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Abstract

This paper uses linked data on over 1,500 workplaces and 20,000 individuals from the 1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey to analyze the relationship between labor unions and the availability of six employer-provided family-friendly policies. Unions appear to help with work-family issues by increasing the availability of parental leave and job sharing options through a combination of negotiating for additional benefits and providing better information about existing policies. There is also a negative association between union membership and the availability of working at home options and, for parents of young children, child care subsidies.

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In the United States, Great Britain, and many other countries, work-family concerns are an important public policy issue and trade unions have been suggested as a potential vehicle for improving the workplace provision of family-friendly policies (Bailyn, Drago, and Kochan, 2001; Cowell, 1993; Gerstel and Clawson, 2000; Grundy, Bell, and Firestein, 1999). While unions can lobby for legislative changes and help employees exercise existing legal rights, the focal role of U.S. and British unions is to negotiate specific workplace terms and conditions of employment. This paper uses the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) to analyze the extent to which unions are associated with the availability of workplace family-friendly policies.

The research concentrating on unions and work-family concerns is not extensive. Gerstel and Clawson (2000) document diverse union leader views on a range of work-family issues and explore why some unions have been more successful than others in negotiating family-responsive benefits. Budd and Brey (2000) analyze the impact of unions on the effectiveness of the U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act. Much of the remaining work on unions and work-life balance are advocacy and educational pieces such as Grundy, Bell, and Firestein (1999) and Schwartz (1996).

Several studies analyze the relationship between organizational characteristics and employer-provided family-friendly benefits (Bardoel et al., 1999; Deitch and Huffman, 2001; Forth et al., 1997; Glass and Fujimoto, 1995; Guthrie and Ross, 1999; Kelly and Dobbin, 1999; Osterman, 1995). The results for unionization are mixed. In studies of U.S. organizations, Guthrie and Ross (1999) and Kelly and Dobbin (1999) do not estimate significant effects of labor unions on maternity leave programs while Deitch and Huffman (2001) and Osterman (1995) similarly find no relationship between unionization and a broader array of family-friendly benefits. In contrast, in a sample of pregnant women, Glass and Fujimoto (1995) conclude that union status is one of the strongest

predictors of family-friendly benefits – though not always in a positive direction. Bardoel et al. (1999) find that unions are positively associated with leave options, but not other family-friendly policies such as flexible work options or child care in Australia. In none of this research, however, is unionism the focus of the analysis.

The present research uses the WERS98 to estimate the relationship between trade unions in Great Britain and the presence of six employer-provided family-friendly policies: parental leave, paid leave, subsidized child care, flexible working time, working at home, and job sharing. Unlike the previous empirical research, we are able to analyze both establishment and individual measures of family-friendly policies and we are able to exploit information on the characteristics of more than 20,000 individual employees matched to information about their workplaces.

In addition to extending the important work-life balance literature, this research also contributes to our understanding of what unions do (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Freeman (1981), Freeman and Medoff (1984), and others have documented that individuals represented by a trade union are more likely to receive traditional fringe benefits such as health insurance and retirement plans. As the nature of employer-provider benefits becomes more diverse, it is instructive to analyze whether the earlier results of unions increasing the likelihood of fringe benefits coverage continues to be accurate.

Family-Friendly Practices

In the postwar period, work policies and benefits were often shaped by the norms of the "ideal" worker who worked full-time and left unpaid household work to someone else (Williams, 2000). Consequently, family-friendly corporate policies can be divided into two categories (Bailyn,

1993; Bailyn, Drago, and Kochan, 2001).[1] One category provides services such as subsidized or on-site day care, sick-child care services, employee assistance programs, and on-site meal preparation to help employees fulfill the standards of the ideal worker. The other category is comprised of benefits that allow employees flexibility to deviate from the model of the ideal worker to better balance work and family concerns.

One major dimension of this second category of family-friendly benefits is leave polices. In Great Britain, there is an explicit distinction between maternity leave (a woman taking leave to give birth and care for a newborn child), paternity leave (a father taking leave around the birth of a new child), and parental leave (leave for the purpose of taking care of a child). Currently, all pregnant employees are entitled to18 weeks of maternity leave and women who have completed one year of service with their employer are able to take additional maternity leave. Moreover, male and female employees are entitled to 13 weeks of unpaid parental leave to be used over the first five years of the child's life. Mandatory paternity leave is scheduled to take effect in 2003. In the United States, there is less of a distinction between the types of leaves and under the Family and Medical Leave Act, employers with more than 50 employees must provide employees with 12 weeks of unpaid family and medical leave, which includes the British concepts of maternity, paternity, and parental leaves, each year. Employers in both countries are able to offer more generous benefits, in both compensation and time allowed off, and these additional leave policies are an important category of employer-sponsored family-friendly policies.

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[1] Case study examples of employer-sponsored family-friendly polices are described in Bureau of National Affairs (1986), Bravo (1995), and Bevan et al. (1999).

A second dimension of family-friendly policies that allow deviations from the ideal worker norm includes those that change the regular work schedule. One major example in this category is job sharing initiatives in which (typically) two employees work part-time to share the responsibilities and total hours of one full-time position. Allowing workers to choose to work part-time in the absence of a formal job-sharing arrangement is another example. Other policies in this category are flexible working schedules in which workers have greater control over when they put in their hours each week at work. Another class of family-friendly policies comprises those policies that allow workers to telecommute and work at home.

A variety of important research issues emerge from these family-friendly policies. Are these policies utilized by individual employees and are they effective (Haley, Perry-Jenkins, and Armenia, 2001; Thompson, Beauvais, and Lyness, 1999; Waldfogel, 1998)? Are employees willing to pay for them (Drago et al., 2001)? Should they be mandated as a matter of public policy (Heymann, 2000)? Are these policies sufficient by themselves to reconcile the conflicts of increased demands at both work and home (Bailyn, 1993)? And, when are these policies adopted (Bardoel et al., 1999; Deitch and Huffman, 2001; Osterman, 1995)? It is this last question, and in particular the role of labor unions, that is the focus of the remainder of this paper.

Conceptual Framework

The literature on employer-provided family-friendly benefits, and fringe benefits more generally, posits a range of alternative explanations as to why employers might provide family-friendly practices. For the purposes of the present analysis, it is useful to group these explanations into three groups or theories: neoclassical economics, internal labor markets, and institutional (or neoinstitutional).

