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### **Rising Skill Premia**

You ain't seen nothing yet?

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The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s)

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## **Abstract**

Increases in inequality between low and high-skilled workers are likely to affect welfare state policies in upcoming decades. Demand for redistribution puts pressure on marginal income-tax rates and other social security measures.

We come to this conclusion by confronting expected supply and demand for skill. If demand for skill continues to increase at the pace of the last decades, supply has to keep up its high rate of growth of the last decades too. A priori, the former is plausible, the latter is not. This paper makes this point and sketches the major uncertainties surrounding the underlying trends.

**Keywords:** Inequality, Policy, Social Security, Cross-country comparison

**JEL-codes:** I28, H24, J31, J38



## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The rise in income inequality in the USA has provoked a large debate on its causes and possible remedies. From this literature, no consensus has (yet) emerged. Different theoretically plausible explanations have been offered, mainly focussing on the so-called skill premium.<sup>2</sup> Providing empirical evidence is difficult and empirical results on the rise in income inequality are largely inconclusive when compared and put together. The future developments are therefore difficult to predict. Still, they are important as income inequality constitutes one of the key indicators to evaluate economic performance. Furthermore, inequality is likely to affect the formulation of welfare state policies. Therefore, the major question that this paper deals with is:

What are the major determinants of the skill premium and what are the likely trends in these determinants? In answering this question, we address both the evolution of the skill premium over time as well as the differences between countries.

The relevance of the skill-premium can be illustrated in several ways. First, the skill premium determines to a large extent income inequality, which in turn is an important determinant of economic growth.<sup>3</sup> Second, the skill premium is an important determinant of the incentive to accumulate human capital which in turn fosters economic growth.<sup>4</sup> Third, inequality is an important determinant of social and economic instability.

On the basis of a careful analysis of the available evidence, we will argue that there has been a long-term trend in demand for skills, that has dominated the development of the skill premium. The underlying factors resulting in this bias are various, all of which will be explored. These factors range from demand shocks associated with the arrival of new General Purpose

<sup>1</sup> This paper is prepared for the scenario study on the future of Europe, to appear in October 2003. We acknowledge comments by Theo van de Klundert, Ruud de Mooij and Paul Tang.

<sup>2</sup> In talking about the skill premium, we refer to skills that are valued in the labour market like education and experience. In most of the remainder, the discussion is restricted to skills related to education. In many cases, however, the same arguments hold for experience. Only where necessary explicit reference will be made to experience.

<sup>3</sup> Inequality leads to popular pressure for redistribution via distortionary taxation, which in turn lowers economic growth. For evidence, see Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996).

<sup>4</sup> This does not conflict with the previous point: there is no robust evidence for a positive effect of human capital on economic growth. Sianesi and Van Reenen (2002) provide a recent survey of the empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of human capital. This literature is largely inconclusive over whether the stock of education affects the long-run *level* or long-run *growth* rate of the economy. They conclude that an increase in average education of the population by one year would raise the level of output per capita by between three and six percent according to the former approach, while in general the effect on growth is overstated in the literature. Their overall conclusion is therefore that the evidence in favour of the growth effect is quite weak for developed countries.

Technologies (GPTs) such as the computer, to trends associated with the increased capital intensity of production processes along with a strong complementarity between physical capital and skills.

The resulting pressure exerted on income inequality can be dealt with in a variety of ways. The first is to simply accept the increase in income inequality. Different countries make different trade-offs in this respect. The second is to increase the supply of skills (both in terms of quantity and quality) in order to match the increased demand. The third is to explicitly develop policies that reduce the income inequality by using, for example, progressive income taxation. One of the goals of this paper is to illustrate that the reaction of countries on the tendency for income inequality to increase has been different. Although some answers can be given on which answers are most appropriate, in many cases it is a matter of choice resulting in different socio-economic outcomes on different dimensions of economic performance (see De Groot et al., 2003, for an elaboration of this argument in a broader context).

We argue that an obvious conclusion is that the demand for skill will continue to grow and that the supply of skill can no longer accommodate this in the near future due to the simple fact that talent is limited by nature and that the cost of increasing the supply of skills further increases exponentially. This will unavoidably lead to large increases in inequality; a 'bad' that can in principle be countered by policy. The pressure for undoing the inequality makes policy more costly in terms of, for example, GDP per capita, as redistribution or policy intervention in general is increasingly costly. How to solve the dilemma is a major issue for policy makers in the future.

However, necessary and important qualifications to this conclusion are to be made. Extrapolating the demand trend for skill is hazardous as it is not precisely clear what is behind this trend: is it increases in capital that is complementary to skill, or a technology trend? The global supply of capital is likely to be altered by an ageing population and the associated implications for aggregate savings (see, e.g., Fair and Dominguez, 1991, and Higgins, 1998). And the technology trend driving up demand for skills has not always been as strong as in recent decades. On the contrary, the past has shown technology trends that drove up the price of unskilled labour. A second qualification is that the demand trend does not seem to work out equally for all countries. This puzzle is dealt with in the paper, but is not solved. A third qualification is that the supply of skills can be increased by improving the quality of the schooling system such that more able students are 'produced'. This qualification is scant comfort as better qualified output of the educational system is not necessarily reducing inequality.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Note that *ceteris paribus* higher-quality graduates increase inequality. This is countered by the general equilibrium effect of more skill supply leading to lower prices per unit of skill. Our guess is that the first effect dominates.



To derive these conclusions, we proceed in a straightforward manner. First we develop an analytical framework of analysis that helps in clarifying terminology and defines a theoretical framework. Next, the facts on the supply and demand of skills and the resulting development of the skill premium are presented for long time periods and a wide cross section of countries. From these facts, we aim to deduce the major determinants of the skill premium. This is done in Section 4 where a wide range of potential explanations for the observed trend is discussed. We argue that a trend in demand is the most likely candidate for explaining the major part of the development of the skill premium over time. From this we derive our main conclusion that inequality is likely to increase further in the future. We further sketch the major uncertainties surrounding this conclusion. In order to understand the differences in the skill premium across countries, knowledge is required on the institutional context. As argued before, countries can respond differently to similar shocks resulting in different outcomes in terms of, for example, income inequality. These differences reflect the different trade-offs that countries make and are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains a discussion and description of the data used in this study.



## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 The skill premium and inequality


The skill premium is measured most directly by the relative wage of workers with two types of schooling. Close to this measure is the Mincerian return to an additional year of schooling (based on econometric estimates using micro-data for wages and controlling for other characteristics). More remote is the earnings ratio of production and non-production workers. This measure relies on the (clearly imperfect) assumption that production workers are low skilled and non-production workers high skilled. Finally, there are three commonly used measures based on the distribution of income: the Gini-coefficient, the Theil measure and the percentile ratios. We use mostly the measures summarising the entire distribution.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 2.1 shows the Gini inequality measure for gross income (Primary Gini) and income after taxes and transfers (Secondary Gini). We show the numbers for the most recent years that are available (varying from 1992 to 1997). The countries are ordered according to the highest reduction achieved by taxes and transfers. Sweden, for example reduces its inequality by almost 50%. The Anglo-Saxon countries can be found on the right-hand side of the figure whereas the Nordic countries are on the left-hand side of the figure.

