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#### DOES IT PAY TO DO WELL IN COMPETITIONS? THE CASE OF THE QUEEN ELIZABETH PIANO COMPETITION

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# Does it pay to do well in competitions? The case of the Queen Elizabeth piano competition<sup>\*</sup>

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#### Abstract

Pianists who achieve high scores in the Queen Elizabeth musical competition are rewarded by subsequent success. It is not clear whether this is caused by the score itself or because those who have high scores are better pianists anyway. Since the timing and the order of appearance are good instrumental variables for the nal ranking, our data on eleven subsequent competitions make it possible to distinguish between the two alternative explanations. We find that high scores have an impact on later success.

JEL codes: J24, L82, Z10.

Keywords: Competition and success, unobserved ability, treatment effects.

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#### 1 Introduction

Do artists who achieve high scores in a competition get rewarded by subsequent success, or is their success due to their intrinsic quality, irrespective of their performance at the competition?

This type of problem is well known in labor economics where (crosssectional) correlation between education and earnings does not necessarily mean that the former has an e<sup>®</sup>ect on the latter. An alternative explanation is that individuals with a greater earning capacity may have chosen for more education. If this is true, it is unobserved ability, or intrinsic quality, that explains di<sup>®</sup>erences in both education and earnings. To determine the true e<sup>®</sup>ect of education on earnings, instrumental variables which a<sup>®</sup>ect education choices, but have no direct e<sup>®</sup>ect on earnings, have to be used.<sup>1</sup>

We use data from eleven subsequent Queen Elizabeth piano competitions organized in Belgium, to distinguish between the two alternative explanations. This is made possible thanks to a particular feature of the competition, as the order of appearance at the competition a®ects the <sup>-</sup>nal ranking. Since the order is decided by a random draw, the <sup>-</sup>nal ranking is in<sup>o</sup> uenced by factors that are not related to the quality of the performers. Therefore ranking is not perfectly correlated with quality and we will be able to conclude that a high score in itself has a positive impact on later success.

The setup of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the main characteristics of the Queen Elizabeth musical competition for piano. In Section 3 we describe the indicators of success that we have been able to collect. In Section 4 we show that there is a relationship between the <sup>-</sup>nal ranking at the competition and subsequent success. In Section 5 we investigate the nature of this relationship in more detail. Section 6 concludes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See David Card (1999) for a survey. A similar problem arises when one investigates the e<sup>®</sup>ects of job training and job search assistance programs on the subsequent duration of unemployment of those who have participated in the programs, while ignoring those who have not participated, and who may have found a job after shorter unemployment spells. See James Heckman et al. (1999).

#### 2 The Queen Elizabeth competition

The Queen Elizabeth musical competition is the best-known international competition for piano (and violin) organized in Belgium and is considered among the best and most demanding in the world. David Oistrakh won the rst violin competition in 1937, and Emil Guilels the rst one for piano in 1938. Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli was also among the twelve laureates in 1938. Among those who won the <sup>-</sup>rst prize since, let us single out a few wellknown names: Leonid Kogan (1951), Leon Fleisher (1952), Vladimir Askenazy (1956), Malcolm Frager (1960), Eugene Moguilevsky (1964), Valery Afanassiev (1972); many others, though not ranked <sup>-</sup>rst, became very famous, like Lazare Berman (1956), Guidon Kremer (1967), Emmanuel Ax (1972), to cite only a few. The competition requires the candidates to perform chamber music as well as a concerto (of their choice) with a full orchestra. The most unusual characteristic is that the 12 <sup>-</sup>nalist are given a single week to study a contemporary concerto composed on the occasion of the competition, and thus completely unknown to them. This concerto is played by all 12 <sup>-</sup>nalists.

Each competition, organized in principle every 4 years, attracts some 85 pianists from many countries around the world.<sup>1</sup> Members of the board of examination (the jury, for short) are selected among world celebrities{ teachers and interpreters.