The neoclassical economics explanations of employer-provided benefits focus on employer decision-making in spot labor markets. The use of non-pecuniary benefits as a tool to attract employees is well documented in the labor supply literature (Killingsworth, 1983). Economic theory suggests that firms will introduce family-friendly policies if they increase profits either via an increase in productivity or by lowering the costs associated with higher wages or higher turnover and/or absenteeism (Glass and Fujimoto, 1995). There are a wide variety non-pecuniary benefits that can be offered and profit-maximizing companies would only choose to offer family-friendly benefits if there was a sufficient level of demand amongst its current and potential employees (Guthrie and Roth, 1999).

In this theory, changes in the labor supply of women and the division of household non-labor market work across parents that lead to increased demand from workers for family-friendly practices cause profit-maximizing employers to offer such benefits. Empirically, this implies that demographic controls are important because different groups of workers will have varying levels of demand for such polices. This theory also suggests that labor market tightness will be important in that employers might need to offer additional benefits to attract employees when labor markets are tight.

Internal labor market explanations of employer-provided benefits stem from employers' need to develop employee commitment. Firms invest in workers and they want workers to invest in firm-specific human capital and have high levels of commitment. Thus, Osterman (1995) argues, firms provide non-pecuniary benefits such as family-friendly practices when they face difficulties employing high quality workers into work tasks that require high levels of commitment and non-supervised performance. Empirically, this implies that measures of internal labor markets and high commitment

work systems, such as the presence of training, job ladders, work teams, and employee seniority, will be important.

In contrast, institutional theories emphasize that organizations respond not only to economic factors, but also to the institutional environment (Guthrie and Ross, 1999; Kelly and Dobbin, 1999). In this model, firms are essentially pressured into adopting family-friendly policies by various institutions.[2] Of particular interest for the present study is one of the key workplace institutions: trade unionism. Unionization of a work group can bring about two important changes in the workplace. One, to the extent that the right to strike results in collective bargaining power that is greater than individual, labor's bargaining power will increase. This increased bargaining power might allow unions to negotiate family-friendly policies. Two, union representation can change the nature of workplace decision-making from a neoclassical focus on the marginal employee to a median-voter model with a focus on average preferences (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). If the average worker has a greater preference for family-friendly policies than the marginal worker, unionized workplaces will have a greater frequency of family-friendly policies.

In the remainder of this paper, we take a holistic approach. The focus of the analyses is the role of unionism and not testing between competing theories of employer-adoption of family-friendly practices. This conceptual framework, however, is instructive in that it provides a basis for our empirical specifications.

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[2] A prominent example in Guthrie and Ross (1999) and Kelly and Dobbin (1999), though not relevant in the present empirical context, is the legal environment – laws, administrative rulings, and the like.

WERS98: Data and Empirical Specification

The data used in this study are drawn from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999).[3] WERS98 is a nationally representative survey of workplaces with 10 or more employees containing a vast amount of information on diverse aspects of human resources and industrial relations. Face-to-face interviews for WERS98 were conducted with a manager (with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations) at 2,191 workplaces between October 1997 and June 1998. Moreover, 25 employees from 1,880 of these workplaces (or all of the employees in workplace with fewer than 25 employees) were randomly selected and asked to complete an employee questionnaire which resulted in over 28,000 completed questionnaires. The response rates were 80% for the face to face interviews and nearly 65% for the employee questionnaire.

WERS98 and its predecessors have been used to analyze diverse research questions (Millward et al., 2001), but we are not aware of any research using these data to examine unions and family-friendly work practices. The employee questionnaire asked "If you personally needed any of these arrangements, would they be available at this workplace?" and the choices of responses were flexible working hours, job sharing, parental leave, working at or from home in normal working hours, and workplace nursery or help with the cost of child care.[4] For each of these five categories, we create an indicator variable indicating whether each individual responded that it was available or not.

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[3] WERS98 is the fourth in an on-going series of surveys and follows the 1980, 1984, and 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys. WERS98 is the first to include questions pertaining to family-friendly practices. For additional details on WERS98, see Cully et al. (1999) and Forth and Kirby (2000).

[4] While unpaid parental leave is now required, it was a voluntary employer option at the time of the WERS98 survey.

Additionally, the questionnaire asked "If you needed to take a day off work at short notice, for example to look after a sick family member, how would you usually do it?" From the responses we constructed an indicator variable indicating whether the employee would be paid for taking time off.[5] These six indicator variables – parental leave, paid leave, child care subsidy, flexible hours, working at home, and job sharing – are the dependent variables of interest. From similarly-worded questions in the management interview, we can also construct a workplace indicator for each of these family-friendly policies except for flexible hours.

Retaining only those individuals who have complete information for the variables used in the analyses below leaves 20,801 individuals from 1,527 workplaces. Of these 20,801 observations, 28.1 percent indicate that parental leave is available to them, 49.1 percent indicate paid leave, 3.5 indicate subsidized child care, 33.1 percent indicate flexible hours, 11.2 percent indicate working at home, and 17.2 percent indicate job sharing. Note that the analogous workplace responses are uniformly higher and we return to this issue later in the paper. Note also that these figures are the unweighted sample fractions. They are presented here to help describe the sample, but they are not point estimates of the population frequencies. WERS98 is a stratified random sample and larger workplaces and some industries are over-represented. Consequently, employee weights should be used to construct population estimates and the weighted means are presented in brackets in Table 1.

As with the measures of family-friendly policies, both the employee and management questionnaires include information on unionization. In the employee questionnaire, individuals were asked whether or not they belong to a trade union (or staff association). In our sample, 40.6 percent

[5] Less than three percent of the employees responded that they could not take time off so we focus on whether or not paid leave is available.

responded in the affirmative. At the workplace level, the management interview asked about the number of union members and recognized unions in the workplaces. From this we construct a workplace recognition variable indicating whether or not there is a recognized union in the workplace and 58.4 percent of the workplaces in our sample (associated with 62.1 of the employees) have a recognized union. Unfortunately, the questions do not allow us to identify whether there is a recognized union that bargains for each specific individual employee in the survey.[6]

Following the wage literature on the union membership premium (Booth and Bryan, 2001; Budd and Na, 2000; Hildreth, 2000), we use the individual and workplace measure of unionization to construct four categories: union members in recognized workplaces, non-members in recognized workplaces, union members in workplaces without a recognized union, and non-members in workplaces with no recognized workplaces. The last category is the omitted category in Table 1. This nonunion category and the union members in recognized workplaces category each account for approximately 35 percent of the individuals. About 25 percent are non-members in recognized workplaces. These are either free riders or the recognized union(s) in their workplace represents different occupations than theirs. The remaining three percent of individuals are union members in workplaces without a recognized union.

