

Why are there serial defaulters ? Quasi-experimental evidence from Constitutions

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Abstract

Presidential democracies were 4.9 times more likely to default on external debts between 1976 and 2000 than parliamentary democracies. This paper argues that the explanation to the pattern of *serial defaults* among a number of sovereign borrowers lies in their constitutions (on *serial defaults* see Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)). *Ceteris paribus*, parliamentary democracies are less likely to default on their liabilities as the confidence requirement creates a credible link between economic policies and the political survival of the executive. This link tends to strengthen the repayment commitment when politicians are opportunistic. I show that this effect is large and statistically significant in the contemporary world even when comparison is restricted to countries that are *twins* in terms of colonial origin, geography and economic variables. Moreover, the result persists if Latin American and/or OECD democracies are excluded from the sample. Since the form of government of a country is typically chosen at the time of independence and highly persistent over time, constitutions can explain why debt policies in developing countries are related to individual histories.

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[†]I am heavily indebted to Jeffrey Frieden and Torsten Persson for critical insights at early stages of this project. Also Natalie Chen, Andrew Oswald, Elias Papaioannou, Carlo Peroni and seminar participants at the Ronald Coase Institute (Barcelona workshop), ISNIE and Warwick University provided useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the ESRC World Economy and Finance Programme is gratefully acknowledged. All eventual remaining errors are mine.

1 Introduction

What explains the fact that historically some countries have been more prone to default on their financial obligations than others? Why has Venezuela defaulted 9 times on its external debts and Mexico 8 times over the last 180 years while India, Malaysia and Thailand have never done so? (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)).¹ This paper finds that the critical aspect to answer this question is not found in the indebtedness statistics of a borrowing country but in its constitutional form of government. More specifically, democracies in which the executive needs the continuous consent of the legislature to remain in power, i.e. parliamentary democracies, are less likely to default on their external liabilities. The thrust of this argument is present in earlier work by North and Weingast (1989) on the evolution of political institutions in 17th century England. The rationale is based on the fact that the vote of confidence requirement found in parliamentary democracies creates a credible link between debt policy decisions and the survival of the executive. It is this credible link that leads to the possibility of compensating offers between opportunistic politicians within a parliamentary cabinet. Such compensation mechanisms will act to reduce the rescheduling probability of a parliamentary government vis-à-vis a presidential government. The contribution of this study is to show that this effect is large and statistically significant in the contemporary world: the estimates suggest that if the legislature could

¹See also Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003).

pose a credible threat to unseat sovereigns through a confidence motion the probability of default in a 25 year period in presidential democracies would be reduced from the current 79.3% to less than 33%. As shown in the paper, this holds even when we use matching techniques to restrict comparison to "twin" countries - i.e. countries with similar colonial origin, geographical and economic characteristics. Hence, the reason that history is of primary importance for debt policy, as already suggested among others by Lindert and Morton (1989) and Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), might come from the persistence of the constitutional form of government of the borrowing countries.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the theoretical hypothesis. Section 3 analyses a cross-section including 72 democracies that have access to private credit markets, showing that the prediction that parliamentary democracies are less likely to default on external debt repayments is borne out in the data. It is shown that this is the case irrespective of whether Latin American or OECD countries are excluded from the sample. The paper recognizes that the main empirical limitation of comparative studies that rely on such fundamental pillars of a constitution as the form of government is that there are few instances of democratic changes in these to allow a more precise identification with standard techniques. This is why section 3.2 resorts to quasi-experimental methods, aiming at insulating the form of government from other factors such as the colonial origin, location

or income level of a country. Although higher standard errors result from matching techniques, the difference between regimes remains large and statistically significant. Section 3.3 then proceeds to find that parliamentary democracies have reduced their external debts in more market friendly ways: only one among five parliamentary democracies that attained a reduction in the debt to GNP ratio in excess of 25% within a three-year-period resorted to a default - compared to more than 80% of presidential democracies in similar circumstances. Parliamentary democracies as Botswana, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Thailand attained such marked debt reductions without changing original terms of debt contracts. Finally, the paper concludes by discussing directions for further research.

