in the MFA/ATC Database.

an average of 6 percent per year, but growth varied across countries and groups. China, for example, faced annual specific quota growth rates of 1 to 2 percent, and wool products experienced slower growth than cotton goods.<sup>11</sup>

The U.S. MFA/ATC Database records the “base” quota, the “adjusted base” quota and the total exports for each specific limit by country and year. The base quota is the originally negotiated quota level determined at the start of an agreement term. Adjusted base quotas reflect the use of what are known as “flexibilities,” which allowed countries to exceed their base quota in a given period by borrowing unused base quota, up to a specified percentage of the receiving group, across groups within a year and across years within a group. Countries could apply multiple flexibilities on a group and the adjustments had to be met by corresponding offsets in the lending groups.

There were three major flexibilities:

1. *Carryforward and carryforward-used*: A carryforward allowed countries to borrow base quota from the subsequent period within a group. A carryforward-used offset a carryforward. For example, in 1997 Macau carried forward 20,419 SME in group 338 (“Men/boys knit shirts”). The flexibility was then offset in 1998, under a carryforward-used, by -20,419 SME. Borrowing was subject to a country-product specific limit.
2. *Carryover and shortfall-used*: A carryover utilized unused quota from the previous period within a group, subject to a country-product specific maximum. A shortfall-used offset a carryover.
3. *Shift-add, shift-subtract, swing*: Shift-add, shift-subtract, and swings allowed across-group base movements within a year, subject to limits.

After accounting for all flexibilities, the adjusted base quota for a given year reflects the country-group deviation in that year from the original base quota. For example, China’s 2002 base quota for group 219 (“duck fabric”) was 2.6 million SME. China made two adjustments on this group that year. First, it borrowed 2 percent from the previous year’s unused quota (carryover). Second, it added 5 percent of its original base quota from another group (swing). These adjustments resulted in an adjusted base quota of 2.8 million SME for group 219 in 2002. If a country made no adjustment on a group, the adjusted base quota simply remained at the base quota.

Table 5 compares countries’ aggregate adjusted base quotas and exports across all groups from 1984 to 2004. Results are reported for the thirty countries with the largest aggregate

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<sup>11</sup>We include only specific-limit groups in our examination of fill rates below. In our regression analysis, non-specific limit groups are treated as unbound; the regressions include all T&C HS codes from all T&C exporters.



adjusted base quotas. As indicated in the first two columns of the table, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong exhibit the highest levels of both adjusted base quota and exports between 1984 and 2004. The final column of Table 5 reports countries' aggregate "fill rates," which equal exports as a percentage of adjusted base quota. Although adjusted base quotas can exceed base quotas, fill rates cannot exceed 100 because they are defined as exports over adjusted base. As indicated in the table, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka all exhibit aggregate fill rates in excess of 80 percent over the sample period. Countries with relatively low fill rates include Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia and Honduras.

Fill rates provide a useful indication of quota restrictiveness. We follow the USITC (and Evans and Harrigan 2005) in defining a binding quota as one in which the fill rate exceeds 90 percent. Here, too, results are reported for the thirty countries with the largest base quota. As indicated in Table 6, Bangladesh, India and China exhibited the largest share of binding quotas over the sample period, in each case above 60 percent. We note that using a more liberal or conservative definition for binding quotas, that is, fill rates of 80 and 95 percent, respectively, does not result in any substantial re-ranking of counties in terms of which are most constrained over the sample period.

Interestingly, we find that less than 30 percent of the quotas were binding for other major developing East Asian economies such as South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Thus, even though these countries were subject to a relatively large fraction of specific limits (see Table 7), these limits appear to have been relatively weak. This outcome may be driven in part by these countries' relatively fast movement into more sophisticated manufactures over the sample period. Indeed, we show in the next section that the share of East Asian observations with binding quotas diminishes over time.

Heterogeneity in fill rates is also apparent across MFA groups. Table 8 reports aggregate fill rates for the ten largest MFA groups. Trousers and knit shirts are the most constrained groups, with exporters filling more than 80 percent of the allocated quota. Textile groups such as cotton sheeting fabric and cotton poplin exhibited fill rates around 50 percent. The database reveals that the (weighted) average fill rate across all years and exporters for textile groups was only 48 percent compared to 72 percent for apparel groups. These fill rates are consistent with research showing that developed countries apply greater protection to industries where escaping competition from developing countries is harder. Khandelwal (2007), for example, argues that it is harder for developed economies to differentiate their products in terms of quality in apparel versus textiles.

Table 8 also shows that while there is heterogeneity in aggregate fill rates across products, China's fill rates exhibited substantially less variation: in all but one of the ten groups, China's fill rates exceeded 90 percent. Columns three and four report Bangladesh's and India's fill rates in the major groups. Although Bangladesh was bound in the apparel groups, the U.S. did not impose specific limits on Bangladesh in the major textile groups, even

though Bangladesh exported these products (with the exception of cotton yarns (300/301)). India's fill rates varied widely in the ten groups and was not subject to quotas for underwear, man-made fiber knit shirts and man-made fiber sweaters.

#### 4. The Relative Restrictiveness of U.S. T&C Quotas

In this section we demonstrate the relative restrictiveness of China's quotas in terms of the number of goods subject to quotas, how quickly quotas were allowed to grow and the extent to which China was allowed to shift quota allocations across products and time.

##### 4.1. Quota Coverage, Fill Rates and ETEs

The share of a country's MFA groups that are covered by specific limits provides one measure of cross-country variation in quota restrictiveness. Table 7 reports these shares for the major T&C exporters in the pooled 1990 to 2004 dataset.<sup>12</sup> As indicated in the table, China, at 61 percent, exhibits the highest share of exports covered by specific limits between 1990 and 2004. Shares for other large Asian exporters are 53 percent for Korea, 51 percent for Taiwan and 46 percent for Hong Kong. By comparison, just 20 percent of India's MFA groups were subject to specific limits.

Fill rates, discussed above, are a second measure of quota restrictiveness. As reported in Table 5, many countries, particularly those in South Asia, exhibited aggregate fill rates over the pooled sample period that are similar to those experienced by China. Fill rates, however, varied substantially over time, as can be seen in Figure 2, which reports the distribution of fill rates for China and three regions—East/Southeast (E/SE) Asia, South Asia and the rest-of-world (ROW)—which, together, comprise all other countries in the sample.<sup>13</sup> Distributions are reported for three cross-sections, 1985, 1995 and 2004. Each row and column of the figure contains histograms for a different year and region, respectively. In each histogram, the last bin reports the share of binding quotas (i.e., those with fill rates exceeding 90 percent). As indicated in the last three columns of the figure, countries in East/Southeast Asia, South Asia and ROW experienced more-or-less steady declines in binding quotas over the two decades. East/Southeast Asia's binding quotas, for example, drop from 60 percent in 1985 to less than 20 percent in 2004, while the fraction for South Asia decline from 60 and 70 percent in 1985 and 1995, respectively, to 30 percent in 2004.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup>We match the quota data to U.S. import data using a concordance HS-MFA group concordance provided by OTEXA. We have not yet processed the concordance mapping MFA groups to the Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (TSUSA) which would allow an analysis of U.S. T&C imports for earlier years.

<sup>13</sup>The East/Southeast Asian countries are: Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Laos, Macau, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. The South Asian countries are: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

<sup>14</sup>The distributions reported in Figure 2 exclude phased-out MFA groups, i.e., the figure displays the distributions of fill rates among quotas still applied to the countries.

China's distribution of fill rates, on the other hand, remained essentially constant over the sample period. This evidence suggest that China's T&C exports to the U.S. remained relatively constrained throughout the MFA and ATC. China's fraction of binding quotas, coupled with the relatively high extensive-margin constraint described above, provide the first two pieces of evidence that China faced a tighter quota regime compared to other countries.

Andriamananjara et al. (2004) argue that the price wedge created by the quota rents is a better measure of how tightly a quota binds than its fill rate.<sup>15</sup> The origin of these price wedges and the degree to which they can be observed varies by country. While some countries, such as Hong Kong, created secondary markets to freely trade license permits, others allocated licenses based on various criteria. China's quotas, for example, were managed by its Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). MOFTEC auctioned off only a small share of the quotas available under the MFA. The rest were distributed to firms according measures of past performace including: their ability to fill at least 90 percent of their previous quotas; their ability to export other products not subject to constraints; and their ability to improve the quality of their exports (Yang, 1995).

One way to measure the price wedge created by quota rents is to compute quotas' export tax equivalents (ETEs). Under a perfectly competitive T&C market, the export tax equivalent of a quota depends on the prices of quota licenses,

$$ETE_{cmt} = \frac{l_{cmt}}{uv_{cmt} - l_{cmt}}, \quad (1)$$

where  $l_{cmt}$  is the license price paid by the firm in country  $c$  in order to export products in MFA group  $m$  at time  $t$  (measured in dollars per SME) and  $uv_{cmt}$  is the free on board unit value.

