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CASE OF THE 1990 REDISTRICTING

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Ebonya L. Washington  
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**ABSTRACT**

Conventional wisdom and empirical academic research conclude that majority Black districts decrease Black representation by increasing conservatism in Congress. However, this research generally suffers from three limitations: 1) too low a level of aggregation 2) lack of a counterfactual and 3) failure to account for the endogeneity of the creation of majority minority districts. I compare congressional delegations of states that during the 1990 redistricting were under greater pressure to create majority minority districts with those under lesser pressure in a difference-in-difference framework. I find no evidence that the creation of majority minority districts leads to more conservative House delegations. In fact point estimates indicate that states that increased their share of majority Black districts saw their delegations grow increasingly liberal. I find similar results for majority Latino districts in the southwest. Thus I find no evidence for the common view that majority minority districts decrease minority representation in Congress.

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## I Introduction

In 1994 the Republican Party won a majority of seats in the United States House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years. The credit (or blame depending on political preference) for this feat has been directed, in part, at the large number of majority Black voter districts created in the preceding round of redistricting. The attribution reflects a long and widely held belief that the creation of majority minority districts moves congress in a more conservative direction. This view has been espoused prior to, during, and now after the 1990 redistricting in the face of more than a decade's worth of post-event data. During the redistricting period, the Republican Party rhetorically and financially supported the creation of the maximum number of majority minority districts possible.<sup>1</sup> Democratic state legislatures, on the other hand, largely wanted to create fewer majority minority districts than the Justice Department mandated.

Theoretically the impact of majority minority districts on the makeup of the state's congressional delegation is ambiguous, that ambiguity perhaps best illustrated by the fact that both the Republican Party and the NAACP support their creation. Majority Black districts generally elect Black Democratic Representatives, who vote more liberally than their White Democratic counterparts, and thus move the delegation in a more liberal direction. However, the uncertainty of the total impact of majority Black district creation on the ideological leaning of a state's entire House delegation stems from the impossibility of theoretically quantifying how candidate positioning and constituent vote choice respond to variation in district configuration.

Thus this question must be adjudicated empirically. And in fact there is a long line of empirical literature, cited by the Supreme Court and election law casebooks (Cox and Holden, forthcoming), supporting the Parties' view that majority minority districts benefit the Republican Party. However, this literature does not directly empirically estimate the impact of a state

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<sup>1</sup> To help maximize the number of majority minority districts created, the Republican National Committee developed and distributed software to minority groups to allow these groups to construct their own redistricting plans to submit to their state legislatures for consideration (Cunningham, 2001). Wrote Republican strategist Lee Atwater (1990), "Where minority districts currently exist, they must be maintained...where minority districts can be created they must be created."

redistricting plan that includes majority minority districts on the party affiliation and voting behavior of the representatives that that state sends to Congress. Instead, many of these studies use cross-sectional and/or panel data on select districts to show that as the percent of Black voters decreases in a district, the likelihood of electing a Republican increases and the voting record of the elected representative moves in a more conservative direction. (See for example Hill 1995, Lublin 1999, Bullock 1995 and Overby and Cosgrove 1996.) The authors then argue that, presumably because of nonlinearities in the relationship between constituent race and representatives' likelihood of voting liberally, the increased liberal voting in districts that gain Blacks is more than offset by the decrease in liberal voting in districts that lose Blacks. Thus these authors posit that there is a tradeoff between Black descriptive (representatives who look like them) and Black substantive (representatives who vote as they would vote) representation. (See for example Swain, 2006). There are three limitations to this type of analysis: 1) The analysis is performed at too low a level of aggregation. Because some districts are moving in a more liberal direction and others in a more conservative direction, one needs to aggregate to the state level to measure the full impact of the state's creation of majority Black districts. In fact Shotts (2003) finds at the state level that the number of representatives who vote to the left of the congressional median is increasing in the number of majority minority districts.<sup>2</sup> 2) These studies generally lack a control state from which we can understand how the state's House delegation would have evolved in the absence of the creation of majority Black districts.<sup>3</sup> 3) These studies do not account for potential bias due to the endogeneity of the decision to create majority Black districts.

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<sup>2</sup> Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996), who also work at the state level, simulate the characteristics of post-1990 state level delegations using pre-1990 data and conclude majority minority districts lead to more conservative state delegations.

<sup>3</sup> The contention that the increase in conservative voting in the congressional delegations of states that created majority minority districts is matched by an increase in conservative voting in the House as a whole was stated, but not formally tested, by Guinier (1995) and Engstrom (1995).

In this paper, I directly address the question of how majority minority districts impact Black representation by examining the characteristics of the delegation that a state sends to Congress before and after the increase in majority minority districts, and in relation to those states that are not mandated to increase their number of minority districts. I primarily focus on the southern United States where the Black population is large and the number of majority Black districts increased from six to 20 with the 1990 redistricting. I consider a variety of outcomes: the racial and party make-up of the delegation as well as how liberal the delegation's voting record is in general and with respect to those issues that are of greatest concern to minorities. My time frame is the five congressional sessions (10 years) before and after the 1990 redistricting which allows for examination of two exogenous shocks to the number of majority minority districts: 1) The initial charge to increase the share of majority minority districts and 2) The later order to dismantle more than half of these districts following court rulings declaring them unconstitutional because of their basis in race. Finally, I expand consideration to a second liberal leaning minority population: Latinos in the southwest.

Employing a simple difference-in-difference design comparing southern states that faced greater pressure to increase their share of majority minority districts with those southern states that faced no increased pressure, I find no evidence that the creation of these districts moved the state's delegation in a more conservative direction. I find that while majority Black districts significantly increased the number of Blacks in Congress, they did not significantly increase the number of Republicans or move the delegation's voting record to the right, generally or on those issues that are of greatest concern to Blacks. In fact point estimates indicate that the increase in majority minority districts was accompanied by a leftward movement in the state's delegation. This finding holds controlling for state demographics and state political trends, across definitions of what constitutes the "south," as well as across definitions of what constitutes a treatment state. Finally, I find that in the southwest, the creation of majority Latino districts also does not move the delegation in a more conservative direction.

One limitation of this work may be its generalizeability. This is a case study of a single redistricting period. However, it is the redistricting period in this country that saw the largest increase in the number of majority minority districts. The Republican takeover of the House two years after this redistricting is the most cited evidence for majority minority districts increasing congressional conservatism. I demonstrate that this historical event actually provides evidence against the conventional view.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section II I discuss the limitations of theoretical arguments on the impact of majority Black districts on delegation conservatism. In Section III I provide a history of the Voting Rights Act and in particular the 1982 amendment that led to the increase in majority minority districts post 1990. I detail data and methodology in Section IV, before presenting the empirical results in Section V. I conclude in Section VI.

