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Abstract

We develop a model of competition between retailer chains with a structural estimation of the demand and supply in the supermarket industry in France. In the model, supermarkets compete in price and brand offer over all food products to attract consumers, in particular through the share of private labels versus national brands across all their products. Private labels can serve as a differentiation tool for the retailers in order to soften price competition. They may affect the marginal costs of all products for the retailer because of eventual quality differences and also by helping retailers to obtain better conditions from their manufacturers. Differentiation is taken into account by estimating a discrete-continuous choice model of demand where outlet choice and total expenditures are determined endogenously. On the supply side, we consider a simultaneous competition game in brand offer and price between retailers to identify marginal costs. After estimation by simulated maximum likelihood, the structural estimates allow to simulate the effect on the equilibrium behavior of retailer chains of a demand shock through an increase in transportation costs for consumers and a merger between two retailer chains.

JEL Codes: L13, L22, L81

Key words: competition, discrete/continuous choice, retailing, structural estimation

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1 Introduction

Private labels (PLs), or store brands, have been growing in importance within the food retailing industry during the last years. Several explanations can be found to justify why a retailer may find profitable to introduce a PL in its offer. The most common justification in the IO literature lies in the vertical relationship between manufacturers of National Brands (NBs) and retailers. In this context, PLs are used by the retailer as a mean to either reduce the double marginalization problem or to gain some bargaining power in front of manufacturers. The marketing literature, on the other hand, has stressed the role of PLs as a tool for either better price discriminate among consumers or for generating consumer loyalty to the store.

All these explanations are in line with statements made by industry managers. Bergès-Sennou, Bontems and Réquillart (2004) cite a survey by LSA/Fournier¹ according to which the main reasons retailers develop PLs are: to increase customer loyalty (16%), to improve their positioning (18%), to improve margins (25%) and to lower prices (33%). More direct conversations with managers reveal that, at least for some retailers, PLs were developed as an instrument to fight back the entry of Hard Discounters (HDs) in the industry².

The purpose of this paper is to integrate these considerations in a single framework in order to better describe how PLs affect the competition between retailers. From their point of view, private labels play a role both in the demand and in the supply sides. Hence, a complete evaluation of the impact of PLs in retailer competition needs to take into account both of them. We will follow the literature on structural models of competition (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) or Bonnet and Dubois (2010)) to estimate the parameters of the demand that, together with an assumed equilibrium condition for the game played by the retailers, will yield estimates for the margins and marginal costs of each retailer. In order to account for the possible effects of private labels on the supply side, we will endogenize the location of retailers in the characteristics space defined by the policy towards PLs. Draganska and Jain (2005) have a similar game of simultaneous price and product line length competition for the supply side, where the product line is a characteristic of the market for yogurts analyzed.

The role of private labels on the demand side is two-fold. On the one hand, PLs serve as a

¹LSA/Fournier “Les marques de distributeurs”, *Libre Service Actualités*, 1472 (January 1996):10-15.

²This is the case, for example, of Leclerc in France who changed its policy towards PLs in 1998 after the successful entry of Aldi and Lidl to the french market.

differentiation tool for retailers. In the characteristics approach to product differentiation, each consumer has an ideal mix of private labels and national brands in the assortment of the retailer. These ideal points are dispersed along the characteristics space, in which retailers themselves locate by choosing their policy towards these kinds of products. Consumers with stronger preferences for PLs will naturally choose to visit those retailers offering a larger assortment of them. Thus the differentiation aspect of PLs comes into play in retailers' competition for the customers. Once the customers are in the store, PLs play a second role of price discrimination in each of the product lines offered by the retailer. In this case, the private label is an option that the retailer can use to better screen the willingness to pay of the different consumers in its customer base (see Putsis (1997) and Stole (2005)). These two mechanisms also explain why PLs emerged as a response to the entry of hard discounters: consumers with the lowest willingness to pay for NBs were attracted by stores offering cheap PL products, reducing the customer base of the incumbent retailers. Retailers had then the choice between a smaller customer base but with a higher average willingness to pay - given that entrants provided the screening device - or keeping the customer base and pursuing themselves the screening through the introduction of private labels.

To determine whether the development of private labels is an important tool of differentiation among retailers, we estimate a discrete-continuous choice model for the demand side (following Haneman (1984) and Smith (2004)) where consumers choose which retailer they patronize and how much they spend depending on the retailers' characteristics.

A survey published in a study ordered by the Office of Fair Trading about competition in the retailing industry³ identified the principal factors affecting the choice of a grocery store. Low price was classified in the third place, just behind the product range and selection and immediately after the quality of the service. The main factor driving the choice was convenience. This points out a moderate importance of price competition and shows that retailers are differentiated according to location and product selection. The strategy of the retailers towards PL products affects this last factor of differentiation, thus raising the possibility that some features of this strategy contribute to soften even more the competition in prices. Hence, we estimate the determinants for patronizing a retailer, and the consumer's expenditure at it, as a function of prices, retailer's and consumer's characteristics. The effect of PLs as a potential differentiation device is captured through variables reflecting each retailer's general PLs policy

³Office of Fair Trading, "Competition in Retailing", Research Paper n° 13, September 1993. See section 2.2.3 on Consumer relationships.

- the percentage of its offer devoted to PL varieties, the number of product lines with a PL presence and other characteristics. These variables are included in the store characteristics. In this way, we can estimate their effect on the consumers' valuation of the bundles that can be purchased at each retailer.

Following Smith (2004) in the functional form chosen for the indirect utility, we carefully model the heterogeneity of consumer preferences. However, in Smith (2004), retailer prices are treated as an unobservable in the estimation of the choice model because of the lack of data on retailer prices, thus instead of inferring marginal costs, Smith (2004) assumes a multi-store Nash pricing equilibrium on the supply side and uses aggregated data on marginal costs to estimate the price parameters using the theoretical expression for the profit margins. Our situation is the opposite, as it is usual in the literature, given the fact that our database is richer and records the prices of all the products purchased in any retailer, allowing a direct estimation of the conditional demand elasticity, which is not the case in Smith (2004). In Smith (2004), unobserved prices affect retailer choice and expenditures and thus both price parameters are not identified. Instead, identification is achieved by fixing the value for the ratio of these parameters so that it implies a plausible conditional (on retailer choice) demand elasticity.

With the estimates of the discrete-continuous choice model at hand, we can compute the demand observed by each retailer. Assuming a Nash equilibrium in prices in the game played by the firms owning the different retailers chains, we can express the vector of retailers' margins as a function of demand parameters. From these margins, we can recover each retailer's marginal cost, which reflects a combination of all products' wholesale prices plus marginal costs of distribution.

Nevertheless, and also given the particular characteristics of the French retailing sector, it is interesting to consider competition along more than one dimension. French regulation forbids the resale at a loss for retailers⁴: the retailer cannot set the price of the good below the price appearing on the bill from the supplier. All rebates and reductions, i.e. listing fees, payable at the end of the year but anticipated by the retailers cannot be deduced from the price appearing in the bill. Moreover, as general terms of sale have to be non-discriminatory according to commercial law, the effect of the ban on resale at a loss is equivalent to allowing floor prices: manufacturers can collude to increase wholesale prices and pay the retailers through negotiated

⁴Resale at a loss was introduced with the Galland Law in 1996 and mostly unchanged until 2006 while our data are from 1998-2000. Several studies, including one carried over by the French Competition Authorities, recognized an inflationary effect of the law.

listing fees (Allain and Chambolle (2005)). As evidence of this phenomenon, Bonnet and Dubois (2010) have shown empirically that resale price maintenance was used in the market for bottled water in France during the years 1998-2000. In this case, price competition between retailers is significantly restricted and they have to find other dimensions in which to compete. Competition along the location in the characteristics space, which in this case is a form of competition in product lines, arises as a reasonable option. For example, one can think that after a merger the retailers involved may find profitable to reorganize their offers of PLs and NBs in order to better discriminate among consumers and reduce competition between them (Gandhi et al. (2005)).

Retailers' decisions on their location in the PLs policy space can also be motivated by the possible different effect of national brands or private labels on the wholesale prices offered by the manufacturers. Literature on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers has pointed to two different ways by which PLs can help to obtain lower wholesale prices on branded products: when linear pricing is used to set wholesale prices, the introduction of a PL by the retailer reduces the double-marginalization problem (Mills (1995) and Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999)); if non-linear pricing is used instead, Rey and Vergé (2010) show how they offer the possibility to refuse the contracts proposed by the manufacturers, increasing the pay-off of non-contracting and thus the rent to retailers.

We thus propose a simultaneous location-and-price game between retailers and assume their marginal costs to be a function of the mix of national brands and private labels in their assortment. This framework allows to simulate retailers' response to changes in demand or supply conditions like a transportation cost shock on consumers or a merger among retailers, and compute their effect on their level of prices and product mix, taking into account the possible effect on costs.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on private labels. Section 3 presents the formal description of the model of consumer choice of a retailer and the likelihood function. The different equilibrium assumptions are discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents an introduction to the dataset. Section 6 presents the econometric method and estimation results. Finally, section 7 details the simulation of demand shocks and merger on equilibrium behavior of retailers.

2 Review of the literature

Literature on the effects of PLs on competition has analyzed mainly the relationship between retailers and manufacturers through their branded products (or NBs). According to this stream of literature, retailers would introduce PLs in order to increase their bargaining power vis à vis manufacturers.

In a vertical structure with one manufacturer and one retailer, both in a monopoly position, if only linear prices are considered (Mills (1995), Bontems et al. (1999)), then this structure suffers from the double marginalization problem. In this case, by introducing a PL, the retailer creates competition in the downstream market which reduces the manufacturer's market power. Consequently, the wholesale price decreases and so does the double marginalization problem. Consumer's surplus rises unless the cost of producing the PL is too high. When non-linear tariffs are allowed (Caprice (2000), Rey and Vergé (2010)), the double marginalization problem disappears, since the wholesale price is set at marginal cost. In this case, the mechanism through which the retailer gains bargaining power is the reservation profit. Assuming the manufacturer makes a take-it or leave-it offers, the opportunity to sell a PL creates some profit for the retailer even if he does not sell the national brand (NB). Thus, for the retailer to accept the offer, the manufacturer must leave some rents to match the retailer's reservation profit.

