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## **DISTANCE, LENDING RELATIONSHIPS, AND COMPETITION**

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## **Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition**

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## **Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition**

### **Abstract**

A recent string of theoretical papers has highlighted the importance of geographical distance in explaining loan rates for small firms. Lenders located in the vicinity of small firms face significantly lower transportation and monitoring costs, and hence wield considerable market power, if competing financiers are located relatively far from the borrowing firms.

We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We control for relevant relationship, loan contract, bank branch, firm, and regional characteristics.

We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and similarly increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. The effect of distance on the loan rate is statistically significant and economically relevant. Robust to changes in model specifications and variable definitions, the effect is seemingly not driven by the modest changes over time in lending technology that we infer. We deduce that transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.

Keywords: spatial price discrimination, bank credit, lending relationships.

JEL: G21, L11, L14.

## 1. Introduction

Banks derive market power ex ante from their relative physical proximity to the borrowing firms or ex post from private information they obtain about firms during the course of the lending relationship. Banks located closer to borrowing firms enjoy significantly lower transportation and monitoring costs, to such an extent that “if other banks are relatively far, close banks have considerable market power” (Petersen and Rajan (1995), p. 417).

We study the effect of geographical distance on bank loan rates, taking into account the distance between both commercial borrowers and their bank branch and commercial borrowers and other competing banks, while controlling for relevant relationship, loan, bank branch, borrower, and regional characteristics. For our study we employ a unique dataset containing detailed loan contract information, including firm and lender identity and location, from more than 15,000 bank loans to (predominantly) small firms. We also collect information on competing bank branches in the vicinity of the firm.

In line with predictions emanating from theory modeling spatial price discrimination, we find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and its lending bank, and increase with the distance between the firm and competing lenders. We identify banking competition and pricing strategies in our analysis by including both the number of bank branches (or, alternatively, branch concentration) and the distance between the borrower and competing bank branches in the vicinity. We observe that increasing distance between the borrower and alternative lenders significantly relaxes price competition and results in substantially higher borrowing costs for the firm. From a variety of exercises we infer that transportation costs, not informational asymmetries, are probably the main basis for the spatial price discrimination we observe.

Economists have long analyzed price discrimination and inferred its importance (Phlips (1983), Thisse and Vives (1988), Stole (2001)). Recent empirical work focusing on, for example, race, gender, and social price discrimination in the car, private mortgage, and business loan markets has rekindled interest (Ayres and Siegelman (1995), Goldberg (1996), Morton, Zettlemeyer and Silva-Risso (2001), Gary-Bobo and Larribeau (2002), Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002)). We contribute to this literature by empirically investigating *spatial* price discrimination and by demonstrating its relevance for the pricing of financial contracts.

Our analysis has two distinct advantages over current empirical work on price discrimination. First, in contrast to race, gender and many other social variables, measures of distance are continuous and possibly less correlated with important but unobservable characteristics. Second, the estimated coefficients in our analysis capturing the presence of spatial price discrimination can be linked to a well-defined primitive (i.e., the transportation costs resulting from the location of borrowers and bank branches). This linkage makes it possible to benchmark the economic relevance of our estimates. For example, our estimated coefficients suggest that in order to obtain a loan a new borrower may have to visit the bank branch between two and three times. A repeat customer, on the other hand, is not required to undertake additional visits. Our estimates also indicate that spatial price discrimination targeting borrowers located near the lending bank branch yields average bank rents of around 4% (with a maximum of 9%) of the bank's marginal cost of funding.

Taken at face value, our findings substantiate an important source of rents accruing to financial intermediaries, based on location. "Location rents" are distinct from rents derived from customer switching costs (Klemperer (1995)), which are in credit markets

often attributed to pervasive informational asymmetries (Fischer (1990), Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2001)). Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003), for example, provide the first estimates of switching costs faced by bank borrowers. Their findings imply average annualized bank rents of roughly 4% of the banks' marginal cost of funding.<sup>1</sup> In our dataset, the increase of the loan rate during the average bank-firm relationship points to annual "information rents" of less than 2% of the bank's marginal cost of funding.

Sweeping global consolidation of the banking industry (Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000)) and widely observed innovations in information technology (Berger (2003)) may erode both location and inside information as sources of bank rents. Petersen and Rajan (2002), for example, document dramatic increases in distance and substantially changing modes of communication between small firms and their lenders in the United States over the last 25 years. Our study complements their work by entering the distance between the firm and the competing banks in the vicinity into the analysis of the loan rate, by documenting that the distance between the firm and the bank in Belgium did not increase substantially over the period 1975-1997, and by arriving at estimates of bank rents generated by spatial price discrimination.

Characteristics of both the Belgian financial landscape and the analyzed bank make our dataset ideally suited to investigate spatial price discrimination. Belgium has a continental bank-based financial system, but is otherwise similar to the U.S. in general economic, financial and technological (both transportation and communication) development.<sup>2</sup> The aforementioned finding of moderate changes in distance in Belgium greatly facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients and suggests that, in contrast to the U.S., small business lending in Continental Europe may not yet have been

affected much by recent improvements in communication and information technology.

The bank we study operates across the nation and across industries. Most firms in its portfolio are single-person businesses, and many firms obtain only one loan from the bank. Hence, even though ‘distances’ are typically rather small in Belgium, transportation costs may be important on the margin for the small borrowers in the dataset. In addition, formalized interviews with bank managers indicate that loan officers located in the bank’s branches enjoyed substantial autonomy when granting and pricing small business loans. The officers’ own assessment of the development of the relationship with the firm, the skills and reputation of the firm’s management, and the quality of the firm’s business vision (i.e., “soft” information in Petersen (2002) and Stein (2002)) played key roles in the lending decision. Though loan officers were required to “harden” their assessment internally by supplying key statistics and other relevant written information, much local discretion remained.

To conclude, we consider our empirical setting to be uniquely suited to study spatial pricing and to analyze whether transportation costs resulting from the distance between borrower and lender, and borrower and competing banks, provide sufficient and reasonable grounds for loan officers to price discriminate. In this regard, our work also contributes to a rapidly widening strand of the literature revealing the considerable impact of geographical distance on activities of financial intermediaries, such as spatial loan rationing (Petersen and Rajan (2002), Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2002)), cross-border bank lending (Buch (2002), Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003), Buch, Driscoll and Ostergaard (2003)), and domestic and international bank branching (Grosse and Goldberg (1991), Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996), Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2001)).<sup>3</sup>

We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical predictions regarding distance, lending relationships and competition. Section 3 introduces the data and discusses the methodology used in our paper. Section 4 displays and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.

## **2. Theoretical Predictions**

### *2.1. Distance*

Recent theoretical papers highlight the importance of distance in explaining the availability and pricing of bank loans. Lending conditions may depend on the distance between the borrower and the lender and the distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank (Table 1 summarizes the theoretical predictions).

In location differentiation models (Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)), borrowers incur distance-related transportation costs visiting their bank branch.<sup>4</sup> Banks price uniformly if they cannot observe borrower location or are prevented from charging different prices to different borrowers. Borrowers pay the same interest rate, but the total transportation costs incurred differ, depending on the firm's location *vis-à-vis* the lending bank.

However, if banks observe the borrowers' location and offer interest rates based on that information, they may engage in spatial price discrimination. Banks are often informed about the borrower's address before even granting or pricing a loan. If borrowers pay for their own transportation, as is mostly likely to be the case, a bank will charge a higher interest rate to those borrowers that are located closest to its bank branch (Lederer and Hurter (1986)). Closer borrowers face higher total transportation costs when visiting competing banks (which are located further away than the lending bank), resulting in some



market power for the lender. Similarly, a monopolist bank optimally charges a higher loan rate to close borrowers, as these borrowers incur lower total transportation costs. Consequently, discriminatory pricing based on location (and associated transportation costs) implies, for a given number of banks, a negative relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender distance and a similar, positive relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank. Further underlining its importance, Thisse and Vives (1988) actually show that spatial price discrimination arises endogenously, even when firms can simultaneously choose between uniform and discriminatory pricing.

The cost of monitoring a borrower could also be related to physical distance. Total monitoring costs could increase with borrower-lender distance, because of extra communication costs or transportation costs incurred by banks visiting the borrowers' premises. Loan rates passing through such costs will increase with distance. However, distance-related monitoring costs might also allow for discriminatory pricing. In Sussman and Zeira (1995), banks face monitoring costs known to be increasing in distance.<sup>5</sup> As a result, lenders extract rents from close borrowers, because more distant competing banks take into account their own higher monitoring costs in their loan rate offers. Spatial price discrimination based on bank monitoring costs again implies a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender (borrower-closest competing bank) distance (for a given number of banks).<sup>6</sup>

## *2.2. Distance and Lender Information*

Lenders may initially be unsure about the exact location of the borrower. For example, if the borrower is an independent salesman or software consultant and maintains

multiple centers of activity, it is not clear at first for the bank where to monitor. In that case, the bank can engage in discriminatory pricing only upon becoming informed about the location and transportation costs faced by their borrowers. In Dell'Arizza (2001), banks become informed about the location of the borrower through first-period lending. In his model, only "relationship" banks, lending to the same firm for a second time, can engage in spatial price discrimination, while *de novo* "transactional" banks have to resort to "mill pricing".

The severity of the asymmetric information problem itself may also increase with distance. Hauswald and Marquez (2003) develop a model in which the precision of the signal about a borrower's quality received by a bank decreases with distance. Because banks will receive more precise signals about close borrowers, competing banks will face increasing adverse selection problems when approaching borrowers closer to the most informed bank. Hence, the informed relationship bank can charge higher interest rates to closer borrowers, while the uninformed transactional banks will charge higher interest rates to borrowers located farther afield (due to the increase in the adverse selection problem). *Ceteris paribus*, Hauswald and Marquez (2003) derive a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank.

### 2.3. Number of Banks

In spatial models, the number of banks in the market is typically inversely related to the distance between the lender and the (closest) competing banks. An increase in the number of banks (harsher competition) increases the likelihood of receiving a lower loan rate offers. A decrease in the fixed setup costs per bank (in, for example, Sussman and

Zeira (1995) and Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999)) increases the number of banks, decreases the distance between any two neighboring banks, and decreases the loan rate for each bank-borrower distance combination.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, an increase in the number of banks may aggravate an adverse selection problem by enabling lower quality borrowers to obtain financing, resulting in moral hazard and credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan (1995)) or a higher interest rate (Broecker (1990), Cao and Shi (2001)). In Dell'Ariceia (2001), adverse selection generates an endogenous fixed cost, constituting a barrier to entry in the industry limiting the number of banks competing in the market.

Similarly, a decrease in the fixed-cost component of the relationship-building technology in Hauswald and Marquez (2003) not only leads to an increase in the number of banks and more competition, but also results in a retrenchment towards relationship lending.<sup>8</sup> The lower entry barrier then leads to sharper adverse selection problems and higher loan rates for the borrowers closest to the relationship lender, but lower loan rates for customers farther away. In effect, loan rates will decrease (increase) more per unit with distance between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank.

#### *2.4. Distance, Borrower Information, and Experience*

Casual observation suggests that borrowers do not always frequent the closest bank, as most spatial models presume they should. Incomplete borrower information and other bank product characteristics may cause borrowers to visit more distant banks.

First, borrowers may not be fully informed about the precise location of all competing banks and the availability and conditions of the loans offered there. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Bester and Petrakis (1995) model such location *cum* informational

differentiation. In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), consumers buy a product from a particular seller upon becoming informed of its location through advertising. The advertising itself is not localized. The sales price in their model exceeds the full information price, by the magnitude of the transportation cost, as informational differentiation lowers the elasticity of demand. In addition, consumers in their model, as they are unaware of all sellers, do not necessarily patronize the closest one. Bester and Petrakis (1995) model the advertising of lower price offers. In the absence of advertising, customers are only informed about “local” prices. Producers will advertise lower prices to attract customers from more distant locations. Hence, more distant informed customers will be observed to receive lower prices.

Second, location is just one characteristic of a bank’s product that is important for its customers. For example, Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) document that small and medium-sized firms in the U.S. are also influenced by other characteristics of the branches (convenience and hours of operation), banks (reputation, quality and reliability), and relationships (personal or long-term) when choosing a particular bank.<sup>9</sup> Hence, borrowers may not visit the closest bank branch when another bank’s loan product exhibits other, more preferred, characteristics.<sup>10</sup> And, once borrowers have experienced a good match and have observed the high quality of the services provided by their current bank, they will switch to another bank only when offered a considerably lower price (Tirole (1988), p. 294).

To conclude, most theoretical models imply a negative (positive) correspondence between the borrower-lender (competing bank) distance and the loan rate, caused by either transportation costs (for either the borrower or the lender) or asymmetric information.

Information availability, experience, and other product characteristics may abate the strength of the distance – loan rate relationship. However, we know of no paper that has yet empirically investigated this association and its causes directly and comprehensively.

### **3. Data**

#### *3.1. Loan Contracts*

The unique dataset we analyze consists of 17,776 loans made to independents or single-person businesses,<sup>11</sup> and small-, medium-, and large-sized firms by an important Belgian bank that operates throughout Belgium. The sample commences with all existing loans at the bank as of August 10, 1997 that were initiated after January 1, 1995.<sup>12</sup>

Characteristics of both the bank and the Belgian financial landscape make this data ideally suited to investigate spatial price discrimination. The bank is one of a handful of truly national and general-purpose banks operating in Belgium in 1997. The bank lends to firms located in most postal zones,<sup>13</sup> and is active in 53 different industries.<sup>14</sup> However, around 83% of the firms in its portfolio are single-person businesses and most borrowers obtain just one (relatively small) loan from this bank.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, even though ‘distances’ are typically rather small in Belgium, transportation costs may be important on the margin for the small borrowers in the dataset. In addition, geographical clustering of economic and financial activity in Northern and Central Belgium results in a substantial variation across the country in the average distances traveled.

