

An Experimental Study on the Relevance and Scope of Culture as a Focal Point

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Abstract

This paper uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a focal point. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play stag-hunt coordination games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that subjects are more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if the only piece of information they have about their partner is that they have the same nationality. However, if subjects receive additional information about their partner, subjects are not more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. We also do not find that subjects are less likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium when their partner has a different nationality as compared to when the partner's nationality is unknown. In addition, we observe that giving subjects information about their partner in general increases the risk of miscoordination. Thus, our findings suggest that nationality can serve as a coordination device but also that the scope of this device is limited.

JEL classification: C91, C92, Z1, Z13

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I. Introduction

The beginning of the new millennium has been marked by increased social, economic, technological, and cultural integration. These phenomena have in turn promoted contact between individuals from different countries and cultural backgrounds putting higher demands on the coordination of actions.³ In this context it is important to understand if and how coordination depends on the cultural backgrounds of the participating actors. One stylized fact in the economic literature on coordination is that in the absence of additional information, people tend to use a solution which seems relevant, natural, or special to them. This solution is known as a focal point (Schelling, 1960; Crawford and Haller, 1990; Mehta *et al.*, 1994; Sugden, 1995; Camerer, 2003). Culture or nationality may be such a focal point and hence one may hypothesize that nationality serves as a coordination device and that miscoordination is more likely to occur if interactions take place between partners from different nationalities (Schelling, 1960; Sugden, 1986).

In this paper we investigate whether and under which circumstances nationality serves as a coordination device in coordination games (Crawford and Haller, 1990; Cooper *et al.*, 1990; Van Huyck *et al.*, 1990; Crawford, 1995). For this purpose we made use of the diverse student body at the University of Hawaii and recruited an equal amount of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese nationals. The subjects play simple stag-hunt coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium, and interact both with their compatriots and with participants from the other two countries. To test for the robustness of the relevance of nationality as a focal point we provide subjects with different levels of information about their partner: (i) no information,

³ We use the term culture, cultural background, and nationality interchangeably in this paper. For a survey on the different definitions for culture consult e.g. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952). Culture certainly has many meanings and nationality is just one aspect of it, albeit an important one. We use nationality as a proxy for culture and discuss the strength of this proxy and other aspects of culture in the conclusion.

(ii) information only about their partner's nationality (i.e. nationality is salient), and (iii) information about their partner's nationality and some other presumably irrelevant characteristics such as hair color (i.e. we make nationality non-/ less salient). In addition, we observe the subjects' level of pro-sociality towards subjects from other nationalities and compatriots in ultimatum and dictator games to investigate whether potential differences in coordination are driven by in-group favoritism (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Our findings show that nationality can indeed serve as a coordination device. Subjects are more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if common nationality is salient as compared to if subjects do not know the nationality of their partner. However, if nationality is non-salient, nationality does not serve as a coordination device, i.e. subjects are not more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if their partner has the same nationality. Moreover, we do not find that subjects are less likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if their partner has a different nationality as compared to when the partner's nationality is unknown. Interestingly, we also find that giving the subjects information about their partner in general increases the risk of miscoordination.

To the best of our knowledge this is the first experimental paper studying inter-cultural coordination between different nationalities in a systematic manner and inter-cultural behavior where the salience of nationality is experimentally manipulated.⁴ Our paper does not only contribute to the literature on coordination games which are characterized by the existence of more than one Nash equilibrium (Crawford and Haller, 1990; Cooper *et al.*, 1990; Van Huyck *et al.*, 1990; Crawford, 1995) but also to the literature comparing behavior across cultures (Roth *et*

⁴ Brandts and Cooper (2007) compare the behavior of subjects in the USA and Spain and observe higher levels of coordination in the USA. This study, however, does not investigate coordination between subjects from different nationalities. Related to our findings is also the study by Crawford *et al.* (2008) in which the authors find that miscoordination increases if the salience of focal points is reduced by minimally changing payoff constellations, and Holm (2000) who finds that information about gender affects coordination in a battle-of-sexes game.

al., 1991; Okada and Riedl, 1999; Anderson *et al.*, 2000; Henrich, 2000; Henrich *et al.*, 2001; Brandts *et al.*, 2004), between cultures (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Buchan *et al.*, 2006; Chuah *et al.*, 2007; Bornhorst *et al.*, 2008) and more generally to the literature on in- and out-group behavior (Sherif *et al.*, 1961; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Kollock, 1998; Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Goette *et al.*, 2006; Charness *et al.*, 2007; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009) which typically reports that individuals treat in-group members better than out-group members.

Most of these studies do not manipulate the salience of group membership. Exceptions are Eckel and Grossman (2005) and Charness *et al.* (2007) which create minimal groups to study cooperation and increase group identity by team goal attainment or passive audiences. Consistent with our findings, these two studies point out that the saliency of group membership affects behavior. In contrast to these studies, we investigate *coordination* among *natural groups* of people with different nationalities and *manipulate* group identity by providing subjects with different levels of information about their partners.

