



HARVARD Kennedy School
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Faculty Research Working Papers Series

Foreign Policy Views and U.S. Standing in the World

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September 2009

RWP09-028

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“Foreign Policy Views and US Standing in the World”

Matthew A. Baum and Henry R. Nau

What do Americans think about the US role in world affairs and why do they think the way they do? Americans typically do not think about foreign policy most of the time, and, as a consequence, know relatively little about it (Almond 1950, Lippmann 1955, Converse 1964, Erskine 1963, Edwards 1983, Sobel 1993, Holsti 2004, Canes-Wrone 2006, Page and Bouton 2006, Berinsky 2007). While foreign policy issues can become salient when major international events (like 9/11 and the Iraq War) arise or when political candidates focus on foreign policy (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989), *ceteris paribus*, Americans know and care more about domestic politics (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996, Holsti 1994, Canes-Wrone 2006, Converse 1964). Consequently, typical Americans are *broadly* aware of foreign policy, and have some *available* attitudes about it (Page and Bouton 2006, Aldrich et al. 1989). However, except in the face of political priming by elites or exogenous shocks, such attitudes may not be broadly accessible when making political decisions, like voting.

What do scholars know about the general attitudes the American public holds toward foreign affairs? At least since World War II most Americans have consistently rejected isolationism (Kull 2001, Holsti 2004) in favor of robust U.S. engagement with the world. Moreover, Americans tend to prefer multilateral over unilateral approaches to foreign policy (Page and Bouton 2006, Holsti 2004, Todorov and Mandisodza 2004). Although these attitudes appear firm, they disguise substantive subtleties such as the fact that most Americans assume that their fellow citizens prefer to act unilaterally (Todorov and Mandisodza 2004) and that multilateral policies generally produce results that the U.S. would prefer if it acted unilaterally (Stewart and Bennett 1991).

Scholars know much less about American attitudes toward more specific aspects of world affairs, such as US standing in the world. This was the subject of a 2008-09 APSA Task Force assembled by APSA President, Peter Katzenstein (Reference Report). The Task Force’s final report defines US standing as “an attribute assigned to the United States by other actors such as foreign leaders and peoples, international organizations, transnational groups, and of course, assessed by American voters” (page reference). Standing in this sense has many aspects but the report emphasizes two in particular: credibility and esteem.

Credibility refers to the U.S. government’s ability to do what it says it is going to do. This dimension captures the reputation, or “standing up,” concerns that have long dominated studies of deterrence as well as U.S. leadership more broadly. Esteem refers to America’s stature, or “standing for,” for other countries and the American image in international politics.

In other words, the Task Force report defines standing as the assessment of America’s role in the world by other countries based on what America *does* (credibility) and what America *is* (the esteem in which it is held).

How do Americans assess or think about this concept of standing? Do they care a lot or a little about how other countries view America’s role in the world? What influences their views of

US standing? On this question, the most significant statistical finding over time (going back well before the Iraq years), illustrated in Figure 1, is the strong link between party identification (ID) and assessments of US standing. Republican respondents consistently see US standing as lower than Democrats during Democratic administrations, and Democratic respondents consistently see US standing as lower than Republicans during Republican administrations. As Peter Trubowitz, one of the Task Force leaders, observed in a summary memo in March 2009 (upon reviewing Figure 1), “tell me your partisan affiliation and which party controls the presidency, and we can predict where you stand on standing (that is, whether you think it’s up or down.)”

[Figure 1 here]

Is this association a simple matter of party reflexivity, or does party identification (ID) serve as a heuristic for other factors influencing American views of US standing? Do Democrats and Republicans think differently about America’s standing in the world because they belong to different parties or because they hold different domestic political philosophies (liberal/conservative), or perhaps because they hold different foreign policy worldviews (e.g., nationalism, realism, neoconservatism or liberal internationalism)? This article explores the independent and interactive influence of these three variables – party ID, domestic political ideology and foreign policy worldviews – in affecting assessments of US standing by US citizens.

Party ID and Foreign Policy Attitudes

Little research has focused directly on party ID and US standing. Rather, scholars have focused primarily on foreign policy attitudes in general. The evidence concerning the influence of party ID on foreign policy attitudes is weak. Page and Bouton (2006), for instance, report that party identification significantly mediated attitudes for only three of twenty possible U.S. foreign policy goals they investigated. Party does tend to be highly correlated with domestic political ideology (consistently in the neighborhood of about .40 across 10 Pew Center surveys we sampled for this study, conducted between 2001 and 2006). However, Page and Bouton (2006) report that once ideology is accounted for, party typically drops out as an influential factor mediating Americans’ attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy goals.

Klinker (2006) reaches a similar conclusion (see also Rauch 2007), arguing that partisan differences on foreign policy issues, while sometimes statistically significant, are in most cases not particularly large. He finds similar patterns with respect to the “goals” of U.S. foreign policy, the “means” of achieving those goals, and Americans’ *values*, such as patriotism and national pride. He reports that the exception to these patterns is ratings of President Bush’s foreign policy, where a large partisan gap is apparent. This is consistent with Jacobson (2006), who finds that the partisan gap associated with the Iraq War is far larger than for any prior U.S. military conflict.¹ This suggests that it is plausible that when a debate regarding American foreign policy becomes highly polarized along partisan dimensions, party ID may become more consequential as a predictor of individual attitudes on that (and related) foreign policy issue(s).

¹ Jacobson’s data extend through 2006. By 2008, the partisan gap over Iraq had begun to recede, as Republicans turned increasingly pessimistic.

Busby and Monten (2008) offer some evidence in support of this latter conjecture, finding that while Americans have remained predominantly internationalist throughout the post-WWII era, “parties...have become more ideologically homogenous, more regionally concentrated, and more extreme in their voting patterns on foreign policy” (465). They attribute this change to a variety of factors, ranging from Vietnam, to the end of the Cold War, to the coming to power of legislators in the Republican Party with different sets of foreign policy preferences from their predecessors, yet who were elected primarily for their views on *domestic* issues.

Given the relatively weak evidence linking party ID and foreign policy views in general, how does one account for the strong link in Figure 1 between party ID and US standing? Perhaps party ID is not the principal underlying causal variable. Maybe other factors such as domestic political ideology or foreign policy worldviews lurk behind or along side party ID and play a stronger role.

Domestic Political Ideology and Foreign Policy Attitudes

The literature offers stronger evidence that political ideology (liberal/conservative) influences attitudes toward US foreign policy. The most widely employed model aimed at disaggregating American attitudes toward foreign policy consists of the so-called MI/CI index (Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1981, Holsti 2004, Holsti and Rosenau 1999, and many others), where “MI” and “CI” represent “militant” and “cooperative” internationalism, respectively. (Scholars have experimented with a number of variants of this scheme, sometimes adding additional dimensions. But none has been as widely employed or influential.) By classifying citizens as either supporting or opposing these two types of internationalism, this index yields a 2x2 matrix, shown in Figure 2 (from Holsti 2004):

[Figure 2 here]

Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1981) defined individuals who support both forms of internationalism as “internationalists” and those who oppose both as “isolationists.” Individuals who support CI but oppose MI are “accommodationists,” while those who oppose CI and support MI are “hard liners.” The percentages shown in the figure represent a sample of the results from the first and final installment of the survey battery cited by Holsti. The results indicate that significant pluralities of Americans are accommodationists, opposing militant internationalism and supporting cooperative internationalism. Conversely, only about one in ten Americans is isolationist. While there was some movement between the “hard liner” and “accommodationist” categories between 1976 and 1996 – perhaps reflecting the end of the Cold War – the overall percentages are more noteworthy for their stability. Indeed, the intervening surveys, conducted every four years (not shown), reveal strikingly similar distributions.

The MI-CI index – which the authors derive by coding a series of survey questions regarding foreign policy attitudes -- has proven impressively reliable at predicting support or opposition to U.S. approaches toward foreign policy in general, and specific policy initiatives in particular. For instance, Holsti (2004: 143) reports that accommodationists were about half as likely as hard liners to view the U.S. victory in the first Persian Gulf War as “a great victory for

the United States” (45 vs. 83 percent) and over five times as likely to believe that the U.S. “will be too ready to use military force and go to war again” (10 vs. 56 percent).

Are these foreign policy attitudes linked to domestic political ideology? Early research (Key 1963, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, Converse 1964) found at most a limited relationship between partisanship and ideology, on the one hand, and foreign policy attitudes, on the other. Subsequent research (Russett and Hanson 1975, Holsti and Rosenau 1988), however, revealed evidence of a relationship between liberal domestic attitudes and dovish international preferences, on the one hand, and between conservative domestic attitudes and hawkish international preferences, on the other.

In the most recent work, Holsti and others (2004; see also Holsti and Rosenau 1996) find a substantial link between foreign policy attitudes as measured by the MI/CI index and domestic political ideology. This work defines domestic political ideology along two dimensions: economic and social. Respondents’ placements along the two dimensions vary independently for each dimension. This yields four types of individuals: liberals (liberal on both dimensions), conservatives (conservative on both dimensions), populists (conservative on social issues, liberal on economic issues), and libertarians (liberal on social issues and conservative on economic issues). Averaging across four surveys conducted between 1984 and 1996, Holsti finds that, by this measure, an average of 78% of liberals are accommodationists, who support CI and oppose MI, 34% of conservatives are hardliners, and another 41% of conservatives are internationalists. In other words, 75% of conservatives support MI, though less than half of those also support CI.

This suggests that there is, in fact, a strong domestic ideological component to foreign policy attitudes. Summarizing the most recent research, Ramos and Nincic (2008) conclude that “where international affairs are concerned, conservatives are more likely to favor self-regarding ends [nationalist] and punitive means [militant internationalism], with liberals more apt to endorse other-regarding objectives [internationalist] and policy means based on positive incentives [cooperative internationalism].”