## II Theory

In contrast to the conventional view, economic theory predicts that majority minority districts do not increase congressional conservatism. In fact, the optimal redistricting literature concludes that these districts weakly move a delegation in a more liberal direction.<sup>4</sup> Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999) model the decision of a partisan gerrymanderer, with no majority minority district requirement and certainty over voter behavior. In order for the gerrymanderer to create the maximum number of winning districts for his party, he must create as many districts as possible in which his party wins by one vote. Shotts (2001, 2002) extends the model to allow for a majority minority mandate. He argues that to a first approximation Blacks are Democrats. Therefore, the majority minority district constraint only binds on those Republican

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<sup>4</sup> An exception is Nakao (2011) with a microfounded probabilistic voting model that incorporates a primary in which vote choice is based solely on candidate race. The author finds the mandate reduces the number of congressional seats won by Democrats.

gerrymanderers who in the absence of the majority minority requirement would not create any districts that are majority Democratic.<sup>5</sup>

Friedman and Holden (2008) advance the optimal gerrymandering by allowing for uncertainty. They model the decision of a partisan gerrymanderer faced with a continuum of voter preferences about which the gerrymanderer receives a noisy signal. Absent a majority minority mandate, the authors show that with a sufficiently precise signal the gerrymanderer's optimal strategy is to "match slices," of the voting distribution from the outside in. In other words, the gerrymanderer creates the first district by pairing a measure of his party's most likely supporters with a slightly smaller measure of his party's least likely supporters. The gerrymanderer repeats the procedure using the remainder of the voter distribution for the second and subsequent districts. Cox and Holden (forthcoming), noting that Blacks are high probability Democrats, point out that the majority minority mandate binds, again, only on a Republican gerrymanderer, who, unconstrained, would pair Black voters with a larger measure of extremely likely Republicans.<sup>6</sup>

Given the theoretical predictions, why does conventional wisdom hold that an increase in the number of majority minority districts results in a net increase in the conservatism of the state's congressional delegation? The increase in conservatism, according to one argument, stems from the fact that both candidate positioning and constituent turnout and vote choice are endogenous to district configuration. Although endogenous behavioral responses are not modeled in the optimal redistricting literature, there is empirical evidence for their existence. Kan and Yang (2001) show that turnout is increasing in the ideological distance between candidates and that both turnout and vote choice decisions are predicted by feelings (e.g., hope, pride, anger,

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<sup>5</sup> They gerrymanderer creates no majority Democratic districts because there are enough Republican voters in the state to create only Republican majority districts. The constraint would not bind on Republican gerrymanderers, faced with a minority Republican constituency, who create, in the absence of the mandate, more Democratic majority districts than the number of majority minority districts required by the mandate.

<sup>6</sup> The conclusions of the optimal redistricting literature are not robust geographically constraints or to supermajority requirements. In practice during the 1990 redistricting the courts did not allow geographic constraints to impede the goal of increasing the number of majority minority districts; nor were there supermajority requirements.

fear) that potential voters hold toward candidates. Washington (2006) demonstrates that White voters are less likely to vote Democratic when the Democratic candidate is Black.

Although proponents of conventional wisdom point to endogenous political responses to argue that majority minority districts increase conservatism, it is not theoretically possible to sign the aggregate effects of all such responses. Not only are the possible responses numerous, they also, to an extent unknown, offset one another, as some districts gain Black voters while others lose Black voters. Thus the theoretical impact of the creation of majority minority districts on delegation ideology is ambiguous. Before turning to the empirical evidence on this question, in the next section, I briefly sketch the pertinent institutional details of the Voting Rights Act. Before turning to the empirical evidence on this question, I detail the congressional act that led to this controversial increase in majority minority districts.

### III History of the Voting Rights Act

The lengths to which the southern White establishment reached, following Reconstruction, to prevent Blacks from exercising the franchise are well documented (Key, 1949). Literacy tests, taxes and all White primaries (in what were essentially one-party states) were some of the more humane obstacles when compared to barriers erected through violence. The iconic image of this brutality is the March 7, 1965 footage of Alabama police officers using tear gas, billy clubs and whips on peaceful demonstrators attempting to march from Selma to Montgomery in support of Black voting rights. Within days of that “Bloody Sunday” President Johnson sent the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to Congress.

The VRA is considered one of the most successful pieces of civil rights legislation in US history (Grofman and Handley, 1998). Two years following its passage Black voter registration rates in all southern states exceeded 50 percent, compared with a low among southern states of less than eight percent in Mississippi just prior to the legislation’s passage. Black voter turnout increased commensurately (United State Commission on Civil Rights, 1968).



Today, we speak of political divisions as being “under the Voting Rights Act” or not. However, all political units are forbidden from engaging in discriminatory electoral procedures<sup>7</sup> under this act. Where the law differs for some jurisdictions is in regards to Section V of the legislation which mandates preclearance by the United States Department of Justice for any electoral procedure changes, including the one most pertinent for my purposes—the redrawing of districts for US Congress. The preclearance provision was aimed at preventing states from circumventing the spirit of the law as some southern states had done to keep de facto all White primaries after the practice had been disallowed de jure (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1984).<sup>8</sup> The decision of whether a political division was subject to the requirements of Section V was first based on the 1964 presidential election. Entities in which under 50 percent of age eligible citizens registered or voted and in which an unlawful test or device, such as a literacy test, was used to determine eligibility for voter registration were subject to Section V. By this criterion the southern states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia and many counties in North Carolina were placed under Section V. During the 1975 renewal of the VRA, when Congress looked to the 1972 presidential election and added the criterion of under 50 percent registered or voting, five percent or more of the population from a single language minority and a failure to provide electoral materials in said language, Texas and parts of Florida were added to the list. When even one political jurisdiction within a state is subject to Section V, the state’s entire Congressional redistricting plan must be pre-cleared. (See Table 1 for a list of the southern states and their pre-and post reform majority minority districts by treatment status.)

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<sup>7</sup> According to the VRA, discriminatory electoral procedures include but are not limited to literacy tests, withholding information from minority voters or potential candidates, eliminating political jurisdictions or redrawing political boundaries to prevent minorities from attaining office.

<sup>8</sup> Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina tried to divorce primaries from state governance so that laws that were binding on the state would not be binding on the primary procedure. Alabama and Louisiana strengthened other barriers to Black voting (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1968).