A pre-selection is made on the basis of the curriculum, without performance. There are three further stages. In the rst one, 24 musicians are selected. This number is reduced to 12 after a second stage. The order of appearance is drawn at random before the rst stage and remains unchanged for the second stage. In both stages, members of the jury, individually, grade candidates after every day of performance. The rst stage may last an undened number of days, depending on the number of candidates. The second stage last 6 days, with four candidates performing every day, two in the afternoon and two in the evening. The marks are given without any discussion between the judges and cannot be changed after having been turned in.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>These are averages between 1951 and 1983, see Philippon (1985, Appendix 12) for details. Among the 1,800 candidates (violin and piano) between 1951 and 1983, 223 were US citizens, 130 Belgians, 87 came from France, 67 from Japan, 59 from the Soviet Union, 50 from Great Britain, etc. See Philippon (1985, Appendix 12), who quotes more than 50 countries of origin.

There is a new random draw to determine the order in which the candidates will appear in this third and last stage. Each of the candidates is given the score of the unknown concerto exactly 7 days before the public performance. At a rate of two per day, candidates must perform the unknown concerto, one piece as soloists and a concerto of their own choice, in that order.<sup>2</sup>

## 3 Data and indicators of success

Our sample consists of the twelve <sup>-</sup>nalists in eleven subsequent piano competitions held between 1952 and 1991.<sup>3</sup> For each of these 132 musicians, we collected some personal data as well as indicators of success.

The personal data consist of sex, age at the moment of the competition, time elapsed between the competition and the date at which the success indicator is observed, nationality, and, of course, order of performance during the competition and <code>-nal</code> rank (one to twelve). Appendix Table A1 gives some information on these characteristics. It shows that 26% of the <code>-nalists</code> are female, musicains are 24.5 years old at the time of the competition, Russians, Americans and Belgians count for almost 50% of the competitors.

The success indicators consist of number of records (and CDs) and opinions obtained from experts. Earnings would of course have been a much better choice, but are impossible to collect. Our indicators ignore those musicians who have devoted their carriers to teaching or to other activities, which may well be better paid than performing. Our contention, however, is that competitions should mainly lead to performing. We distinguish six indicators s<sub>1</sub> to s<sub>6</sub>.

 $s_1$  and  $s_2$ : Presence in Belgian catalogues: Number of CDs ( $s_1$ ) and records ( $s_2$ ) present in the catalogue of the (French region) M@diathpque de Belgique, a public listening library, from which records (and CDs) can be borrowed.<sup>4</sup> Given that the competition takes place in Belgium, the library possesses most

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>For futher detailed information on the working of the competition, see Pierre Delhasse (1985), Charles Philippon (1985) and Programme (1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>After the 1991 competition, rules have changed. Though there are still 12 musicians selected for the third stage, only the <sup>-</sup>rst six are ranked.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>here may be some double counting if older vinyl records have been remastered and published as CDs.

of the records and CDs which have been recorded, including old ones which are not for sale anymore, and probably some which have been little sold, including those recorded during and just after the competition. Table A2 gives some information about the frequency distribution of the two indicators. As can be seen, there are 44 <sup>-</sup> nalists who have no CD in the catalogue, while there are 60 who have no record. But, there are also 8 <sup>-</sup> nalists who have more than 25 CDs and 3 with more than 25 records.

 $s_3$  and  $s_4$ : Presence in British and French record catalogues: Number of records (and CDs) available in the British record catalogue, Gramophone Classical Catalogue in 1997 ( $s_3$ ) and the French catalogue Diapason in 1995 ( $s_4$ ). These indicators describe international success. Their drawback is that they do not provide CDs or records that are either out of print, or not sold anymore, because there is no demand. The Gramophone Classical Catalogue is unanimously recognized as one of the best lists. Table A2 gives an overview on the frequency distribution of the two indicators and shows that the number of  $\bar{}$  nalists who are absent from the catalogues is quite large. Seventy among them are not quoted in the British catalogue and 79 are missing in the French catalogue. Only few musicians have more than 25 records or CDs that are available.

