

“Does Supply Matter? Initial Supply Conditions and the Effectiveness of Conditional Cash
Transfers for Grade Progression in Nicaragua ”

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DOES SUPPLY MATTER? INITIAL SUPPLY CONDITIONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR GRADE PROGRESSION IN NICARAGUA*

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ABSTRACT: We combine administrative and survey data to examine the effect of a conditional cash transfer program on grade progression in Nicaragua from 1999–2003, putting the spotlight on initial supply side conditions and the extent to which they conditioned program effectiveness. Our principal findings are that the program had a substantial effect on grade progression and that these increased over time, even after the original intervention group stopped receiving demand-side transfers. Half of the estimated program effect on progression is accounted for by a reduction in the dropout and repetition rates of beneficiary children who were already in school when the program began. Supply side conditions were important and several of them led to heterogeneous program impacts. The program was more effective in areas with autonomous schools, suggesting flexibility at the school level better enabled schools to respond to changing demand conditions. At the same time, it was also more effective in intervention areas with *poor* initial supply conditions as measured by indicators of grade availability and distance to school. These were the areas with lower enrollments and grade progression before the program, and thus more room for improvement. With the analysis of child schooling in hand, we then turn to assess the “effect” of the program on school supply conditions. It is precisely in the intervention areas with poor initial school supply conditions, that the program was relatively more effective in improving school supply as measured by grade availability, number of sessions per day and number of teachers. The results suggest that initial school supply conditions do not represent insurmountable obstacles for the implementation of a conditional cash transfer program, as long as these constraints are identified at the planning stage and mechanisms put in place to deal with them during the execution stage. Our results also underscore the importance of carefully considering the integrated (demand *and* supply) nature of conditional-cash-transfer programs, something often overlooked in the design of these interventions and, particularly, in the impact evaluation literature.

Key Words: impact evaluation, conditional cash transfer, schooling, supply side

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1. INTRODUCTION

Nicaragua is the second poorest country in Latin America, and its schooling levels are dismal. At the turn of the century, one-third of adults over the age of 25 had no formal education and another third had never completed primary school. Although increasing school coverage and stable political conditions in the 1990s spurred improvements, the net primary enrollment ratio, at 75 percent, remained well below the regional average of 90 percent in 2001 (World Bank 2001). These initial conditions, and continued poor outcomes despite improvements in school supply, are primary concerns for the economic development of Nicaragua that led the government to consider alternative approaches, including ones that incorporate demand-side components.

One of these was the *Red de Protección Social* (RPS), a government program to reduce both current and future poverty via cash transfers to households living in extreme poverty in rural Nicaragua. The transfers are conditional, and behavior is monitored to ensure that households invest a portion of them in the human capital of their children. Conditional cash transfer programs similar to RPS have been implemented in several large Latin American countries, including the *Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y Alimentación* (PROGRESA, now called OPORTUNIDADES) in Mexico, *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil, and *Familias en Acción* in Colombia. They also have been implemented in other Central American countries including Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. One reason for their popularity is their integrated approach, which encompasses various dimensions of human capital including nutritional status, health, and education. As such, these programs are able to influence many of the key indicators highlighted in national poverty reduction strategies.¹

The broad objective of these programs is to generate a sustained decrease in poverty in some of the most disadvantaged regions in their respective countries. The basic premise is that a major cause of the intergenerational transmission of poverty is the inability of poor households to invest in the human capital of their children. Supply-side only interventions, which increase the availability and quality of education and health services, for example, are often ineffective since the resource constraints facing poor households preclude them from incurring the private costs associated with utilizing these services (e.g., travel costs and the opportunity cost of women's and children's time). These programs attack this problem by targeting transfers to the poorest communities and households (thereby supplementing their current incomes) and by conditioning these household's transfers on actions intended to improve their children's human capital development. This effectively transforms cash transfers into human capital subsidies for poor households.

¹ At the same time, this integration makes comprehensive evaluation of such programs complex, and most analyses of them focus on subsets of outcomes, as we do in this paper.

While much of the motivation for, and literature on, CCTs has focused on the demand side, it would be a mistake to consider these as demand-side only programs. Nearly all of the programs implemented also have had substantial supply-side components incorporated directly in their design and implementation. For example, in RPS, there was a per beneficiary student transfer to the teachers and schools, as well as a management structure aimed at improved and expanded coordination with the Ministry of Education. Also for RPS, the existing healthcare services in the program areas were considered to be insufficient at the outset. Rather than rely on the existing governmental system, the program hired and trained private providers to reach the beneficiaries with health care services (Regalia and Castro 2007). The supply-side figured prominently in Progresia as well, where there was a substantial school building program going on during the initial years of the program (Coady and Parker 2004). The design of PRAF Phase II also directly incorporated supply side innovations (and an evaluation designed to assess them), though in the end they were implemented only in part and could not be adequately evaluated (Glewwe and Olinto 2004).

Despite this recognition that the supply side is important, there is relatively little strong evidence on the role it plays in the effectiveness of CCTs. This is in part because of the difficulty of providing firm evidence on the role of supply when it is not directly incorporated into the evaluation. Heinrich (2007) examines an Argentine school scholarship program using matching techniques in which she examines the heterogeneity of program impacts along a variety of school quality dimensions but finds that while some dimensions of quality are associated with schooling outcomes, program impacts did not differ by baseline measures of quality. Coady and Parker (2004) examine the role of several supply side characteristics in the Progresia program, estimating double-difference equations in which they include as controls supply side measures such as a quadratic in distance to the school and various quality indicators. They focus attention on whether the estimated program impact changes after the inclusion of these additional controls (in effect treating changes in those characteristics as exogenous to the program). They find that despite the importance of several school supply-side characteristics, the average program changes little. Because it was clear from the start that RPS would influence supply conditions directly, we do not follow this approach for identification, but rather take an approach more similar to Heinrich (2007).

In this paper, we explore whether and how initial supply-side conditions influenced RPS program impacts on grade progression; in other words, we examine the heterogeneity of program impacts along different dimensions of (exogenous) initial supply. If better initial supply improves program effectiveness, designers of these programs need to ensure that supply is in place before implementing conditional programs like these. If, on the other hand, initial supply is not a significant constraint (for example due to initial excess capacity), focusing on it prior to program implementation may be less important. This would not be the case, however, if the reason initial supply does not “constrain” the program effects is

that increases in supply are also endogenous to the program. After assessing the importance of supply, we estimate the “effect” of the program on supply conditions themselves, an effect that results from both intentional efforts of the program to improve supply, as well as any effect induced from the increased demand.

To examine the role of initial supply for program effectiveness, we first show that RPS reduced repetition and dropout rates and consequently had positive and substantial average effects on enrollment and grade progression during its first four years of operation. We then incorporate initial supply conditions, as well as their interaction with the program dummy, in regressions on grade progression and find that better initial school supply characteristics all have significant and positive associations with grade progression. The interaction of initial supply conditions with program presence, however, suggest only one initial supply condition that may have constrained program effectiveness: school autonomy. In addition, the results show that the program was *more* effective in areas with poor initial conditions as measured by indicators of grade availability and distance to school. This should not be interpreted to mean that program managers should not focus upon improving supply conditions to meet increasing demand. The importance of school autonomy to program success, combined with the quantitative result that the program had a positive impact on supply conditions over time and anecdotal evidence that RPS personnel worked hard at facilitating expansion of school supply in intervention areas, demonstrates the importance of coupling supply- and demand-side interventions in these integrated conditional-cash-transfer programs.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes key aspects of RPS. In Section 3, we describe the design of the evaluation, the data sources we use, and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes, highlighting the policy implications from our research.

2. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL

Modelled after PROGRESA (Skoufias 2005), RPS was designed to address both current and future poverty through cash transfers targeted to poor households in rural Nicaragua. The transfers were conditional, and households were monitored to ensure that children were, among other things, attending school and brought to preventive healthcare checkups; when they failed to fulfill those obligations, they lost their eligibility for the program. By targeting the transfers to poor households, the program alleviated short-term poverty. By linking the transfers to investments in human capital, the program addressed long-run poverty.

Designed in two phases over a period of five years starting in 2000, the pilot phase (also known as Phase I) lasted for three years with a budget of US\$ 11 million, representing approximately 0.2 percent of GDP or 2 percent of annual recurring government spending on health and education at the time (World Bank 2001, annex 21). In late 2002, there was a continuation and expansion of the program (known as

Phase II) for three more years with a budget of US\$ 20 million. In Phase II, original beneficiaries were phased out of certain components of the program as new beneficiaries were incorporated. The program ended in 2006.

2.1 Program targeting

For Phase I of RPS, the government first targeted rural areas in six municipalities of the Central Region, on the basis of poverty as well as on their capacity to implement the programme. The focus on rural areas reflected the distribution of poverty in Nicaragua—of the 48 per cent of Nicaraguans designated as poor in 1998, 75 per cent resided in rural areas (World Bank, 2001). While not the poorest municipalities in the country, or in the Central Region for that matter, the proportion of impoverished people living in these areas was still well above the national average (World Bank, 2003). In addition, these areas had easy physical access and communication, relatively strong institutional capacity and local coordination, and good coverage of schools.