While the act seemed to have a large immediate impact on minority registration and voting, an increase in minorities holding elected office, particularly at the federal level and particularly in the south was slower coming. The 97<sup>th</sup> congress which began in 1981 included 14 Black congressional representatives from outside of the south (4.3 percent of non-southern representatives) and only three from within (3 percent of southern representatives), despite the fact that the percentage of Blacks in the population of the south at the time was approximately double that of any other region.<sup>9</sup> The speed of electoral change was accelerated by the 1982 renewal of the Voting Rights Act when Congress, reacting to the Supreme Court's requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate "discriminatory intent" in order to prevail in a voting rights discrimination case (Presto, 2004), amended the act to outlaw not "discriminatory intent" but "discriminatory results" (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1984). This amendment, like all changes to the act, affected covered and non-covered states differently. First, because non-covered states already had a greater share of Black representatives, particularly relative to their Black populations, the amendment required fewer changes of these states. (See Table 1 for the number of majority Black districts and representatives, by state, before and after the 1990 redistricting.) Second, because of the need for pre-clearance, covered states generally have to comply with new amendments first. In this case, their post-1990 census redistricting plans would have to comply with the new standard. Uncovered states would not have to alter their redistricting plans for compliance until they were on the losing end of a lawsuit on the matter (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 2005).

When the Democratically controlled southern state legislators sat down to hash out the new congressional districts, they understood the 1982 ammendment to mean that they must increase the number of majority minority districts in order to increase the number of minorities in

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<sup>9</sup> The 1980 percentage of Blacks in the population was 18.2 percent in the south, 5.2 percent in the west, 9.1 percent in the north central and 9.9 percent in the northeast region (Gibson and King, 2002).

Congress.<sup>10</sup> However, they did not anticipate the extent to which the Justice Department required they go. The covered state of North Carolina is a good example. The state's initial plan, supported by all minority members of the state legislature, created the first majority Black federal congressional district in the state. Eight of the remaining 11 districts would be "Black influence" districts where Blacks comprised 15-20 percent of the population. The Democrats selected this plan over a plan developed by the Republican minority, which created two majority Black districts. The creation of two such districts was also supported by the ACLU and NAACP. The Justice Department rejected the North Carolina state plan by pointing to the Republican plan as evidence that a map more favorable to the election of Blacks could be created. Similar scenarios played out in other southern covered states. In Georgia the state legislature wanted to increase their number of majority Black districts from one to two and allow for Black influence in the remaining districts. The Justice Department insisted on three majority minority districts. And in Virginia the plan supported by the Black governor Douglas Wilder and the Democratic state legislature was rejected because of the existence of a Republican plan that created more majority Black districts (Cunningham, 2001). Black Representative Craig Washington (D-TX) said at the time, "If you have four districts in a state like Alabama, for example, with a sufficiently large Black population to neutralize Republicans on some issues, and if you can create one Black district by gathering up all the Blacks in such a fashion that they elect a Black person to congress, and in the process you lose the leverage that you had in the three other districts, then that's foolish to me. Every time one person votes for the things that I'm for, and that the Black community is for, the other three from the state will probably vote against them." (Swain, 2006).

Thus Democrats were forced, by the Republican administration, to create a larger number of majority Black districts than they felt were optimal. Following redistricting the number of

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<sup>10</sup> Their anticipation was based in part on Black voters' successful challenge of Arkansas' 1980 state legislative districting plan. In 1989, a federal judge sided with the plaintiffs not because the plan discriminated against Blacks, but because a plan more favorable to the election of Blacks could be drawn (Bullock and Dunn, 1999).

majority Black districts increased from three to 16 in covered southern districts and from three to four in uncovered states. The number of majority Black districts increased in all southern covered states except one.<sup>11</sup> (See Table I.) All of these new Black districts sent Blacks to the 103<sup>rd</sup> congress.

In order to create so many majority Black districts compactness had to be violated.<sup>12</sup> Again, North Carolina is a good example. The state's majority Black 12<sup>th</sup> district (See Figure I) snaked along I-85 (at times no wider than the highway). Said one candidate, "I love the district because I can drive down I-85 with both car doors open and hit every person in the district" (Barone and Ujifusa, 1994). Bullock and Dunn (1999) quantify what they see as "new extremes in creative cartography" by noting that the number of counties split into two districts increased by a factor of two (Florida) to 13 (South Carolina) following redistricting in seven southern states.

Their irregular shapes made these districts particularly vulnerable to legal challenges. Duke law professor Robinson Everett wrote that he was "incredulous" when he saw the shapes of North Carolina's new districts; they seemed to "defy compactness and contiguousness requirements". When he learned that the districts were drawn to increase the number of Blacks in Congress he was concerned that the districts violated White voter's equal protection. Everett, himself White, and four other White co-plaintiffs filed suit (Everett, 2001). Everett's case made it to the Supreme Court where he eventually triumphed. The state was forced to create new district boundaries. As a result the 12<sup>th</sup> district's Black population fell from 57 to 36 percent (See Figure 1) beginning with the election for the 106<sup>th</sup> congress. Again, similar scenarios played out in other covered states. In six years 7 of the 13 new majority-Black districts (spanning five of eight

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<sup>11</sup> Mississippi with a 20 percent Black population and five districts both before and after the 1990 census already had one district. Increasing to two, should the second have elected a Black to congress as well, would have increased the fraction of Blacks in the congressional delegation above the fraction of Blacks in the residential population.

<sup>12</sup> Historical convention and in some cases state regulations formally require districts to be contiguous and compact. Kousser (1995) argues that a force leading to more irregularly shaped districts in this round of redistricting was the equality of population requirements imposed by the Supreme Court's decision in *Karcher v. Daggett* in 1983.

southern covered states that had created them) were redrawn such that Blacks were no longer a majority. But, perhaps because of the power of their incumbency status, six of the seven Black Congress people were reelected by majority White districts (Grofman, Handley and Lublin, 2000-2001).<sup>13</sup> (See Table 1 for state by state changes in districting and Black representation.)

After laying out data and methodology in the next section, I ask whether this increase in Black descriptive representation was accompanied by a decrease in Black substantive representation, as often argued.

#### IV Data and Methodology

In order to evaluate the impact of majority minority districts on minority representation I create the following measures.

*Descriptive Representation:* As descriptive representation simply considers whether representatives share demographic characteristics with their constituents, I measure the level of Black descriptive representation by calculating the share of the state's representatives who are Black.<sup>14</sup> (Means and standard deviations for all outcome variables can be found in Table II.)

*Substantive Representation:* A group is represented substantively, when the representative works to promote the political goals of the group. This is a more nebulous concept to measure than descriptive representation. Thus I present a variety of measures.