We find that fill rates and estimated ETE's are roughly consistent in indicating the extent to which China's exports face a binding quota. Using data on Chinese export license prices available for a subset of MFA groups from 1999 to 2004, we compute the export tax equivalents of U.S. import quotas on Chinese products for these groups.<sup>16</sup> As indicated in Table 9, which summarizes the results of regressing the log of ETE on MFA group fill rates as well as year fixed effects, fill rates and ETEs are positively correlated. The estimated coefficient is 2.1 and highly significant; it implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the fill rate is associated with a 21 percent rise in the ETE. Column two reports an analogous regression but includes MFA group fixed effects and therefore relies solely on variation within groups to identify the correlation coefficient. As indicated in the table,

<sup>15</sup>In countries where export licenses are used to ensure quota adherence, for example, quotas could be binding even if fill rates are low due to insufficient or mis-allocation of licenses. According to Andriamananjara et al. (2004), the internal license allocation regime was inefficient and expensive in many countries.

<sup>16</sup>Data on Chinese export license prices is available at [www.chinaquota.com](http://www.chinaquota.com). Unfortunately, similar data is not available for all countries in our sample.

the estimated coefficient is 1.4. These relationships are intuitive: one would expect that firms pay higher license prices for products in which capacity to export is tighter. While license price data is only available for China in select years and MFA groups, we interpret these results as providing support for our and others' use of fill rates as a gauge of quota restrictiveness.

Our results regarding the relative restrictiveness of U.S. import quotas on China compared to its other trading partners are consistent with the more detailed inquiry of Francois and Worz (2006), who estimate ETEs in a gravity-based econometric model that does not require observation of license prices. They find that China's ETEs increased non-linearly under the ATC and estimate China's ETEs in 2002 at 8 percent and 67 percent for Chinese textiles and apparel, respectively. By comparison, they estimate India's ETEs at only 2 percent for textiles and 5 percent for apparel.

#### *4.2. Quota Growth Rates*

The evolution of countries' fill rates over time implies that quota growth exceeded export growth for all regions except China. Figure 3 traces out the median year-over-year growth in base quota for the four regions over the sample period. For East/Southeast Asia, South Asia and ROW, the step increases in base quota growth rates match the ATC growth-on-growth provision described in Table 1 above. Annual growth for ROW, for example, increased by 16 percent (from 6.00 to 6.96 percent) at the beginning of Phase 1, by 25 percent (to 8.7 percent) at the beginning of Phase II, and by an additional 27 percent (to 11.05 percent) at the beginning of Phase III. The step functions for East and South Asia exhibit identical increases.

China's trajectory of base quota growth, in contrast, is essentially flat. Prior to the ATC, China's growth was roughly equal to that for East/Southeast Asian countries, but in 1994, China's base quota growth was frozen (set to zero). China became eligible for the growth-on-growth provision in 2002, after entry into the WTO, and its median growth rate ticked up slightly, but the magnitude of the increase was small given China's low growth rate. China's overall base growth rate was much lower than the rest of the world for the remainder of the ATC. This restrictiveness also varied across MFA groups. For example, the U.S. imposed slower quota growth for wool products (1 percent for all region in 1995), but even lower growth in these products for China (0.5 percent) overall growth.

#### *4.3. Flexibilities*

The restrictiveness of the U.S. quota regime can also be measured in terms of countries' ability to adjust their base quotas over time. As discussed above, the MFA/ATC agreements granted trading partners limited flexibility to borrow and lend quotas across groups and years in response to demand and supply shocks. To our knowledge, use of flexibilities

has received little attention in the literature. In this section, we examine both the use of flexibilities as well as their intensity, conditional on use. We find that China's adjustments to its base quotas were more frequent and smaller than those of other countries.

Table 10 demonstrates that China made relatively greater use of flexibilities in terms of frequency than many countries between 1984 and 2004. During this period, China made an adjustment to 92 percent of its quotas. Indeed, a striking feature of the data is that China made at least one adjustment to every quota group between 2000 and 2004.

One potential explanation for China's relatively frequent adjustments is that it faced more restrictive caps on its ability to reallocate quotas across groups and time. If flexibility caps were small, a desired increase in one group might involve more transfers across groups or years than if the caps were large. Unfortunately, the Expired Performance Reports do not provide comprehensive information on countries' flexibility limits over the entire sample period.<sup>17</sup> Details available for 1997, however, indicate that China was allowed across-group shifts up to a maximum of 5 percent of the receiving group's base quota and across-time movements of up to 3 percent. Bangladesh and Jamaica, by contrast, were permitted shifts of up to 7 percent across groups and 11 percent across time.

While some countries, notably India and Bangladesh, also made frequent use of the flexibility provisions, among these countries, China faced relatively tighter "flexibility margins" across groups. We define these margins to be the absolute percentage deviation of the adjusted base from the original base for a particular country, group and year. They are computed across all groups in which adjustments are observed. China's median margin, at 5 percent, is the lowest among countries that made adjustments on at least 80 percent of its quota groups. China's margin was also about half the level exhibited by India and Bangladesh.

Another potential explanation for China's greater use of flexibilities was the relative restrictiveness of its quotas. Given the relatively high number of products bound by quotas, their relatively high fill rates, and their relatively low annual growth rates, frequent adjustments to its base levels may have been necessary to respond to given demand or supply shocks.<sup>18</sup> Countries relatively less constrained by their quota levels and growth rates, by contrast, would have more room to respond without making as many adjustments. Moreover, China's was limited in its ability to shift quotas to respond to these shocks. Though we do not pursue this topic here, it is likely that data on countries' flexibility limits and usage under the MFA/ATC could be used to help construct and calibrate a model of optimal quota borrowing and lending.

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<sup>17</sup>Flexibilities were capped at an amount determined by the country's bilateral agreement. Unfortunately, we do not have these details for all agreements in the database.

<sup>18</sup>Indeed, Francois and Worz (2006) find that China's ETEs spiked to 25 and 112 percent for textiles and apparel, respectively, in 2004, when China no longer had the ability to carry forward additional quota levels because of imminent end of the MFA/ATC regime.

## 5. Quantity Responses to ATC Phase-Outs

In this section, we examine China and other countries' export quantity responses to the ATC phaseouts. We show that countries' export growth occurred primarily in incumbent products, that it varied according to the relative restrictiveness of China's quotas, and that China's export surge in 2005 had ample precedent in prior phases of quota liberalization.

### 5.1. Overview

Figure 4 provides an overview of U.S. T&C consumption from 1990 to 2006 according to whether goods were sourced from domestic manufacturers, China, or other U.S. trading partners (ROW).<sup>19</sup> As indicated in the figure, the contribution of domestic producers and other trading partners rose more-or-less steadily through the 1990s. China's exports, on the other hand, remained relatively flat for the reasons outlined above until 2001. After 2001, China's exports surge, other trading partners' exports begin to level off and U.S. production starts a long-run decline. Between 2000 and 2006, China's total T&C exports increased almost six-fold from 4.3 billion to 25 billion SME.

To gain a better sense of the potential impact of China's reaction to quota relaxation on other regions' exports, Figure 5 plots the evolution of export quantities by region between 2000 and 2006. Several regions' exports—e.g., North America, the Caribbean and Oceania—end this period lower than they started, with losses for some (e.g., Oceania) being deeper than others. Other regions experienced reversals of robust export growth during the period. Central America's long-running increase in T&C exports between 2000 and 2005, for example, declined precipitously in 2006. The importance of this reversal is underscored by the fact that T&C goods accounted for roughly three quarters of Central America's total manufacturing exports to the U.S. in 2004. Similar reversals were experienced by South America, the former Soviet Union, East Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. For each of these regions, T&C exports in 2006 were lower than their maximum between 2000 and 2005. South and Southeast Asia, and, although a bit more erratic, the E.U. and North Africa, were the only regions to experience steady export growth between 2000 and 2006.

In the remainder of this section, we provide a more formal assessment of China's impact on other U.S. trading partners T&C exports to the United States.

### 5.2. Intensive vs Extensive Margin Export Growth as Quotas are Removed

Export growth in response to quota relaxation has two potential sources. The first is net growth within countries' continuing products, i.e., along their "intensive" margin.

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<sup>19</sup>U.S. production figures are taken from a report of U.S. T&C production published quarterly by OTEXA (OTEXA, 2007). This publication states that exports at the MFA group level are unreliable, so we set exports to zero to calculate the domestic market size.

The second is net growth due to adding new products or dropping previously exported products, i.e., along their “extensive” margin.<sup>20</sup> *A priori*, it is not obvious which margin will dominate; depending upon assumptions, shifting resources into additional product lines may be more profitable than increasing the capacity of existing product lines.

Table 11 decomposes countries’ aggregate export quantity growth in percentage terms in the year following each phase of ATC integration. We document export patterns by ATC integration to emphasize the similarities in exporting behavior across each integration stage. Except for China, responses are reported by region. The first column for each phase notes regions’ aggregate growth, while the subsequent two columns decompose this aggregate growth into the parts due to countries’ intensive and extensive margins. Each panel reports the change in quantities in the year of integration for each phase. That is, panel one reports growth in 1995, panel two in 1998, and so on. Since China became eligible for Phase I and II integration in 2002, the bottom row reports China’s response in this year for those phases. As indicated in Table, export growth coinciding with Chinese quota relaxation primarily occurs through the intensive margin. For China, the intensive margin represents more than 90 percent of growth in Phases I, III and IV, and two-thirds of growth in Phase II. Across all other U.S. trading partners, the intensive margin represented the more important margin of adjustment in Phases II-IV.