In the next stage of geographic targeting, a marginality index was constructed for all 59 rural census *comarcas*² (hereafter localities) in the selected municipalities. The index was the weighted average of a set of locality-level indicators (including family size, access to potable water, access to latrines, and illiteracy rates, all taken from the 1995 national census) in which higher index scores were associated with more impoverished areas. The 42 localities with the highest scores were selected as eligible and form the evaluation area examined in this article. Although the initial programme design called only for geographic-level targeting in these 42 localities (that is, with all resident households eligible), about 6 per cent of households, deemed to have substantial resources, were excluded *ex ante* from the programme (Maluccio 2009).

2.2 Program design

RPS had two core components:

Food security, health, and nutrition. Each eligible household received a bimonthly (every two months) cash transfer known as the ‘food security transfer,’ contingent upon the designated household representative attending bimonthly health educational workshops and bringing all children under age five for scheduled preventive healthcare appointments with specially contracted providers. Children under age two were seen monthly and those between two and five, bimonthly. The workshops were held within the communities and covered household sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, and other related topics.

Education: Each eligible household received a bimonthly cash transfer known as the “school attendance transfer,” contingent on enrollment and regular school attendance (more than 85 percent) of children ages 7–13 who had not completed 4th grade. Additionally, for each eligible child, the household

² Census *comarcas* are administrative areas within municipalities that typically include between one and five small communities averaging 100 households each.

received an annual cash transfer intended for school supplies (including uniforms and shoes) known as the “school supplies transfer,” and contingent only on enrollment. Unlike the school attendance transfer, which was a fixed amount per household regardless of the number of eligible children in school, the school supplies transfer was a per-student transfer. To provide incentives to the teachers who had some additional reporting duties and were likely to have larger classes after the introduction of RPS, as well as to increase resources available to the schools, there was also a small “supply-side” cash transfer, known as the “teacher transfer.”³ This was given to each beneficiary child, who in turn delivered it to the teacher. Delivery of these funds to the teacher was monitored (and was a program condition for continuing eligibility), though not their ultimate use.

The amount for each transfer in Phase I was initially determined in U.S. dollars and then converted into Nicaraguan Córdobas (C\$) in September 2000, just before RPS began distributing transfers. The food security transfer was \$224 a year and the school attendance transfer, \$112. On its own, the planned food security transfer represented 13 percent of total annual household expenditures in beneficiary households before the program. A household with one child benefiting from the education component received additional transfers of about eight percent, yielding a total potential transfer of 21 percent of total annual household expenditures.

Over the first two years, the actual average monetary transfer (excluding the teacher transfer) was approximately C\$3,500 (\$272 or 17 percent of total annual household expenditures).⁴ This is approximately the same percentage of total annual pre-program household expenditures as the average transfer in PROGRESA, but more than five times as large as the transfers given in PRAF (Caldés, Coady, Maluccio 2006). In contrast to PROGRESA, which indexes transfers to inflation, the nominal value of the transfers remained constant for RPS, with the consequence that the real value of the transfers declined by about 8 percent due to inflation over two years in Phase I. In Phase II, which began in 2003 and incorporated new beneficiaries, demand-side transfers were reduced. The food security transfer was \$168 in the first year and then declined to \$145 and \$126 in the second and third years. At the same time, the school attendance transfer also declined slightly to \$90 a year. Partly offsetting these reductions were increases in the school supplies transfer, which rose from \$21 to \$25 per student and the teacher transfer, which rose from \$5 to \$8 per student.

To enforce compliance with program requirements, beneficiaries did not receive the food security or education component(s) of the transfer when they failed to carry out any of the conditions described

³ In rural Nicaragua, school’s parents’ associations often request small monthly contributions from parents to support the teacher and the school; the teacher transfer was, in part, intended to substitute any such fees.

⁴ The value of the supply side services, as measured by how much RPS paid to the healthcare providers was also substantial. On an annual basis, the health education workshops and basic preventive health care services cost approximately \$120 per beneficiary household.

above. Approximately ten percent of beneficiaries were penalized at least once and therefore did not receive one or both of the transfers. Only the designated household representative was allowed to collect the cash transfers, and where possible, RPS appointed the mother as the representative. As a result, more than 95 percent of the household representatives were women. These representatives attended the health education workshops and were responsible for ensuring that the requirements for their households were fulfilled.

Although centrally administered, with its multisectoral approach across education, health, and nutrition, RPS required inter-institutional cooperation at the national, municipal, and community levels and created specific structures to achieve this. Given funding and administrative oversight from the Emergency Social Investment Fund (FISE) in Phase I and the Ministry of the Family (MIFAMILIA) in Phase II, municipal planning and coordination was conducted by newly constructed committees composed of delegates from the health and education ministries, representatives from civil society, and RPS personnel. This coordination proved important in directing supply-side responses to increased household demand for health and schooling services. At the locality level, RPS representatives worked with local volunteer representatives known as *promotoras* (beneficiary women chosen by the community) and local schools and healthcare service providers, to implement the program. The *promotoras* were charged with keeping beneficiary household representatives informed about upcoming healthcare appointments for their children, upcoming transfers, and any failures in fulfilling the conditions.

2.3 Principal findings from earlier quantitative assessments of Phase I of RPS

Before examining in depth the program effects on continued enrollment and grade progression over four years, we summarize some of the principal findings from the quantitative evaluation after two years of Phase I. Overall, RPS had large positive and significant double-difference estimated average effects on a broad range of indicators and outcomes from 2000 to 2002 (during Phase I), including expenditures, healthcare inputs, nutritional status of children under age five, and school enrolment. Where it did not have significant effects, it was often due to similar, though smaller, improvements in the control areas. Nearly all estimated effects were larger for the extremely poor, reflecting their lower starting points (for example, lower percentages of children enrolled in primary school before the programme). As a result, RPS reduced inequality across expenditure classes for these outcomes (Maluccio and Flores 2005).

For primary schooling, RPS, induced a significant average net increase in school enrollment at the start of the school year for the target group (those 7–13 years old who had not completed fourth grade) of 18.5 percentage points in 2001 (relative to 2000) and 12.8 percentage points in 2002 (relative to 2000). Effects were similar for boys and girls⁵ and with the program enrollment rates for 7–12 year olds no

⁵ Though see Gitter and Barham (2008) who examine heterogeneous effects based on parental literacy characteristics and find that effects are larger in households where males have higher education than females,

longer varied by age. Thus the program had the effect of encouraging those who would have started late to start on time and also those who had dropped out to return. For comparison with a similar, though not identical program, double-difference estimates of changes in enrollment due to PROGRESA were less than 5 percentage points for primary school students (largely because enrollment in primary school in Mexico was already high) and approximately 12 percentage points for grades 6 through 8 (Schultz 2004). An even more striking comparison is with PRAF in Honduras, where the double-difference estimated program impact of the demand-side intervention was only 2 percentage points after one year and was insignificant after two years. However, the programs are not directly comparable for a few reasons: baseline enrollment in PRAF program areas was higher than in RPS areas and the demand-side cash transfers in PRAF were only one-fifth the size of RPS transfers (Glewwe and Olinto 2004).

Before the program, RPS evaluation survey data (see Section 3.1) show that enrollment rates in intervention and control areas for this group were very similar with approximately 72 percent of eligible children enrolling. With the program, enrollment for the target group rose to 92.7 percent in 2002. Enrollment in the control group also increased, however, by 7.6 percentage points. The transfers proved to be a huge additional stimulus even with that increase, which we discuss below.

Enrollment does not guarantee that a child will continue in school throughout the school year, nor does it mean that they attend school regularly. To continue receiving the education transfers, RPS required that no enrolled student have six or more unjustified absences in a two-month period. The effect of the program on current attendance was even larger than that on enrollment, with an average program effect of 20 percentage points for children ages 7–13. There have been positive effects even for those children who were attending school prior to the program as they are now attending more regularly. Changes in control group enrollment raise concerns about the validity of the experiment. The observed increase of 7.6 percentage points was greater than the national rural average and appears to have been the net effect of several factors possibly contaminating the control areas. First, there appear to have been small increases in school feeding in the area, though this expansion was similar in intervention and control areas so there is little reason to expect bias in the double-difference estimates from this potential source of contamination. Second, there may have been changes in expectations in the control group as they learned about the program that they would eventually receive. Maluccio and Flores (2005) argue the effect of such expectations was ambiguous since for some the rational strategy actually would have been to hold some (older) children out of school in anticipation of the program. Third, there may have been improvements in supply in control areas since the program improved schooling supply for intervention areas and in some cases schools served both intervention and control areas. Offsetting this, however, is

particularly for boys.

the possibility of crowding out of children in control areas who might have been discouraged from attending those shared schools.