While making group membership salient has its merits when studying minimal groups, saliency of group membership may limit the generalizability of studies using natural groups. First, by making natural group memberships salient it seems plausible that subjects react to experimenter demand effects which are not present outside the laboratory. Second, as people outside the laboratory environment often have more information about their interaction partners than only their membership in one particular group, the saliency induced in the laboratory may bias behaviors. Our findings suggest that there may be fewer differences between in- and out-group behaviors if the salience of group membership is reduced and that in-group favoritism may play a less important role for coordination.

This paper continues as follows. The next section presents the experimental design. Section

III describes the results, and section IV concludes.

II. Experimental Design

The inter-cultural coordination experiment consists of four parts: (1) A short pre-experimental questionnaire to collect the subjects' nationality and some demographic information. (2) Instructions and control questions for the games. The complete set of experimental instructions and questionnaires is given in the Appendix. (3) The games. All subjects first took part in three ultimatum games and three dictator games before they played three coordination games. Each game was presented to the subjects separately and they received *no information* about the behavior of other subjects or the outcomes of the games until the end of the whole experiment. Players were *randomly paid* for one of the nine games. In addition, we used the *perfect stranger matching*, so no player knew the identity of his co-player and no player was ever matched with the same player twice. Therefore, there is no theoretical reason to believe that the behavior in the coordination games is contaminated by the preceding games.⁵ We focus in this paper on the behavior in the coordination games and mainly use the behavior in the other games to facilitate the interpretation of our coordination findings.

The three coordination games (as well as the three ultimatum and dictator games) differ according to the matching and were presented in random order. In one decision, a subject was matched with a person from the same nationality, and in the other two she was matched with subjects from other nationalities than her own nationality. The matching algorithm is presented in Figure 1. The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). (4) The

⁵ In principle, there could be order effects, i.e. subjects may in general play a coordination game differently after playing e.g. a dictator game. However, because our main analysis compares treatments where the order was identical, our treatment differences cannot be subject to order effects. We briefly examine relationships between ultimatum game, dictator game, and coordination game behavior in section III.

experiment ended with a short post-experimental questionnaire before subjects were paid privately.

There are three across-subject treatments in this experiment which differ by the amount of information subjects have about their matched partners: control (treatment C), salient information about partner's nationality (treatment S), and non-salient information about partner's nationality (treatment NS). In C, a subject receives no information about her partner. In S, the only piece of information a subject receives is the nationality of her partner. In NS, a subject receives information about the age, status at UH (junior, sophomore, junior, senior or graduate student), eye color, hair color, and nationality of her partner. No subject participated in more than one treatment.

The coordination game we study is a symmetric two-person stag-hunt game in which the subjects simultaneously choose either A or B. The earnings are determined depending on their choice and the choice of their match according to the payoff matrix presented in Table 1. For example, if participant 1 chooses A, then participant 2 gets seven tokens if she chooses A and one token if she chooses B. Each token is worth one dollar if the game is chosen for payment. Note that choice B is more risky for the subject as she could either make nine or one token depending on the choice of her match. In contrast, choice A is less risky as it secures at least seven tokens regardless of the other subject's decision. There are two Nash equilibria in this game: (A,A) which is the risk-dominant equilibrium, and (B,B) which is the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Charness (2000) studies this game with the same parameter specifications.

In the ultimatum games a proposer has to decide how to divide ten tokens between her and a responder. If the responder accepts, the offer is implemented; however, if she rejects both player types receive zero tokens. We implemented the strategy method for the responders, i.e. responder

had to decide over their minimal acceptable offer before they knew the actual offer of the proposer. In the dictator games, the proposer also has to decide how to divide ten tokens between her and a responder but the responder cannot reject the offer.

A total of seven sessions were conducted in the UH Experimental Laboratory in April 2009 (two sessions for treatments C and NS each, three sessions for treatment S⁶). Sessions typically included 18 participants: 6 Japanese, 6 Korean, and 6 Chinese students. A total of 126 subjects participated in the experiment (42 Japanese, 38 Korean, 42 Chinese, and 4 other nationalities).⁷

68 percent of the subjects are female. 57 percent identify themselves very strongly, 41 percent somewhat, and 2 percent not at all with their nationality. 55 percent report to have a GPA of 3 (= mean grade in their university classes, 4 is the best), and 37 percent a GPA of 4. With regard to the information subjects receive about their partner in the NS treatment we observe that 55 percent have black and 44 percent brown eyes, 86 percent have black and 13 percent brown hair. The mean age is 25 years. 38 percent are graduate, 25 percent are senior, 21 percent junior, and 16 percent sophomore and freshman students. Each subject participated only in one session. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes and the subjects earned on average \$13 (\$5 show-up fee, plus their earnings from the experimental sessions). Table 2 presents a summary of the sessions.

⁶ We had to conduct an extra session for the S treatment due to an insufficient number of Korean participants present at one of the previous sessions.