There has been also much interest in determining what is the effect of a PL introduction on the prices of the NBs. Theoretical works tend to favour the prediction of a decline in NB's prices whereas empirical works have shown more mixed results. Gabrielsen, Steen and Sørsgard (2001) find a positive effect (when significant) of a PL introduction on the prices of NBs. This effect is larger for high and moderately successful PL introductions and larger on leading brands. Regarding the effect of PL penetration on individual NB prices per category, Ward et al. (2002) find that NB prices tend to rise with PL share and this increase varies within NBs. In some categories the price increase is much higher in the leading brand and in others it is much higher in the second or third brands. More recently, Bontemps et al. (2005), using a similar methodology, show that the positive impact on NB prices is higher for increases in the market share of PL products *stricto sensu*. For other kind of PL products - those exclusively sold by hard discounters or those that are low price products - the effect on NB prices is negative in half of the categories with significant effects and, in any case, their effect is lower than that of strictly PL products.

The other reasons stated for introducing a PL have more to do with the horizontal rela-

tionships between retailers and have been the subject of less attention in the literature. They concern the positioning of retailers' offer and customer loyalty. On the theoretical side, Corstjens and Lal (2000) take this approach and try to "show when and why the store brand can become a source of store loyalty for the retailer". They show that even when there is no cost advantage with respect to NBs, retailers may find profitable to introduce a PL with a relatively high perceived quality since it is capable of creating store loyalty. Conversely, low cost low price PLs only increase price competition between retailers. Basically, a PL works as a brand that is under exclusive distribution in a single retailer. If there exists a certain level of brand-loyalty for this PL, this loyalty is directly translated into a retailer-loyalty. This is then a source of switching costs for the consumers, leading to the usual pricing situations and trade-offs described by Klemperer (1995) of firms facing consumers with switching costs. This intuition would be in line with the empirical findings of a raise in NB prices after the introduction of PL varieties. Moreover, empirical results by Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) support the mechanism explained by Corstjens and Lal (2000). They use a panel of 104 product categories for five competing retailers in one region and construct measures of brand loyalty, store loyalty and store brand purchase. They find that store loyal consumers are more likely to buy PL varieties. Higher store loyalty is associated with lower brand loyalty within a store and also with lower store-invariant measures of brand loyalty. This last correlation suggests that loyal PL consumers tend to be those with less brand loyalty in general.

Corstjens and Lal (2000) further suggest that consumer's loyalty to a retailer should be even higher when he/she opts for purchasing PLs in more than one category of products. This argument would call for a positive relationship between the retailer's probability of being selected and the share of PLs in the total expenditure of the consumer at this retailer. However, reasons in favour of finding the opposite relationship have also been suggested in the literature. Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) mention the argument that PLs could attract mainly deal prone consumers and cite the work of Dick et al. (1995) who find that store brand customers are more price sensitive than average consumers. Furthermore, if the PL products offered by one retailer are perfect substitutes for PL products offered by another retailer, then the mechanism proposed by Corstjens and Lal (2000) for generating retailer-loyalty does not work and the above mentioned relationship would not exist. Evidence of at least some degree of substitution is found by Ailawadi and Harlam (2004), who find that retailers' margins on PLs decrease as the percentage of competing retailers carrying a PL in the category increases.

3 Consumer behavior and the demand model

Retailer's demand is modeled as a combination of discrete and continuous choices. In every purchasing act, the individual chooses first the retailer and then the quantity purchased at this particular retailer. These decisions depend on consumer and retailer characteristics. In particular, since the purchasing act of an individual is motivated by the need of several different products, the choice of the retailer is going to depend on the prices charged to the different products sold. We can simplify this by considering that every retailer offers a particular bundle of goods at a given price. Then, the choice of a retailer is equivalent to purchase one of the offered bundles.

More formally, and following Haneman (1984), the individual consumer i has a direct utility function at time t , u defined over the quantities $x_{it} = (x_{i1t}, \dots, x_{iJt})$ of the bundles goods proposed by J_i different retailers, and on the numeraire q_{it} (which will represent the amount left for top-ups and other purchases in second choice retailers or other minor retailers included in the database). J_i is the choice set in terms of retailers for each consumer i . The quantity x_{ijt} represents the quantity of the composite good bought by consumer i at retailer j in period t . The consumer's utility also depends on L characteristics of the retailer where the purchase is made, which will be denoted by $b = (b_1, \dots, b_L)$, and that could vary with the individual (think of distance to the store for example). Finally, the utility can also be influenced by M characteristics of the individual, $z = (z_1, \dots, z_M)$. The vector ϵ is going to collect all the characteristics of the retailer and the individual that are unobservable for the econometrician.

At every period t , the individual consumer maximizes his direct utility function $u(x_{it}, q_{it}, b_{ijt}, z_{it}, \epsilon_{ijt})$ subject to J_i non-negativity constraints (one for each x_{ijt}) and the budget constraint:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J_i} p_{jt} x_{ijt} + q_{it} = y_{it}$$

where y_{it} is the consumer's total expenditure in food and p_{jt} the retail price of store bundle j . Discreteness in the consumer's decision comes from the additional constraint that all but one of the non-negativity constraints must bind because of the necessarily exclusive consumer choice of retailer. Given this, the problem reduces to choose the pair (x_{ijt}, q_{it}) , with the other x_{ilt} 's set to 0. This maximization yields a demand function $\bar{x}_{ijt}(p_{jt}, y_{it}, b_{ijt}, z_{it}, \epsilon_{ijt})$ and an indirect utility function of the form $\bar{v}_{ijt}(p_{jt}, y_{it}, b_{ijt}, z_{it}, \epsilon_{ijt})$, both conditional on the purchase of the bundle belonging to the j^{th} retailer. The selection among the different retailers is made from a

choice set J_i , defined as the set of all the retailers present less than 16 km away from consumer i , and it will be given by the following condition:

$$\bar{v}_{ijt}(p_{jt}, y_{it}, b_{jt}, z_{it}, \epsilon_{ijt}) \geq \bar{v}_{ikt}(p_{jt}, y_{it}, b_{ikt}, z_{it}, \epsilon_{ikt}) \quad \forall k \in J_i$$

The outcome of this selection process is random from the point of view of the econometrician because of the unobservability of ϵ . Therefore, the different choices will be observed with a probability induced by the distribution of ϵ . The next step in the analysis is to specify a functional form for the conditional indirect utility function. We use the same functional form as Smith (2004), which is in turn very close to the one used in Dubin and McFadden (1984) or Haneman (1984). Treating Roy's identity as a partial differential equation, this functional shape belongs to the class of functions that provides a linear in income conditional expenditure function. Moreover, we specify the way prices and characteristics affect the indirect utility function such that the conditional expenditures functions be linear in parameters as in Dubin and McFadden (1984). The additional restriction put on this class of indirect utility functions is that it provides also a simple and tractable form for discrete choice probabilities.

Accordingly, the conditional indirect utility function has the following shape:

$$\bar{v}_{ijt} = \mu \left[\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1jt}^{g(i)} \right] \exp \left[(\phi_{2h(j)}^{g(i)} - \beta_2^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt}) \zeta_{it} \right] + \psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

where g identifies types of consumers with identical preferences, $g(i)$ is the group type of i , $h(j)$ is the company group to which retailer j belongs to, μ is a scaling term, \mathbf{z}_{it} is a vector of individual characteristics and $\psi_{1jt}^{g(i)}$ and $\psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)}$ are retailer quality indexes defined as:

$$\psi_{1jt}^{g(i)} = \phi_{1h(j)}^{g(i)} + \mathbf{b}'_{1jt} \delta^{g(i)}$$

$$\psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)} = \mathbf{b}'_{2ijt} \theta^{g(i)}$$

The reason for having two different indices is that some of the retailer characteristics included in \mathbf{b}_{2ijt} - and which may be faced differently by each individual - are not going to influence the demanded quantity of the bundle. This specification allows to have an individual-store index $\psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)}$ that will not affect the conditional demand functions but affect the probabilities of the consumer of choosing a given store, and a store specific sort of "quality" index $\psi_{1jt}^{g(i)}$ affecting the conditional demand of the consumer, including eventually an unobserved component $\phi_{1h(j)}^{g(i)}$

which is fixed over time. Additionally, $\phi_{2h(j)}^{g(i)}$ is a retailer chain group fixed effect capturing all those fixed unobserved characteristics of retailer j that only affect the consumer's choice of retailer but not the conditional expenditure. Heterogeneity in consumer tastes is introduced by estimating different sets of parameters $\Theta^g = (\beta_1^g, \beta_2^g, \alpha^g, \phi_{1h}^g, \phi_{2h}^g, \delta^g, \theta^g)$ for every consumer type g .

Individual's indirect utility is also affected by unobservable personal characteristics, such as consumption habits, captured through the univariate random variable ζ_{it} and which is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution $LN(0, \lambda^g)^5$. The other source of randomness are unobserved disturbances to individual's valuation of retailer j at time t , denoted by ϵ_{ijt} , and assumed to be an i.i.d Type-1 Extreme Value distribution function in standard form with unit scale parameter. In addition, these two random variables are assumed to be independent.

The application of the Roy's identity results in the following conditional demand for consumer i at time t for a bundle from retailer j :

$$\bar{x}_{ijt} = \frac{1}{p_{jt}} \left[\left(\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1jt}^{g(i)} \right) \zeta_{it} - \frac{\beta_1^{g(i)}}{\beta_2^{g(i)}} \right] \quad (1)$$

and multiplying it by its price, we obtain the conditional expenditure:

$$\bar{e}_{ijt} = \left(\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1jt}^{g(i)} \right) \zeta_{it} - \frac{\beta_1^{g(i)}}{\beta_2^{g(i)}} \quad (2)$$

From the above expressions, it can be seen that characteristics included in $\psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)}$ do not affect the conditional demand and, therefore, the expenditure. These are likely to be retailer characteristics such as the distance from the consumer's home or retailer services like the number of cashiers. The retailer fixed effects capture retailers' characteristics that are constant through time like, for example, retailers' reputation.