Table 11 also provides an initial view of the contemporaneous response of China’s export growth following each integration phase. China’s overall response in the year of each phase-out was 42, 32, 306 and 271 percent for Phases I to IV, respectively. We note that China’s Phase III increase accounted for 71 percent of the total increase in Phase III exports in 2002 (i.e., 22 of 31 percentage points). In 2005, aggregate exports from all countries excluding China actually *fell* 2 percent, a signal that China’s impact on other U.S. trading partners was potentially large in this final phase.

### 5.3. Reactions to Relaxation of China’s Quotas

Other U.S. trading partners’ reaction to the relaxation of China’s quotas varied according to their relative restrictiveness. As noted above, we classify China’s quotas in the year prior to each phase as being binding if they exhibit a fill rate in excess of 90 percent.<sup>21</sup> To estimate the differential growth associated with relaxation of bound and unbound quotas, we regress the change in country-products’ export quantity on region-year dummies interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether China’s quota was previously binding,<sup>22</sup>

$$\Delta \ln q_{crt} = \beta_{1rt} \text{ChinaBound}_{h,t-1} + \beta_{2rt} \text{ChinaUnbound}_{h,t-1} + \nu_{crt} \quad (2)$$

<sup>20</sup> As noted earlier, the United States imposed quotas at the level of three-digit MFA groups. These groups contain a median of 19 HS products.

<sup>21</sup> Results do not change when we perturb this cutoff.

<sup>22</sup> Because fill rates are available at the MFA group level, we attribute group-level fill rates to all HS products in the group.

where  $\Delta \ln q_{crt}$  is the change in export quantity of country  $c$  in region  $r$  in HS product  $h$  between years  $t$  and  $t+1$  and  $\beta_{1rt}$  and  $\beta_{2rt}$  are region-year dummies. These region-year dummies are interacted with  $ChinaBound_{h,t-1}$ , a dummy variable which equals unity if China's quota in product  $h$  in year  $t-1$  had a fill rate exceeding 90 percent, and  $ChinaUnbound_{h,t-1}$ , is a dummy variable which equals one if China was not subject to a binding quota. *Vis a vis* the aggregate growth pattern displayed in Table 11, this regression differences out the country-product fixed effects.  $\beta_{1rt}$  and  $\beta_{2rt}$  therefore identify the average quantity change across countries in region  $r$  within country-products in which China faced binding and non-binding quotas, respectively.<sup>23</sup> We focus here on other countries' responses in goods in which China faced non-binding and binding quotas to gain insight into how these regions were influenced by China. Toward that end, the coefficients we report for Phases I to III are for 2002; for Phase IV, we report coefficients for 2005. In line with the results of Table 11, equation 2 concentrates on countries' reactions along the intensive margin.

Table 12 reports OLS estimates for four separate estimations of equation (2), one for each phase of ATC integration. There are two columns for each phase: the first reports countries' average growth in products where China previously faced non-binding quotas ( $\beta_{2rt}$ ), while the second column reports countries' average growth in products where China previously faced binding quotas ( $\beta_{1rt}$ ).

Results for Phase I in the first panel of Table 12 contain all zeros in the binding column because none of China's quotas on Phase I products were binding in 2001.<sup>24</sup> The second panel reports the 2002 region-year fixed effects for Phase II products. Results in this column indicate that China averaged 153 percent ( $e^{0.93} - 1$ ) export growth in non-binding products and an incredible 855 percent ( $e^{2.26} - 1$ ) average increase in bound products. Note that the growth rates for Phase II are higher than the aggregate growth rate reported at the bottom of Table 11; this discrepancy is likely due to the fact that small products grew faster than the large products.<sup>25</sup> Results for East Asia and South Asia suggest that exports from these regions increased in products where China's quotas were not binding but declined in the products where China faced binding quotas. Results for Phase III show a similar result with respect to China's response, but more muted responses by other countries. China's exports in products subject to binding quotas increased 511 percent compared to 291 percent in unbound products.

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<sup>23</sup>We exclude the constant in this regression, and standard errors are clustered by exporting country.

<sup>24</sup>Phase I products were placed in the 9xx MFA groups which were a collection of products with which the U.S. was relatively unconcerned and therefore integrated early. The U.S. MFA/ATC Database does not have quota information for these MFA groups. We interpret the fact that this information is missing as evidence that goods in these groups were unconstrained by quotas and this fact was confirmed through correspondences with OTEXA.

<sup>25</sup>See Arkolakis (2007) for a model of market penetration implying that low-volume products grow faster than high-volume products as trade costs fall.



The point estimates for Phase IV are perhaps the most dramatic. Here, too, China's export quantity growth is significantly higher in its bound versus unbound products, 463 percent versus 261 percent. Response to Chinese growth are equally dramatic, with nine of fourteen regions experiencing negative and significant declines in China's bound products. These response contrast starkly with those associated with Phase III.

Variation in countries' reactions to the removal of Chinese quotas likely reflects differences in comparative advantage across T&C products. Though formal assessment of countries' elasticities of substitution with Chinese exports requires structural estimation beyond the scope of this chapter, the results in Table 12 can be used to provide a rough guide as to which countries were the biggest "losers" with respect to China. Toward that end, Table 13 reports the results of a Phase IV regression like that in equation 2 but at the country level. Countries are ordered according to their average response in China's previously bound products, with statistically significant responses in bold. Of the 143 countries in the table, average exports fell in 102 countries, and these drops were statistically significant for 54 countries. Statistically significant declines range from a low of 13 percent ( $e^{0.14} - 1$ ) for Italy to a high of more than 80 percent for Kuwait, Russia, the Maldives, Micronesia, Guinea and Oman. Remarkably, only *eight* countries exhibit an increase in exports. Three of the largest South Asian exporters – Bangladesh, India and Pakistan – report positive but statistically insignificant changes in exports. Though these countries fare much better than others, it is possible their export growth might have been much higher in the absence of robust Chinese growth.

Declines among Sub-Saharan African exporters may have been particularly economically significant. These countries experienced increasing T&C exports to the United States from 2000 to 2004 because of modifications made to the rules-of-origin requirements under AGOA; as shown in Figure 5, the region's T&C exports doubled between 2000 and 2004. These modifications—collectively referred to as the "Special Rule"—allowed countries to satisfy rules-of-origin requirements using fabric of any origin provided that the clothing assembly took place within the countries' borders. As discussed in Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda (2007), firms responded to the Special Rule by importing fabrics from Asian countries for assembly in Africa.<sup>26</sup> The Special Rule also led to substantial inward foreign direct investment as multinational firms located the final stages of production in Africa to "hop" over quotas (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2007). These responses contributed to a boom in Sub-Saharan T&C production, particularly in Madagascar, Lesotho and Swaziland. Between 2000 and 2004, for example, Lesotho's T&C exports to the United States nearly quadrupled, to \$455 million, as the number of T&C factories located in the country doubled from 21 to 47 (IMF 2007). In the year following the end of the ATC in 2005, however, Lesotho's

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<sup>26</sup>The following AGOA countries were not eligible for the Special Rule provision: Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa ([www.agao.gov](http://www.agao.gov)).

T&C production shrank considerably.<sup>27</sup> Both the value and quantity of its T&C exports to the United States fell 14 percent; in China's bound products, the average Lesotho export fell 43 percent. These declines were accompanied by a 30 percent fall in employment, to 35,000 workers, and one quarter of its production facilities being shuttered (IMF 2007).

The most plausible explanation for the sharp decline in Sub-Saharan T&C production following the end of the ATC (and, therefore, the end of the Special Rule's value) is that African production costs are prohibitive, either because relatively low wages are in fact relatively high in quality- or productivity-adjusted terms or because transport costs make multi-national production absent an extra inducement infeasible. Further research into the reasons behind this decline would be useful both for evaluating appropriate policy responses and for understanding the dynamics of Sub-Saharan African economies.

## 6. Price Responses to ATC Phaseouts

A second margin along which countries might react to the removal of import quotas is price. In this section we examine the evolution of the United States' T&C import free-on-board unit values (i.e., import value per SME) subsequent to each Phase of ATC integration. In contrast to the results reported above, we here focus on countries' unit value changes in response to their own, not China's, quota relaxations.

Table 14 reports the results of a regression similar to equation (2) but where the dependent variable is the log difference in unit value rather than export quantity, and where the binding dummy takes a value of one if the country-product was constrained in its country of origin the prior year. As a result, coefficient estimates are with respect to 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005 for Phases I through IV, respectively in the upper portion of the table. China's response to its Phase I and II good quota relaxations in the year in which those quotas were actually removed (i.e., 2002) are reported at the bottom of the table.