Foreign Policy Worldviews and US Standing

Nevertheless, in studies to date, definitions of both domestic political ideologies and foreign policy attitudes are incomplete. Holsti’s two components of domestic ideology – economic and social views – exclude a third potentially crucial political component – political views toward the relative importance of freedom vs. equality and small or decentralized vs. large or centralized government. Similarly, Ramos and Nincic suggest that foreign policy attitudes encompass foreign policy goals – self-regarding or nationalist vs. other-regarding or internationalist – as well as attitudes towards the use of force – militant internationalism vs. cooperative internationalism.

Could a more complete delineation of foreign policy beliefs better account for the full range of Americans’ opinions regarding foreign policy, and especially US standing? In this article, we define the independent variables in terms of foreign policy worldviews and the dependent variable in terms of US standing.. The concept of foreign policy worldviews suggests that Americans may assess US standing through different foreign policy schools of thought.

Some Americans assess standing largely in terms of security threats and power (capabilities or what America *has*); others assess it more in terms of legitimacy, human rights and the like (esteem or what American *is*); still others do so primarily in terms of diplomacy (credibility or what America *does*). How one defines standing determines in large measure whether one sees it rising or falling, and whether one considers that rise or decline as important.²

For example, American relative power increased in the early 1980s, the onset of the “new” Cold War under Ronald Reagan. But American diplomacy was widely criticized around the world. Domestic groups that defined US standing largely in terms of American power saw US standing as rising. Those that defined it more in terms of approbation of American diplomacy saw it as declining.

Similarly, in recent years American diplomacy has been widely reported as being in ill repute. Yet American military power, as least as measured by the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes, has arguably never been greater. According to Figure 1, Democrats seem much more troubled than Republicans by the decline of American diplomacy, while Republicans seem more confident than Democrats by the rise in American power.

Thus the foreign policy worldviews of individuals may be a broad mediating factor between domestic political ideology and US standing. When a Democrat is in the White House, Republicans disapprove of that administration for domestic ideological reasons but also because they distrust the administration’s judgment in foreign affairs, expecting it to behave in ways detrimental to American interests and thereby to cause American standing to fall. Republicans believe, for example, that Democrats depend too much on diplomacy and too little on force, such that threats build up in the world and America’s reputation suffers. Similarly, when a Republican is in power, Democrats oppose the administration for domestic ideological reasons but also because they distrust that administration’s judgment in foreign affairs, expecting it to use too much force and too little diplomacy, increasing terrorism, unilateralism and consequently causing America’s standing to fall.

Some studies define foreign policy worldviews in terms of the idea of American exceptionalism (Lipset 1997). They suggest that values of exceptionalism correlate with tendencies to expect other countries to emulate US values and, as a consequence, often lead to an overestimation of US standing (Davis and Lynn-Jones 1987, Dougal 2001). But other studies question whether exceptionalism is central to foreign policy views. They find that American exceptionalism is really just another version of American nationalism which makes American citizens vulnerable to an “us vs. them” framing by elites (Kohut and Stokes 2006, 2007).

One reason for the inconclusiveness of these studies may be that Americans do not have a single, uniform view of American exceptionalism or foreign policy. Instead, they have several distinct ones. Some citizens, for example, adopt *liberal internationalist* views and tend to think that America is exceptional, such that other countries desire to emulate the US, and that multilateralism will achieve most of what America seeks in world affairs. They are most likely to

² Here we include a definition of standing in terms of US power which the APSA Task Force excluded or included only in relationship to US credibility (behavior) and esteem (values).

assess standing largely in terms of legitimacy and multilateralism. Others adopt more *nationalist* views and think America is exceptional but see this exceptionalism either as unique making Americans more sensitive to threats from abroad (conservative nationalists) or as shared with other societies inclining America to listen more and fear less from other societies (liberal nationalists). Nationalists are likely to assess US standing in more limited terms, including respect abroad for American independence (conservatives) or values (liberal). Still others adopt *realist* views and do not consider America as exceptional at all but ordinary like all other powers. Realists assess US standing mostly in terms of America's security and relative power and see anti-Americanism not as a reaction to American exceptionalism but as a reaction to American power (defensive realists) or hegemony (offensive realists). Neoconservatism may be the newest school of thought, combining the *means* of offensive realism (assertive rather than defensive use of force) with the *ends* of liberal internationalism (spreading democracy). *Neoconservatives* assess US standing largely in terms of US preparedness to support freedom movements and regime change around the world. These traditions are variously labeled but well established in the history and study of American foreign policy (see Perkins 1952, Nordlinger 1995, Nau 2002, Mead 2002, Jentleson 2007). Table 1 summarizes the four worldviews outlined above.

[Table I here]

Hypotheses

Two foundational hypotheses follow from the prior discussion. These are as follows:

H1: *Ceteris paribus*, typical individuals will view US standing as relatively higher when their own party controls the White House than when the other party controls the White House.

H2: *Ceteris paribus*, typical individuals' opinions concerning US standing will also (net of party and domestic ideology) be influenced their worldviews.

If research has established that many Americans possess worldviews of the sort identified above, and at least sometimes bring them to bear in assessing the merits of U.S. foreign policy actions, far less attention has been devoted to exactly *which* Americans bring such worldviews to bear, *when* they are likely to do so, or *why*. We undertake an initial foray into answering all three questions. To do so, we turn to research on human information processing.

A vast literature in cognitive and political psychology shows that typical individuals rely on information shortcuts, or heuristic cues (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1994), including the opinions of trusted political elites (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Zaller 1992; Rahn 1993; Larson 1996, 2000) and party ID (Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994; Nelson and Garst 2005). Individuals' interpretations of heuristic cues depend in significant measure on their preexisting belief systems (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Herrmann et al. 1997), for which party ID is typically an important (Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Groeling 2001; Nelson and Garst 2005) if incomplete (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Holsti 2004) element. The party affiliations of information sources (e.g., elites) and receivers (e.g., citizens) in interaction thus serve as a cognitive filter, mediating the selection and implications of

the information shortcuts typical individuals rely on in making political judgments.³

Party ID is an important heuristic because it is highly accessible. Nearly every adult citizen possesses it, and nearly everyone understands its implications, at least in general terms. Party ID and its implications are continually reinforced by political elites seeking to maintain the value of the party “brand” as a signal representing a set of policies a given candidate will likely tend to support or oppose. These factors, in combination, make party ID a “cheap” – that is, cognitively easy to employ -- information shortcut, in that merely knowing an individual’s party identification communicates a great deal of information about their likely social and political preferences.

A worldview can also be thought of as an information shortcut, allowing an individual to assess the “likely” merits of a policy without necessarily delving into all of its details. However, relative to party ID, worldviews are cognitively demanding. They are less universally recognized than party ID, less frequently primed or reinforced by elites, and require a great deal more information to comprehend or apply to particular circumstances. This makes them more costly to employ as a heuristic for assessing a foreign policy activity. It further raises the questions of who is likely to employ such a demanding heuristic cue, given the ready availability of cheaper ones, and under what circumstances are they likely to do so?

Consistent with prior research (e.g., Holsti 2006), we argue that political sophisticates – that is, individuals who pay a lot of attention to and understand politics – are more likely than political novices – that is, individuals who neither attend to nor understand politics – to employ worldview as a heuristic. For the latter individuals, such a heuristic is far too costly and hence inefficient. Consequently, political novices seem far more likely to rely on more accessible and simple heuristics, like party ID. A hypothesis follows.

H3: Political novices will tend to rely less on worldview than on partisanship in assessing U.S. standing.

Conversely, political sophisticates possess both the means and, in all likelihood, the motivation, to employ the more demanding heuristic of foreign policy worldview. After all, if the goal is to assess the relative merits of a foreign policy activity, then one is likely to do a better job by employing a heuristic that carries with it a great deal of topically pertinent information. The more general, catch-all “brand” of party ID is simply less apt for this purpose. A second hypothesis follows.

H4: Politically sophisticated individuals will rely more on worldview than political novices in assessing U.S. standing.

That said, if human beings are cognitive misers, expending the minimum necessary effort to reach the appropriate decision (Zaller 1992), then it seems unlikely that even political sophisticates would always elect to employ a cognitively demanding heuristic. Rather, they seem

³ For an investigation into the effects of partisan cues on post-9/11 public opinion on U.S. foreign policy, see Hindman (2004).

likely to prefer to match the complexity and precision of the heuristic to the task at hand. That is, if there is significant doubt about the merits of a policy, then it is more likely to be “worth” the effort of a sophisticate to employ a complex heuristic. Conversely, if there is relatively little doubt about a policy, then a simpler heuristic, like party ID, may suffice.

How can we anticipate, *ex ante*, when sophisticates are likely to favor a more high demand/high precision heuristic (worldview) over a more low demand/low precision one (party ID)? One obvious answer concerns the *ex ante* probability that a given individual will be inclined to support or oppose a given foreign policy activity. The partisanship of the president, relative to that of the respondent, can play an important role in such an assessment. American’s support their own party’s presidents in extremely high numbers. From the Eisenhower to the George W. Bush Administrations, an average of over 80% of presidents’ fellow partisans have approved of their job performance, compared to only 49% of opposition partisans. This suggests that partisans – including sophisticated partisans -- are highly likely *ex ante* to assume, absent information to the contrary, that their fellow partisan presidents will pursue policies, including foreign policies, consistent with their own preferences. Hence, party ID – that of the citizen relative to that of the president -- is a sufficient heuristic when a political sophisticate shares the partisanship of the president. However, when the opposition party holds the presidency, then a political sophisticate is unlikely to be willing to assume that the president’s policies are consonant with his or her own interests.