⁷ Subjects were recruited with campus flyers and e-mail announcements. Interested individuals were asked to fill out socio-demographic information as well as to report their nationality. We invited only individuals who reported to be Japanese, Korean, or Chinese. However, during the experimental sessions four participants answered in the pre-experimental questionnaire to be of another nationality (one participant in NS and three participants in S). Accordingly, in our analysis we exclude these participants and the participants that were matched with these in the S and NS treatments. More precisely, we excluded from our analysis three observations in NS and nine observations in S. None of the subjects analyzed in our results had a dual nationality. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were not allowed to talk to each other.

III. Results

Across all nationalities and treatments we find that in the coordination games the risky alternative B was chosen with a probability of 0.441 (156 out of 354 times). There are no significant differences in the mean probability to choose B among nationalities. 46.7 percent of the Japanese choose B which is insignificantly more than Chinese (44.3 percent; Fisher's exact test, $p = 0.797$, two-sided) or Korean (40.9 percent; Fisher's exact test, $p = 0.427$, two-sided). 18.1 percent of the pairings achieve the payoff dominant equilibrium (B,B) (with payoff of (9,9)), 29.9 percent the risk dominant equilibrium (A,A) (with payoff of (7,7)), and 52 percent miscoordinate, i.e. the outcomes are either (A,B) (payoff (1,8)) or (B,A) (payoff (8,1)).

In the control treatment, we observe that 42.6 percent choose B (Japanese: 47.2 percent, Chinese: 41.7 percent, Korean: 38.9 percent). In the salient treatment, 45.8 percent choose B (Japanese: 47.1 percent, Chinese: 41.2 percent, Korean: 50 percent), and in the non-salient treatment 43.1 percent (Japanese: 45.7 percent, Chinese: 51.4 percent, Korean: 31.5 percent).

In the dictator games, the mean token amount sent is 3.26 (treatment C = 3.33, S = 3.00, NS = 3.55). In the ultimatum games, the mean token amount sent is 4.75 out of 10 (treatment C = 4.62, S = 5.12, NS = 4.33) and the mean minimal acceptable offer is 3.12 (treatment C = 3.13, S = 3.35, NS = 2.78). The mean individual behavior in the three coordination games is not significantly correlated to the mean individual behavior in the three dictator games ($r = 0.059$, $p = 0.654$), the mean individual proposer behavior in the ultimatum games ($r = 0.194$, $p = 0.138$) or the mean individual minimal acceptable offer in the ultimatum games ($r = 0.073$, $p = 0.574$). Table 3 summarizes the means of all three treatments under the two different matchings (different or same nationalities) for the coordination, ultimatum, and dictator games.

Conjecture 1: Nationality serves as a coordination device if nationality is salient.

We observe that 56.3 percent of the subjects (27 out of 48) choose B in treatment S if they know that their partner has the same nationality. This percentage is considerably higher than the equivalent percentage in the control treatment C (42.6 percent; $p = 0.057$, $\chi^2 = 2.49$, one-sided). This finding is robust after controlling for the subject's nationality, her level of identity with her nationality, GPA and gender (Table 4, model 1, $p = 0.025$). Identity and GPA predict positively the choice to play B ($p < 0.062$). Model 1 also shows that both Korean and Chinese tend to be less likely to choose B in treatment C ($p < 0.144$).

Figure 2 illustrates that the strength of the coordination device (i.e., the information that the partner is a compatriot) depends on the nationality. We observe that the probability that subjects play B is highest in the treatment condition S-IN (treatment S, partner is compatriot) for all three nationalities. However, for Japanese subjects salient information about the partner being Japanese has very little impact on the willingness to choose B as compared to having no information about the partner's nationality in treatment C (50 vs. 47.2 percent). In contrast, Korean subjects are more likely to choose B when paired with another Korean (66.7 vs. 38.9 percent; $p = 0.047$, $\chi^2 = 2.80$, one-sided). Chinese subjects are moderately more likely to choose B when paired with another Chinese (55.6 vs. 41.7 percent; $p = 0.167$, $\chi^2 = 0.93$, one-sided).

Figure 3 provides an overview of the outcomes in all treatments and distinguishes between the payoff outcomes (9,9), (7,7), and (1,8 which includes 8,1). This figure illustrates that the more pronounced willingness to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium leads to more payoff-dominant outcomes (7 out of 24 or 29.2 percent) when matched with someone from the same nationality than in C (12 out of 54 or 22.2 percent). It also leads to less coordination on the

risk-dominated equilibrium than in C (16.7 vs. 37 percent) and when matched with someone from a different nationality in S (31.3 percent). Later in finding 4 we will analyze in more depth the level of miscoordination in our treatments.

Interestingly, we do not find that subjects behave more pro-socially towards their compatriots in the dictator game. For example, in treatment S the mean transfer in the dictator game to a compatriot (3.32) is almost identical as compared to the mean transfers in treatments C (3.33).⁸ This suggests that our finding that compatriots are more willing to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium is *not* primarily driven by a propensity – or a potential experimental demand effect – to behave more pro-socially towards compatriots. However, we find differential treatment in the ultimatum game on the side of the proposer: The mean offer in treatment S to a compatriot (5.25) is higher than the mean offer in treatment C (4.62, $p = 0.069$, Mann-Whitney, two-sided).⁹ On the side of the responder we find that the minimal acceptable offer is statistically insignificantly higher in treatment S when paired with a compatriot as compared to treatment C (3.5 vs. 3.13, $p = 0.326$, Mann-Whitney test).