As indicated in Table 14, China's average unit values fell in the years that its products were integrated. Here, as above, responses varied according to whether or not China faced binding quotas. Unit value declines for exports previously restrained by China's binding quotas were larger in all integration phases. In 2002, Chinese unit values for bound Phase II products fell 55 percent ( $e^{-0.81} - 1$ ) versus 32 percent for unbound products. For Phase III and IV products, the declines for China were 48 versus 42 percent, and 41 versus 31 percent, respectively. More broadly, though unit value responses vary across phases, they are generally negative and significant for East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, and generally larger in bound products than unbound products.

One explanation for China's and other countries' unit value declines is simply that as quotas are relaxed, goods prices decline and firms slide down their demand curves as prices

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<sup>27</sup>As noted by Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda (2007), Sub-Saharan T&C exports in 2005 were also hurt by an appreciation of the South African Rand.

and quantities adjust to the previously unrealizable competitive outcome. Indeed, Francois and Worz (2006) estimate the export tax equivalent of Chinese quotas to be 25 percent for textiles and 110 percent for apparel in 2004. With the quotas removed, ETEs, by definition, fall to zero.

Declining prices might also accompany quota relaxation as a result of quality downgrading. It is well known in the international trade literature that firms facing quotas have an incentive to export higher-margin goods; see, for example, the theoretical research of Krishna (1987) and Das and Donnenfeld (1987) and the empirical studies of Aw and Roberts (1986) and Feenstra (1988). Evans and Harrigan (2005), for example, find that U.S. imports of products facing binding quotas exhibit a 6.3 percent price premium relative to unbound imports. Under the assumption that prices reflect only vertical product differentiation, the results reported in Table 14 provide *prima facie* evidence that China's T&C quality fell following the removal of quotas.

Quality upgrading in response to quantitative restrictions is possible through changes in demand or changes in supply-side characteristics. In the former, imposition of quota rents leads to identical markups across products which induce consumers to substitute towards higher-priced varieties. This effect is similar to Alchian and Allen's (1964) Washington apples story where higher-priced goods are shipped over greater distances to lower the per dollar transport costs (see also Hummels and Skiba 2004). Feenstra and Boorstein (1994) infer quality in this context by comparing a unit value index, which uses quantity weights, to an exact price index, which uses value weights: if the unit value index increases by more than the exact price index, consumption has shifted towards more expensive goods and average quality of goods from the restricted country increases. Using this method to study the affects of quota removal, Harrigan and Barrows (2007) find that the quality of China's bound products fell 7 percent more than its unbound products when quotas were removed in 2005.

Here, we complement Harrigan and Barrows (2007) by using an approach developed in Khandelwal (2007) to measure quality changes within countries' products. As discussed in detail in the Appendix, this approach uses a discrete choice demand system to infer country-product (i.e., variety) quality, relative to the average U.S. domestic quality, by estimating differences in relative market shares after controlling for prices. We then examine how these measures of country-product quality react to quota removal using a specification analogous to the ones employed above,

$$\Delta\theta_{cht} = \beta_{1rt}ChinaBound_{h,t-1} + \beta_{2rt}ChinaUnbound_{h,t-1} + \nu_{crht}. \quad (3)$$

where  $\theta_{cht}$  is the estimated quality of country  $c$  in product  $h$  at time  $t$  obtained from a implementing the approach discussed in the Appendix. In this specification, we regress the change in country-product quality on region-year fixed effects which are interacted with

$ChinaBound_{h,t-1}$ , a dummy variable which equals unity if China's quota in product  $h$  in year  $t-1$  had a fill rate exceeding 90 percent, and  $ChinaUnbound_{h,t-1}$ , is a dummy variable which equals one if China was not subject to a binding quota. To focus attention on China, we estimate a single ROW fixed effect for each year for all other countries and, as before, run the regressions separately by phase. For Phases I and II, we report coefficients for 2002 when China became eligible for integration, rather than the phaseout defined under the ATC. Coefficients and standard errors are reported in Table 15.

The coefficients generally report a positive change in quality in the year of integration for both bound and unbound varieties and for both China and the ROW. On first inspection, these results appear inconsistent with the idea that dismantling quotas results in quality downgrading. Recall, however, that our measure of country-product quality reflects consumers' valuation of Chinese goods relative to "outside goods," which, in this case, are domestic varieties. These relative valuations complicate the evaluation of the results in Table 15 because, for example, a deterioration in the quality of the outside good would lead to increase in the quality of the imported varieties. That is, our measure of quality does not separately identify shifts in preferences across HS products versus shifts in preferences towards the outside good.<sup>28</sup>

We can use the coefficients in reported in Table 15 to compute a difference-in-differences estimate of China quality upgrading in bound products that uses quality change in unbound products and the ROW as baselines.<sup>29</sup> First, we first take the difference between China's change in quality for bound and unbounded varieties; for Phase IV this is 0.72-1.01, or -0.29. This first difference controls for country-specific changes in technology or shifts in demand that are common to all varieties within the country. Second, we compare this difference to the analogous difference in the ROW's coefficients for China's bound and unbound products; for Phase IV this is -0.29-0.18, or -0.47. This second difference nets out changes in consumers' valuation across varieties. For example, suppose there is a positive technology shock to the Chinese T&C industry. The first difference would control for the technology shock since the shock would be common to China's bound and unbound exports. Now suppose an extreme winter increases the demand winter clothing; this shock, common to both China and ROW assuming away compositional differences, is controlled by differencing Chinese quality with the ROW within products. In this way, the difference-in-differences estimate provides an uncontaminated estimate of the relative Chinese bound-versus-unbound quality change following each phase-out.

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<sup>28</sup>See Nevo (2003) for a detailed discussion on this point. We note that the quality levels could be biased upwards if measurement error in the prices leads to attenuation bias in  $\alpha$ . Assuming that the attenuation bias is the same in bound and unbound products, this possibility provides further motivation for computing difference-in-differences estimates. Problems associated with measurement error are also mitigated by our use of trade costs as an instrument for price.

<sup>29</sup>Actually, this is a triple difference specification, but since we focus on *changes* in quality, the time difference is already assumed.

Difference-in-difference estimates for each Phase are reported in the bottom panel of Table 15. As mentioned earlier, China's Phase I products were not subject to binding quotas, so we merely report the difference between China's and the ROW's unbound quality changes, which is positive and significant at the ten percent level. For Phase II, we find that China's bound products actually increase in quality, an outcome that is inconsistent with theory. One possible explanation for this result is that Phase II products were only marginally binding in a way that our assessment of bindingness does not pick up.

We do find relative declines in China's bound products' quality in response to Phases III and IV, though only the latter estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels. In both Phases, China registered improvements in quality within bound and unbound varieties, but ROW quality increases by more. These results appear consistent with theory and complement the across-good shifts in demand identified by Harrigan and Barrows (2006) for Phase IV products. They also support the idea that restrictions on China were relatively more stringent.

## 7. China's T&C Future

China's share of U.S. textile and clothing imports jumped three-fold, from 10 to 33 percent, between the time it joined the WTO in December 2001 and the end of the ATC regime in 2005. This growth, and in particular China's surging exports in the early months of 2005, spurred domestic firms and other developing countries to lobby the United States, successfully, for the re-imposition of textile and clothing quotas on China. By the middle of 2005, the U.S. and China had agreed to new limits on China's exports in a subset of T&C categories previously covered by Phase IV of the ATC. These categories are listed in Table 2; they are to remain in effect until 2008.

Some analysts believe that China's large increase in Phase IV exports in early 2005 occurred primarily as a hedge against future protectionist measures. By dramatically increasing their exports early in the year, this line of thinking goes, Chinese firms would be able to establish higher base levels for an inevitable new round of quotas. Table 2 provides some evidence in favor of this hypothesis, as the new, post-ATC quota levels agreed to in 2005 were substantially larger than the levels previously imposed by the ATC. Going forward, it is not clear that China will be free of quotas after 2008. According to its WTO accession documents, WTO member countries are allowed to impose product-specific safeguards on China to prevent market disruptions until 2013. As a result, the U.S. might continue to apply quotas or resort to other forms of protection, such as anti-dumping remedies, once the current safeguards are removed (Bown, 2007). Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda (2007) argue that the new safeguards are merely a means of re-imposing an MFA/ATC regime on China, with the major exception that quotas now just apply to China as opposed to all developing economies.

China's exports to the EU also surged after ATC expired. This increase induced a similar response in the EU, with the result that China and the EU also signed a new bilateral agreement in 2005 restricting China's imports in 10 groups of T&C products through 2007.<sup>30</sup> As was well reported at the time, China satisfied its quotas in these goods by September 2005, with the result that \$501 million worth of Chinese goods backed up on European ports.<sup>31</sup> Only after high-level negotiations led to an amended quota agreement for 2005 were these goods allowed into the EU. The EU's new safeguards remain in effect until December 31, 2007; they are summarized in Table 16.

Many observers have reacted to China's T&C export growth with the claim that all of the world's T&C production will relocate to China once its quotas are abolished permanently. Interestingly, Chinese officials appear to be looking beyond their dominance of apparel and textiles, and have voiced concern that rising wages will erode their comparative advantage in this sector *vis a vis* even lower-wage countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh.<sup>32</sup> Though such an outcome appears unlikely, at least in the near term, these countries have become more important sources of T&C exports in recent years. In the year after its trade relations with the U.S. were normalized in 2001, for example, Vietnam's T&C exports to the U.S. increased 240 percent, though its market share in terms of quantity in 2005 remained under 2 percent. Until 2007, when it, too joined the WTO, Vietnam's exports were hampered by U.S. quotas on 25 groups of T&C products.