That said, given the relatively less distinct, unidimensional ideological lines in foreign, relative to domestic politics (which arguably gave rise to the notion, however exaggerated, that “politics stops at the water’s edge”), sophisticates may not be inclined to simply rely on party ID and assume that he or she should oppose the foreign policy of an opposing party’s president. The reason is that partisanship is likely to offer a less clear signal, all else equal, in foreign relative to domestic policy, as Americans tend to know and care less about the latter (see previous citations). This makes it easier for politicians, and thus provides them a greater incentive, to prime domestic political issues in partisan terms. Along these lines, Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) found that domestic issues were more salient to Americans than foreign policy issues in a majority of U.S. presidential elections, even during the Cold War.

By contrast, on foreign policy matters, political sophisticates may seek to ground their objections to the incumbent president in the logic of foreign policy worldviews rather than pure partisanship. They may feel obliged to present an opposition or alternative foreign policy view to that of the incumbent administration. In this circumstance, such individuals might conclude that it is worth the cost to employ the more demanding cognitive heuristic of worldview. By doing so, they can more accurately determine whether they ought to support or oppose the president’s foreign policy initiatives. Two final hypotheses follow:

H5: Political sophisticates from the presidential party will assess U.S. standing primarily based on the party affiliation of the president, and be inclined to hold a more positive view of U.S. standing than their opposing party counterparts. Under such circumstances worldviews will have less influence than party on assessments of U.S. standing.

H6: Political sophisticates will assess U.S. standing in part based on their personal worldviews when the president does not share their partisanship.

Below, we analyze four different datasets to explore the effects of the aforementioned worldviews on U.S. standing, independently and in combination with one another. This allows us to test our six hypotheses against multiple, independently derived operationalizations of our independent and dependent variables, thereby, we hope, making it possible to support our argument more strongly than would be possible through any single empirical test. Unfortunately, available survey questions limited our ability to test consistently all four sets of worldviews. In the first analysis below, we investigate all four worldviews, but in the subsequent three we collapse the four views into a linear scale with nationalists at one end, realists and neocons in the middle, and liberal internationalists at the other end.

Pew Center 2004 Survey

The Pew Center conducted a broad survey on Americans' attitudes toward foreign policy in July 2004, a time during which the war in Iraq dominated public opinion regarding foreign policy. Our analysis of this study tests H1, H2, H4.

In this survey, respondents' party ID and political ideology correlated significantly with attitudes toward Iraq. Based on a six-question scale we constructed (see Table A3 in the Appendix), party and ideology correlated with attitudes toward the Iraq war at -.68 and -.41 respectively (see Table 2), indicating, unsurprisingly, that liberals and Democrats are less supportive of the war than conservatives or Republicans. In other words, if we assume that party ID and ideology precede attitudes toward Iraq (as seems likely for most individuals), then political partisanship, and to a somewhat lesser extent ideology, are extremely strong predictors of attitudes toward the Iraq War. (Table A3 lists the question wording and coding of the six items included in the Iraq attitudes scale.) We also considered the influence of party and ideology on worldviews, as well as that of worldviews on attitudes toward Iraq. Table 2 also presents these correlations. We measured worldviews based on scales delineated in Tables 3 and 4 below.

[Table 2 here]

While Table 2 reveals an extremely strong relationship between party and support for Iraq, and a fairly strong relationship between ideology and support for Iraq, the relationships between these three variables, on the one hand, and worldviews, on the other, are with one exception substantially weaker. The exception is neoconservatives. The neoconservative scale correlates with the Iraq support scale, ideology, and party at .57, -.36, and -.44, respectively. This indicates that neoconservatives are far more likely than other respondents to support the Iraq War, as well as substantially less likely to be ideologically liberal or affiliated with the Democratic party. Overall, these correlations suggest that – again with a partial exception among neoconservatives – party and political ideology account only modestly for worldview (measured on a right-to-left continuum). In short, worldview seems to be influenced by, but vary independently from, party and ideology.

To isolate the significance of worldviews from the partisan salience of Iraq, we next undertook a more systematic regression analysis of these data. We controlled for Iraq attitudes (as well as other variables such as party ID, ideology, interest in politics and socio-economic characteristics). Our model thus included a series of questions (shown in Table A1) from which we constructed indexes for each of the above-referenced worldviews (see Table A2), as well as a two-part question that we employed to measure attitudes toward U.S. standing.

Beginning with the latter, we constructed a dummy variable coded 1 if respondents believed the U.S. was, at the time of the survey, “LESS respected by other countries...as [than] it has been in the past” and if, in a follow-on question, they indicated that they considered this “a major problem” and 0 otherwise.⁴ The two questions were as follows:

Q43: Compared with the past, would you say the U.S. is MORE respected by other countries these days, LESS respected by other countries, or AS respected as it has been in the past? (Coded: 1=More respected, 2=Less respected, 3=As respected as in the past, and 9=Don't know/Refused).

Q.43a:ASK IF LESS RESPECTED (2 IN Q.43) Do you think less respect for America is a major problem a minor problem or not a problem at all? {new} (Coded: 1=Major problem, 2=Minor problem, 3=Not a problem, and 9=Don't know/Refused).

Turning to worldviews, here we employed responses to seven questions (including several multi-part questions). Table A1 in the Appendix lists each question. Table A2 then categorizes responses according to which worldview they represent in our scales. To create our four worldview scales, we normalized each item in Table A1 to a 0-1 interval and then summed all items within each worldview category. This produced four separate scales, based on differing numbers of elements. Hence to standardize the four scales, we separately normalized each one to a 0-1 interval.

We expected, per H2, that in Summer 2004, liberal internationalists would be most likely to see respect for America declining and that this constituted a major problem, while neoconservatives – with the largest ideological stake in the Iraq conflict – would be least likely to hold this view. Realists and nationalists, we anticipated, would fall somewhere in between, with realists perhaps being somewhat more concerned than nationalists. The results, summarized in Table 3, generally, albeit imperfectly, support our expectations, thereby suggesting that respondents’ worldviews do indeed matter when they are asked to assess U.S. standing.

[Table 3 here]

⁴ We experimented with a variety of operationalizations of this U.S. standing indicator, including variants that exploited the full scales or included responses to Q43a of “minor problem” as equivalent to “major problem.” Based on these preliminary analyses, we found that primary threshold point appeared to be between respondents who did or did not believe that “less respect” was a “major problem.” Hence, we employ the above-described operationalization in our final models.

As Table 3 shows, moving from the lowest to highest score on the liberal internationalist scale is associated with a 49 percentage point increase in the probability of believing that the U.S. is less respected (than before 2004) and that this is a major problem ($p < .01$). This represents by far the largest effect across the four worldview groups. Also as anticipated, neoconservatives occupy the opposite extreme. A maximum increase on the neoconservative worldview scale is associated with a 3.4 percentage point *decline* in the probability of believing that the U.S. is less respected (than before 2004) and that this is a major problem ($p < .05$). Nationalists and realists, also as anticipated, fall in between. A maximum increase on the nationalist and realist scales are associated with 33 and 13 percentage point increases, respectively, in the probability of believing that the U.S. is less respected and that this is a major problem ($p < .01$ for the nationalist scale and $p < .05$ for the realist scale). These results are largely consistent with H2.

The relatively stronger effect among nationalists, relative to realists, was somewhat surprising, perhaps owing to a backlash against the changing Bush Administration rationale for the war in Iraq. Initially, the administration presented the war as an act of self-defense, aimed at protecting the U.S. from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. As the search for Saddam's WMD dragged on with no evidence emerging that Iraq possessed such weapons, the Administration increasingly characterized the conflict as aimed at promoting democracy both in Iraq and across the Middle East. While the defense motive may have appealed to nationalists and realists, the democracy motive most likely did not. And one might anticipate a stronger negative reaction among nationalists, for whom the value of "democracy promotion," especially if it involves costs, is most anathema.

In order to further isolate the effects of worldviews, and thereby test H4, we undertook a second analysis, this time adding an interaction with political attentiveness. The goal is to see whether we observe stronger or weaker distinctions across the worldview groups among respondents who are more engaged with political issues (both foreign and domestic).⁵ To test the effect of political attentiveness on these results, we created a political interest scale based on the following 6-part question from the Pew (2004) survey:

Q3: As I read each item, tell me if you happened to follow this news story very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, or not at all closely:

- a. News about candidates for the 2004 presidential election
- b. News about the current situation in Iraq
- c. John Edwards, the Democratic vice presidential candidate
- d. Ethnic violence in Sudan
- e. Saddam Hussein's recent court appearance in Iraq
- f. The release of Michael Moore's movie "Fahrenheit 9/11"

We coded each response on a four-point scale, where 1=not at all closely, 2=not very closely, 3=fairly closely, and 4=very closely. We then normalized each response to a 0-1 interval and summed the six items, thereby forming a 6-category scale, where a score of 0 indicated that the respondent reported not having followed any of the six issues at all, and a score of 6 indicated that the respondent reported having followed all six issues "very closely."

⁵ Ideally we would employ political sophistication, rather than attentiveness. Unfortunately, the necessary questions for doing so are unavailable in this survey.

Broadly consistent with H4, the findings clearly indicate that attentiveness to politics mediates the effects of worldview on attitudes regarding U.S. standing in a largely intuitive manner. Table 4 presents the probabilities for all four worldview groups of believing the U.S. is less respected than in the past and that this is a major problem, as attentiveness to political issues moves from its lowest to highest values.