In Figure 2.2 we depict the annual percentage change in after-tax income inequality for a large set of countries for the period between the early 1980s and 1995. The grey areas indicate the change in inequality at the top half of the distribution and the light areas indicate that of the lower half of the distribution (the black bars depict the annual change in income between the bottom and the top of the distribution).


<sup>6</sup> We refer to the Appendix for a discussion of the available sources and measures of income inequality and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.

Figure 2.1 Primary and secondary inequality (approximately 1994)



Source: Bradley et al. (2001).

Figure 2.2 Annual percentage change in inequality between the early 1980s and 1995



Source: LIS; see Appendix.

Only Spain, Denmark and Luxembourg experienced a decline in inequality in the period considered. All other countries experienced - though in different magnitude - an increase in inequality. For the remainder, a clear pattern does not emerge, however. Contrary to initial expectations countries such as, for example, Italy and Austria are characterised by even larger increases in inequality than the US and the UK. The Nordic countries show a stable distribution. The Netherlands has a unique pattern: compression in the top and increased inequality at the bottom.

**Observation** Inequality increased in most countries from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s.

This observation suggests that a similar force has been at work in most countries. At the same time, there is a variety of country-specific developments in which no clear pattern can be discerned that ask for further explanation. We turn to this in Section 5.

### **A view on the long run**

The basic long-run facts that we aim to explain are reported in Table 2.1. Although the presentation in this table is confined to the US, the general message that can be obtained from this table applies universally. The first column in Table 2.1 describes the relative wage change of college graduates compared to those who completed high school for the US from 1940 to 1996. A few numbers stand out: (i) between 1980-1990, the skill premium increased most rapidly (based on a comparison of relative wage changes over 10-year periods); (ii) the skill premium did not rise continuously; it fell both in the 1970s as well as in the 1940s. Note that the relative supply of skilled labour has steadily increased. The most rapid increase took place in the 1970s; an increase that coincided with a fall in the skill premium.

**Observation** In the United States inequality fell in the 1970s, but increased on average substantially in the last decades despite a monotonous increase in the relative supply of skills.

**Table 2.1 US college/high school wage premium, supply and demand shifts, 1940-1996 <sup>a</sup>**

	Relative wage change	Relative supply change
1940-1950	-1.86	1.49
1950-1960	0.83	2.93
1960-1970	0.69	2.65
1970-1980	-0.74	4.30
1980-1990	1.51	2.48
1990-1996	0.40	2.35
1970-1996	0.39	3.06

<sup>a</sup> Source: Autor et al. (1998). Changes refer to 100 x annual log changes. The relative wage is the log of the hourly wage differential for college graduates (those with sixteen or more years of schooling) relative to high school graduates (those with exactly twelve years of schooling). The supply and wage-share are defined accordingly.

The relative wage of college educated versus high-school educated increased over the long run, decreased in the 1970s and increased strongly in the 1980-1990s. The relative supply of college educated increased throughout the period that we consider. The fundamental question that we need to address is why the relative wage did not fall facing such a large increases in relative supply.

To summarise the facts discussed in this section, two points stand out:

- (i) The observations suggest that a similar force has been at work in the recent decades as inequality tends to increase in all countries. To confidently draw such a conclusion, however, we first need to further explore how the supply of skill evolved over time and across countries.
- (ii) The skill premium does not increase monotonically over time.

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### Inequality dynamics

The dynamics of inequality are hard to capture in a few numbers, but they are important. To illustrate this, imagine the following very unequal society. People entering the job market all earn 5 dollars per hour for the first 10 years that they work and they get 80 dollars per hour ever after. This society is unequal in a static sense, but over the entire lifetime everybody earns the same. If one could borrow against future earnings, such a society could be completely egalitarian.

The relevance of the previous example is empirically illustrated by Flinn (2002). He shows that the cross-sectional wage distribution of young Italian males is more compressed than the comparable distribution for young white US males (using individual-level data for Italy and the US). In contrast, however, the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more dispersed in the US than in Italy. The explanation is that the high frequency of movements between labour-market states in the US leads to a relatively equal distribution of long-run welfare.

A second dimension of the dynamics of inequality is provided by the inter-generational dynamics: is a family's offspring predestined to end up on the same part of the wage distribution or are these (close to) random events? Solon (2002) provides data on the cross-country differences in inter-generational earnings mobility. In the table, a higher number indicates less inter-generational mobility.

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#### Estimates of Inter-generational Earnings Elasticities

Sample	$\beta$
Fathers in working-class York, England, in 1950 and their sons	0.42
Swedish Level of Living Surveys	0.28
Canadian income tax records	0.23
German Socio-Economic Panel	0.11
British National Child Development Survey	0.57
Fathers in Sweden, in 1955 and their sons born in 1939-46	0.14
Co-residing fathers and sons in two south African surveys	0.44
Finnish censuses	0.22
Malaysian Family Life Surveys	0.26
Finnish censuses	0.13
Swedish income tax records	0.13
German Socio-Economic Panel	0.34

Source: Solon (2002).

Solon concludes – while taking into account the methodological differences of the studies – that the UK and the US (the latter is not in the table) are less mobile societies than, for example, Canada, Finland and Sweden. To assess this properly, however, is a difficult task (as the existing inequality level is importantly interfering with the measure presented in the table).

To conclude, there are some important differences between static, dynamic and inter-generational inequality. Each inequality measure focuses on a different aspect of inequality. Reducing one type of inequality may require different policy measures than reducing another type. In this study, our focus is on static inequality.

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## 2.2 Framework of Analysis

A simple framework is applied for analysing the complex question on the causes of the observed relative wage change. We analyse demand and supply for two types of labour, referred to as high-skilled ( $H$ ) and low-skilled labour ( $L$ ).<sup>7</sup> Essentially demand and supply for each skill type meet on separate labour markets where the equilibrium wage for that skill type is set. As in any market, institutional arrangements can prevent the market from clearing. Unemployment and an above-equilibrium wage rate are the consequences. These separate labour markets do, however, not operate in isolation. There are demand spillovers from other factor markets, notably (i) from the market for the other type of skill (the two skill types tend to be substitutes), (ii) from the labour markets in other countries (through changes in import and export prices) and (iii) from the market for other inputs, notably capital (capital tends to complement skill).

A schematic overview of this framework is:

$$\frac{W_H}{W_L} = F\left(\frac{H}{L}, \frac{A_H}{A_L}, K, \frac{P_H}{P_L}\right)$$

where time and country subscripts are omitted for reasons of expositional clarity.  $W$ ,  $A$  and  $P$  stand for wages, technology and prices, respectively (the subscripts refer to skill types). Finally,  $K$  stands for physical capital. We return to the different elements of the equation in greater detail below.