On balance, the potential net effect of these considerations on control group schooling decisions is ambiguous. Increasing enrollments relative to the national trend, however, suggest that they were on average positive. Enrollments increased in the control group for every age group except 13-year olds, with the consequence that before-after comparisons are greater than the double-difference estimates for every age group under 13. As a result, the largest double-difference estimated effect in 2002 was for the oldest eligible children, 13-year olds, because there were no increases in enrollments in the control group for them. If parents in the control group were acting strategically in anticipation of the program they would have been less likely to change decisions regarding these older children who would be ineligible in the following year, anyway. We conclude that to the extent contamination exists it is leading to an underestimation of the effects of RPS on schooling.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Data Sources

The evaluation for Phase I of RPS was based on a randomised, community-based intervention. One-half of the 42 eligible localities were randomly selected into the programme; thus, there are 21 localities in the ‘original’ intervention group (starting in late 2000) and 21 distinct localities in the ‘original’ control group. The selection was carried out after ordering the localities by the marginality index (Section 2.1) into seven strata of six localities each, and randomly selecting from each stratum three localities as intervention and three as control.

In mid-2003 (during Phase II), original control localities were incorporated into the programme. Initially, RPS was designed to provide transfers and related supply-side services for a period of three years. During implementation, however, it was decided to extend the supply-side health and education (which included a small transfer to the schools) components for an additional two years, but not the demand-side transfers. As a result, in 2003, as the original control localities were beginning to receive the programme, the demand-side transfers were terminated in the original intervention localities, though households in those areas continued to be eligible to receive the supply-side health and education components through the end of the period examined in this article. We return to a discussion of this cross-over design in Section 3.2 where we qualify the interpretation of the double-difference estimator over 2000–2004 and in Section 4.3 where we describe the main empirical results.

The first primary data source we use is the *RPS evaluation survey* sample, a stratified (at the locality level) random sample representative of all of the 42 localities described above. The instrument was a comprehensive household questionnaire based on the 1998 Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) instrument was implemented (World Bank 2001), and included additional

details on schooling for all household members, including the walking distance to the school each individual attended. Forty-two households were randomly selected from each locality using as the sample frame the RPS household census, for an initial target sample of 1764 households. The first wave of fieldwork was carried out in late August and early September 2000, without replacement—that is, when it was not possible to interview a randomly pre-selected household, another household was not substituted in its place. When appropriately weighted, the sample is statistically representative of these 42 localities, comprising a relatively poor part of the Central Region in Nicaragua, a region typical of poor rural Nicaragua. Follow-up surveys on the same households were implemented in October of 2001, 2002, and 2004.⁶ From all these RPS surveys, we construct an unbalanced panel data set of children which, in addition to parental, household, and locality characteristics measured before the program began, includes enrollment in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004, and highest grade attained measured in those same years, that reflect grade attained in the previous academic year (in Nicaragua the academic year coincides with the calendar year), i.e., 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003. We refer to this merged panel dataset, which includes select information from the initial RPS household census, as the *RPS evaluation panel survey data*.

As with any panel survey, first round nonresponse and latter round attrition in the survey are potential concerns for the analysis. Overall, 90 percent (1581) of the random sample of 1764 households was interviewed in the first round. In four of the localities, the coverage was 100 percent, though in six it was less than 80 percent. For the follow-up surveys in 2001 and 2002, the target sample was limited to these 1581 first round interviews. In 2002, 91 percent of these were re-interviewed (including a small number who had migrated within the six municipalities and were tracked for re-interview). Again, however, coverage in six of the localities was substantially worse, with less than 80 percent re-interviewed. In 2004, 85 percent were re-interviewed. The principal reasons for failure to interview targeted sample households were that household members were temporarily (i.e., more than the several days the survey team would be in the area) absent or that the dwelling appeared to be uninhabited—both of which are likely to be associated with temporary and/or permanent migration. Both the completion rate at baseline and subsequent attrition levels are on a par with similar surveys in other developing countries (Alderman et al. 2001; Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith 2001). Nevertheless, given the patterns described above, attrition was not random, a concern addressed in Section 4.6.

Monitoring of compliance with program requirements was done using a management information system designed specifically for and by RPS. It comprised a continuously updated, relational database of beneficiaries, healthcare providers, and schools. The second primary data source we use in this study is drawn from that system, the *RPS administrative data* tracking child enrollment and attendance from 2000

⁶ Maluccio and Flores (2005) and IFPRI (2005) describe the sample size calculations and baseline and follow-up samples in more detail.

to 2003. Starting at the end of 2000, child beneficiaries in Phase I intervention areas were monitored by the program. In contrast, children (and households) in original control areas were not followed in the same fashion, since they were not beneficiaries at that time. With the start of Phase II in 2003, however, the latter group, those who lived in (original) control areas in Phase I which became intervention areas in Phase II, became potential beneficiaries. Therefore, those households and children who participated in Phase II of the program from original control areas were incorporated into the RPS administrative data in 2003. Combining these children with initial census data carried out in all 42 localities before the program began,⁷ we construct a child-level panel data set for both Phase I intervention and (original) control areas with observations on schooling enrolment and grade attainment in 2000 and again in 2003.

In the RPS administrative panel data, we observe only those individuals who at one point or another were contacted by and participated in the program. Thus not all children in the original census appear in the administrative data system (and vice versa). While potentially a limitation, we argue that estimates based on this selected sample are unlikely to be biased substantially for two reasons. First, program participation exceeded 90 percent in the program areas. Second, when analyzing the RPS administrative panel data, we focus on younger children, thus avoiding the selection bias of control group individuals who do not appear in the sample because by the time the program arrived in their community they had already completed fourth grade and were no longer eligible. We return to an assessment of the possible effects on our results of using this selective sample in Section 4.6.

Although the administrative data is not available for the exact same years as the survey data, it still serves as a powerful check on the RPS evaluation panel survey data, since it comprises a much larger proportion of the children living in the areas. By augmenting the sample size nearly five-fold, we are able to increase substantially the precision of our estimates. Another advantage of using these data is that it provides a rare example of rigorous program evaluation using administrative data.⁸

The last primary data source we use is a school-level data base collected by RPS, also for administrative purposes. To monitor beneficiary compliance with the program requirements, schools were required to collect information on matriculation, attendance, and payment of the teacher transfer, and feed these into the RPS administrative data system. Therefore, RPS set up a database of schools, and when doing so implemented a short survey form about school conditions in 2000. Hence, there is information on a variety of indicators of school quality at the outset of the program, for nearly all schools in both

⁷ For operational purposes, the RPS carried out a census in both intervention and control areas before the start of the program, in May 2000. This collected basic information on household demographics, housing characteristics, and assets. It also collected for each household the time required to walk to the nearest primary school with at least a fourth grade and, for each child under 15 years of age, current enrollment status and grade.

⁸ We underscore, however, that it is administrative data collected under very special circumstances, in which there was a randomized selection of program areas into intervention and control groups with eventual program entry by the latter group.

intervention and original control areas. In addition, schools with RPS beneficiaries were monitored annually through 2004. Thus in 2003, when the original control group entered the program, information for (former control) schools was updated and RPS began following them as well. From this information, we construct a two-period panel data set of schools from 2000 to 2003, before and after Phase I of the program. We refer to this as the *RPS schools data*. For program beneficiaries it is possible to merge the RPS schools data with children via the administrative data and for all others the merge is carried out at a geographic region at least as fine as the locality-level at which randomization occurred.

3.2. *Econometric methodology*

The empirical approach exploits two key features of the data allowing us to overcome most of the typical concerns in econometric estimation and causal inference: 1) the randomized design of the evaluation and 2) the panel structure, i.e., the fact that the same children were interviewed, before and after RPS was implemented and in both intervention and control localities. We frame the presentation of the econometric methodology around the main outcome variable we examine, completed grades. We consider a series of reduced form specifications, estimating RPS program effects on completed grade progression and differentiating them for children with differing initial access to schooling, measured both in terms of quality and quantity.

The value of randomized evaluations is widely recognized. When done well, recipients and nonrecipients have, on average, the same observed and, more importantly (since they are more difficult to control for), unobserved characteristics. As a result, they establish a credible basis for comparison, freed from selectivity concerns, and the direction of causality is certain (Burtless 1995).⁹ However, even a well-implemented randomized evaluation design is not without its drawbacks. For example, the usual difficulties of following subjects over time in a panel survey persist, so selection bias due to attrition remains a potential problem; the advantages of panel data and randomization are dissipated with attrition if it is nonrandom.

The methodology we use is based on difference-in-difference techniques and yields what is commonly referred to as the “average program impact.”¹⁰ The resulting measures can be interpreted as the expected effect of implementing the program in a similar population elsewhere. For this analysis, the double-difference technique is extended to include a host of individual, household, and school-level controls, and the spotlight is placed on the differential program effect by initial schooling supply. The

⁹ Heckman and Smith (1995), however, highlight that this apparent simplicity can be deceiving, particularly in poorly designed evaluations where there is randomization bias (where the process of randomization itself leads to a different beneficiary pool than would otherwise have been treated) or substitution bias where nonbeneficiaries obtain similar interventions from different sources—a form of “contamination.” These do not appear to have been significant problems in the RPS evaluation (Maluccio and Flores 2005).