[Table 4 here]

The results suggest that for liberal internationalists and realists, but *not* for neoconservatives or nationalists, greater attentiveness is associated with a significantly higher probability of expressing concern over U.S. standing. Among liberal internationalists and realists, increased attentiveness is associated with nearly identical increases of 79 and 78 percentage points, respectively, in the probability of believing the U.S. is less respected than in the past (circa 2004) and that this is a major problem ($p < .10$ in the former case and $p < .05$ in the latter). Consistent with our expectations, the corresponding effects among neoconservatives and nationalists run in the opposing direction: decreases of 26 and 28 percentage points, respectively. However, these latter effects are statistically insignificant and hence of questionable substantive meaning. Nevertheless, taken together, these results generally follow our expectations. As we further develop below, we would expect Democratic political sophisticates who are more likely to hold liberal internationalist and some realist views and who are in opposition in 2004 to use those views to assess U.S. standing, while Republican political sophisticates who are more likely to hold nationalist and neoconservative views and whose president holds office in 2004 would rely more on party heuristics and not apply worldviews to assess U.S. standing⁶

1996 vs. 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) Analysis

While ANES includes consistent questions about party ID and U.S. standing from 1958 on, it includes relatively few other questions that could be coded to worldviews over this same period of time. Of eleven questions we identified that *could* be coded in terms of worldviews, only six were available across multiple administrations, allowing us to investigate the effects of variations in partisan control of the presidency (Democrat Bill Clinton in 1996 and Republican George W. Bush in 2004). These six questions are listed in Table A4 in the Appendix.

To measure U.S. standing, the best question available to us in the ANES surveys was the following “*During the past year, would you say that the United States' position in the world has grown weaker, stayed about the same, or has it grown stronger?*” (VCF9045).⁶ To investigate the effects of worldview, political knowledge, ideology, and party ID on perceptions of U.S. standing (based on the above question regarding the U.S. “position in the world”), we first

⁶ Notice that this question about “weak” and “strong” elicits a response about America’s relative power, whereas the question in the 2004 Pew survey elicits a response as to whether or not the United States is “more or less respected”. Respect may relate to America’s power but it may also relate to its values or leadership/diplomacy. This example suggests the difficulties created for studies such as ours by the inconsistent wording and ambiguous interpretation of questions in the survey data,

created a scale from the aforementioned six questions – each normalized to a 0-1 interval, with liberal internationalist at the low end, realists in the middle and nationalists/neoconservatives at the high end. (The ANES did not include sufficiently varied questions to allow us to develop four distinct categories of worldviews. Hence, as noted earlier, we were forced to collapse the several worldviews into a single scale.)

We then interacted the liberal internationalist-to-nationalist scale with political knowledge (based on the interviewer’s assessment in the post-election wave) and self reported party ID, political ideology and/or a dummy for the George W. Bush (versus Bill Clinton) presidency. We tested a variety of control variables, ultimately including only those that proved significant in at least one model. These included age (plus its quadratic), education, and trust in government.⁷

The dependent variable for this analysis is a 3-category scale, where 0=US position has grown weaker, .5=stayed about the same, and 1=grown stronger. Table 5 presents the results from a series of ordered logit analyses of the effects of party, ideology, political knowledge, the president in office, and worldviews on attitudes regarding the U.S. position in the world.

[Table 5 here]

The results suggest some influence of each of these factors, including worldview, on assessment of U.S. standing. However, the influence of worldview is heavily mediated by partisanship, ideology, and political knowledge. To begin with, consistent with H2, H3 and H4, variations in worldview matter far more among politically knowledgeable respondents than among less knowledgeable ones. Looking at the top two sections of Table 5, we see that whether we interact political knowledge with partisanship or ideology, we find in every instance -- liberals and Democrats, on the one hand, and conservatives and Republicans, on the other --that the gap in attitudes on U.S. standing between liberal internationalists and nationalists is far more stark (by 300 to 500%) among high knowledge respondents than among less knowledgeable ones. For instance, among less knowledgeable Republicans (Section 1 in Table 5), liberal internationalists were, on average, 15 percentage points less likely than nationalists to believe that the U.S. is weaker than in the past. The corresponding gap is nearly three times higher (42 percentage points) among high knowledge Republican respondents ($p < .01$ in every case). The relationships among Democrats (in Section 2 of Table 5) are similar, as are those when we substitute ideology for partisanship (Sections 3 and 4 in Table 5, for conservatives and liberals, respectively). These relationships support H3 and H4, while the overall importance of worldview, even after controlling for ideology and party is consistent with H2. However, they move in an arguably counterintuitive direction, as we anticipated that nationalists would most likely be more sanguine about U.S. standing than liberal internationalists.

This begs the question of “why” liberal internationalists should necessarily be less likely than nationalists to view the U.S. as weaker than in the past. The answer emerges when we take

⁷ We tested models including such additional controls as external efficacy, ethnicity, income, marital status, religiosity, geographic location. None were statistically significant or materially affected the reported results.

the partisanship of the president into account. The fifth through eighth sections of Table 5 replace the political information interaction term with a dummy variable for the Bush Administration (coded 0 in 1996, when President Clinton was in office and 1 in 2004, during President Bush's term in office). The fifth and sixth sections interact the presidency dummy with worldview and partisanship (Republicans and Democrats, respectively), while the seventh and eighth sections substitute ideology for partisanship (conservatives and liberals, respectively).

The results indicate that in 1996, with a Democrat in the White House, variations in worldview heavily mediated attitudes regarding U.S. standing among Republicans and conservatives, but not among liberals and Democrats. Among conservatives in 1996, moving from liberal internationalist to nationalist/neoconservative worldviews is associated with a 51 percentage point increase in the probability of believing the U.S. is weaker in the past ($p < .01$). The corresponding increase among Republicans is 31 percentage points ($p < .10$). No statistically significant relationships emerge for either liberals or Democrats during the Clinton Administration (in 1996).

In stark contrast, in 2004, during the Bush Administration, nearly the precise opposite pattern emerges. In this case, worldviews strongly influence perceptions of U.S. standing among liberals and Democrats, but not among conservatives and Republicans. Among Democrats in 2004, moving from liberal internationalist to realist worldviews is associated with a 63 percentage point decline in the probability of believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past ($p < .01$). Among liberals, the corresponding decline in the probability of believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past is 33 percentage points. However, this last relationship is statistically insignificant and hence must be viewed as merely suggestive. No substantively meaningful or statistically significant effects of worldviews emerge among conservatives or Republicans during the Bush Administration.

These findings support H1, and place the initial results of earlier models employing the political knowledge interaction into a quite different context. It appears that nearly all of the variations in the effects of worldviews among conservatives and Republicans emerge among high knowledge respondents during the Clinton era, while nearly all of the effects among liberals and Democrats emerge among high knowledge respondents during the Bush era. As a test of the face validity of these patterns, Table 6 presents the simple correlations between believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past and worldview among respondents with differing partisan affiliations and ideologies, during the Clinton and Bush Administrations (1996 and 2004, respectively).

[Table 6 here]

The results complement those from the ordered logit analysis. During the Clinton era, the correlation between worldview and attitudes toward U.S. standing are nearly twice as high among Republicans as among Democrats and three times stronger among conservatives relative to liberals. The positive signs indicate that stronger nationalist views are associated with believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past. Conversely, during the Bush era, the directions of the correlations reverse signs, and the relative magnitudes again reverse. In this case, the correlations are 11 times stronger for Democrats than Republicans and eight times stronger for liberals relative to conservatives. Once again, these results are consistent with H1.

Though the ultimate cause of these distinctions is uncertain, one plausible explanation is that, for respondents, partisanship and ideology switch on and off the application of worldviews to evaluations of U.S. standing. In other words, as H5 and H6 anticipate, when the president and the respondent share party or ideological affiliation, the respondent switches off the application of worldview and is inclined to trust the president's judgment *ex ante*. He or she is willing to rely upon the simple heuristic of party or ideological loyalty in assessing the implications of that president's foreign policy for U.S. standing. In other words, if "my party" is in power, then my default position is likely to be to assume that U.S. standing is improving. In these situations, respondents will likely discount (switch off) the more cognitively demanding heuristic of worldview.

However, when the president is from the opposing party, respondents at varying levels of political knowledge will tend to be suspicious of the president's handling of foreign policy and its implications for U.S. standing. Table 5 suggests that less knowledgeable respondents – who tend to lack fully formed worldviews – may continue to rely, relatively more than their highly knowledgeable counterparts, upon the relatively simple heuristic of partisan affiliation. However, more politically knowledgeable respondents – who are more likely to possess a coherent worldview -- will be more likely than low knowledge individuals to employ the more cognitively demanding heuristic of worldview in order to either validate their *ex ante* distrust of the president, or perhaps to assess his performance more carefully and critically than they would if the president shared their political leanings (in which case they would simply give the president "the benefit of the doubt").

To more directly test H5 and H6, we undertake separate analyses of the three-way interactions between worldview, party (or ideology) and political knowledge during the Bush and Clinton presidencies. To the extent the above conjecture is correct, we would anticipate the strongest effects of worldviews to emerge among high knowledge Republicans and conservatives during the Clinton Administration and among high knowledge Democrats and liberals during the Bush years. While party and ideology ought to demonstrate similar effects, we might anticipate somewhat stronger relationships when we parse the data by partisanship, relative to when we do so by ideology. The reason is simply that party ID represents a more unambiguous heuristic allowing citizens to directly compare their presumed interests with those of the president.⁸ In fact, as Table 7 indicates, this is precisely what we find.

[Table 7 here]

In 1996, we observe substantively modest and at best marginally statistically significant effects of worldviews among low knowledge respondents of both parties, albeit especially weak relationships among Democrats. Conversely, among high knowledge respondents, we find no significant worldview effects among Democrats, but large and highly significant effects among

⁸ For instance, while most Americans presumably know their own party affiliation and that of the president with near (if not total) certainty, this may not be as universally true for ideology. After all, while there has been much debate over how liberal or conservative President's Clinton and Bush were, there is no debate concerning their party affiliation.