2 Theoretical Rationale

The theoretical hypothesis of this paper claims that when politicians have conflicting interests in the decision of whether to continue servicing external debt or not, the institutional setting in which such a decision would ultimately be taken will condition the outcome. In particular, it will be crucial whether the political survival of the executive that takes such decision depends or not on other politicians. Specifically, the probability of default in a presidential regime will typically be higher than that seen in a parliamentary regime. To see this assume that a debt default has consequences on the

economy which will put downward pressure on asset values.² If the owners of assets who would negatively be affected in the case of discontinuance of debt service have higher stakes in debt policy than those who do not hold such assets, compensation mechanisms among political actors will tend to reduce the likelihood of a debt rescheduling.

Take the example of a parliamentary government formed by a prime-minister and a junior coalition partner - the latter proxying for the prime-minister's support basis in the legislature. The junior partner may at anytime abandon the government, leading to a government dissolution followed by a new government formation. Assume for the moment that the prime-minister represents asset holders and therefore is strongly opposed to a debt rescheduling whereas the pivotal junior coalition partner represents peasants. Since continuing to service external debt under current conditions implies negative international transfers, peasants would prefer to halt debt servicing (note that since peasants are assumed not to hold assets, it is natural that their optimizing horizons be shorter, as they will internalize the long term consequences of a default to a lesser extent). In such a situation, the prime-minister could buy the critical support of the peasant politician by giving him, for

² In fact, this seems to have been the case in heavily indebted Argentina in 1999. Stock markets fell by 8% in one day when one of the contenders for the presidential position announced that he was considering to halt external debt servicing. Later, in December 2001, the already depressed stock market fell by 8% again after the short-lived president Rodriguez Saa announced the default.

instance, a ministry in the portfolio. Since the benefits are directly linked to the survival of the government, such a transfer could eliminate the incentives of the junior coalition partner to unseat the debt servicing government. Interestingly, if the types of politicians are not perfectly observable before they have implemented policy themselves, all junior coalition partners would be able to extract side payments from the senior government member.

Now consider instead that the prime-minister is a peasant. The simple knowledge that with some probability a junior coalition member represents the interests of stakeholders - who would lose out heavily if a default were declared - will act as a deterrent to the implementation of such a policy, as it might put the political survival of the government at risk. A default would reveal the type of the head of government and hence possibly lead his support basis to draw a new politician from the pool to form a government. In contrast, in a presidential democracy, any threat by Congress members to systematically oppose bill proposals of the executive in case its preferred debt policy is not implemented would not be subgame perfect: once the president has defaulted on debt contracts, legislators would find it optimal to take this decision as a bygone. Obviously, the distinction between constitutional forms of government will only be relevant for countries in which there is an alternative to the incumbent government, i.e. where the threat of unseating the government is credible. This is why in the empirical section the comparison of constitutions is limited to countries in which there are indications of

political freedom.

In a seminal paper, Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) have argued that already in 17th century England the empowerment of parliament during the Glorious Revolution resulted from a necessity of the Crown to raise funds to finance its wars. Reluctant creditors - who had already seen several unilateral changes in repayment terms - only came back to the market once the Parliament finally obtained the power to unseat the sovereign that *stepped too far out of the line* (North and Weingast (1989, p.829). Kohlscheen (2004) formalizes this argument in an analytical model showing that, due to the credible link between policies and the political survival of the executive, debt defaults are less likely to happen in parliamentary democracies than in presidential ones under very general conditions.

3 Empirical Evidence

In order to test the conjecture that parliamentary democracies have a lower propensity to default on foreign debts, economic and political data were obtained for 72 democracies. To be part of the sample, a country had to satisfy two criteria: a) have obtained at least once a credit rating at one of the two major rating agencies; b) have an average index of political freedom and civil liberties that corresponds to a free or partially free democracy according to Freedom House. The first restriction is intended to exclude countries that are not accessing private debt markets and may be primarily involved in

dealings with multilateral institutions. The complete list of countries, their default history and form of government classification can be found at the end of the paper.

To identify which countries have defaulted on their external debts between 1976 and 2000, two alternative indicators are used. The first indicator is from the rating agency Standard & Poor's and indicates any change in the original terms of the contract. The second indicator, due to Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000), flags countries only when there have been substantial arrears in repayments (i.e. in excess of 5% of the debt stock). Also, in contrast to the first indicator, this index includes defaults on commercial debts. I shall refer to episodes identified by the first indicator as *technical defaults* or simply *defaults* and by *substantial defaults* when using the second indicator.³ Finally, I use the form of government classification by Persson and Tabellini (2003). They classified a country as parliamentary if the constitution of the country empowers the legislature to unseat the executive.