We do not discuss the literature on the role for trade in explaining wage inequality, as a consensus is emerging that this is only a limited one. The basic intuition for the lack of evidence is that the trade flows between developing and developed countries are simply not sufficiently large. International trade takes mainly place among developed countries. Besides, large economies like the European Union and the United States are relatively closed: domestic trade is far more important than international trade. Important contributions to this discussion are Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Sachs and Shatz (1995), who argue in favour of an important role for trade and Berman et al. (1994), Bound and Johnson (1992) and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), who downscale the role for trade. For overviews see Katz and Autor (2000) and Nahuis (2003). Thus, in the remainder we drop the price term.

<sup>7</sup> We make the classification more precise later on. A more detailed subdivision of the labour market is made where necessary.



### 3 Trends and analysis


This section describes the development of the elements introduced above over time and across countries. It is meant as a description of empirical facts on which the analysis in Section 4 will elaborate.

#### 3.1 The supply of skills

The supply of skills in a country is mainly determined by the fraction of the population that attends school and the number of years people spend in the educational system. There are, however, other influences on the supply of skill. First, experience is a component of the available skill in a country that is often gathered by on-the-job learning. Second, immigration of workers affects the (distribution of the) supply of skills.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the quality of the educational system is an important determinant of the ‘effective’ skills that are gathered from attending school.

This section sheds light on the evolution of the dominant factor of the (growth of the) supply of skills, namely the flow of people through the educational system. Especially for depicting the evolution of skills over time, this is an appropriate measure. For describing differences across countries, more information is needed on the country-specific relevance of on-the-job learning and the quality of the educational system.

Figure 3.1 The growth rate of the supply of skills versus the initial endowment of skills




Source: De la Fuente and Domenech (2000).

<sup>8</sup> For an extensive discussion of the impact of migration see Borjas et al. (1997).

In Figure 3.1, the horizontal axis depicts the average number of years of schooling in the population in 1960.<sup>9</sup> This varies roughly from 4 to 11 years. The vertical axis depicts the growth rate of the average years of schooling in the population from 1960 to 1995. An 'x' depicts one observation, viz. one country. Two results stand out: first, during the last decades all countries have experienced a large increase in the supply of skill (the growth rates range up to 60 percent). Second, there is a clear negative correlation between the growth rates and the initial levels of schooling. This points at a process of convergence of human capital stocks across countries. An important implication of this is that the growth in the supply of skill within the group of countries in the sample is unlikely to remain equally high. The simple reason for this is that the observed growth rates are to a large extent due to 'catching-up' of stocks of human capital that will peter out over time. The figure below reiterates this point by depicting projections for the relative supply of skilled workers in the Netherlands for the period 1969-2020.<sup>10</sup>

**Figure 3.2 The relative supply of skills in the Netherlands, 1969-2020.**



Source: Jacobs (2002).

<sup>9</sup> Details on the definition of our measure of human capital can be found in De la Fuente and Domenech (2000).

<sup>10</sup> For an elaboration on the determination of the future development of the skill premium in the Netherlands we refer to Jacobs (2002).

The ratio of skilled to unskilled workers increased at a relatively high rate until 2000, whereas from then onwards the ratio tends to stabilise at 40%.

**Observation** The increase in the supply of skills in OECD countries is bounded and likely to run into these bounds within the next thirty years.

### 3.2 The demand for skills<sup>11</sup>

So far we discussed the supply of skills and the relative wage of skilled versus unskilled workers by presenting empirical facts. In order to determine the demand for skills we have to follow a different strategy as the demand for skills is not observable. But, given that we know the skill supply and the wage, we can infer what demand must have been. This only provides reliable results if we know how the labour market and the production process work. In this section we assume that we know all this: more specifically, we assume that the labour market clears (for all skill groups) and that the production process is characterised by a constant elasticity of substitution among the inputs (a CES production function) and that we know how well different skill types can be substituted. Although stylistic, these simplifications enable us to deliver some important insights.

#### A simple model for the skill premium

The production function for the aggregate economy takes the (CES) form

$$Y(t) = \left[ (A_L(t) L(t))^\rho + (A_H(t) H(t))^\rho \right]^{1/\rho},$$

where  $A_L$  and  $A_H$  are factor-augmenting ‘technology’ terms.<sup>12</sup> The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in this production function is  $\sigma \equiv 1/(1 - \rho)$ . Skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes when the elasticity of substitution exceeds one and complements when the elasticity of substitution is less than one.<sup>13</sup> The value of the elasticity of substitution will play a crucial role as the impact of an increase in the productivity of skilled or unskilled workers depends on the value of the elasticity of substitution. In a competitive labour market it holds that:

<sup>11</sup> This section draws upon Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu (1999b).

<sup>12</sup> Technology is in quotes, as this is a typical example of the economists’ view of technology: something that should be there, but we do not know what it is.

<sup>13</sup> Two familiar special cases are: (i)  $\sigma = 0$ ; a Leontief function; there is no substitution possible; the wage ratio is insensitive to supply and (ii)  $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$ ; an additive function; skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes and the wage ratio is also insensitive to supply changes.

$$\frac{w_H}{w_L} = \left( \frac{A_H}{A_L} \right)^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} \left( \frac{H}{L} \right)^{-1/\sigma}$$

This expression provides some important economic insights. First, an increase in  $H/L$  lowers the skill premium. Second, an increase in  $A_H$  can either complement or “replace” skilled workers, depending on the substitution elasticity. Presuming the (empirically supported) claim that  $\sigma > 1$ ,  $A_H$  complements skills. The final story that this expression tells is that for the skill premium not to fall with increases in the relative supply of skills,  $A_H / A_L$  should increase accordingly.

**Observation** Since the supply of skills increased in most countries, something should have shifted demand for skill; more precisely, high-skilled augmenting technological progress should have increased at a faster rate than low-skilled augmenting technological progress (i.e.,  $A_H / A_L$  should have increased).

This observation is purposely vague. We make it more precise later on.

An empirical strategy to identify the demand shift is to take logs of the expression above and to estimate it:

$$\ln \left( \frac{w_H}{w_L} \right) = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \ln \left( \frac{A_H}{A_L} \right) - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln \left( \frac{H}{L} \right)$$

Depending on the type of data, the first term on the right-hand-side is estimated as a constant (in a cross section), as a time-trend (with time-series data), or as time-dummies (with panel data).

Katz and Murphy (1992) estimated the above equation for the US from 1963-1988 and found:

$$\ln \left( \frac{w_H}{w_L} \right) = \text{constant} + 0.033 t - 0.7 \ln \left( \frac{H}{L} \right)$$


and hence the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is about 1.4 ( $=1/0.7$ ) and the skill premium increases – holding relative supply constant – with 3.3% a year!