- 1) Democratic Representatives: In two-party elections, Black Americans cast their votes in favor of the Democratic candidate 70 to 90% of the time (McDermott 1998). During my sample period, 79 percent of Black Southern respondents to the National Election Studies (NES) claimed an affiliation with the Democratic Party, where only 45 percent of White

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<sup>13</sup> Cleo Fields (D-LA) chose not to run again.

<sup>14</sup> This information was collected using the Congressional Research Service's *African American Members of the United States Congress: 1980-2008* available at <http://senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30378.pdf> and the United States House of Representative's Black Members in Congress website <http://baic.house.gov/>.

- southerners stated such an affiliation.<sup>15</sup> Therefore the first measure of substantive representation is the share Democrat of the state congressional delegation.
- 2) Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Scores: Black NES respondents identify as significantly more liberal than non-Blacks, even controlling for party. Therefore the second measure of substantive representation is the representatives' Americans for Democratic Action scores.<sup>16</sup> The ADA, a liberal leaning interest group, typically selects 20 pieces of legislation critical to liberals in each chamber in each year and awards congress members five points for a "correct" vote on each of these bills. Scores range from 0 (completely conservative) to 100 (completely liberal). Across the sample period, House Democrats averaged a score of 73, while Republicans averaged a 15.<sup>17</sup>
  - 3) Leadership Conference for Civil Rights (LCCR) scores: While on average Blacks are more liberal than non-Blacks, there are some issues for which the liberal view is not the Black view.<sup>18</sup> The LCCR, another liberal leaning interest group, calculates a voting score, based on 10-20 votes per congressional session that it considers crucial to promoting civil rights in this country. This score may better capture the issues of importance to Black Americans.
  - 4) Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) scores: A second measure of congressional voting on those issues of greatest importance to Black Americans is the extent to which a representative votes in accordance with the Congressional Black Caucus, as in Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996). I present results using only those ballots in which the

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<sup>15</sup> Authors' calculations.

<sup>16</sup> Available at <http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php>.

<sup>17</sup> I do not adjust ADA, LCCR and CBC scores for comparability across years as prescribed by Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1999). Such an adjustment would be inappropriate in this analysis because it relies on restrictions to the evolution of a representative's mean preferences across years. I want to allow a representative's voting record to evolve freely with district composition. Nonetheless, results are robust to using Poole and Rosenthal's (2007) cross-year comparable dw-nominate scores available at [www.voteview.com](http://www.voteview.com).

<sup>18</sup> Eric John Narcisse (in Cunningham, 2001) suggests that abortion, gay rights, school prayer and the death penalty are such issues.

CBC itself is in at least 80 percent agreement.<sup>19</sup> Founded in 1969 by the then thirteen Black members of Congress, the CBC has as its goals “to positively influence the course of events pertinent to African Americans and others of similar experience and situation, and to achieve greater equity for persons of African descent in the design and content of domestic and international programs and services.”<sup>20</sup> Every Black member of Congress, since the CBC’s founding, with the exception of JC Watts (R-OK), has been a member.<sup>21</sup>

The correlation amongst these substantive representation measures ranges from .57 (share Democrat and average ADA score) and .82 (average LCCR and ADA scores).

Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran argue that these various voting scores can best be thought of as probabilities of voting in favor of legislation supported by the ADA, LCCR or CBC respectively. As probabilities these scores can be averaged meaningfully by state/congressional term to create the likelihood that the average member of the delegation is supportive of the views that minority voters support. Thus I collapse these measures to state/congressional terms means. I focus on the mean and not the median because I am interested in the extent to which the House delegation represents or reflects the positions of Black voters. Given Blacks’ position in the left tails of the population’s ideological distribution, Black voters are never going to share the bliss point with the median voter in congress. Nonetheless, the more liberal is the Congress as a whole the more likely is the introduction of legislation that minorities support and the greater likelihood of its passage given logrolling.

The fact that the state/congressional term is the unit of observation is the key difference between this study and most previous studies. The difference in results stems from the aggregation and not from data differences. If I run the regressions of outcomes on district percent

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<sup>19</sup> Data on how each member of Congress voted in each roll call vote are available on Poole and Rosenthal’s website [www.voteview.com](http://www.voteview.com)

<sup>20</sup> Goals taken from the Congressional Black Caucus Website (<http://www.cbcfinc.org/About/CBC/index.html>).

<sup>21</sup> Non-Black members of Congress are not permitted to join. Membership restrictions obtained in a communication with Myra Dandridge, spokesperson for the Congressional Black Caucus, July 7, 2006.

Black controlling for district and time effects, I can replicate previous findings that as the percent of Black residents increases so too does the likelihood of electing a Black, a Democrat and a more liberal leaning representative. But as I argued previously, such an analysis does not yield the answer to the question of how majority minority districts shape a state's House delegation because the creation of these districts serves to increase the percent Black in some districts while simultaneously decreasing percent Black in others. I also note that when I include the square of percent Black in these same regressions the square enters positively and significantly. As the Black population increases the congressperson becomes increasingly liberally at an increasing rate. The non-linearity suggest that moving Black voters from one district to another would increase average liberalism as the increase in liberalism in the receiving district is greater than the decrease in liberalism in the sending district. This previews my findings that in the aggregate, point estimates indicate that the creation of majority minority districts increases the liberal leaning of the state's House delegation.

In the analysis, I consider ten congresses spanning twenty years. The 98<sup>th</sup>-102<sup>nd</sup> (1983-1992) fall in the period before elections were based on the 1990 redistricting which dramatically increased the number of majority minority districts. The 103<sup>rd</sup> -107<sup>th</sup> (1993-2002) congresses fall in the post period. I limit focus to the 15 former slaveholding states and run regressions of the form of:

$$(1) \text{ Outcome}_{st} = \alpha + B_1(\text{vra}) + B_2(\text{post}) + B_3(\text{vra}*\text{post}) + \gamma_s + \delta_t + X_{st} + u_{st}$$

where *Outcome* is one of the five representation measures laid out above. *VRA* is an indicator for whether the state falls under Section V of the Voting Rights Act. Because of judicial review, these states faced greater pressure to construct a 1990 redistricting plan that included more majority minority districts. *Post* is an indicator for the period in which 1990 census redistricting applies. The interaction *post\*vra* is the key independent variable of interest. A positive significant  $B_3$  in the specification for Black descriptive representation and negative significant  $B_3$ 's in the specifications for Black substantive representation would indicate that the common wisdom is



correct: The majority minority districts created in the 1990s had the perverse impact of increasing Black descriptive representation while decreasing Black substantive representation. This pattern of coefficients would support the view that the creation of majority Black districts moves the state's congressional delegation in a more conservative direction.  $\gamma_s$  and  $\delta_t$  are a vector of state and congressional term fixed effects respectively which control for fixed differences in states' political climates and for session to session movements in regional political leanings.