For each borrower we calculate the distance to both the lending bank and the branches of all other competing banks located in the same postal zone as the borrower. As of December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1994, we identify 7,477 branches,<sup>16</sup> operated by 145 different banks and

located in 837 different postal zones (Table 2). Each postal zone carries a postal code between 1,000 and 9,999. The first digit in the code indicates a geographical region, which we call “postal area” and which in most cases coincides with one of the ten Provinces in Belgium. A postal zone covers on average 26 sq km,<sup>17</sup> and contains approximately six bank branches. A postal area covers 3,359 sq km, on average. Not surprisingly, borrowers are often located in more densely banked areas, with on average more than 17 bank branches per postal zone, resulting in around 250,000 possible borrower – bank branch pairs.

We employ both web-based MapBlast.com and PC-based MS Mappoint to track the shortest traveling time (in minutes) by car between the borrower and each bank branch. We choose the shortest traveling time, the default setting in both programs, over a number of other mapping alternatives,<sup>18</sup> as we suspect that for most entrepreneurs in our sample variable transportation costs consist mainly of traveling time spent. We provide concrete statistics on this issue when we discuss the results, and employ the fastest driving distance (in kilometers) in robustness exercises.

Address recording errors, incomplete map coverage, and changes in street names (we have addresses from the 1995-1997 period, but the software uses up-to-date maps) cut down our sample. We drop 801 contracts that were relocated to another branch or a new branch after the closure of the original branch. Next, we conservatively remove the outlying 1% of borrowers located farthest from their lending bank, as we discover that a combination of address-recording errors,<sup>19</sup> mapping problems,<sup>20</sup> and non-standard borrowing motives and business arrangements<sup>21</sup> are responsible for most of these longer distances. Finally, we lay aside 612 contracts located in postal zones without competing

banks. We return to this set of contracts later in the paper.

Table 3 provides summary statistics for the remaining 15,044 contracts.<sup>22 23</sup> Table 3 shows the definition, mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of our variables, broken down into nine sets of characteristics: (1) geographical distances, (2) relationship characteristics, (3) competition measures, (4) loan rate and size, (5) loan contract characteristics, (6) loan purpose, (7) firm characteristics, (8) firm location, and (9) interest rate variables.

### *3.2. Distance to Lender*

The median borrower is located around 4 minutes and 20 seconds from the lender, which (depending on the local road conditions) translates into 2.25 kilometers (1.40 miles) of driving at 31 km/h (20 mph).<sup>24</sup> In contrast, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the median distance between lending banks and small US firms covered by the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) is more than double that distance, i.e. 4 miles.<sup>25</sup> However, the median firm in the NSSBF employs two to four employees,<sup>26</sup> while the median firm in our sample is a single-person business.<sup>27</sup> In addition, costs of driving differ substantially between Belgium and the U.S.,<sup>28</sup> and Belgian businesses may be limited by the size of the country in their choice of domestically located banks.<sup>29</sup> These arguments may also explain the even larger differences with the other distance statistics reported by Petersen and Rajan (2002). For example, the average (75 percentile) borrower – bank distance in our sample is around 3 (3.5) miles, while the same borrower in Petersen and Rajan (2002) communicates across 42.5 (14) miles with his or her bank,<sup>30</sup> or across a whopping 252 (255) miles with his or her other financial institutions.

Petersen and Rajan (2002) also report that the distance between U.S. borrowers and

banks has increased dramatically over time.<sup>31</sup> For example, the median bank-borrower distance more than doubled between the mid-70s and the early-90s (from 2 to 5 miles), while the average distance more than quadrupled (from 16 to 68 miles). In contrast, in our sample the median and average distances between the borrowers and the Belgian bank we study increased by only around 30%, from 4 (6.85) minutes in 1975 to 5.2 (8.86) minutes in 1997.<sup>32</sup>

Figure 1 displays the traveling time statistics for each year, which are calculated by subtracting the duration of the relationship between lender and borrower from the initiation year of each loan contract. In effect, we assume that the address of the borrower didn't change during the relationship period.<sup>33</sup> The horizontal scale of the figure lists the year and the resulting number of contracts in each year. The right scale reports the means (dots) plus or minus two standard deviations (thin vertical lines) of the traveling times in minutes.

Most of the modest increase in traveling time in our sample seems to occur during the early '90s. This increase may be partly driven by the changes in the number of bank branches because of regulatory driven de-specialization of financial intermediation and resulting consolidation. Indeed, Figure 1 (left scale) illustrates the small decrease in the number of branches of all banks during the same period.<sup>34</sup> Branch closures seem to explain most of the observed variation in traveling time.<sup>35</sup>

Possible selection issues may further complicate the assessment of this moderate growth in distance between bank and borrowers.<sup>36</sup> Actually, if we look at the evolution of distance by loan origination date, we find that average distance decreases from 7.7 minutes in 1995 to 6.7 minutes in 1997! We are therefore tempted to conclude that our findings with respect to the evolution over time of the lender-borrower distances broadly match



results in Buch (2002) and Corvoisier and Gropp (2001). Both studies suggest that physical proximity continues to play an important role in European bank loan markets. We will nevertheless control for possible changes over time in lending technology in robustness exercises.

### *3.3. Distance to Closest Competitors*

We now turn to our other main variable of interest, Distance to the Closest Competitors. The median (average) borrower in our sample is located 2 (2) minutes from the closest competitor or 3 minutes and 15 (50) seconds from the quartile closest competitor located in the same postal zone. The quartile closest competitor is the bank branch with the 25-percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone as the borrower. We select this second measure to gauge competitor proximity for obvious measurement reasons.

Omissions and recording or mapping errors are less likely to influence the 25-percentile statistic than the shortest distance statistic. In addition, bank branches may not be entirely homogeneous in their product offerings. In that case, we also conjecture that our 25% measure is more highly correlated with the distance to the closest, “truly” competing bank branch than the minimum distance metric. In any case, we will also check for robustness of our results with respect to this *a priori* choice of proximity metric.

The lending bank is located closer than the quartile (closest) competitor in more than 44% (25%) of the borrower contract cases, making distance a relevant bank (product) characteristic for a sizeable minority of the borrowers in our dataset. While distance is important, a majority of the borrowers do not patronize the closest bank branch.<sup>37</sup> Hence, our statistics suggest that if banks price uniformly then transportation costs must be negligible for branch choice to be random. On the other hand, if banks do not price

uniformly, then information, reputation, and other bank product characteristics in addition to location must play a role in the choice of bank branch and the determination of loan conditions.

### *3.4. Relationship Characteristics*

Relationship characteristics control for information and experience effects and are therefore central to our analysis. The first characteristic in this category, *Main Bank*, indicates whether this bank considers itself to be the main bank of that firm or not. The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is “having a monthly ‘turnover’ on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 (U.S. Dollar 2,500),<sup>38</sup> and buying at least two products from that bank”. More than half of all borrowers are classified as Main Bank customers. Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship (that is, whether this firm also buys other products from this bank and executes most of its payments via this bank). If these sources of information improve the accuracy of the bank’s information or reduce the monitoring costs, then the measure Main Bank should reduce the expected cost of such loans.<sup>39</sup> But Main Bank also proxies for the exclusivity of the relationship and the resulting lack of information a borrower has about alternatives.<sup>40</sup> In that case, a main bank customer will pay a higher loan rate.

The second relationship variable is the *Duration of the Relationship* in years with that particular bank at the time the loan rate is decided upon. A relationship starts when a firm buys for the first time a product from that bank. The average duration of the relationship in the sample is about eight years. Duration proxies for the increased time for a firm to experience the banks’ products and to appreciate the added flexibility the bank has to maintain and fulfill implicit contracts. While the bank gains private information about a

firm to tailor its products, the firm may also become locked-in. In that case, a long-term bank customer may end up paying a higher loan rate.

### 3.5. Competition

We also enlist in our main analysis the *Number of Competitors*, which is defined as the number of bank branches (minus the lender's) in the borrower's postal zone. In most of the spatial models discussed, the number of competitors corresponds inversely to the sum of the distance to the lender and the closest competitor. This is also the case in our sample, although the correlation coefficient seems small in absolute value. The correlation coefficient for the Number of Competitors and the sum of the Distance to Lender and Distance to the quartile (actual) Closest Competitor for each contract is only  $-0.023^{***}$  ( $-0.103^{***}$ ).<sup>41</sup>

An obvious candidate to explain the small correlation coefficient is the spatial simplification embedded in the theoretical models discussed earlier in the paper. Geographical clustering of business and banking activities across a land surface may weaken any correspondence between distance and the number of bank branches. In addition, there are also the differences in the surface area covered by the different postal zones. A cursory look on the map suggests that many postal zones are roughly equal in size. Exceptions include the postal zones in Brussels (which are small) and the postal zones in the provinces Luxembourg or West-Flanders (which are large). Such differences are most likely related to differences in population density, the number of businesses, and other possible criteria the postal system used to zone the country. We include eight postal area dummies (which cover around 100 zones each), in addition to the base case to control for these differences in zone size. We will also introduce postal zone and bank branch effects

in robustness exercises.

### 3.6. Other Variables

The rest of the variables are less unique to our analysis, so we limit the write-up here.<sup>42</sup> Consider the *loan contract characteristics*. The first is the dependent variable, the *Interest Rate* on the loan until the next revision. For fixed interest rate loans, this is the yield to maturity of the loan. For variable interest rate loans, this is the interest rate until the date at which the interest rate will be revised as stipulated in the contract.<sup>43</sup> The average interest rate on a loan in our sample is 8.12% or 812 basis points (we employ basis points throughout the paper to facilitate the tabulation and interpretation of the results). The loan rate varies widely not only nationally (the standard deviation is 236 basis points), but also at the branch level (the average standard deviation at the branch level is still 217 basis points). Loan fees are not included in our dataset. Loan fees are rarely charged to single-person businesses and are set by the bank's national headquarters. It is therefore unlikely that loan fees will be determined by any of the local variables of interest.

The median loan size is BEF 300,000 (USD 7,500), but varies between BEF 5,000 (USD 125) and BEF 80,000,000 (USD 2,000,000). We will assume in our empirical analysis that loan rate and size are determined jointly. The variable *Collateral* indicates whether the loan is collateralized or not. We have no further information on the type of collateral provided. Approximately 26% of the loans are collateralized. We will assume, as in Berger and Udell (1995), Harhoff and Körting (1998), and Elsas and Krahnén (1998), among others, that collateral and interest rate conditions are determined sequentially, with the collateral decision preceding the interest rate determination. Indeed, collateral is often pledged at the beginning of a relationship, is adjusted only infrequently or inconsistently,

and may end up covering multiple loans. However, we will investigate alternative decision sequences with respect to loan size and collateral in various robustness checks.

Another loan contract characteristic is the *Repayment Duration of the Loan*. For all loans to the firms, we know at what ‘speed’ the loans are repaid. This allows us to compute the exact repayment duration of a loan. We include the natural logarithm of (one plus) this variable in the regression analysis in order to proxy for the risk associated with the time until the loan is repaid. Four dummies capture the effect of the revisability of the loan, as some loan contracts allow resetting the loan rate at fixed dates subject to contractual terms.

We also include dummies capturing the *loan purpose*. We have seven types of loans in our sample. For bank-strategic considerations, we cannot reveal the relative importance of the types of loans. Hence, we cannot report statistics, but nevertheless include the seven loan purpose dummies in Table 3 for convenient reference. The distinction is made between Mortgage, Term, Securitizable Term, Bridge, Prepay Taxes, Consumer Credit, and Other Loans (we take the *Other Loans* category as our base case in the regressions). The size of most loans is rather small, since a large part of our loans are of the Prepay Taxes and Consumer Credit type. We further include a separate *Rollover* dummy (also listed in the Loan Purpose category), which takes a value of one if the loan is given to prepay another loan, and is zero otherwise.

The *firm characteristics* include both proxies for the size and legal form of the firm. Table 4 reports the number of observations for each firm size – legal form combination. A distinction can be made between Single-Person Businesses (82.98% of the sample), Small (15.99%), Medium (0.89%), and Large (0.14%) Firms; and between Sole Proprietorships (82.22%), Limited Partnerships (11.97%), Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing

(1.18%), Corporations (3.78%), and Temporary Arrangements (0.85%). In the regressions, we exclude the dummies for Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships. We include 49 two-digit NACE code dummies to capture industry characteristics.<sup>44</sup>

The *interest rate variables* are incorporated to control for the underlying cost of capital in the economy. We control for variations in the cost of capital by including four variables. The first is the interest rate on a Belgian Government Security with the same repayment duration as the loan granted to the firm. We calculate this interest rate using the exact date of granting the loan to the firm. Secondly, we include a Term Spread, defined as the difference between the yield on a Belgian government bond with repayment duration of five years and the yield on a 3-month Treasury bill. Finally, we incorporate two year dummies for 1996 and 1997 (with 1995 the base case) to control for business cycle effects.

## **4. Empirical results**

### *4.1. Control Variables*

This section provides the empirical results of the determinants of the loan rate. We analyze the determinants of the loan rate by regressing the loan interest rate on our distance, relationship, competition, and control variables, which include loan contract characteristics, loan purpose, firm characteristics, and interest rates. We use the ordinary least squares estimation technique. To benchmark our empirical model, we first analyze and discuss a specification containing only the relationship and control variables. Afterwards, we add our competition and distance variables of interest,<sup>45</sup> discuss and interpret the competition and distance results, and perform supplementary robustness tests.

First, we regress the loan interest rate (in basis points) on the relationship

characteristics and control variables.<sup>46</sup> Most control coefficients remain virtually unaltered throughout the exercises in this paper. We therefore tabulate the estimated coefficients only once, in Table 6. The loan contract characteristics include whether the loan is collateralized, its repayment duration, and the loan revisability options. The coefficient of Collateral indicates that when a loan is collateralized, the loan rate decreases by approximately 51 basis points. This result is in line with the sorting-by-private-information paradigm, which predicts that safer borrowers pledge more collateral (e.g., Berger and Udell (1990) and Besanko and Thakor (1987)). However, it contrasts with results by Elsas and Krahnert (1998) and Machauer and Weber (1998), who report a positive (though economically small) effect of collateralization on loan rates.

The coefficient of  $\ln(1+\text{Repayment Duration of Loan})$  is significantly negative at a 1% level: an increase in duration from say five to six years reduces the loan rate by 14 basis points. However, Crabbe (1991) finds that an increase in duration from five to six years *increases* bond yield spreads by around 11 basis points. But the 72 corporate bonds in his sample have maturities longer than seven years, while 88% of our 15,044 sample bank loans have maturities shorter than seven years.<sup>47</sup> To replicate his empirical model, we replace  $\ln(1+\text{Repayment Duration of Loan})$  by a linear and quadratic term in Repayment Duration, and restrict the coefficient on the Government Security variable to be equal to one. Sampling only loans with maturities longer than seven years, we also find that an increase in duration *increases* bond yield spreads, although the effect is smaller (i.e., only 3 basis points going from five to six years). The estimated coefficients on the Repayment Duration variables for the full sample including all maturities suggest that repayment duration negatively affects spreads for loans with maturities shorter than eight years.

Alternatively, we replace  $\ln(1+\text{Repayment Duration of Loan})$  by 20 Repayment Duration year dummies. The estimated coefficients from this exercise suggest local minima at three and five years. Hence, given the predominance of short loan maturities in the sample, we display the results from the *a priori* chosen and most parsimonious empirical model. We note however that the main results reported later remain virtually unaffected when any of these replacements and/or restrictions are imposed.

We also include four loan revisability dummies (but don't tabulate these coefficients to conserve space). However, we report the rejection (at a 1% significance level) of the hypothesis of the joint equality to zero of the coefficients of the four loan revisability dummies.

The coefficient on the Rollover dummy indicates that if a loan is given to prepay another loan, the loan rate increases by approximately 21 basis points. Term, Bridge, and Consumer Credit loans carry a significantly lower loan rate (but we don't tabulate these coefficients to conserve space). However, again we report the rejection, at a 1% significance level, of the hypothesis of the joint equality to zero of the coefficients of the six Loan Purpose dummies.

Table 6 also shows that Small Firms pay a higher interest rate, while Medium and Large Firms pay a significantly lower interest rate than do Single-Person Businesses (the base case). This non-monotonicity is due to differences in legal exposure. Almost all Single-Person Businesses are Sole Proprietors (Table 4), and owners thus face unlimited liability for their business debts. On the other hand, all Small Firms are Partnerships, Corporations, or Temporary Arrangements; their owners for the most part face only limited liability. Diversification and reputation effects (due to increased firm size) eventually



overwhelm the impact of limited liability, however, and lower the loan rate for the average Medium and Large Firms. Corporations and Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing pay a significantly lower interest rate than do Sole Proprietorships, possibly reflecting both the effects of limited liability and increased firm size.<sup>48</sup> While few individual coefficients on either the eight postal area or the 49 industry dummies are significant, both sets of coefficients are highly significant as a group.

Finally, a significant fraction of the variation in the loan rate is explained by economy-wide factors. The change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the interest rate on a Government Security with the same repayment duration equals 0.5. This coefficient suggests sluggishness in loan rate adjustments, possibly due to the implicit interest rate insurance offered by banks, credit rationing, or the downward drift in Belgian interest rates during our sample period. This decrease in interest rates is actually reflected in our sample loan rates, as the (non-tabulated) coefficients on the two year dummies indicate that the average 1995 (1996) loan rate is a significant 127 (18) basis points above the average 1997 loan rate, *ceteris paribus*. A basis point parallel shift of the Term Spread implies a positive 0.4 basis point shift in the loan rate. The size of the coefficient on the Government Security variable found by Petersen and Rajan (1994) is around 0.3\*\*\*, whereas the coefficient for the term spread is negative and insignificant.<sup>49</sup>

#### *4.2. Relationship Characteristics*

We now report the empirical results concerning the role of relationships. The impact of the bank-firm relationship is captured in two complementary ways. Our first indicator of relationship strength, Main Bank, measures the *scope* of the bank-firm relationship. The loan rate decreases with the scope of the relationship. The results show

that a firm pays 41 basis points less when the scope of a relationship is sufficiently broad (Main Bank = 1).<sup>50</sup>

The second indicator is the Duration of the Relationship between the lending bank and the borrower. We take the log of (one plus) the Duration of the Relationship, as we expect the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease with the duration of the financial relationship. Table 6 shows that the loan rate increases with the duration of the relationship. This result was also documented and discussed in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000). For example, an increase in duration from the median (7.5 years) to the median plus one standard deviation (13 years) increases the loan rate by 10 basis points.

#### *4.3. Competition*

Next, we incorporate our measures of banking competition. Table 7 presents the results. In line with spatial models discussed above, we start by employing the number of bank branches of the competitors (Number of Competitors) operating in the postal zone where the borrower is located. We add the natural log of one plus this number to the regression, and report the results in Model I. The coefficient on  $\ln(1+\text{Number of Competitors})$  is not significantly different from zero.<sup>51</sup> Hence, when competition is measured by the number of bank branches present in the same postal zone as the borrower, neither the effects of induced competition nor adverse selection effects seem to dominate. We add the number of bank branches of competitors in adjacent postal zones to this variable, as the delineation of postal zones may not correspond to the relevant geographical banking market. The coefficient on the adjusted variable is not significant either, and we choose not to report the results.

In Model II, we replace the number of competitors by a more commonly used

measure of competition, the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI). We resort to using the number of bank branches of each bank in the postal zone to construct market shares. In effect, we assume coordination occurs between branches of the same bank, while our previous measure of competition assumed branch independence. The resulting coefficient on the HHI equals a significant, but small, 35.3\*\*. This estimate implies that an increase of 0.1 in the HHI, say from a competitive ( $HHI < 0.1$ ) to a “highly concentrated” ( $HHI > 0.18$ ) market,<sup>52</sup> would increase the loan rate by only 3.5 basis points. The coefficient on HHI in our regression model corresponds to the (mostly) positive coefficients reported in the literature (Appendix A tabulates a few studies). However, it remains difficult to compare results across specifications, banking markets, periods, and HHI measures. Concentration measures are alternatively based on loans, deposits, or branches, and vary widely (across studies) in geographical span (Morgan (2002)).

We introduce postal zone effects in Model III to control better for the geographical variation in competition and firm characteristics. We exclude HHI and the postal area dummies, as these variables are by definition spanned by the postal zone effects. We further drop the industry dummies, as collinearity problems constrain our calculations. A Lagrange multiplier test indicates that the effects are significant. We further test for the orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors using a Hausman (1978) test, and cannot reject orthogonality. In addition, our sample has been drawn from a large population. Hence, we report the coefficients for the random effects model in column III (the results for the fixed effects model are very similar). The coefficients on all variables of interest are virtually unaffected.

We replace the postal zone effects by bank branch effects to capture branch-specific

variation in competition (for example, Barros (1999) and Calem and Nakamura (1998)) and/or spatial variation. Again, random effects seem preferable and the estimated coefficients of the other variables remain similar. We choose not to report the results. Finally, in Model IV we introduce the *Average Real Estate Price* in each Postal Zone in 1995. The cost of bricks and mortar may affect the pricing of loans, and real estate costs differ substantially across Belgium (the average price across postal zones ranges from 0.35 to 7.84 million BEF).<sup>53</sup> However, Model IV shows – surprisingly - that the Average Real Estate Price does not seem to have an effect on the loan rate, neither statistically nor economically. Adding the *Change in Average Real Estate Price* in the preceding and/or following five years does not alter this result.

#### 4.4. Distance

We now turn to a detailed discussion of the coefficients on the distance variables to identify which theoretical predictions can be rejected by the data. We take for each of our distance measures the log of (one plus) the distance, as we conjecture the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease with distance.<sup>54</sup> We will use a robustness exercise to investigate the impact of this choice of functional form.

The negative and significant coefficients on  $\ln(1+\text{Distance to Lender})$  in Models I to IV suggest that borrowers located farther away from the lender pay a lower loan rate at the lending bank. These results are consistent with spatial price discrimination, as the lending bank charges a higher loan rate to borrowers with greater proximity. In addition, the lender's market power increases with the distance between the borrower and the closest competitors, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the variable  $\ln(1+\text{Distance to Closest Competitors})$ . Our proxy for the distance between the borrower

and the closest competitor may identify strategic behavior between banks that our other competition variables did not (or only partly) pick up. Indeed, even after controlling for the number of competitors, branch concentration, postal zone, and bank branch effects, the lending bank seems to enjoy substantial market power, which increases with the distance to the closest competitors. These results thus reject uniform pricing and monitoring cost theories without discriminatory pricing.<sup>55</sup>

The price discrimination models based on linear transportation costs and/or monitoring costs discussed in section 2 further provide precise theoretical predictions concerning the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures (this prediction is not present in the asymmetric information models we discussed). In particular, given the location of bank branches, a marginal shift in the location of the borrower implies that the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures should equal zero. Therefore, in line with this theoretical prediction emanating from simple location models, we restrict the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures to equal zero in Model II (these coefficients are mostly easily interpretable). We test the restriction and report the results in Model V. The F-statistic equals 8.6; hence, we cannot reject the equality restriction.

Both distance effects are not only statistically but also economically relevant (obviously, our distance measures are just one set of all the factors explaining the variation in loan rates). An increase of one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and lender (i.e., the traveling time increasing from 0 to 7.3 minutes), decreases the loan rate by 18 basis points in Model V.<sup>56</sup> An increase of one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and the closest competitors (from 0 to 2.3 minutes) increases the loan rate by about 10 basis points.<sup>57</sup>

For the median loan of BEF 300,000 (USD 7,500), annual outlays for the borrower decrease by BEF 72 (USD 1.8) per extra minute of traveling to the lender.<sup>58</sup> Belgian entrepreneurs and (bank) managers made around BEF 20 / minute in 1995,<sup>59</sup> while the operating costs for a car (gas, maintenance, tires) may have amounted to around BEF 3 / minute of driving.<sup>60</sup> According to a linear transportation cost model, thus, the median borrower is expected to make one-and-a-half additional round-trips to his bank branch as a direct result of the new loan.<sup>61</sup> Alternatively, according to a linear monitoring cost model, loan officers are expected to make three round-trip visits to their median borrowers. Hence, we find our spatial discrimination estimates economically interesting on the margin, but also reasonable (given that, for instance, loan repayment can be organized by mail).

On the basis of the estimates we can also assess the magnitude of possible bank rents. Borrowers located very close to the lender (say in the same housing block) will be charged 14 basis points more, on average, than a borrower located right between the lender and the quartile closest competitor.<sup>62</sup> Hence, “location rents” extracted from the closest borrowers are around 4% (and can be as high as 9%) of the bank’s marginal cost of funding, which we take to be the interest rate on a Belgian government security with equal repayment duration as the loan given to the firm. Location rents extracted from the average observed borrower amount to around 0.5% of the marginal cost.

To put these location rents in perspective, note that the loan rate increases by 62 basis points over 26 years (the period the longest observed relationship lasts). This maximum increase implies annualized “information rents” of less than 7% of the marginal cost of funding.<sup>63</sup> Information rents extracted from the average observed borrower amount to 1.5% of the marginal cost.

#### *4.5. Transportation Costs or Asymmetric Information?*

To recap, the bank in our study does not seem to practice uniform loan pricing. On the contrary, borrowers located closer to the lender and farther away from competitors incur higher loan rates. We also observe that an increase in the distance between borrower and lender decreases the loan rate by a similar amount than a decrease in the distance between borrower and the closest competitors. The transportation costs we impute are reasonable.

However, as argued in section 2, distance may also affect the quantity and quality of information that banks and borrowers have about each other. To disentangle whether the effects of distance on the loan rate hinge on transportation costs or informational asymmetries, we start by interacting our two distance measures with the bank-firm relationship variables in Model VI in Table 7. The results are very interesting. The distance coefficients now capture the impact of distance for “transactional borrowers” (Main Bank = 0 and Duration of Relationship = 0). The restricted coefficients from this regression (which equal  $\pm 14.2^{***}$ ) suggest that (according to a linear transportation model) a transactional borrower in our sample expects to visit his branch two-and-a-half times per year as a result of a new BEF 300,000 (USD 7,500) loan – one time more than the median borrower in Model V. Again, we would argue that the number of imputed visits is quite reasonable.

Main Bank – “relationship” customers, on the other hand, seem shielded from discriminatory loan pricing. Indeed, we cannot reject the joint equality to zero of the sum of the coefficients on the distance measures and the respective interaction terms with the Main Bank variable ( $F = 0.156$ ). Remember that a main bank borrower buys at least two products from the same bank and has a turnover on the current account at that same bank of

at least BEF 100,000 (USD 2,500) per month. Hence, the lender probably knows its main bank borrowers better than it knows its other borrowers. At the same time, the main bank borrowers themselves may be less informed about alternative banks, their products, and prices.

How then to interpret our results? The uninformed (transactional) lender in Hauswald and Marquez (2003) charges a higher loan rate to remote borrowers in order to compensate for the adverse selection problem, which intensifies in the vicinity of an informed (relationship) lender. The informed lender accordingly extracts a higher loan rate from closer borrowers. However, our results so far show a loan rate charged to relationship borrowers that is essentially unaffected by the lender-borrower distance, and a loan rate to transactional borrowers that actually decreases with the lender-borrower distance (this result is independent of the equality restriction, which can not be rejected in the first place).

It is possible that no bank in the vicinity of a firm is informed. In other words, the loans we classify as transactional are of this type “all-around”. The lending bank is uninformed about the borrower, but can infer that no alternative lender in the vicinity of the borrower is informed, either. In that case, there is obviously no adverse selection issue. However, this interpretation seems at odds with our finding that the transactional borrowers are on average more than five years older than the main bank borrowers.<sup>64</sup> The age differential suggests that transactional borrowers may be switching banks, which makes it less likely that other lenders are uninformed. In addition, the positive coefficient of the Duration of the Relationship variable suggests that lenders do become more informed about their borrowers. Admittedly, the other banks may have lent on an arm’s length basis or may not have lent at all. And even if these other banks were relationship lenders, the



information they had collected over time may have become stale. While in all these cases the banks in the vicinity of the transactional borrower are not that well informed either, we suspect that they are at least on average more informed than the current lender. It is just that the magnitude of the adverse selection problem in our dataset doesn't increase discernibly with physical distance.

What about the differential information borrowers (but not lenders) have as a driver of our results? As non-main bank borrowers in our sample possibly patronized other banks before turning to the currently observed lender, they may have been initially less informed about the lending conditions that the observed lender was willing to provide. The more distant, the less informed they might have been. It is possible that these transactional firms become more informed and interested in a particular term loan or line of credit by the advertisements of lower loan rates by the observed lender (Bester and Petrakis (1995)). The offered rate could then reasonably be expected to decrease with distance, commensurate with the informational asymmetry. However, a critical problem with this interpretation is that non-main bank customers actually pay a higher loan rate in our sample. The latter result is not at all compatible with the non-main bank borrowers becoming more informed in a location *cum* information model. Indeed, more informed borrowers are expected to be more price-sensitive, not less. Alternatively, the negative sign on the Main Bank variable could be a reflection of cross-subsidization.

To conclude, we think a more mundane but possibly more coherent explanation for our findings is that the borrowers are exposed to price discrimination based on transportation costs. However, the effects are somewhat obfuscated for main bank borrowers simply because of the possibilities for cross-subsidization between banking

products. We will critically investigate the transportation cost story further in the next section.

#### *4.6. Firm Location, Loan Characteristics, and Distance*

Both MapBlast.com and Mappoint account for road categorization when calculating traveling times. Traffic congestion, however, is not taken into account. As congestion is more common in cities than in the countryside, we introduce a dummy variable *Urban* and interaction terms with our two distance measures. *Urban* equals one when the borrower is located in an agglomeration with more than 250,000 inhabitants,<sup>65</sup> and zero otherwise. The coefficients on the interaction terms in Model VII in Table 7 indicate that urban borrowers experience discrimination twice as harshly, possibly suggesting that traffic congestion substantially increases actual traveling times in urban areas (the other coefficients are broadly unaffected).<sup>66</sup> In addition, rural borrowers pay on average 35 basis points less than urban dwellers.

The latter result raises the troubling possibility that farms (located in rural areas) and manufacturing companies (located on the outskirts of towns) pay a lower loan rate than service-type companies (located downtown and possibly close to bank branches) - not because of location, but because of, say, the tangibility of their assets. The firm variables employed so far, including the 49 industry dummies, may not fully absorb such differences in firm characteristics across location, resulting in a “spuriously” estimated effect of distance on the loan rates. We therefore also split the sample by sector. We identify 247 Agricultural, Fishing, and Mining firms, 900 Manufacturing firms, and 13,897 Service firms. The average Agricultural, Fishing, and Mining firm in the sample is indeed located around 10% farther from the lending branch and closest competitor than the average

Manufacturing firm (we choose not to tabulate these comparisons). On the other hand, Manufacturing and Service firms do not differ statistically in their location *vis-à-vis* the lending or the closest competitor's bank branch. Table 8 reports the coefficients for the three main regressions split along sector (we retain the model numbering introduced in Table 7 throughout the paper). The distance coefficients for the three sectors are surprisingly similar in magnitude, although fewer observations in the Agriculture, Fishing, and Mining and Manufacturing sectors prevent most coefficients from being statistically significant. Hence, differences in firm characteristics (such as asset tangibility) that may be correlated with location seemingly do not drive our results. Nevertheless, we use augmented samples later in the paper to control even better for firm heterogeneity.

Next, Table 9 splits the sample by “relative distance”.<sup>67</sup> We report the means of all relevant loan and firm characteristics by whether or not the borrower is closer to the Lender or closer to the quartile Closest Competitor. We also report the results of a standard difference-of-means test. For easy comparison, we replicate the means for the Full Sample taken from Table 3 in the first column of Table 9. As Table 9 demonstrates, the characteristics of the firms borrowing from closer or more distant lenders do not differ substantially. The differences in means of the proportion of most legal forms and age are insignificant, while the other differences in means of firm characteristics are significant but economically small. These findings cast further doubt on a lender information interpretation of the distance coefficients, as we will argue in the next section.

Even more striking in Table 9 is the observation that distant borrowers obtain larger or longer term loans at a lower rate on a collateralized or transactional basis. These observed differences in loan characteristics are, we contend, fully reflective of the fixed-

cost nature of transportation costs, on the basis of which the lender price discriminates. Start with *loan size*. Loan size is actually exogenous in most location models. By introducing Loan Size in the specifications, we assume in effect a sequential decision process (setting first the loan size followed by the loan rate). We report the results in the first column of Table 10. We focus on the equivalent of a stripped-down version of earlier models (in particular Model V in Table 7), as its parsimony will be needed in subsequent sub sample exercises (the full specification yields similar results). The coefficient on Loan Size equals  $-22.6^{**}$ . The coefficient indicates that an increase in loan size from the median (BEF 0.30 mln.; USD 7,500) to the mean (BEF 0.88 mln.; USD 22,000) amount decreases the interest rate by 13 basis points. The other coefficients, particularly the distance coefficients, remain virtually unaltered and, again, we cannot reject the equality restriction involving the distance coefficients.

Next, we aim to recognize the possible interdependence between loan size, rate, and distance. Loan size and rate may be determined jointly. In addition, the impact of distance on the loan rate may decrease with loan size, due to the fixed-cost character of the incurred transportation costs. Rather than estimating an ad-hoc system, we opt for stratifying the sample by loan size, with cut-offs set at BEF 0.2 and 2 million (USD 5,000 and 50,000). We report all relevant coefficients by size category in three columns in Table 10. The noticeable increase in adjusted  $R^2$  across size categories may reflect the greater role played by observable, “hard” information in the pricing of larger loans.

The distance coefficients decrease by loan size, but remain significant for the two categories containing the smallest and medium sized loans. We can also not reject the equality restriction of the distance coefficients in either of the size categories. In addition,

although the coefficients decrease, the outlays per minute of extra travel time are strikingly similar. For the median loan sizes in each group (i.e., BEF 109,000; BEF 500,001; and BEF 3,105,000), a minute of extra travel time costs BEF 47, 58, and 63, respectively. We find this equality in imputed traveling costs very suggestive of price discrimination on the basis of transportation costs. Though currently not theoretically modeled (as far as we are aware), the deterioration of information quality across distance would, we conjecture, give rise to loan rate schedules in distance that are independent of loan size. Obviously, that is not what we find.

We also split the sample at the median *Repayment Duration of the Loan* (0.55 years) and tabulate the results in two columns in Table 10. The distance coefficients for the group of loans with a duration shorter than 0.55 equal  $-/+21.0^{***}$ ; the coefficients for the longer term loans equal  $-/+6.3^{**}$ . As the median duration in the short-term group is 0.4 and in the long-term group 2.4 years, the size of the coefficients again implies a strikingly similar fixed transportation cost per loan of equal duration.

Next, we drop the *Collateral* dummy from the specifications, and then study separately the sets of contracts with and without collateral. Dropping Collateral hardly affects our main results, and we choose not to tabulate the results to conserve space. To run all specifications on the subsets of contracts, we again drop loan contract and firm characteristics, and report the results in the last two columns of Table 10. Distance continues to play a large role in the pricing of the 11,073 contracts without collateral. The distance coefficients equal minus and plus  $12.9^{***}$ , respectively. On the other hand, the distance coefficients for the 3,971 collateralized contracts drop to  $-/+ 2.3$ , with a standard deviation of 2.0 no longer significant at conventional levels. However, we also cannot

reject the equality restriction of the two distance coefficients. Though borrowers with or without collateral are equally likely to be main bank customers, posting collateral softens spatial price discrimination. However, posting collateral also substantially weakens the impact of the Duration of the Relationship, Loan Size, and Main Bank on the loan rate. This finding suggests that collateralization blurs the informativeness of the loan rate in general.

In the first two columns in Table 11 we further distinguish between “*Lines of Credit*” and other loans we label “Term Loans”. Berger and Udell (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998), for example, argued persuasively that lines of credit tend to be relationship-driven and based on the overall creditworthiness of the firm. However, more than 90% of the 3,678 loans in our sample that embed a revolving option are actually collateralized, and none involve the usual up-front or back-end fees and compensating balances often observed in the U.S. (Saunders and Cornett (2002), p. 329). In addition, revolving loans are on average more than seven times larger than non-revolving loans. Nevertheless, the results again confirm that spatial price discrimination mainly affects the “transactional” loans. Unreported sample split exercises suggest that also un-collateralized or small and medium sized (< 2 mln. BEF) lines of credit are not affected by spatial price discrimination.

Finally, we break up the sample by *loan purpose* and obtain 3,490 Capital Expenditure and 11,554 Non Capital Expenditure Loans (Mortgage, Term, and Securitized Term Loans are classified as Capital Expenditure Loans). All Capital Expenditure Loans are revolving loans, and most are collateralized. Capital Expenditure Loans are on average more than seven times larger than the other loans. Not surprisingly, the coefficients (listed in the next two columns in Table 11) are very similar to the Lines of

Credit coefficients just reported. Spatial price discrimination seemingly affects only the “Non Capital Expenditure Loans” category. However, unreported exercises show that the “transactional” loans (Main Bank = 0 and Duration of Relationship = 0) among the 1,773 small and medium sized (< 2 mln. BEF) Capital Expenditure Loans are subject to statistically significant and economically relevant spatial price discrimination: the coefficients on the distance variables equal  $\pm 9.3^*$ . This is not the case for the “transactional” un-collateralized Capital Expenditure Loans. If anything, the coefficients on the distance variables for the 187 un-collateralized Capital Expenditure Loans are actually the opposite of the full sample results.

#### *4.7. Firm Characteristics and Distance*

We exploited the variation in loan characteristics and further underpinned the transportation cost interpretation of the distance coefficients. However, we remain concerned that firm characteristics may drive both loan rate and distance, and thus spuriously affect our results. The bank may ration credit to more distant borrowers unless they are assessed to be of impeccable quality. Problematic for the econometrician is that the bank may determine the quality of the firm by combining both observable and (for us) unobservable firm characteristics. The lower loan rate for the more distant borrowers in the specifications we report so far would then simply be the result of an omitted variable problem.

We address this critical issue, first by altering the degree of firm heterogeneity in the sample, and second by investigating an augmented sample for which we obtain more firm characteristics (reported in Section 4.8). We start by restricting the sample to Single-Person Businesses that are also Sole Proprietorships. We are left with 12,360 observations, and

report the results in Table 11. The coefficients on all measures of interest (except Main Bank) remain largely unaltered.<sup>68</sup>

Next, we drop 1,744 contracts located in 149 postal zones bordering other countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and France). Firms located in one of these postal zones may differ from interior firms in terms of specialization, customer base, and labor force. These firms also face additional constraints in finding another Belgian bank, or alternatively have the opportunity to employ a foreign bank located in an area adjacent to their postal zone (given the size of the firms in our sample and the exchange rate exposure involved, however, we consider the latter scenario to be rather unlikely). Dropping these contracts does not affect our results, and we choose not to report the almost identical coefficients.

Finally, the last two columns in Table 11 split the sample by relative distance (i.e. whether the Lender or the quartile Competitor are closest to the borrower). We thus check for possible structural differences in the determination of the loan rate across the two groups of borrowers. All coefficients, except the coefficient on loan size, are remarkably similar across the two groups. Hence, at first sight the firms in both groups do not differ dramatically in (for us) unobservable characteristics.

#### *4.8. Augmented Sample*

To further investigate the issue of missing firm characteristics, we match loan contracts to *BelFirst*, a dataset containing yearly balance and profit/loss statements of more than 250,000 Belgian corporations. Conservatively matching by tax identification numbers, we track 1,008 firms.<sup>69</sup> Quite a few Sole Proprietorships are not listed in *BelFirst*. Nevertheless, the means of most loan and firm characteristics of the Augmented Sample



(see Table 9) are surprisingly similar to the means for the entire dataset. Most importantly, the means of both distance measures and the loan rate are not significantly different between the Full and the newly constructed Augmented Samples. The differences in the other variables constitute an additional powerful robustness check on the empirical work we have reported so far.

We study accounting data from the year preceding the origination date of the loan contract. To evaluate firm risk and funding needs, we compare means of firm Assets and the ratios of Earnings, Short-Term Debt, Net Trade Credit, and Intangible Assets over Assets between the two relative distance groups.<sup>70</sup> The means are displayed in the last two columns in Table 9. More distant firms are somewhat larger, more intangible, and obtain larger or longer term loans than closer firms. Otherwise, more distant and closer firms are seemingly similar in profitability and debt structure. Loan Size / Assets does not significantly differ across groups. If anything, more distant firms seem less credit constrained once they obtain a loan. We also track 936 firms through time, and use the Earnings in 2 Years / Assets in 2 Years (after the loan origination year) and Assets in 2 Years / Assets as admittedly ad-hoc measures of expected future profitability and growth. Distant firms outperform close firms on average - both in earnings and asset growth, but the differences are not significant and the measures are fraught with survivorship biases (we cannot establish for sure why *BelFirst* ceased reporting the records of some firms).

Next, we introduce the new firm characteristics in a few basic specifications in Table 12. Model I features the Age of the firm, which we collected separately, while Models II and III include the newly constructed accounting measures. Despite the endogeneity issue, we also add Earnings in 2 Years / Assets in 2 Years and Assets in 2

Years / Assets in Models IV and V. All specifications further incorporate three Firm Size dummies, eight Postal Area dummies, two Industry Sector dummies capturing respectively Agriculture / Fishing / Mining and Manufacturing (collinearity precludes employing the Industry dummies), the Interest Rates Variables, and an Intercept.

We find that smaller and more indebted firms and firms taking out smaller loans (either absolute or relative to its assets size) end up paying higher loan rates. The distance coefficients increase in absolute value to more than 20. But these coefficients are estimated less precisely and remain significant only at a 5% level in all but one model (the standard deviations on the coefficients increase to more than 10). Again, we cannot reject the equality restriction on our distance measures at a 1%-level of significance. Excluding these newly introduced variables in the just reported specifications does not alter the estimated parameters of the other variables. Adding firm Age to Models II to V further reduces the number of observations (to 936 and 792, respectively) and precision of the estimates, but does not qualitatively affect the results.

To conclude, more distant firms are somewhat larger and take out loans that are significantly larger in absolute, though not in relative size. Otherwise, distant and close firms do not differ significantly. Controlling for the additional firm characteristics does not affect the distance – loan rate correspondence. We contend that these empirical results are fully in line with price discrimination on the basis of transportation costs. Remember that our estimates of the distance coefficients by loan size imply almost the same imputed traveling cost per minute. These estimates and the results in this section indicate that borrowers, because of the fixed cost nature of traveling, will consider driving to more distant lenders when seeking larger loans. On average, somewhat larger firms seek and

obtain these larger amounts of funding.<sup>71</sup>

#### 4.9. Further Robustness Checks

Before concluding, we subject the main results reported in Models I to V in Table 7 to a battery of additional robustness checks. First, we revisit our *a priori* choices regarding our distance measures. We rerun all models employing traveling times in levels (rather than logs). Results are mostly unaffected, although (not surprisingly) the coefficients entail somewhat smaller effects. In Model III, the coefficient on Distance to Lender equals -1.1\*\*\*, implying a decrease in the annual outlays for the median borrower of BEF 33 per extra minute of travel time to the lender. Again, we cannot reject the equality restriction in Model V.

We also replace the  $\ln(1+\text{Distance to Closest Competitors})$  (i.e., the 25-percentile measure) by the (possibly more noisy)  $\ln(1+\text{Distance to the actual Closest Competitor})$  in all specifications discussed so far. We report the coefficients for the representative Models II, III, and V in Appendix B with the label “actual”, but do not tabulate standard errors to conserve space. As can be seen from the table, coefficients are unaffected both in sign and magnitude, though (not unexpectedly) significance levels are somewhat higher. We also replace traveling time by physical distance in all specifications and again report the three models in Appendix B, labeled “physical”. Remember that (based on our calculations) physical distance may well be less indicative as a measure of transportation costs for entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, while the coefficients decrease somewhat in size (for longer trips physical distance in kilometers exceeds traveling time in minutes), signs and significance levels are broadly unaffected.

We remain concerned that technological developments and/or the location of

competitors determine the choice of lender, partly driving our results rather than spatial price discrimination. Hence, we add the Starting Year of the Relationship (assuming technology progresses linearly through time) and the (national) Number of Branches to all models. Even though  $\ln(1+\text{Duration of Relationship})$  and Starting Year are by construction almost interchangeable and highly correlated (-0.91), both coefficients are significant. In Model V, the coefficients are 55.4\*\*\* and 4.5\*\*\*, respectively. The coefficient on the Number of Branches is insignificant. More importantly, however, the results for the distance coefficients of interest in all discussed models remain virtually unaltered.

Next, we also split the sample by contracting year. We find justification for a sample split on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1996 in the observation that the Belgian monopoly telecom Belgacom (partly privatized only 17 days earlier) drastically reorganized itself to better focus on its customers.<sup>72</sup> While the costs of telephone calls did not drop substantially at once, this remarkable corporate refocusing may have raised expectations of lower communications costs in the near future. Such expectations might have softened loan rate discrimination. We run parsimonious models including distance measures, relationship variables, and the concentration index using alternatively the 393 contracts signed in 1995 and the remaining 14,651 later contracts. Though estimated imprecisely in the first subsample, the coefficients on our distance measures actually increase in absolute value from  $-/+ 18.3^*$  in 1995 to  $-/+ 26.1^{***}$  in 1996-1997. Combining these results with our earlier discussion leads us to conclude that technological developments may not be a major issue when interpreting our results.

Finally, we return to the 612 contracts located in postal zones without any identified bank branches. We add these contracts to the sample, bringing the number of observations

to 15,656. We calculate the Distance to the Lender for each of these additional contracts, but we set their Distance to the Closest Competitors equal to zero. We add a dummy (which equals one for each of the 612 contracts, and zero otherwise) to account for the undetermined effect of distance, and rerun all models. The coefficient on the dummy in the postal zone effects model, for example, equals 39.5\*\*\* (with a standard deviation of 13.9). Hence, borrowers located in a postal zone without any competing bank pay on average 40 basis points more than borrowers located in contested postal zones. This coefficient is quite reasonable when interpreted within the confines of a linear transportation model. The average postal zone covers a square of 5 by 5 km. For example, driving 5 km to get to the closest competitor (now located outside the postal zone) at 31 km/h (the average speed) would result in ten minutes traveling time. According to the estimates gleaned from the original effects model, a ten-minute distance increases the loan rate by 44 basis points.

## **5. Conclusion**

We study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms and both the lending bank and all other banks in the vicinity of the firm. As far as we are aware, we report the first comprehensive evidence of the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lender and increase similarly with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Both effects are statistically significant and economically relevant. The results are robust to various changes in model specifications and variable definitions, and do not seem to be induced by the modest changes in lending technology we infer. The observed stability of the Belgian bank branch system during our sample period allows us to interpret the coefficients of the simple reduced-form specifications within the framework of static

models explaining spatial price discrimination.

According to theoretical predictions, loan rates may reflect both transportation costs and informational effects. We find that loan rates decrease more with lender-firm distance for transactional (single-product), short-term, un-collateralized, term (not line of credit), and non-capital expenditure loans. Spatial price discrimination relaxes as borrowers engage the lending bank more broadly, for a longer time period, post collateral, obtain a line of credit, or use the loan for capital expenditure purposes.

Transportation costs provide a simple yet coherent explanation for the loan rate schedules we observe. Informational issues faced by the lender, on the other hand, do not play a prominent role in the pricing of loans according to the borrower's location. While we find no direct evidence of adverse selection increasing with geographical distance, it is possible either that most borrowers we classify transactional are unknown to all banks in the vicinity or that distances involved are just too small for informational asymmetries to become meaningful.

Loan officers seemingly price loans by location, although distance variables are not featured explicitly in the "credit scoring system" described to us in interviews. However, the revealed autonomy granted to local loan officers in assessing and pricing local loan applications may be optimal (Stein (2002)). The acknowledged importance of qualitative, "soft factors" in the decision process provides the loan officers with the necessary discretion. Such discretion is not unusual. Brunner, Krahn and Weber (2000), for example, provide preliminary empirical evidence (for Germany) of the importance of qualitative factors in setting loan rates through internal bank ratings. The loan officers employed at the bank we study may wield *soft* factors to practice a *hard*-edged

discriminatory pricing policy based on location and the presence of alternative providers of financing in the vicinity of the firm.

While adverse selection does not increase with geographical distance, we confirm previous evidence based on the current dataset that loan rates increase with the duration of the bank-firm relationship. Hence, both branch location and information acquisition during a relationship may yield bank rents. Spatial price discrimination applied to borrowers located near the lending bank branch results in average “location rents” of around 4% of the bank’s marginal cost of funding. Loan rate increases during the average bank-firm relationship point to annual “information rents” of somewhat less than 2% of the marginal cost.

Initial work employing the current dataset suggests that adverse selection may further play a more prominent role with regard to bank industry specialization. For example, we find that the borrower pays a substantially lower interest rate if it operates in an industry in which the bank is specialized nationwide. While these preliminary results are outside the scope of this study, and consequently not reported here, the distance coefficients we report in this paper are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. In future work we plan to corroborate these findings, analyze industry specialization at the bank branch level, and test the intriguing hypotheses on bank industry specialization found in Boot and Thakor (2000), Hauswald and Marquez (2003), and Stomper (2001).

To conclude, brick-and-mortar branching may remain vital in ensuring access to credit at reasonable rates, particularly for small firms and entrepreneurs. Belgium was clearly over-branched in the late nineties. Hence, the opportunities for spatial price discrimination were rather limited. Nevertheless, distance still seemed to have played a

visible role in the setting of loan rates. While technological developments in communication and travel may ultimately diminish the relevance of distance, we find only minor traces of such developments in our sample (which covers the 1975-1997 period). Consequently, presaging “the Death of Distance” remains somewhat premature in a European banking context.<sup>73</sup>



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
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Figure 1. Distance, by Year.



**TABLE 1. THEORETICAL MODELS LINKING LOAN RATES AND DISTANCE**

<i>Arguments &amp; Discussed Models</i>	Impact on the Loan Rate of the		
	Distance to the Lender*	Distance to the Closest Competitor*	Number of Competitors
<i>Transportation Costs (for Borrower)</i>			
Uniform Pricing	no	no	negative
Discriminatory Pricing	negative	positive	negative
<i>Monitoring Costs (for Lender)</i>			
Marginal Cost Pricing	positive	negative	negative
Discriminatory Pricing	negative	positive	negative
	Distance to the Relationship Bank*	Distance to the Transactional Bank*	Number of Competitors
<i>Asymmetric Information</i>			
Dell'Ariccia (2001)	negative	no	negative
Hauswald and Marquez (2003)	negative	positive	positive / negative

Notes: \* For a given number of competitors.

**TABLE 2. BANK AND POSTAL ZONE STATISTICS**

	Postal Zones	Postal Areas			
<i>Total Number of Banks</i>	145				
<i>Total Number of Bank Branches</i>	7,477				
Total Number with Bank Branches	837	9			
Total Number with Borrowers of the Bank	921	9			
Total Number	1,168	9			
Average Surface Area, in sq km	26	3,359			
Average Population	8,632	1,120,209			
	Mean	Median	Min	Max	Std. Dev.
<i>Number of Banks per Postal Zone</i>	6.4	4	0	103	10.4
<i>Number of Adjacent Postal Zones / Postal Zone with Bank Branches</i>	5.1	5	0	16	2.0
<i>Number of Banks in Postal Zones Adjacent to Postal Zones with Bank Branches</i>	53.6	44	2	471	42.4

Sources: *Belgian Bankers' Association, Bankvestigingen in België, 1995, CIA Factbook 1995, and Geocart, Administratieve Kaart van België en Groot-Hertogdom Luxembour, 1992.*

**TABLE 3. DATA DESCRIPTION**

Variables	Definition	Mean	Median	Min	Max	St.dev
<i>Distance</i>						
Distance to Lender	Shortest traveling time, in minutes	6.90	4.29	0.00	51.00	7.30
Distance to Closest Competitors	Shortest traveling time to the closest quartile competitor in the borrower's postal zone, in minutes	3.82	3.27	0.00	24.00	2.33
<i>Relationship Characteristics</i>						
Main Bank	= 1 if bank considers itself as main bank, <sup>a</sup> in percent	58.82	100	0	100	49.22
Duration of Relationship	Length of relationship with current lender, in years	7.93	7.47	0.00	26.39	5.44
<i>Competition</i>						
Number of Competitors	Number of branches (minus the lender's) in the borrower's postal zone	17.18	13	1	103	15.49
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	Summed squares of bank market shares, by number of branches, in each postal zone	0.17	0.15	0.05	1.00	0.11
<i>Loan Rate and Size</i>						
Loan Rate	Interest rate on loan until next revision, in basis points	812	782	200	2,200	236
Loan Size	Size of loan, in millions of BEF <sup>c</sup>	0.88	0.30	0.005	80	1.83
<i>Loan Contract Characteristics</i> <i>Including 4 Loan Revisability Dummies</i>						
Collateral	= 1 if loan is secured via collateral, in percent	26.40	0	0	100	44.08
Repayment Duration of Loan	Repayment duration of loan, in years	2.35	0.55	0.00	20.00	3.26
<i>Loan Purpose</i>						
Mortgage	= 1 if loan is a business mortgage loan	n/a <sup>b</sup>				
Term	= 1 if loan is a business term loan (investment credit)	n/a <sup>b</sup>				
Securitizable Term	= 1 if loan is a securitizable business term loan (investment credit)	n/a <sup>b</sup>				



Bridge	= 1 if loan is a bridge loan	n/a <sup>b</sup>				
Prepay Taxes	= 1 if loan is credit to prepay taxes	n/a <sup>b</sup>				
Consumer Credit	= 1 if loan is a consumer credit loan (capturing installment loans)	n/a <sup>b</sup>				
Other	= 1 if loan is given for another purpose or its purpose is not specified	n/a <sup>b</sup>				
Rollover	= 1 if loan is given to prepay another loan, in percent	10.20	0	0	100	30.27
<i>Firm Characteristics</i>		<i>Including 8 Postal Area and 49 Industry Dummies</i>				
Small Firm	= 1 if < 10 employees and turnover < 250 mln. BEF, <sup>c</sup> in percent	15.99	0	0	100	36.64
Medium Firm	= 1 if > 10 employees or turnover > 250 mln. BEF, <sup>c</sup> in percent	0.89	0	0	100	9.40
Large Firm	= 1 if turnover > 1 bln. BEF, <sup>c</sup> in percent	0.14	0	0	100	3.73
Limited Partnership	= 1 if firm is limited partnership, in percent	11.97	0	0	100	32.46
Limited Partnership w/ ES	= 1 if firm is limited partnership with equal sharing, in percent	1.18	0	0	100	10.78
Corporation	= 1 if firm is corporation, in percent	3.78	0	0	100	19.07
Temporary Arrangement	= 1 if firm is a temporary arrangement, in percent	0.85	0	0	100	9.18
<i>Firm Location</i>						
Average Real Estate Price	In the Postal Zone in 1995, in millions of BEF <sup>c</sup>	2.40	2.19	0.35	7.84	0.99
Urban	= 1 if located in agglomeration with > 250,000 inhabitants, in percent	9.73	0	0	100	29.64
<i>Interest Rate Variables</i>		<i>Including 2 Year Dummies</i>				
Government Security	Interest rate on a Belgian government security with equal repayment duration as loan to firm, in basis points	389	350	305	805	87
Term Spread	Yield on Belgian government bond of 5-years - yield on treasury bill with maturity of 3 months, in basis points	179	177	100	268	31

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Notes. The number of observations is 15,044. <sup>a</sup> The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is: for Single-Person Businesses and Small Firms, have a 'turnover' on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 per month and buy at least two products from that bank. <sup>b</sup> For bank-strategic considerations we cannot reveal the relative importance of the types of loans. <sup>c</sup> 40 Belgian Francs (BEF) are approximately equal to 1 US\$.

**TABLE 4. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY LEGAL FORM AND SIZE OF THE FIRMS**

Legal Form / Firm Size	Single-Person Business	Small	Medium	Large	All Firms
Sole Proprietorship	12,360	-	9	-	<b>12,369</b>
Limited Partnership	96	1,671	33	1	<b>1,801</b>
Limited Partnership w/ ES Corporation	1	172	4	-	<b>177</b>
Temporary Arrangement	2	460	87	20	<b>569</b>
	25	102	1	-	<b>128</b>
<b>All Firms</b>	<b>12,484</b>	<b>2,405</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>15,044</b>

**TABLE 5. CORRELATION TABLE**

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Loan Rate	(1) -0.051***	0.016**	-0.063**	0.081***	0.000	-0.009
Distance to Lender	(2) 1	0.184***	-0.033***	-0.122***	-0.071***	0.217***
Distance to Closest Competitors	(3) 1	1	0.013	0.013	0.146***	-0.001
Main Bank	(4) 1	1	1	0.218***	0.010	-0.002
Duration of Relationship	(5) 1	1	1	1	-0.005	-0.045***
Number of Competitors	(6) 1	1	1	1	1	-0.375***
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	(7) 1	1	1	1	1	1

Source: The number of observations is 15,044. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, using Pearson-correlation.

**TABLE 6. BORROWING COSTS, FIRM, AND LOAN CHARACTERISTICS**

Variable Categories	Independent Variables	Model	
<u>Relationship Variables</u>	Main Bank	-40.7*** (3.7)	
	ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	19.2*** (2.3)	
<u>Loan Contract Characteristics</u>	Collateral	-50.9*** (8.3)	
	ln(1+Repayment Duration of Loan)	-92.5*** (9.3)	
	<i>Included Dummies</i>	4 Loan Revisability***	
<u>Loan Purpose</u>	Rollover	21.3*** (7.3)	
	<i>Included Dummies</i>	6 Loan Purpose***	
<u>Firm Characteristics</u>	Small Firm	44.0** (19.2)	
	Medium Firm	-99.5*** (26.2)	
	Large Firm	-170.2*** (51.4)	
	Limited Partnership	-30.2 (18.7)	
	Limited Partnership w/ ES	-46.3* (24.7)	
	Corporation	-116.2*** (21.1)	
	Temporary Arrangements	-35.1 (24.2)	
	<i>Included Dummies</i>	8 Postal Area*** 49 Industry***	
	<u>Interest Rate Variables</u>	Government Security	0.5*** (0.1)
		Term Spread	0.4*** (0.1)
<i>Included Dummies</i>		2 Year***	
	<u>Intercept</u>	589.6*** (122.9)	
	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.222	

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. The number of observations is 15,044. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.

**TABLE 7. BORROWING COSTS AND THE ROLE OF DISTANCE**

		Models						
Independent Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
<i>Distance</i>								
ln(1+Distance to Lender)	-4.3* (2.5)	-5.4** (2.5)	-10.3*** (2.7)	-5.4** (2.5)	-8.3*** (2.2)	-14.2*** (5.5)	-12.8** (5.5)	
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)	16.1*** (3.8)	16.6*** (3.6)	18.5*** (4.0)	16.7*** (3.6)	8.3*** (2.2)	14.2*** (5.5)	12.8** (5.5)	
<i>Relationship Variables</i>								
Main Bank	-40.9*** (3.7)	-41.1*** (12.7)	-53.0*** (3.8)	-41.1*** (3.7)	-41.0*** (3.7)	-44.4*** (3.9)	-44.9*** (3.9)	
ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	18.8*** (2.3)	18.8*** (2.3)	23.9*** (2.4)	18.9*** (2.3)	18.6*** (2.3)	18.4*** (2.5)	18.7*** (2.5)	
Main Bank $\times$ ln(1+Distance to Lender)						11.1** (4.6)	11.1** (4.6)	
Main Bank $\times$ ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)						-11.1** (4.6)	-11.1** (4.6)	
ln(1+Duration of Relationship) $\times$ ln(1+Distance to Lender)						-0.1 (2.7)	-0.0 (2.7)	
ln(1+Duration of Relationship) $\times$ ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)						0.1 (2.7)	0.0 (2.7)	

<i>Competition</i>							
	ln(1+Number of Competitors)	-0.4 (2.6)					
	Herfindahl – Hirschman Index		35.3** (15.2)		34.4** (15.3)	37.6** (15.2)	36.5** (15.2)
	Postal Zone Random Effects			Yes <sup>b</sup>			
<i>Firm Location</i>							
	Average Real Estate Price <sup>a</sup>				-1.1 (2.2)		
	Urban						14.6 (24.8)
	Urban x ln(1+Distance to Lender)						-10.5 (7.3)
	Urban x ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)						23.8 (15.0)
<i>Loan Contract Characteristics (incl. 4 Loan Revisability Dummies), Loan Purpose, Firm Characteristics (incl. 8 Postal Area and 49 Industry Dummies), Interest Rate Variables (incl. 2 Year Dummies), and Intercept</i>		Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Equality Restriction(s), F-statistic					8.645	3.597
	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.227	0.223	0.143 <sup>d</sup>	0.223	0.222	0.222
	Independent Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
							VII
<i>Table 6 Continued</i>		Models					

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. The number of observations is 15,044. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. <sup>a</sup> In millions of BEF. <sup>b</sup> Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 390.1\*\*\*, and Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.0. <sup>c</sup> Excluding postal area and industry dummies. <sup>d</sup> Corresponding fixed effects model statistic.

**TABLE 8. BORROWING COSTS AND THE ROLE OF DISTANCE, BY INDUSTRY SECTOR**

Independent Variables / Models	Agriculture, Fishing, and Mining			Manufacturing			Services		
	II	III	V	II	III	V	II	III	V
ln(1+Distance to Lender)	-2.7	-4.4	-11.1	-5.0	-18.0	-10.0	-5.6**	-11.2***	-8.3***
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)	28.8	32.2	11.1	23.9	14.0	10.0	16.3***	17.7***	8.3***
Main Bank	-42.0	-48.3	-41.9	3.5	-4.6	3.2	-44.2***	-55.6***	-44.1***
ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	27.2	23.1	23.6	13.4	40.5***	13.9	19.0***	24.2***	18.7***
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	-94.4		-89.9	-32.2		-30.0	43.8***		46.1***
Postal Zone Random Effects		No <sup>b</sup>			Yes <sup>c</sup>			Yes <sup>d</sup>	
<i>Loan Contract Characteristics (incl. Loan Revisability Dummies), Loan Purpose, Firm Characteristics (incl. Postal Area and Industry Dummies), Interest Rate Variables (incl. Year Dummies), and Intercept</i> <sup>a</sup>	Yes	Yes <sup>e</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>e</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>e</sup>	Yes
Equality Restriction, F- statistic			0.7524			1.389			7.296
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.334	0.143 <sup>f</sup>	0.335	0.287	0.276 <sup>f</sup>	0.287	0.217	0.165 <sup>f</sup>	0.217
Number of Observations	247	247	247	900	900	900	13,897	13,897	13,897

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in %. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. Agriculture, Fishing, and Mining comprises NACE codes 1 – 14, Manufacturing 15 – 47, and Services 48 – 99. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. <sup>a</sup> Includes all variables with variation within the groups. <sup>b</sup> Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 0.01. <sup>c</sup> Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 209.67\*\*\*. Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 4.75. <sup>d</sup> Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 320.34\*\*\*. Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 33.38. <sup>e</sup> Excluding postal area and industry dummies. <sup>f</sup> Corresponding Fixed Effects model statistic.

**TABLE 9. DATA DESCRIPTION, BY SUBSAMPLE**

Samples	Full			Augmented		
	All	Lender = Closest	Lender ≠ Closest	All	Lender = Closest	Lender ≠ Closest
Means of Variables						
Distance to Lender	6.90	2.70	9.94 <sup>c</sup>	7.32	2.57	10.19 <sup>c</sup>
Distance to Closest Competitors	3.82	4.24	2.22 <sup>c</sup>	3.69	4.10	3.44 <sup>c</sup>
Main Bank	58.82	60.68	57.46 <sup>c</sup>	63.98 <sup>d</sup>	68.15	61.46
Duration of Relationship	7.93	8.45	7.54 <sup>c</sup>	5.98 <sup>d</sup>	6.51	5.66 <sup>c</sup>
Number of Competitors	17.18	19.11	15.76 <sup>c</sup>	18.13	19.82	17.10 <sup>c</sup>
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	0.17	0.15	0.18 <sup>c</sup>	0.17	0.14	0.19 <sup>c</sup>
Loan Rate	812	825	802 <sup>c</sup>	798	829	779 <sup>c</sup>
Loan Size	0.88	0.78	0.96 <sup>c</sup>	1.03 <sup>d</sup>	0.75	1.19 <sup>c</sup>
Collateral	26.40	24.49	27.78 <sup>c</sup>	19.74 <sup>d</sup>	19.47	19.90
Repayment Duration of Loan	2.35	2.14	2.49 <sup>c</sup>	1.60 <sup>d</sup>	1.37	1.74 <sup>c</sup>
Small Firm	15.98	15.01	16.69 <sup>c</sup>	76.19 <sup>d</sup>	76.05	76.27
Medium Firm	0.89	0.67	1.05 <sup>c</sup>	0.56 <sup>d</sup>	0.47	0.62
Large Firm	0.14	0.09	0.17	0.69 <sup>d</sup>	0.26	0.95 <sup>c</sup>
Limited Partnership	11.97	11.32	12.44 <sup>c</sup>	53.67 <sup>d</sup>	55.26	52.70
Limited Partnership w/ ES	1.17	0.99	1.32	0.68 <sup>d</sup>	0.73	0.65
Corporation	3.78	3.45	4.02	22.12 <sup>d</sup>	20.78	22.92
Temporary Arrangements	0.09	0.09	0.09	2.88 <sup>d</sup>	2.63	3.03
Age	16.57	15.85	17.04	19.68 <sup>d</sup>	19.88	19.57
Assets <sup>a</sup>				16.71	13.22	18.82 <sup>c</sup>
Earnings / Assets <sup>b</sup>				5.53	5.39	5.62
Short-Term Debt / Assets <sup>b</sup>				40.51	41.53	39.90
Net Trade Credit / Assets <sup>b</sup>				-2.22	-3.08	-1.78
Intangible Assets / Assets <sup>b</sup>				4.85	3.80	5.48 <sup>c</sup>
Loan Size / Assets <sup>b</sup>				18.20	14.61	20.37
Earnings in 2 Yrs / Assets in 2 Yrs <sup>b</sup>				1.43	-1.99	3.50
Assets in 2 Yrs / Assets <sup>b</sup>				1.88	1.83	1.91
<i>Number of Observations</i>						
<i>Earnings and Assets in 2 Years</i>				936	353	583
<i>Age</i>	2,655	1,046	1,609	851	321	530
<i>All Other Variables</i>	15,044	6,341	8,703	1,008	380	628

Notes. The definition of most variables can be found in Table 3. <sup>a</sup> In millions of BEF. <sup>b</sup> In percent. Significantly different at a 1% level from the mean of the: <sup>c</sup> Full – Lender = Closest subsample, <sup>d</sup> complement of the Augmented sample (14,036 observations; 1,804 for Age), <sup>e</sup> Augmented – Lender = Closest subsample.

**TABLE 10. LOAN SIZE, DURATION, AND COLLATERAL**

Independent Variables	Incl. Loan Size	By Loan Size (LS), in millions of BEF			By Duration of Loan (DL), in years		Collateral	
		LS≤0.2	0.2<LS≤ 2	2<LS	DL<0.55	0.55≤DL	No	Yes
ln(1+Distance to Lender)	-13.6*** (2.4)	-15.0*** (4.1)	-4.0* (2.1)	-0.7 (2.3)	-21.0*** (4.1)	-6.3** (2.8)	-12.9*** (2.9)	-2.3 (2.0)
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)	13.6*** (2.4)	15.0*** (4.1)	4.0* (2.1)	0.7 (2.3)	21.0*** (4.1)	6.3** (2.8)	12.9*** (2.9)	2.3 (2.0)
Main Bank	-43.0*** (3.9)	-32.9*** (6.4)	8.3** (3.5)	-6.6* (4.0)	-53.1*** (6.5)	-35.3*** (4.5)	-45.6*** (4.7)	-7.6** (3.2)
ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	29.3*** (2.4)	26.0*** (4.4)	14.4*** (2.0)	10.7*** (2.1)	36.9*** (4.3)	24.7*** (2.6)	29.9*** (3.0)	1.8 (1.7)
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	10.3 (16.0)	32.0 (29.8)	14.0 (13.6)	38.3*** (14.3)	19.3 (27.8)	1.6 (17.9)	-11.0 (19.5)	37.0*** (12.9)
Loan Size	-22.6*** (1.1)				-56.6*** (2.6)	-11.4*** (1.1)	-140.6*** (3.5)	-4.7*** (0.5)
<i>Interest Rate Variables (including 2 Year Dummies) and Intercept</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	15,044	5,850	7,344	1,850	6,698	8,346	11,073	3,971
Equality Restriction, F	0.115	3.268	4.616	1.717	0.491	0.411	0.091	1.733
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.084	0.011	0.136	0.665	0.089	0.085	0.175	0.447

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.



**TABLE 11. LOAN TYPE / PURPOSE, FIRM TYPE, AND RELATIVE DISTANCE**

Independent Variables	Loan Type		Loan Purpose		Firm Type		Relative Distance	
	Lines of Credit	Term	Capital Expenditures	Non Capital Expenditures	SPB & SP <sup>a</sup>	Other	Lender = Closest	Lender ≠ Closest
ln(1+Distance to Lender)	3.7 (2.5)	-10.5*** (2.7)	-0.2 (1.7)	-16.0*** (2.9)	-11.2*** (2.6)	-19.1*** (5.8)	-14.7** (7.2)	-12.3*** (3.9)
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)	-3.7 (2.5)	10.5*** (2.7)	0.2 (1.7)	16.0*** (2.9)	11.2*** (2.6)	19.1*** (5.8)	14.7** (7.2)	12.3*** (3.9)
Main Bank	3.1 (4.0)	-34.3*** (4.4)	-5.0* (2.9)	-50.4*** (4.7)	-51.3*** (4.2)	25.9** (10.2)	-53.3*** (5.9)	-34.9*** (5.2)
ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	9.3*** (3.5)	23.1*** (2.8)	3.6** (1.5)	33.4*** (3.0)	25.1*** (2.6)	24.4*** (6.5)	25.5*** (3.7)	31.6*** (3.1)
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	22.6 (16.5)	-13.8 (18.0)	30.1** (11.8)	-5.9 (19.4)	10.0 (17.4)	-10.0 (38.2)	-5.2 (42.3)	11.2 (17.4)
Loan Size	-5.8*** (0.6)	-224.5*** (4.1)	-3.8*** (0.4)	-73.3*** (2.5)	-36.6*** (1.8)	-11.0*** (1.5)	-33.9*** (2.2)	-18.6*** (1.3)
<i>Interest Rate Variables (including 2 Year Dummies) and Intercept</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	3,678	11,366	3,490	11,554	12,360	2,684	6,341	8,703
Equality Restriction, F	0.173	1.798	3.453	1.861	0.411	0.999	0.004	0.039
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.357	0.248	0.563	0.120	0.093	0.100	0.100	0.075

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. <sup>a</sup> Single-Person Businesses operating as Sole Proprietorships.

**TABLE 12. AUGMENTED SAMPLES**

	Models				
	I	II	III	IV	V
ln(1+Distance to Lender)	-16.2***	-22.5**	-22.1**	-21.8*	-22.1**
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)	16.2***	22.5**	22.1**	21.8*	22.1**
Main Bank	0.1	-32.8*	-34.7*	-35.0*	-38.2*
ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	29.1***	40.3***	43.8***	39.7***	44.7***
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	44.0	-0.7	4.5	22.8	30.5
Loan Size	-8.9***	-8.9***		-8.4***	
Loan Size / Assets			-50.2***		-53.2***
<i>Additional Firm Characteristics</i>					
Age <sup>a</sup>	0.2				
Assets <sup>b</sup>		-0.3**	-0.4***	-0.3	-0.3**
Earnings / Assets		-24.0	31.0	-14.7	-14.1
Short-Term Debt / Assets		80.2**	70.9*	71.7*	67.5*
Net Trade Credit / Assets		-66.1	-69.5	-51.9	-57.8
Intangible Assets / Assets		59.6	57.2	89.3	93.5
Earnings in 2 Years / Assets in 2 Years				-15.2	-14.1
Assets in 2 Years / Assets				-1.3	3.3
<i>Incl. 3 Firm Size, 8 Postal Area, 2 Industry Sector Dummies, Interest Rate Variables and Intercept</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	2,655	1,008	1,008	936	936
Equality Restriction, F	0.946	1.891	1.921	1.897	1.850
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.101	0.159	0.159	0.160	0.160

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. <sup>a</sup>In years. <sup>b</sup>In millions of BEF.

**APPENDIX A. EMPIRICAL WORK INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF BANK MARKET CONCENTRATION ON BANK LOAN CONDITIONS.**

Papers	Data Source # Observations in Regressions Observation Type	Concentration in Markets Geographical span: Avg. Pop. / Area Average HHI	Loan Rate Measure The Impact of Concentration on the Loan Rate <b>Impact of <math>\Delta</math>HHI = 0.1, In Basis Points</b>
Hannan (1991)	STB ±8250 US firms	bank deposits 4,725 0.14	loan rate Mostly Positive <b>-6 to 61***</b>
Berger, Rosen and Udell (2002)	NSSBF 1993 520 small US firms	bank deposits n/a 0.19	credit line rate – prime rate Mostly Positive <b>7 to 14*</b>
Sapienza (2002)	Credit Register 107,501 Italian firms	bank loans 600,000 <sup>a</sup> 0.06	loan rate – prime rate Positive <b>59***</b>
Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2001)	Central Bank of Norway 1,241 Norwegian firms	bank business credit 250,000 <sup>a</sup> 0.19	credit line rate - 3 month money market rate Insignificantly Positive <b>3<sup>b</sup></b>
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002)	ECB 2001 246 EU country – years	bank loans 30,000,000 <sup>a</sup> 0.13	country-specific loan rate margin Positive <b>50***<sup>c</sup></b>
Corvoisier and Gropp (2001)	ECB 2001 209 EU country – years	bank loans 30,000,000 <sup>a</sup> 0.13	country-specific loan rate margin Positive <b>10 to 20**<sup>d</sup></b>

Notes. The measure of concentration in all studies is the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI), which can be calculated by squaring the market share of each bank competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers ( $0 < \text{HHI} < 1$ ). NSSBF is the National Survey of Small Business Finance. STB is the Federal Reserve’s Survey of the Terms of Bank lending to business. <sup>a</sup> Our calculations. <sup>b</sup> For HHI increasing from 0.1 to 0.2. <sup>c</sup> Coefficients in regressions for short-term loans in their models 3, 5, and 6. <sup>d</sup> Their models 2 and 5. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.

**APPENDIX B. THE ACTUAL CLOSEST COMPETITOR AND PHYSICAL DISTANCE**

Independent Variables	Models					
	II-actual	III-actual	V-actual	II-physical	III-physical	V-physical
ln(1+Distance to Lender)	-5.3**	-10.5***	-8.6***	-3.5*	-7.9***	-4.7**
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)	16.7***	18.0***	8.6***	10.4***	14.7***	4.7**
Main Bank	-41.2***	-53.2***	-41.0***	-41.0***	-53.0***	-40.9***
ln(1+Duration of Relationship)	18.9***	24.1***	18.6***	18.9***	24.0***	18.8***
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index	24.1		32.2**	31.3**		33.5**
Postal Zone Random Effects		Yes <sup>a</sup>			Yes <sup>b</sup>	
<i>Loan Contract Characteristics</i> (including 4 Loan Revisability Dummies), <i>Loan Purpose</i> , <i>Firm Characteristics</i> (including 8 Postal Area and 49 Industry Dummies), <i>Interest Rate Variables</i> (including 2 Year Dummies), and <i>Intercept</i>	Yes	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes
Equality Restriction, F- statistic			9.338			3.385
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.223	0.143	0.222	0.222	0.142	0.222

Notes. The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in %. In Models labeled "actual", the Distance to the *actual* (not 25%) Closest Competitor is used. In Models "physical", the fastest *physical* distance (not traveling time) is used. The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 3. The number of observations is 15044. We employ ordinary least squares estimation. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. <sup>a</sup> Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 392.23\*\*\*. Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.17. <sup>b</sup> Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 394.25\*\*\*. Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.19. <sup>c</sup> Excluding postal area and industry dummies.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Average one-time customer switching costs in Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) equal 4.12% of Norwegian corporate loan amounts. Annualized at 9.16% (the average 9 to 12 month T-bill rate in their sample) over an 18-year period (the median duration of bank-firm relationships in Norway reported by Ongena and Smith (2001)), switching costs can amount to bank rents of 4.20% of the banks' marginal cost of funding (taken to be the T-bill rate). The average switching cost of retail depositors at three Finnish banks in Shy (2002) equals 9.70%. Assuming, as he does, a lifetime deposit relationship, switching costs can result in bank rents totaling 9.70% of their marginal cost of funding (by construction this ratio is independent of the level of the T-bill rate for a lifetime relationship).

<sup>2</sup> GDP / Capita: Belgium (B) = \$ 18,040, U.S. (US) = \$ 25,850; Financial Assets / GDP: B = 4.5, US = 3.1; Banking Assets / GDP: B = 2.5, US = 0.5; Number of Telephones / Capita: B = 0.46, US = 0.50; Kilometers of Paved Highways / Capita: B = 1.20, US = 1.37. Financial Asset ratios are from 1993; the rest of the data is from 1994. Financial Assets aggregates Banking Assets, Open-End Investment Company Assets, Equity Market Capitalization, International and Domestic Debt Securities. Sources: Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997) and *CIA Factbook 1995*.

<sup>3</sup> Distance also determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank holding companies (Berger and DeYoung (2001), Berger and DeYoung (2002)), the strength of informational contagion between banks (Aharony and Swary (1996)), and the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of U.S. private firms (Lerner (1995)). Physical distance further influences activities on financial and product markets in general. International capital flows seem bound by geographical proximity (Portes and Rey (2001)), but so is the composition and returns on actively managed U.S. mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), the trading profitability of traders on the German electronic exchange Xetra (Hau (2001)) and the portfolio choices of American (Huberman (2001)) and Finnish investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). *Local* financial development is further found to encourage business start-ups, to enhance entry and competition in product markets, and to foster firm growth (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002)).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Kilkenny and Thisse (1999) and Chapter 7 in Tirole (1988) for a review.

<sup>5</sup> Almazan (2002) also assumes bank monitoring costs increase with distance to model the trade-off between bank expertise and capital.

<sup>6</sup> The correspondence between borrower-lender distance and loan rate may also become non-monotonic if monitoring costs are further dependent on loan size (Wong and Chan (1993)).

<sup>7</sup> An increase in the number of banks also decreases the loan rate in more general models of imperfect Cournot competition between a finite number of banks. See, for example, the rendition of the Monti (1972)-Klein (1971) model in Freixas and Rochet (1997) (pp. 57-60).

<sup>8</sup> In Boot and Thakor (2000), more interbank competition encourages banks not only to step up relationship lending but also to diminish sector specialization.

<sup>9</sup> See Binks and Ennew (1997) for evidence on bank choice by U.K. small firms.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989), Anderson and de Palma (2000), and Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002).

<sup>11</sup> Independents or single-person businesses are natural persons who run a small business in which they are employed themselves.

<sup>12</sup> The bank argues that loans starting earlier than 1995 were prepaid. We have a dummy variable Rollover in all empirical specifications, capturing whether the new loan served to repay an old loan.

<sup>13</sup> 549 bank branches lend to firms located in 921 out of 1,168 postal zones. The concentration index of the number of loans (sum of shares squared) is 22 (equal shares would yield an index equal to 9).

<sup>14</sup> According to a two-digit NACE classification. NACE is the European industrial classification system subdividing industries. The industry concentration index across the 53 industries is 1,238 (equal shares would result in an index equal to 204).

<sup>15</sup> The dataset covers loans granted to 13,104 borrowers - implying that the average borrower maintained only 1.36 loans at that bank.

<sup>16</sup> The Annual Report of the *Belgian Bankers Association* reports 7,668 branches. We consolidate multiple branches of the same bank at the same address.

<sup>17</sup> Belgium covers 30,230 sq km in land surface (source: *CIA Factbook 1995*).

<sup>18</sup> Such as the shortest, but not necessarily fastest, driving distance or the shortest distance as-the-crow-flies.

<sup>19</sup> For example, a small-town bank branch is listed as underwriting a dozen contracts located around the country. We suspect an address-recording error in the dataset we received. Unfortunately, we cannot ask the bank to check such entries.

<sup>20</sup> For example, serious misspelling of street names invariably leads the mapping software to “overshoot” the correct distance. We track and fix most (but possibly not all) such mapping problems.

<sup>21</sup> For example, some borrowers reside in a ritzy beach resort (often more than an hour drive from their respective lenders in various locations inland) most likely to lower their community taxes.

<sup>22</sup> We are left with 11,222 different borrowers in the sample. We report only the statistics for the set of all contracts, as the borrower-based statistics are very similar.

<sup>23</sup> The loan rate and type of the 2,732 discarded contracts on average does not significantly differ (at a 1% level) from the 15,044 remaining contracts, though the borrowers are somewhat more “transactional” (mean Main Bank = 52.5%, mean Duration of Relationship = 7.2 years) and larger than the firms remaining in the sample (the means of the Small, Medium, and Large Firm dummies are 20.6%, 3.4% and 0.4%, respectively; the mean Loan Size is BEF 1.09 million).

<sup>24</sup> The sample is highly representative in this regard. The average speed of travel in Belgium across all modes of transportation was 31.1 km/h in 1998 according to a National Survey of Mobility (source: *Belgian National Institute of Statistics* at [www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d37\\_nl.htm#1](http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d37_nl.htm#1)). Traveling time and driving distance are highly correlated. For example, the correlation coefficient for the 15,044 borrower-lender pairs is 0.96.

<sup>25</sup> 75% of the surveyed Canadian entrepreneurs in Mallett and Sen (2001) indicated that five kilometers or less was a convenient distance in procuring business

loans and other financial services. However, the average entrepreneur in their study obtains a loan of 172,000 USD, while the average loan size in our study is only around 20,000 USD.

<sup>26</sup> For example, Cole and Wolken (1995), Table 1.

<sup>27</sup> Petersen and Rajan (2002) document that firm size is positively correlated with distance (their Table III, column VI). However, the effect seems rather limited for smaller firm sizes.

<sup>28</sup> Belgian gasoline prices at the pump are typically more than double the prices in the US, mainly because of taxation. For example, in the last week of September 2001 regular gasoline at the pump went for 1.48 USD/gallon in the US and 3.11 USD/gallon in Belgium (source: *Energy Info Administration* and *Belgian Petroleum Federation*).

<sup>29</sup> The US land surface measures 9,158,960 sq km, making the US 303 times larger than Belgium (source: *CIA Factbook 1995*).

<sup>30</sup> Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2002) note that reweighing the NSSBF to make the survey nationally representative (because the NSSBF under-samples the very smallest firms) decreases the average distance in their sample from 26.1 to 11.8 miles (their Footnote 15).

<sup>31</sup> See also Czynak and Hannan (2001).

<sup>32</sup> We also analyze the postal codes for all 17,776 contracts. The percentage of firms located in another postal zone (area) than the lender increased from 35% (2%) prior to 1981 to 47% (7%), after 1993. If we assume a conservatively long average traveling distance of 3 (30) km within a postal zone (area) and 87.5 km across postal areas (i.e., half the integer of the square root of the surface of each respective region), average distances increased by around 45%. Hence, our mapping technology and screening procedures seem not to have biased our results across time.

<sup>33</sup> Only 179 borrowers report different addresses on loan contracts written in the same year, and an additional 75 borrowers report different addresses across different years. 351 contracts with the same address list a different borrower name. Hence, only a few borrowers either move within the sample period or manage multiple businesses.

<sup>34</sup> Source: Annual Reports of the *Belgian Bankers' Association*. For years prior to 1991, we imputed the number of bank branches using growth rates in the numbers of commercial bank branches only. Ideally, we would like to break out the numbers for the individual bank we study.

<sup>35</sup> We regress the Distance to Lender on an intercept, the Starting Year of the Relationship, a Large Firm dummy, and an interaction term between the latter two variables. We want to investigate whether technology affects larger firms in a different way than other firms. Distance grows significantly, but only by around 9 seconds per year, while the growth in distance between large firms and their lenders is indistinguishable from the growth in distance between small firms and their lenders. When we add the (national) number of bank branches to this specification, the growth in distance drops to a significant but small 4 seconds per year. The closure of one branch in each postal zone (implying a decrease in the number of bank branches about equal the observed drop between 1990 and 1997) increases the traveling time by around 1 minute and 40 seconds.

<sup>36</sup> See Petersen and Rajan (2002). In addition, firms may be poached, and hence may switch banks, more frequently if they are located farther away from a bank branch (Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)).

<sup>37</sup> In less densely branched areas proximity may play a more prominent role. For example, regressing Distance to Lender on Distance to Closest Competitors yields a slope coefficient of 0.57\*\*\* and an intercept equaling 4.69\*\*\*. These estimates suggest a crossover point of around 11 minutes at which the Distance to the Lender on average becomes smaller than the Distance to the quartile Closest Competitor. Less than 1% of all borrowers in our sample are located in such areas.

<sup>38</sup> We use Belgian Francs (BEF) throughout the paper, but initially indicate equivalent amounts in U.S. Dollars (USD). Belgium switched to the Euro on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1999.

<sup>39</sup> A possible effect of Main Bank is that the bargaining power of a firm increases, as it also buys other products at that bank. In other words, cross-subsidization could negatively influence the loan rate.

<sup>40</sup> Large Belgian firms maintain more than ten bank relationships (Ongena and Smith (2000)). On the other hand, the average small Belgian firm surveyed by de Bodt, Lobez and Statnik (2001) employs only two banks. The firms in the latter sample are on average more than three times larger and 7 years older than the firms in our sample.

<sup>41</sup> As in all Tables, \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tailed).

<sup>42</sup> The variables are further discussed at length in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000).

<sup>43</sup> We let variable rate loans commence at the loan origination date or at the earliest interest rate revision date occurring within the sample period.

<sup>44</sup> Three industries are no longer represented in the reduced sample, while one industry dummy is suppressed.

<sup>45</sup> Table 5 contains the correlation coefficients between these variables. Most correspondences we document in the multivariate analyses are already foreshadowed in this Table.

<sup>46</sup> This specification merely replicates an exercise by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), who drop large firms and analyze the remaining 17,429 observations, and Degryse and Van Cayseele (1998), who employ all 17,776 observations.

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, Barclay and Smith (1995) for an explanation of these observed differences in debt maturity.

<sup>48</sup> Additional regressions (one without size dummies and another one without legal form dummies) confirm the existence of a positive legal form and a negative firm size effect. We also collect Total Assets for 1,063 firms. Within each firm size category, corporations are on average always larger than any other legal form.

<sup>49</sup> We restrict the coefficient on the Government Security variable to be equal to one to estimate the impact of the independent variables on the spread rather than on the loan rate. The main results are unaffected. We further replace both interest rate variables (and the two year dummies) by weekly time effects. While the time effects are significant as a group, the coefficients (in all main models we report) are otherwise virtually unaffected. We focus on specifications incorporating the interest rates, as this type of specification is widely used in the literature.



<sup>50</sup> Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000) provide a detailed discussion of these results and the related theoretical and empirical literature.

<sup>51</sup> Mallett and Sen (2001) find a similar result for the Canadian banking industry (their Table III, Columns 4 and 5). More in general, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) report that once a market has between three and five firms, the next entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.

<sup>52</sup> The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (April 1997) label markets with an HHI above 0.18 ‘highly concentrated’ and an HHI below 0.10 ‘unconcentrated’.

<sup>53</sup> The average price is based on all non-farm real estate sold during 1995 in 589 different municipalities. Some municipalities cover multiple postal zones (source: *Belgian National Institute of Statistics* at [ecodata.mineco.fgov.be](http://ecodata.mineco.fgov.be) “verkopen van onroerende goederen”).

<sup>54</sup> Car entry time or any other fixed departure time cannot determine bank choice. However, service and queuing time can differ across banks. We assume queuing time to be uncorrelated with our distance measures. This assumption is reasonable, we think, as branches typically operate on a first-come-first-served basis.

<sup>55</sup> Geographical clustering of bank branches may introduce spurious correlation between our two distance measures and hence a bias against finding significant results.

<sup>56</sup> The estimated coefficient on the Predicted Distance from Lender variable in Model II in Table VII in Petersen and Rajan (2002) implies a decrease by 62 basis points in the U.S., if one assumes the average speed of travel in the U.S. is the same as in Belgium. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the Number of Bank Branches per square kilometer in Model I Table 3 in Hyttinen and Toivanen (2002) implies an increase of 18 basis points in deposit rates in Finland (for example, increasing the average 0.008 branches / km<sup>2</sup> or 1 branch / 125 km<sup>2</sup> to 4 branches / 125 km<sup>2</sup> or 0.032 branches / km<sup>2</sup>, reduces the average distance say from 11 km to 5.5 km or from 21 minutes to 10.5 minutes of traveling time, and decreases the deposit rate by 26 basis points).

<sup>57</sup> The estimated coefficient on the Competition Index variable in Column 3 in Table II in Mallett and Sen (2001) implies an increase of 15 to 25 basis points per extra minute of traveling to the closest competitor in Canada (i.e., for the number of other banks going from 1 to 2 or 3 within a convenient distance between 2.5 and 4.5 kilometers).

<sup>58</sup> All calculations are averaged over the zero to one standard deviation interval.

<sup>59</sup> The gross monthly wage of Belgian entrepreneurs and managers was 153,416 BEF, and full-time employees worked 1,543 hours on average per year (source: *Belgian National Institute of Statistics* at [www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d321\\_nl.htm](http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d321_nl.htm)).

<sup>60</sup> Including BEF 1.8 / minute for gas (at a speed of 31 km / h in a car using 10 liters of gasoline / 100 km and a pump price of 35 BEF / liter) and BEF 1.20 / minute for maintenance and tires (source: *Belgian Petroleum Federation* and AAA “*Your Driving Costs*”).

<sup>61</sup> We could be picking up the impact of “social distance” (e.g., the loan officer and entrepreneur are members of the same weekend soccer club). However, we think it would be highly coincidental that social distance would result in imputed traveling costs, which would equal the opportunity costs of time of our borrowers. In addition, our

empirical work embeds substantial spatial simplifications, focuses on relatively small distances, and glosses over the possibilities for travel scheduling by either borrowers or loan officers (e.g., borrowers dropping off kids, loan officers visiting multiple borrowers). However, we contend these issues make it less likely that location matters significantly and is reflected in reasonable proportions in the loan rates we observe.

<sup>62</sup> We apply the estimates from Table 7 Model V to each individual observation. Median = 14 basis points, minimum = 0, maximum = 29.

<sup>63</sup> We employ the coefficient estimate (18.6) from Table 7 Model V. We annualize at the government security rate.

<sup>64</sup> We collect Age for 2,655 borrowing firms. The mean age for the 1,712 main bank borrowers is 14.7 years, while for the 943 non-main bank borrowers it is 20.0 years.

<sup>65</sup> Antwerpen, Brussel – Schaarbeek, Charleroi, Gent, and Liege (source: *UN Demographic Yearbook 1995*). We assign postal zones on the basis of the current circumscription.

<sup>66</sup> As the distance measures are in log form, the interaction coefficients suggest a squaring of traveling times. Admittedly the effect is estimated rather imprecisely. While the equality restrictions can be rejected at a 5% level of significance, removing all four restrictions does not alter results qualitatively.

<sup>67</sup> The means are less (significantly) different if we cut by “absolute distance”, i.e. compare the 33<sup>rd</sup> percentile (Lender to Distance  $\leq 3$  minutes) with the 66<sup>th</sup> percentile ( $\geq 7$  minutes) of the full sample.

<sup>68</sup> We also randomly select one loan per firm (from the original 15,044 observations) to abate the impact of those firms subscribing to multiple contracts. Those firms may be larger and have other (for us unobservable) characteristics. Nonetheless, the results for the remaining 11,222 loans are very similar to the results reported so far and we choose not to report them.

<sup>69</sup> We drop 50 firms with negative equity and/or debt-asset ratios larger than one. Retaining those observations does not alter the results.

<sup>70</sup> We replaced our prior choices Earnings, Short-Term Debt, and Intangibles with Profits / Earnings After Taxes, Debt, and Start-up Costs respectively, but the results don't change.

<sup>71</sup> In our full sample the average Single-Person Business borrows BEF 0.8 mln. (USD 20,000), the average Small Firm obtains BEF 1 mln. (USD 25,000), and the average Medium or Large Firm gets BEF 2.5 mln. (USD 62,500).

<sup>72</sup> Source: *History of Belgacom* at [www.belgacom.be](http://www.belgacom.be).

<sup>73</sup> “The Death of Distance” is the title of a book by Frances Cairncross. Its second edition is published by Harvard Business School Press. See also [www.deathofdistance.com](http://www.deathofdistance.com).