To estimate the relationship between the six family-friendly practices and unionization, we estimate a probit model for each dependent variable. Each model includes the three union membership variables described in the preceding paragraph so that non-members in unrecognized workplaces is the omitted reference category. To control for other observable differences across individuals and workplaces that may be related to the presence of family-friendly polices, a variety

[6] The results are robust to using different workplace indicators of recognized unions in the workplace.

of control variables are also included. These variables were selected to capture the different theories described in the preceding section. Brief definitions and descriptive statistics for these variables are included in Table 1. Industry and occupation effects are also included. Lastly, the probit models are weighted using employee weights and the standard errors account for the stratified sampling procedure of workplaces and the clustered sampling procedure of individuals.

Baseline Probit Results

Table 2 presents the results from estimating a probit model for each of the six family-friendly policies using the individual responses pertaining to the availability of these policies. The probit coefficients, which reflect employee weights, are reported along with standard errors, which account for stratification and clustering, in parentheses. Estimated marginal effects are reported in brackets.[7]

The first column presents the results using the individual responses regarding the availability of parental leave. Before examining the union results, it is interesting to note that women, individuals with children, those with postgraduate degrees, and more senior employees are more likely to report parental leave being available while older employees, non-whites, and part-timers are less likely. Individuals in workplaces with larger fractions of female employees and in larger workplaces are also more likely to indicate that parental leave is available.

Union members in workplaces with recognized unions are estimated to be 0.081 (the marginal effect reported in Table 2) percentage points more likely to report that parental leave is available than non-members in workplaces without any recognized unions, ceteris paribus. This estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value < 0.0001) and relative to the weighted sample

[7] We use the standard marginal effect calculation: evaluating variables at their sample means, the marginal effects are calculated as the change in probability for a small change in the independent continuous variable and for a discrete one unit change in the dummy variables.

mean of the dependent variable of 0.268, this point estimate implies an increase of 30 percent in the availability of parental leave. We don't know, however, whether this estimate means that unions are more likely to negotiate for parental leave policies or whether union members have better information about existing policies. This issue will be analyzed further below.

For non-members in workplaces with recognized unions, there is also a significant, positive effect of 0.049 percentage points. These individuals might be free riders or are in different occupations than those represented by the recognized unions. Both of these groups, however, might be less likely to have accurate information about workplace policies which would yield a smaller coefficient than for union members. This estimate may also reflect a spillover effect from occupational groups represented by unions to those not.

Finally, one might hypothesize that union members in workplaces without a recognized union would be more likely to have parental leave available because an employer might try to discourage further unionization efforts by providing increased benefits. There isn't any evidence for parental leave, or any of the other family friendly polices, to support this possibility. Some of the point estimates for this variable are large, but all are very imprecisely estimated.

For members and non-members in recognized workplaces, there are no significant differences in the reporting rates for paid family leave policies or child care subsidies. For flexible working hours, the union member coefficient is essentially zero while for nonmembers, it is significantly positive. These probit models include occupation (and industry) fixed effects, but these are for nine, broad occupational categories.[8] There may be occupational differences between jobs often occupied by

[8] The occupational categories are managerial and senior administrative; professional; associate professional and technical; clerical and secretarial; craft and skilled service; personal and protective service; sales; operative and assembly; and other.

union members and non-members not captured by these broad occupation controls. Moreover, there are likely to be legitimate constraints on the feasibility of flexible working hours for some occupations based on the nature of the work (compare an assembly line worker with a professor).

The estimates in the last two columns imply that union membership in recognized workplaces is associated with less frequent options to work at home, though the overall sample mean and marginal effect are small, and with a significantly greater likelihood of job sharing options. In fact, the pattern of results for job sharing is quite similar to that for parental leave: the union membership marginal effect of 0.051 translates to a difference in excess of 30 percent relative to the sample mean availability of job sharing of 0.148 and non-members also exhibit a significantly positive, though smaller, effect. Overall, these baseline results suggest that trade unions do have a significant relationship with individual perceptions of the availability of some family-friendly policies, especially parental leave and job sharing, but unionism is also negatively associated with the ability to work at home.

These results are robust to different measures of unionism in the workplace. The results reported in the tables use an indicator for a unionized workplace based on a survey question about the number of recognized unions in that workplace. It is also possible to construct measures from a question on the fraction of workers covered and from questions pertaining to the role of unions in setting pay for different occupations (Booth and Bryan, 2001). Using each of these as an indicator for whether or not the workplace has one or more recognized unions, the pattern of results for family-friendly policies are the same as reported in Table 2, though the magnitude of the union effect varies slightly.

Instrumental Variables Estimates

It's possible that individuals with specific preferences for family-friendly benefits choose to be a union member or work in a unionized workplace. If these preferences are based on some unobservable characteristic, then the probit models in Table 2 fail to control for this difference and union status is endogenous. This would further imply that the estimates in Table 2 are biased upwards (in absolute value) and that the results are over-stating the effects on unions on family-friendly policies.

To address this issue, we need an instrument for union status which is correlated with union status but uncorrelated with family-friendly benefits. The WERS98 survey asks individuals who they think would best represent them "in dealing with managers" for two separate issues: "getting increases in my pay" and "if a manager wanted to discipline me." We construct two indicator variables for individuals who responded that a trade union would best represent them in these two matters. We think these variables fulfill the conditions to be valid instruments: correlated with union status but not family-friendly policies. Table 3 therefore presents the instrumental variables estimates of union membership. Note that the control variables from Table 2 are also included in the models, but are not reported because of space constraints.

There are two additional econometric complications. One, the dependent variable is dichotomous so Table 2 presents probit models while instrumental variables is regression-based. However, as will be shown in Table 3, the ordinary least squares (OLS) results, i.e., linear probability models, yield very similar results as the probit models in Table 2 so we do not think this is a significant issue in the present application. Two, union status in Table 2 is interacted with another

variable which is not easily handled by instrumental variables. Table 3 therefore presents two alternative specifications which each only include one union variable.