The assumption that allows for the interpretation of  $B_3$  as the causal impact of majority minority districts on the composition of the state House delegation is that absent the increase in majority minority districts in the covered states, the two sets of states would have seen their representatives' parties and voting behavior evolve in similar patterns, conditional on control variables. To increase the credibility of that assumption I include  $X$ , a vector of time varying state level controls which include percent Black in the population and the percent of the state delegation that is new in the most basic specification. Representatives with a larger share of Black voters tend to vote more liberally. (See Grose, 2005 for a summary of this literature.) New representatives have also been shown to vote differently than veterans (Stratmann, 2000). In what I refer to subsequently as specification 2 this vector is expanded to include demographic characteristics that predict the state's political leaning: state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates and these measures for the state's Black population in particular.<sup>22</sup> These additional covariates are calculated using March Current Population Survey data. Specification 3

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<sup>22</sup> In the tabled results I do not control directly for the political leaning of the state population so as not to control away the sort of endogenous political behavior response that might lead to a correlation between majority minority districts and conservative leaning of the congressional delegation. One concern with such an omission is that in the post period the voters of the covered districts could be wanting the Congress to move in a relatively more liberal direction while the creation of the majority minority districts is pulling the delegation in a more conservative direction and because of these opposing forces I obtain a null finding. However, this concern is assuaged by two findings 1) Results are robust to the inclusion of the Democratic share of the two party presidential vote and 2) By both the presidential vote and the NES liberal conservative scale covered districts are relatively more conservative in the post period than in the pre-period as compared to uncovered districts.

includes the covariates of the previous specification in addition to state\*year linear trends to allow for states to be trending differently politically overtime.

Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for serial correlation and dependence within state observations. Because small numbers of clusters tends to lead to over rejection of the null, I follow Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) in determining significance based on a t distribution with degrees of freedom one less than the number of clusters.

## V Results

The basic results are illustrated in Figure II. Panel A illustrates the large increase in majority minority districts that occurred in covered states between the 102<sup>nd</sup> and 103<sup>rd</sup> congresses. Where uncovered states (dotted line) increased their share majority minority districts an average of two percentage points, the covered states (solid line) increased from an average of five to an average of seventeen percent majority minority districts across these two congresses. Court challenges decreased that share in the 105<sup>th</sup> and 106<sup>th</sup> congresses. Nonetheless, after the 103<sup>rd</sup> congress the share of majority minority districts in covered states does not fall below that of the uncovered states or below the pre-period share in covered states. The mandate to increase the share of majority minority districts had the long lasting impact of doing exactly that.

The goal of the majority minority district mandate was to increase the number of Blacks in congress. It worked, panel B shows. The share of Black representatives among uncovered districts remained basically flat across the ten congresses. In the covered states there was a small increase in share Black in the pre-period as the result of majority Black districts created in the 1980 redistricting. These districts were represented by incumbent Whites. When the Whites retired, Blacks won these seats. However, there is a stark increase in percent Black in the covered states between the 102<sup>nd</sup> and 103<sup>rd</sup> congresses. Share Black increased from five to 17 percent as all the newly Black districts sent Blacks to congress. And even as some majority Black districts were dismantled later in the redistricting period, the now incumbent Black legislators (save one as explained in Section III) were reelected by their now majority White districts, the graph further

illustrates with the small decrease in share Black in the delegation between the 105<sup>th</sup> and 106<sup>th</sup> congresses.

Was this increase in descriptive representation accompanied by a decrease in substantive representation? The remaining panels of the table indicate that the answer to this question is no. Panel C illustrates what those who argue that majority minority districts aid Republicans often note: the share of Democratic representatives in the covered delegations decreased in the post-mandate period. However, the figure also demonstrates that the decline in Democratic share was similar (and in fact slightly greater) in the uncovered states during this time. Panel D addresses the same issue looking at the delegations' voting records as rated by the liberal leaning ADA. Here we see that average liberal rating remains basically flat in the covered states, while falling in the uncovered states. By this measure as well, covered states appear relatively more liberal in the post period. Thus Figure II suggests that the increase in majority minority districts was accompanied by a relative increase in Blacks in the delegation but not in conservatism. The figure supports the contention of Guinier (1995) and Engstrom (1995) that the increase in the share of Republicans in congress was due to a national movement toward conservatism and not to the new redistricting rules.

The figures further provide support for the identifying assumption of the quantitative analysis that follows. In order to identify the causal impact of the creation of the majority minority districts I assume that control and treatment states would have seen similar trends in the party mix and voting patterns of their legislative delegations in the absence of the increase in majority minority districts in treatment states. Panels C and D demonstrate that in the pre-period (before the increase in majority minority districts in treatment states in the 103<sup>rd</sup> congress) the two groups of states saw similar trends in their delegations' behavior.

I turn to the formal results in the first column of Table III where I present estimates from regressions of the form of (1). The share of Black representatives in the average state delegation increased by a significant 13 percentage points in covered states relative to uncovered states in

the post period, indicates the first cell. (Each cell in the table presents the estimated coefficient for *vra\*post* from a different regression.) The result is robust to including additional demographic controls (column 2) and state trends (column 3). In the remaining rows I examine Black substantive representation. As demonstrated in the second row there is no evidence that the creation of majority minority districts was accompanied by a decrease in Democrats in the delegation. In fact, point estimates, across the three specifications, while insignificant, indicate an increase of five to 13 percentage points. In the next row I examine the impact of majority minority districts on the liberal leaning of the votes of the state's delegation. Once again point estimates indicate an increase in liberalism, here about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a standard deviation. Turning to the issues of particular interest to the Black community as captured by the LCCR and CBC scores, we find a similar pattern of insignificant yet consistently positive increases in liberalism. While standard errors in the Democratic and CBC specifications are large and I cannot reject substantial decreases in liberalism by these measures, the tighter point estimates for the remaining substantive representation measures coupled with the fact that all point estimates are positive provides additional evidence against the contention that majority minority districts move delegations in a more conservative direction.