 $s_5$ : An aggregate (summary) indicator for presence in catalogues. Table A2 shows that a large number of musicians is missing in one or the other catalogue. The <sup>-</sup>fth success indicator merely takes into account the presence of a musician in a catalogue. The values range from 0 (not present in any of the four catalogues) to 4 (present in all four catalogues). Table A3 shows the di®erent combinations of presence in the four previous catalogues. There are 29 <sup>-</sup>nalists who are absent from all four catalogues, while 36 are present in all four catalogues. The number of observations in the intermediate categories is evenly spread. Twenty-three <sup>-</sup>nalists appear in one, 24 in two and 20 in three catalogues.

 $s_6$ : As an alternative indicator of success we used the ratings given by Belgian musical critics, who were asked to rank each participants on a scale between 0 and 5 (unknown to exceptional). This information was collected in 1998, using a written survey sent to some 25 critics, of which 11 answered. As shown the number of  $\bar{}$  nalists for each rating is more evenly spread than

was the case with our previous indicators. It appears that 12 finalists got no marks at all, while 24 among the 132 were given more than  $25.^5$ 

Aggregate characteristics on the indicators can also be found in the second part of Appendix Table A1.

#### 4 Does ranking a ect success?

In our econometric analysis we use the following simple equation to relate final ranking to success, which is specified as a latent variable  $S_i^{\pi}$ :

$$\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathtt{m}} = \mathbf{O}_{\mathbf{0}}^{\mathtt{m}} + \mathbf{O}_{\mathbf{1}}^{\mathtt{m}} \mathbf{\Gamma}_{\mathbf{i}} + \mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{i}} \tag{1}$$

where  $r_i$  is the final ranking obtained by musician i at one of the 11 competitions.<sup>6</sup>. The °k (k = 0; 1) are the parameters of interest and  $u_i$  is an error term that we assume to be normally distributed. We do not observe  $S_i^{\mu}$ , but  $s_{j;i}$ ; (j = 1; 2; ...:6); i.e. the six different success indicator described earlier.

The discussion made clear that many observations have value zero (no record or CD in a catalogue, or no marks given by the critics). Therefore, we are led to estimate Tobit models specified as:

The estimation results are presented in the first row of Table 1. As shown, ranking has a positive effect for all success indicators except, though the coefficients are not significantly different from zero for  $S_3$  and  $S_4$  (the indicators which are probably the most important, since they give the number of records and CDs available on international markets). This means that a high ranking seems to lead to more success.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>It would obviously have been preferable to base such results on a sample of international music critics. We felt that it would have been very difficult, both to select the critics, and get their reactions on a large number of musicians about whom most knew very little, if anything. We thought that Belgian music critics should feel more involved in the results of the survey than their foreign colleagues, and therefore, more prone to answer. They are probably also better informed, since the competition is held in Belgium.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>**0** make interpretation of the parameters easier, the winner gets rank 12, the second gets rank 11, etc. This implies that a "good" ranking coincides with a high rank-number.

We also investigated whether other characteristics than ranking contributed to the success of the finalist. We fould that neither gender, nor age at the finals, nationality, year of the competition (which measures the time elapsed between the competition and the time at which success is measured) influence success.<sup>7</sup>

Next, we estimate the parameters of (1) using a Probit specification, for the first five success indicators. This means that we only take into account of the presence in a catalogue, and ignore the number of records or CDs. The Probit model is specified as:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} s_{j;i} &=& 0 \mbox{ if } s_{i}^{^{\pi}} \mbox{ } \pmb{6} \mbox{ } 0 \\ s_{j;i} &=& 1 \mbox{ if } s_{i}^{^{\pi}} > 0 \end{array} \tag{3}$$

The results appear in the second part of Table 1. The effect of ranking on success is again positive, and all parameter estimates are significantly different from zero at a 5% probability level, except for the coefficient on  $S_3$  which is significant at a 10%-level only.