At last, one can also obtain the conditional probability for individual i to choose retailer j . Actually, given the additivity assumption for ϵ_{ijt} on the indirect utility function and the assumption that ϵ_{ijt} follows an extreme value distribution, the probability s_{ijt} of retailer j to be selected by individual i - conditional on the unobserved individual i 's characteristics ζ_{it} -

⁵Hence, $E[\zeta_{it}] = e^{\lambda^g/2}$ and $Var[\zeta_{it}] = e^{\lambda^g} (e^{\lambda^g} - 1)$ where $g = g(i)$ is the type of consumer i .

follows a multinomial logit:

$$s_{ijt}(\zeta_{it}) = \frac{\exp \left\{ \mu \left[\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1jt}^{g(i)} \right] \exp \left[(\phi_{2h(j)}^{g(i)} - \beta_2^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt}) \zeta_{it} \right] + \psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)} \right\}}{\sum_{k \in J_i} \exp \left\{ \mu \left[\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{kt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1kt}^{g(i)} \right] \exp \left[(\phi_{2h(k)}^{g(i)} - \beta_2^{g(i)} \ln p_{kt}) \zeta_{it} \right] + \psi_{2ikt}^{g(i)} \right\}}$$

Then, integrating out over the distribution of population characteristics, we thus obtain the market shares of each retailer as a function of prices and characteristics of supermarkets. This aggregated demand function is known by retailers whose competition is modelled in the next section.

4 The Retailers Game

4.1 Price Competition

We first assume that retailers compete in prices, taking as given the vector of store characteristics determined in a previous stage. Thus, the observed prices are those arising from a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous price setting game between retailers groups. A single firm can own several retailers and form a group of retailer chains (i.e. in France, in 2005, the Hyper 2 group owns the hypermarkets of Hyper 2, the supermarkets of Supermarket 1, some hard-discount and other proximity retailers). Hence, we assume that prices are chosen by each group of retailers in order to maximize the joint profits of their members.

Denoting by J_h the set of retailers owned by group h (where $h = 1, \dots, H$ and J_1, \dots, J_H is a partition of $\{1, \dots, J\}$), at time t the expected joint profits of group h is the sum of profits provided by all types of consumers and equal to $\sum_g \int_{\zeta} \Pi_h^g dF_g(\zeta_i)$, where⁶

$$\Pi_h^g = \sum_{i/g(i)=g} \sum_{j \in J_h} (p_j - c_j) s_{ij} \bar{x}_{ij}$$

In this expression, c_j represents the marginal cost of one unit of good sold by retailer j .

Each retailer group maximizes the joint expected profits with respect to all prices of each retail store of the group. Considering all the possible types of consumers, the first order conditions

⁶Subscript t is omitted in this section to simplify notations.

with respect to prices p_j of retail group h can be expressed as:

$$\sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \frac{\partial \Pi_h^g}{\partial p_j} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} = 0 \quad (3)$$

where

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_h^g}{\partial p_j} = \sum_{i/g(i)=g} \left[s_{ij} \bar{x}_{ij} + (p_j - c_j) s_{ij} \frac{\partial \bar{x}_{ij}}{\partial p_j} + \sum_{k \in J_h} (p_k - c_k) \bar{x}_{ik} \frac{\partial s_{ik}}{\partial p_j} \right]$$

because $\frac{\partial \bar{x}_{ik}}{\partial p_j} = 0$ for all $k \neq j$.

The first term of the summation measures the extra profits coming from the price increase over the quantity sold. The second term reflects the change in the quantity sold due to the price increase. This quantity can change through a decrease in the retailer's probability of being selected by the consumer but also through a decrease of the consumers expenditure. The final term captures the effect of a change of retailer j 's prices on the profits of the other retailers of the group.

Every retailer in group h sets its price level to maximize the sum of the expected profits derived from each segment of consumers. Thus, the observed price levels must satisfy the system of J equations formed by the first-order conditions (3). Once the demand is known, the only unknowns are the marginal costs c_j of each retailer, which can be obtained by solving this system of equations. To see that, the first-order conditions can be expressed in matrix notation.

Define I_h as the ownership diagonal matrix of retail group h , which is of size $J \times J$ and whose elements $I_h(j, j)$ are equal to 1 if retailer j belongs to group h and 0 otherwise. Denote by $i_h = \text{diag}(I_h)$ the vector containing the diagonal elements of I_h . Let S_p and X_p be two $J \times J$ matrices containing the sum across consumer types of expected responses of quantity to a change in prices coming through, respectively, a change in the market share and a change in the conditional demand, i.e.

$$S_p \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \bar{x}_{i1} \frac{\partial s_{i1}}{\partial p_1} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} & \cdots & \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \bar{x}_{iJ} \frac{\partial s_{iJ}}{\partial p_1} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \bar{x}_{i1} \frac{\partial s_{i1}}{\partial p_J} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} & \cdots & \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \bar{x}_{iJ} \frac{\partial s_{iJ}}{\partial p_J} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$X_p \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} s_{i1} \frac{\partial \bar{x}_{i1}}{\partial p_1} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \ddots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} s_{iJ} \frac{\partial \bar{x}_{iJ}}{\partial p_J} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} \end{pmatrix}$$

Note that the off-diagonal elements of X_p are zero due to our formulation of the conditional demand, which makes it dependent only on the own-price of the retailer. Finally, define Q as a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the expected total quantity sold by each retailer j : $Q(j, j) = \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} s_{ij} \bar{x}_{ij} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\}$. Then, the margins $\gamma_h \equiv [(p_j - c_j) 1_{j \in J_h}]_j$ of retailers of group h ($1_{j \in J_h} = 1$ if $j \in J_h$ and 0 otherwise) are solution of the following equations:

$$Q i_h + (I_h X_p + I_h S_p I_h) \gamma_h = 0 \quad \forall h = 1, \dots, H \quad (4)$$

The solution to this system of equations can be found by minimizing the sum of squares of condition (4). This yields a solution for γ_h of the form, $\forall h = 1, \dots, H$:

$$\gamma_h = - (I_h X_p + I_h S_p I_h)^{-1} Q i_h \quad (5)$$

When solving the system of J equations, we obtain an estimate for the marginal cost of each store bundle of goods. This estimate is of course dependent on the assumption about the game that is played by the retailers. Were the retailers engaged, for example, in tacit collusion, the real marginal costs would differ from those estimated here.

4.2 Simultaneous Location-and-Price Competition

Suppose now that retailers compete not only in prices but also in their location choice in the characteristics space of goods, choosing both variables simultaneously. More specifically, retailers can vary their offer in PL and NB so as to attract more consumers to the store and, possibly, increase expenditures. This kind of game implies a second set of first-order conditions that adds to the set defined in (3), which allows us to recover more information on the parameters determining retailers' marginal costs.

Literature on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers has signaled the importance of PLs in the outcome of this relationship. When linear pricing is used to set wholesale prices, the introduction of a PL by the retailer reduces the double-marginalization problem and allows the retailer to purchase NBs at a lower wholesale price. If non-linear

pricing is used instead, PLs can be used by the retailers to increase their market power within the vertical structure. Rey and Vergé (2010) show how they offer the possibility to refuse the contracts proposed by the manufacturers, since retailers can rely on other manufacturers and on their PLs to conform their offer. Moreover, the wider the coverage of PL brands the easier to refuse contracts that bundle several brands of the manufacturer. Since PLs increase the payoff of non-contracting, the manufacturer is obliged to leave a positive rent to the retailer. This rent depends inversely on the retailer's profit on the other brands and can be affected by the manufacturer through the wholesale price offered to the retailer.

In order to test whether PL brands have a different impact than NBs on retailers' marginal costs, we consider that their marginal cost function depends on the ratio in which each type of brands is present in their assortment. Denote this ratio by ρ_j . Therefore, in the simultaneous location-and-price game, retailers forming the group h solve the following problem:

$$\underset{\{p_j, \rho_j\}_{j \in J_h}}{\text{Max}} \quad \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \Pi_h^g dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} \equiv \sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \sum_{i/g(i)=g} \sum_{j \in J_h} (p_j - c_j(\rho_j)) s_{ij}(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\rho}) \bar{x}_{ij}(p_j, \rho_j) dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\}$$

Each retailer then chooses the level of its ρ_j according to its effect on market shares, conditional demands and marginal cost levels. We do not need to impose any functional form for the relationship between this ratio and the level of marginal costs. Actually, this ratio can affect marginal costs in two ways: *a*) it may reduce the marginal cost of the bundle of products by substituting branded product varieties by PLs that may be purchased at lower wholesale prices; *b*) it may reduce the wholesale price for other NBs by increasing the rent that manufacturers are obliged to leave to the retailer. Note, as well, that the level of marginal costs may depend on factors that are known for the retailers but unobserved by the econometrician - i.e. the retailer's ability to negotiate contracts or any bargaining power vis a vis manufacturers and orthogonal to ρ_j . Assuming that there is a unique maximum, we use the first-order conditions with respect to price which are given by equation (3) and the one with respect to ρ_j . Actually, the maximization with respect to ρ_j yields the following additional conditions:

$$\sum_g \left\{ \int_{\zeta} \frac{\partial \Pi_h^g}{\partial \rho_j} dF_g(\zeta_i) \right\} = 0 \quad (6)$$

where the derivative of retail group h 's profits arising from consumers of type g with respect to

the ratio is given by the following expression, for all $j \in J_h$, and $h = 1, \dots, H$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_h^g}{\partial \rho_j} = \sum_{i/g(i)=g} \left[-s_{ij} \bar{x}_{ij} \frac{\partial c_j}{\partial \rho_j} + (p_j - c_j) s_{ij} \frac{\partial \bar{x}_{ij}}{\partial \rho_j} + \sum_{k \in J_h} (p_k - c_k) \bar{x}_{ik} \frac{\partial s_{ik}}{\partial \rho_j} \right]$$

The derivative of marginal cost with respect to ρ_j and the margin, of each retailer, are the unknowns of these equations. As in the previous case, this system of equations can be written in matrix form. Let Γ_{PL} be the vector of derivatives of retailers' marginal cost with respect to ρ_j . Define S_ρ and X_ρ in the same spirit of S_p and X_p , with the price derivative substituted by the derivatives with respect to ρ_j . Then, the implied derivative of marginal costs is given by the following expression:

$$\frac{\partial c_j}{\partial \rho_j} (\rho_j) = (I_h Q)^- (I_h X_\rho + I_h S_\rho I_h) \gamma \quad \text{for all } h = 1, \dots, H \quad (7)$$

in which $^-$ denotes the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse (because of the block configuration of the matrix $I_h Q$) and $\gamma = \sum_{h=1}^H \gamma_h$.