Given the large T&C export capacity of China, China's dominance of the T&C market should continue into the near future, especially as the new safeguards expire. As China continues its transition towards more capital- and skill-intensive industries, however, it is likely that the relative importance of apparel and textiles in the Chinese economy will fall. Already, T&C exports have declined to 11 percent of the country's total exports to the U.S., down from 26 percent in 1990. As this transition continues, it is likely that countries at earlier stages of development, such as Cambodia and Vietnam, will become bigger players.

## 8. Appendix: Quality Estimation

This Appendix explains how to identify quality from the T&C import data. The framework is based on the approach taken by Khandelwal (2007) and the reader is referred to that paper for additional details.

We assume that consumers have discrete choice preferences and select the one country-product variety that provides them with the highest utility. The (indirect) utility that

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<sup>30</sup>Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley (2007) report that China has either signed, or is in negotiations to sign, similar quota agreements with Brazil, Turkey, Canada, Mexico and Peru.

<sup>31</sup>"Europe and China in Accord Over End to a Textile Dispute," New York Times, September 6, 2005.

<sup>32</sup>See the discussions of the 2007 China Development Forum, "Towards New Models of Economic Growth", available at <http://www.cdrf.org.cn/en/>.

consumer obtains from purchasing variety  $ch$  is

$$V_{chnt} = \theta_{1ch} + \theta_{2t} + \xi_{cht} - \alpha p_{cht} + \varepsilon_{chnt}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\theta_{ch} + \theta_t + \xi_{cht}$  denotes the quality of variety  $ch$  at time  $t$ ,  $p_{cht}$  denotes its price and  $\varepsilon_{chnt}$  is a random consumer-variety specific term. The random term  $\varepsilon$  introduces horizontal differentiation; its inclusion precludes prices from being sufficient statistics for quality.<sup>33</sup> The random term  $\varepsilon$  can be decomposed into two randomly distributed components,

$$\varepsilon_{chnt} = \psi_{hnt} + (1 - \sigma)\nu_{chnt}, \quad (5)$$

with  $0 \leq \sigma < 1$ . The  $\psi$  term is a consumer-HS product random effect which provides consumer  $n$  with an idiosyncratic utility from choosing a variety that resides in product  $h$ . This term generates a nested logit system which is a more flexibility demand model because it alleviates the IIA problem found in simple logit models. The product-level random effect creates correlation across varieties within a same HS code which means that consumers are more likely to substitute towards varieties within the same product.<sup>34</sup>

Under the assumption that  $\nu$  is an i.i.d extreme value, we can aggregate over all individual purchases in the economy to obtain aggregate market shares for each variety (e.g., see Berry 1994). In order to complete the demand system, the consumer is allowed to choose an “outside” good if none of the inside varieties provides him with a high enough utility. In this context, the outside good market share is the U.S. market share.

The aggregation leads to the following demand system equation

$$\ln s_{cht} - \ln s_{0t} = \theta_{1ch} + \theta_{2t} - \alpha p_{cht} + \sigma \ln s_{c|ht} + \xi_{cht} \quad (6)$$

The left hand side of the demand system measures the variety's market share  $s_{cht}$  relative to the outside good market share ( $s_{0t}$ ). We run regression (6) separately for aggregates of the MFA groups.<sup>35</sup> This allows price sensitivities and year fixed effects to vary by aggregate leading to more flexible parameter estimates. The portion of observed quality are captured by country-product ( $\theta_{1ch}$ ) and year ( $\theta_{2t}$ ) fixed effects. The price is denoted by  $p_{cht}$  where  $\alpha$  captures price sensitivity (a semi-elasticity). The  $s_{c|ht}$  term results from the demand structure that nests varieties within products. This term captures the variety's market

<sup>33</sup>In a vertical market, prices are sufficient statistics for quality. Here, a variety that happens to possess a low quality,  $\theta_{ch}$ , and a high price,  $p_{cht}$ , may still be purchased if the consumer draws a high  $\varepsilon_{chnt}$ .

<sup>34</sup>As  $\sigma$  goes to zero, the within product correlation also goes to zero and the model converges to a standard logit model.

<sup>35</sup>Market share within an MFA group sum to one, but we pool observations over aggregates of the MFA groups. For example, one aggregate includes dresses which differ according to fabric (e.g., MFA groups 336, 436, 636, 736, and 836). MFA groups are classified into 43 aggregates.

share *within* product  $h$  at time  $t$ . Finally,  $\xi_{cht}$  is the unobserved component of quality that becomes the residual of the estimating equation. Since this term is potentially correlated with prices, we have the classic simultaneity problem associated with estimating demand curves. We identify the equation by instrumenting price with trade costs.<sup>36</sup> The estimated qualities are defined by  $\theta_{cht} = \theta_{1ch} + \theta_{2t} + \xi_{cht}$ . The interpretation of these quality measures is that conditional on price, the variety with higher market shares have higher quality.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Hummels and Skiba (2004) find evidence supporting the Alchian-Allen conjecture that export quality increases with trade costs. This potentially raises concerns that trade costs may be correlated with variety quality. However, the exclusion restriction remains valid as long as transport costs affect *average* quality and not the time-specific deviation,  $\xi_{cht}$ . Since the nest share term is also endogenous, we use the number of varieties within HS product to instrument this term (Berry et al., 1995)

<sup>37</sup>Note that this intuition for quality is similar to that found in Hallak and Schott (2007). The results of these regressions are available upon request.



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Phase	Starting Date	Share of Export Volume Integrated	Increase in Quota Growth Rate	Number of HS Products Integrated
I	January 1, 1995	16	16	318
II	January 1, 1998	17	25	744
III	January 1, 2002	18	27	745
IV	January 1, 2005	49	n/a	2,978

Notes: Table describes the four phases of the Agreement on Textiles and Quotas. First three columns describe aspects of the Agreement that were common to all signatories. Final column reports the integration of products as implemented by the United States. Quota growth acceleration was advanced one phase for countries with less than 1.2 percent of the importing country's total quotas in 1991. Source: OTEXA.

Table 1: ATC Integration Schedule

MFA Category	Unit	2004 Quota	2005 Exports	2006 Quota	2007 Quota	2008 Quota
200 Yarns and sewing thread <sup>a</sup>	KG	939,116	na	na	na	na
300/301 Carded and combed cotton yarn <sup>a</sup>	KG	2,671,428	na	na	na	na
200/301 <sup>a</sup>	KG	-	6,949,753	7,529,582	8,832,199	10,131,052
222 Knit fabric	KG	10,619,328	18,145,812	15,966,487	18,728,689	21,482,908
229 Special purpose fabric <sup>b</sup>	KG	-	29,001,226	33,162,019	39,237,301	45,007,492
332/432/632 Hosiery <sup>c</sup>	DPR	42,433,990	58,230,777	na	na	na
332/432/632-B Baby socks <sup>c</sup>	DPR	-	-	61,146,461	71,724,800	80,866,195
332/432/632-T Baby socks <sup>c</sup>	DPR	-	-	64,386,841	75,443,136	85,058,437
338/339 Cotton knitted shirts & blouses	DOZ	2,523,532	20,624,490	20,822,111	23,893,373	26,938,606
340/640 Men's and boys' woven shirts	DOZ	2,345,946	6,173,242	6,743,644	7,738,332	8,724,590
345/645/646 Sweaters	DOZ	1,030,348	7,850,557	8,179,211	9,477,660	10,581,854
347/348 Cotton trousers	DOZ	2,421,922	18,379,851	19,666,049	22,566,791	25,442,951
349/649 Brassieres	DOZ	17,729,479	20,717,107	22,785,906	26,146,827	29,479,266
352/652 Underwear	DOZ	5,276,745	18,175,964	18,948,937	21,957,081	24,302,011
359-S/659-S Swimwear	KG	750,959	5,951,219	4,590,626	5,267,743	5,990,767
363 Cotton terry towels	NO	24,773,109	87,842,008	103,300,000	118,600,000	134,828,519
443 Men's & boys' wool suits	NO	140,015	1,613,356	1,346,082	1,544,629	1,756,637
447 Men's & boys' wool trousers	DOZ	76,352	203,332	215,004	246,718	280,581
619 Polyester filament fabric <sup>b</sup>	M2	-	60,348,016	55,308,506	63,466,510	72,177,600
620 Other synthetic filament fabric <sup>b</sup>	M2	-	83,531,558	80,197,248	92,026,342	103,755,190
622 Glass fabric <sup>b</sup>	M2	-	30,274,778	32,265,013	37,846,860	43,412,575
638/639 MMF knitted shirts & blouses	DOZ	2,712,680	3,762,225	8,060,063	9,248,922	10,427,707
647/648 MMF trousers	DOZ	2,974,238	6,490,061	7,960,355	9,134,507	10,298,709
666 Window blinds/window shades	KG	573,372	0	964,014	1,106,206	1,268,884
847 Silk blend & other vegetable fibre trousers <sup>d</sup>	DOZ	-	15,714,461	17,647,255	20,250,225	23,029,668