For the fifth success indicator,  $S_5$  we estimated an Ordered Probit model, which accounts for the ordering in the success without imposing a strict relationship between the ordering. The Ordered Probit model is specified as follows:

$$\begin{split} s_{j;i} &= 0 \text{ if } s_i^{*} \mathbf{6} \ 0 \\ s_{j;i} &= 1 \text{ if } 0 < s_i^{*} \mathbf{6}^{-1}_{-1} \\ s_{j;i} &= 2 \text{ if } u_1 < s_i^{*} \mathbf{6}^{-1}_{-2} \\ s_{j;i} &= 3 \text{ if } u_2 < s_i^{*} \mathbf{6}^{-1}_{-3} \\ s_{j;i} &= 4 \text{ if } {}^{-1}_{-3} < s_i^{*} \end{split}$$
(4)

where the threshold parameters  ${}^{1}_{1}$  to  ${}^{1}_{3}$  are estimated jointly with the other parameters of the model. The estimation results in Table 1 show that also in this case, we find that a better ranking has a significant positive effect on further success.

Finally, for  $S_6$ , we simply applied OLS since this indicator seems to be quite evenly spread across all observations. Again, we find a high ranking

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>It is of course quite surprising that the last variable has no effect, since this implies that if "fame" comes along after the competition, it comes very quickly.

to increase later success. The estimated  $coe \pm cient$  hardly di<sup>®</sup>ers from the Tobit-coe  $\pm cient$ , which indicates that the zero-observations do not seem to contribute in an important way.

### 5 Why is ranking important?

#### 5.1 The determinants of ranking

From previous research it is clear that the ranking of the *-*nalists is a<sup>®</sup>ected by the way the QE musical competition is organized. Renato Flores and Victor Ginsburgh (1996) *-*nd that those musicians who appear in the beginning of the competition have a lower probability of being ranked among the top, whereas those who perform during the *-*fth day have a better chance of being ranked among the *-*rst. Herbert Glejser and Bruno Heyndels (2000) *-*nd that those who perform later in the week or later on a given evening (two musicians compete every evening) obtain a better rank. They also point out that men are better ranked than women.

To investigate the relationship between ranking and order of appearance, we estimated the following equation (using OLS) :

$$r_i = \overline{}_0 + \overline{}_1 \text{female}_i + \overline{}_2 \text{first}_i + \overline{}_3 \text{late}_i + v_i$$
(5)

where  $r_i$  is the <code>-nal</code> ranking of pianist i, female, first and late are three dummy varaibles; the <code>-rst</code> is equal to one if the pianist is female (and 0 otherwise); first is equal to one if i was <code>-rst</code> in the order of appearance at a given competition (and 0 otherwise) and the last one, late, is equal to one if i was second to play in a particular evening (and 0 otherwise). The <code>-'s</code> are parameters and  $v_i$  is the error term assumed to be i.i.d. The parameter estimates (and the t-values which appear between brackets) are:

 $i_{1} = i_{1} 1:86 (2:9)$  $i_{2} = i_{1} 2:96 (3:1)$  $i_{3} = 1:13 (1:9)$ 

with  $\overline{R}^2$  is equal to 0.13.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>As an alternative to the OLS estimate we also ran an Ordered Probit with 12 values,

The parameters show that female <code>-nalists</code> are ranked almost two positions below male <code>-nalists.9</code> It also appears that those who perform during the <code>-rst</code> evening have a rank that is almost three positions lower than that of other candidates. Finally, those who perform second during an evening are ranked about one position higher than those who perform early in the evening. Therefore, similarly to previous researchers, we <code>-nd</code> that, though random in itself, the order of appearance does a<sup>®</sup>ect the <code>-nal</code> ranking.<sup>10</sup> This implies that it is not only the quality of the pianists that determines the ranking, but also the pecularities of the ranking procedure.