To put the point estimates in perspective it is helpful to note that the increase in the ADA score is higher than expected based solely on the change in party composition. The five percentage point increase in share Democratic times 62, the difference in average ADA score between Democrats and Republicans in my sample period, yields an expected increase in ADA of only 3.1. The larger actual increase in ADA score is due in part to the fact that majority minority districts result in the election of Black Democrats who are more liberal than the White Democrats they replace. Further evidence of this is the fact that there is not a simple mean shift in the voting record in the treated delegations, but there is an increase in voting dispersion as well. The final row of the table presents results using the standard deviation of ADA score as an outcome and shows a positive (and significant in two specifications) coefficient on *vra\*post*.

As majority minority districts were designed to increase representation for Blacks, it is important to examine their impact on this population in particular. In the second half of the table I examine impacts on the average southern Black by weighting regressions by Black population.<sup>23</sup> Results are robust to this change in weighting. The treated increase their share Black representatives by about ten percentage points, an estimate which is significant in two of three specifications. And while the share Democratic results are unstable in sign across specifications, the results on political leaning of the delegation are consistently in a more liberal direction. In fact in the final specification, accounting for state-trends, we see a significant increase in the ADA and CBC scores.

I examine robustness to alternative definitions of treatment and control states in Table IV. In the first column I exclude the border states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, all control states. The fact that these states were not part of the confederacy suggests that their historic relationship with Blacks may be different from states of the deeper south

To further ensure that results are not driven by changing differences in culture in treatment and control states, in column 2 I limit the treatment states to Texas and Florida, the two southern states which fall under Section V not because of past transgressions against Black voters but because of a failure to offer Spanish language materials. I once again include border states. This specification matches treatment and control states, neither of which in 1965 was judged as having discriminatory voting practices against Black Americans. Results are robust to both of these changes in sample. Across the two samples there is a significant increase in Black representation of about ten percentage points, a noisily estimated impact on party composition and while results on the liberal leanings of the vote are significant in only a third of specifications, they are consistently positive. Thus once again results provide no evidence of majority minority districts moving the House delegation in a more conservative direction.

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<sup>23</sup> The states in the sample with the largest number of Blacks are Texas, Florida and Georgia.

In the final robustness check of the table I consider a different measure of pressure to create majority minority districts. Instead of Section V status, I consider a state as under pressure in the post period if the share of Black Representatives in the 102<sup>nd</sup> congress is less than the share Black in the population and if another Black Representative could be added without increasing the number of Black Representatives over parity. (“Rough proportionality,” Cox and Holden, 2010 argue make it less likely that a court would require that the state create an additional majority minority district.) Under this definition all states retain the same pressured/not pressured status with two exceptions. Maryland with 12.5 percent Black representatives, a 25 percent Black population and eight districts is not under VRA but is considered pressured by the new definition. Mississippi, covered, with 20 percent Black representatives, 36 percent Black population and 5 districts, is considered not pressured. As indicated by the consistently positive coefficients in column 3, the result of majority minority districts failing to decrease the liberalness of the delegation is robust to this change.

Up to this point, I have focused on the impact of the increase in majority minority districts mandated by Congress and the Justice Department. While the focus on this simple dd is driven by power considerations, in an additional robustness check I consider a second exogenous shock to the share of Black districts: the court ordered dismantling of several Black districts. As indicated in Figure II, this dismantling primarily took place between the 105<sup>th</sup> and 106<sup>th</sup> congresses. In Table V I run an expanded version of equation 1 in which I include the triple interaction of covered, post and a dummy for the 105<sup>th</sup>-107<sup>th</sup> congresses to understand whether state delegations moved in a more liberal direction following the elimination of several majority minority districts.<sup>24</sup> Table V indicates that the answer is no. When the share of majority minority districts increases the share Democratic in the delegation increases as well and when the number of majority minority districts decreases so does the share Democratic. Results are insignificant,

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<sup>24</sup> The sample here is all southern states. Regressions are unweighted.

but robust in sign and magnitude across specifications and across measures of substantive representation as indicated by the ADA results in the remainder of the table.

Thus I find robust evidence that the increase in majority minority districts did not lead to a decline in Black substantive representation. The pre-trend graphical analysis suggests that the identification strategy is sound, although, one can never prove the identifying assumption. I note, however, that in order to maintain the argument that the majority minority districts created in the 1990s decreased Black representation one would have to argue that my results are biased upwards. In other words, one would have to believe, that in the absence of the increase in majority minority districts, treatment states—historically more antagonistic toward Blacks—would have trended in an even more liberal direction relative to controls. This seems unlikely.

#### *Majority Latino districts*

In the previous section I showed that there was no evidence that majority Black districts led to increased conservatism of southern states' delegations. The policy also impacted Latino voters. In this section I ask whether majority Latino districts increased conservatism in the delegations from southwestern states. Latinos share several characteristics with Blacks that are relevant to political efficacy. Like Blacks, Latinos are more liberal than average. Sixty-one percent of southwestern Latino respondents to the NES during the sample period identified as Democrats. Among non-Latinos the figure was 47 percent. Mexican Americans in the southwest in particular have suffered a history of lynching (Carrigan, 2003) and segregation (Ruiz, 2001). Latinos are a protected class. And in regards to the Voting Rights Act, states may be covered under Section V based on a historical failure to provide bilingual materials to a group who comprises five percent or more of an area's population. Arizona, Texas and parts of California<sup>25</sup> are covered for that reason. The remaining states that were formerly Mexican territory (Colorado,

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<sup>25</sup> Kings, Merced and Yuba counties are covered for failure to provide bilingual materials. Monterey and Yuba are covered because of the use of an illegal test or device.

Nevada, New Mexico and Utah) are not. (See Table VI for a list of sample states and their share of majority Latino districts and representatives over time.)

In Figure III I examine graphically how the congressional delegation of southwestern states changed with the increase in majority Latino districts. I focus on the southwest where the presence of Latinos is arguably more exogenous than in the remainder of the country. In this area Latino history is long and the Latino population is large, which makes the analysis comparable to that of Blacks in the southern portion of the country. As indicated in Panel A of the figure there were no majority Latino districts in uncovered states across the sample period. The covered states in the southwest, like those in the south, saw a large increase in majority minority districts from .09 to .18 between the 102<sup>nd</sup> and 103<sup>rd</sup> congresses. And unlike in the south the vast majority of these districts remained intact until the next redistricting. Turning to the question of descriptive representation in Panel B while covered states are increasing their share Latino in their delegation over the sample period (especially in relation to the uncovered states where share Latino is decreasing), there is no clear jump between the 102<sup>nd</sup> and 103<sup>rd</sup> districts when redistricting took place. This is because White incumbents ran and won in many of these newly created districts. Thus for example in California it wasn't until the last congress of the redistricting period that Latinos represented all of the majority Latino districts.