Notes: Table reports the safeguards imposed on Chinese products in 2005. <sup>a</sup>In 2004, quotas were placed on MFA 200 and the group MFA 300/301. In 2006, quotas were reimposed on MFA 200 and MFA 301 to reflect a new group category, MFA 200/301. Using the footnotes in the OTEXA expired performance reports, we aggregated 2005 exports to reflect this new group and denote 2005-08 exports and quotas within 200 and 300/301 with a "na". <sup>b</sup>No specific limit quotas in 2004. <sup>c</sup>In 2004, quotas were applied on MFA group 332/432/632, and in 2006, quotas were imposed on two new group categories, 332/432/632-B and 332/432/632-T. We were unable determine if the quota levels for these two new MFA groups reflect an aggregate quota or not, so we report the 2006-08 figures for 332/432/632-B and 332/432/632-T as reported in the official OTEXA documents, and denote 2006-08 quotas for 332/432/632 with a "na". For 2005 exports, we aggregate the exports from MFA 332, 432, and 632 using the trade data and the HS-MFA concordance described in the text. Source: Authors' calculations from the trade data and OTEXA. Source: OTEXA and authors' calculations.

Table 2: Chinese Quotas under Safeguards, 2006-2008

Argentina	Dominican Republic	Kenya	Oman	Sri Lanka
Bahrain	Egypt	Korea, South	*Pacific Islands	Taiwan
Bangladesh	El Salvador	Kuwait	Pakistan	Thailand
*Barbados	Fiji	Laos	Panama	*Trinidad Tobago
Belarus	Germany, East	*Lebanon	Peru	Turkey
Brazil	Guam	Lesotho	Philippines	UAE
Bulgaria	Guatemala	Macau	Poland	Ukraine
Burma	Haiti	Macedonia	*Portugal	Uruguay
Cambodia	Honduras	Malaysia	Qatar	USSR
*Canada	Hong Kong	Maldives Islands	Romania	Vietnam
China	Hungary	Mauritius	Russia	Yugoslavia
Colombia	India	Mexico	Singapore	
Costa Rica	Indonesia	Nepal	Slovak Republic	
Czech Republic	Jamaica	Nigeria	South Africa	
Czechoslovakia	Japan	Northern Mariana	*Spain	

Notes: Table displays the set of countries with which the United States negotiated quantitative restrictions on apparel and textile imports between 1984 and 2004. \* denotes countries not subject to Specific Limits (see text). Source: U.S. MFA/ATC Database

Table 3: List of Countries in U.S. MFA/ATC Database

MFA Group Description	Segment	Units	Square Meter Conversion
218 Yarns of different colors (cotton &/or mmf)	Yarn	SQM	1
219 Duck fabric (cotton &/or mmf)	Yarn	SQM	1
606 Non-textured filament yarn (mmf)	Yarn	KG	20.1
621 Impression fabric (mmf)	Fabric	KG	14.4
628 Twills/sateens staple/filament fiber (mmf)	Fabric	SQM	1
629 Other fabrics of staple/filament fiber (mmf)	Fabric	SQM	1
348 W&G trousers, breeches & shorts (cotton)	Apparel	DOZ	14.9
350 Robes, dressing gowns, etc. (cotton)	Apparel	DOZ	42.6
431 Gloves and mittens (wool)	Apparel	DPR	1.8
433 M&B suit-type coats (wool)	Apparel	DOZ	30.1
836 Dresses (silk or non-cotton veg. fibers)	Apparel	DOZ	37.9
362 Bedspreads & quilts (cotton)	Made-ups	NO	5.8
464 Blankets (wool)	Made-ups	KG	2.4
465 Floor coverings (wool)	Made-ups	SQM	1
665 Floor coverings (mmf)	Made-ups	SQM	1

Notes: Examples of MFA groups, native units and the conversion factors to square meters. Source: U.S. MFA/ATC Database.

Table 4: Sample OTEXA Category Descriptions

Country	Adjusted Base Quota (SME)	Export (SME)	Fill Rate (%)
China	28.4	24.9	88
Taiwan	26.3	16.6	63
Hong Kong	22.8	17.1	75
Korea, South	21.3	13.3	63
Turkey	13.0	5.7	44
Pakistan	12.4	10.3	84
Malaysia	11.0	3.8	35
Thailand	11.0	6.9	63
Indonesia	10.3	8.8	85
Philippines	9.6	6.9	72
India	8.4	7.3	87
Bangladesh	8.0	7.0	88
Egypt	7.1	1.9	27
Brazil	6.9	2.4	35
Sri Lanka	5.4	4.4	81
Singapore	3.8	1.6	43
Mexico	3.0	1.2	39
Macau	2.8	1.9	69
Dominican Republic	2.6	1.7	66
Romania	1.9	0.4	21
UAE	1.8	1.1	60
Japan	1.6	1.0	61
Jamaica	1.5	0.3	20
Colombia	1.5	0.2	10
Honduras	1.3	0.3	25
Mauritius	1.1	0.5	44
Costa Rica	1.1	0.6	51
Guatemala	0.9	0.7	73
Poland	0.9	0.1	13
Cambodia	0.9	0.8	85

Notes: Quantities are in billions of square meters. Data for specific limits only. Percentage filled is exports divided by base quota. Countries sorted by aggregate base quota under the MFA/ATC. Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database.

Table 5: Total Specific Limit Base, Top 30 Countries

Country	Binding Quotas -		
	Liberal Definition (%)	Default Definition (%)	Conservative Definition (%)
Bangladesh	89	81	75
India	76	65	57
China	72	64	55
Indonesia	73	59	50
Pakistan	67	57	47
Guatemala	67	45	32
Hong Kong	52	42	34
Macau	52	41	32
UAE	48	39	28
Philippines	53	37	30
Sri Lanka	50	36	27
Thailand	51	36	25
Cambodia	42	32	28
Korea, South	42	30	19
Taiwan	43	30	21
Dominican Republic	50	29	17
Malaysia	32	23	16
Singapore	29	22	15
Costa Rica	36	21	12
Turkey	22	18	15
Colombia	26	18	11
Mauritius	18	14	11
Brazil	16	12	8
Romania	16	11	8
Mexico	16	9	7
Egypt	12	9	6
Poland	14	8	5
Japan	10	7	3
Jamaica	5	2	1
Honduras	0	0	0

Notes: Table reports the fraction of specific limits with fill rates that exceed 80, 90 and 95 percent, respectively. Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database.

Table 6: Top 30 Countries in Terms of Binding Quotas, 1984 to 2004



Country	Fraction of Specific Limits (%)
China	61
Korea, South	53
Taiwan	51
Hong Kong	46
Indonesia	42
Thailand	41
Malaysia	39
Mexico	38
Sri Lanka	38
Romania	33
Philippines	31
Japan	31
Pakistan	25
Turkey	25
India	22
Macau	22
Brazil	22
Poland	22
Singapore	21
Uae	20
Bangladesh	20
Mauritius	18
Cambodia	17
Dominican Republic	16
Jamaica	15
Egypt	9
Colombia	6
Guatemala	4
Costa Rica	4
Honduras	4

Notes: The Table reports the fraction of OTEXA categories exported by the country that were subject to specific limits from 1990-2004. The table lists the thirty countries with the largest aggregate base quotas. Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database.

Table 7: Fraction of Specific Limits, Top 30 Countries

MFA Group	Description	Fill Rate (%)	China's Fill Rate (%)	Bangladesh's Fill Rate (%)	India's Fill Rate (%)	Base Quota (SME)
300/301	Cotton Yarns	54	52	-	12	7.2
313	Cotton Sheeting Fabric	50	93	-	70	8.6
314	Cotton Poplin / Broadcloth Fab.	51	95	-	54	4.8
315	Cotton Printcloth Fabric	67	97	-	75	8.0
*340/640	Non-Knit Shirts	69	99	64	99	12.8
347/348	Cotton Trousers	83	99	99	98	10.3
*352/652	Underwear	77	85	97	-	8.6
638/639	Mmf Knit Shirts	83	98	96	-	9.5
645/646	Mmf Sweaters	55	95	92	-	7.9
*647/648	Mmf Trousers	80	99	100	93	8.5

Notes: Table reports the average fill rates for the twenty largest MFA groups. Quantities are in billions of square meters. \* denotes that China's quotas were negotiated on the subgroups. Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database.

Table 8: Fill Rates by OTEXA Category, Top 10 Categories

	Log (ETE)	Log (ETE)
Fill Rate	2.1 ***	1.4 ***
	0.2	0.2
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Category FE	No	Yes
R-squared	0.21	0.80
Observations	417	417

Notes: The dependent variable is the log export tax equivalent (see text). Column 2 includes OTEXA category fixed effects. Significance: \* 10 percent, \*\* 5 percent, \*\*\* 1 percent. Source: Chinese export license prices obtained from [www.chinaquota.com](http://www.chinaquota.com).