#### **A constant or increasing trend in demand?**

The demand trend is responsible for the fact that the skill premium did not dramatically fall throughout the 20th century despite the continuing increase in the relative supply of skilled

workers; there was a positive demand trend on average. In order to shed light on recent labour market experience, it is important to be more precise. There has been an acceleration in the increase of relative demand for skill in the 1980s. Figure 3.3 illustrates this point (it depicts time-dummies from a panel inequality regression that corrects for human capital supply and country specific effects only; we discuss this in greater detail in Section 5).<sup>14</sup>

**Figure 3.3 Time specific deviations from a constant demand trend for skills**



Source: Own estimation. For data sources see Section 5 (footnote 24) and the Appendix.

What the figure reveals is that the deviations from a constant demand trend are negative from the early 1970s to 1980, whereas a steep turn upward is present up till the 1990s. In other words, the pressure on inequality has substantially increased in the 1980s, while it decreased in the 1970s.

### 3.3 Putting the pieces together

The first column in Table 3.1 shows the relative wage change of college graduates compared to those who completed high school for the US from 1940 to 1996. Recall that: (i) in the period 1980-1990, the skill premium increased most rapidly when comparing 10-year periods; (ii) the skill premium did not rise continuously. In the 1970s it fell as well as in the 1940s. Note that the

<sup>14</sup> This procedure is a variation on Murphy et al. (1998), who find a similar pattern.

relative supply of skilled labour has steadily increased. The most rapid increase took place in the 1970s. This increase coincided with a fall in the skill premium.


**Table 3.1 US college/high school wage premium, supply and demand shifts, 1940-1996<sup>a</sup>**

	Relative wage change	Relative supply change	Relative demand change	Relative wage change if the supply change is zero?
1940-1950	-1.86	1.49	-1.11	-0.79
1950-1960	0.83	2.93	4.09	2.92
1960-1970	0.69	2.65	3.62	2.59
1970-1980	-0.74	4.30	3.26	2.33
1980-1990	1.51	2.48	4.60	3.29
1990-1996	0.40	2.35	2.91	2.08
1970-1996	0.39	3.06	3.60	2.57

<sup>a</sup> Source Autor et al. (1998). Changes refer to 100 x annual log changes. The relative wage is the log of the hourly wage differential for college graduates (those with sixteen or more years of schooling) relative to high school graduates (those with exactly twelve years of schooling). The supply and wage-share are defined accordingly. The demand shift is not observed, but is determined as the implied demand shift that results if the aggregate elasticity of substitution is equal to 1.4.

Figure 3.4 puts the numbers of the first column of Table 3.1 together graphically and reveals that the skill premium has been enormously depressed around the Second World War (WWII) and that the recent surge in inequality has ‘only’ restored inequality to the pre WWII level (see Section 4.2 for an elaboration).

Figure 3.4 The skill premium over the long run



Source: See Table 3.1.


**Observation** In the United States, inequality is not at an unprecedentedly high level today.

This observation is driven by the fact that inequality in 1940 is roughly equal to inequality in 1996. A more alarming way of saying the same is: inequality has not been so high for the last 60 years.

Figure 3.5 shows how inequality *would* have evolved if supply had not accommodated the demand trend; inequality would have risen dramatically. We show two *what-if* scenarios. First, the dotted line shows how inequality would have evolved had the supply of human capital remained constant at its 1970 level. The actual increase in inequality since 1970 was about 15%; the counterfactual increase in inequality would be about a 100%! The counterfactual experiment for 1940-1996 shows an even more dramatic result.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The counterfactual increase in inequality would be lower if the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers was higher.

Figure 3.5 Relative wage if relative supply had been constant



Source: Own calculations based on Table 3.1

If, as we argue, the growth in the supply of skills will flatten in the future and the demand trend continues to evolve as in the last three decades, inequality will increase drastically.

**Observation** With a continuing demand trend and a lower growth rate of the supply of skills, inequality will increase substantially.

This observation is to be qualified by some uncertainties that we discuss in the next section.



## 4 Scenarios for the future: Expectations and uncertainties

### 4.1 Uncertainty about the future development of the supply of skills

In characterising the supply of skills, years and type of schooling do not tell the whole story. As mentioned before, experience effects and migration affect the human capital stock. But even more important, especially when comparing stocks across countries, the quality of the educational system might differ across countries. For two reasons it is important to take a closer look at quality<sup>16</sup>: first, differences in quality across countries might hamper comparison;<sup>17</sup> second, quality might be a dimension of skills that still leaves room for improvements and is a dimension where policy can play a direct role.

To assess quality we use “output data” of the educational system; The International Adult Literacy Survey of the OECD is a collection of comparable data about the numeracy and literacy skills of the adult population in seven countries. We compare this with the “input data” discussed above: the average number of years of schooling. Figure 4.1 depicts, for a limited set of countries, the data of the two sources for 1995.<sup>18</sup>

Average years of schooling per country vary from a low 11.1 in Sweden to above 13 for Germany and the United States. When the IALS scores are used as skill measures the picture is very different. Sweden has the highest score, with the Netherlands ranking second. The United States now ranks lowest. The correlation between the two measures of skill is negative. This is not to suggest causality, of course, but to emphasise the caution that is required in comparing information across countries.

<sup>16</sup> Quality can in our stylised model be seen as an element of  $A$ . We interpret  $H$  and  $L$  as the number of high- and low-skilled workers and  $A_H$  and  $A_L$  as their effectiveness, which is, amongst others, determined by quality of schooling.


<sup>17</sup> See Leuven et al. (2002) who make this point forcefully.

<sup>18</sup> The IALS scores are the arithmetic average of the scores on three tests (see Leuven et al., 2002). The numbers are transformed to facilitate comparison with the years of schooling data.

**Observation** The quality dimension of the educational system differs substantially across countries. Notably the United States has a low quality compared to the quantity.

If countries succeed in increasing the quality of the graduates aggregate supply of skills, this can exert downward pressure on the skill premium. Whether it leads to lower inequality is a different matter as those who already are relatively well of – the educated – experience an increase in quality (read: wages).

**Figure 4.1 Comparing educational quality and quantity**



Source: Leuven et al. (2002).


## 4.2 Uncertainty about the future development of the demand for skills

Unless we know what is behind the demand-trend, we are unable to say something sensible about the likelihood of that trend continuing in the future. This section explores the potential driving forces.