Finding 1: *We find evidence that nationality serves as a coordination device if nationality is salient: Subjects are more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if matched with someone from the same nationality. The strength of this coordination device depends on the nationality.*

⁸ Note also that if we only look at Koreans – in whom the propensity to coordinate with a compatriot is most pronounced – we also find no such statistical differences. In the dictator game, Koreans even give more in treatment C (3.73) than to compatriots in treatment S (3.17).

⁹ This finding is in line with the finding in Chuah et al (2007) who find that Malaysian Chinese subjects gave on average higher offers in the ultimatum game to compatriots as compared to subjects from the United Kingdom. Note that there are procedural differences between our and their study. In particular, Chuah et al. conducted their experiments in their subjects' respective home countries (Malaysia or United Kingdom) whereas we conducted our experiments outside the subjects' home countries.

Conjecture 2: Nationality serves as a coordination device also if nationality is non-salient.

44.1 percent (15 out of 34) subjects choose B if they play with someone from the same nationality in treatment NS. This percentage is not statistically different from the percentage in the control treatment (42.6 percent). Note also that none of the other pieces of information that we gave subjects about their partner in the NS treatment (age, status, hair color, eye color) is significantly related to the choice of B ($p > 0.33$, Spearman). Table 4, model 2 shows that even after controlling for our co-variates, subjects are not more likely to choose B when matched with a compatriot in NS ($p = 0.987$).

In Figure 3 we observe a low fraction of payoff-dominant outcomes in treatment NS when paired with a compatriot (12.5 percent) and a high level of miscoordination on the outcomes ((8,1) (1,8)) which is even somewhat higher than in treatment C (64.7 percent in NS compared to 40.7 percent in C; $p = 0.101$, Fisher's exact test, two-sided).

We also do not find that subjects behave more pro-socially towards their compatriots if nationality is non-salient in the dictator and ultimatum game. In the dictator game, subjects give 3.35 tokens to compatriots (treatment C = 3.32). In the ultimatum game, subjects offer 4.28 tokens to compatriots in treatment NS (treatment C = 4.62) and the minimal acceptable offer is 2.35 when matched with a compatriot in NS (treatment C = 3.13, $p = 0.185$, Mann-Whitney).

Finding 2: *Nationality does not serve as a coordination device if nationality is non-salient.*

Subjects are not more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium with someone from the same nationality if they are provided with additional information about their partner.

Conjecture 3: Coordination is more difficult if subjects know that their partner has a different nationality.

40.6 percent (39 out of 96) of the participants choose B if they play with someone from a different nationality in treatment S. 42.6 percent (29 out of 68) of the subjects choose B if they play with someone from a different nationality in NS. These percentages are not different from the percentage in treatment C (42.6 percent, χ^2 , $p > 0.776$). The non-significant impact of knowing that the partner has a different nationality is also confirmed in Models 3 (for treatment S) and 4 (for treatment NS) of Table 4 ($p > 0.453$).

In Figure 3 we can see that only a low fraction of outcomes are payoff-dominant (12.5 percent) when matched with someone from a different nationality in S. Moreover, 56.3 percent miscoordinate on the outcomes ((8,1) (1,8)) in S when matched with someone from a different nationality which is insignificantly higher than in C (Fisher's exact test, $p = 0.164$, two-sided). Also in treatment NS, few outcomes are payoff-dominant when matched with someone from a different nationality (14.7 percent) – but this percentage is still higher than when matched with someone from the same nationality in NS (11.8 percent). 55.9 percent miscoordinate on the outcomes (8,1) and (1,8) which is somewhat higher than in the control treatment (40.7 percent, $p = 0.192$, two-sided, Fisher's exact test) but less than when matched with someone from the same nationality in S (64.7 percent).

Finding 3: *Subjects are not less likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if they know that their partner has a different nationality regardless whether nationality is salient or non-salient.*

Figure 3 illustrates an additional finding: Miscoordination, i.e. the outcomes (1,8) and (8,1) are considerably less likely in the control treatment (40.7 percent) as compared to the treatments S and NS regardless whether subjects in these two treatments are matched with someone from their own or another nationality (miscoordination ranges in these cases from 54.2 to 64.7 percent). The difference between the C and the S treatment is significant at $p = 0.100$ ($\text{Chi}^2 = 2.710$); i.e. already providing participants with information about their partners' nationality is enough to increase the risk of miscoordination. Part of this difference is likely explainable from the fact that subjects try harder to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in S when matched with a compatriot.