¹⁰ Ravallion (2008) provides a discussion of this and related evaluation tools.

reduced-form econometric model is shown in equation (1), where instead of characterizing it as (two-period) panel data, we first-difference the dependent variable (highest grade completed in one period less highest grade completed in an earlier period, yielding grade progression). This allows us to include initial conditions and other time invariant factors directly on the right hand side (akin to including interactions of these factors with a second period dummy variable before differencing).

$$(1) \Delta E_{ihc} = \beta_0 + X_{i0} \beta_1 + X_{h0} \beta_2 + P_{c0} \beta_3 + K_{c0} \beta_4 + K_{c0} P_{c0} \beta_5 + \Delta \varepsilon_{ihc}$$

Where

ΔE_{ihc} = the number of approved grades progressed between the baseline survey and a later period, for child i (in household h and locality c)

X_{i0} = is a vector of individual characteristics at baseline year 0 (e.g., age and sex)

X_{h0} = is a vector of household characteristics at baseline (e.g., per capita expenditures, parental age and schooling, and family structure)

P_{c0} = (1) if a Phase I program locality c , because the dependent variable is in difference form, this is the double-difference estimator of the average program effect (conditional on the other controls in the regression)

K_{c0} = is a vector of relevant schooling characteristics at baseline (dummy variables reflecting good schooling conditions for: time to school, school autonomy, number of grades offered, student-teacher ratio, and textbooks per student)

The error term ($\Delta \varepsilon_{ihc}$) includes all unobserved individual, household, and locality *time varying* effects.

Because this is a difference equation at the child level, child, household, and locality fixed-effects all drop out of the regression. This is important, since individual heterogeneity can affect substantially the estimation of program effects (Behrman and Hoddinott 2005). Moreover, controlling for fixed effects has the added benefit of controlling in part for attrition, to the extent that it is the result of persistent unobserved heterogeneity. We also include several initial conditions, however, and thus are implicitly allowing those factors to affect the rate of schooling progression.

The parameters of interest are β_3 , the double-difference estimator of the average program effect and β_5 , the estimator of the differential average program effect for each measure of initial supply that we consider. Because the specification does not condition on household participation in the program, but only on whether the household resides in a locality that has the program, the estimates using the RPS evaluation panel survey data for the first two years of operations reflect the “intent-to-treat” effect of the program (Burtless 1995).

About 10% of the households in the original intervention areas were either excluded by RPS (as described in Section 2.1) or chose not to participate. Sample households in this subgroup are not program beneficiaries so that basing estimates on the sample that includes them may “dilute” the estimated effects

of the program. The intent-to-treat methodology is a conservative one relative to measuring the effect of the intervention on the treated, for example. Given the relatively high participation rates, however, it is unlikely to underestimate the effects on treated households by very much, something we verify in the empirical analysis.

The above interpretation as a double-difference estimator for the program effect is valid for comparisons from 2000 to 2001 or 2002, using the child-level RPS evaluation survey panel data set. It must be modified slightly, however, for the other comparisons we make, using the RPS administrative panel data comparing 2000 and 2003, and the RPS evaluation panel survey data comparing 2000 and 2004.

Because only those who at some point participated in the program are included in the RPS administrative panel data, when we use that sample we are estimating the effect of the program on grade progression (from 1999–2002) on those who were treated in 2000 in the original intervention group, relative to those from the original control group who were treated starting in 2003. Provided the selection processes for participation did not vary over these few years, this is an excellent control group for estimating the effect of the treatment-on-the-treated, since any unobservables driving participation should be balanced across the two randomly chosen groups. Therefore, β_3 for this sample is the effect of the treatment-on-the-treated, since the estimation includes only those who participated in the program from the original intervention group and those who eventually participated from the original control group.

The other exception to interpreting β_3 as the intent-to-treat average program effect is in the comparison from 2000 to 2004 using the RPS evaluation panel survey data. As described in Section 3.1, in 2003 original intervention areas received the last of their demand-side transfers (which had always been scheduled for three years) though they continued to receive supply-side benefits in the form of health services and the teacher transfer.¹¹ At the same time, original control areas were enrolled in the program. As a result, β_3 represents the four year intent-to-treat program effect of having had RPS Phase I for three years (from 2000 to 2003) and then the supply-side only for one year relative to having had no program the first three years and RPS Phase II (with its modifications, including a reduction in demand-side transfers) for the last year. While we are unable to disentangle the two changes in this “cross-over” design without additional assumptions, we emphasize that this “hybrid” estimate provides us with a conservative four-year impact for the original program. As with the one- and two-year assessments of the program effect, due to high program take-up these estimates are likely to differ little from their treatment-on-the-treated counterparts.

¹¹ After the demand-side transfers were completed, the teacher transfer was then delivered directly to the school, rather than via the household.

In the double-difference analyses that follow, we work with all available children in the unbalanced household panel samples for each comparison. All standard errors are calculated allowing for clustering at the household level (Stata Corporation 2007).¹² We ignore the stratified sample design, which can be corrected for statistically using locality-level sample weights; correcting for this aspect of the design made no substantive changes to the estimated effects so we chose not to do so in order to present estimates with the somewhat more conservatively estimated heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.

4. RESULTS

4.1 *Baseline conditions*

We first examine measures of child schooling and indicators of school quality at baseline, before RPS was implemented. In doing so we: 1) verify that conditions in the intervention and control groups were similar in 2000, prior to the start of the program; and 2) characterize the educational environment (in terms of schooling inputs and outcomes) in which the program operated, as well as the extent to which supply side characteristics were associated with schooling outcome measures.

Table 1 presents initial enrollment (left-hand side panel) and grades completed (right-hand side panel) for eligible target children, all those between 7 and 13 years of age who had not completed fourth grade, as well as for 5 and 6 year olds. Enrollment was rare for 5 year olds and uncommon for 6 year olds. By age 7, however, enrollment was above 50 percent and increased up to age 10 (75 percent), before declining. Thus, even at its peak, there was substantial room for increasing enrollment in the target population. The (initially rising) age pattern of enrollment indicates that, of those children who eventually attended school, many started late. The legal starting age for first grade is 7, though it is permissible to start at earlier ages if one has attended pre-school. An observed effect of the program was not only to increase overall attendance but also to improve appropriate-age starts (Maluccio and Flores 2005). At the five percent significance level, there are no significant differences in enrollment across intervention and control groups and enrollment rates differ by at most 2-3 percentage points.¹³

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In the right panel of Table 1, we present the number of grades completed at the end of 1999, before the program. Logically these rise with age, though there is a slight leveling off at higher ages, due to the selectivity of this sample examined in the table (those who had not yet completed 4th grade), that

¹² Results are similar when regressions using the evaluation survey are weighted by sample probabilities.

¹³ If we consider instead *all* children of these ages, regardless of grades completed, the enrollment rates were similar to those shown in Table 1 with identical peaks and little difference across intervention and control groups (Appendix Table 3).

censors the attainment levels.¹⁴ Grades completed would increase by one each year if all children were enrolled, remained in school all year, and passed to the next grade. From the left-hand-side panel we know that not all children are enrolled, but the increases seen in the right-side panel also reflect the fact that failure to advance also was common in the population, despite the practice of social promotion, so that some students were likely dropping out before the end of the year and then re-enrolling the following year. For example, in 2000, 13 percent of the targeted eligible children were repeating a grade that year, and 10 percent of those were repeating for the third time.

In the 7–13 age range, the largest difference between average grades completed for children in intervention versus control areas by age was for 11 year olds (0.061 grades), but even that difference is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. We conclude that the population of children in the two groups was very similar (in other words the randomization was successful) and that there is great potential for the program to have an effect.¹⁵

Table 2 presents a set of school supply and quality indicators, organized by intervention and control groups, to explore whether any of these conditions differed across groups. In addition to obvious characteristics (e.g., distance measured in time) we present some transformations of those characteristics into binary variables (e.g., distance in time ≤ 30 minutes), foreshadowing how we use them in the econometric analysis. The first thing to notice is that there were more schools in the intervention areas—there are two reasons for this. First, intervention areas were larger (in area and in population, as evident in Table 1) than control areas and, second, some (about a dozen) schools served both intervention and control areas and we categorize these as intervention schools in our analysis.

The first two indicators of distance (in time and in meters) to the nearest primary school are measured at the child level. The remaining quality measures are from the RPS schools data so measured at the school level.¹⁶ There are four statistically significant differences (at the 10 percent significance level) out of the 15 indicators presented. Three of these relate to distance to school, which is approximately 5 minutes longer, on average, in intervention areas, corresponding to about 150 meters. Schools in intervention areas also appear to be larger by these measures, including total enrollment, and

¹⁴ In contrast, completed grades for all children consistently rises, reaching 2.3 grades by age 13 as shown in Appendix Table 3.

¹⁵ A parallel analysis of the same initial conditions for the RPS evaluation data in 2000 yields similar conclusions about the patterns of age versus enrollment and grade attainment and the equality between intervention and control groups.