Retailers' margins γ_h can be recovered from (4) and substituted in (7). The estimated margins are the same as in the previous case. The difference is that together with the first-order condition on ρ_j , they imply a set of estimates for the effect of this ratio on marginal costs. The sign of this effect is determined by the observed sign of $(I_h X_\rho + I_h S_\rho I_h)$. Elements in the diagonal of the first matrix contain a weighted sum of the effect of ρ_j on the estimated conditional demand of each consumer, with more weight given to consumers with higher purchase probabilities. The rows of the second matrix contain a weighted sum of its effect on the probability of selecting retailer j , with more weight given to individuals with higher estimated conditional demands.

5 Data

Data on consumer and product characteristics, as well as consumers' retailer choices are drawn from a database recording the purchasing acts of french households through the technique of home scanning⁷. The database consists of individual purchases made from 1998 to 2000 by more

⁷The database comes from TNS World Panel and we thank INRA for providing us the data as well as Christine Boizot for her help in the access to these data.

than 9000 households⁸ in french distributors of food products. It covers all the metropolitan french *departements* and 476 products belonging to 64 different food categories (water, aperitifs, fresh fruits, cheese ...)⁹. It is representative of the French population.

The database is organized as a collection of product files in which a typical record is a purchase of that product in a given retailer at a certain date. In this record one has information about the identifying code of the individual, so that we can trace all the purchases of each individual, his/her socio-demographic characteristics, as well as characteristics of the product (brand, price, format ...), quantity purchased and retailer characteristics (name of the retailer, surface of the store and type of retailer).

Since different individuals can have different purchasing habits, and may therefore visit the stores with a different frequency, observations belonging to the same month are grouped together. The choice of the period length as a month is somewhat arbitrary, but it is long enough to capture different habits. Moreover, it will be useful in the construction of price indexes that will avoid short-term variations due to product promotions and enables us to abstract from other dynamic considerations.

Data on outlet characteristics for every retailer were obtained from LSA/*Atlas de la Distribution 2005*, which lists all the french outlets involved in food distribution. Besides their location, the Atlas provides us with the name of the retailer chain the outlet is affiliated to, its surface, the number of cash registers, the number of employees, the number of parking slots and the number of pumps available in the outlet's gas station. We merged this information with the household data using the name of the retailer, the zip code of the consumer's residence and the surface of the outlet. For each of the retailer chain, we found the closest outlet to the consumer dwellings thanks to zip codes and geographical data allowing to compute distances. If this distance was less than 16 kilometers, the outlet was included in the consumer's choice set. Only one outlet per retailer chain was included in this set. The computed distance is added as an additional retailer characteristic.

Using the information contained in the household data, several additional variables have been constructed regarding individuals' and retailers' characteristics (from all the possible retailers,

⁸The number of households for 1998 is of 9756, that of 1999 is 11310, while the same figure for 2000 is of 12291. Around 1/4 of the panel is renewed every year, thus leaving us with 3710 households present in the whole period.

⁹Nevertheless, households do not record all the products purchased. In particular, for each household there is a group of products not recorded. This group can be either a) fruits and vegetables or b) fish and meat. The rest of products are recorded for all the households.

we selected 22 of them representing about a 90% of the total sales recorded in the database).

5.1 Household-specific variables

The data contain detailed information on households characteristics including household composition, geographic information on dwellings and also some classification by income groups that will be used to define groups of consumer types. The data also contain detailed continuous observation of all purchases with information on products, brands, prices, retailers.

The data on purchase are aggregated at the household level, by month and we define the following variables:

- *Monthly expenditure per retailer*: All the purchases of a household during a particular month are aggregated to form his monthly expenditure. Purchases made at the selected retailers are identified and the rest of the purchases are aggregated into purchases in the outside option. The first row of Table 1 presents the average across individuals in the panel of their total expenditure per month.
- *First and second choice retailers*: The first choice retailer is the one where an individual spent the most in a given month. The same computations have been done for the second retailer choice. The average monthly expenditure across consumers in first and second choice retailers is displayed in Table 1. For each household, expenditure in PL products in each retailer is also computed. Table 1 also shows the average of this expenditure across consumers with a positive purchase, of any kind of product, at first and second choice retailers.
- *Share of PL products in expenditures per retailer*: It is the monthly expenditure in PL products made at a given retailer over the consumer's total expenditure at that retailer. This variable reflects the importance of PL products in individuals' average expenditure per retailer.
- *Loyalty to a retailer in terms of first choice*: This is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual's first choice in a given period coincides with his/her first choice retailer in the previous period. This variable is shown at the bottom of Table 1.
- *Loyalty to a retailer in terms of total expenditures*: It is the percentage that the monthly expenditure spent on a given retailer represents over the total expenditure of the household across all retailers during that month.

(in €)		1998	1999	2000
Monthly expenditure	Mean	173.13	170.62	166.89
	St. Dev	137.98	144.96	150.46
Monthly expenditure in 1st choice retailer	Mean	128.95	128.52	126.23
	St. Dev	119.83	129.16	135.67
Monthly expenditure in 2nd choice retailer	Mean	41.96	40.92	39.84
	St. Dev	36.00	35.21	34.75
PL monthly expenditure in 1st choice retailer	Mean	26.95	28.94	29.38
	St. Dev	57.56	74.89	83.77
PL monthly expenditure in 2nd choice retailer	Mean	10.02	10.54	10.45
	St. Dev	14.37	14.59	14.02
Number of visited retailers	Mean	2.97	2.95	2.95
	St. Dev	1.09	1.09	1.09
Loyalty to first choice retailer	Mean	0.66	0.66	0.64

Table 1: Summary statistics for consumers' data

The data show that the average expenditure in first-choice retailers is significantly larger than in second-choice ones. This suggests that the selection of the first-choice retailer is the most relevant decision for the consumer. On the other hand, expenditure in PLs is relatively more important at second than at first choice retailers. Finally, around 65% of the households in the sample chose the same retailer in two consecutive periods.

5.2 Retailer-specific variables

Table 2 shows some statistics at the retailer level over the variables defined as below:

- *Sales in PL products:* Column (A) displays the retailer specific ratio of sales in PL products over its total sales (PL penetration).
- *First choice probability:* Column (B) shows the average probability of choosing a given retailer as first choice (in terms of expenditures). This is computed as the number of households who prefer a given retailer spending the largest part of their food expenditures in that retailer over the total number of households who purchased some food in a given period.
- *Price index:* Column (C) shows a price index computed for every retailer using data on prices and quantities purchased. Details the construction of this index are given in the following subsection.
- *Share of PL varieties in total offer:* Column (D) presents the number of PL varieties (references) offered by the retailer over the total number of varieties offered. The whole

offer cannot be observed and, instead, both the numerator and the denominator have to be computed using the records from the household data. The denominator is computed as the addition of the number of varieties offered for each product in a particular retailer chain for each period. We aggregate the information coming from outlets with a similar surface within a retailer: every outlet is assigned into a group according to its surface in steps of 50 m^2 . We divide France in 7 large regions and thus the sum is conducted by retailer, region, group and period. The computation of the numerator is analogous to that of the denominator but considering only the references identified as PLs. For hard discounters, this share is defined as hard discount brands over total varieties offered.

- *Share of NB varieties in total offer*: Similar to the previous variable but taking into account only varieties classified as NB. The total number of varieties offered is not equal to the sum of the number of PL and NB because of the presence of "First Price" brands or of "Regional" brands.
- *Surface, cash registers, employees, car parking, pumps and number of outlets*: Columns (E) to (J) present the averages across retailers of the variables provided by LSA's Atlas.

Retailers	(A) Share of PL in sales	(B) First choice probability	(C) Price index	(D) Share of PL varieties	(E) Surface (in m ²)	(F) Cash Regist.	(G) Number employees	(H) Parking slots	(I) Number pumps	(J) Nb of outlets (in 1998)
Hard Disc. 1	47.02%	0.74%	5.71	60.35%	663	1	-	9	0	408
Supermarket 2	12.18%	2.17%	8.11	15.74%	1,474	8	42	159	3	138
Hyper 1	14.30%	10.13%	7.38	18.71%	10,110	50	472	1,790	9	91
Hyper 2	21.49%	10.99%	7.71	22.60%	9,508	46	380	1,856	11	157
Supermarket 3	21.49%	1.55%	8.52	32.90%	1,177	7	32	112	2	243
Hard Disc. 2	53.86%	0.43%	5.73	64.70%	497	3	4	49	0	7
Supermarket 1	19.00%	3.91%	7.98	27.34%	1,547	9	43	176	4	440
Hyper 3	16.88%	4.40%	7.66	25.68%	5,644	27	207	887	8	52
Hyper 4	16.06%	2.83%	7.82	20.88%	9,097	34	344	1,199	9	57
Supermarket 4	32.55%	0.99%	7.74	42.91%	909	5	12	54	1	9
Hyper 5	16.47%	3.39%	7.95	22.28%	6,920	28	219	1,089	8	111
Hyper 6	19.48%	0.28%	8.36	28.24%	2,876	15	81	371	4	36
Hyper 7	18.01%	0.75%	7.57	20.62%	3,892	21	151	602	7	38
Hyper EDLP 1	25.92%	14.42%	7.18	34.37%	1,720	9	42	205	4	903
Hard Disc. 3	75.53%	2.67%	5.74	86.30%	899	7	20	76	0	316
Hyper EDLP 2	16.00%	17.32%	7.15	26.92%	4,335	22	165	652	8	465
Hard Disc. 4	66.58%	3.48%	5.55	79.16%	692	1	-	15	0	868
Hyper 8	13.80%	0.14%	7.95	16.95%	6,025	30	251	939	8	40
Supermarket 5	15.16%	1.25%	9.14	22.25%	862	13	63	16	0	219
Supermarket 6	14.40%	0.04%	12.52	14.26%	1,921	24	165	75	0	3
Supermarket 7	17.68%	5.45%	7.55	23.23%	1,737	10	56	202	4	355
Outside Option*	19.35%	13.05%	7.15	26.15%	695	4	13	62	1	1,702

Note: EDLP stands for "Every Day Low Prices"

(*) Weighted by the number of outlets of each retailer in the outside option, except for the average price index.