The difference between the C and NS treatment is also significant ($p = 0.064$, $\text{Chi}^2 = 3.431$); i.e. providing subjects with information about their partners' nationality, university status, hair color, eye color, and age increases the risk of miscoordination to an even larger extent. The difference between the control and the S and NS treatments combined is significant at $p = 0.047$ ($\text{Chi}^2 = 3.931$). As the probabilities of choosing B are similar in treatments C and NS (and S if matched with someone from a different nationality), this difference cannot be explained by a *general* tendency of subjects trying harder to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in one of the two treatments. One possibility could be that additional information about partners makes some subjects more and others less willing to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium.

Finding 4: *The probability of miscoordination is higher if subjects have salient and/or non-salient information about their partners' nationality.*

We finish this section by investigating the role of the constellations of nationalities.

Figure 4 provides an overview of the probability of choosing B depending on the treatment and the constellation of nationalities. The Figure shows some interesting, nationality specific patterns. First, we observe that Japanese subjects, who seemed according to Figure 2 not to discriminate between compatriots and other nationals, behave differently towards Koreans (only 27 percent choose B when paired with a Korean in treatment S) and Chinese (61 percent). Korean subjects tend to be less likely to choose B when the information about their partner's nationality is non-salient as compared to when it is salient. The opposite is true for Chinese, who tend to be less likely to choose B when the information about their partner's nationality is salient. For example, when a Chinese only knows that her partner is Japanese (treatment S), she chooses B with a probability of 0.28 as compared to a probability of 0.5 when additional information about the partner is available besides her Japanese nationality (treatment NS).

Interestingly, in S and NS combined subjects are quite unlikely to choose B if their partner is Japanese and not a compatriot (35.7 percent). This percentage is lower than when the partner is Korean (40.4 percent) or Chinese (48.2 percent). While these differences are not uniform and not yet statistically significant, the patterns are consistent with a history of national disagreements in the region. Namely, one may speculate that both the Chinese and Korean subjects are biased against the Japanese in response to the Japanese imperialist policy and military occupations of their nations in the past.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper we experimentally test the relevance and scope of focal points when individuals make decisions under strategic uncertainty. In a period which is marked by extensive international trade, nationality may present one important focal point which individuals can

coordinate on. What is the relevance and scope of nationality as a coordination device? We recruited subjects coming from three countries that heavily engage in international trade and let them play coordination games in three treatments in which we manipulated the information they receive about their partner.¹⁰

Our findings suggest that nationality can function as a coordination device but that the scope of this device is limited. Subjects attempt to coordinate more on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if their partner has the same nationality and the information about the partners' nationality is salient. We provide suggestive evidence showing that this difference is not the result of more pro-social behavior towards compatriots, i.e. in-group favoritism. However, if the information about the partners' nationality is not salient, i.e. nationality is only one of several other attributes which subjects know about their partner, nationality seems to be irrelevant for coordination. Moreover, overall we do not find in our study that coordination is more difficult between partners of different nationalities.

One possible explanation of these results may lie in the multi-dimensional nature of culture in this experiment. While nationality certainly comprises one aspect of culture, it does not represent the full extent of it. Besides being nationals of three different countries, subjects in this experiment are all students of University of Hawaii and are united by a university culture and international community. As the focus is diluted away from nationality in the non-salient treatment, common culture for university students may dominate and hence the results on nationalities are weakened.

More generally, one may speculate that the scope of nationality as a coordination device is limited outside the laboratory environment because (i) interacting parties often have access to

¹⁰ According to the size of their exports China ranks 2nd, Japan 4th, and Korea 12th. From 2000-2008 China has almost six-folded, Japan and Korea have more than doubled, their exports. Data from United Nations Statistics Department available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/annual%20totals.htm>.

more information about their partners than only their nationality and (ii) there is a probability that they share different cultural aspects. On the other hand, our findings also suggest that having more information about trading partners may not necessarily be beneficial as it seems to increase the risk of miscoordination. Moreover, our experimental results imply that coordination is not more difficult between parties from different nationalities if subjects have more information about their partners than only their nationality.

We believe that our paper also contributes to the growing cross-cultural literature and the economic literature on group identity. Our findings suggest the necessity of conducting experiments which manipulate the salience of cultural and group membership for testing the robustness of the findings in the in- and out-group literature which use natural groups.

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
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Figures 1-3:


Figure 1: Matching Algorithm



Each participant makes three decisions for each game: one towards their compatriot and two matched with participants from different countries (in randomized order).

(6) represents a number of participants from each nationality present in a session

Figure 2: Choice to try to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibrium depending on treatment and nationality



Notes: S-IN: Treatment S, subject is paired with compatriot; NS-IN: Treatment NS, subject is paired with compatriot, C: Treatment C, subject does not know nationality of partner, NS-OUT: Treatment NS, subject is paired with partner from a different nationality, S-OUT: Treatment S, subject is paired with partner from a different nationality.