¹⁶ In the early 1990s, a school reform was undertaken to devolve control from the central government to local schools or, in some rural areas, clusters of schools. Autonomous schools are rural schools that have been given a degree of autonomy in decision making, in three principal areas: pedagogy, administration, and finance. They also are encouraged to involve parent more. In general, it is seen that when functioning well, they are more flexible than traditional schools, though both types still operate under the Ministry of Education (King, Ozler, and Rawlings 1999).

number of teachers (significant at 10 percent). These differences also are not very large, however, and the schools are statistically indistinguishable across intervention and control when we examine student-teacher ratios and textbooks per student, suggesting that while slightly larger, they are not better resourced on a per student basis. On the whole, these figures present a picture of a situation in which, similar to educational achievements for the children, the environment is similar across intervention and control localities.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Next, we combine information on enrollment and grade attainment from Table 1 with that on schooling conditions in Table 2, to explore whether schooling outcomes are better for children living in areas with better (as defined in the table) school supply and school quality conditions—they are. In Table 3 we present evidence on the importance of supply side characteristics in schooling outcomes for rural Nicaraguan children using two cross-sectional OLS regressions predicting enrollment (left hand panel of Table 3) and highest grade attained (right hand panel) using the 2000 RPS household census combined with the RPS schools data and the sample of children targeted by RPS. We condition on a large set of individual and household characteristics likely to be associated with schooling, as well as schooling supply measures. There seems to be little difference between intervention and control children at baseline for either outcome, even after controlling for a host of characteristics. Boys appear slightly less likely to be enrolled and after conditioning on the variables in Table 3 have attained on average 0.1 grades less. A quadratic in age is jointly significant, with older children being more likely to be enrolled and having more education, but at a diminishing rate. The quadratic in pre-program logarithmic per capita expenditures, as well as the schooling of both parents are all positively associated with enrollment and progression. Lastly, even after conditioning on these factors, the school supply variables are jointly significant in both regressions (not shown) and with one exception are all individually significant with coefficient signs in the expected direction. We treat this as strong suggestive evidence that supply side conditions are important in the schooling decisions made by and for Nicaraguan boys and girls.¹⁷

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

4.2 Program impact on enrollment, dropout, and repetition

Our first approach to assessing schooling outcomes is to examine the effect of the program in its first two years on enrollment for those children who were not in school in 2000 (before the program began), and,

¹⁷ We do not treat these associations as necessarily causal because of the possibility that, *inter alia*: 1) school placement is endogenous and associated with other locality characteristics affecting child schooling; 2) migration in rural Nicaragua is associated with primary schooling availability or quality or, perhaps more likely, with other conditions that are correlated with such indicators; and 3) parental characteristics are associated with other investments in children that influence schooling or with ability that may be transmitted intergenerationally to children. See Handa (2002) for related discussion.

separately, on dropout and repetition for those children who were in school in 2000.¹⁸ Unlike the results described in Section 2.3, which compare enrollment rates for, e.g., 7 year olds in 2000 (in intervention and control groups) with enrollment rates for 7 year olds in 2002 (and thus not the same children), here we explore whether there was a program effect on enrollment rates among those 9 year olds in 2002 (continuing with the 2000 versus 2002 example) who were 7 years old and *not* in school in 2000. We also look at the program effects on dropout and repetition rates for those 9-year olds (in 2002) who were in school in 2000. The extent to which the program boosts enrollment rates and reduces dropout or repetition rates for beneficiary children, higher grade progression is to be expected, possibly beyond grade four as required by the program. Because we condition on enrollment status before the program, these estimates are necessarily first-difference estimates (since the pre-program difference for each individual is by definition zero).

The first two columns of Table 4 present the first-difference estimated program effect on enrollment in 2001 and 2002, by age, for the target population who were not in school in 2000, estimated from the RPS evaluation panel survey data. Each reported estimate represents the coefficient (and its associated standard error in parentheses below) on the program dummy variable from an OLS regression with the outcome defined as a dummy variable indicator of whether the child was enrolled in time period t , with $t=2001$ or 2002 . The controls include only a constant and the dummy variable for the intervention (thus yielding the first-difference estimate).

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

In the first and second years of operation there is a clear and consistent program effect on enrollment. For most age groups (and for all the three combined age groups we consider, 5–9, 7–9, and 7–13 in 2000), children living in intervention areas and not enrolled in school in 2000 were more likely to be enrolled in 2001 and again in 2002. The program effect averaged a massive 41 percentage points in 2001 for those 7–13 in 2000, and declined only slightly in 2002, as enrollments in the control group continued to climb, especially among younger children because of their late entry in school. These results are unchanged when we condition on the set of individual and household characteristics in Table 3 (results not shown). While some of those included factors (such as parental schooling) might better be treated as endogenous, this does not affect the consistency of the first-difference estimator of the program effect due to the randomized evaluation design.

The remaining columns in Table 4 present the first-difference estimated program effect on dropout and repetition rates in 2001 and 2002 for the target population who were already enrolled in

¹⁸ It is not possible to estimate the program's effect on enrollment for the same individuals over time for the RPS administrative panel data since only program's beneficiaries appear in the data. Given the cross-over design, it is not sensible to look at effects on enrollment using the RPS evaluation survey data in 2004.

school in 2000, again by age group. Each reported estimate (and its associated standard error in parentheses below) is the coefficient on the program dummy variable from an OLS regression with the outcome defined as a dummy variable indicator of whether the child was *not* enrolled in time period t , with $t=2001$ or 2002 , for the dropout analysis, and as a dummy variable indicator of whether the child repeated at least one grade either in 2001 or 2002, for the repetition analysis. The controls include only a constant and the dummy variable for the intervention (thus yielding the simple first-difference estimate).

In the first and second years of operation, the program significantly reduced both dropout and repetition rates. For most age groups (and for all the three combined age groups we consider, 5–9, 7–9, and 7–13 in 2000), children living in intervention areas and enrolled in school in 2000 were more likely to still be enrolled in 2001 and 2002, and less likely to have repeated a grade. The program reduced dropouts by 5.8 percentage points among children 7–13 year old in 2001 and by 6.1 percentage points for the same children in 2002. Moreover, for children age 7–13 in 2000, the program lowered repetition rates by 11.6 percentage points over the following two years. The substantive results are unchanged when we condition on the set of individual and household characteristics in Table 3 (results not shown). By nearly any standard, then, it is clear that RPS had large and significant effects on schooling during this period.

4.3 Program impact on grade progression

While analyzing enrollments (or other indicators such as dropouts and repetition) is informative, and can point to where in the process children are faltering, grade progression represents a sufficient statistic for all those other measures.¹⁹

In Table 5.A, we use double-difference estimation to explore the effect of RPS on grade progression.²⁰ The RPS evaluation survey panel surveys conducted in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004 each provides grade attainment for the previous year. The RPS administrative panel data provide the same information before the program began and again in 2003. We therefore examine the program effect on grade progression from 1999–2000 (column 1), 1999–2001 (column 2), and 1999–2003 (column 4) using the smaller sample from the RPS evaluation panel survey data, and from 1999–2002 (column 3) using the RPS administrative panel data on all children who had participated in the education component of RPS by 2003. We limit our use of the RPS administrative panel data to children ages 5–10 years old because of the high levels of attrition of older children—if a child had already passed fourth grade there was no operational reason to monitor their progress and they were thus dropped from the RPS administrative database (as discussed in Section 3.1). Meanwhile, the RPS evaluation panel data survey followed all

¹⁹ Although grade progression does not measure actual achievement, information we do not have in this data set.

²⁰ All estimates shown are double-difference estimates without inclusion of controls (other than a constant). When we include the controls for the individual and household characteristics in Table 3, the double-difference estimated impacts change only marginally.

children in the sample regardless of continued program eligibility or participation, though it, too, was not immune to attrition, as described in Section 3.1.

Table 5.A shows that there was a substantial average program impact of RPS on grade progression for all ages and age ranges and in all periods. During the first three periods of measurement (the first three columns) children in original control areas had not yet been incorporated into the program and thus we observe a pure program effect. The intent-to-treat double-difference estimator indicates that from 1999–2001 program beneficiaries ages 5–9 progressed 0.38 grades more, on average, than children in the control group. The effect is 0.43 grades for 7–9 year olds during the same period. Although not strictly comparable,²¹ the treatment-on-the-treated estimates of program effects from 1999–2002 demonstrate a continued upward trend in program impact, with the estimated effects for these same two age groups increasing to 0.53 and 0.68.²²

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Even after incorporation of control children as beneficiaries of the program, there continues to be a substantial program impact of RPS on the initial intervention group's grade progression, as demonstrated in the 1999–2003 period estimates. At the time the information was collected for these last estimates, the initial intervention group had completed three years worth of transfers and one year without demand-side transfers (though teachers continued to receive the teacher transfer for those children who would have been eligible). At the same time, children in original control areas had been incorporated into the program for nearly one year. For nearly all age groups, the double-difference estimated coefficients increased in 1999–2003 (compared with 1999–2002), though at a slower pace compared with previous years. This suggests not only a lasting relative advantage of the intervention on the initial intervention group even after they were no longer receiving program benefits (particularly for the cohort of older children), but also that the duration that children receive program benefits matters.

In Table 5.B we use double-difference estimation to explore the effect of RPS on grade progression conditioning on children's initial pre-program enrollment status in 2000. The double-difference estimator indicates that by 2003 for all age groups (5–9, 7–9, 10–13 and 7–13 in 2000) the program effect on grade progression was significantly larger for RPS beneficiaries not enrolled in school

²¹ To estimate the effect of the intervention on the treated, rather than estimating the double-difference intent-to-treat for the RPS evaluation survey panel data, we endogenize the participation decision by using the random program placement as an instrumental variable for actual program participation. Since this approach amounts to rescaling the intent to treat estimates by the fraction of program participants, which is close to one, the results change little, with coefficients on the effect differing by less than 5 percent for the estimates shown in Table 5.