In the top panel of Table 3, we instrument for union members and ignore whether or not individuals are in workplaces with a recognized trade union. The probit model marginal effect is reported in row 1. Note that while the magnitudes of the marginal effects are smaller (in absolute value) relative to those presented in Table 2, the pattern is the same except for the case of flexible hours which is not statistically significant in the baseline results of Table 2. The second row presents the OLS (or linear probability model) results. The results are again quite similar to the probit results in row 1 so we feel it is appropriate to use instrumental variables in this case even though the dependent variables are dichotomous. The instrumental variables estimates when we instrument for union membership (and ignore workplace unionization) are reported in row 3.

Recall the concern: if some unobservable characteristics are driving the family-friendly results and these unobservables are correlated with union status, then the union estimates in a probit or linear probability model will be biased up (in absolute value). The estimates in row 3 of Table 3 do not support this concern. In each case where there is a statistically significant union effect, i.e., excluding paid family leave and child care, the instrumental variables estimate is larger, not smaller, in absolute value.

In the bottom panel of Table 3 we present an alternative specification in which the variable of interest is union member in a recognized workplace. The conclusions are the same as in the top panel: the OLS estimates are similar to the probit estimates, and the instrumental variables estimates are uniformly larger in absolute value than the OLS and probit estimates. These results do not

indicate that the baseline results in Table 2 overstate the union effects on family-friendly policies and the remaining results in the subsequent sections will therefore utilize probit models as in Table 2.

Subgroup Differences

The preceding tables present estimates of the relationship between unionization and family-friendly policies for the WERS98 sample as a whole. The literature on work-family issues, however, often emphasizes the heavily ingrained gender roles in family care (Williams, 2000). Thus, there may be important differences between men and women, or between other groups, that are hidden by the overall point estimates. We therefore estimated the models of Table 2 for a variety of subgroups and selected results are presented in Table 4.

For ease of comparison, the first two rows of Table 4 present the baseline union member in a recognized workplace estimates from Table 2 and the overall weighted sample means for each of the six family-friendly policies. Row 3 presents the union member in a recognized workplace estimate for analogous probit models in which the sample is restricted to women only. The sample frequencies of the six policies among women are reported in row 4. The differences between the entire sample and women are slight.[9] The largest point estimate differences are in the paid family leave, child care, and flexible hours policies, but none of these coefficients are statistically significant and with imprecisely estimated coefficients, it is not surprising that the point estimates are noisy between rows 1 and 3.

As in the entire sample, among women unions are positively associated with the likelihood of parental leave and job sharing, and negatively associated with options pertaining to working at

[9] There is also a question that asks whether the work they the individual does is done by women or men. No significant differences in the union results are found for individuals who report that their work is done mainly or only by women.

home. For this last policy, the union estimate in row 3 is technically not statistically significant at the five percent level, but it is quite close with a p-value of 0.058. The biggest difference seems to be with respect to job sharing. In the overall sample, the marginal effect is 0.051 percentage points whereas for women it is 0.076 and for men it is 0.022. Thus, unions seem to have a greater impact on job sharing arrangements for women than men.

Rows 5 and 6 of Table 4 present the results of restricting the sample to non-white individuals. Among these individuals, the union effect on parental leave is much greater than among whites. Moreover, the union marginal effect in the job sharing model is also about twice as large as for whites (0.092 versus 0.047). The sample size is small (764) and the estimates in the last two columns are marginally significant (p-values of 0.060 and 0.078, respectively) so we don't want to overstate these results. But they do hint at a greater union role in affecting the availability of parental leave and job sharing options among workers who are members of a minority group.

Overall, the two strongest positive effects for unions appear to be for parental leave and job sharing policies and row 7 demonstrates that these results are even stronger for individuals with young children (ages 0-4). In fact, the union marginal effects for both of these policies are twice as large for this subsample than the overall sample. At the same time, this subsample also exhibits a statistically significant union effect for child care. While the sample frequency is quite small for this policy, the estimate in row 7 implies that unionized workers with young children are only half as likely (a marginal effect of -0.034 relative to a sample mean of 0.071) to have this benefit available.

Lastly, rows 9 and 10 present the results when the sample is restricted to individuals in manual occupations. The most striking results are in the last two columns. The full-sample negative union effect on working at home and the positive effect on job sharing options appear to be limited to non-

manual occupations in that the estimated coefficients in row 9 are small and imprecisely estimated. Note, however, that this may reflect a lack of opportunity in that manual occupations might not be well-suited to these types of arrangements. For working at home, in particular, note that the sample mean is only 0.016 among manual occupations.

Better Policies or Information?

While the previous section reveals some important differences across some subgroups, the overall results show a positive association between unionism and the availability of parental leave and job sharing policies in British workplaces. Recall that the results in Tables 2 - 4 use individual responses to questions about the availability of these policies. Thus, this positive union effect may stem from two very different sources. Unions may successfully bargain for these policies (or avoid them, as in the case of working at home) for their members so that union-nonunion differences reflect actual differences in the availability of these policies. On the other hand, an important alternative scenario is that these policies do not differ between unionized and nonunion workplaces but that unionized individuals are better (or worse, in the case of working at home) informed about the availability of these policies. The results in Tables 2 - 4 do not distinguish between these two explanations.

To investigate this issue, first note that with the exception of flexible working hours, WERS98 contains both individual and workplace measures of the family-friendly policies. For the workplace-level questions, the manager with day-to-day responsibilities for personnel matters was interviewed and for the family-friendly policies, this manager was asked questions very similar to the individual questions described above. The main difference in the wording between the individual questions and the workplace questions is that while the individual questions ask whether the policies are available

to the individual respondent, the workplace questions ask whether the policies are available to "any non-managerial employees."

The top panel of Table 5 presents select results from five workplace probit models analogous to the individual-level probit models from Table 2. These five probit models include all of the workplace-level control variables from Table 2 and the results for the recognized unions in the workplace coefficients are reported in the first row of Table 5. The results are qualitatively similar to those from the individual-level analyses in Table 2: unions are associated with increased availability of parental leave and job sharing (though with a p-value of 0.156) and decreased availability of working at home options.[10] These results imply that unions are associated with greater actual availability of parental leave benefits and reduced availability of working at home options.[11]

But what about the information provision scenario? Consider a probit model for parental leave, for example, using the individual responses but restricting the sample only to those individuals whose workplace had a parental leave policy. Since all individuals in this model have a parental leave policy available, then the estimated coefficients reflect differences in information about the policy – ignorance, not actual availability. To this end, the bottom panel of Table 5 presents this type of probit model for each of the five policies in which each sample is limited to those individuals with workplace responses indicating the presence of the relevant family-friendly policy.