#### 4.2.1 The great compression

The remarkable compression of the wage structure in the period 1940-1950 might be telling interesting stories with respect to a potential return to a bias in demand favouring the unskilled (see Figure 4.2). Goldin and Margo (1992) provide a thorough analysis of this period. There are two preliminary issues to be resolved. First, was the compression a mere continuation of a trend originating much earlier than the war? Though data for the earlier period are scarce and the Great Depression of the 1930s interfered, Goldin and Margo conclude that prior to 1940 there was no clear compression. The second preliminary question is – for the past to be informative about the future – how much of the compression is to be attributed to the war and the accompanying command economy. The war does not explain the major part of the story. Although the role played by the National War Labor Board and the increase in the minimum wage may have been substantial, the compression continued long after the war suggesting that underlying market forces were at work. Moreover, both compression at the bottom, as well as at the top of the wage distribution were responsible for the overall decrease in inequality.

Figure 4.2 Log wages 90<sup>th</sup>-10<sup>th</sup> percentile US



Source: Goldin and Margo (1992).

The enduring low level of inequality after the war is explained by supply and demand and related institutional factors. First, those people who served in the army were given generous financial support to educate themselves, which induced a drastic increase in supply of skills. Second, the period 1940-1950 was exceptional in that the demand for unskilled kept up with the demand for

skilled. Finally, a strong labour movement in the 1950s supported strong unions that compressed the wage structure.

Acemoglu et al. (2002) explore an alternative explanation for the enduring compression that could be responsible for the “observed” change in demand, namely changes in female labour participation induced by the millions of men mobilised to serve the armed forces. They find that women substitute for men with some intermediate level of skill, which is plausible given that men at the low end of the skill distribution were likely to be employed in (heavy) manual occupations. This induced wage compression between intermediate and low skilled. However, when estimating the overall impact of female participation on male wage inequality the impact is *positive*, leading to the conclusion that without the female participation response the great compression would have been greater! This finding emphasises that the 1940-1950 era was characterised by a demand bias relatively favourable to the unskilled.

**Observation** A demand bias favouring unskilled is not an unknown phenomenon. Though analysis of the past decades reveals a continuing demand shift favouring the skilled, the 1940-1950 period was relatively favourable to unskilled.

#### 4.2.2 What demand trend?

Recall the observation derived in the previous section:

**Observation** Since the supply of skill increased in most countries something should have shifted demand for skill; more precisely, high-skilled augmenting technological progress should have increased at a faster rate than low-skilled augmenting technological progress (i.e.,  $A_H / A_L$  should have increased).

The question that we address here is what is behind the demand trend.

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## Evolution of inequality in middle-income countries and what Heckscher and Ohlin tell

The observed increase in the skill premium, together with the more pronounced presence of low-wage countries in the global economy due to increased integration and reduced transport costs, leads many to conclude that the latter is causing the former. The argument that global market integration leads to the increase in the wage gap is fairly persuasive for many people. Economists have also been sympathetic to the argument because the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, related to the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, provides a readily available tool of analysis. To illustrate the logic of the theorem we will run through an example based on the situation in the US. Suppose the US is skilled-labour abundant. Furthermore we assume that the US starts trading with low or middle income countries (LMIC) due to a decline in trade barriers erected by the LMIC. The US will shift production towards the skilled-intensive goods industries (as the relative price of the skilled-intensive good increases). As the shrinking sector is unskilled-intensive, it releases relatively plentiful unskilled workers. Thus, the relative wage of the unskilled has to *decrease* in order to get the unskilled absorbed in the skilled-intensive industry. This change in the relative factor reward also changes the factor-input ratio in both industries. In the LMIC, the opposite happens; most importantly, the relative wage of unskilled workers *increases*.

The table below indicates that the relative position of unskilled in the LMIC deteriorated too in the period 1980-1990. Hence the most important prediction does not come through. This again suggests that the demand trend is pervasive across countries.

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### Inequality in middle income countries

Country	Year last survey	Year first survey	Percentile ratio in last year	Annual change in log percentile ratio (90/10) * 100
Czech R.	1996	1992	3.01	5.98
Hungary	1994	1991	4.19	7.06
Poland	1995	1986	4.04	1.56
Russia	1995	1992	9.39	11.45
Mexico	1998	1989	11.55	2.32

Source: LIS.

For the US and many other countries the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not explain much of the increase in inequality as, most importantly, there is no evidence that the relative price of unskilled-intensive goods fell.

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### Biassed technology or capital skill-complementarity?

In the previous analysis, the demand trend was imputed instead of observed. Everything that cannot be explained by changes in supply is to be driven by changes in demand. As discussed in the box, demand changes related to international trade cannot explain a large part of the imputed demand movement. What is left of the demand change is, in an overwhelmingly large part of the literature, attributed to biased technological change. The ICT revolution is the obvious candidate for being the driving force behind this bias.

That the technological trend is not observable leaves room for alternative factors, such as capital-skill complementarity. Assuming that the ever cheaper and better capital equipment makes skilled workers more productive whereas the unskilled worker have to compete with or are replaced by capital (capital and unskilled workers are substitutes) can explain the observations too. Krussel et al. (2000) show that the observable factors – the capital price and the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers – are able to explain the skill premium in the US for the last 30 years.<sup>19</sup>

This result is to be contrasted with results derived in studies that attempt to make the unobservable technology trend more observable. First, the existence of a large computer premium that increases from 1984-1993 (Krueger, 1993; Autor et al., 1998) is taken as direct evidence of skilled-biased technical change.<sup>20</sup> Second, there is evidence of a more general technology-skill complementarity. An example of this evidence is the existence of positive correlations in cross-sections across industries and plants of capital intensity and of indicators of new technologies (computers, R&D intensity) with worker skills (Doms et al., 1997). Also the positive correlation of the rate of skill upgrading with technology indicators like computer usage, computer investment and R&D intensity are interpreted as direct evidence (Berman et al., 1994; Autor et al., 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). The final example of general technology-skill complementarity is the evidence of greater acceleration in skill upgrading in more computer-intensive sectors (Autor et al., 1998).

**Observation** Capital-skill complementarity can explain the US observations. This, however, is to be weighted against the substantial evidence that positively relates technology to skill upgrading.

#### 4.2.3 What bias is one thing, why a skill bias is another

So far we identified only what is behind the demand trend. A tentative conclusion is that a "substantial" part of the demand trend is related to biased technological change. In order to assess the likelihood of a future continuation of this bias, understanding why technology is biased in the first place is necessary. The first view is that a major innovation – the invention of the microprocessor – temporarily accelerates demand for skills in order to implement the new technology (see Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987 and Bartel and Sicherman 1999). A second view is that the current technological paradigm is inherently biased towards skills. One way of

<sup>19</sup> Arranz (2001) argues that 56% of the demand change is explained by biased technological change, whereas 44% is explained by capital-skill complementarity. The difference is explained by the fact that Krusell et al. (2000) impose too many restrictions in their model. Arranz argues that different patterns of complementarity/substitutability exist and that the elasticities of substitution are not constant. Arranz does not find evidence of equipment-skill complementarity as Krussel et al. do, but only IT-skill complementarity.