Table 1 summarizes the information found in the list of countries at the end of the paper. The difference is striking: whereas only 7 out of the 43

³ Detragiache and Spilimbergo's indicator tends to be more permissive towards borrowers. For instance, while the two authors suggest that Bolivia and Jamaica never had any debt crisis, Standard & Poor's considers that each of them defaulted at least twice. Looking at the more recent cases, only S&P considers that the rescheduling process of Pakistan in 1999 and Russia in 2000 was preceded by a default. Detragiache and Spilimbergo however also include commercial defaults, and therefore consider that South Korea and Thailand both defaulted in 1998.

parliamentary democracies in the sample had a credit incident during the 25 years of the sample period, no less than 23 of the 29 presidential countries did so. Since most of the democracies throughout Latin America have presidential regimes, I also report the proportions when Latin America is dropped from the sample. The pattern persists: 5 defaulters among 38 parliamentary democracies against 7 in the group of 11 presidential democracies. Finally, the table shows that parliamentary countries also seem less likely to default when we restrict the sample to the developing world.

[Table 1 about here]

3.1 Logit Analysis

Table 3 shows the marginal effects at the mean of the covariates obtained with a logit regression when the usual economic determinants of debt defaults are added as explanatory variables. All variables are sample averages. Among the economic explanatory variables, the income level stands out as the most significant, but only when rich countries are included in the sample. Note that, perhaps a bit surprisingly, the indebtness statistics do not have a significant effect on the likelihood of repayment. Neither does the fraction of tax revenues spent on interest payments. In fact, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) have already pointed out that more than half of debt defaults occurred in countries whose indebtness statistics would have been satisfactory for the country to meet the Maastricht criterion of a debt to GNP ratio

below 60%. Higher average growth rates and higher stocks of international reserves relative to imports reduce the likelihood of default, although the effects are not always significant. The only variable that remains statistically significant throughout is the parliamentary dummy variable. The full sample results suggest that a parliamentary constitution reduces the likelihood of a country defaulting during a 25 year interval by 46 to 54 percentage points. In other words, 4/5 of the 63 percentage point difference between regimes remains after controlling for economic conditions. To assess the magnitude of this effect consider the following example: the average presidential democracy in the sample had a per capita income of about \$1,950 during the last quarter of the 20th century. The estimates suggest that the risk of default of the representative presidential democracy if its constitution required the executive to co-opt the support of the Congress to remain in power would be the same as for a presidential democracy with a per capita income level of \$15,000 - which roughly corresponds to the average income level of Ireland during the period.

[Table 3 about here]

3.2 Matching

The main objection to the results reported in the previous section is that the selection of constitutions may not be random. Parliamentary and presidential democracies have different origins and may well differ in other aspects as

well. For instance, parliamentary democracies typically have higher income levels and are older democracies than presidential democracies. This may raise doubts about whether causality has been established with the above correlation. In fact, only two developed democracies are not parliamentary: Switzerland and the United States. These are hardly typical cases of presidential regimes in our sample. In particular, the United States has enjoyed a unique geopolitical situation during the sample period and has a system of checks and balances on the executive in place which is hardly the norm in other presidential countries. This asymmetry of cases constitutes an additional difficulty for an econometric test, as we are confronted with the task of identifying which effects are explained by forms of government, higher income levels or by whether the democracy is more mature. It is important to note however that if the proposition that markets in parliamentary countries have a higher degree of immunization from debt crises is correct, one should certainly not expect to observe the same proportion of forms of government across different income groups, since the incidence of debt crises belongs to the determinants of well-being in a country (see Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)). A market that is afflicted by the *serial default* phenomenon will probably not provide an economic environment in which long-term credit markets might thrive. So, while the skeptical will take this disproportion of parliamentary democracies among rich countries as a fundamental flaw of the dataset, those who are sympathetic to the proposition might interpret this disproportion as

an additional confirmation of the theory. The findings of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest that we should not stop at this point of the discussion.