#### 5.2 Ranking and success reconsidered

The fact that peculiarities of the competition a®ect the nal ranking allows us to investigate the relationship between ranking and success in more detail. If (unobserved) quality in°uences both ranking and success then there should be a positive correlation between the errors  $u_i$  and  $v_i$  of equations (1) and (5). To check for this, we proceed in the following way. We assume that  $u_i$  and  $v_i$ are i.i.d. drawings from a bivariate distribution with correlation ½. Success is again speci<sup>-</sup>ed as a Tobit (for indicators  $s_1$  to  $s_6$ ), a Probit (indicators  $s_1$ to  $s_4$ ), an ordered Probit (indicator  $s_5$ ) or a linear model (indicator  $s_6$ ). We reestimated all models to investigate to what extent the correlation between the error terms drives the relationship between success and ranking. The di®erent likelihood speci<sup>-</sup>cations are presented in Appendix 2.

Table 2 gives an overview of the estimation results. The  $\neg$ rst two rows of the table give the outcome for the case in which the success equation has a Tobit-speci<sup>-</sup>cation. It appears that the coe±cients  $\circ_1$  remain positive and

which generated the following estimates:  $\bar{}_1 = -0.55$  (2.7),  $\bar{}_2 = -0.91$  (2.9) and  $\bar{}_3 = 0.32$  (1.6), showing that the estimation results are qualitatively similar to those obtained when OLS are used.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>See Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse (2000) who <sup>-</sup>nd that female musicians are more likely to be hired if the hiring committee is not aware of the gender of the musician (blind auditions).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>We also <sup>-</sup>nd that pianists from the USSR and from the USA are ranked higher than other pianists. This, however, may re<sup>°</sup>ect a di<sup>®</sup>erence in quality rather than a characteristic of the ranking due to the QE-competition. Belgian pianists are not ranked di<sup>®</sup>erently from other pianists. Since there may be di<sup>®</sup>erences in the average quality of the 11 competitions, we also added 10 competition-speci<sup>-</sup>c dummy variables. This did not a<sup>®</sup>ect the parameter estimates.

become even larger than in the previous estimates. The reason for this is that the correlation  $coe\pm cient$  between the errors of the two equations is negative in all cases. This suggests that the quality as determined by the jury through the ranking is not in line with the preferences of the audiences who buy records and CDs. The third row of Table 2 shows estimates of the correlation  $coe\pm cient$ , after imposing that ranking does not a<sup>®</sup>ect success (°<sub>1</sub> is set to zero). Then, it is only the correlation between the error terms that is responsible for the variation in success; in other words, it is only the correlation  $coe\pm cient$  is positive for all success indicators, though in the case of s<sub>3</sub> it is signi<sup>-</sup>cantly di<sup>®</sup>erent from zero at a 10% level only.

To test whether either of the restrictions  $\frac{1}{2} = 0$  or  $\circ_1 = 0$  can be supported by the data, we compute Likelihood Ratio tests, the results of which are also shown in Table 2. It appears that we cannot reject  $H_0 : \frac{1}{2} = 0$ , which means that there is no signi<sup>-</sup>cant in  $\circ$  uence from unobserved quality on success and that, therefore, it is the ranking itself which causes the variation in success. We cannot reject  $H_0 : \circ_1 > 0$  either, which con<sup>-</sup>rms the previous result. Note however, that we cannot reject  $H_0 : \circ_1 = 0$  for success indicator  $s_3$ , which is probably the most important one (no. of records and CDs in the Gramophone Classical Catalogue).

The lower part of Table 2 shows the results for alternative speci<sup>-</sup>cations of the success equation. For  $s_1$  to  $s_4$ , we estimate a bivariate model in which success has a Probit speci<sup>-</sup>cation, while for  $s_5$  success is speci<sup>-</sup>ed as an ordered Probit and for  $s_6$  we estimate a bivariate normal speci<sup>-</sup>cation. The alternative estimates basically con<sup>-</sup>rm our previous results. We can reject neither  $H_0 : \frac{1}{2} = 0$  nor  $H_0: {}^{\circ}_1 > 0$  (though this is at the 1% probability level for  $s_5$  and  $s_6$  only, and at the 10% level for the other speci<sup>-</sup>cations).