Figure 3: Payoff Outcomes in Coordination Game across Treatments





Figure 4: Choice to try to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibrium depending on treatment and constellations of nationalities



Notes: S-CH: Treatment S, subject is paired with Chinese; NS-CH: Treatment NS, subject is paired with Chinese, S-KO: Treatment S, subject is paired with Korean; NS-KO: Treatment NS, subject is paired with Korean, S-JA: Treatment S, subject is paired with Japanese; NS-JA: Treatment NS, subject is paired with Japanese.

Tables 1-3:

Table 1: Payoff Matrix in Coordination Game

		subject 2	
		A	B
subject 1	A	7,7	8,1
	B	1,8	9,9

Table 2: Experimental Design

Treatment	Number of observations in coordination game
Control (C) (no information)	J-J: 11 K-K: 11 C-C: 11 J-K: 21 J-C: 22 K-C: 22
Total observations:	108
Salient (S) (subjects know only their partner's nationality)	J-J: 18 K-K: 12 C-C: 18 J-K: 30 J-C: 36 K-C: 30
Total observations:	144
Non-salient (NS) (Subjects know their partner's age, status at UH, eye color, hair color, & nationality)	J-J: 12 K-K: 10 C-C: 12 J-K: 22 J-C: 24 K-C: 22
Total observations:	102

J: Japanese, K: Korean, C: Chinese and treatments as:
C: Control, NS: Non-salient, and S: Salient

Table 3: Behavior in Ultimatum, Dictator, and Coordination Game (means, *N*)

	C - Treatment	S - Treatment		NS - Treatment	
		different	compatriot	different	compatriot
proposer	4.62	5.06	5.25	4.38	4.28
(offer)	<i>53</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>18</i>
responder	3.13	3.27	3.50	3.00	2.35
(MAO)	<i>53</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>17</i>
dictator	3.33	2.83	3.32	3.65	3.35
(offer)	<i>54</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>17</i>
coordination	0.43	0.41	0.56	0.43	0.44
(probability B)	<i>108</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>34</i>

Note: Italic numbers are number of observations. Bold numbers indicate significant differences. In some cells are odd numbers because we excluded observations whenever a participant was matched with someone whose nationality is not Chinese, Korean, or Japanese. In all reported observations, the matching was between these three nationalities.

Table 4: Choice to try to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibrium in coordination game depending on the matching & co-variates (Probit regression)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Observations in Treatments	C & S if paired w/ compatriot	C & NS if paired w/ compatriot	C & S if paired w/ non-compatriot	C & NS if paired w/ non-compatriot
Compatriot?	0.055** (0.025)	0.001 (0.987)		
Non-compatriot?			0.025 (0.448)	-0.012 (0.912)
Identity	0.207* (0.062)	0.074 (0.556)	0.231** (0.012)	0.061 (0.588)
Female?	0.090 (0.434)	0.097 (0.459)	0.029 (0.770)	0.149 (0.213)
GPA	0.276*** (0.000)	0.121 (0.216)	0.091 (0.199)	0.088 (0.345)
Subject is Korean?	-0.227 (0.126)	-0.130 (0.394)	-0.153 (0.224)	-0.190 (0.157)
Subject is Chinese?	-0.233 (0.102)	-0.085 (0.563)	-0.171 (0.163)	-0.060 (0.655)
N	154	142	200	176

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects. P-values in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered on subject level. Compatriot = 1 if subject is paired with compatriot, 0 otherwise. Non-compatriot = 1 if subject is paired with subject having a different nationality, 0 otherwise. Subject is Korean/Chinese? 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. Female = 2 if subject is a female, 1 otherwise.

Appendix A: Pre-experimental Questionnaire

1. What is your age?

2. Please indicate your gender

Male Female

3. What is your major at UH?

4. How long have you lived in the United States?

5. Of which country are you currently a citizen?

6. How strongly do you identify yourself with this country?

Not at all Somewhat Very strongly

7. Are you happy to identify yourself with this country?

No Somewhat Yes

Appendix B : Experimental Instructions

Treatment C (Control)

Welcome and thank you for your participation in the economics experiment on decision making!

Introduction

Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.

During this experiment you will participate in decision tasks that give you the opportunity to earn money. All the earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately upon completion of the experiment we will pay you your game earnings in CASH. Your earnings are confidential and you will be paid in private.

This experiment will consist of several parts. In each part, you will be asked to make 3 decisions which will involve another participant with whom you will be randomly matched. For every decision task, you will be randomly matched with a **different** participant than in the previous decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just as the decisions of the person you are matched with may affect your payoffs.

At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the paid task. The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be informed of the results of any task until the end of the experiment.

We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are clear. Are there any questions?

Part 1

In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. Their identity will not be revealed to you and yours will not be revealed to them.

You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your role will remain the same for all three decisions in this part and in the next.

Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of **10** dollars has been allocated to the both of you. The proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you. The proposer's task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder.

Instructions to the RESPONDERS: The responders will not see the proposer's offer. The responder's task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the proposer. If the proposer's actual offer to the responder is at least as large as the smallest offer responder is willing to accept, then the money is divided according to the proposer's offer. Otherwise, neither of you will receive anything.

Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know the outcome of the decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked to make 3 decisions in this part, and each time you will be matched with a **different** person.