The selection of constitutions depends on a number of observable variables, allowing us to resort to quasi-experimental evidence (for an earlier example in this context see Persson and Tabellini (2002)). In the first stage we estimate the probability of a country to select a parliamentary form of government as a function of observable historical and geographical factors. Namely we observe whether the country has been colonized by the British, the fraction of the population speaking one of the five major european languages as their first language (denoted by eurfrac), the time since independence (t_indep) and the geographical location (the latitude of the capital city or continental dummy variables). As economic explanatory variables long term characteristics such as the degree of exposure to international trade (openness), the indebttness statistics and per capita income are used. Once the propensity of each country to adopt a parliamentary constitution has been computed, we are able perform estimates using only the countries that are sufficiently similar (the "twins") in terms of propensity score. The cost of this method is that some observations which are not on the common support are dropped from the sample. Since observable differences between treatment and control groups are ironed out however, such cost might be worth paying.

Table 4 reports the results based on the nearest-neighbour, radius (0.05) and kernel matching techniques for three different propensity score logit spec-

ifications. Bootstrapping was used to estimate the standard errors (with 10,000 replications). The results suggest that parliamentary countries are less likely to default on external debts, even when we restrict our comparison to democracies with similar characteristics. This effect amounts to between 46 and 58 percentage points in the probability of default over the sample period, which is in line with the finding of the previous section. In other words, the matching estimates suggest that by including a confidence requirement in their constitution, the group of presidential countries would see the probability of default in a 25 year interval reduced from 79.3% to between 21% and 33%.⁴ This is still above the 16.3% default rate observed for parliamentary democracies.

[Table 4 about here]

3.3 Debt Reversals

A further test of the theory comes from comparing how countries with different political institutions reacted to episodes in which debt repayment meant a great effort for the borrowing country.⁵ For this test, I use Reinhart, Ro-

⁴ Which compares with 25 to 33% in the logit analysis.

⁵ Note that the theory suggests that political institutions will only be relevant for debt policy when there exists some divergence on whether the optimal policy is to service debt or to default (and eventually reschedule). It is highly plausible for instance that in the cases where international transfers are positive, there would be an unanimity in favor of continuing debt servicing. If all political actors however have the same preferences regarding what the optimal policy might be, the outcome would be the same whatever the

goff and Savastano's list of 22 episodes of sharp debt reductions between 1970 and 2000, defined as decreases in the external debt to GNP ratio of at least 25% over a 36 month interval. Six of these episodes involved countries that were described as not free at the time (Freedom House). Table 5 lists the remaining 16 cases according to the form of government. The table is consistent with previous findings. Only two of the eleven presidential democracies did not reduce their indebtedness by resorting to a default. Among the five cases that involved parliamentary democracies the opposite pattern can be observed. Only Jamaica did default. Botswana in 1976-79, Malaysia in 1986-89, Papua New Guinea in 1992-95 and finally Thailand in 1998-01 managed to massively reduce debt stocks without changing the forms of repayment dictated by original contracts. These countries do not share many common characteristics apart from being parliamentary democracies at the time of the debt reversal. Despite the small size of the sample, the hypothesis that the proportion of defaulters is unaffected by the form of government can be rejected at the 5% confidence level.

[Table 5 about here]

decision making institution.

4 Concluding Remarks

This paper confirms the theoretical prediction that parliamentary democracies are less likely to default on their external liabilities. The effect is quantitatively large and holds true irrespective of whether Latin American or OECD countries are excluded from the sample. It is important to stress that the theory does not predict that a presidential country will always default earlier than a parliamentary democracy. What it does say is that over a long period of time or in a cross-section, as used in this paper, one should observe less discontinuances in debt contracts in countries with a parliamentary constitution. In principle, the theoretical prediction should extend to the case of domestic debt reschedulings.

Rather than resulting from the form of government per se, the failure of some countries to repay as originally contracted is related to the inexistence of a representative committee that decides on debt policy. The decision structure found in parliamentary democracies mimics to some extent the role such a committee would play. Future research might focus on institutional reforms that could strengthen commitments and better insulate credit markets from political developments that are at the crux of a democratic process.