#### 6 Conclusions

Musicians who are successful in the Queen Elizabeth competition seem to be rewarded by subsequent success also. However, this could be so because those who are better ranked in the competition are better musicians anyway, and the success in the competition adds nothing. From an analytical point of view the question is whether the competition is a \treatment" or an indicator of inherent musical quality. We <code>-nd</code> that the order and timing of appearance

at the competition is a good predictor of the *nal* ranking. This means that not only unobserved quality matters but also the characteristics of the competition. Since the order and timing of appearance are randomly set before the competition starts, they cannot a<sup>®</sup>ect subsequent success. Because of this, order and timing are unique instrumental variables for the *nal* ranking, which we *nd* to have a signicant impact on later success, irrespective of the quality of the *nalist*. Pianists who score high are more likely to get their work recorded later on. It is also remarkable that even the opinion of experts is more in<sup>o</sup> uenced by the ranking at the competition than by the quality of the performers. The conclusion is obvious and strongly supported by the data: it pays to do well in the Queen Elizabeth piano competition.

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## 8 Appendix 1 Information on the data used

Variable	Mean	Min.	Max.	St.dev.
Musicians				
Female	0.26	0	1	0.44
Age	24.53	16	31	3.51
Russians	0.16	0	1	0.37
Americans	0.23	0	1	0.42
Belgians	0.08	0	1	0.28
Success indicators				
S <sub>1</sub>	6.62	0	125	13.44
S <sub>2</sub>	4.23	0	99	10.34
S <sub>3</sub>	3.72	0	115	11.13
S4	2.77	0	94	8.87
S5	2.08	0	4	1.52
S <sub>6</sub>	13.64	0	48	12.05

Table A1 Characteristics of the dataset

No. of records, CDs	lo. of	of pianists				
or ratings <sup>∞</sup>	S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>	S <sub>4</sub>	<b>S</b> 5	S <sub>6</sub>
0	44	60	70	79	29	12
1	17	16	15	14	23	11
2	11	7	8	5	24	10
3	10	11	8	5	20	6
4	4	7	5	2	36	4
5	4	4	3	4	-	5
6	4	4	2	6	-	6
7	3	3	1	5	-	1
8	2	4	3	2	-	1
9	1	3	1	2	-	5
10	3	0	3	1	-	3
11	2	0	2	2	-	4
12	4	0	2	0	-	3
13	2	2	1	1	-	1
14	4	0	1	1	-	2
15	0	2	1	0	-	3
16	3	0	0	0	-	5
17	1	0	0	0	-	2
18	1	1	0	0	-	5
19	1	1	1	1	-	4
20	1	1	1	0	-	2
21	1	1	1	1	-	2
22	0	0	1	0	-	1
23	0	1	0	0	-	4
24	0	1	1	0	-	6
25	1	0	1	0	-	0
>25	8	3	2	1	-	24
Total	132	132	132	132	132	132

Table A2 Frequency distribution of success indicators  $s_1 \ to \ s_6$ 

 $^{\tt m}$  Indicators  $s_1$  to  $s_5$  are records and CDs; indicator  $s_6$  represents ratings by musical journalists.

Presence or absence in catalogues										
	sence in cat MB (rec)		Diap	No. of pianists						
No catalogue										
0	0	0	0	29						
	One catalogue									
1	0	0	0	10						
0	1	0	0	13						
0	0	1	0	0						
0	0	0	1	0						
Two catalo	ogues									
1	1	0	0	10						
1	0	1	0	10						
1	0	0	1	2						
0	1	1	0	0						
0	1	0	1	1						
0	0	1	1	1						
Three cata	logues									
1	1	1	0	7						
1	1	0	1	5						
1	0	1	1	8						
0	1	1	1	0						
All catalogues										
1	1	1	1	36						