Republicans. In the case of Republicans, moving from liberal internationalist to nationalist worldviews is associated with a 54 percentage point *decline* in the probability of believing that the U.S. is *stronger* than in the past and a 28 point *increase* in the probability of believing that the U.S. is *weaker* than in the past ($p < .10$ in both cases). The pattern is precisely reversed during the Bush Administration (in 2004). Here, we observe no significant effects of worldviews among either low-knowledge respondents or high-knowledge Republicans, but highly significant effects among high knowledge Democrats. Among this last group, moving from liberal internationalist to nationalist worldviews is associated with a *decrease* of about 66 percentage points in the probability of believing the U.S. is *weaker* than in the past and a 65 percentage point increase in the probability of believing the U.S. is *stronger* than in the past ($p < .01$ in both cases).

The patterns among liberals and conservatives are similar to those among partisans, albeit modestly weaker, as predicted by the more direct correspondence of party ID for the respondent relative to the president (and hence its likely stronger heuristic value). During the Clinton Administration, among high knowledge conservatives but not among liberals or low knowledge conservatives, moving from liberal internationalist to nationalist is associated with a large (83 percentage point) decline in the probability of believing the U.S. is stronger than in the past. During the Bush Administration, no significant relationships emerge among conservatives, while highly knowledgeable liberals are more strongly influenced by worldviews than their less knowledgeable counterparts. However, in this last instance the effects for high knowledge liberals, though far larger in magnitude than those for low knowledge liberals are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, taken together, and with this one partial exception, these results appear to offer fairly clear evidence in support of our conjecture. These results offer fairly strong support for H5 and H6.

2008 ANES Analysis

We turn next to a replication of the above ANES findings, based on the 2008 ANES study. Because this is a cross-sectional analysis, we cannot replicate our cross-partisan findings from the prior analysis. Hence, we can only partially test hypotheses concerning the partisanship of the respondent relative to that of the president. Moreover, in 2008 there was a near universal consensus among Americans that U.S. standing was on the decline – albeit less so regarding the *reasons* for that decline. Indeed, only 7.5% of respondents reported believing that the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger over the prior year, compared to over 65% who reported believing the U.S. position had grown weaker. Consequently, it is more difficult to find statistically significant variation on our key causal variables in this context. Nonetheless, we anticipate finding at least some evidence consistent with our predictions even in this demanding political (and hence data) environment.

Unlike the prior analysis, in which we employed the interviewer's estimate of respondents' levels of political information as our indicator of political awareness (Zaller 1985, Baum 2002, 2003), in this instance we were able to develop an arguably superior measure by combining the political information indicator with the interviewer's assessment of respondents' level of intelligence. This allows us to better capture both *knowledge* and *understanding* of politics, which Zaller (1992) identifies as the two critical elements of political awareness. In

statistical testing, the combined indicator consistently outperformed the original political awareness indicator, which relied solely on political information.⁹

Table 8 presents the results of a logit analysis employing the identical dependent variable as in the 1996 and 2004 ANES analyses in the prior section. In Table 9, we employ Clarify – statistical simulation software developed by King et al. (2000) -- to transform the results into expected probabilities (as well as derive confidence intervals) that respondents believe the U.S. position in the world has grown stronger over the prior year.

[Tables 8 and 9 here]

The first noteworthy pattern in Table 9, shown in the bottom section of the table, is that Republicans are consistently and statistically significantly (from $p < .05$ to $p < .15$, depending on political sophistication and worldview) more likely than Democrats – by anywhere from about 5 to 13.5 percentage points, depending on political sophistication and worldview – to believe the U.S. position in the world had strengthened over the prior year. Give the presence of a Republican in the White House, this result is precisely what H1 would predict.

These same results generally support H3. Among political novices, the effects of variations in political partisanship are far larger than the effects of variations in worldview. Among these respondents, the effects of two standard deviation shifts in worldview are tiny (ranging from zero to two percentage points) and statistically insignificant regardless of party. In contrast, the effects of variations in party are substantially larger and in one of two instances statistically significant (5.3 points for low-sophistication liberal internationalists and 8.7 points, significant at $p < .10$, among low-sophistication nationalists).

Table 9 also offers support, to varying degrees, for H2 and H4. Looking at the top section of Table 9, we can see that, as noted above, among the least politically sophisticated respondents variations in worldview have no statistically significant effect on perceptions of the U.S. position in the world, regardless of party. However, among the most highly sophisticated respondents, worldviews do appear to matter. Among Democrats, a two standard deviation movement from liberal internationalist toward nationalist – from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the overall mean on the scale – is associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of believing that the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger over the prior year ($p < .10$). Among Republicans, the corresponding change is a 5.8 point *decrease* in the likelihood of believing the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger ($p < .10$). Finally, among Independents, the same shift in worldview is associated with a nearly significant ($p < .15$) 4.2 point decrease in the likelihood of believing the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger over the prior year. These results are clearly consistent with H2 and H4, while being arguably somewhat less so with H5 and H6, as variations in worldview here appear to matter slightly more for sophisticated Republicans (the presidential party in 2008), relative to sophisticated Democrats (the opposition party in 2008).

⁹ Nonetheless, the results do largely replicate with both operationalizations of political awareness. We believe the combined indicator is conceptually superior. Hence, we report results employing that variable.

This latter difference is not statistically significant, and in all likelihood represents a floor effect. As indicated earlier, very few respondents overall (7.5%) – including 14.2% of Republicans and 4.8% of Democrats -- in Fall 2008 believed the U.S. position in the world had strengthened over the prior year. The fact that nearly three times as many Republicans as Democrats believed the U.S. position in the world had strengthened over the prior year may account for the somewhat larger effects observed among Republicans.

2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP)

Our final investigation employs data from the 2008 CCAP, conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix. We employ two waves of this panel study, conducted in January and October 2008. For our dependent variable in this analysis, we employ the following question:

“Which comes closest to your view: (1) America’s standing in the world has fallen because of things America has done; (2) America’s standing in the world has fallen but NOT because of anything that America has done; (3) America’s standing in the world is about the same as it was 10 years ago; (4) America’s standing in the world is better than it was 10 years ago.”¹⁰

Our first key causal variable is a scale, similar to that employed in our ANES analyses, that runs from liberal internationalism at the low end to nationalism at the high end, with realism and neoconservatism roughly in between. We constructed the scale based on the questions and coding shown in Table A5 in the Appendix.

The second key causal variable measures respondents’ political knowledge, based on a series of factual knowledge questions. First, the survey asked respondents if they knew whether a set of individuals were currently members of the House of Representatives, the Senate, or not members of Congress. These individuals included: Nancy Pelosi, Robert Gates, Denis Kucinic, Ted Kennedy, and Patrick Leahy.¹¹ We summed up the correct responses and then normalized the resulting score to a 0-1 interval. The survey also asked respondents if they knew the current job of Condoleezza Rice, and if they knew whether the U.S. dollar had strengthened or weakened over the prior year. We awarded one point for each correct response. We then added the three elements together to form a 0-3 scale, where 3 represents maximum political knowledge.

Our final key causal variable is the respondents’ party identification, which we divided into three dummy variables, one each for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents/Other party affiliations (including Independent leaners). We then interacted all three key causal variables in order to separately assess the effects of worldviews on different partisan subgroups at differing

¹⁰ Notice that this definition of standing elicits a response about America’s behavior – what it has done – *and* about America’s position, that is its relative power or values, unrelated to what it has done.

¹¹ Additional individuals were included in the list. But these five were asked of the largest number of respondents, and hence focusing on them allowed us to maximize our N.

levels of political knowledge. We also include controls for respondents' political ideology (a 5-point liberal-to-conservative scale), level of education, and gender.

In order to separately estimate the probability of selecting each of the response categories of the dependent variable, we employ multinomial logit, which does not assume that the several categories are scaled in any manner. Finally, it is worth noting that in order to preserve the appropriate direction of causality, to the extent possible, we take the dependent variable from the October wave and the key causal variables from the January wave. (The controls are taken from whichever wave included the least missing data.) Table 10 presents the results of our multinomial logit analysis. Table 11 then transforms the key coefficients into probabilities, again employing Clarify.¹²

[Tables 10 and 11 here]

Beginning with H1, the results shown in the bottom half of Table 11 offer clear support for our hypotheses. In nearly every case, regardless of worldview or political sophistication, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to view U.S. standing as either the same or better than 10 years prior, and less likely to view it as having fallen. Among low-information liberal internationalists, Republicans are 15.3 percentage points more likely than Democrats to believe that U.S. standing is better or the same than 10 years prior. Among low- and high-information realists, the corresponding differences are 79.4 and 1.45 points, respectively. High information liberal internationalists are the sole (partial) exception, as the direction of the gap here reverses, albeit by only 1.6 points.

The top half of Table 11, in turn, offers support, albeit to somewhat varying degrees, for H2, H3, and H4. In over half of the comparisons shown in the table, including nearly every instance among highly sophisticated respondents, variations in worldview are associated with statistically significant differences in attitudes toward U.S. standing. This supports H2. Moreover, consistent with H4, the relationships are far stronger among political sophisticates. Among these respondents, worldview exerts a statistically significant influence on the probability of holding a given opinion regarding U.S. standing in 10 of 12 possible comparisons (4 possible attitudes toward standing x 3 partisan subgroups). These differences range from a low of about nine percentage points to a high of over 78 points. Moreover, in every instance the directions of the differences are consistent with intuition. That is, liberal internationalists are significantly more likely to believe that U.S. standing fell during the Bush years because of America's actions, while nationalists are more likely to agree that it fell, but *not* because of anything America did. These gaps are also larger among sophisticates than among novices in five of six comparisons (3 partisan subgroups x 2 worldviews).