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[10] The previous empirical literature on the availability of company-provided family-friendly benefits is comprised almost entirely of workplace or firm-level analyses. The results in the first row of Table 5 indicate that this is not problematic in that the pattern of results between the individual and workplace-level analyses using WERS98 are similar.

[11] Since we do not know for sure whether the manager's response applies to the unionized employees, this assertion is not valid if workplaces with unions systematically provide family friendly benefits to nonunionized, non-managerial occupations with greater frequency than its own unionized occupations and than other nonunion workplaces. This seems unlikely.

There is one complication, however. The workplace-level measure captures whether any non-managerial employees have this policy available, not whether all non-managerial employees have this policy available. To address this, the probit models in the bottom panel of Table 5 further exclude workplaces in which three other fringe benefits (pension plan, extra sick leave, and four or more weeks paid leave) are not provided to both managers and the largest occupational group. This is an attempt to omit workplaces in which fringe benefits are not equally available.

The results for union members in recognized workplaces in Table 5 include statistically significant and positive coefficients for parental leave and job sharing policies and very imprecisely estimated coefficients for the other policies. We cannot rule out the possibility that these results reflect differential availability of these policies between unionized and nonunion employees within a specific workplace. But to the extent that this possibility is not widespread, the results imply that unionized employees have better information about parental leave and job sharing policies. More definitive results, however, require additional survey questions not presently available.

Conclusion

Problems of balancing work-life conflicts are a major policy concern and the focus of significant research. One possible institution for improving work-life problems is trade unions and a primary mechanism for unions in this regard is to bargain for additional employer-provided family-friendly policies. Therefore, we use linked data on over 1,500 workplaces and 20,000 individuals from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) to analyze the relationship between unions and the availability of six major family-friendly policies: parental leave, paid family leave, child care subsidies, flexible working hours, working at home options, and job sharing options.

Using weighted probit models, the overall results imply that union members in workplaces with one or more recognized unions are significantly more likely to report the availability of parental leave and job sharing policies and significantly less likely to report the availability of work at home options. Instrumental variables estimates do not indicate that endogeneity is a problem when interpreting these results. Unions seems to be especially important for employees who are members of minority groups and those with young children, while the job sharing and work at home results are confined to non-manual occupations. Moreover, for parents of young children, union members in recognized workplaces are significantly less likely to report the availability of child care policies.

We also try to investigate the extent to which these results, which are based on individual reports of the availability of these policies, reflect greater provision of these policies in unionized workplaces or greater information about these policies in unionized workplaces. As described in the previous section, the data are not perfect for addressing this issue, but assuming that these benefits are relatively uniformly applied among non-managerial occupations within a workplace, the results imply that the negative union estimate for working at home reflects less availability, the higher level of individual responses among union members for job sharing policies reflects greater information about these policies, and the higher level of parental leave responses reflects both higher availability and improved information.

In sum, unions appear to positively affect the provision of some family-friendly policies, in particular parental leave and job sharing options, in British workplaces through a combination of negotiating for additional benefits and through providing better information about existing policies. At the same time, unions appear to be negatively associated with the provision of other family-friendly

policies such as working at home options and child care subsidies. Whether this reflects the preferences of union members or union leaders is an important question for future research.

While sometimes positive and sometimes negative, the results indicate that unions are related to the provision of family-friendly policies. As work-family conflicts continue to affect U.S. and British employees and organizations, policy makers need to incorporate unions into their discussions and activities. And unions need to work with their members, employers, and others to make sure they are effectively serving their members in this important arena.

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Table 1
British Workplace Employee Relations Survey Sample, 1998:
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Sample Mean (1)	Sample Standard Deviation (2)	Weighted Mean (3)
Individual Responses			
Parental Leave Available	0.281	(0.450)	[0.268]
Paid Family Leave on Short Notice	0.491	(0.500)	[0.453]
Workplace Nursery or Child Care Subsidy Available	0.035	(0.184)	[0.036]
Flexible Working Hours Available	0.331	(0.470)	[0.312]
Working at Home Available	0.112	(0.315)	[0.090]
Job Sharing Available	0.172	(0.378)	[0.148]
Union Member	0.406	(0.491)	[0.388]
Management Responses (Workplace-Level)			
Parental Leave Available	0.436	(0.496)	[0.415]
Paid Family Leave Available	0.658	(0.474)	[0.613]
Workplace Nursery or Child Care Subsidy Available	0.124	(0.329)	[0.115]
Working at Home Available	0.183	(0.387)	[0.171]
Job Sharing Available	0.405	(0.491)	[0.372]
Recognized Union(s) Present	0.621	(0.485)	[0.599]
Individual-Level Variables			
Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.377	(0.485)	[0.360]
Not a Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.244	(0.429)	[0.238]
Union Member in Non-Recognized Workplace	0.029	(0.167)	[0.027]
Age (midpoints of 7 categories)	39.512	(11.317)	[39.411]
Female	0.499	(0.500)	[0.481]
Living with a Spouse or Partner	0.700	(0.458)	[0.698]
Any Children Ages 0-4	0.140	(0.347)	[0.143]
Any Children Ages 5-11	0.194	(0.395)	[0.199]
Any Children Ages 12-18	0.200	(0.400)	[0.200]
Non-white	0.037	(0.188)	[0.036]