Any questions?

Part 2

In this part, you will be matched with different participants than before. You have not been matched with these people before. You have been assigned the same role as in the previous part (proposer or responder). The proposer has to make a decision, while the responder has no decision to make in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are matched with.

Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of **10** dollars has been allocated to the both of you. The proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you. The proposer's task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder. The responder has no decision to make in this game, so the money will be divided according to the decision of the proposer.

You will be asked to make your decision three times, and each time you will be matched with a **different** person.

Please make your decision as prompted on the screen.

Part 3

In this part, you have been randomly matched with another person. You have not been matched with this person before. Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your payoff in this part will depend on your decision as well as the decision of the participant with whom you are matched. Their identity will not be revealed to you.

Your task in this part is to choose either "A" or "B"

Depending on your choice and the choice of your match, your earnings will be the following:

		Other participant	
		A	B
You	A	7, 7	8, 1
	B	1, 8	9, 9

- If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A” then both of you receive \$7 each
- If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “B” then you get \$8 and the other participant gets \$1
- If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “B” then both of you receive \$9 each
- If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “A” then you get \$1 and the other participant gets \$8.

Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen

Treatment S (Salient)

Welcome and thank you for your participation in the economics experiment on decision making!

Introduction

Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.

During this experiment you will participate in decision tasks that give you the opportunity to earn money. All the earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately upon completion of the experiment we will pay you your game earnings in CASH. Your earnings are confidential and you will be paid in private.

This experiment will consist of several parts. In each part, you will be asked to make 3 decisions which will involve another participant with whom you will be randomly matched. For every decision task, you will be randomly matched with a **different** participant than in the previous decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just as the decisions of the person you are matched with may affect your payoffs.

At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the paid task. The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be informed of the results of any task until the end of the experiment.

We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are clear. Are there any questions?

Part 1

In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. Their identity will not be revealed to you and yours will not be revealed to them. All you will know about them is their nationality.

You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your role will remain the same for all three decisions in this part and in the next.

Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of **10** dollars has been allocated to the both of you. The proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you. The proposer's task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder.

Instructions to the RESPONDERS: The responders will not see the proposer's offer. The responder's task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the proposer. If the proposer's actual offer to the responder is at least as large as the smallest offer responder is willing to accept, then the money is divided according to the proposer's offer. Otherwise, neither of you will receive anything.

Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know the outcome of the decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked to make 3 decisions in this part, and each time you will be matched with a **different** person.

Any questions?

Part 2

In this part, you will be matched with different participants than before. You have not been matched with these people before. You have been assigned the same role as in the previous part (proposer or responder). The proposer has to make a decision, while the responder has no decision to make in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are matched with, except their nationality

Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of **10** dollars has been allocated to the both of you. The proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you. The proposer's task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder. The responder has no decision to make in this game, so the money will be divided according to the decision of the proposer.

You will be asked to make your decision three times, and each time you will be matched with a **different** person.

Please make your decision as prompted on the screen.

Part 3

In this part, you have been randomly matched with another person. You have not been matched with this person before. Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your payoff in this part will depend on your decision as well as the decision of the participant with whom you are matched. Their identity will not be revealed to you, except their nationality..

Your task in this part is to choose either "A" or "B"

Depending on your choice and the choice of your match, your earnings will be the following:

		Other participant	
		A	B
You	A	7, 7	8, 1
	B	1, 8	9, 9

- If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A” then both of you receive \$7 each
- If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “B” then you get \$8 and the other participant gets \$1
- If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “B” then both of you receive \$9 each
- If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “A” then you get \$1 and the other participant gets \$8.

Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen

Treatment NS (Non-salient)

Welcome and thank you for your participation in the economics experiment on decision making!

Introduction

Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.

During this experiment you will participate in decision tasks that give you the opportunity to earn money. All the earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately upon completion of the experiment we will pay you your game earnings in CASH. Your earnings are confidential and you will be paid in private.

This experiment will consist of several parts. In each part, you will be asked to make 3 decisions which will involve another participant with whom you will be randomly matched. For every decision task, you will be randomly matched with a **different** participant than in the previous decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just as the decisions of the person you are matched with may affect your payoffs.

At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the paid task. The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be informed of the results of any task until the end of the experiment.

We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are clear. Are there any questions?

Part 1

In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. Their identity will not be revealed to you and yours will not be revealed to them. All you will know about them is:

Age, Status at UH, Eye color, Hair Color, and Nationality.

You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your role will remain the same for all three decisions in this part and in the next.

Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of **10** dollars has been allocated to the both of you. The

proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you. The proposer's task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder.

Instructions to the RESPONDERS: The responders will not see the proposer's offer. The responder's task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the proposer. If the proposer's actual offer to the responder is at least as large as the smallest offer responder is willing to accept, then the money is divided according to the proposer's offer. Otherwise, neither of you will receive anything.

Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know the outcome of the decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked to make 3 decisions in this part, and each time you will be matched with a **different** person.

Any questions?