Table 9: Export Tax Equivalent and Fill Rates

Country	Fraction of Groups with Adjustments	Flexibility Adjustment Margin
Cambodia	99	15
Guatemala	97	7
Bangladesh	97	11
Dominican Republic	95	8
India	93	8
Philippines	92	11
China	92	5
Indonesia	89	10
Pakistan	88	8
Sri Lanka	88	11
UAE	84	6
Macau	81	6
Thailand	80	6
Honduras	78	4
Hong Kong	75	5
Taiwan	71	5
Korea, South	65	4
Turkey	60	2
Costa Rica	60	1
Singapore	52	0
Malaysia	50	0
Colombia	45	0
Romania	30	0
Brazil	27	0
Mauritius	25	0
Mexico	25	0
Egypt	16	0
Poland	15	0
Japan	7	0
Jamaica	6	0

Notes: Column 1 reports the median flexibility adjustment margin between 1984-2004. Column 2 displays the fraction of MFA groups that were subject to at least one flexibility adjustment. The table lists the thirty countries with the largest aggregate base quotas. Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database.

Table 10: Flexibility Use, 1984-2004

Region	Phase I			Phase II			Phase III			Phase IV		
	Aggregate Growth	Intensive Margin	Extensive Margin	Aggregate Growth	Intensive Margin	Extensive Margin	Aggregate Growth	Intensive Margin	Extensive Margin	Aggregate Growth	Intensive Margin	Extensive Margin
China	9	16	-6	9	10	-1	306	288	17	271	269	2
Caribbean	47	23	24	0	0	-1	-12	-12	0	-1	1	-2
Central America	33	6	27	-10	-3	-7	6	10	-4	1	3	-2
East Asia	-10	-10	0	24	24	0	57	22	36	-24	-25	0
European Union	2	3	-1	-3	-3	0	13	12	2	64	64	0
Former Soviet Union	-50	-45	-5	-21	-22	1	-18	-18	0	-61	-51	-10
Middle East	-34	-43	9	-1	-2	2	15	13	2	-12	-12	0
North Africa	-46	-31	-15	23	23	0	-8	-27	19	-4	-4	0
North America	13	10	3	5	5	0	4	5	-1	-14	-13	-1
Oceania	-42	12	-54	48	45	3	-15	-15	1	-52	-49	-3
Other Europe	102	-36	138	12	-6	18	21	-9	30	-30	-30	-1
South America	-65	-58	-7	-51	-51	0	44	44	-1	-13	-12	-1
South Asia	33	33	0	18	18	0	5	3	2	20	19	0
Southeast Asia	-47	8	-54	18	18	0	-13	-13	0	0	0	0
Sub-Saharan Africa	-53	-42	-11	10	-25	34	69	60	9	-16	-15	-1
All Regions	3	2	1	3	3	0	31	27	4	14	14	0
All Regions (ex. China)	3	1	2	2	2	0	9	6	4	-2	-1	0
China (2002)	42	41	1	32	21	11						
All Regions (2002)	8	19	-12	14	11	3						

Notes: Decomposition table reports aggregate growth, decomposed into the extensive and intensive margins, by phase and region, in year of integration. In this table, the integration years for Phase I-IV are for 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005, respectively. Extensive margin is defined as the net SME quantity growth in varieties that enter and exit in the year of integration. Intensive margin is defined as the net SME quantity growth in continuing varieties in the year of integration. Note that the aggregate growth values for Phase I and II differ from the previous table because this table reports values for 1995 and 1998, respectively. The bottom rows in each panel report Phase I and II export growth for China and all regions in 2002, the year that China was eligible for ATC liberalization. The sum of the intensive and extensive margin may not sum to aggregate growth due to rounding.

Table 11: Aggregate Growth Decomposition, by Phase and Region

Coefficients	Phase I Δ Ln (SME)		Phase II Δ Ln (SME)		Phase III Δ Ln (SME)		Phase IV Δ Ln (SME)	
	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound
Integration Year (2002 for Phase I-III)								
x China	0.41 ***	0.00	0.93 ***	2.26 ***	1.36 ***	1.81 ***	1.28 ***	1.73 ***
	0.11	0.00	0.11	0.24	0.14	0.18	0.07	0.08
x Caribbean	0.21	0.00	-0.16	-0.17	-0.38	-0.25 *	-0.36 ***	-0.30 ***
	0.33	0.00	0.27	0.17	0.58	0.14	0.05	0.06
x Central America	-0.26 *	0.00	-0.13	-0.05	0.30 *	0.10	-0.19	-0.26 ***
	0.15	0.00	0.11	0.07	0.17	0.10	0.11	0.04
x East Asia	0.16	0.00	0.17 **	-0.68 ***	0.09	0.00	-0.22 ***	-0.58 ***
	0.13	0.00	0.07	0.19	0.10	0.16	0.08	0.10
x European Union	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.12	-0.01	0.05	-0.15 ***	-0.20 ***
	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.16	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.04
x Former Soviet Union	0.09	0.00	0.28	-0.07	-0.49 ***	-0.22	-0.92 ***	-1.14 **
	0.43	0.00	0.24	0.22	0.11	0.45	0.30	0.56
x Middle East	-0.07	0.00	0.08	0.11	0.11	-0.22	-0.32 ***	-0.42 ***
	0.25	0.00	0.15	0.24	0.20	0.14	0.09	0.16
x North Africa	0.35	0.00	0.33 ***	0.31	-0.17 ***	-0.25	0.01	-0.09
	0.28	0.00	0.01	0.26	0.04	0.50	0.03	0.08
x North America	0.01	0.00	0.05	-0.19	-0.11 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.29 **	-0.20 **
	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.12	0.09
x Oceania	-0.26 **	0.00	-0.17 ***	-0.55 ***	-0.13	0.03	-0.19 ***	-0.26 ***
	0.10	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.25	0.29	0.05	0.09
x Other Europe	0.06	0.00	-0.12 ***	1.72 **	-0.11	0.14	-0.02	-0.04
	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.71	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.15
x South America	-0.15	0.00	0.03	0.33 *	0.21	0.29	-0.14	-0.11
	0.15	0.00	0.17	0.18	0.14	0.25	0.10	0.08
x South Asia	0.31 ***	0.00	0.36 ***	-0.07	0.22 *	0.34	0.09	-0.08
	0.10	0.00	0.12	0.21	0.12	0.37	0.11	0.09
x Southeast Asia	0.34	0.00	0.23	0.20	0.26	0.06	-0.04	-0.11
	0.26	0.00	0.14	0.28	0.22	0.28	0.07	0.09
x Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.10	0.00	0.02	0.16 **	0.38 *	-0.26	-0.31 **	-0.50 ***
	0.14	0.00	0.18	0.08	0.20	0.40	0.14	0.12
Observations	41,100		88,818		97,482		431,069	

Notes: Table regresses change in the (log of) country-product quantity on year-region-Unbound versus Bound interactions. Each column reports the result of a regression encompassing all the products whose quotas were relaxed in the noted phase. Phase I-III report year-region fixed effects for year 2002, the year China entered the WTO, and Phase IV reports fixed effects for 2005. Bound refer to the HS codes in which China had greater than a 90 percent fill rate in the previous year. Standard errors clustered by exporting country. Significance: \* 10 percent, \*\* 5 percent, \*\*\* 1 percent.