<sup>20</sup> DiNardo and Pischke (1997) disagree on this. However, Autor et al. (1998) respond convincingly.

understanding this is, for example, to think of ICT as a technology that raises solely the productivity of R&D workers. As R&D workers are skilled this would lead to a permanent increase in the skill premium. This is not truly an explanation, but it is important to note the difference between the temporary effect and the permanent effect. The third view is that a permanent bias in technology can be explained by economic factors too. Technology is not inherently biased, but biased due to the incentive to create such a bias. Technology is non-rival – the same technology can be used at no additional cost by more people – and therefore technology is driven towards the largest markets. Having noted the enormous increases in the supply of skill (read: the market for skill biased technology) it is not surprising to see a strong bias in technology too (see Acemoglu, 1998, Acemoglu, 1999a<sup>21</sup> and Nahuis and Smulders, 2002).

A few remarks are in place here. (i) It is not correct to conclude from this last mechanism that an ever -accelerating circular mechanism is created like: a skill bias leads to higher skill premiums which leads to a long-run increase in skills which again leads to a skill bias, etc. This link is broken by the fact that increasing the supply of skill is getting more costly as more workers are skilled already. (ii) Integration with low-skilled abundant countries does not necessarily make the market for unskilled technology larger. This depends on the intellectual property rights regime that prevails; if copying is 'allowed', the technology firms cannot reap the benefits of the larger market for unskilled technology. (iii) If international trade lowers the wage of unskilled workers, the induced technology mechanism magnifies this effect. (iv) Finally, policy fostering the supply of skills to reduce inequality is hampered by the induced technology mechanism.

<sup>21</sup> Acemoglu (1999a) provides a mechanism that gives rise to an increase in inequality when the supply of skills increases, but different from the other papers mentioned in the text; it does not use innovation theory. He shows that when the size of the market for skills increases it may become cheaper to post a vacancy targeted at the skilled and thereby raising their attractiveness and wage.





## 5 The determinants of differences in inequality across space and time

So far, we discussed several explanations for differences in income inequality across countries and its evolution over time. Apart from differences in supply of skills and biased technological progress, these differences are often attributed to differences in the labour-market institutions. This section aims at empirically investigating the determinants of the differences in inequality, simultaneously accounting for differences in supply, technological progress and institutional settings.

Our main results are contained in Table 5.1. This table contains regression equations in which our measure of inequality is the Estimated Household Income Inequality Measure.<sup>22</sup> The investigated time period is 1963-1992.<sup>23</sup> The analysis controls for time-invariant country characteristics by means of country-specific fixed effects. Thus, we consider mainly changes over time. The remainder of this section uses the results presented below to draw conclusions on the empirical relevance of the different explanations for changes in inequality. These discussions are extended with circumstantial evidence from the existing literature.

<sup>22</sup> We refer to the Appendix for an extensive discussion of this measure and a robustness analysis of the results obtained in this section by using alternative measures for income inequality. We prefer this measure because it is available for long time periods (which only holds for the Theil inequality measure and the EHII measures) and because it measures income inequality instead of pay-inequality for the manufacturing sector as the Theil measure does.

<sup>23</sup> The EHII measure is available for the period 1963-1998, but we only have time series for institutions covering the period 1963-1992 (from Golden et al., 2002). For reasons of comparability of the regression equations in Table 5.1, we have therefore restricted the time period considered to 1963-1992.

**Table 5.1 Regression results. Dependent variable Log of Estimated Household Income Inequality measure**

Additional controls	Time	Differences in supply	Unemployment	Technology	A different institutional setting
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
Time	0.002 (11.9)	0.004 (7.0)	0.009 (13.3)	0.004 (6.7)	0.004 (5.6)
Log of human capital		-0.224 (3.67)	-0.827 (11.9)	-0.237 (7.7)	-0.199 (2.9)
Log of std unemployment			0.027 (7.8)		
Log of union density					-0.061 (6.5)
Log of bargaining level					-0.004 (0.9)
Log of GDP per capita growth				0.004 (2.1)	
Country specific fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R <sup>2</sup> -adj.	0.83	0.84	0.90	0.84	0.87
# panel observations	368	362	314	308	328

t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses. For data and their sources, see the Appendix.

### Differences in supply of skills

Differences in the (relative) supply of skills lead to differences in relative wages. In the previous sections, we already argued that it is difficult to properly assess the relevance of this candidate given the measurement problems in determining the quality of the supply of human capital. Still, we try to test for the hypothesis that differences in income inequality are caused by differences in supply. The measure that we use for the supply of skills is the log of human capital (taken from Doménech and De la Fuente). We see in Table 5.1 that differences in supply have a statistically significant negative effect on income inequality. This result strongly suggests that a lack of human capital indeed results in increases in income inequality. Note that, once we control for the supply of human capital, the time trend increases. This underlines the point of the previous section that inequality would have been much higher had the supply of human capital not increased so rapidly.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Figure 3.3 is constructed by estimating an analogous equation to column (II) in Table 5.1, but with time-dummies for each year instead of a time trend.

In the existing literature on this issue, Blau and Kahn (1996) attribute the substantially higher *level* of wage inequality in the US to differences in institutions and not to differences in the distribution of measurable characteristics (skills). This study was subsequently criticised by Leuven et al. (2002) who argue that the skill measure used by Blau and Kahn is inappropriate as it ignores differences in quality (see Section 4.1). They show that using a quality measure leaves room for a substantial role for differences in supply. Acemoglu (2002) uses a very simple supply and demand framework to explain the *changes* in skill premia across countries. Also in his analysis, supply factors account for a significant component of the differences in trends in inequality.

**Observation** There is fairly convincing empirical evidence that differences in the supply of skills play a role in explaining differences in income inequality, both over time as well as across countries. Care is required, however, as the measures that are commonly used to determine supply face difficulties in appropriately controlling for differences in the quality of skills. The fact that those studies that make a serious attempt to correct for quality differences generally find that supply differences matter may be seen as another indication for the relevance of the supply-oriented explanation.

#### **High minimum wages lead to unskilled unemployment in the EU**

A popular explanation for differences in unemployment and wage inequality starts from the notion that European institutions increase wages of unskilled workers above market-clearing levels. This results in relatively low income inequality in Europe as compared to the US and relatively high unemployment, especially among the unskilled. This explanation can be stated, freely after Davis (1998), as follows: US inequality props up as European unemployment.

If this explanation were to be correct, unemployment among unskilled should have increased at a different rate than unemployment among the skilled in Europe as compared to the US. This is investigated in Table 5.2. The table reveals that the increase in unemployment over the 1980s was not markedly different between low- and high-skilled. Unemployment rates increased for both types of workers in all European countries.

**Observation** The increase in unemployment over the 1980s was not markedly different between low- and high-skilled.

The puzzle is further complicated by the observation that the story does not only apply to continental Europe, but also to the Anglo-Saxon countries (reported in Table 5.3).