Part 2

In this part, you will be matched with different participants than before. You have not been matched with these people before. You have been assigned the same role as in the previous part (proposer or responder). The proposer has to make a decision, while the responder has no decision to make in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are matched with, except their:

Age, Status at UH, Eye Color, Hair Color, and Nationality.

Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of **10** dollars has been allocated to the both of you. The proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you. The proposer's task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder. The responder has no decision to make in this game, so the money will be divided according to the decision of the proposer.

You will be asked to make your decision three times, and each time you will be matched with a **different** person.

Please make your decision as prompted on the screen.

Part 3

In this part, you have been randomly matched with another person. You have not been matched with this person before. Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your payoff in this part will depend on your decision as well as the decision of the participant with whom you are matched. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are matched with, except their:

Age, Status at UH, Eye Color, Hair Color, and Nationality.

Your task in this part is to choose either "A" or "B"

Depending on your choice and the choice of your match, your earnings will be the following:

		Other participant	
		A	B
You	A	7, 7	8, 1
	B	1, 8	9, 9

- If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A” then both of you receive \$7 each
- If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “B” then you get \$8 and the other participant gets \$1
- If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “B” then both of you receive \$9 each
- If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “A” then you get \$1 and the other participant gets \$8.

Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen

Appendix C: Exit Questionnaire

1. What is your gender? ___M ___F
2. What is your major at UH? _____
3. What is your GPA? _____
4. How long have you been living in the United States? _____
5. How easy to understand were the instructions? _____
6. [Only applicable to NS treatments] When making decisions in this experiments, you were matched with another person. Which of their characteristics were most important in your decision? _____
7. Do you have any friends participating in this session at the same time with you?

Yes No

8. If you do have friends in this session with you, did that affect your decisions in this experiment? Yes No

9. Did you like the experiment? Yes No

10. Please add any additional comments you have about this experiment:

Appendix D: Consent Form

AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Principal investigator: **Olga Bogach**, Department of Economics,
University of Hawaii, phone (808)-956-2325

This is a research experiment in economics of decision-making. The experiment has been explained to me in detail, and I have been familiarized with experimental instructions. I understand that the experiment is voluntary, and participation is anonymous. The data collected on my decisions will be anonymous and will not put me at any risk. Although there are no risks to me, I will be paid \$5 participation fee, plus whatever money I make during the experiment. There are benefits to the society from this experiment in studying economics of decision making.

I certify that I have been told of the possible risks involved in this project that I have been given satisfactory answers to my inquiries concerning project procedures and other matters and that I have been advised that I am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation in the project at any time without prejudice. I understand that the experiment will take at most 1 hour.

I herewith give my consent to participate in this project with the understanding that such project does not waive any of my legal rights; nor does it release the principal investigator or the institution or any employee or agent thereof from liability for negligence.

Signature of participant: _____

Date: _____

If you cannot obtain satisfactory answers to your questions from the Principal Investigator, or have comments or complaints about your treatment in this study, contact: Committee on Human Studies, University of Hawaii, 2540 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822. Phone: (808)-956-5007

Appendix E: Ultimatum and Dictator Game Results

Table A1: Ultimatum and Dictator Game Behavior: Constellation of Nationalities in NS Treatment

Variable (mean, \$)	ja-ja	ja-ko	ja-ch	ko-ko	ko-ja	ko-ch	ch-ch	ch-ja	ch-ko
Proposer's share	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.6	4.5	6.2	6.2	5.7	6.0
in ultimatum game	<i>7</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>
Proposer's share	6.0	6.0	5.8	6.6	6.8	5.6	7.3	6.5	7.3
in dictator game	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>
Responder's minimum	1.8	1.8	2.7	2.8	4.2	3.3	2.5	3.0	2.6
acceptable offer	<i>6</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>

Notes: ja = Japanese, ch = Chinese, ko = Korean. Numbers in italics show the respective number of observations. Ja-ko, for example, shows the mean decision of the Japanese proposers matched with Korean responders, whereas ko-ja shows the mean decision of the Korean proposer matched with a Japanese responder.

Table A2: Ultimatum and Dictator Game Behavior: Constellation of Nationalities in S Treatment

Variable (mean, \$)	ja-ja	ja-ko	ja-ch	ko-ko	ko-ja	ko-ch	ch-ch	ch-ja	ch-ko
Proposer's share	5.0	4.8	4.9	4.7	5.3	5.4	4.6	5.2	3.7
in ultimatum game	<i>9</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>7</i>
Proposer's share	6.2	5.8	6.3	6.8	7.9	7.4	7.1	7.6	7.6
in dictator game	<i>10</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>8</i>
Responder's minimum	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.2	1.9	3.9	3.6	3.5
acceptable offer	<i>9</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>

Notes: ja = Japanese, ch = Chinese, ko = Korean. Numbers in italics show the respective number of observations. Ja-ko, for example, shows the mean decision of the Japanese proposers matched with Korean responders, whereas ko-ja shows the mean decision of the Korean proposer matched with a Japanese responder.