Education (O Level is omitted category)			
CSE or Equivalent	0.109	(0.312)	[0.124]
A Level or Equivalent	0.159	(0.366)	[0.146]
Degree or Equivalent	0.189	(0.391)	[0.156]
Postgraduate Degree or Equivalent	0.063	(0.243)	[0.050]
Education Other Level	0.215	(0.411)	[0.256]
Recognized Vocational Qualifications	0.379	(0.485)	[0.378]
Hourly Wage (midpoints of 12 categories)	7.540	(4.900)	[7.247]
Years at this Workplace	5.399	(3.617)	[5.354]
Part-Time	0.195	(0.396)	[0.257]
Fixed Term Contract	0.030	(0.172)	[0.028]
Temporary Position	0.034	(0.182)	[0.040]
Days of Training in Last Year	2.671	(3.237)	[2.454]
Workplace Variables			
Total Employees	257.066	(604.075)	[595.629]
Establishment Age (years)	35.936	(42.945)	[38.555]
Firm Has Multiple UK Work Sites	0.788	(0.409)	[0.749]
Public Sector Organization	0.333	(0.470)	[0.281]
Proportion Female Employees	0.493	(0.286)	[0.483]
Proportion Part-time Employees	0.232	(0.260)	[0.256]
Proportion Youth Employees	0.052	(0.099)	[0.060]
Proportion Older Employees	0.156	(0.113)	[0.160]
Proportion Non-white Employees	0.040	(0.090)	[0.041]
Average Annual Wage	7.520	(2.491)	[7.244]
Pay Based on Age or Years of Experience	0.515	(0.500)	[0.491]
Pay Based on Job Grade	0.754	(0.431)	[0.727]
Proportion of Employees with Formal Training	0.515	(0.360)	[0.472]
Proportion in Formal Teams	0.723	(0.355)	[0.707]
Proportion in Quality Circles	0.229	(0.322)	[0.221]
Employees Have A Lot of	0.228	(0.419)	[0.229]

Discretion Over Work			
Employees Have Some Discretion Over Work	0.449	(0.497)	[0.443]
Formal Collective Dispute Procedure in the Workplace	0.664	(0.472)	[0.657]
Human Resources Employee at the Work Site	0.424	(0.494)	[0.453]
Employees Dismissed ÷ Total Employees (last 12 months)	0.011	(0.030)	[0.014]
Employees Resigned ÷ Total Employees (last 12 months)	0.128	(0.167)	[0.135]
Fraction of Occupations with Difficulty Filling Vacancies	0.225	(0.315)	[0.232]
Sample Size	20,801		

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.
Notes: The sample mean and standard error (in parentheses) are unweighted.
The weighted mean [in brackets] uses individual sampling weights.

Table 2
Probit Analysis of Family Friendly Policies in Great Britain, 1998

	Parental Leave	Paid Family Leave	Child Care	Flexible Hours	Work at Home	Job Sharing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.251*	0.054	-0.097	-0.001	-0.275*	0.262*
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.129)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.066)
	[0.081]	[0.021]	[-0.004]	[-0.000]	[-0.021]	[0.051]
Nonmember in a Recognized Workplace	0.150*	-0.021	-0.087	0.144*	-0.011	0.167*
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.126)	(0.059)	(0.079)	(0.067)
	[0.049]	[-0.008]	[-0.003]	[0.051]	[-0.001]	[0.033]
Union Member in a Non-Recognized Workplace	0.033	-0.078	0.055	-0.110	-0.192	0.014
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.172)	(0.090)	(0.122)	(0.100)
	[0.011]	[-0.031]	[0.002]	[-0.037]	[-0.013]	[0.003]
Age	-0.022*	0.033*	-0.005	-0.011	0.052*	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)
	[-0.007]	[0.013]	[-0.0002]	[-0.004]	[0.004]	[-0.002]
Age Squared (÷ 1,000)	0.089	-0.378*	-0.056	0.195	-0.516*	0.095
	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.253)	(0.133)	(0.180)	(0.144)
	[0.028]	[-0.149]	[-0.002]	[0.067]	[-0.042]	[0.018]
Female	0.251*	-0.084*	0.207*	0.081*	-0.123*	0.239*
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.046)
	[0.080]	[-0.033]	[0.008]	[0.028]	[-0.010]	[0.045]
Living with a Spouse or Partner	0.010	0.024	-0.099	-0.066*	0.031	-0.026
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.043)
	[0.003]	[0.010]	[-0.004]	[-0.023]	[0.002]	[-0.005]
Any Children Ages 0-4	0.221*	-0.018	0.349*	-0.012	0.127*	0.090
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.074)	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.046)
	[0.074]	[-0.007]	[0.017]	[-0.004]	[0.011]	[0.017]
Any Children Ages 5-11	0.069*	-0.005	-0.012	0.089*	-0.012	0.008
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.069)	(0.033)	(0.052)	(0.044)
	[0.022]	[-0.002]	[-0.001]	[0.031]	[-0.001]	[0.001]
Any Children Ages 12-18	0.099*	-0.101*	0.100	0.064	0.020	-0.005
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.041)
	[0.032]	[-0.040]	[0.004]	[0.022]	[0.002]	[-0.001]
Non-white	-0.199*	-0.044	-0.313*	0.161	-0.207*	0.068
	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.129)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.116)
	[-0.059]	[-0.017]	[-0.009]	[0.058]	[-0.014]	[0.013]
Education (O Level is omitted category)						
CSE or Equivalent	-0.189*	0.014	0.193	0.055	0.066	-0.105
	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.114)	(0.044)	(0.081)	(0.060)
	[-0.057]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.019]	[0.006]	[-0.019]
A Level	0.034	0.064	0.042	0.110*	0.225*	0.096*