²² In addition to intent-to-treat versus treatment-on-the-treated differences, estimates for 1999–2002 are based on the much larger RPS administrative panel data, thus yielding more precise estimates. To assess whether there are differences in the composition of the samples that would influence the estimated coefficients, we limit the 1999–2002 sample to those children also found in the RPS household panel survey data and find very similar coefficients (not shown).

in 2000. By 2003, program beneficiaries, who were 7–13 year old in 2000 and were not enrolled in school before the RPS started, progressed 0.9 grades more than same age children in the control group not enrolled in school in 2000. Over the same period, the estimated program effect is 0.4 grades for 7–13 year olds who already had been enrolled in school in 2000.

The average program effect on grade progression presented in Table 5.A can be decomposed into two parts representing the RPS effect on grade progression for children enrolled and not enrolled in school in 2000. By 2003, 44 per cent of the average RPS estimated effect on grade progression for children 7–13 year olds in 2000 was accounted for by the program estimated effect on grade progression for those who were not enrolled in school in 2000. The proportion is 55 per cent for 5–9 year olds in 2000. This suggests that approximately half of the average program effect on grade progression is accounted for by the estimated net decline in dropout and repetition rates among beneficiary children *already* enrolled in school when the program started.

4.4 Program Impact on Schooling Progression, Incorporating Initial Supply

In Table 6, we incorporate initial supply side conditions into the analysis to examine the extent to which these conditions constrained or enhanced program effectiveness, or in other words to examine the heterogeneity of impact. We use the larger RPS administrative panel data to examine grade progression from 1999–2002, the longest period over which we can examine a pure program effect for the original intervention group. We present results for two age groups, 5–9 and 7–9 year olds. The first specification for each age group includes the original program group dummy along with controls for individual and household characteristics. Most of these are significant and influence progression in expected ways. Nevertheless, the program impact remains nearly identical to that presented for the same age groups in Table 5.A.

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

The second specification incorporates the initial (year 2000) school supply-side characteristics and their interactions with the program, adding dummy variables representing initial school quality and its interaction with the program group dummy for each indicator. The indicators of initial school quality are the time it takes students to walk to school, whether the school was autonomous, whether the school had a fifth grade, the student-teacher ratio, and the number of textbooks per student. All the indicators have been converted into dummy variables that equal one if the condition is determined to be good (as defined in table 3, in most cases referring to above the median).

The coefficients on the non-interacted school supply variables are the main effects (presented in the second and fourth columns), which we interpret only as associations with progression. The coefficients on school-supply variables interacted with the program dummy variable represent the differential effect of the program given initial supply characteristics (or, equivalently, the differential or

marginal effect of initial supply in program areas) and are presented in the third and sixth columns, under the “interaction” subtitle. Given the randomized evaluation, we interpret these as causal effects. Since we have formulated all the school supply variables to be dichotomous variables, these are equivalent to triple differences (holding other controls constant). They tell us how important initial supply conditions were to program effectiveness. If they are small and insignificant, it suggests initial supply conditions did not change the effectiveness of the program, perhaps because these conditions improved over time, particularly in the most underserved among the intervention areas. If positive and significant, it means initial supply conditions enhanced the program impacts, so that having them in place was important. The converse of that, of course, is that *not* having them led to lower program effectiveness.

The main effect coefficients on all supply variables for 5–9 year olds show that better initial school supply characteristics all have significant and positive associations with grade progression. The insignificant interaction effects show that there was no differential program effect for areas with initially low student-teacher ratios or higher availability of textbooks per student. Negative interaction terms, however, signal that the program was less effective when at the outset there was fifth grade available or the school was less than 30 minutes walking distance. The program was more effective, then, in areas with poor initial conditions as measured by these two indicators. Receipt of the conditional cash transfers appears to have compensated for distance to school in intervention areas. Of course, intervention areas characterized by the poorest initial school supply conditions are also those in which there was greater room for improving grade progression, through an increase in enrollment and a reduction in dropout and repetition rates. This finding is similar to that of Maluccio and Flores (2005) in which many estimated program effects were larger for poorer households, who had more potential for improvement in many areas. Finally, this result also hints at the possibility of an impact of the program *on* school supply conditions in the most underserved intervention areas, which we explore in the next subsection.

In contrast, school autonomy, which has a positive association with higher progression in both control and intervention areas, has an even more positive and significant impact on grade progression in intervention areas. Insofar as school autonomy enables schools to better respond to changing demand conditions, this result highlights the importance of greater school flexibility and responsiveness to demand in intervention areas. Results for 7–9 year olds are similar, though the program interaction with distance, while still negative, is no longer significant for these older children. Receipt of the program in intervention areas may not have been enough to alter older children’s decisions to travel (or not) to school based on distance to school.

4.5 Changes in Supply

To this point, we have explored the effects of the program on various child schooling outcomes, including grade progression. We have also conditioned on initial supply conditions in our analysis of

program effects on grade progression. Schooling supply characteristics, however, were not static over the period. While schools were generally available in RPS program areas as a result of the targeting described in Section 2.1, there was variation in supply (including the number of grades offered) and steps were necessary to accommodate the changes in enrollment as the program rolled out. Discussions with the RPS implementation team revealed that the two most common responses to increased enrollment pressures were increasing the number of sessions per day and increasing the number of teachers. For autonomous schools, this was a more straightforward process, because they operate under a system with substantial local control (King, Ozler and Rawlings 1999; Gunnarsson et al. 2006). In one RPS municipality with a smaller proportion of autonomous schools, however, it was more difficult to increase the number of teachers. In some cases, this problem was resolved when beneficiary parents agreed, on the suggestion of RPS, to contribute part of their transfers to help pay for a new teacher for the first year. In other cases, staffing problems were not resolved. Possibly reflecting these problems, enrollment rates were the lowest in this municipality, though they were still 90 percent, on average. The overall level of enrollment after program implementation left little room for improvement, and therefore supply does not appear to have been a major constraint on enrollment, though it had significant effects on progression in both intervention and control areas as demonstrated in the previous subsection. Improvements in supply required active intervention and coordination on the part of RPS, in part via the coordination committees set up for this purpose. For this reason, it is particularly important to underscore that we interpret the estimated program effect on child schooling outcomes as the combined effect of demand- and supply-side components of the program.

We now use the same analytical framework employed above to determine what “effect” the program had on the supply side. To do this, we use the RPS schools data, a panel data set comprising observations on schooling characteristics in 2000 and 2003. We limit the sample to those schools whose catchment areas were either 90 percent original intervention or 90 percent original control in Phase I. To start, we carry out simple double-difference estimates of the program effect on a variety of supply characteristics. Table 7 shows that the estimated program effects are positive and significant for the logarithm of the number of classes (sessions), the number (and logarithm) of teachers in the school, and the highest grade offered. The insignificant interaction effects show that there was no program effect on either the raw number of classes or sessions per day or on the student-teacher ratio.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

To assess whether supply conditions improved more in the most underserved intervention areas, we carry out double-difference estimates of the program effect on the same supply side characteristics

interacting initial (year 2000) school conditions with the program group dummy.²³ Since all the school supply variables are dichotomous, these are equivalent to triple differences. Table 7 shows that, in intervention areas, program effects on school conditions were significant and relatively larger for schools with low initial conditions. In intervention areas, the relative increase in the number of classes per day and the number of teachers is significantly larger among schools with initial low conditions. Moreover, the program effects on the highest grade offered was significantly greater (by one grade) among schools which initially offered at most three grades compared schools offering more than three grades located in intervention areas. Finally, while on average program effects were insignificant on student-teacher ratio, the RPS marginally, but significantly, increased the student-teacher ratio among schools with high initial ratios (35 or greater) compared to low initial student teacher ratio schools in intervention areas.

We conclude that the RPS, both directly via coordination with the Ministry of Education and other actors and, presumably, indirectly via the stimulus for on enrollments, not only increased the demand for schooling but also increased the supply, especially among the most underserved schools in intervention areas. However, this supply side improvement was not enough to prevent a marginal increase in the student teacher ratio among the most overcrowded schools in intervention areas. These improvements surely contributed to the relatively large gains observed at the individual level for children living in intervention areas that had poor initial supply.

4.6 Robustness to attrition

The estimates presented in this paper are based on panel data samples in which there were varying degrees of attrition and they therefore might be subject to attrition bias. For the RPS evaluation survey panel data, attrition is on the order of 7–15 percent (e.g., for target sample children from 2000 to 2002 and 2004) and for the RPS administrative panel data, attrition is 38 percent for the target sample. For both data sets, however, the percentage of attrition is comparable across original intervention and control groups. While simple loss to follow-up is the main cause of attrition from both data sources, students dropping out of school or graduating from fourth grade and thus being eliminated from the ongoing RPS monitoring of beneficiary enrollment and progression were additional important reasons for attrition from the RPS administrative panel data. Attrition of any magnitude raises concern about the validity of the estimates reported above. What is of ultimate concern in this analysis is not the level of attrition, but whether, and to what extent, the attrition invalidates the inferences we make using these data.