In the remainder of the figure I examine whether this increase in majority Latino districts decreased Latino substantive representation. Like for Blacks, the answer seems to be no. While the graphs are not as smooth as for the southern sample that included more states, Panel C does indicate that the fraction of Democratic representatives is basically flat in the covered states across the entire sample period. The change in Democratic composition in the control states jumps a bit from congress to congress but seems to show a relative decrease in share Democratic in the 103<sup>rd</sup> and later congresses. This pattern is echoed in Panel D where the outcome is ADA score. Relative to uncovered states, covered states seem to move in a more liberal direction after the increase in the number of majority minority districts.



This finding is robust to the addition of controls in regression analysis as shown in Table VII. The table indicates that following the increase in majority minority districts the share of Latino districts increased in covered states or was basically flat, when considered relative to trend. Meanwhile there is no evidence of a decrease in Latino substantive representation. Once again point estimates on share Democratic, average ADA score and average agreement with congressional Latinos indicate exactly the reverse. In fact there is a significant increase in substantive representation according to that last measure in two of three specifications.<sup>26</sup>

#### VI Conclusion

With the 1982 renewal, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in a manner that encouraged the creation of more majority minority districts. Both civil rights group and the Republican Party saw the amended legislation as a boon to their cause. In fact the Republican Party and many political scientists see the increased majority minority districts as responsible at least in part for the Republicans' winning back control of the House in 1994. Thus the common view is that majority minority districts trade off descriptive representation for substantive representation. They increase the fraction of minorities in Congress, while moving Congress in a more conservative direction.

I find that this trade off did not exist following the redistricting that resulted in the largest increase in majority minority districts in US history. While majority Black districts increased the number of Blacks in congress, they did not increase the number of Republicans or produce more conservative state delegations. In fact, most point estimates indicate an increase in delegation liberalism both for majority Black districts in the south and for majority Latino districts in the southwest. In summary, I find no support for the view that majority minority districts decrease minority representation.

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<sup>26</sup> The results are robust to weighting states by Latino population and to changing the sample to those states whose 1990 population was at least 10 percent Latino.

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Table I: Change in the Number of Majority Black Districts and Black Representatives in Southern States across Congresses

			102 <sup>nd</sup> congress (pre-1990 redistricting)		103 <sup>rd</sup> congress (post-1990 redistricting)		107 <sup>th</sup> congress (post-1990 redistricting)	
	Reason Section V	1990 percent Black	Majority Black Districts	Black Representatives	Majority Black Districts	Black Representatives	Majority Black Districts	Black Representatives
<i>States Under VRA Section V</i>								
Alabama	Blacks	25	0/7	0/7	1/7	1/7	1/7	1/7
Florida	Latinos	14	0/19	0/19	3/23	3/23	2/23	3/23
Georgia	Blacks	27	1/10	1/10	3/11	3/11	1/11	3/11
Louisiana	Blacks	31	1/8	1/8	2/7	2/7	1/7	1/7
Mississippi	Blacks	36	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
North Carolina	Blacks	22	0/11	0*/11	2/11	2/12	1/12	2/12
South Carolina	Blacks	30	0/6	0/6	1/6	1/6	1/6	1/6
Texas	Latinos	12	0/27	1/27	2/30	2/30	0/30	2/30
Virginia	Blacks	19	0/10	0/10	1/11	1/11	1/11	1/11
<i>States not Under VRA Section V</i>								
Arkansas		16	0/4	0/4	0/4	0/4	0/4	0/4
Delaware		17	0/1	0/1	0/1	0/1	0/1	0/1
Kentucky		7	0/7	0/7	0/6	0/6	0/6	0/6
Maryland		25	1/8	1/8	2/8	2/8	2/8	2/8
Missouri		11	1/9	2/9	1/9	2/9	1/9	1/9
Tennessee		16	1/9	1/9	1/9	1/9	1/9	1/9

Sources: 1990 percent black from census using American Fact Finder. Majority minority districts, based on the racial makeup of the population at the time of the 1990 census, from various issues of the *Almanac of American Politics* and Grofman, Handley and Lublin (2000-2001). Black members of congress from the Congressional Research Service's *African American Members of the United States Congress: 1980-2008* available at <http://senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30378.pdf> and the United States House of Representative's Black Members in Congress website <http://baic.house.gov/>.

\*Eva Clayton (D-NC) served during only two months of the 102<sup>nd</sup> congress, following the death of the incumbent.

Table II: Summary Statistics of Average State Representative Characteristics (Standard Deviation in Parentheses)

	All Southern States	All Southern States (Black Population Weighted)	Non Border States	Excluding Black Treatment	Former Mexican Territory States
Black	.088 (.090)	.103 (.090)	.086 (.086)	.074 (.082)	
Latino					.081 (.151)
Democratic	.558 (.213)	.554 (.181)	.565 (.176)	.556 (.225)	.396 (.192)
ADA score	37.7 (12.6)	37.0 (10.4)	34.9 (8.2)	42.4 (13.9)	37.0 (17.6)
Standard Deviation of ADA score	30.8 (7.4)	31.8 (7.0)	30.4 (7.2)	31.8 (7.1)	34.9 (12.5)
LCCR score	49.3 (14.0)	48.0 (11.8)	46.5 (10.7)	53.7 (14.9)	
Agreement with CBC	.622 (.088)	.616 (.078)	.608 (.072)	.638 (.096)	
Agreement with Latino congress persons					.639 (.111)
States in Sample:	AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MO, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA	AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MO, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA	AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA	AR, DE, FL, KY, MD, MO, TN, TX	AZ, CA, CO, NM, NV, TX, UT

Notes: In the first two columns of statistics N=150, with the exception of standard deviation where N=140. Delaware has only one representative. In the third column N=110, in the fourth N=80 (70) and in the final column N=70.

Table III: Impact of Increased Majority Minority Districts on State Representative Characteristics

(Each cell presents the coefficient on covered\*post)

	Southern States (unweighted)			Southern States (Black population weighted)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black	.134*** (.028)	.14*** (.03)	.1** (.041)	.119*** (.033)	.129*** (.035)	.081 (.052)
Democratic	.052 (.124)	.067 (.14)	.13 (.147)	-.055 (.077)	-.059 (.084)	.051 (.069)
ADA score	9.6 (5.8)	11.0 (6.8)	13.2 (7.7)	4.0 (3.2)	3.6 (3.0)	9.2* (3.8)
LCCR score	9.3 (5.7)	10.0 (6.4)	17.4 (9.0)	4.1 (3.4)	3.0 (3.8)	11.8** (4.9)
CBC score	.049 (.041)	.055 (.05)	.067 (.063)	.013 (.026)	.007 (.025)	.032 (.032)
Standard Deviation of ADA score	8.9** (3.0)	8.4** (3.1)	4.8 (4.7)	6.3** (2.7)	6.3** (2.7)	3.8 (4.0)

Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and controls for percent of state population that is Black and percent of state delegation that is new. Specification 2 also includes controls for state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates and those measures for state Black population. Specification 3 includes those controls plus state/year linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Significance levels determined based on  $t_x$  distribution where  $x$  is defined as the number of clusters less one. N=150 (140 for standard deviation of ADA score; Delaware has only one representative). \*\*\*denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level and \* at the 10 percent level.