Table A3
Presence or absence in catalogues

MB (CD): Belgian listening library, CDs

MB (rec): Belgian listening library, records

GCC: Gramophone Classical Catalogue, CDs and records Diap: Diapason Catalogue, CDs and records

### 9 Appendix 2 Likelihood speci<sup>-</sup>cations

In the speci<sup>-</sup>cation of the likelihoods we use the fact that  $f(s_i; r_i) = f(s_i j r_i):f(r_i):$ Now, the conditional distribution of  $s_i$  given  $r_i$  is normal with mean  $\circ_0 + \circ_1 r_i + \frac{1}{2}v_i \frac{3}{4}u^{-\frac{3}{4}}$ 

Tobit speci<sup>-</sup>cation for success{linear for ranking

$$L = \frac{\mathbf{Y} \otimes \tilde{\mathbf{A}}_{i} \otimes \tilde$$

where  $\mathbb{C}(:)$  is the normal distribution and A(:) the related density function.

Probit speci<sup>-</sup>cation for success{linear for ranking

For the probit speci<sup>-</sup> cation we have  $({}^{2}_{i}; u_{i}) \gg$  bivariate normal  $[0; 0; {}^{3}_{42}; 1; {}^{k}_{2}]$ . From this we derive the likelihood for the Probit model:

$$L = \frac{\mathbf{Y}}{s_{i}=0}^{\mathbb{C}} \stackrel{\mathbf{A}}{=} \frac{i \stackrel{\circ}{=} 0 i \stackrel{\circ}{\mathbf{p}} \frac{1}{1 i \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2}}}{\frac{1}{1 i \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2}}} \stackrel{\mathbf{Y}}{=} \frac{\mathbf{Y}}{s_{i}>0}^{\mathbb{C}} \stackrel{\mathbf{A}}{=} \frac{i \stackrel{\circ}{=} \frac{1}{1 i \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2}}}{\frac{1}{1 i \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2}}} \stackrel{\mathbf{Y}}{=} \frac{1}{i \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2}} \stackrel{\mathbf{A}}{=} \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{$$

Ordered probit speci<sup>-</sup>cation for success{linear for ranking

In the same way we derive the likelihood for the estimates in which the success equation is speci<sup>-</sup>ed as an ordered probit:

$$L = \frac{\mathbf{Y} \otimes \tilde{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{I}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1}}{\mathbf{Y} \otimes \tilde{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{I}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1}} \mathbf{I}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{2}}{\mathbf{Y} \otimes \tilde{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{I}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1}} \mathbf{I}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{2}} \mathbf{I} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{I}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1$$

Bivariate normal speci<sup>-</sup>cation for success and ranking

Finally, we specify the likelihood of the bivariate normal distribution as:

$$L = \frac{\mathbf{Y}}{i} \frac{1}{\frac{3}{4}u} \frac{\mathbf{P}}{1 + \frac{1}{2}} \left[ \hat{\mathbf{A}} \frac{\mathbf{u}_{i i}}{\frac{1}{3}u} \frac{\frac{1}{2}v_{i}^{\frac{3}{4}u} = \frac{3}{4}v}{1 + \frac{1}{2}} \right] \frac{1}{\frac{3}{4}v} \hat{\mathbf{A}} \frac{\mathbf{P}}{\frac{3}{4}v} \frac{\mathbf{P}}{\frac{3}{4}v} \mathbf{P} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \hat{\mathbf{A}} \frac{\mathbf{P}}{\frac{1}{3}v_{i}} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\frac{3}{4}v_{i}} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\frac{1}{2}v_{i}} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\frac{1}{2}v_{i}}$$

Parameters	Parameters Success indicators					
	S <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>	S <sub>4</sub>	S <sub>5</sub>	S <sub>6</sub>
Tobit	1.26 (2.1)	1.45 (2.0)	1.09 (1.3)	1.32 (1.7)		1.64 (5.5)
Probit <sup>¤</sup>	0.94 (2.8)		0.62 (1.9)	0.81 (2.5)	0.15 3.8	-
Ordered Probit <sup>*</sup> -	- -	- -	- -	-	0.10 <sup>y</sup> (3.6)	-
OLS <sup>¤¤</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	1.48 (5.4)

Table 1 Estimates of parameter  $^{\circ}_{1}$  in success equation (1)

Intercepts are not reported. t-values, based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, are given between brackets under each coe±cient. <sup>#</sup>Coe±cients are multiplied by 10.