We address sample attrition bias in two ways. First, in the specifications already considered, we included a large number of individual, parental, and household characteristics, many of which, in addition to playing a role in educational outcomes, are themselves associated with attrition in the sample (not

²³ The indicators of initial school quality included in the regressions are dummies that equal one if the condition is determined to be good (as defined in the table).

shown). Conditional on the maintained assumptions about the functional form, attrition selection on right-side variables does not lead to attrition bias (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 1998a and 1998b).

The second way we explore the potential effects of attrition is to examine the characteristics of those who attrit versus those who remain, focusing on the RPS administrative panel data, where we lose a much higher percentage of respondents. When we condition on the individual and household characteristics included in Table 3, we find that children with low initial schooling who lived in intervention areas were less likely to attrit than their counterparts living in original control areas or with high initial schooling. This is what we would expect, given that those with higher schooling at the outset would be more likely to complete grade four by 2003, thus passing out of the target population and out of the administrative data. While the effect of such attrition on estimated program effects is ambiguous, we present two types of evidence suggesting the bias likely leads to *underestimates* of program effects.

First, using the RPS evaluation panel survey data, we examine grade progression by age and initial schooling level. For a given age, those who had more schooling in 2000 generally had progressed more by 2004 than those with less initial schooling. This suggests that we lose from the RPS administrative panel data sample individuals who progressed more quickly, thus leading to underestimates of the program effect of the treatment-on-the-treated.

Second, we examine grade progression in the RPS evaluation panel survey contrasting children who appear in both the RPS administrative panel data and the RPS evaluation survey panel data, with children that appear only in the latter. These children represent a subsample, albeit selected, of children who were not followed up in the RPS administrative panel data. Similar to the pattern described above, children in the RPS evaluation panel survey but not the RPS administrative panel data progressed much more than those present in both surveys. In each year, the difference between these two groups, however, is similar across intervention and original control groups. So that while the RPS administrative panel data sample disproportionately lost to attrition those with higher grade progression, it appears it did so to an equal extent in both intervention and control groups, suggesting little bias in the resulting double-difference estimates of the treatment-on-the-treated average program effect.

We conclude that attrition bias, while likely present, is not driving the results reported here, and the likely potential biases are leading to underestimates of the program effects, if anything.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we combine survey and administrative data to examine the effect of a conditional cash transfer program on grade progression in Nicaragua from 1999 to 2003, putting the spotlight on initial supply side conditions and the extent to which they constrained program effectiveness. Our principal findings are that the program had a substantial effect on grade progression and that these increased over time, even after the original intervention group stopped receiving demand-side transfers. Half of the

estimated program effect on progression is accounted for by a reduction in the dropout and repetition rates of beneficiary children who were already in school when the program began.

Initial supply side conditions were important and substantially influenced program performance. The program was more effective in areas with autonomous schools, suggesting flexibility at the school level better enabled schools to respond to changing demand conditions. At the same time, it was also more effective in intervention areas with *poor* initial supply conditions as measured by indicators of grade availability and distance to school. These were the areas with lower enrollments and grade progression before the program, and thus more room for improvement. With the analysis of child schooling in hand, we then turn to assess the effect of the program on school supply conditions. It is precisely in the intervention areas with poor initial school supply conditions, that the program was relatively more effective in improving school supply as measured by grade availability, number of sessions per day and number of teachers. The evidence does not allow one to conclude, however, that improving supply conditions alone would have led to equally sized improvements in schooling. This is indirectly evident from the fact that even areas with greater supply at the outset of the program did not have outcomes similar to those resulting from the program.

The results suggest that initial school supply conditions do not represent insurmountable obstacles for the implementation of a conditional cash transfer program, as long as these constraints are identified at the planning stage and mechanisms put in place to deal with them during the execution stage. Our results also underscore the importance of carefully considering the integrated (demand *and* supply) nature of conditional-cash-transfer programs, something often overlooked in the design of these interventions and, particularly, in the impact evaluation literature.

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Table 1. School Enrollment and Attainment at Baseline (2000): by Age and by Original Intervention and Control

Age:	Enrollment in grades 1-4 (2000)								Grade Attainment in grades 1-4 (End-1999)				
	<u>All</u>		<u>Control</u>		<u>Intervention</u>		<u>Difference</u>		<u>All</u>	<u>Control</u>	<u>Intervention</u>	<u>Difference</u>	
	N	mean	N	mean	N	mean		p**	mean	mean	mean		p**
5	1876	0.007	807	0.011	1069	0.004	0.007	0.055	0.004	0.002	0.006	-0.003	0.492
6	2092	0.146	897	0.149	1195	0.143	0.006	0.687	0.013	0.018	0.010	0.008	0.211
7	2066	0.513	837	0.524	1229	0.505	0.019	0.391	0.081	0.085	0.078	0.007	0.625
8	2037	0.683	851	0.697	1186	0.673	0.024	0.251	0.298	0.320	0.282	0.037	0.155
9	1696	0.725	716	0.735	980	0.717	0.017	0.431	0.621	0.620	0.621	-0.001	0.975
10	1883	0.748	755	0.740	1128	0.754	-0.013	0.519	0.910	0.943	0.888	0.055	0.258
11	1507	0.731	619	0.740	888	0.725	0.015	0.527	1.167	1.131	1.191	-0.061	0.312
12	1392	0.693	578	0.706	814	0.684	0.022	0.389	1.266	1.268	1.264	0.004	0.950
13	1131	0.629	480	0.627	651	0.630	-0.003	0.926	1.297	1.281	1.309	-0.028	0.704
5-9	9767	0.409	4108	0.414	5659	0.406	0.008	0.418	0.191	0.196	0.187	0.009	0.403
7-9	5799	0.635	2404	0.648	3395	0.625	0.023	0.073	0.315	0.327	0.306	0.021	0.221
7-13	11712	0.672	4836	0.679	6876	0.667	0.013	0.154	0.728	0.733	0.724	0.009	0.635

Notes: Table based on children in 2000 census who had not completed fourth grade. All ages calculated in January 2001, at beginning of program.

** Test of significance across groups is two sample test of proportions for enrollment and mean comparison test for grade completion

Table 2. Schooling Conditions at Baseline (2000): by Original Intervention and Control

Condition	Intervention	Control	p*	Total
<i>Child-level conditions, census (N)</i>				
Time to school (minutes)	6876 28.9 (34.2)	4836 24.1 (28.4)	0.000	11712 27.0 (32.0)
Time to school < 30 minutes	0.618	0.664	0.000	0.637
<i>Child-level conditions, evaluation data (N)</i>				
Distance to school (meters)	912 1036.9 (1218.1)	807 893.4 (991.1)	0.008	1719 969.5 (1119.3)
Distance to school < 500 meters	0.444	0.482	0.115	0.462
<i>School-level conditions (N)</i>				
Autonomy of school	107 0.29	83 0.31	0.726	190 0.30
Total enrollment at beginning of 2000	75.7 (55.6)	66.1 (39.1)	0.184	71.5 (49.19)
Number of teachers	2.25 (1.67)	1.88 (1.25)	0.092	2.09 (1.51)
School has more than one teacher	0.57	0.51	0.379	0.54
Student-teacher ratio in each section	35.12 (9.62)	36.68 (11.02)	0.299	35.8 (10.26)
Student-teacher ratio is good, <=35	0.56	0.61	0.456	0.58
Highest grade available in school	4.42 (1.40)	4.58 (1.33)	0.432	4.49 (1.37)
Availability of fifth grade or more	0.45	0.52	0.342	0.48
Number school texts available	128.0 (126.9)	111.6 (116.6)	0.359	120.83 (122.5)
Number school texts per student	1.72 (1.07)	1.69 (1.54)	0.854	1.71 (1.29)
Number school texts per student good, >1.5	0.53	0.55	0.768	0.54

Notes: SD in parentheses.