The results offer fairly strong support for H3 as well. The bottom half of Table 11 indicates that among liberal internationalists, variations in partisanship are associated with statistically distinct effects on attitudes toward standing in only one of eight possible

¹² For independents in Table 11, it was necessary to vary political sophistication from just slightly above minimum (.1, instead of 0) to maximum, as the results became implausible when sophistication was set to 0, presumably due to the small number of respondents located at the lowest levels of political sophistication.

comparisons (2 political sophistication groups x 4 possible attitudes regarding standing). However, the magnitudes of the gaps between the parties are larger among low-sophistication respondents in three of four possible comparisons (that is, attitudes toward standing). Because these differences are insignificant, however, they must be interpreted as at most suggestive.

Among nationalists, the results are more unambiguously supportive of the hypothesis. Less sophisticated respondents here vary far more than their more sophisticated counterparts as their partisanship varies. Among low-sophistication respondents, variations in party are associated with statistically significant differences in the probability of holding a given attitude regarding standing in three of four possible instances (worse because of U.S. actions, worse, but not because of U.S. actions, same, better). The differences here are quite large in magnitude, ranging from 33 to 81 percentage points, with low-sophistication Democrats far more likely than low-sophistication Republicans to believe U.S. standing has fallen, either because of U.S. actions or not, and far less likely to believe U.S. standing is the same as 10 years prior. In contrast, among high sophistication realists, the magnitudes of the effects of differences in party are smaller in every instance – dramatically so in three of four cases – and statistically significant in only one case (belief that U.S. standing has fallen because of America’s actions).

The results are ambiguous for H5 and H6. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, Democratic political sophisticates (the opposition party in 2008) do, in these data, appear to base their attitudes regarding U.S. standing in significant measure on their worldviews (see top half of Table 11). However, contrary to H5, so too do Republican sophisticates. Moreover, in two of four comparisons, the effects of worldviews are larger in magnitude among Republicans. This latter result may be an artifact of the timing of the survey, as the dependent variable was collected in October 2008, a time when the Republican incumbent president (George W. Bush) had largely ceded the political spotlight to the two candidates for president (John McCain and Barack Obama), both of whom were highly critical of the Bush Administration’s handling of U.S. foreign policy. This may have mitigated, to some extent, the effects of partisanship on assessments of U.S. standing. Nonetheless, despite this latter inconsistency, the overall results from the CCAP analysis are largely supportive of our theoretical predictions, offering fairly clear support for all but one of our six hypotheses.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that foreign policy worldviews may be a more powerful predictor of how Americans think about the U.S. role in the world and particularly U.S. standing in the world than previous research suggests. While ANES data going back to 1958 suggest that party ID is a powerful predictor of attitudes toward U.S. standing, the causal variables at work behind this correlation may be worldviews, especially when one takes into account differences in individual Americans’ capacities and incentives to apply such worldviews.

We predicted that by treating worldview as an information shortcut, or heuristic cue, similar in some ways to party identification, we might gain insight into who would likely rely on worldviews in assessing U.S. standing and when they were most likely to do so. Our results largely conform to our predictions. Because worldview is a more complex and less widely accessible heuristic cue than party ID, it is more readily available to political sophisticates who

are most likely to possess the knowledge and context necessary for applying it. However, given that all human beings are cognitive misers, even sophisticates are likely to prefer “cheaper” heuristics when they can afford to do so. Hence, we anticipated that the most likely users of worldview would be political sophisticates from the non-presidential party. After all, when the president shares one’s party affiliation, it is likely that he or she will pursue policies consistent with one’s interests. Under such circumstances, one need not resort to the relatively “costly” heuristic of worldview. Conversely, less politically sophisticated individuals are likely to be dependent on more simple heuristics, like party ID.

Our results largely bore out these expectations. We found that all respondents use party ID as a convenient heuristic to determine attitudes toward U.S. standing. Other studies (see above citations) show that domestic political ideology is a factor affecting some attitudes toward foreign policy. But these studies rely on limited definitions of domestic ideology and foreign policy attitudes. A broader definition of the independent variable in terms of foreign policy worldviews captures more of the variance in explaining attitudes toward U.S. standing in the world. Across our four data sets, nationalists, neoconservatives and some realists who are Republican tend to think about U.S. standing in the world more in terms of power and values, while liberal internationalists and some realists who are Democrats assess it more in terms of diplomacy and multilateralism. When a respondent’s own party is in power, that respondent, whether politically knowledgeable or not, assesses U.S. standing under that president primarily based on shared partisanship. When the respondent’s party is in opposition, however, politically knowledgeable respondents, far more than their less-knowledgeable counterparts, assess U.S. standing in significant measure in terms of worldviews, distrusting the incumbent president not just because s/he is from the opposite party but because s/he holds a different worldview that, in their view, potentially damages U.S. standing in the world.

The implications for the study of foreign policy attitudes are potentially profound. By reconceptualizing worldview as a heuristic cue, we are able to advance the study of foreign policy attitudes, pioneered by scholars such as Holsti, Rosenau, Wittkopf and Maggiotto by predicting not only *which* worldviews are likely to influence foreign policy attitudes, but also *who* is likely to employ worldviews in rendering such assessments, and *when* they are likely to do so.

Unfortunately, data limitations prevented us from fully elaborating the differences in worldviews across different types of survey respondents, as well as tracing the effects of worldviews over time. There are two types of data that would help us pursue this line of inquiry further. First, it would be helpful to identify other polls that ask consistent questions about party, ideology, world views and U.S. standing over a longer period of time. Second, it would be helpful to identify data regarding non-American respondents’ attitudes toward the standing of other great powers, rather than just toward the standing of the United States. These data would help us assess whether attitudes toward U.S. standing are more or less negative and influenced by the same or different factors, than attitudes toward the standing of other powers.

With respect to this latter question, we were able to undertake one preliminary test using Pew Global Attitudes Surveys for 2002 and 2005-2008. We compared favorability ratings of the United States and China along with a measure of US/China relative power. The results are shown

in Figure 3. The top chart in Figure 3 measures attitudes among a constant set of three countries – Russia, Japan, and Indonesia -- for each year, while the bottom chart in Figure 3 measures attitudes across all available countries for each year. The individual countries whose evaluations of the U.S. and China are included in the samples vary modestly from year to year, though they are similar for all years except 2002.

[Figure 3 here]

We find that U.S. favorability ratings declined precipitously in 2002-2006 and then began to recover in 2008. China's favorability ratings move consistently downward throughout the series. During this period, U.S. relative power – that is, GDP as a share of global GDP -- is clearly declining relative to China, albeit not dramatically so. We observe a powerful inverse relationship between U.S. relative power and attitudes toward China (as China's power rises, its favorability declines), but a somewhat less powerful relationship between U.S. relative power and attitudes toward the U.S. Since this is bivariate analysis, with an N of 5 yearly comparisons, these are at most suggestive findings. After all, any number of potential exogenous factors could account for the U.S. drop in favorability in the 2002-06 period, most notably the globally unpopular war in Iraq. Hence, if one were to cherry pick among potential exogenous factors, this *could* be interpreted as consistent with the argument that people tend to resent a hegemon, regardless of that nation's actions. After all, once Iraq (as an irritant to U.S. prestige abroad) is removed from the system, the trends become consistent with a realist perspective given declining U.S. relative power (that is, rising favorability for the U.S.). Of course, discounting the 2002-06 period due to Iraq, when U.S. power is declining along with its favorability, would constitute cherry picking of the data. While Iraq may account for this, we cannot establish such a relationship with these limited data. So we cannot really draw strong conclusions here. We thus leave this task for future research.

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TABLE 1. Four Worldviews	
<i>Worldview</i>	<i>Foreign Policy Preferences</i>
Nationalists (includes Holsti's isolationists, see <i>Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy</i> , 1996, 104)	Independence (unilateralism for conservatives; non-intervention for liberals), homeland (including missile) defense, self-reliance, respect for American power (conservative) or values (liberal)
Realists (includes Holsti's accommodationists)	Active alliances, peace through strength, world order/stability, prudence (co-existence), moral relativism, equilibrium (defensive), hegemony (offensive)
Conservative Internationalists (includes Holsti's hardliners and neoconservatives)	Reduce tyranny (not just coexist or cooperate with it), spread freedom (regime change), forceful diplomacy, preempt threats militarily
Liberal Internationalists (includes Holsti's internationalists)	strengthen legitimacy of universal institutions (multilateralism), human rights, disarmament, fight poverty and disease to preempt threats

TABLE 2. Correlations Between Worldviews, Party ID, Ideology, and Iraq Support			
	Iraq Support Scale	Ideology (Con-to-Lib)	Party (Rep-to-Dem)
Ideology (Con-to-Lib)	-.41		
Party (Rep-to-Dem)	-.68	.45	
Liberal Internationalist	-.19	.18	.20
Nationalist	.18	-.22	-.13
Realist	.24	-.25	-.18
Neoconservative	.57	-.36	-.44

TABLE 3: Probability of thinking U.S. less respected and this is a major problem, by worldview (Pew 2004)			
	Min.	Max.	Difference
Liberal Internationalist	.040	.534	.494**
Realist	.040	.169	.129*
Nationalist	.040	.368	.328**
Neocon	.040	.006	-.034*
^ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; Note: “Min” means lowest score on a given worldview scale; “Max” means highest score on a given worldview scale.			