or Equivalent	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.046)
	[0.011]	[0.025]	[0.002]	[0.039]	[0.021]	[0.019]
Degree	0.029	-0.009	0.122	0.145*	0.391*	0.165*
or Equivalent	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.086)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.052)
	[0.009]	[-0.004]	[0.005]	[0.051]	[0.041]	[0.033]
Postgraduate	0.234*	-0.049	0.291*	0.328*	0.621*	0.252*
Degree	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.086)	(0.069)
or Equivalent	[0.079]	[-0.019]	[0.014]	[0.121]	[0.082]	[0.053]
Other Education	-0.230*	-0.025	-0.067	0.073	-0.086	-0.186*
Level	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.105)	(0.045)	(0.067)	(0.062)
	[-0.071]	[-0.010]	[-0.002]	[0.025]	[-0.007]	[-0.032]
Recognized	-0.034	-0.004	0.078	-0.036	-0.108*	-0.034
Vocational	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.038)
Qualifications	[-0.011]	[-0.002]	[0.003]	[-0.012]	[-0.009]	[-0.006]
Hourly Wage	0.004	0.001	-0.002	-0.007*	0.012*	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
	[0.001]	[0.0002]	[-0.0001]	[-0.002]	[0.001]	[0.0004]
Tenure (years)	0.013*	0.012*	0.020*	0.001	0.006	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Part-time	-0.149*	-0.357*	-0.025	0.266*	-0.101	0.156*
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.040)	(0.074)	(0.049)
	[-0.046]	[-0.137]	[-0.001]	[0.095]	[-0.008]	[0.030]
Fixed Term	-0.130	-0.274*	-0.067	-0.090	-0.019	-0.149
	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.125)	(0.074)	(0.105)	(0.078)
	[-0.039]	[-0.105]	[-0.002]	[-0.031]	[-0.001]	[-0.025]
Temporary	-0.092	-0.459*	-0.014	0.151*	-0.128	0.118
	(0.078)	(0.083)	(0.126)	(0.066)	(0.149)	(0.083)
	[-0.028]	[-0.170]	[-0.001]	[0.054]	[-0.009]	[0.023]
Training (days in	0.025*	0.005	0.003	0.032*	0.037*	0.027*
last year)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.0001]	[0.011]	[0.003]	[0.005]
<u>Workplace Variables</u>						
Workplace Number	0.050*	-0.057	0.135*	-0.028	-0.105*	0.015
of Employees	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.014)
(÷ 1,000)	[0.016]	[-0.022]	[0.005]	[-0.010]	[-0.009]	[0.003]
Workplace Age	0.068	0.347	-0.570	-1.607*	-2.659*	0.104
(years, ÷ 1,000)	(0.360)	(0.448)	(0.874)	(0.509)	(0.716)	(0.422)
	[0.021]	[0.137]	[-0.021]	[-0.556]	[-0.217]	[0.019]
Firm has Multiple	-0.026	0.118*	-0.336*	-0.120*	-0.185*	-0.073
Work Sites	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.099)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.054)
	[-0.008]	[0.046]	[-0.015]	[-0.042]	[-0.016]	[-0.014]
Public Sector	0.043	0.302*	0.195	-0.004	0.151	0.239*

	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.161)	(0.091)	(0.115)	(0.075)
	[0.014]	[0.119]	[0.008]	[-0.001]	[0.013]	[0.047]
Workplace Proportion Female	0.362*	-0.007	0.549*	0.566*	0.299	0.839*
	(0.109)	(0.138)	(0.254)	(0.147)	(0.177)	(0.145)
	[0.115]	[-0.003]	[0.020]	[0.196]	[0.024]	[0.155]
Workplace Proportion Part-time	-0.050	-0.525*	-0.063	-0.229	-0.173	-0.170
	(0.112)	(0.128)	(0.228)	(0.144)	(0.225)	(0.131)
	[-0.016]	[-0.207]	[-0.002]	[-0.079]	[-0.014]	[-0.031]
Workplace Proportion Youth	0.119	-0.946*	0.469	0.674*	-1.444*	0.194
	(0.241)	(0.229)	(0.478)	(0.252)	(0.565)	(0.259)
	[0.038]	[-0.373]	[0.017]	[0.233]	[-0.118]	[0.036]
Workplace Proportion Older Workers	-0.299	-0.027	-0.327	0.124	0.135	-0.020
	(0.159)	(0.214)	(0.383)	(0.201)	(0.298)	(0.222)
	[-0.095]	[-0.011]	[-0.012]	[0.043]	[0.010]	[-0.004]
Workplace Proportion Non-white	0.306	0.058	0.956*	0.105	0.262	-0.063
	(0.184)	(0.198)	(0.342)	(0.208)	(0.234)	(0.225)
	[0.097]	[0.023]	[0.036]	[0.036]	[0.021]	[-0.012]
Workplace Average Wage	0.002	0.029*	0.024	0.010	0.014	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)
	[0.001]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Pay Based on Age or Seniority	-0.002	-0.037	-0.056	-0.077	-0.076	0.041
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.090)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.043)
	[-0.001]	[-0.015]	[-0.002]	[-0.027]	[-0.006]	[0.008]
Pay Based on Job Grade	-0.004	0.039	-0.078	0.036	-0.029	0.015
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.095)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.048)
	[-0.001]	[0.015]	[-0.003]	[0.012]	[-0.002]	[0.003]
Workplace Proportion with Formal Training	0.017	0.164*	-0.069	-0.103	-0.060	0.104
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.132)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.068)
	[0.006]	[0.065]	[-0.003]	[-0.036]	[-0.005]	[0.019]
Workplace Proportion in Teams	0.104*	-0.054	0.336*	-0.006	-0.084	0.104
	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.120)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.065)
	[0.033]	[-0.021]	[0.012]	[-0.002]	[-0.007]	[0.019]
Workplace Proportion in Quality Circles	0.020	0.041	-0.047	0.118	0.007	0.047
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.131)	(0.072)	(0.102)	(0.064)
	[0.006]	[0.016]	[-0.002]	[0.041]	[0.001]	[0.009]
Employees Have A Lot of Discretion Over Work	0.083	-0.057	0.332*	0.146*	0.135	0.033
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.089)	(0.057)
	[0.027]	[-0.022]	[0.015]	[0.052]	[0.012]	[0.006]
Employees Have Some Discretion Over Work	0.063	-0.019	0.213*	0.098*	0.041	0.043
	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.102)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.050)
	[0.020]	[-0.007]	[0.008]	[0.034]	[0.003]	[0.008]
Formal Collective Dispute Procedure	0.075	-0.046	0.028	0.113*	0.003	-0.029
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.099)	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.051)

at Workplace	[0.024]	[-0.018]	[0.001]	[0.039]	[0.001]	[-0.005]
Workplace Has a Human Resources Employee	0.056 (0.038) [0.018]	0.196* (0.044) [0.077]	0.338* (0.096) [0.013]	0.038 (0.046) [0.013]	0.091 (0.057) [0.007]	0.042 (0.046) [0.008]
Workplace Dismissal Rate (12 months)	-0.167 (0.623) [-0.053]	-1.536* (0.700) [-0.605]	1.611 (0.956) [0.060]	-0.321 (0.623) [-0.111]	-1.722 (0.964) [-0.141]	0.273 (0.752) [0.051]
Workplace Resignation Rate (12 months)	-0.011 (0.148) [-0.003]	-0.226 (0.127) [-0.089]	-1.217* (0.366) [-0.045]	0.172 (0.139) [0.059]	0.431 (0.222) [0.035]	-0.135 (0.176) [-0.025]
Difficulty Filling Vacancies (fraction of occupations)	-0.096 (0.054) [-0.030]	0.066 (0.064) [0.026]	-0.050 (0.146) [-0.002]	-0.041 (0.064) [-0.014]	-0.133 (0.092) [-0.011]	-0.097 (0.074) [-0.018]
Industry (11)	Yes*	Yes*	Yes*	Yes*	Yes*	Yes*
Occupation (8)	Yes*	Yes*	Yes	Yes*	Yes*	Yes*

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Notes: The sample size is 20,801. Each entry contains the probit coefficient, standard error (in parentheses), and marginal effect [in brackets] from a probit model weighted by individual sampling weights. The standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure.