Table 2: Summary statistics for retailer data

5.3 Price Indices

The computation of a price index is motivated by our definition of utility for a bundle of goods. We need to assign this bundle a price faced by the consumers when considering whether to purchase it. The index we compute is a weighted average of the implied prices of the products included in the database.

Given that for every product we have a sequence of different brands purchased at different prices during the time period, first of all we have to compute a single price for this product. The price of a product k is computed, for every selected retailer j in region m (using administrative "departements") and period t , according to the following expression:

$$\hat{p}_{jmt}^k = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{jmt}^k} p_{ijmt}^k q_{ijmt}^k}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{jmt}^k} q_{ijmt}^k}$$

where p_{ijmt}^k is the price of the brand corresponding to the i^{th} observation in the database, and that was purchased at retailer j in region m and period t . Similarly, q_{ijmt}^k represents the quantity purchased while N_{jmt}^k is the number of varieties of product k for sale at retailer j in region m and period t . When the price of a product k at retailer j cannot be computed for a period t due to the lack of data, this price is set to its average value across periods. However, this problem is not very important, except for two retailers which happen to have a very small number of outlets.

Once all the product prices are computed, we collapse them in a single measure by computing a weighted average equal to:

$$\tilde{p}_{jmt} = \sum_k \varpi^k \hat{p}_{jmt}^k$$

The weight for each product in the index is given by:

$$\varpi^k = \frac{\frac{1}{N^k} \sum_{i,j,m,t} p_{ijmt}^k q_{ijmt}^k}{\sum_k \left(\frac{1}{N^k} \sum_{i,j,m,t} p_{ijmt}^k q_{ijmt}^k \right)}$$

where N^k represents the total number of varieties of product k across retailers. That is to say, the weight is given by the share of the mean expenditure in product k when taking into account all the observations with respect to the sum of mean expenditures in all the products.

Other price indexes could be computed following Diewert (1976). In particular, the Fisher price index is exact for a general translog expenditure function. Since the translog functional form provides a second order approximation to any general expenditure function, it is considered a good approximation to the true cost of living price index. The computation of the weights can also be done in different ways. Tests will be done to check the robustness of our results to these different price indexes.

The use of a price index may also be considered problematic since it may suffer from endogeneity. By construction, the index takes only into account the prices of those varieties of products finally purchased by the consumer. However, since we are using averages over all the consumers in the database, we expect this problem to be small. In a first stage, and given that the retailer choice model is estimated using data at the individual level, we will treat the price index as exogenous and test this assumption later.

6 Identification and Econometric Method

6.1 Estimation method

Given the functional form chosen for the indirect utility and the distribution of ϵ_{ijt} , the probability of retailer j to be selected by household i - conditional on its unobserved characteristics ζ_{it} - follows a multinomial logit:

$$s_{ijt}(\zeta_{it}) = \frac{\exp \left\{ \mu \left[\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1jt}^{g(i)} \right] \exp \left[(\phi_{2h(j)}^{g(i)} - \beta_2^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt}) \zeta_{it} \right] + \psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)} \right\}}{\sum_{k \in J_i} \exp \left\{ \mu \left[\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{kt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1kt}^{g(i)} \right] \exp \left[(\phi_{2h(k)}^{g(i)} - \beta_2^{g(i)} \ln p_{kt}) \zeta_{it} \right] + \psi_{2ikt}^{g(i)} \right\}}$$

The unconditional probability of individual i selecting retailer j can be found by integrating out over the distribution of the unobserved individual characteristics:

$$r_{ijt} = \sum_g 1_{g(i)=g} \int_{\zeta} s_{ijt}(\zeta_{it}) dF_g(\zeta_{it}) \quad (8)$$

where F_g is the cumulative density function of ζ for type g consumers, assumed to be identically distributed for all consumers within a type g . As ζ is assumed log normal, this unobserved individual characteristic also induces a density of the conditional expenditure, which can be

found by a change of variable technique:

$$f_{\bar{e}_{ijt}}(\bar{e}_{ijt} | j) = \frac{1}{\left[\bar{e}_{ijt} + \frac{\beta_1^{g(i)}}{\beta_2^{g(i)}} \right] \sqrt{2\pi\lambda}} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{2\lambda^{g(i)}} \left[\ln \left(\frac{\bar{e}_{ijt} + \left(\beta_1^{g(i)} / \beta_2^{g(i)} \right)}{\beta_2^{g(i)} y_{it} + \beta_1^{g(i)} \ln p_{jt} + \mathbf{z}'_{it} \alpha^{g(i)} + \psi_{1jt}^{g(i)}} \right) \right]^2 \right) \quad (9)$$

Therefore, the joint probability of observing consumer i spending an amount of \bar{e}_{ijt} in retailer j at time t is equal to the conditional probability times the marginal probability and is given by the product of expressions (8) and (9). The likelihood of the sample is given by the following expression:

$$\ln L = \sum_{i,j,t} d_{ijt} \{ \ln r_{ijt} + \ln [f_{\bar{e}_{ijt}}(\bar{e}_{ijt} | j)] \}$$

where d_{ijt} is a dummy variable indicating whether consumer i chose retailer j at time t or not.

6.2 Specification choices

Let's choose the variables entering the different elements of the indirect utility. In addition to the household budget attributed to food (y_{it}) and the price of the basket of goods (p_{jt}), variables \mathbf{b}_{1jt} in $\psi_{1jt}^{g(i)}$ are considered to affect both the choice of a retailer and the conditional expenditure of the consumer. Among them, retailer-specific characteristics include the logarithm of its surface (*ln surface*) and the ratio ρ_j of PL varieties to NBs in its assortment. Fixed effects capture observable and unobservable characteristics of retailers that are constant across households and time. The most important of these characteristics is the average perception of retailer's quality. \mathbf{z}_{it} contains also individual-specific variables such as the number of cars in the household or the size of the household.

Given the dependence of the estimates of the elasticity of costs with respect to ρ_j , it is important to capture as flexibly as possible all the taste variations in the sample. Consumer taste for ρ_j is allowed to vary between consumers along two dimensions. First, consumers may value differently PL varieties sold at hard discounters than those sold at traditional retailers. Second, due to the earlier entry of hard discounters in the Northern part of France, preferences for PLs are allowed to vary also between consumers of the north-west and south-east parts of France.

The term $\psi_{2ijt}^{g(i)}$ represents the effect of the variables that may condition the household's choice of a retailer but not his expenditures. We include the distance between the household and the retailer (*distance*), the logarithm of the surface of the retailer outlets (*ln surface*) - this

is a proxy for the total number of varieties, or the assortment, offered by the retailer at that outlet - and the number of competing retailers located less than 3 kilometers away from the consumer.

Finally, a second set of retailer fixed effects is included in $\phi_{2h(j)}^{g(i)}$ to capture unobservable retailer chain characteristics that do not influence the conditional expenditure of the individual. As in Smith (2004), the identification of the two sets of fixed effects is possible because we observe both the retailer choice and the expenditure for every individual.

Given the complexity of the model to be estimated and to ease the computational burden, some restrictions have been added implicitly on the valuation of the alternatives for the consumers by gathering all hard discounters and a minor hypermarket chain into two alternatives (*Hard discounters* and *Other hypermarkets*); the outside option is enlarged with the smallest supermarkets from Table 2. This formulation assumes that retailers within the grouped alternatives are perfect substitutes for each other and that their unobserved characteristics, such as quality, are equally perceived by the consumers within these two kinds of retailers. Hence, the two alternatives represent the aggregate competitive pressure that hard discounters and the rest of the minor hypermarkets put on the remaining retailers.

6.3 Identification issues

Demand parameters are obtained using simulated maximum likelihood (SML). Simulated choice probabilities are computed averaging the results from 60 random draws taken for every observation from a log-normal distribution $LN(0, \lambda^{g(i)})$ for ζ_{it} . Convergence of the iteration process that estimates the $\lambda^{g(i)}$ parameters jointly with the rest of demand parameters is hard to obtain and requires good starting values. However, part of the parameters are already identified with the conditional expenditure equation (2). In particular, $\lambda^{g(i)}$ is identified and can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation of this equation. Thus, similarly to Smith (2004), we follow a three step procedure in which the estimated value of $\lambda^{g(i)}$ - obtained after the maximum likelihood estimation of the conditional expenditure - is then used to define the distribution from which the random draws are taken. All other parameters of the discrete-continuous choice model are then estimated by SML in a second stage. The third step recomputes the value of $\lambda^{g(i)}$ that maximizes the SML at the estimated value of the other parameters in step 2. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until convergence.