<sup>\*\*</sup>We also tried a linear speci<sup>-</sup>cation with  $ln(s_6 + 1)$  as a dependent variable, which led to an estimate of 0.14 (5.6), showing that here also, ranking has a signi<sup>-</sup>cant positive e<sup>®</sup>ect on success.

<sup>y</sup>In the Ordered Probit model,  ${}^{1}_{1} = 0.54$  (5.3);  ${}^{1}_{2} = 1.02$  (8.1);  ${}^{1}_{3} = 1.45$  (10.3).

		1		•	,	
Parameters			Success	indicato	ors	
	s <sub>1</sub>	S <sub>2</sub>	S <sub>3</sub>	S <sub>4</sub>	S <sub>5</sub>	S <sub>6</sub>
Tobit model						
° 1	2.55	2.29	2.12	2.31	0.32	2.63
	(1.5)	(2.2)	(1.4)	(1.7)	(2.3)	(3.1)
1/2	-0.27	-0.21	-0.21	-0.23	-0.29	-0.30
	(0.9)	0.9)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.2)	(1.4)
Tobit model,	imposin	g the rest	triction	° <sub>1</sub> = 0		
1/2	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.24	0.27	0.40
	(1.9)	(2.9)	(1.6)	(2.3)	(3.1)	(4.9)
Likelihood ra	tio tests	for the T	Fobit mo	del		
½ = 0	1.24	0.66	0.56	0.70	1.62	1.72
° <sub>1</sub> = 0	4.02 <sup>¤¤</sup>	4.00 <sup>¤¤</sup>	2.04	3.18 <sup>¤</sup>	6.38 <sup>¤¤</sup>	8.88 <sup>¤¤¤</sup>
Other sector	+ ! V					
Other speci		1 40	1 40	1 ( )	0.10	0.40
°1	1.55	1.49	1.42		0.18	0.42
	(2.0)	(1.8)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(3.0)	(3.3)
1/2	-0.24	-0.15	-0.31	-0.32	-0.31	-0.31
	(0.9)	(0.5)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.3)	(1.5)
Other speci	cations,	imposing	the rest	riction	° <sub>1</sub> = 0	
1/2	0.26	0.32	0.15	0.21	0.28	0.38
	(2.4)	(3.2)	(1.4)	(2.0)	(3.0)	(4.6)
Likelihood ra	tio tests	for other	- speci⁻c	ations		
1/2 = 0	0.70	0.26	1.20	1.28	1.74	1.92
° <sub>1</sub> = 0	3.40 <sup>¤</sup>	3.00 <sup>¤</sup>	3.00 <sup>¤</sup>	3.82¤	6.66 <sup>¤¤¤</sup>	9.16 <sup>¤¤¤</sup>

Table 2 Additional estimates for paramater  $^{\circ}_{1}$  (and for ½) in model (1)-(5)

Intercepts in the success equation and other parameters (female,  $\mbox{ "rst, last})$  in the ranking

equation are not reported. t-values, based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, are given between brackets under each coe $\pm$  cient.

 ${}^y\textsc{Bivariate}$  Probit-linear model for  $s_1$  to  $s_4;$  Bivariate Ordered Probit for  $s_5;$  Bivariate Normal for  $s_6.$ 

<sup>a</sup>, <sup>aa</sup> and <sup>aaa</sup> mean signi<sup>-</sup>cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Critical  $Å^2$ -values for the LR-test statistic are respectively 2.71, 3.84 and 6.63.