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DATA SOURCES

col_uk: indicator of whether a country was colonized by the UK. Wacziarg (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2003).

col_uka: $\text{col_uk} \times (250 - \text{t_indep}) / 250$. Wacziarg (1996).

default indicator: Standard and Poor's.

eurfrac: fraction of population speaking English, French, German, Spanish or Portuguese as first language. For new democracies that were formed through secession, linguistic data of the country from which the secession occurred were imputed. Hall and Jones (1999).

latitude: latitude of the capital city of the country divided by 90. Hall and Jones (1999).

parliamentary dummy: indicator of whether the executive needs the confidence of the legislature to remain in power. Persson and Tabellini (2003). Lebanon, Morocco and Panama were classified as having a presidential form of government.

per capita income, GDP growth, interest payments/revenues, debt/GNP,

international reserves/imports: WDI database. Central government debt data were complemented with data from the OECD yearbook (sample period averages).

openness: from the WDI database (WDI. NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS—Trade (% of GDP)).

substantial default indicator: Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001).

t_indep: number of years since independence of the country.

Forms of Government and Default History 1976-2000

	parliamentary constitution ?	default	substantial def.		parliamentary constitution ?	default	substantial def.		parliamentary constitution ?	default	substantial def.
Argentina	No	Yes	Yes	Germany	Yes	No	No	Nicaragua	No	Yes	Yes
Australia	Yes	No	No	Ghana	No	Yes	No	Norway	Yes	No	No
Austria	Yes	No	No	Greece	Yes	No	No	Pakistan	No	Yes	No
Bahamas	Yes	No	No	Guatemala	No	Yes	Yes	Panama	No	Yes	Yes
Barbados	Yes	No	No	Honduras	No	Yes	Yes	Papua NG	Yes	No	No
Belgium	Yes	No	No	Hungary	Yes	No	No	Paraguay	No	Yes	Yes
Belize	Yes	No	No	Iceland	Yes	No	No	Peru	No	Yes	Yes
Bolivia	No	Yes	No	India	Yes	No	No	Philippines	No	Yes	Yes
Botswana	Yes	No	No	Indonesia	No	Yes	Yes	Poland	Yes	Yes	No
Brasil	No	Yes	Yes	Ireland	Yes	No	No	Portugal	Yes	No	No
Bulgaria	Yes	Yes	No	Israel	Yes	No	No	Russia	No	Yes	No
Canada	Yes	No	No	Italy	Yes	No	No	Senegal	No	Yes	Yes
Chile	No	Yes	Yes	Jamaica	Yes	Yes	No	Singapore	Yes	No	No
Colombia	No	No	Yes	Japan	Yes	No	No	South Africa	Yes	Yes	No
Costa Rica	No	Yes	Yes	Jordan	No	Yes	Yes	South Korea	No	No	Yes
Cyprus	No	No	No	Lebanon	No	No	No	Spain	Yes	No	No
Czech Rep.	Yes	No	No	Luxembourg	Yes	No	No	Sweden	Yes	No	No
Denmark	Yes	No	No	Malaysia	Yes	No	No	Switzerland	No	No	No
Dominican	No	Yes	Yes	Malta	Yes	No	No	Thailand	Yes	No	Yes
Ecuador	No	Yes	Yes	Mauritius	Yes	No	No	Trinidad&T.	Yes	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	No	No	Yes	Mexico	No	Yes	Yes	Turkey	Yes	Yes	No
Fiji	Yes	No	No	Morocco	No	Yes	Yes	U.K.	Yes	No	No
Finland	Yes	No	No	Netherlands	Yes	No	No	USA	No	No	No
France	Yes	No	No	New Zealand	Yes	No	No	Uruguay	No	Yes	No
								Venezuela	No	Yes	Yes

Table 1

Debt Repayment in Democracies: 1976-2000

Worldwide

	presidential	parliamentary	ratio
	A	B	A/B
No. of countries	43	29	
% with substantial defaults incident	65.5	7.0	9.4
% with default incidents	79.3	16.3	4.9

Non-OECD

	presidential	parliamentary	ratio
	A	B	A/B
No. of countries	25	22	
% with substantial defaults incident	68.0	13.6	5.0
% with default incidents	84.0	31.8	2.6

Non-LatAm

	presidential	parliamentary	ratio
	A	B	A/B
No. of countries	11	38	
% with substantial defaults incident	27.3	5.3	5.2
% with default incidents	63.6	13.2	4.8