As already mentioned, the identification of this discrete/continuous choice model is achieved

here with the exclusion restriction that the distances to the retailers affect the choice probabilities of retailers by each consumer but not the conditional expenditure. This is justified by the fact that we exclude the distance to the retailer to affect the expenditure at that retailer once it is chosen. Moreover, we consider choice sets for each consumer which depend on the catchment area (defined using the set of retailer stores present within a given distance to the household address). These choice sets vary across consumers and we assume that prices and characteristics of retailers in the choice set vary exogenously with respect to the unobserved consumer taste distribution conditional on household characteristics like their income group. This amounts to assume that there is no other heterogeneity of consumer tastes that would be observed by the retailer when they choose prices.

6.4 Substitution patterns and Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives

Simple logit models suffer from the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which generates proportionate substitution patterns among alternatives. In the present paper, more flexible substitution patterns are obtained by two different ways.

In the first place, the model allows for heterogeneity of parameters across consumer types (g). Hence, the IIA holds for individuals within the same consumer type, but not at the aggregate level if a sufficient number of types is specified. These consumer types are defined in terms of income. The household database classifies individuals in 18 income categories and we further aggregate those with the smallest number of observations (specially in the lowest and highest part of the income distribution), reducing the number of different income categories to 9. This yields 9 consumer types, although not all of them have enough observations to allow the model to be estimated. Results are obtained for almost all types with monthly income categories ranging from less than 305 € to 4,574 € .

A second source of flexibility is obtained by allowing for taste variation within consumer types. This is achieved by the interaction of individual and alternatives' characteristics. The addition of observable individual-specific variables in z_{it} , together with the unobservable ζ_{it} and the functional form chosen for the indirect utility, provide these interactions. Hence, even at the consumer type level, the IIA does not hold for the aggregate.

6.5 Simultaneity bias

The estimation of demand for differentiated products may suffer from endogeneity problems analogous to those posed by homogeneous product analysis: producers will set all the control variables in their maximization problem (price and ρ_j , here) taking into account any demand shocks that they may observe. If these shocks are unobserved by the econometrician, then a simultaneity bias appears. In the context of differentiated products and discrete choice models, these shocks are product characteristics (in our case, retailer characteristics) that are unobservable or hardly measurable by the researcher. Among these characteristics, quality stands out as one of the most important. Other such characteristics proposed in the literature are past experience (Berry et al. (1995)) or advertising and coupon activity (Besanko et al. (1998)).

To the extent that these characteristics are constant through time, the inclusion of retailer fixed effects in the indirect utility should remove this source of correlation from the error term. Hence, the coefficients of price and of ρ_j would be unbiased. On the other hand, advertising or promotions can be thought as varying in time. Advertising is likely to be higher during weeks in which there is a promotion. Nevertheless, our time period being a month, we expect these two variables to be fairly constant through these aggregated time periods and so their effect to be captured through the fixed effects.

7 Estimation results and simulations

7.1 Empirical estimates of the demand model and margins

Tables 3 and 4 present the results obtained¹⁰. Remark that we allow the ratio of private labels to national brand in the product offerings (ρ_j) to affect utility differently across two large regions (the north and northeast of France and the rest of the country) through interactions with the dummy variable "Northern region" and we also allow this ratio to affect utility differently between hard discount retailers and "traditional" retailers through the interaction with a dummy variable for hard discounters. This choice has been the result of a specification search, and indeed we see from estimates that the offer of more private label products (higher ρ_j) can have opposite effects on the utility of consumers depending on their income groups. This taste

¹⁰Due to the small market share of Hard discounters among consumers of types 6, 7 and 8, the estimation for these groups has been performed excluding Hard discounters from the possible alternatives. Also, the estimation for group 5 failed to converge and hence it is not reported. Remark also that some variables have been removed from the specification of utility on an empirical basis.

variation can be interpreted in several ways but reflects the fact that private label products can be perceived differently in the population. Given the functional form chosen for the utility of the consumer, the interpretation of the coefficients cannot be read directly from the table. The exception are the coefficients of variables inside ψ_{2jt} , which enter the utility function linearly. As expected, distance to the retailer reduces the utility of every alternative. Its effect is less severe for middle-income consumers, who are more willing to travel. Low-income consumers may face high transportation costs whereas high-income consumers may value more their time. The surface of the retailer has a positive effect on the utility for nearly all the income classes, but less so for the high-income consumers. On the contrary, these consumers have a higher valuation for the availability of parking slots. With respect to the availability of gas stations, when significant, results show that it is positively valued. This is specially true for low and middle-income consumers. Finally, a higher number of retailers close to the consumer reduces the mean utility that he derives from each of them.

The estimated parameters also allow to compute the corresponding elasticities that are presented for each retailer in Table 5.

Group dependent parameters	Group 0			Group 1			Group 2			Group 3		
	Coeff.	Std Err.		Coeff.	Std Err.		Coeff.	Std Err.		Coeff.	Std Err.	
μ	-1.6449	55.7574		1322.30	813.47		2907.00**	1476.36		4003.67***	1514.40	
β_1	17.646***	5.8421		19.109***	3.5515		23.0657***	3.1411		21.3423***	2.6881	
β_2	0.6874***	0.0129		0.706***	0.0076		0.7215***	0.0053		0.6925***	0.0043	
ψ_1												
Hyper 1	-13.051	70.857		-38.331	24.060		-102.147***	23.507		20.120	20.363	
Hyper 2	21.259	71.254		-32.455	24.297		-106.395***	23.834		21.370	20.716	
Supermarket 1	40.868	62.987		-11.428	21.733		-101.442***	21.740		12.359	19.144	
Hyper EDLP 1	30.125	68.873		-0.733	22.044		-84.553***	22.158		42.158**	19.165	
Hyper EDLP 2	27.764	68.735		-12.141	22.882		-87.891***	22.599		34.462*	19.658	
Others	38.149	58.917		-6.591	20.705		-71.313***	20.246		35.599**	17.572	
Other Hyperm.	-8.610	69.229		-16.975	23.690		-92.635***	23.724		16.872	20.421	
Hard Discount	259.244	342.977		-162.47***	23.579		-176.827***	20.460		-123.97***	19.001	
ρ_j												
$\rho_j \times$ Northern region	-33.8439	48.3953		8.5547	10.3760		19.8202*	10.4626		-11.1250	9.4022	
$\rho_j \times$ Hard Discount	-32.028***	10.6108		-7.8773	5.6836		-17.1569***	5.2063		-10.9406**	4.4362	
$\rho_j \times$ Northern region \times Hard Disc.	9.4401	55.8011		5.8313	10.4256		-8.8196	10.5012		26.3282***	9.4221	
α												
Household size	28.662**	11.5323		8.0043	5.4687		17.4546***	5.0231		9.5219**	4.2711	
Number of cars	-1.2674	3.3536		2.7329	1.9293		-0.0559	1.4498		-0.3615	1.2828	
Log surface	2.7973	4.7848		4.6193	3.5382		-1.3316	2.7039		4.8674*	2.6876	
ϕ_2												
Hyper 1	-0.2704	7.0307		-1.9008	2.4860		6.6603***	2.4056		-4.7680**	2.1848	
Hyper 2	-8.2801	37.7343		-6.781***	0.5417		-7.7008***	0.4510		-8.0726***	0.3338	
Supermarket 1	-4.2704	31.2911		-6.798***	0.5425		-7.6985***	0.4511		-8.0887***	0.3344	
Hyper EDLP 1	-3.1689	29.2542		-6.804***	0.5413		-7.7204***	0.4514		-8.0733***	0.3333	
Hyper EDLP 2	-4.5623	30.5571		-6.833***	0.5407		-7.7227***	0.4505		-8.0927***	0.3331	
Others	-5.1305	31.2748		-6.839***	0.5418		-7.7370***	0.4507		-8.1070***	0.3336	
Other Hyperm.	-5.3460	27.3536		-6.764***	0.5416		-7.6684***	0.4504		-8.0457***	0.3331	
Hard Discount	-5.3272	29.6074		-6.776***	0.5419		-7.7099***	0.4506		-8.0699***	0.3337	
ψ_2												
Distance	-2.8311	28.7772		-7.029***	0.5408		-7.9590***	0.4503		-8.3107***	0.3327	
Log surface	-0.5286***	0.0500		-0.513***	0.0197		-0.4843***	0.0147		-0.3918***	0.0109	
Nb retail <3km	-0.3079	0.2304		0.379***	0.0828		0.2533***	0.0562		0.4831***	0.0550	
Nb cashier/m ²	-0.2362***	0.0703		-0.434***	0.0478		-0.3770***	0.0337		-0.4733***	0.0276	
Nb park. slot/m ²	0.0299***	0.0070		-0.0041	0.0049		0.0088***	0.0034		0.0195***	0.0026	
Nb pumps/m ²	-1.9377***	0.2768		-0.5508***	0.1572		-1.0115***	0.1239		-0.4939***	0.0931	
λ	1.6690***	0.3949		-0.0166	0.2316		1.1736***	0.1774		-0.1623	0.1525	
	0.0718***	0.0059		0.0768***	0.0041		0.0796***	0.0029		0.0812***	0.0024	