TABLE 4: Probability of thinking U.S. less respected and this is a major problem, by worldview, as political attention increases from its minimum to maximum value (Pew 2004)

	Min.	Max.	Difference
Liberal Internationalist	.131	.921	.790 [^]
Realist	.169	.951	.782*
Nationalist	.849	.569	-.280 (insig)
Neocon	.569	.307	-.263 (insig)
[^] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$			

TABLE 5. Probability Respondent Believes U.S. Has Grown Weaker Than in Past

	Liberal Intl'ist	Realists/Trad'list	Diff	
By Political Knowledge				
1. Republicans				
Low political info	0.22	0.37	0.15	**
High political info	0.03	0.45	0.42	**
2. Democrats				
Low political info	0.33	0.25	-0.08	**
High political info	0.48	0.12	-0.36	**
3. Conservative				
Low political info	0.18	0.34	0.16	**
High political info	0.03	0.55	0.52	**
4. Liberal				
Low political info	0.38	0.27	-0.11	*
High political info	0.62	0.11	-0.51	*
By Administration				
5. Conservative				
Clinton 96	0.13	0.64	0.51	**
Bush 04	0.29	0.11	-0.18	
6. Liberal				
Clinton 96	0.16	0.22	0.06	
Bush 04	0.85	0.52	-0.33	
7. Republicans				
Clinton 96	0.23	0.54	0.31	^
Bush 04	0.19	0.12	-0.07	
8. Democrats				
Clinton 96	0.13	0.24	0.11	
Bush 04	0.92	0.29	-0.63	**

^ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

TABLE 6. Correlation Between Nationalist Worldview and Believing U.S. Weaker than in the Past	
	Overall
Clinton (1996)	
Democrats	.10
Republicans	.19
Liberals	.08
Conservatives	.24
Bush (2004)	
Democrats	-.23
Republicans	-.02
Liberals	-.16
Conservatives	-.02

TABLE 7. Probability that Respondent Believes the U.S. is Weaker or Stronger than in the Past, as Party ID, Ideology, Political Knowledge and Administration Vary (1996 vs. 2004 ANES)

	Probability U.S. Weaker			Probability U.S. Stronger		
	Liberal Int'list	Realist/Trad'list	Diff	Liberal Int'list	Realist/Trad'list	Diff
<u>CLINTON '96</u>						
1. Republicans						
Lo political info	0.39	0.47	0.08 ^	0.14	0.09	-0.05 ^
Hi political info	0.04	0.32	0.28 ^	0.74	0.2	-0.54 ^
2. Democrats						
Lo political info	0.11	0.14	0.03	0.45	0.39	-0.06
Hi political info	0.09	0.22	0.13	0.55	0.29	-0.26
3. Conservative						
Lo political info	0.23	0.5	0.27 **	0.26	0.09	-0.17 **
Hi political info	0.01	0.46	0.45 **	0.96	0.13	-0.83 **
4. Liberal						
Lo political info	0.15	0.16	0.01	0.37	0.36	-0.01
Hi political info	0.32	0.33	0.01	0.24	0.22	-0.02
<u>BUSH '04</u>						
5. Republicans						
Lo political info	0.23	0.21	-0.02	0.43	0.47	0.04
Hi political info	0.26	0.15	-0.11	0.45	0.61	0.16
6. Democrats						
Lo political info	0.77	0.61	-0.16 **	0.06	0.13	0.07 **
Hi political info	0.74	0.08	-0.66 **	0.08	0.73	0.65 **
7. Conservative						
Lo political info	0.36	0.24	-0.12	0.3	0.43	0.13
Hi political info	0.64	0.17	-0.47	0.18	0.6	0.42
8. Liberal						
Lo political info	0.77	0.71	-0.06	0.06	0.09	0.03
Hi political info	0.33	0.13	-0.2	0.41	0.68	0.27

^ $p < .10$, ** $p < .01$

TABLE 8. Effects of Party, Ideology, and Foreign Policy Views on Perceptions of U.S. Standing, 2008 ANES

	(1) Party	(2) Ideology
Democrat	1.847 (1.060) [^]	-----
Republican	1.367 (1.090)	-----
Liberal	-----	.907 (1.22)
Conservative	-----	-.441 (.98)
Party ID	-----	.558 (.17)**
Ideology (liberal to conservative)	.135 (.095)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Democrat	-.052 (.066)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Republican	.036 (.066)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Independent	.028 (.063)	-----
Political Information/Intelligence x Democrat	-.137 (.051)**	-----
Political Information/Intelligence x Republican	.013 (.041)	-----
Political Information/Intelligence x Independent	.047 (.048)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Information/Intelligence x Democrat	.006 (.005)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Information/Intelligence x Republican	-.004 (.004)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Information/Intelligence x Independent	-.0042 (.005)	-----
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Liberal	-----	-.0665 (.073)
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Conservative	-----	.0405 (.054)
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Moderate	-----	-.008 (.066)
Political Information/Intelligence x Liberal	-----	-.134 (.079) [^]
Political Information/Intelligence x Conservative	-----	.036 (.036)
Political Information/Intelligence x Moderate	-----	-.018 (.052)
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Information/Intelligence x Liberal	-----	.007 (.006)
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Information/Intelligence x Conservative	-----	-.004 (.003)
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Information/Intelligence x Moderate	-----	-.0002 (.0044)
Age	-.014 (.007) [^]	-.012 (.0073)
Education	-.065 (.045)	-.062 (.045)
Trust in Government Scale	.445 (.20)*	.441 (.200)*
Constant	-3.022 (1.06)**	-2.672 (1.070)*
Observations	1262	1262
R-squared	.08	.07

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, [^] $p < .10$; Robust standard errors in parentheses

TABLE 9. Probability that Respondent Believes the U.S. is Weaker or Stronger than in the Past, as Party ID, Ideology, Political Sophistication and Administration Vary (2008 ANES)

BY PARTY

	Liberal	Nationalist	diff	
Low Sophistication	Internationalist			
Democrats	0.089	0.077	-0.012	
Republicans	0.142	0.164	0.022	
Independents	0.051	0.049	-0.002	
High Sophistication			diff	
Democrats	0.016	0.044	0.028	^
Republicans	0.151	0.093	-0.058	^
Independents	0.083	0.041	-0.042	^^
Low Sophistication	Democrats	Republicans	diff	
Liberal Internationalist	0.089	0.142	0.053	
Nationalist	0.077	0.164	0.087	^^
High Sophistication			diff	
Liberal Internationalist	0.016	0.151	0.135	**
Nationalist	0.044	0.093	0.049	^

BY IDEOLOGY

	Liberal	Nationalist	diff	
Low Sophistication	Internationalist			
Liberals	0.095	0.075	-0.02	
Conservatives	0.077	0.088	0.011	
Moderates	0.083	0.071	-0.012	
High Sophistication			diff	
Liberals	0.022	0.058	0.036	^^
Conservatives	0.108	0.057	-0.051	*
Moderates	0.064	0.056	-0.008	
Low Sophistication	Liberals	Conservatives	diff	
Liberal Internationalist	0.095	0.105	0.01	
Nationalist	0.075	0.096	0.021	
High Sophistication			diff	
Liberal Internationalist	0.021	0.038	0.017	
Nationalist	0.058	0.053	-0.005	

** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ^ $p < .10$, ^^ $p < .15$

TABLE 10. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF PARTY AND FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS ON PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. STANDING, CCAP 2008

	Fallen because of America's Actions	Fallen, but <i>not</i> because of America's Actions	Better than <u>10 years ago</u>
Democrat	-2.792 (3.25)	-1.923 (4.04)	11.68 (13.0)
Republican	-27.06 (1.00)**	-21.46 (9.80)*	-7.615 (16.5)
Nationalist Scale x Democrat	2.218 (1.14)^	2.167 (1.58)	3.363 (1.57)*
Nationalist Scale x Republican	13.11 (4.96)**	9.975 (4.84)*	11.34 (5.90)^
Nationalist Scale x Independent	-1.573 (1.54)	-2.084 (1.60)	4.390 (6.70)
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Democrat	1.025 (1.07)	.008 (1.49)	-.626 (1.88)
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Republican	13.28 (4.75)**	11.36 (4.71)*	11.20 (5.75)^
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Independent	-.424 (1.01)	-.858 (1.21)	23.11 (3.61)***
Political Information x Democrat	1.526 (1.30)	.328 (1.64)	1.955 (1.24)
Political Information x Republican	9.593 (3.63)**	7.532 (3.60)*	8.406 (4.64)^
Political Information x Independent	.537 (.98)	-.134 (1.12)	5.778 (4.44)
Nationalist Scale x Democrat x Political Information	-1.299 (.61)*	-1.049 (.80)	-1.758 (.80)*
Nationalist Scale x Republican x Political Information	-5.159 (1.84)**	-3.694 (1.83)*	-4.587 (2.26)*
Nationalist Scale x Independent x Political Information	-.111 (.71)	.612 (.74)	-1.890 (2.39)
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Democrat x Political Information	-.256 (.49)	-.256 (.73)	-.138 (.68)
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Republican x Political Information	-4.456 (1.71)**	-4.130 (1.74)*	-4.395 (2.17)*
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Independent x Political Information	.779 (.50)	.384 (.57)	-212.6 (15.7)***
Education	.066 (.12)	-.187 (.12)	.0288 (.26)
Male	-.338 (.35)	-.328 (.35)	-.143 (.71)
Ideology (liberal to conservative)	-.366 (.22)^	-.167 (.22)	.512 (.48)
Constant	3.404 (2.06)^	3.427 (2.37)	-17.37 (13.3)
Observations	609		
R-squared	.33		

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ^ $p < .10$; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: omitted category is "America's standing in the world is about the same as it was 10 years ago."