Table 12: ATC Phase-outs: Export Quantities and Binding Quotas

<b>Kuwait (-2.89)</b>	<b>Taiwan (-0.55)</b>	<b>UAE (-0.26)</b>	Mozambique (0.05)
<b>Russia (-2.81)</b>	<b>Swaziland (-0.54)</b>	Ukraine (-0.25)	Malawi (0.05)
<b>Maldives (-2.35)</b>	<b>Sweden (-0.52)</b>	<b>El Salvador (-0.23)</b>	Slovakia (0.06)
<b>Micronesia (-2.14)</b>	<b>Ghana (-0.51)</b>	<b>Guatemala (-0.23)</b>	Trinidad and Tobago (0.09)
Georgia (-1.99)	Mali (-0.48)	<b>Gambia (-0.23)</b>	Iceland (0.09)
<b>Guinea (-1.85)</b>	Bahrain (-0.48)	<b>Turkey (-0.23)</b>	Vietnam (0.09)
<b>Oman (-1.82)</b>	Mauritius (-0.47)	Czech Republic (-0.21)	Chile (0.11)
Suriname (-1.38)	<b>Slovenia (-0.46)</b>	Lebanon (-0.21)	Germany (0.12)
<b>Cyprus (-1.35)</b>	<b>Poland (-0.45)</b>	Nicaragua (-0.21)	Cambodia (0.12)
<b>Albania (-1.25)</b>	<b>Venezuela (-0.45)</b>	Colombia (-0.20)	Indonesia (0.13)
<b>Kyrgyzstan (-1.24)</b>	<b>Argentina (-0.45)</b>	Ecuador (-0.18)	Bangladesh (0.15)
Kazakhstan (-1.21)	<b>Hungary (-0.44)</b>	Brunei (-0.17)	Switzerland (0.16)
Azerbaijan (-1.13)	<b>Barbados (-0.40)</b>	Australia (-0.15)	Armenia (0.16)
Tajikistan (-1.09)	<b>Belarus (-0.39)</b>	Brazil (-0.15)	Uzbekistan (0.18)
<b>Macedonia (Skopje) (-1.00)</b>	<b>Malaysia (-0.39)</b>	Belgium (-0.15)	Cook Islands (0.18)
<b>South Africa (-0.98)</b>	<b>Honduras (-0.37)</b>	Ireland (-0.14)	Bolivia (0.22)
<b>Ivory Coast (-0.91)</b>	Costa Rica (-0.36)	United Kingdom (-0.14)	Jordan (0.24)
Ethiopia (-0.91)	<b>Romania (-0.35)</b>	<b>Italy (-0.13)</b>	<b>Peru (0.24)</b>
<b>Syria (-0.90)</b>	<b>Finland (-0.35)</b>	Spain (-0.13)	Panama (0.25)
<b>Moldova (-0.87)</b>	Greece (-0.35)	Japan (-0.12)	Botswana (0.26)
<b>Korea, South (-0.85)</b>	Guyana (-0.34)	Namibia (-0.11)	<b>Uganda (0.30)</b>
<b>Mongolia (-0.84)</b>	<b>Dominican Republic (-0.34)</b>	Uruguay (-0.10)	Saudi Arabia (0.32)
<b>Nepal (-0.77)</b>	Haiti (-0.34)	Portugal (-0.10)	<b>Nigeria (0.48)</b>
<b>Israel (-0.72)</b>	Fiji (-0.33)	Croatia (-0.10)	Qatar (0.51)
<b>Singapore (-0.69)</b>	Latvia (-0.32)	Estonia (-0.07)	Bosnia-Herzegovina (0.63)
Zambia (-0.69)	<b>Sri Lanka (-0.31)</b>	Mexico (-0.07)	<b>Senegal (0.67)</b>
Bermuda (-0.69)	<b>Canada (-0.31)</b>	Paraguay (-0.04)	British Virgin Islands (0.69)
Sierra Leone (-0.68)	<b>Austria (-0.31)</b>	Turkmenistan (-0.04)	<b>San Marino (0.75)</b>
Jamaica (-0.65)	New Zealand (-0.31)	Kenya (-0.02)	<b>Malta (0.90)</b>
<b>Cape Verde (-0.62)</b>	<b>Zimbabwe (-0.30)</b>	Morocco (-0.02)	<b>Bahamas (1.35)</b>
<b>Hong Kong (-0.62)</b>	<b>France (-0.30)</b>	Tanzania (0.01)	Netherlands Antilles (1.60)
Belize (-0.61)	Egypt (-0.29)	Lithuania (0.02)	<b>Laos (1.88)</b>
<b>Denmark (-0.59)</b>	Norway (-0.28)	Tunisia (0.02)	Somalia (1.94)
<b>Madagascar (-0.57)</b>	<b>Philippines (-0.28)</b>	Pakistan (0.02)	Tokelau (2.05)
<b>Lesotho (-0.57)</b>	Bulgaria (-0.27)	India (0.03)	Mauritania (3.43)
<b>Macao (-0.55)</b>	<b>Thailand (-0.26)</b>	Netherlands (0.05)	

Notes: Table regresses change in the (log of) country-product quantity on country-year fixed effects on the set of China's Phase IV products that were subject to binding quotas in 2004. The 2005 coefficients for each country are reported in parantheses. Bold denotes that export response is statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level (robust standard errors).

Table 13: "Winners and Losers"

Coefficients	Phase I $\Delta \ln(\text{Price})$		Phase II $\Delta \ln(\text{Price})$		Phase III $\Delta \ln(\text{Price})$		Phase IV $\Delta \ln(\text{Price})$	
	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound
Integration Year								
x China	-0.17 0.10		-0.07 0.05	0.11 0.14	-0.54 *** 0.06	-0.66 *** 0.09	-0.37 *** 0.02	-0.53 *** 0.03
x Caribbean	-0.08 0.24		-0.10 0.08		-0.17 * 0.10		-0.02 0.03	
x Central America	-0.13 0.18		-0.01 0.06		-0.03 0.06		-0.03 0.02	-0.03 0.49
x East Asia	0.07 0.06		-0.08 ** 0.03		-0.17 *** 0.03	-0.14 0.14	-0.01 0.01	-0.15 ** 0.06
x European Union	0.00 0.04		-0.01 0.02		-0.01 0.02		0.01 * 0.01	0.05 0.13
x Former Soviet Union	0.03 0.47		-0.11 0.12		0.13 0.09	-0.09 0.39	0.16 *** 0.03	0.03 0.18
x Middle East	0.00 0.21		0.05 0.06		-0.04 0.05	-0.15 0.33	0.02 0.02	0.02 0.16
x North Africa	0.31 0.30		0.06 0.09		0.10 0.08		0.03 0.03	
x North America	0.01 0.08		0.05 0.04		0.00 0.04		0.03 * 0.02	
x Oceania	0.10 0.18		-0.08 0.08		0.01 0.08		0.03 0.03	
x Other Europe	0.04 0.12		-0.01 0.07		-0.13 ** 0.06		0.01 0.02	0.16 0.70
x South America	0.39 ** 0.15		-0.07 0.06		-0.06 0.05		0.04 ** 0.02	-0.17 0.35
x South Asia	0.12 0.09		-0.02 0.04	-0.10 0.86	-0.15 *** 0.04	-0.49 * 0.27	-0.07 *** 0.01	-0.20 ** 0.08
x Southeast Asia	0.26 ** 0.10		-0.13 *** 0.04		-0.13 *** 0.03	0.12 0.39	-0.04 *** 0.01	-0.14 * 0.07
x Sub-Saharan Africa	0.18 0.21		-0.16 0.10		-0.19 ** 0.08		0.07 *** 0.02	
Year 2002 x China	-0.14 * 0.08		-0.38 *** 0.05	-0.81 *** 0.13				
Observations	41,100		88,818		97,482		431,069	

Notes: Table regresses change in the (log of) country-product unit value on year-region-unbound versus bound interactions. Each column reports the result of a regression encompassing all the products whose quotas were relaxed in the noted phase. Phase I, II and III report year-region fixed effects for year 1995, 1998 and 2002, respectively. The bottom panel reports 2002 fixed effects for Phases I and II for China. Phase IV reports fixed effects for 2005. Bound refers to the HS codes in which countries had greater than a 90 percent fill rate in the previous year. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance: \* 10 percent, \*\* 5 percent, \*\*\* 1 percent.

Table 14: ATC Phase-outs: Unit Values and Binding Quotas




	Phase I		Phase II		Phase III		Phase IV	
	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound	Unbound	Bound
China	0.10 *		0.49 ***	0.81 ***	0.99 ***	1.03 ***	1.01 ***	0.72 ***
	0.05		0.08	0.19	0.14	0.21	0.06	0.08
ROW	-0.01		0.03	-0.12 ***	0.07 **	0.40 ***	-0.03 *	0.15 ***
	0.01		0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.02
Diff-in-Diff	0.11 **		0.47 **		-0.29		-0.47 ***	
	0.05		0.21		0.26		0.11	
Observations	40,186		88,415		97,106		429,488	

Notes: Table regresses change in the country-product quality on year-region-unbound versus bound interactions. The procedure to estimate quality is discussed in the Appendix. Bound refer to the HS codes in which China had greater than a 90 percent fill rate in the previous year. Phase I-III coefficients are for 2002, the year China entered the WTO, and Phase IV reports 2005 coefficients. The difference-in-differences are computed as the change in China's bound and unbound coefficients minus the analogous difference in ROW coefficients. Significance: \* 10 percent, \*\* 5 percent, \*\*\* 1 percent.

Table 15: ATC Phase-outs: Export Qualities and Binding Quotas

MFA Groups	Unit	2006 Quota	2007 Quota	2007 Quota Growth
Cotton fabrics	kg	61,948,000	69,692,000	12.5
T-shirts	no	540,204,000	594,000,000	10.0
Children's sub-limit	no	45,017,000	49,518,000	10.0
Pullovers	no	189,719,000	220,000,000	16.0
Men's trousers	no	338,923,000	383,000,000	13.0
Blouses	no	80,493,000	88,543,000	10.0
Bed linen	kg	15,795,000	17,770,000	12.5
Dresses	no	27,001,000	29,701,000	10.0
Brassieres	no	219,882,000	248,000,000	12.8
Table & kitchen linen	kg	12,349,000	13,892,000	12.5
Flax or ramie yarn	kg	4,740,000	5,214,000	10.0

Table 16: EU Safeguards on China's TC, 2006-07



Notes: Bound products are those with >90% fill rates one year prior to integration. Log scale approximates actual percentage changes. Red lines display the year in which quotas on the noted goods are phased out.

Figure 1: China's T&C Exports, by Phase




Figure 2: Fill Rates by Region, 1984-2004



Figure 3: Median Base Growth Rate by Region, 1990-2004




Figure 4: T&C Quantities, by Region




Figure 5: Exports to the U.S., 2000-2006, by Region