Table 3: Results of the discrete-continuous choice model per groups of consumers

Group dependent parameters	Group 4			Group 6			Group 7			Group 8		
	Coeff.	Std Err.		Coeff.	Std Err.		Coeff.	Std Err.		Coeff.	Std Err.	
μ	3787.30**	1595.31		1866.61**	860.90		1882.98**	954.91		723.68	695.02	
β_1	29.544***	2.9514		39.867***	3.8754		43.275***	5.1509		32.3376***	10.0077	
β_2	0.6960***	0.0041		0.7231***	0.0042		0.738***	0.0052		0.7340***	0.0109	
ψ_1												
Hyper 1	-86.920***	21.516		-137.98***	37.345		-159.20***	48.823		-145.921	89.766	
Hyper 2	-94.070***	21.682		-149.36***	37.680		-149.19***	49.137		-153.556*	90.902	
Supermarket 1	-89.210***	19.950		-134.19***	33.137		-164.20***	43.273		-145.612*	81.223	
Hyper EDLP 1	-81.748***	19.861		-129.96***	35.845		-144.08***	45.673		-138.891	86.038	
Hyper EDLP 2	-71.573***	20.509		-122.90***	35.782		-160.28***	46.697		-113.245	86.580	
Others	-67.687***	18.669		-130.50***	31.617		-132.40***	40.364		-149.682*	78.167	
Other Hyperm.	-88.604***	21.118		-155.89***	37.327		-174.64***	48.104		-93.937	91.019	
Hard Discount	-208.07***	20.971		-	-		-	-		-	-	
ρ_j	12.4707	8.2080		-55.221***	19.6305		31.0663	24.7187		-78.2920	51.2036	
$\rho_j \times$ Nothern region	8.4218*	5.0780		16.0691**	7.2911		-7.9338	9.7441		115.006***	21.8657	
$\rho_j \times$ Hard Discount	2.3872	8.2696		-	-		-	-		-	-	
$\rho_j \times$ Nothern region \times Hard Disc.	-7.6884	4.8951		-	-		-	-		-	-	
α												
Household size	-0.1896	1.3743		2.3458	1.7296		-2.5264	2.1367		-10.4677*	5.7845	
Number of cars	0.6722	2.6526		-8.5652***	3.0573		-13.089***	3.8808		14.9451**	6.1321	
Log surface	4.3210*	2.2146		11.8320***	3.7900		10.932**	5.0931		11.1345	9.4899	
ϕ_2												
Hyper 1	-8.1562***	0.3747		-8.2482***	0.4183		-8.184***	0.4574		-7.0675***	0.8446	
Hyper 2	-8.1473***	0.3746		-8.2464***	0.4183		-8.170***	0.4573		-7.0454***	0.8455	
Supermarket 1	-8.1735***	0.3748		-8.3381***	0.4226		-8.246***	0.4617		-7.1778***	0.8557	
Hyper EDLP 1	-8.1825***	0.3744		-8.2849***	0.4186		-8.244***	0.4580		-7.1648***	0.8475	
Hyper EDLP 2	-8.1895***	0.3745		-8.2900***	0.4184		-8.211***	0.4575		-7.1312***	0.8459	
Others	-8.1268***	0.3743		-8.2173***	0.4183		-8.171***	0.4574		-7.0198***	0.8457	
Other Hyperm.	-8.1429***	0.3744		-8.2518***	0.4182		-8.168***	0.4571		-7.1794***	0.8452	
Hard Discount	-8.4004***	0.3742		-	-		-	-		-	-	
ψ_2												
Distance	-0.4814***	0.0114		-0.5050***	0.0123		-0.495***	0.0173		-0.5721***	0.0468	
Log surface	0.3583***	0.0443		0.1742***	0.0414		0.0399	0.0583		-0.1641	0.1282	
Nb retail. <3km	-0.4184***	0.0256		-0.4007***	0.0291		-0.376***	0.0360		-0.2187***	0.0762	
Nb cashier/m ²	0.0138***	0.0024		-0.2288***	0.0848		-0.3043**	0.1233		-1.8614***	0.3287	
Nb park. slot/m ²	-0.1313*	0.0680		0.0246**	0.0023		0.0264***	0.0029		0.0220***	0.0071	
Nb pumps/m ²	0.4653***	0.1425		0.1545	0.1539		0.3867*	0.1986		0.4127	0.4639	
λ	0.0806***	0.0024		0.0707***	0.0023		0.0653***	0.0025		-	-	

Table 4: Results of the discrete-continuous choice model per groups of consumers (cont.)

Retailer	Own-price elasticity of choice	Own-price elasticity of conditional demand	Own-PL/NB ratio elasticity of choice
Hyper 1	-10.9759	-1.1482	-0.0022
Hyper 2	-10.9694	-1.1311	-0.0054
Supermarket 1	-11.7135	-1.1464	-0.0037
Hyper EDLP 1	-9.5673	-1.1853	-0.0044
Hyper EDLP 2	-9.1811	-1.1490	-0.0085
Others	-11.9909	-1.1716	-0.0061
Other Hyperm.	-12.4183	-1.1319	-0.0057
Hard Discount	-13.4877	-1.3654	2.4036

Table 5: Elasticities implied by the choice model

Own-price elasticities of expected choices are computed by averaging the simulated price elasticities of every consumer's retailer choice. Own-price elasticities of expected conditional demand are computed by averaging the simulated price elasticity of consumer's demand across consumers who did their primary shopping at a given retailer j . The expected price elasticities are thus given by the following expressions:

$$\varepsilon_{jt}^c = \frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \int_{\zeta} \frac{[\partial s_{ijt}(\zeta) / \partial \ln p_{jt}]}{s_{ijt}(\zeta)} dF_g(\zeta)$$

$$\varepsilon_{jt}^x = \frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \int_{\zeta} \frac{[\partial \bar{x}_{ijt}(\zeta) / \partial \ln p_{jt}]}{\bar{x}_{ijt}(\zeta)} dF_g(\zeta)$$

where N_j is the number of consumers of retailer j .

Hard discounters have the largest price elasticity of choice, indicating that their customers are the most willing to switch to competing retailers. Moreover, they also face the largest price elasticity of conditional demand. Thus, when confronted with a price increase, their customers react by cutting down on consumption. A different pattern emerges for *Hyper EDLP 1* and *Hyper EDLP 2*, two retailers who advertise themselves as having lower prices than the other hypermarkets. Despite facing a higher conditional demand price elasticity, their net price elasticity (taking into account both the elasticities of the probability of choice and of the conditional demand) is one of the most inelastic among the selected retailers. Hence, their customers are relatively loyal to the store but adjust their expenditure in case of a price increase relatively more than customers in competing retailers. Two other retailers, *Hyper 1* and *Hyper 2*, are in an intermediate situation: their price elasticities are moderate for the selection of retailer and relatively low for the conditional demand. In other words, they may lose some

Retailer	Margin % of sales	PL/NB ratio (ρ) cost elasticity
Hyper 1	9.00% (0.0072)	-0.0183 (0.0042)
Hyper 2	10.40% (0.0045)	-0.0165 (0.0029)
Supermarket 1	12.81% (0.0231)	-0.0328 (0.0094)
Hyper EDLP 1	9.31% (0.0071)	-0.0336 (0.0045)
Hyper EDLP 2	9.79% (0.0047)	-0.0288 (0.0031)
Others	10.40% (0.0120)	-0.0206 (0.0035)
Other Hyperm.	8.48% (0.0114)	-0.0132 (0.0049)
Hard Discount	9.87% (0.0192)	0.9537 (0.3221)

Table 6: Average estimates for margins and elasticities of costs to PL/NB ratio

customers after a price increase but those who stay do not change much their expenditure¹¹.

Elasticities with respect to ρ_j are computed in a similar way as price elasticities. Except for Hard Discounters, all retailers see their choice probabilities marginally decreasing with an increase of this ratio. The ratio ρ has the higher effect (in absolute value) for *Hyper EDLP 2* and the other small retailers whereas the smaller impact is found for *Hyper 1* and *Supermarket 1*. These findings seem consistent with consumers' perceptions about the quality of PL products in different retailers: *Hyper 1*'s PLs are well considered whereas *Hyper EDLP 2*'s are not so much.

Let us discuss in what follows the margins and derivatives implied by the assumed competition model between retailers. The results summarized in Table 3 are used to construct the matrices X_p , S_p and Q , which are needed for the computation of the margins γ according to the expression in (5). The averages, across periods and regions, of the implied margins over sales and ratio-elasticity of costs are presented in Table 6.

Estimated margins are in line with those estimated by Smith (2004) (around 10-13%) for the British market, whose concentration is similar to that of the French market¹². The effect of ρ on retailers' marginal cost is estimated to be negative but small in magnitude. Excluding Hard Discounters, the larger effect on cost (in absolute value) is found for *Hyper EDLP 1*: a

¹¹Our database does not contain information on purchases done in small retailers - such as street markets and other small specialized stores - that can be good substitutes of the selected retailers for some consumers. Hence, our results are conditional on visiting one of these larger retailers and the competitive effect of street markets and the like is not accounted for.

¹²According to ACNielsen data, the five largest retailers in UK hold a market share of 67% in 1999. In France this figure was around 72%. See *Rapport d'information sur l'évolution de la distribution*, Assemblée Nationale, 2000.

Retailer	Original sample choice probability	Simulated choice probability	Difference
Hyper 1	14.81%	15.06%	0.25 %
Hyper 2	17.34%	17.67%	0.33 %
Supermarket 1	6.77%	6.95%	0.18 %
Hyper EDLP 1	22.46%	23.01%	0.55 %
Hyper EDLP 2	27.95%	28.64%	0.69 %
Others	6.75%	6.90%	0.15 %
Other Hyperm.	3.72%	3.80%	0.08 %
Hard Discount	3.35%	0	—

Table 7: Simulated choice probabilities in the absence of Hard Discounters

1% increase in the PL to NB ratio decreases its marginal costs by a 0.03 %. Hard Discounters face a cost elasticity closer to unity.

Finally, to provide an indication of the consumers' substitution patterns between retailers, we compute their expected choice probabilities in the absence of Hard Discounters. We simulate the probability each consumer assigns to the retailers in his choice set, excluding the Hard Discounters, assuming that the rest of the retailers do not change their prices. By the law of large numbers, the average of these choice probabilities across consumers, computed for every retailer, converges to the true choice probability they face. Table 7 presents the results of this simulation. *Hyper EDLP 2* and, to a lesser extent, *Hyper EDLP 1* would be the two retailers benefitting the most. This finding seems realistic in the view that both retailers are relatively more specialized in low and middle income consumers and heavily advertise their "Every Day Low Prices" pricing policy¹³. Thus, in the absence of Hard Discounters, consumers would preferably turn to other retailers they perceive as having lower prices. In this case, this decision implies travelling higher distances, since most part of the consumers would switch to hypermarkets or large supermarkets located further away. Supermarkets, like Supermarket 1, and other small retailers, although located closer to the consumer, would only take minor advantage of the absence of Hard Discounters.