TABLE 11. Effects of Party ID, Political Sophistication and Worldview on Attitudes Regarding U.S. Standing (2008 CCAP)

MINIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION				
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Realist/</u>	<u>Difference</u>	
Democrats	<u>Internationalist</u>	<u>Traditionalist</u>		
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)	0.585	0.335	-0.250	
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)	0.206	0.447	0.241	
same (3)	0.169	0.024	-0.145	^
better (4)	0.041	0.194	0.153	
Republicans				
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)	0.256	0.424	0.168	
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)	0.381	0.202	-0.179	
same (3)	0.201	0.154	-0.047	
better (4)	0.162	0.220	0.058	
Independents				
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)	0.538	0.312	-0.226	
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)	0.265	0.133	-0.132	
same (3)	0.195	0.509	0.314	
better (4)	0.001	0.045	0.044	
MAXIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION				
Democrats				
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)	0.915	0.513	-0.402	^^
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)	0.010	0.118	0.108	^
same (3)	0.020	0.258	0.238	*
better (4)	0.058	0.110	0.052	
Republicans				
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)	0.876	0.132	-0.744	**
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)	0.075	0.602	0.527	**
same (3)	0.039	0.248	0.209	^
better (4)	0.010	0.018	0.008	
Independents				
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)	0.993	0.209	-0.784	**
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)	0.006	0.519	0.513	**
same (3)	0.001	0.184	0.183	**
better (4)	0.000	0.089	0.089	**

MINIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION**Liberal Internationalists**

	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Difference</u>	
<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of actions (1)	0.582	0.235	-0.347	
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)	0.214	0.408	0.194	
same (3)	0.164	0.178	0.014	
better (4)	0.039	0.178	0.139	

Nationalists

<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of actions (1)	0.334	0.009	-0.325	*
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)	0.491	0.023	-0.468	^
same (3)	0.117	0.928	0.811	*
better (4)	0.057	0.040	-0.017	

MAXIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION**Liberal Internationalists**

<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of actions (1)	0.926	0.880	-0.046	
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)	0.010	0.072	0.062	^
same (3)	0.016	0.039	0.023	
better (4)	0.048	0.009	-0.039	

Nationalists

<u>US Standing over past 10 years</u>				
fallen b/c of actions (1)	0.086	0.002	-0.084	*
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)	0.082	0.020	-0.062	^
same (3)	0.809	0.966	0.157	^
better (4)	0.024	0.012	-0.012	

** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ^ $p < .10$, ^^ $p < .15$

Appendix: Data Coding

TABLE A1: Four Worldviews

Question	Question Text	Response Categories
32	What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or shouldn't it play any leadership role?	1=Single leader, 2=Shared leadership, 3=No leadership, and 9=Don't know/Refused
33	IF "SHARED LEADERSHIP ROLE" (2 IN Q.32), ASK: Should the United States be the most active of the leading nations, or should it be about as active as other leading nations?	1=Most active, 2=About as active, and 9=Don't know/Refused
34	Should the United States base its foreign policy mostly on the interests of the U.S., or should it strongly take into account the interests of its allies?	1=own estimates of national interests, 2=interests and views of allies, 3=both
37	Do you think that using military force against countries that may seriously threaten our country, but have not attacked us, can often, sometimes, rarely or never be justified?	1=often, 2=sometimes, 3=rarely, 4=never
39	From this list of long range U.S. foreign policy goals, which do you think should have top priority, some priority, or no priority at all?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Taking measures to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks 2. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction 3. Insuring adequate energy supplies for the U.S. 4. Strengthening the United Nations 5. Reducing the spread of AIDS and other infectious diseases 6. Protecting groups or nations that are threatened with genocide 7. Promoting democracy in other nations 8. Promoting U.S. business and economic interests abroad 9. Finding a solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
42	Do you think this should be a top priority, some priority, or no priority at all in the way we conduct our foreign policy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. compassionate 2. practical 3. decisive 4. cautious 5. following moral principles
45	Do you think that we should increase our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut it back?	1=increase, 2=same, 3=cut back

TABLE A2: Elements and Coding of Worldview Scales

Worldview	Scale Coding, by Question
Nationalists	Q32 & Q33: No Leadership (Q32) Q34: Own estimates of national interests Q37: never Q39: protect against terrorist attacks, Prevent spread of WMD, Insure adequate energy supplies Q42: Cautious Q45: Increase defense spending
Realists	Q32 & Q33: Shared Leadership (Q32) & Most Active (Q33) Q34: Both Interest and Views of Allies <i>and</i> Own Estimates of National Interests Q37: sometimes Q39: protect against terrorist attacks, Prevent spread of WMD, Insure adequate energy supplies, Promoting U.S. business and economic interests abroad Q42: Practical, Cautious Q45: About the same defense spending
Neoconservatives	Q32 & Q33: Single Leader (Q32) & Most Active (Q33) Q34: Own estimates of national interests Q37: Often Q39: protect against terrorist attacks, Prevent spread of WMD, Insure adequate energy supplies, Promoting democracy, Promoting U.S. business and economic interests abroad Q42: Decisive, Follow moral principles Q45: Increase defense spending
Liberal Internationalists	Q32 & Q33: Shared leadership (Q32) & About as active (Q33) Q34: Interests and views of allies Q37: Rarely Q39: Strengthen United Nations, Reduce spread of AIDS, Protect against genocide, Promoting democracy, Find solution to Israel-Palestinian conflict Q42: Compassionate, Practical, Follow moral principles Q45: Cut back defense spending

Question Number	Question Text	Coding
Q30	Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation in Iraq?	1=approve, 0=disapprove, .5=don't know
Q60	Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?	1=right decision, 0=wrong decision, .5=don't know/refused
Q61	How well is the U.S. military effort in Iraq going?	1=not at all well, 2= not too well, 3=fairly well, 4= very well, 2.5=don't know/refused (recoded to 0-1 interval)
Q62	Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as possible?	1=keep troops in Iraq, 0=bring troops home, .5=don't know/refused
Q63	Do you think George W. Bush has a clear plan for bringing the situation in Iraq to a successful conclusion, or don't you think so?	1=has a clear plan, 0=doesn't have a clear plan, .5=don't know/refused
Q64	Do you think the war in Iraq has helped the war on terrorism, or has it hurt the war on terrorism?	1=helped, 0=hurt, .5=don't know/refused

Question Number	Question	Response Categories
VCF0823	'This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.'	1=agree 0=disagree .5=DK (1=Nationalist, Realist/Neocon in between, 0=Liberal Internationalist)
VCF0843	Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. (1996,2004: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. (1996,2004: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) (2004: And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6). Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?	1. Greatly decrease defense spending 2. 3. 4. Keep about the same or DK 5. 6. 7. Greatly increase defense spending. (7=Nationalist, 6-5 Neocon, 4-3 Realist, 1-2 =Liberal Internationalist)
VCF0853	'This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.' (2004: do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?)	1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree or DK 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly (1=Nationalist, 2-3=Realist, 3-4=Neocon, 4-5=Liberal Internationalist)
VCF0854	'We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree or DK 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly (1=Nationalist, 2-3 Realist, 4 Neocon, 5=Liberal Internationalist)
VCF0879	Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be (1992,1994: increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?) (1996,1998: increased a lot, increased a little,	1. Increased a lot 2. Increased a little 3. Same as now or DK 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased a lot

	decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?) (2004: increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?)	(on 0-1 interval, 5=Nationalist, 4-3=Realist,2=Neocon, 1=Liberal Internationalist)
VCF0892	If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which (of the following) programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased: Should federal spending on Foreign Aid be increased, decreased or kept about the same?	1. Increased 2. Same or DK 3. Decreased or cut out entirely (3=Nationalist, 2=Realist/Neocon, 1=Liberal Internationalist)

TABLE A5: CCAP Worldview Scale Questions		
Question	Response Categories	Coding
What is the most important problem facing the country today	(1) War in Iraq (2) Terrorism (3) Education (4) Health Care and Health costs (5) Corruption in Government (6) Energy Supply/Gas and Oil Prices (7) Economy and Jobs (8) Rising Prices (9) Poverty (10) Housing (11) Immigration (12) Crime (13) Drug Abuse (14) Taxes/Deficit (15) Social Security and pensions (16) Abortion (17) Gay Marriage (18) Pollution and the Environment (19) Other	<p><i>Nationalists</i> – Score=1 if respondent selected any of the following: war in Iraq, terrorism, corruption in government, energy supplies, economy and jobs, rising prices, immigration, crime, drug abuse, taxes, abortion, gay marriage.</p> <p><i>Liberal internationalists</i> – Score=1 if respondent selected any of the following: education, health care, energy supplies, economy and jobs, poverty, housing, social security and pensions, pollution and environment</p>
When it comes to America's image abroad, there are two viewpoints concerning what would be better to improve America's image in other countries. Which viewpoint comes closer to your own?	(1) We need a president who will present an image that America has a more open approach and is willing to negotiate with friends and foes alike (2) We need a president who will present an image of strength that shows America's willingness to confront our enemies and stand up for our principles (3) Not Sure/Neither	1=Liberal Internationalist/Realist 2=Nationalist/Neocon

FIGURE 1. Percent Believing U.S. Position in the World Has Grown Weaker in Past Year, 1958-2008




FIGURE 2. Holsti's (1996) MI/CI Matrix

		Militant Internationalism	
		Support	Oppose
Cooperative Internationalism	Support	Internationalist 1976 30% 1996 29%	Accommodationist 1976 42% 1996 48%
	Oppose	Hard Liner 1976 20% 1996 13%	Isolationist 1976 08% 1996 10%

FIGURE 3. U.S. and China Favorability Ratings, as U.S. Share of Global GDP Varies, 2002-08