School-level conditions for all schools attended by children 7-13 who had not completed fourth grade

* Test of significance across groups is two sample test of proportions for enrollment and mean comparison test for grade completion

Table 3. Descriptive Regressions on School Enrollment and Attainment at Baseline (2000) (n=11712)

Regressors	Enrollment in grades 1-4 (2000)				Grade attainment in any grade (end-1999)			
	(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)	
<i>Intervention</i>								
Original intervention area (intervention=1)	-0.020	*	-0.016		-0.028		-0.018	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
<i>Individual characteristics</i>								
Gender (male=1)	-0.016	*	-0.016	*	-0.095	***	-0.095	***
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Age in 2000	0.387	***	0.378	***	0.605	***	0.587	***
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.05)		(0.04)	
Age in 2000 squared	-0.018	***	-0.018	***	-0.019	***	-0.018	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
<i>Household characteristics</i>								
Predicted log per capita expenditures	2.540	***	1.979	***	3.341	***	2.276	***
	(0.42)		(0.42)		(0.76)		(0.75)	
Predicted log per capita expenditures squared	-0.145	***	-0.112	***	-0.175	***	-0.111	**
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Schooling of mother	0.031	***	0.025	***	0.073	***	0.062	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Schooling of father	0.010	***	0.009	***	0.038	***	0.036	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Age of mother	0.001		0.001		0.004	**	0.002	
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Age of father	-0.001		-0.001		0.001		0.001	
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Female head of household	0.009		0.012		-0.016		-0.011	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Family size	0.028	***	0.023	***	0.054	***	0.043	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Number males age 0-5 in family	-0.055	***	-0.045	***	-0.095	***	-0.075	***
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Number females age 0-5 in family	-0.052	***	-0.040	***	-0.089	***	-0.066	***
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Number males age 7-13 in family	-0.018	**	-0.013	*	-0.055	***	-0.044	***
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Number females age 7-13 in family	-0.015	*	-0.006		-0.038	***	-0.020	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
<i>Schooling supply</i>								
Time to school < 30 minutes			0.101	***			0.152	***
			(0.01)				(0.02)	
Autonomy of school			0.025	**			0.083	***
			(0.01)				(0.02)	
Availability of fifth grade or more			0.076	***			0.158	***
			(0.01)				(0.02)	
Student-teacher ratio <=35			0.082	***			0.167	***
			(0.01)				(0.02)	
Number school texts per student >1.5			0.010				0.045	**
			(0.01)				(0.02)	
Constant	-12.36	***	-10.12	***	-19.08	***	-14.87	***
	(1.67)		(1.67)		(3.02)		(2.98)	
F-stat [p-value]	72.12	0.00	75.13	0.00	255.76	0.00	231.34	0.00

Notes: Table based on children in 2000 census, ages 7-13 who had not completed fourth grade

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Table 4. Average Program Effect on Enrollment, Dropout, and Repeats, conditional on 2000 enrollment

Double Difference													
Not enrolled in 2000						Enrolled in 2000							
Age:	N	Enrolled 2001		N	Enrolled 2002		N	Dropout 2001		Dropout 2002		N	Repeated 2001 or 2002
5	243	0.077 (0.053)		224	0.113 (0.063)	*		-		-		211	
6	224	0.277 (0.064)	***	218	0.168 (0.044)	***	79	-0.078 (0.055)		0.024 (0.043)		273	-0.144 (0.106)
7	125	0.324 (0.075)	***	107	0.184 (0.063)	***	175	-0.082 (0.032)	***	-0.110 (0.037)	***	261	-0.036 (0.076)
8	83	0.602 (0.090)	***	75	0.510 (0.095)	***	223	-0.046 (0.020)	**	-0.028 (0.020)		273	-0.213 (0.065)
9	58	0.336 (0.121)	***	46	0.261 (0.127)	**	190	-0.011 (0.018)		-0.021 (0.015)		216	-0.211 (0.070)
10	56	0.397 (0.127)	***	49	0.178 (0.131)		219	-0.028 (0.020)		-0.019 (0.013)		228	-0.119 (0.063)
11	42	0.478 (0.111)	***	40	0.476 (0.106)	***	160	-0.114 (0.044)	***	-0.024 (0.038)		174	-0.006 (0.067)
12	49	0.312 (0.131)	***	43	0.412 (0.138)	***	146	-0.107 (0.046)	**	-0.092 (0.039)	***	158	-0.071 (0.075)
13	55	0.495 (0.116)	***	44	0.508 (0.132)	***	114	-0.046 (0.055)		-0.218 (0.063)	***	115	-0.140 (0.080)
5-9	733	0.299 (0.036)	***	670	0.201 (0.035)	***	671	-0.048 (0.015)	***	-0.014 (0.034)	***	1234	-0.158 (0.041)
7-9	266	0.410 (0.057)	***	228	0.299 (0.056)	***	588	-0.044 (0.015)	***	-0.047 (0.015)	***	750	-0.152 (0.044)
7-13	468	0.412 (0.046)	***	404	0.340 (0.047)	***	1227	-0.058 (0.015)	***	-0.061 (0.013)	***	1425	-0.116 (0.031)

Notes: Table based on children had not completed fourth grade by end-1999 in RPS baseline 2000

All ages calculated in January 2001, at beginning of program.

Robust Standard errors in parentheses *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 % level.

Table 5A. Average Program Effect on Grade Attainment: By Age & Period

Double Difference												
Age:	N	1999-2000		N	1999-2001		N	1999-2002		N	1999-2003	
5	247	0.004 (0.019)		228	0.102 (0.052)	*	1377	0.210 (0.034)	***	211	0.315 (0.132)	**
6	301	0.060 (0.034)	*	291	0.278 (0.077)	***	1615	0.516 (0.045)	***	273	0.463 (0.142)	***
7	294	0.079 (0.059)		269	0.452 (0.094)	***	1510	0.675 (0.050)	***	261	0.647 (0.154)	***
8	302	0.146 (0.061)	**	291	0.536 (0.094)	***	1269	0.636 (0.056)	***	273	0.680 (0.155)	***
9	245	0.156 (0.069)	**	219	0.314 (0.106)	***	831	0.761 (0.067)	***	216	0.491 (0.170)	***
10	270	0.116 (0.066)	*	248	0.213 (0.101)	**	712	0.772 (0.071)	***	228	0.206 (0.152)	
11	197	0.213 (0.073)	***	189	0.340 (0.115)	***				174	0.524 (0.195)	***
12	198	0.078 (0.086)		180	0.233 (0.127)	*				158	0.472 (0.204)	**
13	167	0.211 (0.096)	**	155	0.542 (0.133)	***				115	0.852 (0.263)	***
5-9	1389	0.107 (0.028)	***	1298	0.379 (0.050)	***	6602	0.529 (0.026)	***	1234	0.607 (0.087)	***
7-9	841	0.115 (0.040)	***	779	0.426 (0.064)	***	3610	0.676 (0.035)	***	750	0.596 (0.105)	***
7-13	1673	0.129 (0.031)	***	1551	0.371 (0.051)	***				1425	0.532 (0.082)	***

Notes: Table based on children who had not completed fourth grade by end-1999 in RPS baseline 2000
 All ages calculated in January 2001, at beginning of program.

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

Table 5B. Average Program Effect on Grade Attainment conditional on 2000 enrollment

Double Difference												
Age:	N	1999-2000		N	1999-2001		N	1999-2002		N	1999-2003	
Conditional on not being enrolled in 2000												
5-9	733	0.024	*	670	0.295	***	4193	0.503	***	632	0.591	***
		(0.014)			(0.044)			(0.259)			(0.090)	
7-9	266	0.052	*	228	0.486	***	1454	0.764	***	218	0.848	***
		(0.029)			(0.081)			(0.045)			(0.154)	
10-13	208	0.181	***	277	0.447	***				152	0.955	***
		(0.067)			(0.079)						(0.240)	
7-13	474	0.075	**	412	0.484	***				370	0.897	***
		(0.031)			(0.074)						(0.141)	
Conditional on being enrolled in 2000												
5-9	656	0.162	***	628	0.409	***	2409	0.642	***	602	0.509	***
		(0.045)			(0.065)			(0.041)			(0.101)	
7-9	575	0.147	***	551	0.396	***	1894	0.649	***	532	0.478	***
		(0.048)			(0.069)			(0.043)			(0.107)	
10-13	624	0.140	***	588	0.256	***				523	0.313	***
		(0.043)			(0.059)						(0.101)	
7-13	1199	0.140	***	1139	0.324	***				1055	0.397	***
		(0.035)			(0.050)						(0.079)	

Notes: Table based on children who had not completed fourth grade by end-1999 in RPS baseline 2000
 All ages calculated in January 2001, at beginning of program.
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses
 *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

Student-teacher ratio <=35			(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)
			0.160	***	0.057		0.160	***	0.082
Number school texts per student >1.5			(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)
			0.106	**	-0.041		0.110	*	-0.032
Constant			(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)
	-12.72	***	-9.51	**		-15.95	**	-13.32	*
	(4.18)		(4.11)			(6.94)		(6.84)	
F-stat [p-value]	237.70	0.00	181.83	0.00		48.65	0.00	41.98	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses

*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

Notes: Table based on children had not completed 4th grade by end-1999 in RPS baseline 2000

All ages calculated in January 2001, at beginning of program.

Table 7. Average Program Effect on School Supply Characteristics, 2000-2003

	Highgrade		Number of classes	Logarithm of number of classes		Number of teachers		Logarithm of number of teachers		Student - Teacher ratio
<hr/> Simple double difference <hr/>										
DD	0.355	*	0.361	0.143	**	0.294	**	0.131	**	1.098
	(0.186)		(0.405)	(0.069)		(0.151)		(0.066)		(2.237)
<hr/> Double difference interacting program effect with low initial values <hr/>										
DD	0.022		0.339	0.032		0.315		-0.046		4.634 *
	(0.187)		(0.445)	(0.072)		(0.227)		(0.098)		(2.599)
DD for low	1.072	***	0.059	0.301	***	-0.028		0.230	**	-7.071 **
	(0.229)		(0.492)	(0.080)		(0.220)		(0.095)		(2.778)

Notes: Table based on 132 schools. Low initial values are: Highgrade - 3rd grade or lower; Number of classes - 3 or fewer; Number of teachers - 2 or fewer; Student-teacher ratio - 35 or lower
Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.