Non-LatAm & Non-OECD

	presidential	parliamentary	ratio
	A	B	A/B
No. of countries	11	15	
% with substantial defaults incident	54.5	6.7	8.2
% with default incidents	72.7	20.0	3.6

Table 2

Summary statistics

	observations	average	std. dev.	min	max
Defaulters	72	0.417	0.496	0	1
Parliamentary	72	0.597	0.494	0	1
Latin America	72	0.319	0.470	0	1
Log (p.c. income)	72	3.684	0.559	2.483	4.623
GDP growth	72	3.361	1.873	-0.312	8.977
openess (trade/GDP in %)	72	74.25	47.51	16.6	328.6
Debt/GDP	72	58.59	52.40	3.3	410.7
European lang. speaking pop. (%)	71	0.432	0.438	0	1
former British colony (col_uk)	72	0.333	0.475	0	1
former British colony (col_uka)	72	0.259	0.380	0	0.928
normalized latitude of capital city	71	0.340	0.190	0.015	0.710

Table 3

Dependent variable: Default indicator dummy

	WORLD			Non-OECD			Non-LatAm			Non-Latam&Non-OECD		
parliamentary	-0.540 2.73***	-0.463 2.20**	-0.543 2.68***	-0.563 2.84***	-0.460 2.06**	-0.540 2.70***	-0.309 1.97**	-0.273 1.87*	-0.309 1.96**	-0.724 2.12**	-0.839 1.83*	-0.730 2.11**
Latin America	0.211 1.10	0.227 1.14	0.221 1.10	0.068 0.34	0.070 0.32	0.079 0.40						
log (p.c. income)	-0.608 3.45***	-0.598 3.32***	-0.617 3.38***	-0.284 1.23	-0.097 0.36	-0.293 1.30	-0.340 2.56**	-0.307 2.27**	-0.340 2.54**	-0.392 1.28	-0.114 0.36	-0.387 1.25
GDP growth	-0.074 1.57	-0.062 1.26	-0.075 1.54	-0.090 1.89*	-0.081 1.51	-0.088 1.84*	-0.042 1.40	-0.035 1.23	-0.042 1.38	-0.116 1.76*	-0.134 1.72*	-0.115 1.76*
openess		-0.003 0.98			-0.006 1.69*			-0.002 1.09			-0.010 2.33**	
debt/GDP			0.002 0.76			0.001 0.63			0.000 0.02			0.000 0.11
Countries	72	72	72	49	49	49	49	49	49	26	26	26
Pseudo R2	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.35	0.41	0.36	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.35	0.49	0.35
Log likelihood	-23.46	-22.97	-23.20	-21.15	-19.35	-20.97	-13.51	-12.94	-13.51	-11.65	-9.23	-11.65

Marginal effects reported. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

alternative specifications with interest payments/revenues or reserves/imports available upon request

Table 4

Defaulting democracies and constitutions: matching estimates 1976-2000

	Nearest N.	Caliper	Kernel	Nearest N.	Caliper	Kernel	Nearest N.	Caliper	Kernel
parliamentary	-0.552 2.62***	-0.555 2.54**	-0.552 2.62***	-0.500 2.32**	-0.464 2.04**	-0.586 2.57***	-0.473 1.94*	-0.516 2.13**	-0.500 2.07**
no. of observations	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71
...on common support	66	64	66	65	61	62	66	59	62
logit specification:	A	A	A	B	B	B	C	C	C

logit A: eurfrac, t_indep, latitude, log (pc income)

logit B: col_uka, LatAm, debt/GDP, openness

logit C: col_uk, t_indep, latitude, openness

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5

Debt Reductions 1970-2000

	Defaulters	Compliers
Presidential	81.8% Morocco 85-88 Philippines 86-89 Costa Rica 87-90 Bolivia 88-91 Panama 89-92 Jordan 91-94 Albania 92-95 Bulgaria 92-95 Russia 99-02	18.1% South Korea 85-88 Egypt 87-90
Parliamentary	20% Jamaica 90-93	80% Botswana 76-79 Malaysia 86-89 Papua NG 92-95 Thailand 98-01

Not free: Gabon 78, Chile and Swaziland 85, Paraguay 87,
Lebanon 90 and Iran 93.