7.2 Simulating retailer response to demand shocks

In order to illustrate the applications of our proposed framework, we present in this section a simulation of the retailers' response to a demand shock. In particular, we consider the case of an

¹³See *Rapport sur l'évolution de la distribution*, Assemblée Nationale (2000).

increase in the transportation cost of all the consumers. Retailers located further away would be penalized relative to other closer retailers, such as supermarkets and Hard Discounters. In this case, models assuming only price competition between retailers would predict a price decrease for hypermarkets in order to retain their more sensitive (to distance) customers. Of course, if the fraction of distance-sensitive consumers is low enough, retailers may find profitable to lose these customers and keep (or slightly increase) the level of prices for the rest. However, if retailers can control, in addition to prices, their location in the characteristics space then the price decrease may be lower: retailers can compensate the increase in transportation costs by offering more quantity of the characteristics that are valued by the consumer. Retailers can play on this degree of differentiation. Of course the trade-off is determined by the costs of changing these characteristics. In our proposed framework, retailers can control their offering of PLs with respect to that of NBs and that, in turn, has an effect on their marginal costs.

We implement the increase in transportation costs by simulating a 10% increase in the distance of the consumer to all the retailers. The exercise amounts to solve the system of equations formed by the first order conditions (3) and (6) with respect to prices and ρ_j . This requires the knowledge of the level of marginal costs ($\gamma_j - p_j$) as well as the value of the cost derivative along all the domain of the ratio. As our method allows to recover estimates for each retailer of c_j and $\frac{\partial c_j}{\partial \rho_j}$ at the observed value ρ_j that we denote $\widehat{\frac{\partial c_j(\rho_j)}{\partial \rho_j}}$. We proceed by assuming that the relationship between marginal costs and the ratio is the same for all the retailers up to a constant and use the implied values of the derivative to recover a functional form for $c_j(\rho)$. The empirical estimates of $\widehat{\frac{\partial c_j(\rho_j)}{\partial \rho_j}}$ show that the derivative of marginal costs with respect to ρ_j is negative for small values of the ratio and positive for larger ones. This implies that the functional form for marginal costs should be decreasing for small ρ_j and increasing afterwards. One way to reconcile these findings is by fitting a polynomial of order two for the relationship between the marginal cost derivative and the ratio. Using a quadratic form, we estimate the parameters b, c, d using

$$\widehat{\frac{\partial c_j(\rho_j)}{\partial \rho_j}} = b + c\rho_j + d\rho_j^2 + \varepsilon_j$$

With the coefficients of this polynomial, we recover the polynomial of order three that characterizes the level of marginal costs. The only unknown is the value of the constant in this last polynomial, which can be recovered from the difference between the level of marginal costs $c_j = (\gamma_j - p_j)$ estimated for each region and period and the value implied by the polynomial. This constant varies across retailers and hence allows for differences in marginal costs

Retailer	Simulated equilibrium (original distance)		Simulated equilibrium (10% increase in distance)		Change	
	Price p	Ratio ρ	Price p	Ratio ρ	Price p	Ratio ρ
	Hyper 1	5.96	1.2552	5.97	1.2606	+0.17 %
Hyper 2	5.96	1.3930	5.96	1.3987	+0.00 %	+0.41 %
Supermarket 1	7.13	1.2508	7.24	1.2460	+1.54 %	-0.38 %
Hyper EDLP 1	6.23	1.0477	5.88	1.1069	-5.62 %	+5.65 %
Hyper EDLP 2	5.62	1.3263	5.62	1.3318	+0.00 %	+0.41 %
Others	6.16	1.2143	6.17	1.2309	+0.16 %	+1.37 %
Other Hyperm.	6.52	1.2826	6.54	1.2903	+0.31 %	+0.60 %
Hard Discount	5.27	2.1698	5.43	2.1940	+3.04 %	+1.12 %

Table 8: Retailers' reaction to an increase in transportation costs of 10%

irrespective of the ratio of private labels ρ . Thus the cost function per retailer is assumed to be

$$c_j(\rho) = a_j + b\rho + c\frac{\rho^2}{2} + d\frac{\rho^3}{3}$$

where $a_j = c_j - b\rho_j + c\frac{\rho_j^2}{2} + d\frac{\rho_j^3}{3}$.

The simulation is performed using the data for one large region (north and northeastern part of France) and one period of our sample. Results are given in Table 8.

The first two columns of Table 8 show the equilibrium price and equilibrium ratio ρ obtained when simulating the model without changing any covariates of the model. Comparing these results with the true data, the simulation shows a better performance in recovering observed prices than observed ratios. It overestimates the price level of *Hyper EDLP 1* and the Hard discounters, while underestimates the ratio ρ for Hard discounters. For the rest of the retailers, the simulated ratio is larger than the observed one but that of Hyper EDLP 1 is relatively too low.

Besides this first remark on the performance of the simulation in recovering the observed data, we nevertheless argue that the comparison of the two simulated equilibria is informative about the retailers' reaction to the demand shock.

In general, the reaction of prices and ratios is small in magnitude. There are, however, a few exceptions. Retailers located closer to the customer, such as Hard discounters and supermarkets like *Supermarket 1*, are able to increase prices between 1.5-3% at the expense of more distant retailers. This is specially true for Hard Discounters, who can compensate the increase in prices

Retailer	Original equilibrium		Merger equilibrium (Hyper 2 and Superm.1)		Change	
	Price p	Ratio ρ	Price p	Ratio ρ	Price p	Ratio ρ
Hyper 1	5.96	1.2552	5.96	1.2581	+0.05 %	+0.23 %
Hyper 2	5.96	1.3930	5.98	1.3955	+0.34 %	+0.18 %
Supermarket 1	7.13	1.2508	7.93	1.1811	+11.24 %	-5.57 %
Hyper EDLP 1	6.23	1.0477	6.26	1.0488	+0.49 %	+0.11 %
Hyper EDLP 2	5.62	1.3263	5.63	1.3266	+0.21 %	+0.02 %
Others	6.16	1.2143	6.16	1.2212	+0.05 %	+0.57 %
Other Hyperm.	6.52	1.2826	6.53	1.2830	+0.18 %	+0.03 %
Hard Discount	5.27	2.1698	5.26	2.1668	-0.10 %	-0.14 %

Table 9: Merger Simulation

with an increase in the ratio of PLs. Among the more distant retailers, those competing for lower income consumers reduce somewhat both their prices and ratio. This is specially true in the case of *Hyper EDLP 1*, who cuts prices significantly trying to attract more consumers thanks to its more dense network of stores. The rest of retailers seem to prefer a marginal increase in prices at the risk of losing their more price sensitive customers.

As a second simulation, we simulate the merger of two retailer chains, the "hypermarket 2" chain and the chain named "Supermarket 1". This amounts to simulate the new equilibrium taking into account the fact that the merged entity would maximize total profit of all retailers of these two chains. Results of the simulation are in Table 9 where the two first columns report again the equilibrium simulation at the original situation of the industry structure for comparison with the merger simulation.

The results show that the largest changes would occur for the prices of the supermarket 1 stores prices which would increase by more than 11% with an important reduction in the offerings of private labels since the ratio ρ would decrease by 5.57 %. It seems that the merger would allow the chain to increase prices and reduce the private labels offerings. Most other retailers would also increase prices even if not in large proportion, except hard discounters who would be decreasing prices slightly.

8 Conclusion

This paper complements the literature on the food retailing industry by developing a structural model in which retailer chains compete in price and brand offer to attract consumers. In particular, retailers' brand offer is characterized by the share of private labels versus national

brands across all their supplied products. We show that, in general, consumers' valuation of private labels plays a negative role both in their decision of which retailer to visit and in the average expenditure at the store. Nevertheless, the inclusion of private labels slightly reduces marginal costs for the retailer. Hence, the results point out lower marginal costs and a higher bargaining power with respect to manufacturers as the main motivations for the introduction of private labels.

Our proposed framework allows for a richer simulation of retailers' reaction to changes in demand or supply conditions. We have shown how some retailers may find profitable to increase prices while adjusting the ratio of PLs according to the preferences of their consumers. For example, in the case of a demand shock that could be an increase in transportation cost, we find that this increase in spatial differentiation (making stores further from each other and from customers) allows most retailers to slightly increase prices except some type of less distant retailers (denoted hyper EDLP 1) who decrease prices but also increase private labels offerings (which allows to reduce cost). On the contrary, hard discounters which are typically the small and the closest react by increasing prices and private labels. The framework can also be applied to the analysis of mergers which we illustrate by the merger of two retailer chains. We find that not only the merger leads to a price increase of the stores of one of the merged chains but also to a decrease in the offerings of private labels by this chain.

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A Appendix

A.1 Price Index

At first, all the 476 products were used to construct the index. The resulting price series, however, presented strong fluctuations for some of the retailers. Specially for the supermarkets Hard Disc. 1, whose price index had a range going from 5,79 € to 11,89 €. A careful inspection of the data revealed that these retailers had a small number of observations for products with high variation in prices (crustaceous, oysters, quality wine...). Thus, for data on purchases of these products, it was possible to have one month with a purchase of a cheap variety and next month a purchase of an expensive variety. In order to avoid this problem and to obtain more stable price indices, we decided to include two selection criteria for the products. The first one is about the average number of observations per retailer and period (the number of observations present for each retailer and period is computed and the average across retailers and periods is taken). When this number is below a given threshold, the product is eliminated from the index. The threshold was set at 20 observations after trying with several values. Actually, this threshold keeps a reasonable number of products while eliminating those with the most severe effects. Since this criterion still allows for a small number of observations for a single retailer, we introduced a second criterion. It eliminates those products for which one can obtain a mean expenditure with a confidence interval including negative values for some retailer. Besides these two criteria, other products were eliminated for several reasons: 11 products were eliminated because they were not present in all the 36 periods; 1 product was eliminated because it seems to present wrongly coded information; and finally, 10 products that are normally sold in units were also eliminated to keep consistency within the quantity variables defined in the rest of the products. In the end, a total of 240 products were kept to form the index.