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level (industry and occupation are joint tests).

Table 3
Instrumental Variables Estimates: Union Member Results

	Parental Leave	Paid Family Leave	Child Care	Flexible Hours	Work at Home	Job Sharing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Union Member						
1. Probit:	0.041*	0.020	-0.001	-0.040*	-0.021*	0.019*
Marginal Effect	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.008)
2. OLS	0.041*	0.018	-0.004	-0.036*	-0.041*	0.028*
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.002)
3. Instrumental	0.059*	0.035	-0.001	-0.098*	-0.090*	0.041*
Variables	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Union Member in a Recognized Workplace						
4. Probit:	0.048*	0.027	-0.002	-0.035*	-0.020*	0.023*
Marginal Effect	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.008)
5. OLS	0.047*	0.026	-0.005	-0.032*	-0.040*	0.034*
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.010)
6. Instrumental	0.061*	0.036	-0.001	-0.101*	-0.093*	0.042*
Variables	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.018)

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Notes: The sample size is 20,296. Each entry reports the coefficient (rows 2, 3, 5, and 6) or marginal effect (rows 1 and 4) and standard error (in parentheses) for the indicated union measure. Each model contains the control variables (except those relating to union status) from Table 2. In rows 3 and 6, union status is instrumented by two indicator variables for whether the individual feels a union is their best representative for pay and discipline matters. The models use individual weights and the standard errors account for the clustering in the sampling procedure.

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 4
Unions and Family-Friendly Policies: Subgroup Estimates

	Parental Leave	Paid Family Leave	Child Care	Flexible Hours	Work at Home	Job Sharing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Baseline Results (from Table 2, sample size 20,801)						
1. Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.251*	0.054	-0.097	-0.001	-0.275*	0.262*
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.129)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.066)
	[0.081]	[0.021]	[-0.004]	[-0.000]	[-0.021]	[0.051]
2. Dependent Variable Mean	0.268	0.453	0.036	0.312	0.090	0.148
Women (sample size 10,370)						
3. Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.259*	-0.034	-0.245	-0.016	-0.195	0.277*
	(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.166)	(0.078)	(0.103)	(0.077)
	[0.091]	[-0.013]	[-0.011]	[-0.006]	[-0.012]	[0.076]
4. Dependent Variable Mean	0.305	0.396	0.046	0.368	0.073	0.209
Non-white (sample size 764)						
5. Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.464*	-0.069	0.169	0.067	-0.707	0.447
	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.449)	(0.224)	(0.376)	(0.253)
	[0.140]	[-0.027]	[0.004]	[0.025]	[-0.016]	[0.092]
6. Dependent Variable Mean	0.260	0.449	0.032	0.380	0.091	0.180
Has a Child or Children Ages 0-4 (sample size 2,830)						
7. Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.427*	0.057	-0.654*	0.143	-0.017	0.555*
	(0.122)	(0.132)	(0.226)	(0.122)	(0.162)	(0.148)
	[0.161]	[0.023]	[-0.034]	[0.047]	[-0.002]	[0.111]
8. Dependent Variable Mean	0.374	0.470	0.071	0.299	0.109	0.179
Manual Occupation (sample size 7,058)						
9. Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.182*	0.170	-0.198	-0.077	0.073	0.005
	(0.092)	(0.108)	(0.191)	(0.085)	(0.143)	(0.115)
	[0.049]	[0.065]	[-0.003]	[-0.022]	[0.001]	[0.001]
10. Dependent Variable Mean	0.207	0.421	0.022	0.230	0.016	0.078

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Notes: Each entry contains the probit coefficient, standard error (in parentheses), and marginal effect [in brackets] from a probit model for the indicated subgroup. The probit models are weighted by individual sampling weights and include all of the variables from Table 2. The standard errors account for the stratification and clustering in the sampling procedure.

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 5
Unions and Family-Friendly Policies: Effects on Policies or Information?

	Parental Leave	Paid Family Leave	Child Care	Work at Home	Job Sharing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Workplace-Level Analyses					
Recognized Union(s) in the Workplace	0.466* (0.197) [0.166]	0.056 (0.185) [0.022]	0.203 (0.227) [0.009]	-0.360* (0.187) [-0.050]	0.273 (0.192) [0.073]
Workplace Controls from Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	1,527	1,527	1,527	1,527	1,527
Individual-Level Analyses: Workplaces with the Family-Friendly Policy and Equal Other Benefits					
Union Member in a Recognized Workplace	0.213* (0.094) [0.079]	-0.005 (0.076) [-0.002]	-0.205 (0.308) [-0.047]	-0.200 (0.194) [-0.039]	0.333* (0.137) [0.105]
Nonmember in a Recognized Workplace	0.161 (0.098) [0.060]	-0.042 (0.076) [-0.017]	-0.290 (0.308) [-0.061]	-0.090 (0.187) [-0.018]	0.265* (0.135) [0.087]
Union Member in a Non-Recognized Workplace	0.067 0.129) [0.025]	-0.090 (0.105) [-0.036]	0.303 (0.448) [0.079]	-0.305 (0.258) [-0.051]	0.287* (0.142) [0.099]
Controls from Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.558	0.215	0.224	0.281
Sample Size	7,330	10,061	2,087	3,036	6,823

Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998.

Notes: Each entry contains the probit coefficient, standard error (in parentheses), and marginal effect [in brackets] from a probit model weighted by workplace or individual sampling weights. The individual-level probit models are conditional upon the workplace reporting the availability of the relevant family-friendly policy and upon three other fringe benefits (pension plan, extra sick leave, and four weeks paid leave) being available to both managers and the largest occupation group. The standard errors in the individual-level analyses account for the clustering in the sampling procedure.
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.