**Table 5.2 Male Unemployment Rates by Education (Percentages)**

Country and education	1971 - 1982	1983 - 1990	1991 - 1993
<b>Germany</b>			
Total	31.0	56.0	41.0
High ed.	17.0	31.0	22.0
Low ed.	64.0	130.0	107.0
Ratio	38.0	42.0	49.0
Difference	47.0	99.0	85.0
<b>Italy</b>			
Total	77.0	112.0	112.0
High ed.	122.0	131.0	125.0
Low ed.	46.0	73.0	75.0
Ratio	38.0	55.0	6.0
Difference	- 4.7	- 5.8	- 5.0
<b>Netherlands</b>			
Total	63.0	100.0	68.0
High ed.	32.0	57.0	50.0
Low ed.	70.0	140.0	99.0
Ratio	22.0	25.0	20.0
Difference	38.0	83.0	49.0
<b>Spain</b>			
Total	89.0	169.0	151.0
High ed.	62.0	99.0	90.0
Low ed.	106.0	196.0	200.0
Ratio	17.0	20.0	22.0
Difference	44.0	97.0	110.0
<b>Sweden</b>			
Total	24.0	25.0	58.0
High ed.	10.0	11.0	28.0
Low ed.	29.0	33.0	69.0
Ratio	29.0	30.0	25.0
Difference	19.0	22.0	41.0

Source: Nickell and Bell (1996).

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**Table 5.3 Male Unemployment Rates by Education (Percentages)**

Country and education	1971 - 1982	1983 - 1990	1991 - 1993
<b>United Kingdom</b>			
Total	50	90	108
High ed.	24	44	62
Low ed.	75	159	171
Ratio	31	36	26
Difference	51	115	109
<b>Canada</b>			
Total	68	91	115
High ed.	25	39	51
Low ed.	83	119	161
Ratio	33	31	32
Difference	58	80	110
<b>United States</b>			
Total	49	62	60
High ed.	20	24	30
Low ed.	78	113	110
Ratio	39	47	37
Difference	58	89	80

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Source: Nickell and Bell (1996).

These results are in line with what we report in Table 5.1. There we see that there is a statistically significant *positive* relationship between inequality and the standardised unemployment rate. The claim that the difference in unemployment and inequality performance between Europe and the US is rooted in different labour-market institutions that increase unemployment in Europe whereas they foster inequality in the US is therefore unlikely to be correct.

**Observation** Differences in labour-market institutions are unlikely to be responsible for simultaneously explaining the relatively large income inequality in the US (and the Anglo-Saxon countries in general) and the relatively low unemployment.

### **Biassed technological progress**

A next explanation for the increase in inequality over time emphasises biased technological progress. A simple way to test for this explanation is to consider whether there is a systematic development over time of income inequality after correcting for other factors that might explain the development of income inequality over time. The estimates for the time trend in all columns in Table 5.1 indeed reveal that there is evidence for a uni-directional long-run change in inequality, immaterial of the control variables included in the regression analysis. This suggests that there is something left that has resulted in increases in income inequality, after controlling for changes over time of supply of skills, institutional settings, etc.

In order to assess the role for technology more directly we introduce a technology-related variable in the regression model. We follow Galor and Moav (2000) who derive predictions for the relation between (both exogenous and endogenous) growth and inequality. The results in Table 5.1 reveal that growth and inequality are indeed positively correlated. Growth is interpreted here as a proxy for R&D activity or other growth-enhancing policies.

Some qualifications are, however, in place here. The first is that the bias in technological progress can be a temporary phenomenon associated with the arrival of, for example, a General Purpose Technology (see Helpman, 1998, and Nahuis, 2003). To test for the relevance of such an explanation, we would need data on the late 1990s to test whether the advent of the ICT can indeed be interpreted as a General Purpose Technology that (initially) makes intensive use of high-skilled labour resulting in increased income inequality. We have not been able to gather consistent data to test for this.

Second, there is an emerging consensus in the empirical growth literature that inequality is bad for growth (for references see footnote 3). The estimates reported in column (IV) of Table 5.1 do not necessarily contrast with this literature. The literature referred to is based on a wider set of countries and relies on cross-section information. We rely mainly on time-series information for a sample of OECD countries.

A final qualification relates to the direction of causality. In the previous arguments, we have taken the bias in technological progress as exogenous. An alternative view on what might have happened (Acemoglu, 2002) is that high minimum wages have increased unskilled unemployment, inducing firms to choose different technologies that also increased skilled unemployment. The minimum wages in that case are responsible for increasing general unemployment (both high- and low-skilled) via a direct effect on low-skilled unemployment and an indirect effect via the direction of technological progress on high-skilled unemployment. This explanation is consistent with the evidence reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.

**Observation** Skill-biased technological progress is associated with changes in income inequality. Open questions remain, however, regarding the direction of causality and the question whether biased technological progress mainly affects short-run fluctuations in income inequality or (also) long-run changes.

#### **Institutional determinants**

Finally, we turn to the institutional explanations. The results in Table 5.1 reveal that especially a high union density (as well as – though statistically insignificant – a high bargaining level) lower inequality. The previously discussed result on the effect of unemployment indicates that this is an effect that goes beyond the effect that these institutions might have on unemployment. This result indicates the relevance of institutional factors in explaining differences in income inequality across countries. We explore this relationship further in an accompanying paper in which we also consider the relevance of institutions for other indicators of economic performance such as unemployment, productivity and GDP per capita (De Groot et al., 2003).

**Observation** Differences in the institutional setting – most notably union density – across countries are important determinants of differences in income inequality.





## 6 Conclusions

In this paper, we investigated the determinants of changes in income inequality over time as well as differences in income inequality across countries. In explaining the increase in income inequality over time, we mainly explored the potential relevance of changes in the relative supply of skills and biased technological progress. Both factors may have contributed. Pinning down the exact contribution of these factors is difficult because of measurement problems associated with determining the quality of the supply of high- and low skilled labour as well as identifying the sources of biases in technological progress.

In explaining differences in the changes in inequality across countries, we find that differences in labour market institutions (most notably trade unions) substantially depress income inequality. Our analysis shows that this effect goes beyond the direct effect that labour market institutions have on low-skilled unemployment. Hence, unions counter the upward trend in inequality directly.

With respect to future trends, the major lesson from this paper is that it is plausible that inequality is going to increase. Over the past decades, the increased demand for skills was a lasting trend matched largely by an increase in the supply of skills. This increase in skills is likely to run into bounds. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the bias of technological progress is endogenous and may well switch in favour of low-skilled workers again. What exactly could trigger a change in the bias in technology is a question for future research.



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## Appendix

This Appendix describes and discusses the various data-sources that provide information on income inequality as we have used them throughout the paper. Also other data used in this study are described. Where relevant, we also perform robustness analyses of the results presented in the main text of this paper by constructing Tables equivalent to those in the main text.

