Assessing the Impact of Cap-and-Trade Climate Legislation on Agriculture in the Northern Plains: A Policy Simulation with Farmer Preference and Adaption

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Research Objective

Investigate farmer preference to carbon sequestration potential under cap-and-trade. Examine the production cost impact of carbon

pricing due to cap-and-trade.

Simulate acreage enrollment in carbon sequestration, carbon supply, and the impact of cap-and-trade on farm income and its distributional effect.

Policy Background and Motivation

Pending cap-and-trade climate legislation – The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. Co-existence of both opportunity and challenge for agriculture.

 Divided view and debate on the net impact of cap-and-trade on farm income.

Research Challenges and Issues

- Farmer production behavior Farmers might not be willing to tradeoff the potential revenue from carbon sequestration with restrictions on production management over a 5 year period and transaction costs.
- Farmer capacity of adaption

While cap-and-trade can increase prices for energy-intensive inputs, farmers may adjust production practice to mitigate the production cost impact.

Heterogeneity in farmer and distribution effect of cap-and-trade

Some farmers may gain and others may lose, depending on farming attributes.

Methodology

• Approach:


- benefit-cost analysis
- stated preference approach
- reduced production cost function
- statistical simulation

Modeling tool: Matlab programming

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Assessing the Agricultural Impact of Cap-and-Trade: Research Framework



Farmer Behavior Model

Preference to Carbon Sequestration

Assumption: farmers tend to maximize their profits **Derived Kuhn-Tucker condition**: farmers would participate in carbon sequestration only if the benefit is greater than farmer perceived costs. **Empirical Specification**:

Probability (carbon sequestration) = binomial logit **Data for Empirical Estimation**: farmer stated preference survey

Adaption to Manage Production Cost

Economic Production Theory:

• Production cost function: production cost is a function of output quantity and input prices.

• Farmer adaption: profit-maximizing farmers will adjust production to reduce their production costs as relative input prices change. Hypothesis:

• Variable production costs are an implicit function of energy prices (given that agriculture production is energy intensive in terms of input). • Variable production costs are a non-linear function of energy prices (due to farmer adaption).

Empirical Specification: Variable production costs per unit land are a quadratic function of energy prices.

Data for Empirical Estimation: state level variable production costs, acreage of cropland in active production, and energy prices (1945-2008).

Farmer Preference to Carbon Sequestration Survey Survey Design:


• Structure of survey questionnaire: preference to participate in carbon sequestration, socio-economic background and attitude to climate legislation, and current production practice.

• Versions of survey questionnaire: 6 different versions corresponding to 6 levels of carbon prices ranging from \$5 to \$70 per metric ton.


• Sample sizes: 500 for each version of questionnaire with a given carbon price

 Survey administration: a random sample of 3000 farmers in the USDA **ND** Agricultural Statistic Service database selected

Simulated Agricultural Impact of Cap-and-Trade **Climate Legislation**



Aggregate Margin Production Cost v.s. Carbon Revenue



prices and may vary depending on the base year production cost.

Some Caveats

• The study did not consider the effects of higher commodity prices and increased demand for bio-energy feedstock. • Simulated ex ante carbon revenue based on farmer stated preference might underestimate ex post actual carbon revenue after cap-and-trade climate legislation becomes effective. Production cost impact of cap-and-trade might be underestimated as well since the effect of GHG emission regulation on prices for nonenergy intensive input was not considered.





United States Department of Agriculture

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