Table IV: Impact of Increased Majority Minority Districts on State Representative Characteristics, Robustness to Sampling Changes

	Non-Border States	Excluding Black Treatment	Treatment Based on Distance from Parity in 102 <sup>nd</sup>
Black	.125*** (.025)	.086** (.036)	.137*** (.029)
Democratic	-.052 (.049)	.114 (.108)	.079 (.142)
ADA score	4.3 (3.3)	12.1* (5.7)	10.8 (6.1)
LCCR score	4.3 (3.9)	14.8** (5.9)	8.9 (6.6)
CBC score	.018 (.02)	.082 (.037)	.057 (.045)
Standard Deviation of ADA score	7.5*** (1.5)	4.3 (2.9)	8.2** (3.5)

Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and controls for percent of state population that is Black and percent of state delegation that is new. Significance levels determined based on  $t_x$  distribution where  $x$  is defined as the number of clusters less one. In column one N=110, in two N=80 (70 for standard deviation) and in three N=150 (140 for standard deviation). \*\*\*denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level and \* at the 10 percent level.

Table V: Impact of Increased and Decreased Majority Minority Districts on State Representative Characteristics

Outcome:	Democrats			ADA		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Covered*post	.112 (.142)	.132 (.149)	.117 (.151)	12.2 (7.6)	13.6 (8.0)	12.5 (7.3)
Covered*post*(105-107)	-.103 (.085)	-.109 (.072)	-.104 (.093)	-4.3 (7.9)	-4.3 (6.0)	-6.3 (5.6)

Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and controls for percent of state population that is Black and percent of state delegation that is new. Specification 2 also includes controls for state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates and those measures for state Black population. Specification 3 includes those controls plus state/year linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Significance levels determined based on  $t_x$  distribution where  $x$  is defined as the number of clusters less one.  $N=150$ .



Table VI: Change in the Number of Majority Latino Districts and Latino Representatives in Southwestern States across Congresses

		102 <sup>nd</sup> Congress (pre-1990 redistricting)		103 <sup>rd</sup> Congress (post-1990 redistricting)		107 <sup>th</sup> Congress (post-1990 redistricting)	
	1990 percent Latino	Majority Latino Districts	Latino Representatives	Majority Latino Districts	Latino Representatives	Majority Latino Districts	Latino Representatives
<i>States Under VRA Section V</i>							
Arizona	19	0/5	0/5*	1/6	1/6	1/6	1/6
California	26	4/45	3/45	6/52	4/52	6/52	6/52
Texas	26	5/27	4/27	7/30	5/30	6/30	6/30
<i>States not Under VRA Section V</i>							
Colorado	13	0/6	0/6	0/6	0/6	0/6	0/6
Nevada	10	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2
New Mexico	38	0/3	1/3	0/3	1/3	0/3	0/3
Utah	5	0/3	0/3	0/3	0/3	0/3	0/3

Sources: Latino population from *The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief*, May 2001. Majority minority districts, based on the racial makeup of the population at the time of the 1990 census, from various issues of the *Almanac of American Politics*. Latino Members of Congress from the Library of Congress' *Hispanic Members of Congress* at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/congress/>.

Notes: \*Edward Pastor (D-AZ) elected in the middle of the 102<sup>nd</sup> congress in a special election.

Table VII: Impact of Increased Majority Latino Districts on State Representative Characteristics


(Each cell presents the coefficient on covered\*post)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Latino	.164 (.117)	.255 (.145)	.009 (.039)
Democratic	.079 (.047)	.074 (.074)	.216 (.116)
ADA score	3.3 (2.1)	4.1 (3.9)	13.9 (10.0)
Agreement with Congressional Latinos	.041 (.045)	.06* (.03)	.153* (.075)

Note: All specifications include state and congressional term fixed effects and controls for percent of state population that is Latino and percent of state delegation that is new. Specification 2 also includes controls for state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates and those measures for state Latino population. Specification 3 includes those controls plus state/year linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Significance levels determined based on  $t_x$  distribution where  $x$  is defined as the number of clusters less one.  $N=70$ . \*\*\*denotes significance at the 1 percent level, \*\* at the 5 percent level and \* at the 10 percent level.

Figure I: 1990 North Carolina Redistricting

Before the 1990 redistricting North Carolina districts primarily followed county lines. There were no majority Black districts. 102<sup>nd</sup> districts pictured below. County percent Black shaded.



After the 1990 redistricting North Carolina districts were shaped less regularly. 103<sup>rd</sup> congressional districts pictured below.





Figure I: 1990 North Carolina Redistricting (continued)

The 103<sup>rd</sup> districts majority Black districts (1<sup>st</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup>) particularly created controversy for their irregular shapes.



After the North Carolina districts were found to be a violation of White voters' equal protection, the districts had to be redrawn for the 106<sup>th</sup> and 107<sup>th</sup> congresses. Percent Black in the 12<sup>th</sup> fell from 57 to 36 percent.







Figure II: Change in Characteristics of Southern State Districts and Representatives Over Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status

A: Majority Black Districts




B: Black Representatives




Notes: ■ represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act; ◆ represent covered states. X axis demarcates congressional sessions.

Figure II: Change in Characteristics of Southern State Districts and Representatives Over Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status (continued)

C. Democratic Representatives




D. Average ADA Scores




Notes: ■ represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act; ◆ represent covered states. X axis demarcates congressional sessions.

Figure III: Change in Characteristics of Former Mexican Territory State Districts and Representatives Over Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status

A: Majority Latino Districts




B. Latino Representatives




Notes: ■ represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act; ◆ represent covered states. X axis demarcates congressional sessions.

Figure III: Change in Characteristics of Former Mexican Territory State Districts and Representatives Over Time, by State Voting Rights Act Status (continued)

C. Democratic Representatives



D. Average ADA Score



Notes: ■ represent states not included in Section V of the Voting Rights Act; ◆ represent covered states. X axis demarcates congressional sessions.