### Inequality measures

As we already discussed in the main text, there is a plethora of empirical measures proxying for income inequality, each with its own pros and cons. In this paper, we have used the Gini measures for income inequality as gathered by the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) and Deininger and Squire (1996), the Theil inequality measure taken from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), Atkinson measures and percentile ratios gathered by LIS, and Estimated Household Income measures that were estimated by Galbraith and Kum (2003). For information on the primary and secondary income distribution (before and after correction for taxes and transfers, respectively), we rely on Bradley et al. (2001) who use LIS data as a source.<sup>25</sup>

Without going into detail on all these different measures, it is useful to characterise the essential differences between them since they have motivated our choice for the measures used in the main text<sup>26</sup>:

1. There are differences in time span. Long time series are only available from the UTIP and Galbraith and Kum. Those therefore underlie the analysis in Section 5.
2. The LIS has made a huge effort making the different inequality measures comparable across countries. This makes this measure the ideal one, apart from the fact that no long time series are available.
3. The Theil measure provided by the UTIP is based on pay inequality in the manufacturing sector. This is not our preferred measure for income inequality that we would like to be measured at income level. For that reason, the Estimated Household Income Measure - though constructed - was used in Section 5 instead of the Theil measure.
4. The Atkinson, Theil, Gini and percentile ratios have different interpretations. Although larger values of the indicators all imply larger income (or pay) inequality, the interpretation of the Gini measure and the percentile ratios are most straightforward and are therefore preferred in the illustrations in Section 2-4.

<sup>25</sup> We are grateful to Bradley for making the inequality data underlying his paper readily available to us.

<sup>26</sup> Details of all sources can be found on the Internet at [www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm) (Deininger and Squire), [utip.gov.utexas.edu](http://utip.gov.utexas.edu) (University of Texas Inequality Project reporting the Theil measure and the Estimated Household Income Inequality measure), [www.lisproject.org](http://www.lisproject.org) (Luxembourg Income Study).

### Correlation of inequality measures

In order to provide some feeling for the differences (and similarities) among these measures of (or proxies for) income inequality, we have constructed a correlation matrix of all these measures for the year 1989. This matrix is contained in Table A.1. The table reveals that almost all measures are highly correlated, with the exception of the Gini measure from Deininger and Squire that is poorly correlated with the Theil inequality measure and the Estimated Household Income measures.<sup>27</sup>

**Table A.1 Correlation matrix**

	GINI_DS	THEIL_INEQ	GINI_LIS	ATKINSON_5	ATKINSON_10	PERC90_10	PERC90_50	PERC80_20	EHI2	EHI4	GINI_PRE	GINI_POST
GINI_DS	1.00	0.02	0.60	0.64	0.67	0.61	0.51	0.59	0.11	0.17	0.53	0.53
THEIL_INEQ		1.00	0.53	0.50	0.44	0.59	0.54	0.54	0.84	0.71	0.28	0.42
GINI_LIS			1.00	0.99	0.96	0.94	0.97	0.97	0.62	0.58	0.69	0.76
ATKINSON_5				1.00	0.98	0.93	0.96	0.96	0.56	0.53	0.72	0.74
ATKINSON_10					1.00	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.52	0.52	0.72	0.70
PERC90_10						1.00	0.89	0.97	0.57	0.51	0.53	0.64
PERC90_50							1.00	0.93	0.68	0.66	0.71	0.77
PERC80_20								1.00	0.57	0.50	0.56	0.65
EHI2									1.00	0.81	0.29	0.48
EHI4										1.00	0.44	0.48
GINI_PRE											1.00	0.88
GINI_POST												1.00

### Other data and sources

Apart from the inequality measures that we have used before, Section 5 uses data that proxy the explanatory variables for (changes in) income inequality. These data and their sources are:

- human capital. This variable measures the average years of schooling as reported by De la Fuente and Doménech (2001). The original data are available at [fuster.iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/human.html](http://fuster.iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/human.html). We have linearly interpolated the five-year observations to get complete time series.
- standardised unemployment rate. Taken from Golden et al. (2002). Data are available at [www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data](http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data). We refer to their codebook for original sources.
- union density. Taken from Golden et al. (2002). See above.
- bargaining level. Taken from Golden et al. (2002). See above.

<sup>27</sup> The relatively low correlation between GINI\_LIS and GINI\_POST is due to the fact that the two sources use a different definition of Germany (the former excludes East Germany whereas the latter includes it). Leaving out Germany results in a correlation of 0.96.



- GDP growth. This variable is defined as the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Data are taken from the GGDC Total Economy Database 2003 (University of Groningen and the Conference Board). The database is available at [www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc](http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc).

### Robustness analysis

Tables A.2 and A.3 repeat the analysis discussed in Section 5, but now with alternative inequality measures. Table A.2 uses the Estimated Household Income Inequality measure that is based on four control variables instead of two as the one that we used in the main text. As can be seen, the differences are minor. Table A.3 uses the Theil pre-tax income inequality measure from UTIP. For this measure, the results are slightly less clear-cut than for the EHII measures. The time trend is no longer uniformly positive (although in no case significantly negative). The result that more human capital is associated with less income inequality stands upright. There is also no evidence that unemployment and income inequality are negatively correlated (although we do not find a significantly positive relationship as with the EHII measures). Finally, the effects of differences in the institutional setting are comparable for the various inequality measures.

**Table A.2 Regression results. Dependent variable Log of Estimated Household Income Inequality measure**

Additional controls	Time	Differences in supply	Unemployment	Technology	A different institutional setting
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
time	0.002 (8.4)	0.003 (4.6)	0.008 (13.3)	0.003 (4.5)	0.002 (2.7)
Log of human capital		-0.153 (2.2)	-0.710 (7.9)	-0.181 (2.4)	-0.107 (1.4)
Log of std unemployment			0.010 (2.3)		
Log of union density					-0.044 (4.1)
Log of bargaining level					-0.012 (2.3)
Log of GDP per capita growth				0.002 (0.8)	
Country-specific fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R <sup>2</sup> -adj.	0.85	0.86	0.89	0.86	0.88
# panel observations	368	362	314	308	328

t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses

**Table A.3 Regression results. Dependent variable Log of Theil inequality coefficient**

Additional controls	Time	Differences in supply	Unemployment	Technology	A different institutional setting
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
time	-0.002 (1.6)	0.026 (7.0)	-0.0514 (10.0)	0.029 (7.1)	0.02 (4.2)
Log of human capital		-3.282 (8.0)	-5.824 (10.6)	-3.390 (7.7)	-2.733 (5.4)
Log of std unemployment			0.003 (0.1)		
Log of union density					-0.201 (2.9)
Log of bargaining level					-0.013 (0.4)
Log of GDP per capita growth				0.039 (3.0)	
Country-specific fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R <sup>2</sup> -adj.	0.89	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91
# panel observations	368	362	314	308	328

t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses