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REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES IN THE ERA OF
GROWING FINANCIAL AND TRADE INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates the impact of international reserves, terms of trade shocks and capital flows on the real exchange rate (REER). We observe that international reserves cushions the impact of TOT shocks on the REER, and that this effect is important for developing but not for industrial countries. This buffer effect is especially significant for Asian countries, and for countries exporting natural resources. Financial depth reduces the buffer role of IR in developing countries. Developing countries REER seem to be more sensitive to changes in reserve assets; whereas industrial countries display a significant relationship between hot money and REER.

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This note evaluates how international reserves hoarding and economic structure affect the real exchange rate (REER) and its adjustment to inflows of capital, terms of trade shocks, and other shocks. We compare the REER patterns between developing and the OECD countries.¹ The background of our study is the presumption that volatility induces first order adverse effects on the economic performance of developing countries.² Recently, Aghion et al. (2006) found that REER volatility reduces growth for countries with relatively low levels of financial development; hence factors mitigating REER volatility may be associated with superior economic performance. Other studies have unraveled the fact that TOT improvement leads to REER appreciation through the income effect.³ For most developing countries, terms of trade shocks are the most important source of exogenous volatility. Developing countries are exposed to TOT volatility that is 3 times the volatility of industrial countries, resulting in income shocks that are 3.5 times as volatile as those affecting industrial countries [see IDB (1995) and Hausmann et al. (2006)]. Dealing with TOT volatility is a challenge for natural resources exporters, exposed to TOT volatility that is 3 times the volatility of manufacturing countries.⁴ TOT shocks impose a daunting challenge for developing countries. Shallow domestic financial systems, relatively small size, and the lack of sectoral diversification in most developing countries limit their ability to mitigate TOT shocks by internal adjustment. Sovereign risk and the lack of proper financial instruments inhibit the ability to hedge against these shocks by relying on the global financial system (see Caballero (2003)). Developing countries are left with self-insurance as a last resort option of dealing with TOT shocks.

Our study examines the degree to which international reserves mitigate the impact of terms of trade (TOT) shocks on the REER. We find that this effect is important for developing countries, especially important for Asian countries, and for countries exporting natural resources, but not for industrial ones. We also confirm that financial depth is a key element in determining the degree of mitigation offered by international liquidity. The overall results are robust to adding controls like capital flows, exchange rate management and monetary policy, trade and financial openness.

¹ See Edwards (1989) and Edwards and Savastano (2000), Cheung, Chinn, Fujii (1999), Chinn (2006) and Hau (2002) for studies dealing with for analysis of the REER in developing countries, and the impact of productivity and other macro forces on the REER.

² See IDB (1995).

³ See Mendoza (1995) and Gregorio and Wolf (1994).

⁴ See Appendix B for details.

1. Effective TOT shocks and REER adjustment – the shock absorbing role of international reserves

We start the analysis by testing the extent to which international reserves mitigate the impact of terms of trade shock on the REER. The empirical analysis covers 1970 to 2004, 60 developing economies and 20 industrialized economies.⁵

As a benchmark, we adopt a panel regression methodology:

$$(1) \quad \ln(REER_{it}) = \alpha_{1,i} + \alpha_1(TO * \ln(TOT))_{it} + \alpha_2(\{TO * \ln(TOT)\} * RES)_{it} + \varepsilon_{it};$$

where the independent variable is the natural log of the real effective exchange rate (REER), defined such that higher REER indicates real appreciation (see Appendix A for definitions), $TO * \ln(TOT)$ is the *effective terms of trade*, defined by the trade openness, $TO = \ln[1 + (\frac{IM + EXP}{2GDP})]$, times the natural log of the terms to trade, $\ln(TOT)$, and $RES = \ln[1 + \frac{\text{International Reserves}}{GDP}]$ a proxy for the

International reserves/GDP rate. Buffering effects of international reserves would be captured by $\alpha_2 < 0$. The mitigation of TOT shocks may stem from reducing the magnitude of the REER adjustment triggered by capital flows; thus, minimizing the odds that capital flight may end up with a full blown financial crisis, potentially triggered by balance sheet effects associated with nominal and REERs depreciations [see Calvo et .al (2004) and Mendoza (2005) for further discussion of these balance sheet effects]. Equation (1) is also consistent with the predicted patterns of financial intermediation and the real exchange rate in a collateral dependent open economy, extending the framework in Aizenman and Lee (2006) to a two sector model [see Appendix A].

A concern regarding regression (1) is the possibility of a unit root in the real effective exchange rate. The results of individual tests on REER series portraying these series as I(1) processes could be due to low power in those tests. We work around this problem using the panel unit root test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002).⁶ Although we rejected the unit root hypothesis for the

⁵ See Appendix B for the exact list of countries include in each category.

⁶ The test assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same AR(1) coefficient, but allows for individual effects, time effects and possibly a time trend. By introducing a series of lags, the test may be viewed as a pooled Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), with the null hypothesis of nonstationarity (I(1)) behavior. See Taylor & Sarno (1998) and Calderon (2002) for other references to the stationarity of pooled REER series.

REER, we found high persistence: an autoregressive coefficient of about 0.84, but well below 1 (see Table B7, Appendix B).

The specification of regression (1) follows the observation that the *effective terms of trade shock*, $d \ln(TOT) * TO$, is a first order approximation of the income effect associated with the terms of trade improvement rate, $d \ln(TOT)$, where the income effect is defined as the GDP rate of change induced by the shock.⁷ By design, (1) implies that the elasticity of the REER with respect to effective terms of trade shocks is

$$(2) \quad \frac{d \ln(REER)}{TO * d \ln(TOT)} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 * RES$$

Hence, regression (1) provides information about the degree to which hoarding international reserves may impact REER dynamics induced by terms of trade shocks. Table 1 reports the regression results for 1970-2004. Column (1) presents the baseline regression pooling all countries, subject to data availability. The elasticity of the REER with respect to the effective terms of trade shock is well above one: a one percent improvement of the effective terms of trade induces a REER appreciation of about 1.8 percent.⁸

Table 1: REER vs. Effective Terms of Trade and Mitigation through Reserve Accumulation

Dependent Variable: $\ln(REER)$	All	Developing	Industrial	Manufactures	Natural Resources	LATAM	ASIA
Effective TOT	1.802*** [0.244]	1.836*** [0.255]	0.95 [0.594]	0.442 [2.077]	4.376*** [0.779]	1.642** [0.802]	2.269** [1.104]
Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves	-3.873*** [0.746]	-3.937*** [0.766]	-1.603 [4.607]	12.269 [23.668]	-10.676 [7.013]	-0.537 [9.164]	-4.672** [2.280]
Observations	1863	1260	603	271	253	343	202
R-Squared	0.4549	0.4367	0.5947	0.4066	0.6162	0.3903	0.2161
Years	1970-2004	1970-2004	1970-2004	1970-2004	1970-2004	1980-2004	1970-2004

Robust standard errors in brackets

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

This regression includes fixed country effects not reported in the table.

⁷ I.e., for small terms of trade shocks, $\Delta GDP / GDP \cong TO * \Delta \ln(TOT)$.

⁸ See Appendix G, Table G1, for regressions of the REER on the effective TOT and International reserves in the absence of interaction terms. For developing countries, the elasticity of the REER with respect to the effective TOT is well above one, whereas the elasticity of the REER with respect to the stock of IR/GDP is well below minus one – higher stock of IR/GDP is associated, on average, with depreciated REER.

Column (1), Table 1 implies that $d \ln(REER)/[TO * d \ln(TOT)] \cong 1.8[1 - 2 * RES]$; that is, international reserves hoarding lessens the elasticity of the REER with respect to the effective TOT by more than twice the International reserves/GDP. Hence, for a country with trade openness of 0.25, and IR/GDP ratio of 0.1, the elasticity of the REER with respect to the TOT is $.25 * 1.8(1 - 2 * 0.1) = 0.36$. This is in line with De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), who found that the elasticity of the REER with respect to TOT, unconditional of the RES position, is about 0.4 for a sample of OECD countries. Table 2 summarizes the elasticity of the REER with respect to both the effective and the regular TOT. Developing countries, especially emerging Asia, and commodity exporters have been significantly more exposed to changes in the terms of trade. Increasing the stock of reserves in each of these countries could reduce this vulnerability to external shocks, smoothing the reactions of their REERs to terms of trade changes.

Table 2: Means of the interaction terms and REER elasticity respect to ETOT and TOT

	All	Developing	Industrial	Asia	LATAM	Natural Resources	Manufactures
Means							
Reserves over GDP	0.09	0.108	0.055	0.163	0.078	0.075	0.056
Trade Openness	0.23	0.24	0.2	0.32	0.16	0.19	0.22
REER Elasticity to							
Effective TOT	1.45	1.42	1.24	1.51	1.60	3.58	1.13
Terms of Trade	0.33	0.34	0.25	0.48	0.26	0.68	0.25

All means are calculated over the same sample period as in the equations displayed in table 1. These elasticities are calculated based on the average holding of international reserves and average trade openness for each sub group.

Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 show that aggregation matters – the mitigation effects associated with international reserves applies to developing, but not to Industrial countries. This is consistent with the notion that limited development of the capital market in Developing countries hampers their ability to mitigate the volatility associated with shocks. Economic structure matters greatly – exports of natural resources magnify the impact of the effective terms of trade shocks and the mitigation associated with international reserves by a factor exceeding 2. Interestingly, this mitigation effect is insignificant for that group, yet we will show later that it is significant for the lagged effective TOT shock. In contrast, these interactions are insignificant for manufacturing intense countries. The last two columns focus specifically on Latin America and Asia; effective TOT shocks induce large effects in both blocks. International reserves provide a powerful mitigation of effective TOT shocks in Asian countries, but not in LATAM.

Table B.8 in the Appendix supports the robustness of prior results, evaluating the adjustment to the one year lagged effective terms of trade shock on the contemporaneous REER:

$$(1') \quad \ln(REER_{it}) = a_{1,i} + \alpha_1(TO * \ln(TOT))_{it-1} + \alpha_2(TO * \ln(TOT) * RES)_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The signs are identical to Table 1, the main difference being that shocks are apparently absorbed faster in LATAM and Asia, where most of the coefficients on the lagged shocks are insignificant for these blocks. Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C report country specific results. The above suggests that the volatility of the real effective exchange rate would be mitigated by higher levels of international reserves. We validate this conjecture in our data [see Appendix F]. For further reference to previous studies looking at this relationship see Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci (2004).

To verify robustness, Table C.1 in Appendix C reports distinct specifications of regressions (1) and (1') for subsets of countries. The regularities uncovered in these regressions include:

- Reserves play a role in the mitigation of TOT shocks only in Developing countries. This mitigation role is not displayed in Industrial countries under any specification.
- REERs in countries that specialize in exports of manufactures are inelastic to changes in their terms of trade. No role for reserves as shock absorber for this subgroup.
- Commodity exporters display a very elastic REER against changes in the terms of trade. This role is consistently more significant for lagged values of TOT.
- REERs in Latin American emerging economies are remarkably independent from changes in the TOT, and reserves do not seem to function as shock absorbers for those economies. Exceptions are Argentina, Chile or Ecuador (see table C.2 in the appendix).
- For Asian emerging markets, TOT changes clearly have an impact on their REER, and reserves play a central role moderating the effects of changes in the TOT.

Appendix C submits our initial findings to a series of controls. We show that the transmission of effective terms of trade shocks into the REER and the buffer role of foreign liquid assets is augmented by greater flexibility of exchange rate regimes. REER seems to be more sensitive and reserves play a more prominent role after negative effective TOT shocks. Although we do not find a significant change in the slope of the interaction between effective TOT and Reserves for all

developing countries after the 1997 Asian Crisis, we find that in Latin American economies and Commodity exporting countries, reserves play a bigger mitigation role after 1997.

Faced by changes in their terms of trade, we expect that countries with deep financial markets will be able to internally self-adjust in a more effective manner than those with shallow markets. To verify, we introduce the interaction of our reserve mitigation term $[TO \cdot \ln(TOT) \cdot RES]$ with a measure of financial depth represented by the M2 money aggregate deflated by GDP (see Appendix D).⁹ Financial depth significantly decreases the role of reserves as shock absorber for our global sample of developing economies. This effect seems to be insignificant for Latin America, industrialized economies, commodities and manufacture exporters. Interestingly, Asian economies seem to be extremely sensitive to both the mitigation effect of reserves and the role of financial development in the domestic market. The same regression holds for lagged values of terms of trade, reserves and liquid liabilities. Although the role of financial development seems to die faster than that of reserves for all emerging markets, the results are quite robust, especially for Asian economies, where both effects (that is, reserves as shock absorber and the corresponding mitigation of this role through financial depth) remain highly significant.

To verify robustness, we estimate the REER adjustment in four ways [see Appendix E]: Panel with Country Effects, Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate, Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate, and Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate, controlling for various types of capital flows, exchange rate regime, trade and financial openness, and relative income. Overall, the relationship between TOT, REER and the mitigation effect from reserve accumulation described above is robust to the inclusion of these controls. Breaking Capital Inflows in several categories allows us to expose systematic distinctions in the effect of those flows on the REER for different subgroups of countries [see Table 3].

- Inflows associated with short term capital tend to appreciate the REER. Developing countries' REER seem to be very sensitive to changes in reserve assets, fairly inelastic to movements of short term capital and highly inelastic to changes in long term foreign capitals. Industrial

⁹ Following King and Levine (1993) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) we experiment also with M3, Credit Allocated to the Private Sector and M3 minus M1.

countries display a very consistent positive correlation between FDI inflows and REER appreciations across the board. Inflows of Hot Money are also associated with real appreciations in these industrialized economies. When we interact reserves with trade openness, we observe that the effects of a decrease in reserves on the REER are diminished as we move towards greater trade openness [see Appendix E].

- Manufactures exporters display a highly significant relationship between inflows of hot money and appreciation of the REER; while natural resource countries' REER are not related to changes in capital inflows, once we adjust for trade openness. REER in Asian emerging economies consistently react to inflows of hot money, especially in those specifications that take trade openness into consideration. Changes in reserve assets and FDI inflows seem to play a minimal role in the determination of the REER for these Asian Economies. Latin American emerging markets REER seem to be considerably sensitive to changes in reserve assets although this relationship is broken when we use the interactions with trade openness.

Table 3: Summary of Correlations between Capital Inflows and REER Appreciations.

Type of Inflow	Specifications without Interactions			Specifications with Interactions		
	FDI	Hot Money	Decrease in Official Reserves	FDI	Hot Money	Decrease in Official Reserves
Sign of the Significant Coefficient	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-
Developing Countries	0/0	2/0	8/0	0/0	2/0	8/0
Industrial Countries	6/0	8/0	5/0	8/0	8/0	2/0
Manufactures Exporters	6/2	8/0	0/0	0/3	8/0	2/0
Commodity Exporters	0/0	8/0	2/0	0/0	0/1	0/0
Latin America	2/0	2/0	8/0	0/7	5/4 ^(*)	0/0
Asia	0/0	2/5	0/0	2/0	8/0	2/0

Notes: Each number represents the number of significant (at 10 %) coefficients of each type of capital inflows to REER across our eight different specifications [See Appendix D]. "0/0" would correspond to 8 insignificant coefficients for that country subgroup.

Positive signed coefficient uncovers a positive relationship between inflow and appreciation. For the case of Reserves, positive signed coefficients reveal a positive relation between reductions of official reserves and appreciations.

(*) For Latin America there is a distinction between the effects of "Other Investment" inflows and "Portfolio" inflows. The former seem to be associated with appreciations of the REER while the later are associated to real depreciations.

- REER depreciation associated with FDI, found by Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003), is only consistently present in manufactures exporters and Latin American economies once we account

for trade openness. FDI inflows tend to appreciate REER in industrial countries, even though at a lower rate than other types of capital.

- The results support the hypothesis that international trade helps mitigate pressures for real appreciation (see Hau (2002)).
- Nominal exchange rate depreciation has the expected negative effect on REER across the board. Natural resource exporters and Latin American economies seem to be especially sensitive to these changes in nominal exchange rates.
- Higher International reserves/GDP ratio is associated with depreciated REER. However, this effect is mitigated by trade openness. These results are much weaker for the OECD.

2. Concluding remarks

Our paper suggests that hoarding and managing international reserves has the effect of mitigating the impact of TOT shocks on the REER. Consequently, countries exposed to TOT volatility may benefit from active management of international reserves in ways that go well beyond the conventional prerogative of a central bank (see Davis et. al. (2001) for a review of the experience of Chile and Norway). Greater integration of financial markets may have increased the responsiveness of financial flows to TOT shocks [see Aizenman and Lee (2005), Rodrik (2006) and the references therein]. Hence, TOT improvement associated with higher domestic returns would induce capital inflows, leading to further REER appreciation. Similarly, TOT deterioration may lead to disorderly outflows, where the rush to exit is motivated by the wish to minimize capital losses. Better understanding of these issues is left for future investigation.

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Appendix to

Real exchange rate and international reserves in an era of growing financial and trade integration

by

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The Appendix is composed of the following parts:

Appendix	Pages
A: Financial intermediation, the real exchange rate and liquidity shocks; a model explaining regression (1).	1-5
B: Definition and data:	6-13
Volatility measures	11
Unit root test	12
Robustness to lagged variables	13
C: REER vs. TOT shocks, different specifications for subsets of countries	14-21
Controls:	
Foreign exchange rate regimes	18
Symmetry of TOT and reserves buffer effects	19
Role of reserves before and after 1997	20
Reserves under deep and shallow financial markets	20
Possible TOT endogeneity from export dependency	21
D: The Role of Domestic Financial Development	22
E: Regressions including capital flows and economic structure	23-38
F: The Relationship between REER volatility and IR	39
G: The effect of changes in the levels of TOT, stock of IR and domestic liquidity on the Real Effective Exchange Rates	40
References	41

Appendix A: Financial intermediation, the real exchange rate and liquidity shocks

This appendix outlines a model explaining equation (1). It would be presumptuous for us to claim that we have a fully specified model that accounts for all the reasons for hoarding reserves, and that we control all the relevant variables. Indeed, we doubt that such a model exists -- countries hoard reserves due to several motives beyond the traditional buffer stock and exchange rate management approaches. The observed hoarding reflects changing circumstances, where precautionary and self insurance, mercantilist and REER stabilization motives seem to play greater role, possibly due to deeper financial and trade integrations [see Cheung and Ito (2006) for an econometric evaluation of the changing patterns of hoarding international reserve¹⁰]. In this appendix we outline a model explaining the REER stabilization role of international reserves in the presence of TOT shocks. Our empirical strategy is to start testing the most rudimentary prediction of this model, stated in equation (1). We verify the robustness of our findings by adding controls dealing with other variables identified as pertinent for accounting international reserves [exchange rate flexibility, trade and financial openness, etc.].

A growing literature has identified financial intermediation, in the presence of collateral constraints, as a mechanism explaining the hazard associated with credit cycles induced by shocks. The prominent role of bank financing in developing countries suggests that capital flights, induced by adverse terms of trade shocks or contagion, impose adverse liquidity shocks. This appendix outlines a model describing conditions under which ex-ante hoarding of international reserves may provide a self insurance mechanism that would mitigate the real effects of liquidity shocks, ultimately reducing the adverse effects of terms of trade volatility on the GDP. For simplicity, we focus on an ex-ante/ex post model dealing with the determination of the GDP level and the real exchange rate during one investment cycle. Applying the logic of endogenous growth, one may extend the model to deal with the impact of terms of trade shocks on growth.

As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial intermediation is done by banks, relying on debt contracts. Specifically, we consider the case where investment in a long-term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. Hence, shocks may force costly liquidation of earlier investments, thereby reducing output. We solve the optimal demand

¹⁰ Cheung Y. W. and H. Ito (2006) "Cross-sectional analysis on the determinants of international reserves accumulation" manuscript, APEA annual conference Seattle, July 29-30.

for deposits and international reserves by a bank that finances investment in long-term projects. The bank's financing is done using callable deposits, exposing the bank to liquidity risk. Macro liquidity shocks, stemming from sudden stops and capital flights, cannot be diversified away. In these circumstances, hoarding reserves saves liquidation costs, potentially leading to large welfare gains; gains that hold even if all agents are risk neutral. In this framework, deposits and reserves tend to be complements – higher volatility of liquidity shocks will increase both the demand for reserves and deposits. This is another example of hoarding international reserves as a self-insurance against non-diversifiable liquidity shocks.¹¹

We model the financial intermediation and the real exchange rate by combining Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) insight with Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee's (2003) modeling of market imperfections in a collateral dependent small open economy.¹² We construct a minimal model to explain the self insurance offered by international reserves, in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks with endogenous real exchange rate determination. Investment in a long term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. Hence, the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of the earlier investment, reducing second period output. We simplify further by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneur – the entrepreneur is the bank owner, using it to finance the investment.

We consider a small open economy, where a traded good Y is produced with capital and a country specific non-traded factor. In addition, the traded sector includes exports of commodities, generating revenue which is determined by the realization of terms of trade shocks [= the relative price of the exported commodities to other traded goods]. The traded good Y is the numeraire. The relative price of the non-traded factor is denoted by p , and is referred to as the real exchange rate. There is a continuum of lenders and borrowers and their number is normalized to 1.

We focus now on the evolution of the economy throughout one investment cycle, where gestation lags imply that capital should be installed well before hiring specific non-traded input. To simplify, the supply of the specific factor is inelastic, at a level Z . The lenders in the economy cannot invest directly, but lend their saving at the international interest rate. Depositors are entitled to a real

¹¹ See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Garcia and Soto (2004), Aizenman and Lee (2005), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005), and Rodrik (2006) for studies dealing with various aspects of self insurance and international reserves. See Flood and Marion (2002) for empirical assessment of hoarding international reserves.

¹² The model extends the one sector framework outlined in Aizenman and Lee (2005).

return of r_f on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of investment. The safe return reflects a risk free investment opportunity, either in the form of a foreign bond, or as storage technology. The borrowers are entrepreneurs who have investment opportunity, but are credit constrained. The actual investment should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. The production function is a Cobb Douglas CRS technology:

$$(A1) \quad y_2 = \frac{1}{a} \bar{K}_1^\beta z^{1-\beta},$$

where \bar{K}_1 is the non-liquidated capital invested at period 1, z is the level of country-specific input, hired at a relative price of p_1 . Premature liquidation of capital is costly, and is associated with a proportionate adjustment cost of θ . Specifically, reducing the capital stock by one dollar yields a net liquidity of $1/(1+\theta)$. The time line associated with financial intermediation is summarized in Figure A1. At the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur with initial wealth H_1 , borrows μH_1 .¹³ The combined liquidity of $(1+\mu)H_1$ finances planned investment K_1 , and setting aside liquid reserves R_1 :

$$(A2) \quad (1+\mu)H_1 = K_1 + R_1.$$

Next, a liquidity shock δ realizes. A positive shock is inconsequential, because banks can accommodate positive liquidity shocks by purchasing a risk free bond, or investing in the risk free low yield storage technology. Hence, we focus our attention on adverse liquidity shocks, reducing desirable deposits from μH_1 to $\mu H_1(1+l\delta)$, $\delta < 0, l > 0$. Our model focuses on the impact of adverse liquidity shocks on optimal investment and liquidity, refraining from modeling the reasons for the shock. Such a shock may reflect external developments, like a higher foreign interest rate, contagion, or a reaction to a signal revealing the future TOT. For example, suppose that the public learns of a signal δ , determining the second period foreign currency earnings from commodity exports. A negative TOT shock may induce anticipation of an economic slowdown, triggering capital flights, and reducing deposits from μH_1 to $\mu H_1(1+l\delta)$. Independently of the exact source of the adverse liquidity shock, gestation lags associated with tangible investment and costly liquidation, expose the bank to the downside risk associated with abrupt adjustment.

¹³ Collateral constraints can be shown to arise due to capital market imperfections in the presence of moral hazard and costly monitoring [see Holmstrom-Tirole (1996) and Aghion-Banerjee-Piketty (1999)].

The bank uses reserves to meet the liquidity shock and to purchase the non-traded input. In case of need, the liquidity shock may be met by costly liquidation of capital. Consequently, the ultimate capital is:

$$(A3) \quad \bar{K}_1 = \begin{cases} K_1 - (1 + \theta) \text{MAX} \{(-\delta)l\mu H_1 + p_1 z - R_1, 0\} & \text{if } \delta < 0 \\ K_1 & \text{if } \delta \geq 0 \end{cases}.$$

We assume that the liquidity constraint is binding, and that the marginal productivity of the non traded input exceeds the return on liquid reserves. The producer's surplus is

$$(A4) \quad \Pi = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{a} K_1^\beta \left[\frac{(1 + \mu)H_1 - K_1}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} - (1 + r_f)\mu H_1 & \text{if } \delta \geq 0 \\ \frac{1}{a} \bar{K}_1^\beta \left[\frac{\{1 + \mu(1 + l\delta)\}H_1 - K_1 + (K_1 - \bar{K}_1)/(1 + \theta)}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} - (1 + r_f)\mu H_1(1 + l\delta) & \text{if } \delta < 0 \end{cases},$$

where p_1 may depend on δ .

To gain further insight, it is useful to focus on the simplest discrete example, where with probability half an adverse liquidity shock of $\delta = -\varepsilon$ ($0 \leq \varepsilon < 1$) would take place, and with probability half there would be no liquidity interruption. The value of ε corresponds to the volatility of the liquidity shock, δ . The asymmetric nature of tangible investment implies that only negative liquidity shocks may require real adjustment. In these circumstances, the expected profits are:

$$(A5) \quad E[\Pi] = 0.5 \left\{ \frac{1}{a} K_1^\beta \left[\frac{(1 + \mu)H_1 - K_1}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} \right\} + 0.5 \left\{ \frac{1}{a} \bar{K}_1^\beta \left[\frac{\{1 + \mu(1 - l\varepsilon)\}H_1 - K_1 + (K_1 - \bar{K}_1)/(1 + \theta)}{p_1} \right]^{1-\beta} \right\},$$

$$\left. \begin{matrix} - (1 + r_f)\mu H_1 \\ - (1 + r_f)\mu H_1(1 - l\varepsilon) \end{matrix} \right\},$$


where $K_1 \geq \bar{K}_1$

Applying the above, the equilibrium is characterized by the following:

Claim:

Higher international reserves mitigates the liquidation would occur in the bad state ($K_1 > \bar{K}_1$), and reduces the real exchange rate depreciation associated with adverse shocks.

Figure A1
The time line



APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS AND DATA

Definitions of the series used in the Main text

Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER)

The real effective exchange rate index represents a nominal effective exchange rate index adjusted for relative movements in national price or cost indicators of the home country,

$$REER = \prod_i^t [(e / e_i)(P / P_i)]^{w_i}$$

Where e : Exchange rate of the subject currency against the US dollar (US dollars per rupee in index form)

e_i : Exchange rates of currency i against the US dollar (US dollars per currency i in index form)

w_i : Weights attached to the country/ currency i in the index

P : Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Subject country

P_i : Consumer price index of country i

An Increase in REER corresponds to a Real Domestic Appreciation. Data belongs to the IFS dataset.¹⁴

Trade Openness (TO)

Trade openness is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by twice the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. The final variable TO is defined as a smooth moving average including a maximum of 5 past observations of trade openness. Data from IFS and WDI was used to compose this index

Terms of Trade (TOT)

Net barter terms of trade are the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding import price index measured relative to the base year 2000

Sources:

- 1) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics.
- 2) Constructed. We use export and import value data from IFS. We use two kinds of proxies for export/import price indices.
 - a. Indices for export and import prices that are compiled from survey data for wholesale prices or directly from the exporter or importer (called “direct pricing”). See IFS line 76.
 - b. Indices for Unit Value of Exports see IFS line 74 and Unit Value of Imports see IFS line 75 are Laspeyres, with weights derived from the data for transactions.

We use indices based on direct pricing when available since these are generally considered preferable to unit value indices, because problems of unit value bias are reduced.

¹⁴ IFS data has started to report REER data as Divisia Indices. To our best knowledge the REER data used in this study follows the previous trade weighted definition.

Reserves (RES)

The “Reserves” variable used for the interaction with terms of trade the total stock of Reserves (special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities) where gold holdings are excluded. Data is finally converted as the ratio of domestic GDP. The main source for this series is WDI and DataStream

Net Capital Inflows

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment captures the net inflows from foreign direct investors to the domestic economy

Portfolio Investment: Portfolio Investment is composed of flows in equity and debt considered for portfolio investment

Other Investment: Other Investment is composed of trade credits, loans, currency and other flows. Most of this capital flows are short term

- **Δ INTER. RESERVES:** Decrease in Official International Reserves

Net Capital Inflows were taken from the BOPS dataset.

Economic Structure

- 1- **RELATIVE INCOME:** GDP per Capita relative to the US GDP per capita
- 2- **EXMG:** Excess Money Growth. Calculate as Money and Quasi-Money (M2) growth rate minus GDP (in current US\$) growth.
- 3- **MANGDP:** Percentage of the economic activity captured by the manufacturing sector (excluding construction)
- 4- **CGDP:** Percentage of the economic activity dedicated to the production of commodities other than manufactures.

Sources: IFS, WDI and UN statistics.

REGRESSION SPECIFICATIONS

- 1- Simple Panel with Country Fixed Effects

$$\ln(REER_{it}) = CountryEffects_i + \alpha * X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where α is a vector of (n, 1) estimators and X is a vector (1, n) of independent variables.

- 2- Panel with Country Fixed Effects and Quadratic Time Trend

$$\ln(REER_{it}) = CountryEffects_i + \alpha * X_{it} + \beta_1 * T + \beta_2 * T^2 + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where T represents a time trend

- 3- Panel with Country Fixed Effects and Time Effects

$$\ln(REER_{it}) = CountryEffects_i + TimeEffects_t + \alpha * X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

DETRENDING THE REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE

We use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter ¹⁵ to test the robustness of the previous regressions results against the hypothesis of common trends. Using this filter the de-trended real effective exchange rate (TLREER) solves the following optimization problem:

$$\text{Min}_{\{TREER_t\}_{t=1}^T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\text{LogREER}_t - \text{TREER}_t)^2 + \lambda \sum_{t=2}^{T-1} [(\text{TREER}_{t+1} - \text{TREER}_t) - (\text{TREER}_t - \text{TREER}_{t-1})]^2$$

Where lambda is the penalty parameter. In the appendix we present results with a lambda = 1600

Country and Year Availability for all subgroups used in the main text

Table B.1 Developing Countries

Country	First Year	Last Year	Country	First Year	Last Year	Country	First Year	Last Year
Algeria	1981	2002	Gambia	1981	2002	Pakistan	1980	2004
Argentina	1981	2004	Ghana	1981	2002	Panama	1981	2002
Bolivia	1981	2002	Hungary	1980	2004	Paraguay	1981	2002
Brazil	1980	2004	India	1980	2003	Peru	1981	2002
Bulgaria	1986	1991	Indonesia	1982	2002	Philippines	1981	2003
Burundi	1981	2002	Iran	1996	2000	Poland	1980	2004
Cameroon	1981	2002	Ireland	1971	2004	Sierra Leone	1981	2002
Chile	1981	2002	Israel	1975	2004	Singapore	1980	2004
China	1981	2002	Jordan	1980	2004	Solomon Is.	1978	1988
Colombia	1980	2004	Kenya	1995	2000	South Africa	1975	2004
Congo	1981	2002	Korea	1971	2004	St. Lucia	2003	2003
Costa Rica	1981	2002	Lesotho	1981	2002	Thailand	1980	2004
Côte d'Ivoire	1981	2002	Malawi	1981	2002	Togo	1981	2002
Cyprus	1980	1987	Malaysia	1981	2002	Trinidad. & Tobago	1975	1990
Dominican Rep	1981	2002	Malta	1975	1989	Tunisia	1981	2002
Ecuador	1981	2002	Mexico	1981	2002	Turkey	1981	2004
Egypt	1981	2002	Morocco	1980	2002	Uganda	1983	2002
Equatorial Guinea	1986	2002	Nicaragua	1988	2002	Uruguay	1981	2002
Fiji	1980	1988	Nigeria	1981	2002	Venezuela	1981	2002
Gabon	1981	2002	Oman	1999	2003	Zambia	1981	2002

¹⁵ Hodrick, R. J., and Prescott, E. C., "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation." *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 29 (1), Feb. 1997, 1-16.

Table B.2 Selected OECD Countries

Country	First Year	Last Year	Country	First Year	Last Year
Australia	1972	2004	Japan	1971	2004
Austria	1971	1993	Netherlands	1971	2004
Belgium	1994	2004	New Zealand	1971	2004
Canada	1971	2004	Norway	1971	2004
Denmark	1971	2004	Portugal	1984	2003
Finland	1971	2004	Spain	1971	2004
France	1991	2004	Sweden	1971	2004
Germany	1971	2004	Switzerland	1971	1987
Iceland	1971	1997	United Kingdom	1972	2004
Italy	1971	2004	United States	1971	2004

Table B.3 Regions

East/South Asia	Latin America
China	Argentina
India	Bolivia
Indonesia	Brazil
Korea	Chile
Malaysia	Colombia
Pakistan	Costa Rica
Philippines	Ecuador
Singapore	Mexico
Thailand	Nicaragua
	Panama
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Uruguay
	Venezuela

Export Composition: The two subgroups of countries under Manufactures and Natural Resources exporters are selected based in the following criteria

- Consistently in the top 20 ranking of countries with the highest net External Balance
- Net Export Balance Always positive for all sub periods
- Manufactures exporters must have a negative balance for net exports of commodities.
- Natural Resources exporters must have a negative balance for net exports of manufactures.

Table B.4 Export Composition, Manufactures

MA		Net Exports of Manufactures (% of GDP)				
Country	1970-76	1977-83	1984-90	1991-97	1998-04	
Korea	1.83	8.67	9.51	5.11	11.65	
Finland		3.61	1.93	7.09	10.05	
Germany	8.96	8.73	8.85	4.71	7.18	
Sweden	1.86	3.47	3.12	4.68	7.08	
Belgium	6.00	3.43	5.01	6.11	5.85	
Japan	7.83	8.99	6.96	5.01	4.84	
Italy	5.01	6.25	3.83	5.01	4.35	
France	1.87	2.05	0.19	0.71	0.65	

Table B.5 Export Composition, Natural Resources


NR		Net Exports Natural Resources (% GDP)				
Country	1970-76	1977-83	1984-90	1991-97	1998-04	
Oman	19.70	12.69	20.62	31.18	39.52	
Kuwait	67.63	48.50	13.13	32.78	39.51	
Nigeria	21.88	28.46	33.74	26.05	39.30	
Saudi Arabia	47.07	49.87	15.62	30.97	24.94	
Algeria	23.08	23.40	13.56	19.41	23.49	
Russia				6.89	19.53	
Norway	0.87	9.65	10.92	13.40	18.41	
Venezuela	22.19	19.30	17.85	18.27	16.13	
Chile	8.88	7.53	12.77	9.93	9.23	
Australia	3.66	2.91	4.95	4.61	4.88	
Canada	4.88	4.68	4.39	4.67	4.68	
South Africa	4.57	3.87	1.38	1.80	2.12	
Mexico	0.20	6.02	5.04	1.56	0.55	

Measures of Relative Volatility for the REER and the different Shocks

Table B.6 Relative Volatility of the Shocks (measure as standard deviation of the log differences)

	D(Log REER)	D(Log TOT*TO)	D(Log TOT)	D(Log RESERVES)
ALL Countries	0.115	0.029	0.1248	0.0256
Developing countries	0.131	0.0355	0.149	0.0287
Industrial countries	0.0483	0.0098	0.0522	0.0129
Manufactures Exporters	0.0566	0.0099	0.0487	0.0135
Natural Resources Exporters	0.1439	0.0353	0.1526	0.0276
LATAM	0.1614	0.0211	0.1292	0.0222
ASIA	0.095	0.0193	0.0862	0.0252

Figure B1: TOT Shock Volatility



Pooled Unit Root Test for the Series used in the Main Text

In this section we test our REER and TOT* Reserves series for unit roots using estimators of a panel unit root test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002). The test assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same AR(1) coefficient, but allows for individual effects, time effects and possibly a time trend. The test may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test when lags are included, with the null hypothesis that of nonstationarity (I(1) behavior). After transformation by factors provided by LLC, the t-star statistic is distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis of nonstationarity.

Table B.7.1: Results from an ADF test on the log of REER

coefficient	t-value	t-star	Lags	Trend
-0.16212	-18.457	-7.62705	2	No
-0.14916	-18.705	-9.15011	1	No
-0.27354	-22.114	-4.01753	1	Yes

Regressions are based on a balanced panel of 96 countries over the period 1980-2003

Table B.7.2: Results from an ADF test on the Interaction TOT*Reserves

coefficient	t-value	t-star	Lags	Trend
-0.17182	-10.888	-3.94686	2	No
-0.18008	-11.491	-4.63357	1	No
-0.52963	-20.68	-6.9924	1	Yes

Regressions are based on a balanced panel of 60 countries over the period 1980-2002

Summary of results:

Tables B.7.1 and B.7.2 show the results of our pooled ADF test under different specifications (number of lags and the inclusion of time trends) for our REER series and the interacted variable of TOT and Reserves used in the econometric analysis. Although both series show a remarkably high persistence (AR (1) coefficients above .7 for both series without trend), we are able to reject the null of non-stationarity at a 1% confidence level in both tests.

References:

Levin, Andrew, Lin, Chien-Fu and Chia-Shang James Chu: "Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties". *Journal of Econometrics*, 108, 1-24, 2002.

Robustness Test of Table 1 in the Main Text Using Lagged Variables

Table B.8 tell us that our results are robust to the inclusion of lagged variables

Table B.8: REER vs. Lagged effective Terms of Trade and Mitigation through Reserve Accumulation

Dependent Variable: ln(REER)	All	Developing	Industrial	Manufactures	Natural Resources	LATAM	ASIA
Lagged Effective TOT	1.773***	1.806***	0.784	0.23	4.362***	1.205	1.762
	[0.278]	[0.289]	[0.581]	[1.895]	[0.759]	[0.827]	[1.103]
Lagged Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves	-3.557***	-3.633***	0.988	6.282	-11.528*	4.654	-4.024*
	[0.887]	[0.910]	[4.573]	[21.767]	[6.473]	[10.059]	[2.388]
Observations	1852	1263	589	262	252	343	201
R-Squared	0.4465	0.4302	0.5947	0.4027	0.6165	0.3898	0.2047
Years	1970-2004	1970-2004	1970-2004	1970-2004	1970-2004	1980-2004	1970-2004

Robust standard errors in brackets

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

APPENDIX C: REER vs. TERMS OF TRADE SHOCKS

Table C.1: Different specifications for subsets of countries

Countries	Specification	Dependent Variable	TOT	SE	TOT * Reserves	SE	T	T ²	Obs.	R ²
All	Country Effects	Log REER	1.802***	[0.244]	-3.873***	[0.746]			1863	0.4549
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.513***	[0.223]	-4.304***	[0.675]	-0.008*	0	1863	0.4955
	CE + TE	Log REER	1.247***	[0.205]	-3.513***	[0.662]			1863	0.5324
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.487***	[0.138]	-1.729***	[0.531]			1863	0.0379
All Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	1.773***	[0.278]	-3.557***	[0.887]			1852	0.4465
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.483***	[0.259]	-3.877***	[0.827]	-0.006	0	1852	0.4874
	CE + TE	Log REER	1.260***	[0.241]	-3.410***	[0.804]			1852	0.5249
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.527***	[0.174]	-1.401**	[0.627]			1852	0.0327
Developing	Country Effects	Log REER	1.836***	[0.255]	-3.937***	[0.766]			1260	0.4367
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.047***	[0.215]	-4.281***	[0.766]	-0.079***	0.001***	1260	0.5535
	CE + TE	Log REER	0.917***	[0.201]	-3.612***	[0.679]			1260	0.581
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.464***	[0.143]	-1.688***	[0.539]			1260	0.038
Developing Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	1.806***	[0.289]	-3.633***	[0.910]			1263	0.4302
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.093***	[0.254]	-3.885***	[0.867]	-0.071***	0.001***	1263	0.5367
	CE + TE	Log REER	0.970***	[0.239]	-3.500***	[0.812]			1263	0.57
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.510***	[0.180]	-1.375**	[0.639]			1263	0.0323
Industrial	Country Effects	Log REER	0.95	[0.594]	-1.603	[4.607]			603	0.5947
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.322**	[0.590]	-1.969	[4.766]	0.009***	-0.000***	603	0.6085
	CE + TE	Log REER	1.581**	[0.632]	-4.13	[4.834]			603	0.6232
	HP (1600)	TREER	1.030***	[0.213]	-2.853	[2.274]			603	0.0532
Industrial Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	0.784	[0.581]	0.988	[4.573]			589	0.5947
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.168**	[0.573]	0.301	[4.686]	0.009***	-0.000***	589	0.6066
	CE + TE	Log REER	1.314**	[0.609]	-0.76	[4.631]			589	0.6223
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.902***	[0.210]	-1.211	[2.129]			589	0.049
Manufactures Exporters	Country Effects	Log REER	0.442	[2.077]	12.269	[23.668]			271	0.4066
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	0.823	[2.151]	-1.914	[25.259]	-0.016	0	271	0.4429
	CE + TE	Log REER	-0.813	[2.868]	6.139	[28.984]			271	0.4507
	HP (1600)	TREER	1.013*	[0.530]	-9.594	[6.013]			271	0.0211
Manufactures Exporters Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	0.23	[1.895]	6.282	[21.767]			262	0.4027
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	0.678	[1.974]	-8.498	[22.474]	-0.015	0	262	0.4416
	CE + TE	Log REER	-1.321	[2.687]	-1.659	[25.778]			262	0.4543
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.425	[0.497]	-1.4	[6.190]			262	0.0098
Natural Resources Exporters	Country Effects	Log REER	4.376***	[0.779]	-10.676	[7.013]			253	0.6162
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	3.994***	[0.756]	-12.613**	[6.350]	-0.009	0	253	0.6579
	CE + TE	time effect	3.491***	[0.854]	-8.006	[6.414]			253	0.6831
	HP (1600)	TREER	2.194***	[0.613]	-15.144***	[5.320]			253	0.1221
Natural Resources Exporters Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	4.362***	[0.759]	-11.528*	[6.473]			252	0.6165
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	3.962***	[0.756]	-12.622**	[6.299]	-0.011*	0	252	0.6537
	CE + TE	Log REER	3.523***	[0.844]	-7.271	[6.282]			252	0.6813
	HP (1600)	TREER	2.221***	[0.601]	-12.595***	[4.779]			252	0.1465
LATAM	Country Effects	Log REER	1.642**	[0.802]	-0.537	[9.164]			343	0.3903
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	0.65	[0.832]	4.444	[8.659]	-0.083***	0.002***	343	0.4287
	CE + TE	Log REER	0.606	[0.813]	6.164	[8.355]			343	0.5198
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.408	[0.586]	4.251	[6.306]			343	0.0226
LATAM Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	1.205	[0.827]	4.654	[10.059]			343	0.3898
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	0.686	[0.793]	7.282	[9.548]	-0.064***	0.001***	343	0.413
	CE + TE	Log REER	0.662	[0.758]	8.174	[8.891]			343	0.5202
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.154	[0.532]	8.365	[7.158]			343	0.029
ASIA	Country Effects	Log REER	2.269**	[1.104]	-4.672**	[2.280]			202	0.2161
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.752***	[0.512]	-6.619***	[1.624]	-0.164***	0.003***	202	0.8368
	CE + TE	Log REER	1.551***	[0.495]	-6.605***	[1.385]			202	0.8894
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.216	[0.343]	-0.331	[0.744]			202	0.0071
ASIA Lagged	Country Effects	Log REER	1.762	[1.103]	-4.024*	[2.388]			201	0.2047
	CE + Time Trend	Log REER	1.413***	[0.512]	-6.229***	[1.668]	-0.158***	0.003***	201	0.8289
	CE + TE	Log REER	1.385***	[0.479]	-6.395***	[1.427]			201	0.8883
	HP (1600)	TREER	0.016	[0.342]	0.006	[0.807]			201	0.004

Table C.2: Log REER vs. TERMS OF TRADE: Individual Countries (no trend)

Dependent Variable Log REER	Terms of Trade		Terms of Trade * Reserves		Obs	R-squared	Total Effect 1990-99	Total Effect 2000-04	Volatility of TOT
Algeria	0.921	[1.795]	36.452	[21.306]	23	0.4137	3.393279	12.91223	0.0902
Argentina	44.994	[6.597]***	-793.738	[113.969]***	25	0.5594	-0.76438	-27.4739	0.0099
Australia	10.149	[0.921]***	-63.007	[16.952]***	33	0.7871	7.626154	6.907381	0.0206
Austria	16.803	[13.353]	-280.526	[187.404]	24	0.2939	-4.74984	3.230961	0.0093
Belgium	-1.367	[4.695]	57.881	[83.458]	12	0.3227	1.998743	0.988936	0.0108
Bolivia	1.345	[1.846]	77.249	[37.692]*	23	0.8385	7.190718	8.426918	0.0649
Brazil	-6.046	[2.192]**	-18.407	[44.493]	25	0.3863	-7.04516	-7.428	0.0216
Burundi	5.154	[0.617]***	-32.071	[4.999]***	23	0.7434	1.000668	2.818424	0.0488
Cameroon	0.264	[1.907]	-182.262	[106.348]	23	0.0874	0.09035	-8.05198	0.0216
Canada	5.257	[4.535]	-211.588	[172.354]	35	0.0487	-0.84815	-3.9066	0.0105
Chile	8.436	[1.561]***	-50.188	[13.080]***	23	0.6338	-1.46511	-0.97332	0.0517
China	38.103	[17.606]**	-431.96	[153.822]**	23	0.2259	-7.19028	-56	0.0087
Colombia	1.587	[10.937]	73.252	[78.815]	25	0.3741	9.439636	10.32927	0.0194
Congo, Republic of	2.428	[0.939]**	36.857	[32.604]	23	0.3657	2.941388	3.44642	0.1159
Costa Rica	-2.085	[4.334]	28.723	[44.425]	23	0.101	0.56918	0.451427	0.0364
Côte d'Ivoire	0.582	[0.478]	-37.471	[21.887]	23	0.26	-0.49561	-3.87651	0.0848
Cyprus	-7.907	[10.673]	25.031	[51.539]	8	0.8416	-3.7336	-2.45531	0.0166
Denmark	-6.698	[1.877]***	148.646	[28.909]***	35	0.4637	4.880927	12.60173	0.0116
Dominican Rep.	3.155	[1.945]	-65.165	[48.125]	23	0.1681	0.830061	1.07641	0.0514
Ecuador	7.158	[1.322]***	-46.25	[21.816]**	23	0.66	3.386239	5.400608	0.0573
Egypt	2	[0.844]**	-63.281	[14.008]***	23	0.3746	-10.2414	-7.00149	0.0600
Equatorial Guinea	0.487	[0.347]	-4.054	[2.560]	18	0.1799	0.412928	0.135584	0.1573
Fiji	2.156	[1.907]	-31.649	[11.505]**	9	0.7802	-3.40377	-3.81525	0.0541
Finland	0.065	[2.972]	9.376	[61.627]	35	0.0065	0.688312	0.671141	0.0166
France	4.912	[3.829]	-337.649	[272.996]	15	0.1407	-2.68579	-2.22818	0.0061
Gabon	2.381	[0.578]***	-14.162	[9.728]	23	0.4263	1.973659	1.929885	0.1306
Gambia, The	-2.987	[2.355]	184.589	[92.015]*	23	0.2859	38.18945	35.59034	0.0567
Germany	-1.786	[3.076]	47.037	[57.857]	34	0.0779	-0.08829	-0.64367	0.0185
Ghana	19.626	[6.744]***	-140.716	[148.911]	23	0.5838	9.341858	4.979629	0.0508
Hungary	-13.193	[2.128]***	39.43	[29.032]	22	0.5405	-7.06913	-6.5527	0.0351
Iceland	7.548	[1.771]***	-97.397	[22.108]***	28	0.3312	1.873382	1.844021	0.0154
India	-47.612	[4.233]***	516.252	[63.435]***	24	0.7087	-25.3773	16.04066	0.0097
Indonesia	7.108	[1.623]***	1.197	[26.197]	22	0.7613	7.220985	7.280557	0.0574
Ireland	2.829	[2.047]	-21.415	[11.969]*	35	0.1355	0.770717	2.002309	0.0218
Israel	-4.289	[3.490]	42.098	[22.733]*	30	0.2438	0.925048	4.132718	0.0211
Italy	2.696	[1.258]**	-37.944	[28.131]	35	0.1082	1.424221	1.887972	0.0202
Japan	2.013	[6.441]	-226.311	[111.787]*	35	0.2281	-6.0853	-24.3248	0.0207
Jordan	-11.637	[1.136]***	31.755	[3.878]***	25	0.745	-4.55274	-0.30726	0.0320
Kenya	-2.892	[5.163]	49.464	[71.037]	6	0.1051	-0.30107	1.541209	0.0550
Korea	3.157	[7.419]	17.626	[64.699]	35	0.0411	4.417353	6.858481	0.0329
Lesotho	4.827	[2.104]**	-34.683	[15.980]**	23	0.0731	-6.46674	-8.57529	0.0584
Malawi	2.413	[0.402]***	16.927	[8.022]**	23	0.7628	3.643276	4.01933	0.0576
Malaysia	-4.505	[1.120]***	15.158	[6.231]**	23	0.638	-0.58792	0.622804	0.0744
Malta	-1.825	[0.873]*	0.604	[1.557]	15	0.5911	-1.57121	-1.59734	0.0409
Mexico	3.841	[2.048]*	-177.211	[71.729]**	23	0.1901	-5.69239	-9.71975	0.0360

Morocco	1.864	[2.354]	-6.042	[20.203]	23	0.0964	1.172524	0.458257	0.0266
Netherlands	-3.163	[2.211]	31.075	[39.964]	35	0.1032	-1.14995	-2.47822	0.0096
New Zealand	-0.293	[1.191]	29.575	[12.954]**	35	0.1966	1.90258	1.423403	0.0195
Nicaragua	-2.581	[12.768]	-25.065	[144.098]	15	0.1056	-4.48777	-5.43802	0.0446
Nigeria	6.648	[1.369]***	-22.726	[11.276]*	23	0.5821	4.10128	2.638195	0.1208
Norway	0.038	[0.322]	0.974	[2.415]	35	0.0176	0.165762	0.185171	0.0377
Oman	-4.682	[2.068]	28.299	[11.851]	5	0.5314	-0.38616	-0.9774	0.1053
Pakistan	0.587	[3.905]	180.263	[77.974]**	25	0.3399	4.372123	14.9713	0.0182
Panama	-3.72	[3.471]	22.188	[55.815]	23	0.1292	-1.88255	-2.11735	0.0192
Paraguay	8.33	[8.402]	-122.221	[69.753]*	23	0.5248	-4.77552	-6.37776	0.0266
Peru	-12.423	[2.465]***	22.793	[34.700]	23	0.7537	-9.64043	-8.94619	0.0357
Philippines	-6.201	[1.468]***	47.298	[13.514]***	24	0.4473	-1.85904	1.280084	0.0258
Poland	-1.247	[1.057]	144.776	[37.645]***	20	0.6573	11.89795	18.95151	0.0986
Portugal	3.339	[1.700]*	-1.431	[28.072]	21	0.304	3.12042	3.246945	0.0166
Sierra Leone	-2.809	[0.761]***	56.415	[25.622]**	23	0.4102	-0.77461	1.684829	0.1235
Singapore	0.536	[0.635]	-0.898	[1.299]	26	0.0315	-0.00389	-0.06588	0.1065
Solomon Is.	1.09	[0.931]	-0.413	[3.931]	11	0.5372	1.055265	1.033999	0.1221
South Africa	8.363	[2.463]***	-295.929	[134.140]**	30	0.2885	3.054353	-6.1382	0.0157
Spain	-0.231	[3.198]	15.579	[49.158]	35	0.0196	1.08814	0.361527	0.0191
Sweden	5.904	[1.963]***	-56.652	[43.973]	35	0.2698	1.730086	2.326805	0.0171
Switzerland	9.758	[15.266]	-30.977	[114.031]	18	0.458	5.908318	5.655074	0.0151
Thailand	6.832	[1.849]***	-21.225	[9.096]**	25	0.6472	2.888231	1.507516	0.0348
Togo	5.85	[2.320]**	-5.524	[8.320]	23	0.6351	5.221563	5.215947	0.0361
Trinidad & Tobago	3.6	[1.024]***	-11.309	[2.946]***	16	0.6144	2.671946	1.352825	0.1018
Tunisia	12.562	[3.598]***	-121.252	[48.821]**	23	0.5939	2.970556	-0.27149	0.0246
Turkey	-10.378	[3.447]***	34.234	[44.545]	25	0.2378	-8.10595	-6.19887	0.0083
Uganda	5.419	[1.432]***	-33.319	[21.326]	21	0.4698	3.20476	0.290683	0.0591
United Kingdom	23.715	[8.824]**	-603.084	[210.701]***	33	0.2138	4.118539	8.682902	0.0091
United States	14.147	[5.898]**	-2,132.26	[1,255]*	35	0.1093	-5.39353	0.801306	0.0039
Uruguay	-4.075	[10.680]	-25.147	[159.464]	23	0.1165	-5.57496	-7.47942	0.0138
Venezuela	1.247	[2.049]	16.333	[17.311]	23	0.4222	3.505121	3.197085	0.0672
Zambia	0.459	[0.827]	-30.488	[18.780]	23	0.2087	-0.96593	-1.81874	0.0847

Table C.3: Log REER vs. TERMS OF TRADE: Individual Countries (Time & Quadratic Time Trends)

Dependent Variable Log REER	Terms of Trade		Terms of Trade * Reserves		Time Trend		Quadratic Time Trend		Obs.	R-squared
Algeria	-0.593	[2.099]	-11.949	[14.170]	-0.187	[0.158]	0.002	[0.003]	23	0.8108
Argentina	54.019	[7.178]***	-896.022	[159.674]***	-0.059	[0.056]	0.001	[0.001]	25	0.6481
Australia	7.669	[1.303]***	-43.5	[13.355]***	0.003	[0.007]	0	[0.000]	33	0.8549
Austria	6.275	[4.266]	-60.431	[59.229]	0.019	[0.002]***	0	[0.000]***	24	0.9197
Belgium	-4.248	[3.838]	86.046	[57.759]	-0.098	[0.044]*	0.002	[0.001]*	12	0.5384
Bolivia	6.857	[5.645]	42.717	[37.459]	0.18	[0.183]	-0.003	[0.003]	23	0.8621
Brazil	-13.804	[2.099]***	44.627	[31.061]	0.108	[0.026]***	-0.003	[0.001]***	25	0.7601
Burundi	4.107	[0.901]***	-26.3	[6.915]***	-0.05	[0.034]	0.001	[0.001]	23	0.7861
Cameroon	0.612	[1.383]	-65.803	[117.333]	0.075	[0.038]*	-0.002	[0.001]**	23	0.5346
Canada	-1.577	[3.760]	42.348	[113.089]	-0.009	[0.006]	0	[0.000]	35	0.7587
Chile	4.429	[5.158]	-15.191	[27.169]	-0.122	[0.103]	0.003	[0.002]	23	0.7408
China	-11.115	[5.714]*	178.811	[54.470]***	-0.34	[0.026]***	0.006	[0.001]***	23	0.9537
Colombia	-4.748	[10.760]	79.185	[75.440]	-0.089	[0.042]**	0.002	[0.001]*	25	0.6127
Congo	0.276	[0.766]	12.094	[26.950]	-0.408	[0.070]***	0.009	[0.002]***	23	0.6638
Costa Rica	3.351	[3.675]	-19.205	[36.258]	-0.094	[0.036]**	0.002	[0.001]**	23	0.3527
Côte d'Ivoire	-0.222	[0.644]	-6.146	[21.889]	0.03	[0.035]	-0.001	[0.001]	23	0.3731
Cyprus	-2.048	[6.226]	3.173	[30.331]	-0.042	[0.036]	0.001	[0.001]	8	0.9794
Denmark	-2.321	[1.371]	80.254	[21.309]***	0.01	[0.002]***	0	[0.000]***	35	0.7246
Dominican Rep.	-0.506	[0.766]	-19.219	[18.263]	-0.188	[0.022]***	0.004	[0.000]***	23	0.8129
Ecuador	3.525	[2.500]	-55.423	[18.265]***	-0.224	[0.076]***	0.004	[0.001]***	23	0.7686
Egypt	2.051	[1.983]	-83.081	[14.829]***	0.155	[0.053]***	-0.004	[0.001]***	23	0.6463
Equatorial Guinea	-0.072	[0.063]	-0.801	[1.170]	-0.244	[0.034]***	0.004	[0.001]***	18	0.8857
Fiji	0.208	[0.765]	-2.15	[10.640]	0.384	[0.174]*	-0.014	[0.006]*	9	0.94
Finland	4.324	[1.642]**	-86.336	[33.027]**	0.027	[0.005]***	-0.001	[0.000]***	35	0.6209
France	8.297	[3.878]*	-304.52	[224.088]	0.015	[0.024]	0	[0.000]	15	0.6209
Gabon	-0.397	[0.413]	-4.024	[4.084]	-0.052	[0.035]	0	[0.001]	23	0.8873
Gambia, The	-1.377	[1.077]	71.793	[53.577]	-0.005	[0.033]	0	[0.001]	23	0.7721
Germany	12.296	[3.716]***	-178.965	[67.778]**	0.001	[0.003]	0	[0.000]**	34	0.6417
Ghana	1.824	[5.747]	-82.165	[64.175]	-0.582	[0.219]**	0.01	[0.004]**	23	0.8622
Hungary	-6.456	[1.626]***	45.028	[12.009]***	-0.064	[0.017]***	0.002	[0.000]***	22	0.9063
Iceland	6.789	[1.306]***	-92.396	[16.793]***	0.011	[0.003]***	0	[0.000]***	28	0.6859
India	-3.414	[8.929]	0.05	[100.140]	-0.122	[0.059]*	0.002	[0.001]	24	0.9117
Indonesia	3.965	[2.258]*	-1.356	[24.358]	-0.03	[0.066]	0	[0.001]	22	0.9269
Ireland	1.676	[2.043]	-6.55	[14.844]	0.008	[0.004]*	0	[0.000]	35	0.2568
Israel	-5.9	[3.961]	46.938	[24.268]*	0.003	[0.013]	0	[0.000]	30	0.2718
Italy	5.487	[1.412]***	-57.99	[31.090]*	0.009	[0.006]	0	[0.000]*	35	0.3372
Japan	5.743	[1.152]***	-59.678	[20.164]***	0.088	[0.006]***	-0.002	[0.000]***	35	0.9545
Jordan	-9.576	[2.108]***	35.605	[6.578]***	-0.113	[0.054]**	0.002	[0.001]**	25	0.8383
Korea	2.567	[1.328]*	6.598	[13.004]	-0.223	[0.004]***	0.004	[0.000]***	35	0.9871
Lesotho	3.227	[1.906]	-18.825	[13.545]	0.09	[0.025]***	-0.002	[0.001]***	23	0.8068
Malawi	2.147	[0.655]***	10.831	[8.206]	0.035	[0.023]	-0.001	[0.000]*	23	0.8098
Malaysia	-1.378	[1.452]	6.486	[5.278]	-0.039	[0.047]	0	[0.001]	23	0.8059
Malta	-0.639	[2.276]	-2.836	[2.943]	-0.067	[0.032]*	0.002	[0.001]*	15	0.7584
Mexico	4.134	[3.096]	-126.801	[62.869]*	-0.05	[0.074]	0.001	[0.001]	23	0.4316
Morocco	-0.882	[0.662]	-1.684	[9.778]	-0.117	[0.011]***	0.002	[0.000]***	23	0.8821
Netherlands	-13.419	[2.259]***	205.82	[42.912]***	0	[0.002]	0	[0.000]	35	0.4922
New Zealand	0.999	[1.031]	12.477	[11.830]	-0.003	[0.005]	0	[0.000]	35	0.2832
Nicaragua	1.551	[7.660]	-29.756	[64.320]	0.947	[0.258]***	-0.017	[0.005]***	15	0.7077
Nigeria	3.918	[2.314]	-30.485	[8.182]***	-0.243	[0.183]	0.004	[0.004]	23	0.7415
Norway	-0.155	[0.362]	4.803	[3.032]	0.011	[0.003]***	0	[0.000]***	35	0.3457
Pakistan	-0.771	[0.933]	61.619	[19.138]***	-0.118	[0.018]***	0.002	[0.000]***	25	0.9543
Panama	-2.602	[1.375]*	27.437	[18.871]	-0.054	[0.010]***	0.001	[0.000]***	23	0.9219
Paraguay	3.397	[6.521]	-23.29	[46.954]	-0.149	[0.034]***	0.003	[0.001]***	23	0.8138
Peru	9.721	[8.701]	-69.043	[53.452]	0.322	[0.108]***	-0.005	[0.002]***	23	0.8558
Philippines	-2.942	[1.229]**	8.891	[15.022]	-0.064	[0.023]**	0.001	[0.001]**	24	0.7073
Poland	-4.705	[2.154]**	167.475	[50.107]***	0.258	[0.168]	-0.004	[0.003]	20	0.8324
Portugal	-3.348	[1.074]***	33.891	[15.780]**	0.054	[0.015]***	-0.001	[0.000]**	21	0.9092
Sierra Leone	0.145	[1.462]	18	[32.397]	-0.133	[0.081]	0.002	[0.002]	23	0.615
Singapore	1.245	[1.129]	0.465	[2.425]	0	[0.024]	0	[0.001]	26	0.2692

Solomon Is.	0.113	[0.288]	-0.732	[0.905]	0.277	[0.063]***	-0.011	[0.002]***	11	0.9152
South Africa	-7.621	[2.695]***	519.109	[123.963]***	0.023	[0.013]	-0.001	[0.000]***	30	0.8161
Spain	1.887	[2.792]	-11.199	[44.469]	0.026	[0.005]***	-0.001	[0.000]***	35	0.5914
Sweden	0.245	[2.124]	33.193	[47.220]	-0.008	[0.005]	0	[0.000]	35	0.8377
Switzerland	-12.134	[3.651]***	118.98	[25.403]***	0.069	[0.005]***	-0.003	[0.000]***	18	0.9494
Thailand	-5.201	[2.233]**	24.879	[8.783]**	-0.054	[0.015]***	0.001	[0.000]	25	0.8616
Togo	2.772	[1.455]*	-5.445	[2.873]*	-0.038	[0.015]**	0	[0.000]	23	0.8823
Trinidad & Tobago	3.32	[0.543]***	-10.281	[1.318]***	0.14	[0.016]***	-0.005	[0.001]***	16	0.9285
Tunisia	1.442	[2.245]	-50.018	[24.401]*	-0.116	[0.018]***	0.002	[0.000]***	23	0.9231
Turkey	-3.052	[4.502]	54.224	[41.894]	-0.114	[0.019]***	0.002	[0.000]***	25	0.6665
Uganda	-0.049	[1.555]	2.785	[15.073]	-0.153	[0.047]***	0.002	[0.001]*	21	0.7044
United Kingdom	17.346	[5.964]***	-363.271	[161.525]**	0.011	[0.006]*	0	[0.000]	33	0.5485
United States	13.989	[15.745]	-2,275.21	[3,024.243]	-0.003	[0.015]	0	[0.000]	35	0.1177
Uruguay	0.573	[4.915]	-29.08	[82.966]	-0.13	[0.048]**	0.003	[0.001]**	23	0.4707
Venezuela.	-1.389	[1.829]	18.338	[10.202]*	-0.28	[0.101]**	0.006	[0.002]***	23	0.7757
Zambia	-1.259	[0.832]	-0.662	[13.986]	-0.102	[0.038]**	0.002	[0.001]**	23	0.4368

Robust standard errors in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Inclusion of Controls to our Main Equation

In this section we control for the differences in the foreign exchange regimes across countries. To do so, we divide our sample following Reinhart and Rogoff's classification of FOREX Regimes (see below, note that we do not include dual markets and freely falling regimes)¹⁶

- 1 •No separate legal tender
- 2 •Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
- 3 •Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
- 4 •De facto peg
- 5 •Pre announced crawling peg
- 6 •Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
- 7 •De factor crawling peg
- 8 •De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
- 9 •Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
- 10 •De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
- 11 •Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time)
- 12 •Managed floating
- 13 •Freely floating

The sample is divided between observations under relatively fixed exchange rate regimes (RR code < 9) and observations under relatively floating regimes (RR code 9 or higher).

Table C.4: Controlling for the Foreign Exchange Rate Regime

Dependent Variable: REER FOREX Regime	All Countries		Developing Countries		Industrial Countries	
	Floating	Fixed	Floating	Fixed	Floating	Fixed
Effective TOT	3.374*** [0.523]	1.028*** [0.231]	3.500*** [0.573]	1.011*** [0.242]	2.235*** [0.673]	0.715 [0.772]
Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves	-7.571*** [2.169]	-3.982*** [0.980]	-7.668*** [2.322]	-3.981*** [0.997]	-8.306* [4.951]	8.851 [12.878]
Observations	524	899	292	567	232	332
R-squared	0.6239	0.5886	0.5826	0.4952	0.6255	0.8308

Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹⁶ Reinhart & Rogoff (2004): "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 119 Issue 1, Pages 1-48.

Summary of results:

Table C.4 indicates that developing countries under more flexible forex regimes will find a larger role for reserves as shock absorbers at the same time that they seem to be more exposed to exogenous TOT shocks.

To further analyze the uncovered buffer effect of liquid foreign assets on TOT shocks we divide the main regression by the nature of the TOT shock (positive or negative).

Table C.5 Symmetry of Terms of Trade Shocks and Reserves Buffer Effect

Dependent Variable: REER Nature of TOT shock	All Countries		Developing Countries		Industrial Countries	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Effective TOT	1.391*** [0.384]	2.483*** [0.383]	1.376*** [0.449]	2.588*** [0.409]	1.222* [0.626]	0.943 [0.674]
Effective TOT* Stock of Reserves	-2.772* [1.428]	-5.486*** [1.128]	-2.827* [1.568]	-5.709*** [1.185]	5.087 [7.803]	-4.124 [5.239]
Observations	858	933	533	613	325	320
R-squared	0.4453	0.5005	0.4077	0.4763	0.5872	0.6359

Robust standard errors in brackets
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Summary of results:

The results displayed in Table C.5 show that the buffer effect of reserves in developing countries seems to be larger given a deterioration of the countries terms of trade. Nevertheless, given the standard errors it is difficult to reject the hypothesis of symmetry across both coefficients.

Have reserves changed their role as ETOT shock absorbers after the 1997 global turmoil? To answer this question a simple test consists of splitting the interaction between ETOT and Reserves into two covering the periods before 1997 and after 1998 then using a simple Wald test to compare the slopes on those coefficients the table below shows the results of a panel regression with country fixed effects. Reserves are always in terms of domestic GDP. We also include the level of reserves to control for significant changes in the volume of international liquidity between periods. F statistics corresponding to the Wald tests are shown at the bottom of the table.

Summary of results:

From the Wald test applied to the coefficients on table C.6 we determine that the slope of the buffer effect of reserves did not significantly change after the 1997 financial crisis for developing countries in general. However, the Wald test indicates differences between pre 97 and post 97 slopes for the different subgroups. Reserves seem to play a more relevant role after 1997 for Latin American and Commodity exporters. Although the results show a higher role of reserves before 1997 for Asian economies, this may be due to the depletion of reserves in those countries that followed from the financial crisis.

Table C.6 Role of Reserves Before and After the 1997 Asian Crisis

	All	Developing Countries	Industrial Countries	Latin America	Asia	Commodity Exporters	Manufactures Exporters
Effective TOT	1.754***	1.740***	1.191**	1.606**	2.062**	4.810***	-2.019
	[0.239]	[0.261]	[0.496]	[0.789]	[0.860]	[0.717]	[1.803]
ETOT * Stock of Reserves* Post 1997	-5.072***	-5.647***	5.753	-25.463**	-4.075**	-27.286***	5.384
	[1.620]	[1.699]	[6.182]	[10.215]	[1.586]	[5.612]	[26.791]
ETOT * Stock of Reserves* Pre 1997	-3.432***	-3.243***	-1.808	3.175	-9.210***	-15.005*	42.154*
	[0.837]	[0.917]	[5.009]	[9.304]	[2.304]	[7.692]	[23.281]
Stock of Reserves	-1.093***	-1.263***	0.525**	0.235	-2.941***	-3.013***	-2.565***
	[0.126]	[0.139]	[0.226]	[0.599]	[0.310]	[0.420]	[0.860]
Observations	1863	1217	646	343	202	253	271
R-squared	0.4743	0.4522	0.6028	0.3966	0.3536	0.6996	0.438
Wald Test							
H₀: Effective Terms of Trade * Stock of Reserves Pre 1997 = Effective Terms of Trade * Stock of Reserves Post 1997							
F Statistic	0.76	1.43	3.97	8.58	11.16	5.24	1.2
Prob > F	0.3847	0.2319	0.0469	0.0036	0.001	0.0229	0.2739

Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Post 1997 (Pre 1997) corresponds to a dummy variable with value 1 if the year is above 1997 (below or equal to) 1997 and 0 otherwise.

Financial depth seems to be important to determine the degree in which reserves help absorb external shocks. To highlight this finding we divide our between observations of relatively low domestic liquidity (less than twenty percent of total output) and relatively high liquidity (more than twenty percent of total output). We observe that the buffer effect of international reserves seems to be stronger when countries face shallow financial systems.

Table C.7: Reserves as shock absorbers under deep and shallow financial markets

Dependent Variable LREER	M2 >20% of GDP	M2 < 20 % of GDP
Effective TOT	1.671***	2.103***
	[0.255]	[0.413]
Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves	-3.683***	-8.875**
	[0.714]	[4.385]
Observations	1547	316
R-squared	0.504	0.5702

Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reserves are always in terms of domestic GDP

Summary of results:

From table C.7 we observe that countries characterized by low private financial liquidity seem to leave more room international reserves as shock absorber.

To control for possible TOT endogeneity in countries with a high percentage of output dedicated to specific export markets (oil, minerals etc) we purged our main regression of countries with high specific export to GDP ratios.¹⁷ For the dependency ranking used for the selection of countries to be purged see:

http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/research_reports/art2635.html/pdfs/eireport.pdf

Table C.8: Reserves as shock absorbers purged of possible TOT endogeneity from export dependency

Dependent Variable LREER	All Countries	All Countries minus those with high dependency on Specific Exports
Effective TOT	1.802*** [0.244]	2.666*** [0.324]
Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves	-3.873*** [0.746]	-6.517*** [0.953]
Observations	1863	1645
R-squared	0.4549	0.4623

Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reserves are always in terms of domestic GDP

Summary of results:

Controlling for possible endogeneity in the TOT shocks through world market share and export dependency leaves our main result unaffected. Moreover, purging countries with high export dependency makes our coefficients larger and more robust.

¹⁷ These countries are: Algeria, Kingdom of Bahrain, Chile, Rep of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, and Zambia.

APPENDIX D: The Role of Domestic Financial Development

In this section we explore the effects of financial depth using liquid assets in the economy (M2 over GDP¹⁸).

Table D.1.1: REER vs. TOT shocks, International Reserves and Financial Depth

Dependent Variable: Log(REER)	Developing Countries	Industrial Countries	LATAM	Asia	NR Exporters	MA Exporters
Effective TOT	0.603*** [0.131]	0.957*** [0.302]	0.445 [0.402]	1.950*** [0.358]	2.554*** [0.579]	-2.615 [2.711]
Effective TOT* Stock of Int. Reserves	-3.601*** [0.955]	5.378 [9.994]	17.423 [14.245]	-19.38*** [2.709]	-0.66 [7.209]	-3.068 [16.457]
Effective TOT * Stock of Int. Reserves * FD	2.592* [1.403]	-15.362 [19.366]	-56.529 [46.858]	22.594*** [3.421]	-23.218 [20.933]	68.65 [48.033]
Observations	1253	511	343	202	252	224
R-squared	0.5662	0.645	0.5506	0.9229	0.6717	0.4283

The measure used as a proxy of Financial Development (FD) in this table is the monetary aggregate M2 over Nominal GDP. Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table D.1.2: REER vs. Lagged TOT shocks, International Reserves and Financial Depth

Dependent Variable: Log(REER)	Developing Countries	Industrial Countries	LATAM	Asia	NR Exporters	MA Exporters
Lagged Effective TOT	0.629*** [0.156]	0.810*** [0.289]	0.56 [0.381]	1.582*** [0.344]	2.653*** [0.574]	-2.602 [2.578]
Lagged Effective TOT* Stock of IRs	-2.944** [1.201]	8.837 [9.647]	3.679 [14.045]	-15.991*** [2.298]	0.939 [5.474]	-1.851 [15.414]
Lagged Effective TOT * Stock of IRs *FD	1.515 [1.717]	-20.108 [18.238]	-6.076 [37.875]	18.418*** [2.826]	-29.423 [20.139]	44.116 [57.284]
Observations	1256	505	343	201	252	221
R-squared	0.5499	0.6412	0.5413	0.9175	0.6747	0.4277

The measure used as a proxy of Financial Development (FD) in this table is the monetary aggregate M2 over Nominal GDP. Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

¹⁸ This is a rough measure of Liquid Liabilities but not uncommon in the literature (see Hausmann, R., Gavin, M. Pages-Serra, C. and Ernesto Stein (1999) “Financial Turmoil and Choice of Exchange Rate Regime.” Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper 400.

APPENDIX E: REGRESSIONS INCLUDING CAPITAL FLOWS AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE*

Table E.1.1: Panel with Country Effects no Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.231 [0.322]	0.163 [0.345]	1.030*** [0.323]	2.676** [1.147]	0.87 [0.927]	1.146 [0.723]	-0.771 [0.744]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.906*** [0.206]	0.939*** [0.221]	0.471** [0.220]	0.281 [1.178]	1.566*** [0.536]	1.642*** [0.525]	0.683 [0.549]
OTHER INVESTMENT	0.404** [0.171]	0.393** [0.182]	0.599*** [0.149]	0.870* [0.453]	1.827*** [0.379]	0.044 [0.296]	0.581 [0.381]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT.	0.309 [0.189]	0.193 [0.255]	0.497*** [0.186]	-0.768 [0.636]	1.598*** [0.507]	0.492* [0.287]	-2.405*** [0.748]
SHOCKS							
TERMS OF TRADE	1.669*** [0.203]	1.681*** [0.214]	1.356*** [0.220]	0.493 [0.720]	3.195*** [0.410]	1.905*** [0.431]	0.491 [0.513]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.105* [0.054]	-0.111* [0.058]	-0.027 [0.032]	-0.061 [0.119]	-0.191* [0.102]	-0.157** [0.063]	-0.114 [0.215]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.900*** [0.129]	-0.860*** [0.144]	-1.215*** [0.119]	-1.198** [0.463]	-1.021*** [0.296]	-1.273*** [0.310]	-1.223*** [0.184]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.003 [0.006]	0.003 [0.007]	0.008 [0.020]	-0.012 [0.010]	-0.406*** [0.135]	0.007 [0.007]	0.013 [0.253]
RELATIVE INCOME	0.391 [0.362]	-0.013 [0.507]	1.114*** [0.212]	-1.792** [0.795]	-0.028 [0.639]	0.442 [1.157]	-3.397*** [0.864]
Observations	1584	1136	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared	0.5356	0.5226	0.7643	0.5634	0.7906	0.5054	0.5064

* Following the BOP accounting conventions, “- Δ INTER. RESERVES” in this Appendix reports the decrease in international reserves/GDP ratio.

Table E.1.2: Panel with Country Effects with Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		-0.889 [0.856]	-1.162 [0.929]	3.964*** [1.514]	-10.177* [5.609]	4.225 [4.277]	-5.303** [2.648]	-2.685 [2.914]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	1.272* [0.762]	1.477* [0.829]	-7.354** [3.391]	28.911*** [11.076]	-8.599 [10.758]	20.479** [8.211]	1.245 [2.312]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		2.675*** [0.487]	2.907*** [0.547]	-1.081 [1.344]	0.662 [2.468]	1.027 [1.939]	-0.073 [2.187]	4.483*** [1.482]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-3.255*** [0.736]	-3.556*** [0.803]	3.861 [3.306]	0.064 [4.772]	0.844 [4.450]	5.387 [6.437]	-4.432*** [1.368]
OTHER INVESTMENT		1.094*** [0.328]	1.127*** [0.379]	1.516*** [0.562]	5.465*** [1.192]	-0.696 [2.541]	1.623** [0.801]	2.705*** [1.022]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-1.271** [0.580]	-1.328** [0.638]	-2.695** [1.338]	-9.445*** [2.110]	5.964 [6.401]	-4.752** [2.346]	-2.345*** [0.892]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		1.984 [1.869]	1.841 [2.607]	4.989*** [1.192]	12.274* [6.751]	3.143 [2.800]	-2.096 [3.106]	18.368*** [4.893]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.015 [0.019]	-0.014 [0.026]	-0.046*** [0.012]	-0.118* [0.066]	-0.017 [0.029]	0.028 [0.031]	-0.189*** [0.046]
SHOCKS								
TERMS OF TRADE		2.201*** [0.294]	2.258*** [0.310]	1.700*** [0.387]	1.149 [1.388]	3.687*** [0.741]	1.195 [0.799]	2.686*** [0.895]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-4.252*** [0.978]	-4.652*** [1.042]	-3.168 [3.856]	-20.086 [12.609]	-6.635 [4.584]	10.686 [8.469]	-7.968*** [2.437]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.103* [0.055]	-0.112* [0.060]	-0.01 [0.032]	-0.01 [0.096]	-0.219** [0.104]	-0.171*** [0.058]	-0.057 [0.172]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.915*** [0.127]	-0.865*** [0.142]	-1.204*** [0.119]	-1.657*** [0.515]	-0.910*** [0.290]	-1.742*** [0.339]	-1.030*** [0.159]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.002 [0.006]	0.003 [0.007]	-0.009 [0.023]	-0.001 [0.012]	-0.391*** [0.148]	0.008 [0.007]	0.004 [0.229]
RELATIVE INCOME		-0.068 [0.369]	-0.701 [0.524]	1.321*** [0.231]	-2.730*** [0.946]	0.092 [0.862]	-0.203 [1.225]	-3.358*** [0.820]
Observations		1578	1130	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared		0.5512	0.5412	0.775	0.6357	0.798	0.5255	0.582

Table E.2.1: Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate with no Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.188 [0.195]	0.191 [0.205]	0.169 [0.323]	-1.278*** [0.423]	0.63 [0.967]	1.952*** [0.536]	-0.216 [0.342]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.569*** [0.149]	0.569*** [0.160]	0.824*** [0.163]	0.288 [0.296]	0.448 [0.572]	1.402*** [0.443]	0.515** [0.246]
OTHER INVESTMENT	0.032 [0.144]	0.009 [0.153]	0.676*** [0.108]	0.265* [0.147]	1.059*** [0.349]	-0.305 [0.256]	0.290* [0.168]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	0.358** [0.154]	0.412** [0.205]	0.489*** [0.127]	-0.177 [0.231]	0.564 [0.434]	0.283 [0.258]	0.895*** [0.312]
SHOCKS							
TERMS OF TRADE	0.317** [0.126]	0.299** [0.132]	0.804*** [0.146]	-0.901*** [0.304]	0.832** [0.404]	0.802*** [0.296]	0.446*** [0.159]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.149*** [0.040]	-0.147*** [0.043]	-0.137*** [0.026]	-0.254*** [0.042]	-0.245** [0.101]	-0.128** [0.052]	-0.132 [0.082]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.269*** [0.080]	-0.257*** [0.090]	-0.459*** [0.080]	-1.143*** [0.157]	-0.819*** [0.250]	-0.855*** [0.216]	-0.187** [0.089]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.009** [0.005]	0.009** [0.005]	0.035* [0.021]	-0.009*** [0.003]	-0.380*** [0.117]	0.009* [0.005]	-0.215* [0.129]
RELATIVE INCOME	0.881*** [0.157]	1.119*** [0.218]	0.144 [0.138]	1.028*** [0.182]	-0.860* [0.464]	2.140** [0.963]	1.614*** [0.289]
Observations	1584	1136	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared	0.1096	0.1059	0.3046	0.515	0.3767	0.2314	0.2547

Table E.2.2: Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate with Interaction terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		0.447	0.485	4.451***	-0.333	0.064	-2.591	-0.414
		[0.646]	[0.728]	[1.471]	[1.863]	[3.831]	[1.924]	[1.614]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.388	-0.4	-10.355***	-0.773	1.724	14.284**	0.083
		[0.570]	[0.642]	[3.417]	[3.554]	[9.870]	[6.117]	[1.284]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		1.754***	1.829***	2.380**	2.292**	1.081	-0.202	0.329
		[0.344]	[0.389]	[1.045]	[1.021]	[1.755]	[1.539]	[0.803]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-2.097***	-2.178***	-3.975	-4.281**	-1.292	5.255	0.274
		[0.502]	[0.553]	[2.568]	[1.882]	[4.407]	[4.620]	[0.755]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.344	0.201	1.689***	1.719***	1.781	1.379*	0.234
		[0.238]	[0.267]	[0.531]	[0.439]	[1.961]	[0.760]	[0.441]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.664	-0.462	-2.553**	-2.706***	-2.377	-4.967**	0.068
		[0.450]	[0.475]	[1.275]	[0.755]	[5.010]	[2.343]	[0.421]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		-1.183	-2.337	0.57	-1.559	-3.524*	-1.69	7.620***
		[1.443]	[1.914]	[0.806]	[3.131]	[2.056]	[2.369]	[2.564]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.017	0.029	-0.001	0.015	0.042**	0.023	-0.065***
		[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.009]	[0.030]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.024]
SHOCKS								
TERMS OF TRADE		0.473***	0.445**	0.725***	-0.24	2.191***	-0.166	0.709**
		[0.176]	[0.186]	[0.246]	[0.540]	[0.632]	[0.559]	[0.336]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-0.974	-0.9	1.068	-9.020*	-14.364***	13.784**	-0.849
		[0.693]	[0.731]	[2.296]	[5.383]	[4.637]	[6.012]	[1.028]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.147***	-0.147***	-0.138***	-0.244***	-0.261***	-0.138***	-0.119
		[0.041]	[0.045]	[0.025]	[0.040]	[0.087]	[0.046]	[0.083]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.283***	-0.274***	-0.506***	-1.136***	-0.906***	-1.226***	-0.160*
		[0.080]	[0.090]	[0.085]	[0.176]	[0.235]	[0.252]	[0.092]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.009**	0.009*	0.013	-0.008**	-0.379***	0.010**	-0.212*
		[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.025]	[0.003]	[0.126]	[0.005]	[0.126]
RELATIVE INCOME		0.719***	0.964***	0.219	0.900***	-1.824***	1.596	1.685***
		[0.172]	[0.243]	[0.147]	[0.221]	[0.608]	[1.010]	[0.285]
Observations		1578	1130	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared		0.119	0.1161	0.3341	0.5548	0.4288	0.2866	0.2723

Table E.3.1: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with no Interaction terms (coefficient for Time dummies not shown)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.143 [0.277]	0.062 [0.257]	1.255*** [0.369]	4.312*** [1.469]	-0.671 [0.912]	-0.966 [0.773]	-0.357 [0.610]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.524*** [0.179]	0.491** [0.195]	0.373* [0.223]	0.31 [1.185]	1.341** [0.574]	1.139* [0.581]	-0.32 [0.425]
OTHER INVESTMENT	0.092 [0.165]	-0.016 [0.175]	0.490*** [0.163]	1.191** [0.528]	1.418*** [0.389]	-0.172 [0.286]	-0.403 [0.343]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	0.079 [0.218]	-0.106 [0.298]	0.532*** [0.201]	-0.767 [0.785]	0.777 [0.670]	0.239 [0.389]	-1.115* [0.577]
SHOCKS							
TERMS OF TRADE	1.143*** [0.184]	0.766*** [0.191]	1.564*** [0.251]	-1.797 [1.958]	2.330*** [0.442]	1.359*** [0.389]	0.105 [0.370]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.201*** [0.058]	-0.214*** [0.063]	-0.129** [0.058]	-0.39 [0.289]	-0.333*** [0.107]	-0.145** [0.065]	-0.413** [0.186]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.831*** [0.146]	-0.686*** [0.162]	-1.856*** [0.177]	-1.463** [0.617]	-0.688* [0.382]	-1.243*** [0.312]	0.513** [0.220]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.01 [0.007]	0.011 [0.007]	0.028 [0.019]	-0.012 [0.014]	-0.420*** [0.145]	0.008 [0.007]	-0.284 [0.196]
RELATIVE INCOME	-0.163 [0.349]	-0.57 [0.420]	1.026*** [0.220]	-2.904** [1.164]	-0.934 [0.658]	-2.697** [1.091]	3.603*** [0.922]
Observations	1584	1136	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared	0.602	0.6189	0.8008	0.6012	0.8303	0.6091	0.84

Table E.3.2: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Interaction terms (coefficient for Time dummies not shown)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		-0.842 [0.806]	-0.717 [0.861]	3.203** [1.493]	-12.157* [6.807]	6.777 [4.846]	-7.088*** [2.536]	3.147 [2.419]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	1.159 [0.727]	0.927 [0.784]	-5.038 [3.400]	33.862*** [12.932]	-18.249 [12.191]	19.115** [7.803]	-3.343* [1.932]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		1.875*** [0.428]	1.737*** [0.464]	-1.58 [1.296]	0.895 [2.866]	-1.388 [2.420]	-1.372 [2.167]	0.542 [1.253]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-2.488*** [0.618]	-2.274*** [0.663]	4.714 [3.228]	-0.472 [5.474]	6.339 [5.435]	7.518 [6.104]	-0.821 [1.264]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.483 [0.310]	0.262 [0.356]	1.223** [0.611]	6.052*** [1.317]	-0.016 [2.651]	0.943 [0.717]	2.010** [0.825]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.731 [0.530]	-0.537 [0.582]	-2.356 [1.501]	-10.789*** [2.284]	3.182 [6.706]	-3.633* [2.010]	-2.532*** [0.772]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		-1.456 [1.996]	-2.676 [2.726]	6.916*** [1.450]	17.410** [8.617]	-3.202 [3.529]	-4.940* [2.858]	7.324* [4.145]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.018 [0.020]	0.029 [0.027]	-0.066*** [0.015]	-0.170** [0.085]	0.042 [0.037]	0.054* [0.029]	-0.070* [0.039]
SHOCKS								
TERMS OF TRADE		1.656*** [0.262]	1.313*** [0.268]	2.071*** [0.468]	-0.027 [2.477]	2.510*** [0.791]	0.31 [0.686]	1.361*** [0.478]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-4.115*** [0.879]	-4.264*** [0.907]	-5.007 [4.651]	-17.702 [17.604]	-4.66 [4.832]	13.245* [7.207]	-4.193*** [1.432]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.205*** [0.059]	-0.220*** [0.064]	-0.126** [0.055]	-0.396 [0.267]	-0.382*** [0.101]	-0.167*** [0.063]	-0.307* [0.157]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.834*** [0.147]	-0.678*** [0.163]	-1.897*** [0.173]	-2.453*** [0.693]	-0.391 [0.421]	-1.630*** [0.338]	0.712*** [0.234]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.009 [0.007]	0.011 [0.007]	0.025 [0.020]	-0.004 [0.016]	-0.405** [0.157]	0.01 [0.007]	-0.404** [0.179]
RELATIVE INCOME		-0.579* [0.351]	-1.083*** [0.420]	1.256*** [0.236]	-3.521*** [1.196]	-1.216 [0.897]	-3.357*** [1.089]	3.603*** [0.849]
Observations		1578	1130	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared		0.6129	0.6291	0.8157	0.6771	0.8376	0.6315	0.8684

Table E.4.1: Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with no Interaction Terms (time trend coefficients not shown)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.172 [0.280]	0.253 [0.267]	1.135*** [0.334]	3.288** [1.327]	0.117 [0.971]	0.838 [0.772]	-0.617 [0.537]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.886*** [0.197]	0.820*** [0.220]	0.436* [0.225]	0.164 [1.237]	1.387** [0.535]	1.241** [0.558]	-0.204 [0.457]
OTHER INVESTMENT	0.253 [0.167]	0.042 [0.174]	0.625*** [0.152]	0.913* [0.475]	1.585*** [0.375]	-0.019 [0.297]	-0.261 [0.327]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	0.098 [0.202]	-0.01 [0.262]	0.471** [0.193]	-0.823 [0.659]	0.897 [0.567]	0.565* [0.303]	-1.306** [0.580]
SHOCKS							
TERMS OF TRADE	1.295*** [0.197]	0.918*** [0.202]	1.358*** [0.247]	0.295 [0.771]	2.656*** [0.419]	1.488*** [0.427]	0.501 [0.370]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.150*** [0.056]	-0.174*** [0.060]	-0.018 [0.033]	-0.061 [0.119]	-0.235** [0.098]	-0.140** [0.068]	-0.233 [0.165]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.654*** [0.135]	-0.734*** [0.158]	-1.338*** [0.142]	-1.349*** [0.513]	-0.598* [0.338]	-1.368*** [0.328]	0.106 [0.219]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.005 [0.006]	0.007 [0.007]	0.029 [0.020]	-0.012 [0.010]	-0.463*** [0.143]	0.006 [0.007]	-0.169 [0.207]
RELATIVE INCOME	0.197 [0.341]	0.04 [0.424]	1.125*** [0.212]	-1.995** [0.808]	-0.659 [0.638]	-0.159 [1.086]	2.754*** [0.788]
Observations	1584	1136	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared	0.5614	0.587	0.7675	0.566	0.8056	0.5247	0.7562

Table E.4.2: Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Interaction Terms (time trend coefficients not shown)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		-0.48 [0.827]	-0.054 [0.945]	4.061*** [1.546]	-8.831 [6.130]	5.683 [4.207]	-5.270** [2.610]	4.569* [2.328]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.794 [0.737]	0.389 [0.841]	-7.325** [3.485]	27.869** [11.956]	-13.911 [10.641]	19.185** [8.101]	-5.048*** [1.875]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		2.352*** [0.449]	2.042*** [0.490]	-1.046 [1.303]	1.162 [2.515]	0.006 [1.930]	-1.191 [2.173]	1.726 [1.333]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-2.724*** [0.661]	-2.250*** [0.710]	3.628 [3.224]	-0.733 [4.789]	3.066 [4.332]	7.433 [6.293]	-2.083 [1.299]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.736** [0.325]	0.411 [0.361]	1.646*** [0.579]	5.777*** [1.247]	-0.702 [2.391]	1.459* [0.800]	1.995** [0.791]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.907 [0.564]	-0.709 [0.592]	-2.985** [1.407]	-9.828*** [2.219]	5.108 [6.161]	-4.609** [2.318]	-2.569*** [0.779]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		-0.337 [1.949]	-1.815 [2.635]	5.520*** [1.296]	13.283* [6.825]	-1.862 [2.812]	-3.722 [3.069]	9.987* [5.595]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.007 [0.019]	0.022 [0.026]	-0.052*** [0.014]	-0.127* [0.066]	0.028 [0.028]	0.046 [0.031]	-0.101* [0.052]
SHOCKS								
TERMS OF TRADE		1.879*** [0.278]	1.488*** [0.283]	1.557*** [0.429]	0.904 [1.540]	3.226*** [0.717]	0.496 [0.761]	1.885*** [0.550]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-4.613*** [0.914]	-4.354*** [0.943]	-1.307 [4.265]	-18.49 [13.991]	-8.472* [4.562]	13.001 [7.932]	-4.065** [1.820]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.150*** [0.057]	-0.177*** [0.062]	0.001 [0.033]	-0.015 [0.097]	-0.286*** [0.097]	-0.156** [0.063]	-0.125 [0.133]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.650*** [0.135]	-0.700*** [0.158]	-1.373*** [0.141]	-1.788*** [0.548]	-0.364 [0.344]	-1.792*** [0.346]	0.256 [0.225]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.005 [0.006]	0.007 [0.007]	0.016 [0.023]	-0.001 [0.012]	-0.450*** [0.155]	0.008 [0.007]	-0.308 [0.187]
RELATIVE INCOME		-0.269 [0.345]	-0.532 [0.438]	1.381*** [0.230]	-2.968*** [0.955]	-1.002 [0.865]	-0.867 [1.112]	2.565*** [0.739]
Observations		1578	1130	448	193	235	336	194
R-squared		0.5747	0.5978	0.7798	0.6379	0.8161	0.549	0.7937

Table E.5.1: Panel with Country Effects and Lagged Terms of Trade with no Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.226 [0.313]	0.161 [0.334]	0.872*** [0.308]	2.177* [1.135]	0.087 [1.005]	1.095 [0.690]	-0.644 [0.677]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.652*** [0.195]	0.693*** [0.210]	0.31 [0.232]	0.389 [1.090]	0.33 [0.601]	1.359*** [0.481]	0.62 [0.504]
OTHER INVESTMENT	0.252 [0.175]	0.242 [0.187]	0.500*** [0.148]	0.789* [0.461]	1.500*** [0.378]	-0.039 [0.285]	0.689* [0.362]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	0.204 [0.188]	0.1 [0.252]	0.365* [0.193]	-1.001 [0.674]	0.991* [0.509]	0.396 [0.284]	-2.195*** [0.722]
SHOCKS							
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE	1.541*** [0.237]	1.553*** [0.250]	1.198*** [0.225]	-1.015 [1.051]	2.790*** [0.464]	1.814*** [0.437]	0.209 [0.513]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.101* [0.054]	-0.104* [0.059]	-0.061* [0.032]	-0.056 [0.120]	-0.199** [0.099]	-0.170*** [0.063]	-0.074 [0.215]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.923*** [0.128]	-0.876*** [0.143]	-1.238*** [0.123]	-1.660*** [0.561]	-0.894*** [0.306]	-1.217*** [0.315]	-1.158*** [0.179]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.003 [0.006]	0.003 [0.006]	0.015 [0.021]	-0.020* [0.011]	-0.380*** [0.118]	0.008 [0.007]	0.028 [0.253]
RELATIVE INCOME	0.183 [0.367]	-0.324 [0.519]	1.102*** [0.214]	-2.004** [0.822]	-0.075 [0.664]	-0.353 [1.071]	-3.650*** [0.852]
Observations	1586	1137	449	192	234	336	194
R-squared	0.5238	0.511	0.7605	0.5673	0.7618	0.5049	0.5043

Table E.5.2: Panel with Country Effects and Lagged Terms of Trade with Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		-0.796 [0.843]	-1.024 [0.926]	3.856** [1.548]	-11.496** [5.456]	5.834 [4.099]	-6.002** [2.612]	-2.655 [2.862]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	1.128 [0.759]	1.292 [0.836]	-7.389** [3.453]	30.778*** [10.834]	-13.209 [10.467]	22.273*** [8.102]	1.378 [2.285]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		2.187*** [0.504]	2.418*** [0.569]	-1.206 [1.357]	0.574 [2.495]	-1.439 [2.409]	-0.656 [2.139]	3.934** [1.530]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-2.758*** [0.767]	-3.039*** [0.843]	3.718 [3.352]	1.059 [4.795]	3.663 [5.464]	5.953 [6.286]	-3.696** [1.449]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.880*** [0.323]	0.894** [0.379]	1.266** [0.582]	5.265*** [1.220]	-0.76 [2.579]	1.282* [0.761]	2.573** [1.033]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-1.279** [0.585]	-1.312** [0.645]	-2.281 [1.391]	-8.984*** [2.173]	4.966 [6.516]	-4.335** [2.174]	-2.201** [0.877]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		0.898 [1.964]	0.606 [2.824]	4.356*** [1.424]	13.446** [6.474]	1.167 [3.155]	-5.217* [2.815]	14.536*** [5.141]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.005 [0.020]	-0.003 [0.028]	-0.041*** [0.015]	-0.129** [0.063]	-0.003 [0.033]	0.060** [0.028]	-0.153*** [0.047]
SHOCKS								
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE		2.060*** [0.343]	2.124*** [0.362]	1.337*** [0.381]	-0.209 [1.512]	4.194*** [0.772]	1.403 [0.876]	1.944** [0.966]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-3.802*** [1.203]	-4.243*** [1.271]	-1.458 [3.739]	-17.459 [12.196]	-15.679*** [5.171]	5.931 [10.301]	-6.884** [2.772]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.116** [0.056]	-0.122** [0.061]	-0.052 [0.032]	-0.034 [0.108]	-0.301*** [0.096]	-0.192*** [0.056]	-0.058 [0.183]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.908*** [0.126]	-0.850*** [0.142]	-1.238*** [0.125]	-1.944*** [0.574]	-0.818*** [0.302]	-1.688*** [0.358]	-0.984*** [0.158]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.004 [0.006]	0.004 [0.007]	-0.003 [0.023]	-0.01 [0.013]	-0.406*** [0.135]	0.01 [0.006]	-0.047 [0.236]
RELATIVE INCOME		-0.192 [0.381]	-0.897 [0.550]	1.303*** [0.235]	-2.780*** [0.929]	-0.323 [0.896]	-1.005 [1.226]	-3.705*** [0.855]
Observations		1543	1097	446	192	230	324	190
R-squared		0.5428	0.5327	0.77	0.6404	0.7859	0.5308	0.5641

Table E.6.1: Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade with no Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.174 [0.187]	0.177 [0.197]	0.09 [0.304]	-1.090** [0.458]	0.175 [0.915]	1.932*** [0.527]	-0.188 [0.345]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.480*** [0.144]	0.478*** [0.154]	0.713*** [0.175]	0.279 [0.294]	-0.102 [0.593]	1.244*** [0.429]	0.378 [0.248]
OTHER INVESTMENT	-0.023 [0.143]	-0.048 [0.151]	0.605*** [0.105]	0.338** [0.155]	0.977*** [0.328]	-0.353 [0.255]	0.292* [0.169]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	0.304* [0.161]	0.346 [0.217]	0.419*** [0.125]	-0.063 [0.251]	0.357 [0.405]	0.171 [0.276]	0.984*** [0.322]
SHOCKS							
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE	0.378*** [0.139]	0.365** [0.145]	0.692*** [0.133]	-0.548* [0.297]	0.868** [0.338]	0.869*** [0.281]	0.300* [0.170]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.159*** [0.040]	-0.157*** [0.043]	-0.158*** [0.025]	-0.234*** [0.043]	-0.280** [0.110]	-0.135*** [0.051]	-0.146* [0.087]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.245*** [0.078]	-0.233*** [0.087]	-0.471*** [0.080]	-1.014*** [0.160]	-0.756*** [0.254]	-0.781*** [0.211]	-0.176** [0.089]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.010** [0.004]	0.010** [0.005]	0.040* [0.022]	-0.010*** [0.003]	-0.337*** [0.105]	0.010* [0.005]	-0.228* [0.134]
RELATIVE INCOME	0.813*** [0.148]	1.028*** [0.209]	0.152 [0.137]	1.123*** [0.194]	-0.865* [0.463]	1.641* [0.881]	1.544*** [0.296]
Observations	1586	1137	449	192	234	336	194
R-squared	0.1148	0.1112	0.2966	0.5018	0.393	0.2226	0.2408

Table E.6.2: Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade with Interaction Terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		0.453	0.488	4.327***	0.839	1.091	-3.242*	-0.574
		[0.625]	[0.705]	[1.458]	[1.826]	[3.479]	[1.930]	[1.637]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.434	-0.44	-10.216***	-2.892	-0.254	16.099***	0.336
		[0.563]	[0.635]	[3.348]	[3.590]	[9.077]	[6.064]	[1.292]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		1.617***	1.694***	2.312**	2.232**	0.624	-1.111	0.177
		[0.357]	[0.405]	[1.064]	[1.000]	[1.944]	[1.483]	[0.831]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-1.936***	-2.021***	-4.003	-3.882**	-2.016	7.354*	0.438
		[0.522]	[0.575]	[2.612]	[1.835]	[4.741]	[4.391]	[0.793]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.312	0.153	1.563***	1.771***	0.823	1.329*	0.117
		[0.242]	[0.273]	[0.533]	[0.471]	[1.894]	[0.741]	[0.448]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.707	-0.485	-2.335*	-2.589***	0.134	-5.020**	0.23
		[0.463]	[0.489]	[1.282]	[0.811]	[4.861]	[2.246]	[0.419]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		-1.511	-2.926	0.011	0.276	-3.458	-2.637	7.262**
		[1.572]	[2.133]	[0.965]	[3.181]	[2.195]	[2.518]	[2.817]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.02	0.035*	0.004	-0.002	0.041*	0.032	-0.061**
		[0.015]	[0.021]	[0.010]	[0.030]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.026]
SHOCKS								
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE		0.490**	0.471**	0.497**	-0.281	2.711***	0.239	0.581
		[0.215]	[0.225]	[0.240]	[0.498]	[0.635]	[0.496]	[0.367]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-0.783	-0.763	2.631	-2.955	-19.071***	8.143	-1.018
		[0.863]	[0.895]	[2.290]	[6.366]	[4.421]	[6.695]	[1.106]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.157***	-0.158***	-0.162***	-0.241***	-0.343***	-0.144***	-0.125
		[0.041]	[0.045]	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.070]	[0.045]	[0.088]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.257***	-0.246***	-0.521***	-0.978***	-0.773***	-1.169***	-0.156*
		[0.080]	[0.090]	[0.084]	[0.169]	[0.209]	[0.252]	[0.093]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.010**	0.010**	0.018	-0.009**	-0.340***	0.010**	-0.215*
		[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.026]	[0.004]	[0.110]	[0.005]	[0.128]
RELATIVE INCOME		0.673***	0.909***	0.21	1.117***	-1.870***	0.996	1.594***
		[0.163]	[0.234]	[0.146]	[0.226]	[0.609]	[1.006]	[0.296]
Observations		1543	1097	446	192	230	324	190
R-squared		0.1238	0.1214	0.3275	0.5344	0.4826	0.2844	0.2601

Table E.7.1: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade and no Interaction terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.11 [0.272]	0.05 [0.254]	1.057*** [0.341]	4.526*** [1.473]	-1.161 [0.894]	-0.93 [0.728]	-0.372 [0.556]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.352** [0.170]	0.383** [0.186]	0.189 [0.245]	1.085 [1.019]	0.564 [0.571]	0.948* [0.522]	-0.301 [0.399]
OTHER INVESTMENT	-0.012 [0.168]	-0.093 [0.177]	0.390** [0.167]	1.437*** [0.501]	1.132*** [0.379]	-0.17 [0.268]	-0.324 [0.319]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	-0.033 [0.228]	-0.207 [0.318]	0.411* [0.218]	-0.622 [0.793]	0.298 [0.648]	0.262 [0.368]	-0.874 [0.537]
SHOCKS							
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE	1.089*** [0.214]	0.764*** [0.220]	1.490*** [0.270]	-5.558** [2.164]	2.123*** [0.456]	1.472*** [0.379]	0.129 [0.313]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.208*** [0.058]	-0.218*** [0.062]	-0.170*** [0.057]	-0.227 [0.240]	-0.323*** [0.101]	-0.152** [0.062]	-0.384** [0.180]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.798*** [0.148]	-0.652*** [0.167]	-1.862*** [0.180]	-1.987*** [0.651]	-0.685* [0.396]	-1.200*** [0.329]	0.520** [0.217]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.01 [0.006]	0.011* [0.007]	0.042** [0.021]	-0.027* [0.014]	-0.434*** [0.130]	0.009 [0.007]	-0.312 [0.196]
RELATIVE INCOME	-0.329 [0.353]	-0.781* [0.427]	1.032*** [0.223]	-3.698*** [1.079]	-1.324* [0.693]	-3.288*** [0.966]	3.683*** [0.850]
Observations	1586	1137	449	192	234	336	194
R-squared	0.595	0.6144	0.7969	0.6389	0.8214	0.6134	0.852

Table E.7.2: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade and Interaction terms

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		-0.831 [0.801]	-0.713 [0.878]	3.247** [1.506]	-8.936 [6.490]	6.049 [4.573]	-8.091*** [2.479]	2.353 [2.375]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	1.093 [0.732]	0.88 [0.810]	-5.404 [3.414]	28.069** [12.023]	-16.342 [11.562]	21.152*** [7.691]	-2.525 [1.910]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		1.490*** [0.441]	1.410*** [0.475]	-1.559 [1.325]	1 [2.944]	-3.14 [2.513]	-2.361 [2.005]	-0.364 [1.167]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-2.056*** [0.650]	-1.852*** [0.693]	4.028 [3.314]	1.199 [5.773]	8.678 [5.648]	8.96 [5.657]	0.346 [1.174]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.376 [0.303]	0.184 [0.355]	1.008 [0.642]	5.857*** [1.329]	-0.177 [2.565]	0.892 [0.659]	1.713** [0.789]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.827 [0.537]	-0.645 [0.592]	-2.025 [1.573]	-9.540*** [2.366]	2.493 [6.544]	-3.708** [1.843]	-2.169*** [0.711]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		-2.232 [2.119]	-3.371 [3.022]	6.337*** [1.685]	16.965** [7.417]	-4.317 [3.690]	-7.137*** [2.485]	7.387* [3.785]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.025 [0.021]	0.035 [0.031]	-0.062*** [0.017]	-0.165** [0.073]	0.048 [0.039]	0.077*** [0.025]	-0.068* [0.035]
SHOCKS								
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE		1.627*** [0.315]	1.356*** [0.331]	1.851*** [0.503]	-3.303 [2.647]	3.258*** [0.747]	0.809 [0.695]	1.261*** [0.427]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-3.884*** [1.108]	-4.139*** [1.132]	-4.66 [4.707]	-16.033 [15.835]	-13.698*** [4.996]	8.834 [7.751]	-4.812*** [1.423]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.218*** [0.059]	-0.228*** [0.063]	-0.187*** [0.054]	-0.295 [0.220]	-0.431*** [0.096]	-0.188*** [0.060]	-0.310** [0.155]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.828*** [0.148]	-0.682*** [0.169]	-1.917*** [0.178]	-2.693*** [0.713]	-0.461 [0.435]	-1.574*** [0.354]	0.801*** [0.240]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.011 [0.006]	0.011* [0.007]	0.038* [0.022]	-0.02 [0.017]	-0.483*** [0.153]	0.011* [0.006]	-0.453** [0.175]
RELATIVE INCOME		-0.663* [0.365]	-1.201*** [0.439]	1.252*** [0.238]	-4.006*** [1.093]	-1.828** [0.895]	-4.387*** [1.047]	3.732*** [0.801]
Observations		1543	1097	446	192	230	324	190
R-squared		0.6088	0.6267	0.811	0.6989	0.842	0.6508	0.8754

Table E.8.1: Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade and no Interaction Terms (time trend coefficients not shown)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP							
FDI	0.177 [0.271]	0.268 [0.262]	0.999*** [0.320]	3.130** [1.377]	-0.728 [1.008]	0.913 [0.724]	-0.567 [0.509]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES	0.692*** [0.185]	0.700*** [0.207]	0.265 [0.235]	0.314 [1.131]	0.291 [0.589]	1.118** [0.501]	-0.278 [0.420]
OTHER INVESTMENT	0.135 [0.170]	-0.035 [0.177]	0.527*** [0.154]	0.883* [0.479]	1.293*** [0.370]	-0.074 [0.285]	-0.165 [0.328]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT	-0.033 [0.209]	-0.138 [0.278]	0.338* [0.204]	-1.003 [0.680]	0.32 [0.565]	0.47 [0.300]	-1.158** [0.568]
SHOCKS							
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE	1.196*** [0.228]	0.863*** [0.230]	1.247*** [0.248]	-1.093 [1.075]	2.265*** [0.439]	1.561*** [0.424]	0.312 [0.361]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$	-0.155*** [0.056]	-0.185*** [0.060]	-0.05 [0.032]	-0.048 [0.121]	-0.246** [0.102]	-0.160** [0.066]	-0.263 [0.166]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE							
TRADE OPENNESS	-0.628*** [0.135]	-0.671*** [0.159]	-1.373*** [0.146]	-1.802*** [0.588]	-0.433 [0.348]	-1.313*** [0.341]	0.196 [0.219]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH	0.006 [0.006]	0.008 [0.006]	0.040* [0.021]	-0.02 [0.012]	-0.445*** [0.126]	0.008 [0.007]	-0.126 [0.208]
RELATIVE INCOME	0.02 [0.343]	-0.095 [0.423]	1.110*** [0.212]	-2.269*** [0.857]	-0.84 [0.672]	-0.616 [1.036]	2.851*** [0.733]
Observations	1586	1137	449	192	234	336	194
R-squared	0.5512	0.5779	0.7648	0.5712	0.7856	0.5196	0.7662

Table E.8.1: Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade and no Interaction Terms (time trend coefficients not shown)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REER	INTERACTION TERMS	ALL	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES	MANUFACTURES EXPORTERS.	COMMODITIES EXPORTERS	LATAM	ASIA
CAPITAL INFLOWS								
FDI		-0.427	0.012	3.977**	-10.008	6.101	-5.805**	4.324*
		[0.821]	[0.950]	[1.569]	[6.179]	[3.820]	[2.580]	[2.330]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.695	0.294	-7.362**	29.862**	-15.207	20.164**	-4.705**
		[0.740]	[0.854]	[3.530]	[11.942]	[9.742]	[8.048]	[1.882]
- Δ INTER. RESERVES		1.922***	1.580***	-1.168	1.624	-2.4	-1.938	0.605
		[0.465]	[0.507]	[1.311]	[2.553]	[2.421]	[2.121]	[1.290]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-2.228***	-1.644**	3.482	-0.573	6.178	8.313	-0.867
		[0.696]	[0.743]	[3.263]	[4.875]	[5.365]	[6.128]	[1.272]
OTHER INVESTMENT		0.589*	0.3	1.412**	5.779***	-0.898	1.165	1.752**
		[0.317]	[0.356]	[0.599]	[1.271]	[2.341]	[0.753]	[0.784]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	-0.950*	-0.762	-2.605*	-9.691***	4.563	-4.177*	-2.252***
		[0.568]	[0.597]	[1.460]	[2.298]	[6.005]	[2.168]	[0.735]
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT		-1.119	-2.494	4.911***	15.171**	-4.743	-6.504**	5.621
		[2.061]	[2.947]	[1.522]	[6.390]	[3.060]	[2.757]	[6.254]
	<i>TRADE OPENNES</i>	0.014	0.027	-0.047***	-0.145**	0.052*	0.074***	-0.058
		[0.021]	[0.030]	[0.016]	[0.062]	[0.031]	[0.027]	[0.057]
SHOCKS								
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE		1.787***	1.465***	1.250***	-0.469	3.805***	0.791	1.185**
		[0.329]	[0.334]	[0.423]	[1.611]	[0.717]	[0.801]	[0.596]
	<i>STOCK OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES</i>	-4.203***	-4.062***	0.223	-15.305	-17.861***	9.294	-2.97
		[1.132]	[1.135]	[4.185]	[13.009]	[4.985]	[9.537]	[2.126]
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION AGAINST US \$		-0.162***	-0.191***	-0.038	-0.031	-0.377***	-0.175***	-0.19
		[0.057]	[0.062]	[0.032]	[0.108]	[0.091]	[0.060]	[0.144]
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE								
TRADE OPENNESS		-0.641***	-0.691***	-1.418***	-2.091***	-0.204	-1.762***	0.406*
		[0.135]	[0.161]	[0.148]	[0.598]	[0.344]	[0.361]	[0.224]
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH		0.006	0.008	0.025	-0.01	-0.481***	0.009	-0.302
		[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.023]	[0.014]	[0.144]	[0.006]	[0.190]
RELATIVE INCOME		-0.339	-0.545	1.362***	-3.094***	-1.602*	-1.299	2.733***
		[0.356]	[0.450]	[0.232]	[0.955]	[0.891]	[1.151]	[0.697]
Observations		1543	1097	446	192	230	324	190
R-squared		0.5656	0.5916	0.7759	0.6442	0.8155	0.5539	0.792

Appendix F: REER volatility vs. International Reserves

Table F.1: The Relationship between REER volatility and International Reserves

Dependent Variable: REER Volatility	Reserves	SE	Constant	SE	Observations	R-squared
All	-9.612***	[3.155]	4.935***	[0.395]	1292	0.215
Industrial Countries	0.384	[2.291]	2.139***	[0.163]	429	0.147
Developing Countries	-10.419***	[3.429]	6.106***	[0.528]	863	0.178
East/South Asia	-7.557***	[1.830]	5.338***	[0.399]	286	0.278
Latin America	-29.861***	[6.570]	7.197***	[0.725]	280	0.121
Natural Resource Countries	-9.172	[9.394]	5.810***	[1.127]	360	0.204
Manufactures Countries	-9.862***	[3.317]	3.142***	[0.293]	139	0.232

Robust standard errors in brackets

* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Definitions:

REER Volatility: Standard Deviation of the Real Effective Exchange Rates over the 12 months of each year

Reserves: Average yearly stock of International Reserves

List of Countries Included:

Industrial	Developing	S/E Asia	Latin America	Natural Resource	Manufactures
Australia	Argentina	Israel	China	Argentina	Finland
Canada	Brazil	Korea	Honk Kong	Brazil	Japan
Denmark	Bulgaria	Kuwait	India	Chile	Korea
Finland	Chile	Malaysia	Indonesia	Colombia	Sweden
Hungary	China	Mexico	Japan	Ecuador	Mexico
Japan	China	Morocco	Korea	Mexico	Nigeria
New Zealand	Colombia	Nigeria	Malaysia	Peru	Norway
Norway	Czech Republic	Pakistan	Philippines	Venezuela	Russia
Spain	Ecuador	Peru	Singapore		Saudi Arabia
Sweden	Egypt	Philippines	Thailand		South Africa
Switzerland	Euro Area	Poland			Venezuela
United Kingdom	India	Romania			
United States	Indonesia	Russia			
		Saudi Arabia			
		Singapore			
		Slovenia			
		South Africa			
		Thailand			
		Turkey			
		Venezuela			

Appendix G: The effect of changes in the levels of Terms of Trade, Stock of International Reserves and Domestic Liquidity on the Real Effective Exchange Rates

Table G1: The Effect of Log ETOT and Stock of Reserves on the Log of REER

	All	Developing Countries	Industrial Countries	Asia	LATAM	Commodity Exporters	Manufactures Exporters
Log Effective Terms of Trade	1.384*** [0.181]	1.358*** [0.195]	1.137*** [0.355]	-0.415 [0.406]	1.644*** [0.482]	3.220*** [0.434]	0.581 [1.006]
Stock of International Reserves over GDP	-1.084*** [0.126]	-1.254*** [0.137]	0.520** [0.217]	-2.727*** [0.301]	0.179 [0.602]	-2.315*** [0.470]	-1.990*** [0.641]
Observations	1863	1217	646	202	343	253	271
R-squared	0.4689	0.4461	0.6021	0.3212	0.3905	0.6603	0.4307

Robust standard errors in brackets,

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table G2: The Effect of Log ETOT, Stock of Reserves and Domestic Liquidity on the Log of REER

	All	Developing Countries	Industrial Countries	Asia	LATAM	Commodity Exporters	Manufactures Exporters
Log Effective Terms of Trade	1.450*** [0.191]	1.410*** [0.204]	1.180*** [0.412]	-0.398 [0.337]	1.614*** [0.468]	3.150*** [0.424]	-0.593 [2.236]
Stock of International Reserves over GDP	-1.070*** [0.142]	-1.143*** [0.153]	0.785** [0.306]	0.535 [0.593]	0.363 [0.736]	-2.280*** [0.454]	-4.343** [1.764]
Level of M2 over GDP	-0.12 [0.113]	-0.278* [0.149]	0.125 [0.118]	-2.146*** [0.376]	-0.23 [0.340]	0.628** [0.293]	0.858 [0.895]
Observations	1511	1156	355	202	343	252	94
R-squared	0.4685	0.4488	0.6193	0.4109	0.3917	0.6682	0.4505

Robust standard errors in brackets,

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

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