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## **Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Trade-Policy Options for the United States and Japan**

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### **Abstract**

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of a prospective new round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post-Uruguay Round tariffs on agricultural and industrial products and services barriers by 33 percent in a new WTO trade round would increase world welfare by \$613.0 billion, with gains of \$177.3 billion for the United States, \$123.7 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialized and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post-Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by \$1.9 trillion, with gains of \$537.2 billion (5.9 percent of GNP) for the United States and \$374.8 billion (5.8 percent of GNP) for Japan.

Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than a new WTO multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile, and Korea and the United States with Chile, Singapore, and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some nonmember countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analyzed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalization are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.

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# **Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Negotiating Options for the United States and Japan\***

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## **I. Introduction**

The United States and Japan are two of the key players in the global trading system even though they have at times been at odds regarding each other's trade and domestic policies. What we wish to explore in this paper are the options that the two nations have in ongoing and prospective trade negotiations at the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels. For this purpose, we use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to provide some quantitative assessments of the economic effects of different options. The Michigan Model is a multi-country, multi-sector computational general equilibrium model that we have used now for more than 25 years to analyze changes in trade policies.

In Section II, we first analyze the potential economic effects of the liberalization of trade in agricultural products and services, which are currently in the early negotiation stages of a new WTO trade round as part of the built-in agenda mandated in the Uruguay Round. We also consider the liberalization of trade in industrial products, which is yet to be decided pending agreement among the WTO members on the agenda for a new trade round. In Section III, we analyze regional negotiating options of interest to the United States and Japan. These options include the removal of trade barriers between members of the Asia-Pacific Economic (APEC) forum, an ASEAN Plus 3 Free Trade Agreement, expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to include Chile, and a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA). In Section IV, we consider bilateral FTAs that are being negotiated or actively considered by Japan and the United States. These include Japanese bilateral FTAs with Singapore, Ko-

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rea, Mexico, and Chile, and U.S. bilateral FTAs with Chile, Singapore, and Korea. Conclusions and implications for policy are discussed in Section V.

## **II. Computational Analysis of a Prospective WTO Multilateral Negotiating Round**

As already mentioned, the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round mandated that multilateral negotiations under WTO auspices would commence for agriculture and services in 2000. It had been expected that the agenda for a broader WTO negotiating round would be approved at the WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Seattle in December 1999. However, because of the lack of consensus in Seattle among the WTO members, decisions on the details of the negotiating agenda for a new round were put off. The next WTO Ministerial Meeting will be held in Qatar in November 2001, and the hope is that agreement on the negotiating agenda for a new round may be achieved then. To provide some perspective on the economic effects that might result from a new round, we thought it would be instructive to use the Michigan Model to assess the potential magnitudes involved.

### **Overview of the Michigan Model**

The version of the Michigan Model that we will use in this paper covers 18 economic sectors, including agriculture, manufactures, and services in each of 20 countries/regions. The distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates some aspects of the New Trade Theory, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and product variety. A complete description of the formal structure and equations of the model can be found on line at [www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model](http://www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model).

To help the reader interpret the results to follow, it is useful first to review the features of the model that serve to identify the various economic effects that are being captured in the different scenarios. Although the model includes the aforementioned features of the New Trade Theory, it remains the case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much the same way that they would with perfect competition. That is, when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) substitute toward imports and the domestic competing industry contracts production while

foreign exporters expand. With multilateral liberalization reducing tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously in most sectors and countries, each country's industries share in both of these effects, expanding or contracting depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less than in other sectors and countries. At the same time, countries with larger average tariff reductions than their trading partners tend to experience a real depreciation of their currencies in order to maintain a constant trade balance, so that all countries therefore experience mixtures of both expanding and contracting sectors.

Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand for all sectors, with world prices rising most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most. This in turn causes changes in countries' terms of trade that can be positive or negative. Those countries that are net exporters of goods with the greatest degree of liberalization will experience increases in their terms of trade, as the world prices of their exports rise relative to their imports. The reverse occurs for net exporters in industries where liberalization is slight -- perhaps because it already happened in previous trade rounds.

The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-trade effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional benefits due to elements of the New Trade Theory. Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country where there is a comparative advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency gains should raise national welfare measured by the equivalent variation for every country, although some factor owners within a country may lose, as will be noted below. However, it is possible for a particular country whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest liberalization to lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains.

On the other hand, although the New Trade Theory is perhaps best known for introducing new reasons why countries may lose from trade, in fact its greatest contribution is to expand the list of reasons for gains from trade. It is these that are the dominant contribution of the New Trade Theory in our model. That is, trade liberalization permits all countries to expand their export sectors at the same time that all sectors compete more closely with a larger number of competing varieties from abroad. As a result,

countries as a whole gain from lower costs due to increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions due to greater competition, and reduced costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety. All of these effects make it more likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are shared across the entire population.

In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects countries as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor – the “scarce factor” – to lose through the mechanism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941). The additional sources of gain from trade due to increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, however, are shared across factors, and we routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor and capital gain from liberalization. That is often the case here.

In the real world, all of these effects occur over time, some of them more quickly than others. Our model is however static, based upon a single set of equilibrium conditions rather than relationships that vary over time. Our results therefore refer to a time horizon that is somewhat uncertain, depending on the assumptions that have been made about which variables do and do not adjust to changing market conditions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these adjustments. Because our elasticities of supply and demand reflect relatively long-run adjustments and because we assume that markets for both labor and capital clear within countries, our results are appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several years – perhaps two or three at a minimum. On the other hand, our model does not allow for the very long-run adjustments that could occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and technological change. Our results should therefore be thought of as being superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the economies involved. To the extent that these growth paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, our model does not capture that.

### **Benchmark Data**

The main data source used in the model is “The GTAP-4 Database” of the Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis Project (McDougall et al., 1998). The reference year for the GTAP da-

tabase is 1995. The monopolistically competitive market structure in the non-agricultural sectors of the model imposes an additional data requirement of the numbers of firms at the sectoral level, and there is need also for estimates of sectoral employment. These data have been adapted from a variety of published sources and are available on request. We have projected the GTAP-4 1995 database to the year 2005, which is when the Uruguay Round liberalization will have been fully implemented. In this connection, we extrapolated the labor availability in different countries/regions by an average weighted population growth rate of 1.2 percent per annum. All other major variables have been projected, using an average weighted growth rate of GDP of 2.5 percent.<sup>1</sup>

The projected database provides us with an approximate picture of what the world could be expected to look like in 2005 if the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations had not occurred. In Brown, Dendorff, and Stern (2001), we have analyzed the impact of the UR-induced changes expected to occur over the course of the 10-year implementation period as a consequence of the negotiated reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. We then readjusted the scaled-up database for 2005 to mimic the world as it might look in the post-UR implementation. In what follows, we use these re-adjusted data as the starting point to carry out our liberalization scenarios for a new WTO negotiating round.

### **Computational Scenarios**

To assess the economic effects of a WTO negotiating round, we assume 33 percent reductions in post-Uruguay Round agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers. For want of a better name, we refer to the WTO round as the Millennium Round. The scenarios that we have run are as follows:

**MR-1** *Agricultural liberalization is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay Round agricultural import tariffs.*<sup>2</sup>

**MR-2** *Liberalization of industrial products is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay Round tariffs on mining and manufactured products.*

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<sup>1</sup> The underlying data are drawn from World Bank sources and are available on request. For a more elaborate and detailed procedure for calculating year 2005 projections, see Hertel and Martin (1999) and Hertel (2000).

<sup>2</sup> Reductions in post-Uruguay Round agricultural export subsidies will presumably also be negotiated in a new trade round, but they are not included in this scenario.

**MR-3** *Services liberalization is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in estimated post-Uruguay Round services barriers.*

**MR-4** *This combines MR-1, MR-2, and MR-3.*

In addition to the foregoing scenarios, we thought it would be of interest to run a scenario of global free trade, as follows:

**MR-5** *Global free trade is modeled as complete removal of all post-Uruguay Round tariffs on agricultural products and industrial products as well as services barriers.*

While services were addressed in the Uruguay Round, the main accomplishment was creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is an umbrella agreement setting out the rules governing the four modes of providing services transactions. These modes are: (1) cross-border services (e.g., telecommunications); (2) services provided in the country of consumption (e.g., tourism); (3) services requiring a domestic presence in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI); and (4) movement of natural persons. Brown and Stern (2001) have developed a new version of the Michigan Model for the purpose of analyzing the behavior of multinational firms, which are major providers of services, both intra-firm as well as in the production and sales of foreign affiliates located in host countries.<sup>3</sup> To approximate existing services barriers, Brown and Stern used estimates of barriers to FDI provided by Hoekman (2000), based on the gross operating margins of services firms listed on national stock exchanges for the period, 1994-96. These estimates are available on request.

### **Aggregate Results**

The welfare effects, as measured by the equivalent variation, for the MR-1 to MR-4 scenarios are indicated in columns (1)-(4) of table 1.<sup>4</sup> As shown in column (1), the MR-1 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay Round agricultural-import tariffs increases global welfare by \$10.8 billion. Japan experiences a welfare increase of \$4.3 billion. The United States records a welfare decline of \$4.1 billion, which re-

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<sup>3</sup> Because of computer-capacity constraints, Brown and Stern use a 3-sector aggregation consisting of agriculture, manufactures, and services and the same 20-country/region breakdowns as is being used here. They also make allowance for international flows of FDI and increases in capital stocks in response to the multilateral trade liberalization that they analyze.

<sup>4</sup> The effects on imports, exports, terms of trade, real wages, and the return to capital are given in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001).



flects the drawing of resources away from the monopolistically competitive, nonagricultural sectors, thereby producing negative scale effects in these sectors. Similar negative welfare effects are also noted for Australia and New Zealand, both of which are net exporters of agricultural products.

The results of the MR-2 33 percent reduction of post-Uruguay Round manufactures tariffs are indicated in column (2) of table 1 and show an increase in global welfare of \$210.7 billion. It is evident that welfare increases in all of the countries/regions listed. The largest welfare gain is \$63.3 billion for EU/EFTA, while Japan's gain is \$57.8 billion and the U.S. gain is \$31.3 billion. The welfare gains for the developing countries/regions are much smaller in absolute terms, but, as a percentage of GNP, range from 0.54 percent for China to 3.52 percent for the Philippines.

As noted above, the Uruguay Round negotiations on services resulted in creation of the GATS, but no significant liberalization of services barriers occurred. Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there have been successful multilateral negotiations to liberalize telecommunications and financial services. While it would be desirable to assess the economic effects of these sectoral agreements, we cannot do so here because of lack of data. What we have done then is to use the estimates of services barriers mentioned above and assumed that these barriers are reduced by 33 percent. In column (3) of table 1, it can be seen that global welfare rises by \$389.6 billion, which exceeds the \$210.7 billion welfare increase for manufactures liberalization. All of the countries/regions listed experience positive welfare gains. The United States has the largest welfare gain of \$150.0 billion, compared to \$103.4 billion for EU/EFTA and \$61.6 billion for Japan. There are sizable percentage increases in welfare for the smaller industrialized and developing countries.

The results for the MR-4 scenario are a linear combination of the other three scenarios. Overall, in column (4) of table 1, global welfare rises by \$613.0 billion. The United States has a welfare gain of \$177.3 billion, EU/EFTA a gain of \$168.9 billion, and Japan a gain of \$123.7 billion. As already noted, most of the smaller industrialized countries and the developing countries show sizable percentage increases in welfare. Finally, MR-5 involves the removal of all barriers and corresponds to what we consider as global free trade. Again, since our model is linear, the results for MR-5 are some three times

larger than for MR-4. The welfare gains for the United States are \$537.2 billion (5.92 percent of GNP), EU/EFTA, \$511.9 billion (4.67 percent of GNP), and Japan, \$374.8 billion (5.77 percent of GNP). The percentage welfare increases for the other countries shown range from 3.52 percent of GNP for Australia to 16.96 percent for Singapore.

### **Sectoral Employment Results**

The sectoral employment results for MR-4 and MR-5 for Japan and the United States are presented in table 2.<sup>5</sup> In column (1), the MR-4 negative effects for Japan, measured in numbers of workers and percent of sectoral employment, are concentrated in agriculture (-75,703, -1.85%), food, beverages and tobacco (-28,763, -0.86%), textiles (-1,196, -0.16%), wearing apparel (-31,606, -2.30%), leather products and footwear (-3,227, -2.95%), and trade and transport (-14,736, -0.09%). The largest sectoral employment increases for Japan are in metal products, durable manufactures, and construction. For the United States, in column (3), there are employment declines in textiles (-18,826, -1.55%), wearing apparel (-47,605, -4.37%), leather products and footwear (-9,042, -6.21%), trade and transport (-43,126, -0.14%), and other private services (-92,052, -0.25%). The largest employment increases for the United States are in agriculture (132,608, 3.23%), durable manufactures, and construction. The sectoral employment results for global free trade in Scenario MR-5 in table 2 are some three times larger than those shown for Scenario MR-4.

### **III. Analysis of Regional Negotiating Options**

Both the United States and Japan are engaged in a number of negotiations involving regional arrangements. For the United States, this includes expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to include Chile and ongoing discussions and negotiations for a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA). Both the United States and Japan are members of the Asia Pacific Economic (APEC) forum. There has also been some discussion of a so-called ASEAN Plus 3 arrangement in which Japan, China/Hong Kong, and Korea would join together with the members of the Association of South East

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<sup>5</sup> Sectoral results for percentage changes in exports, imports, output, and scale economies are given in Brown, Dear-

Nations (ASEAN) in an FTA. In this section, we report the results of regional scenarios that involve both the United States and Japan in the case of APEC, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA that involves Japan, an expansion of NAFTA to include Chile, and an approximation to the FTAA that we refer to as a Western Hemisphere FTA (WHFTA) that involves the United States. These scenarios are:

**RA-1:** *APEC trade liberalization – elimination of all bilateral post-Uruguay Round agriculture and manufactures tariffs and services barriers among APEC countries.*<sup>6</sup>

**RA-2:** *ASEAN Plus 3 FTA – elimination of all bilateral post-Uruguay Round agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers among the ASEAN countries<sup>7</sup> plus China/Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea.*

**RA-3:** *NAFTA-Chile FTA – elimination of all bilateral post-Uruguay Round agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers between the NAFTA members and Chile.*

**RA-4:** *Western Hemisphere FTA (WHFTA) – elimination of all bilateral post-Uruguay Round agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers among the NAFTA members and Chile and an aggregate of countries comprising Central America and Caribbean and Other South America (CCS).*<sup>8</sup>

## Results

In each of these cases, our reference point is the post-Uruguay Round, 2005 database described above together with the post-Uruguay Round tariff rates on agricultural products and manufactures and the specially constructed measures of services barriers used in the Millennium Round scenarios in Section II preceding. Four scenarios have been carried out for each of the four arrangements noted: (A) removal of agricultural tariffs; (M) removal of manufactures tariffs; (S) removal of services barriers; and (C) combined removal of agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers. Because of space constraints, we report only the latter combined results, denoted RA-1C, ..., RA-4C. The results of the other scenarios are available on request.

**RA-1C: APEC Trade Liberalization** – This scenario treats APEC as a FTA and does not make allowance for the “open regionalism” that APEC purportedly offers to non-members. If open regionalism

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dorff, and Stern (2001).

<sup>6</sup> The membership of APEC is taken here to include: Australia; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Philippines; Singapore; Taiwan; Thailand; and United States.

<sup>7</sup> Taken here to include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

<sup>8</sup> The CCS aggregate comprises: Central America and Caribbean; Venezuela; Colombia; Rest of Andean Pact; Argentina; Brazil; Uruguay; and Rest of South America.

were to be pursued, it would mean in effect that APEC liberalization would be extended to non-members who wished to become associated with or to join APEC. But presumably these non-members would then themselves be required to eliminate their own trade barriers vis-à-vis the APEC members. Since we cannot determine a priori how non-members of APEC would respond, we take the closest approximation to open regionalism to correspond with our global free-trade scenario MR-5 in table 1 above.

In table 3, the complete elimination of (post-Uruguay Round) APEC bilateral tariffs and services barriers increases global welfare by \$764.4 billion. Japan's welfare increases by \$283.1 billion (4.36 percent of GNP) and U.S. welfare increases by \$294.7 billion (3.25 percent of GNP). There is some evidence of trade diversion for EU/EFTA amounting to \$7.0 billion and Rest of Asia, \$1.0 billion, which reflects trade diversion in manufactures being offset against trade creation in agriculture and services. It is interesting then to compare the bilateral removal of APEC trade barriers with the removal of all global trade barriers in Scenario MR-5 noted above. The welfare gain from global free trade, indicated earlier in table 1, is \$1.9 trillion, which compares to a gain of \$764.4 billion if all tariffs and services barriers were removed bilaterally among the APEC member countries. The gains for Japan and the United States from global free trade are \$374.8 and \$537.2 billion compared to \$283.1 and \$294.7 billion, respectively, for complete APEC bilateral liberalization. The detailed sectoral results for Japan are indicated in column (1) of table 4. Thus, for complete APEC bilateral liberalization, the numbers of workers decline in agriculture, food, beverages and tobacco, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and trade and transport services, and increase in all other manufacturing sectors, particularly metal products, machinery and equipment, and other private services. The sectoral employment results for the United States are shown in column (3) of table 4, indicating employment declines in most manufacturing sectors, especially textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, other manufactures, trade and transport, and government services. The main U.S. employment increases are in agriculture, food, beverages, and tobacco, construction, and other private services.

**RA-2C: ASEAN Plus 3** – Table 3, column (2), contains the results of a FTA involving the

members of ASEAN together with China/Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea.<sup>9</sup> Complete removal of all bilateral tariffs on agriculture and manufactures and services barriers increases global welfare by \$224.7 billion. Japan's welfare rises by \$160.8 billion, and there are welfare increases for the ASEAN members as well as for China/Hong Kong and South Korea. There is evidence of trade diversion for the EU/EFTA (-\$2.6 billion), Rest of Asia (-\$58 million), and Mexico (-\$55 million). In a scenario not shown here, if Hong Kong were to be excluded from this FTA, it would experience a welfare decline of \$366 million. The sectoral results for Japan are shown in table 4, column (2), and indicate employment declines in agriculture, food, beverages, and tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and trade and transport services. Employment rises in all other sectors in Japanese manufacturing and services. The sectoral employment effects in China (excluding Hong Kong), which are quite large, are shown in column (1) of table 5. There are declines in textiles, wood and wood products, chemicals, metal products, transportation equipment, machinery and equipment, construction, trade and transport, and government services. There are employment increases in agriculture, mining, food, beverages and tobacco, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, other manufactures, and other private services. The sectoral employment results for Korea are shown in column (2) of table 5. There are relatively sizable employment declines in agriculture, durable manufactures, and services, and employment increases especially in textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and other manufactures.

**RA-3C: NAFTA-Chile FTA** – Table 3, column (3), indicates the results of a FTA involving the NAFTA member countries and Chile.<sup>10</sup> The complete removal of all post-Uruguay Round bilateral tariffs on agriculture and manufactures and services barriers vis-à-vis Chile increases global welfare by \$5.5 billion. The welfare of the NAFTA members rises, with the largest absolute gain of \$4.2 billion for the United States. Chile's welfare increases by \$300 million, which is 0.92% of its GNP. There is some evidence of trade diversion for a number of countries, including the aggregate of Central America and Caribbean and Other South American (CCS) countries. The sectoral employment effects for the NAFTA

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<sup>9</sup> For some background information on discussions relating to an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, see Barry (2001).

<sup>10</sup> For a more comprehensive analysis of the accession of Chile to the NAFTA, see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern

members and for Chile are shown in columns (1)-(4) of table 6. The U.S. employment effects are negligible, as are those for Canada and Mexico. The employment effects for Chile are noticeably larger, with increases in agriculture, mining, metal products, and other private services, and reductions in textiles and wearing apparel, some other manufacturing sectors, and trade and transport and government services.

**RA-4C: Western Hemisphere Trade Agreement (WHFTA)** – Discussions have been ongoing for several years to create a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA).<sup>11</sup> The most recent efforts to move forward in achieving a FTAA were made at a Summit of the Americas meeting of the 34 member nations in Quebec City in April 2001. Since the country detail in our model does not include the individual members of the FTAA, we have chosen to approximate it by combining the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Chile with an aggregate of the Central American and Caribbean and Other South American (CCS) nations into what we refer to as a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA). The complete removal of all bilateral tariffs on agriculture and manufactures and services barriers can be seen in table 3, column (4), to increase global welfare by \$77.9 billion. The welfare of the NAFTA members rises by \$52.7 billion for the United States, \$2.8 billion for Canada, and \$2.8 billion for Mexico. The welfare of Chile rises by \$2.0 billion and the CCS aggregate by \$18.4 billion. There is evidence of trade diversion for Australia, New Zealand, EU/EFTA, some Asian developing countries, and the Middle East and North Africa. The sectoral employment effects are indicated in columns (5)-(9) of table 6. The United States shows relatively small employment declines in agriculture, mining, food, beverages, and tobacco, and other private and government services, and increases in all other sectors. While the employment effects for Canada are also small, the absolute employment increases for Mexico, Chile, and the CCS aggregate are noteworthy. This suggests that the smaller countries would experience more employment adjustments than the largest countries in a WHFTA.

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(2000).

<sup>11</sup> See Office of the United States Trade Representative (20001a).

#### IV. Analysis of Bilateral Negotiating Options

As already mentioned, both Japan and the United States are currently engaged in or are considering a number of bilateral trading arrangements. For Japan, these include negotiation of a FTA with Singapore and active consideration of FTAs with Mexico, Korea, Chile, and possibly other countries.<sup>12</sup> The United States has been a member of the NAFTA since its inception in 1994. It has recently concluded a bilateral FTA with Jordan and is actively considering FTAs with Chile, Singapore, and Korea.<sup>13</sup> In what follows, we analyze the effects on economic welfare and sectoral employment of these various bilateral arrangements. The scenarios are as follows:

**JSFTA:** *Japan-Singapore FTA*

**JKFTA:** *Japan-Korea FTA*

**JCFTA:** *Japan-Chile FTA*

**JMFTA:** *Japan-Mexico FTA*

**USCFTA:** *U.S.-Chile FTA*

**USSFTA:** *U.S.-Singapore FTA*

**USKFTA:** *U.S.-Korea FTA*

As with the regional scenarios, we report only the combined results of the combined removal of agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers, denoted by JSFTA-C, etc. The results for the separate removal of the agricultural, manufactures, and services barriers are available on request. We should emphasize that our computational analysis does not take into account other features of the various FTAs, such as the negotiation of explicit rules and development of new institutional and cooperative arrangements that could be beneficial to the countries involved.<sup>14</sup> These factors do not lend themselves readily to quantification, however. By the same token, we have not made allowance for rules of origin that may be negotiated as part of each FTA and that could be designed with protectionist intentions.

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<sup>12</sup> For more details, see: METI, White Papers/Reports (2000a,b,c); Institute of Developing Economies and JETRO (2000); Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2000); Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2000); and Keidanren (1999, 2000).

<sup>13</sup> See Office of the United States Trade Representative (2001b,c) and United States International Trade Commission (2001) for information on the U.S. FTA initiatives.

<sup>14</sup> Thus, for example, the prospective Japan-Singapore FTA is to be referred to as the "Japanese-Singapore Agreement for a New Age Partnership." Details of the proposed agreement are set out in METI (2000a).

**JSFTA-C: Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement** – As shown in table 7, column (1), the combined removal of bilateral tariffs on agricultural products and manufactures and services barriers would increase global economic welfare by \$15.4 billion. Japan's welfare rises by \$10.9 billion (0.17 percent of GNP), and Singapore's welfare rises by \$1.8 billion (2.43 percent of GNP). A JSFTA appears to be trade diverting for the other ASEAN economies, as is evident in the declines in economic welfare for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The other industrialized countries besides Japan show increases in welfare. The sectoral results, which are shown in column (1) of table 8, indicate that employment rises by relatively small amounts in all sectors in Japan, except trade and transport services.<sup>15</sup> For Singapore, as indicated in column (1) of table 9, there are relatively substantial employment declines in virtually all manufacturing sectors and increases in employment in trade and transport (20,521) and other private services (5,160). A Japan-Singapore FTA thus appears to shift employment in Japan especially towards durable manufactures and employment in Singapore away from manufactures towards services sectors.

**JKFTA-C: Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement** – In table 7, column (3), a JKFTA for all sectors combined increases global welfare by \$30.3 billion. Japan's economic welfare increases by \$27.4 billion (0.42 percent of GNP), and South Korea's welfare increases by \$3.2 billion (0.57 percent of GNP). There is evidence of trade diversion from a JKFTA for the United States (-\$207 million), EU/EFTA (-\$214 million), and smaller amounts for several of the Asian developing countries. The sectoral results, shown in table 8, column (2), indicate that there are relatively small employment declines in Japan in agriculture, labor-intensive manufactures, and trade and transport services, and increases in employment in durable manufactures, construction, and other private services. For Korea, as shown in Table 9, column (3), employment falls in chemicals, durable manufactures, and services, except for trade and transport. Employment rises in Korea's agriculture and labor-intensive manufactures.

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<sup>15</sup> Sectoral results for percentage changes in exports, imports, output, and scale economies for this and the following bilateral FTA's are available on request.



**JCFTA-C: Japan-Chile Free Trade Agreement** – A JCFTA covering all sectors is shown in table 7, column (5), to increase global welfare by \$4.9 billion. Japan's welfare rises by \$4.3 billion (.07 percent of GNP) and Chile's welfare rises by \$688 million (0.86 percent of GNP). There is evidence of small, negative welfare effects due to trade diversion for the smaller industrialized countries and for all of the Asian economies, except Hong Kong. The sectoral results for Japan, which are shown in table 8, column (3), indicate relatively small employment declines in agriculture, food, beverages, and tobacco, trade and transport, and other private services, and employment increases in all other manufacturing sectors. In Chile, as indicated in column (5) of table 9, employment falls in mining, all manufacturing sectors, and in services except other private services.

**JMFTA-C: Japan-Mexico Free Trade Agreement** – As indicated in table 7, column (7), the combined removal of bilateral trade barriers for agricultural products, manufactures, and services in a JMFTA increases global welfare by \$7.3 billion. Japan's welfare increases by \$6.3 billion (0.10 percent of GNP) and Mexico's welfare by \$1.9 billion (0.5 percent of GNP). There are indications that a JMFTA would be trade diverting for the United States (-\$750 million), Canada (-\$33 million), EU/EFTA (-\$121 million), and in small amounts for several of the Asian and CCS economies. The sectoral results for Japan, which are shown in column (4) of table 8, indicate relatively small employment declines in agriculture, food, beverages and tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and trade and transport services and increases especially in durable manufactures. For Mexico, in table 9, column (7), the sectoral results show relatively small employment declines in agriculture and all manufactures sectors and employment increases in trade and transport and other private services.

**USCFTA-C: U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement** – To supplement the regional scenario noted for the expansion of NAFTA to include Chile and to permit comparison with a Japan-Chile FTA, the results of a U.S.-Chile FTA are indicated in column (6) of table 7. Global welfare increases by \$4.7 billion, with U.S. welfare increasing by \$4.2 billion and Chile's welfare by \$0.5 billion. These welfare increases are comparable to those indicated for the Japan-Chile FTA in column (5) of table 7, although the patterns of trade diversion differ somewhat between the U.S. and Japanese FTAs with Chile. The sectoral results

for the United States are shown in column (5) of table 8 and indicate relatively small employment declines in U.S. agriculture, mining, food, beverages, and tobacco, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and other private services, and employment increases in the other sectors. The sectoral employment effects for Chile are indicated in column (6) of table 9 and show employment increases in agriculture, mining, metal products, and other private services and employment declines in several manufacturing sectors and services. The sectoral employment changes for Chile differ somewhat for the Japan and U.S. FTAs, as can be seen by comparing columns (5) and (6). Nonetheless, a number of these sectoral changes are relatively large and indicate the adjustments that may occur with the FTAs.

**USSFTA-C: U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement** – The welfare effects of a U.S.-Singapore FTA are noted in column (2) of table 7. Global welfare rises by \$20.6 billion, with U.S. welfare rising by \$16.7 billion and Singapore's welfare by \$2.0 billion. These welfare increases are somewhat larger than those shown for the Japan-Singapore FTA in column (1), although there are some differences in the patterns of trade diversion. The sectoral employment effects for the United States are indicated in column (6) of table 8. There are positive, but relatively small, employment increases in all U.S. sectors, except for wearing apparel, trade and transport, and other private services. For Singapore, noted in column (2) of table 9, there are relatively large sectoral employment increases in wearing apparel and trade and transport services and declines in most other sectors. These sectoral changes correspond for Singapore to those shown in column (1) of table 9 for the Japan-Singapore FTA and suggest sizable employment adjustments for Singapore that may occur in both FTA arrangements.

**USKFTA-C: U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement** – The welfare effects of a U.S.-Korean FTA are shown in column (4) of table 7. Global welfare rises by \$38.8 billion, with U.S. welfare rising by \$29.2 billion and Korean welfare by \$8.2 billion. These welfare effects are somewhat larger than for the Japan-Korea FTA noted in column (3) of table 7, and the U.S.-Korea FTA can be seen to have no evidence of trade diversion. The sectoral employment effects for the United States are indicated in column (7) of table 8. U.S. employment increases notably in agriculture and food, beverages, and tobacco and declines in most of the manufacturing and services sectors. It is interesting to compare these results with

the results for the Japan-Korea FTA in column (2) of table 8 that indicate employment declines in Japan's agricultural sector, food, beverages, and tobacco, wearing apparel, and trade and transport services. The sectoral employment effects for Korea are indicated in column (4) of table 9. There are noteworthy employment declines in agriculture, food, beverages, and tobacco, non-metallic mineral products, construction, and other private services and increases in most manufacturing sectors and trade and transport services. The sectoral employment results for Korea with a Japan-Korea FTA, shown in column (3) of table 9, suggest quite different sectoral effects than for a U.S.-Korea FTA. The employment adjustments involved for Korea in both FTAs may therefore be significant in some sectors, although they could be offsetting.

## **V. Conclusions and Implications for Policy**

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects of the trade liberalization that may be negotiated in a new trade round to be conducted under WTO auspices, as well as a variety of regional and preferential trading arrangements. While our focus has been on the United States and Japan, we have also provided results for the effects on the other major trading countries/regions in the global trading system. The overriding conclusion that emerges from our model simulations of a new trade round is that multilateral trade liberalization has positive and often sizable impacts on economic welfare in all of the industrialized and developing countries/regions covered in the Michigan Model. A second conclusion is that while regional and bilateral FTAs may be welfare enhancing for the member countries directly involved, these welfare gains are considerably smaller than those resulting from multilateral trade liberalization, and, in any case accrue in absolute terms primarily to the large industrialized countries. Thus, the benefits of FTAs to the developing country partners appear somewhat limited, and, in some cases, could be disruptive because of intersectoral shifts in output and employment, depending on how rapidly the FTAs would be implemented. It is also the case that the regional and bilateral FTAs involve elements of trade diversion and are therefore detrimental to some non-member countries.

While our research is by no means the last word on the subject, our computational results nonetheless strongly suggest that the interests of the United States and Japan may not be well served altogether by the negotiation of regional and bilateral preferential trading arrangements. There is some danger accordingly that the realization of the very significant benefits of multilateral liberalization may be jeopardized by pursuing these arrangements. It is imperative therefore for the United States, Japan, and other WTO member countries to move ahead expeditiously in launching a new multilateral trade round.

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**Table 1**  
**Global Welfare Effects of Multilateral Negotiating Options**  
**(Percent of GNP and Billions of Dollars)**

	WTO Millennium Round – 33% Reductions in:								Global Free Trade All Barriers Removed—MR-5 (5)	
	Agricultural Tariffs—MR-1 (1)		Manufactures Tariffs—MR-2 (2)		Services Barriers—MR-3 (3)		Combined Liberalization—MR-4 (4)			
<b>Industrialized Countries</b>										
Japan	0.07%	\$4.3	0.89%	\$57.8	0.95%	\$61.6	1.90%	\$123.7	5.77%	\$374.8
United States	-0.04	-4.1	0.34	31.3	1.65	150.0	1.95	177.3	5.92	537.2
Canada	0.01	0.1	0.38	2.8	1.46	10.6	1.85	13.5	5.62	40.9
Australia	-0.04	-0.2	0.56	2.5	0.65	2.8	1.16	5.1	3.52	15.5
New Zealand	-0.04	-0.0	1.88	1.4	1.20	0.8	3.04	2.2	9.22	6.8
EU and EFTA	0.02	2.2	0.58	63.3	0.94	103.4	1.54	168.9	4.67	511.9
<b>Developing Countries</b>										
<b>Asia</b>										
Hong Kong	0.02	0.0	1.56	2.0	1.78	2.3	3.36	4.3	10.18	13.1
China	0.18	1.6	0.54	4.9	0.79	7.1	1.50	13.6	4.55	41.2
Korea	0.16	0.9	1.40	8.0	0.91	5.2	2.48	14.1	7.51	42.7
Singapore	0.12	0.1	2.85	2.1	2.62	1.9	5.60	4.2	16.96	12.6
Taiwan	0.71	2.5	1.58	5.6	0.49	1.7	2.78	9.8	8.44	29.6
Indonesia	0.06	0.1	0.06	0.1	0.79	2.0	1.65	4.2	5.00	12.7
Malaysia	0.28	0.3	1.99	2.4	0.54	0.6	2.81	3.4	8.51	10.2
Philippines	0.20	0.2	3.52	3.1	1.68	1.5	5.40	4.8	16.38	14.5
Thailand	0.03	0.1	1.47	3.0	1.12	2.3	2.62	5.4	7.94	16.4
Rest of Asia	0.40	2.3	0.90	5.2	0.47	2.7	1.78	10.2	5.38	30.8
<b>Other</b>										
Chile	-0.05	-0.0	1.29	1.0	1.17	0.9	2.40	1.9	7.28	5.9
Mexico	0.03	0.1	0.32	1.1	1.49	5.2	1.84	6.5	5.58	19.6
Cent., Carib., S. Amer.	-0.03	-0.5	0.31	5.1	1.13	18.9	1.41	23.6	4.28	71.4
Middle East & N. Africa	0.09	0.8	0.92	8.0	0.88	7.6	1.90	16.4	5.75	49.7
<b>Total</b>		<b>10.8</b>		<b>210.7</b>		<b>389.6</b>		<b>613.0</b>		<b>1,857.4</b>

**Table 2**  
**Sectoral Employment Effects of Multilateral Negotiating Options for Japan and the United States**  
**(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)**

Sector	Japan				United States			
	WTO Millenium Round MR-4 (1)		Global Free Trade MR-5 (2)		WTO Millenium Round MR-4 (3)		Global Free Trade MR-5 (4)	
Agriculture	-1.85%	-75,703	-5.60%	-229,403	3.23%	132,608	-0.77%	-31,523
Mining	-0.68	-464	-2.06	-1,407	0.08	577	-1.91	-1,306
Food, Beverages & Tobacco	-0.86	-28,763	-2.59	-87,160	0.29	9,113	-0.76	-2,5669
Textiles	-0.16	-1,196	-0.49	-3,625	-1.55	-18,826	-0.37	-2,724
Wearing Apparel	-2.30	-31,606	-6.96	-95,777	-4.37	-47,605	-4.92	-67,761
Leather Products & Footwear	-2.95	-3,227	-8.93	-9,781	-6.21	-9,042	-5.92	-6,492
Wood & Wood Products	0.07	1,296	0.22	3,92	0.13	5,765	0.06	1,100
Chemicals	0.71	10,880	2.14	32,970	0.27	7,792	0.91	139,880
Non-metallic Min. Products	0.38	5,209	1.14	15,784	-0.13	-1,019	0.46	6,331
Metal Products	1.00	25,089	3.04	76,030	0.17	4,793	1.26	31,565
Transportation Equipment	2.73	15,960	8.27	48,362	0.18	3,496	2.70	15,796
Machinery & Equipment	1.42	33,396	4.31	101,200	0.63	18,216	1.61	37,817
Other Manufactures	0.66	3,422	2.01	10,368	0.47	8,534	0.04	2
Elec., Gas & Water	0.30	10,855	0.91	32,893	0.19	8,919	0.34	12,300
Construction	0.25	22,700	0.77	68,788	0.10	13,049	0.32	28,736
Trade & Transport	-0.09	-14,736	-0.26	-44,653	-0.14	-43,126	-0.30	-51,285
Other Private Services	0.14	24,930	0.41	75,545	-0.25	-92,052	0.19	34,796
Government Services	0.04	1,959	0.13	5,93	0.00	-1,191	0.09	4,100
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		

Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.



**Table 3**  
**Global Welfare Effects of Regional Negotiating Options**  
**(Percent of GNP and Billions of Dollars)**

	APEC FTA (1)		ASEAN Plus 3 (2)		NAFTA-Chile FTA (3)		WHFTA (4)	
<b>Industrialized Countries</b>								
Japan	4.36%	\$283.1	2.48%	\$160.8	0.002%	\$0.1	0.006%	\$0.4
United States	3.25	294.7	0.02	2.3	0.046	4.2	0.581	52.7
Canada	4.21	30.7	0.04	0.3	0.040	0.3	0.383	2.8
Australia	2.99	13.0	0.20	0.9	-0.003	-0.0	-0.009	-0.0
New Zealand	6.09	4.5	0.23	0.2	-0.001	-0.0	-0.004	-0.0
EU and EFTA	-0.06	-7.0	-0.02	-2.6	-0.001	-0.1	-0.008	-0.9
<b>Developing Countries</b>								
<b>Asia</b>								
Hong Kong	8.10	10.4	4.15	5.3	0.003	0.0	-0.034	-0.0
China	2.17	19.6	0.36	3.2	-0.002	-0.0	-0.008	-0.1
Korea	5.10	29.0	3.03	17.2	-0.004	-0.0	-0.028	-0.2
Singapore	11.85	8.8	8.46	6.3	0.004	0.0	0.036	0.0
Taiwan	6.32	22.2	1.97	6.9	0.003	0.0	0.015	0.1
Indonesia	3.52	8.9	2.15	5.4	-0.001	-0.0	-0.002	-0.0
Malaysia	5.32	6.4	3.34	4.0	0.005	0.0	0.069	0.1
Philippines	11.52	10.2	6.16	5.4	0.005	0.0	0.013	0.0
Thailand	5.18	10.7	2.78	5.7	0.002	0.0	-0.003	-0.0
Rest of Asia	-0.18	-1.0	-0.01	-0.1	0.001	0.0	-0.001	-0.0
<b>Other</b>								
Chile	3.91	3.1	0.38	0.3	0.922	0.7	2.478	2.0
Mexico	3.94	13.9	-0.02	-0.1	0.116	0.4	0.806	2.8
Cent., Carib., S. Amer.	-0.01	-1	0.05	0.8	-0.010	-0.2	1.103	18.4
Middle East & N. Africa	0.39	3.4	0.27	2.3	-0.003	-0.0	-0.017	-0.1
<b>Total</b>		<b>764.4</b>		<b>224.7</b>		<b>5.5</b>		<b>77.9</b>

**Table 4**  
**Sectoral Employment Effects for Japan and the United States of Regional Negotiating Options**  
**(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)**

Sector	Japan				United States							
	APEC FTA (1)		ASEAN Plus 3 FTA (2)		APEC FTA (3)		ASEAN- PLUS-3 FTA (4)		NAFTA- Chile FTA (5)		WHFTA (6)	
Agriculture	-5.06%	-206,698	-0.77%	-31,523	8.30%	340,702	0.42%	17,315	-0.02%	-656	-0.48%	-19,640
Mining	2.00	1,375	-1.91	-1,306	-0.30	-2,111	-0.04	-258	0.00	14	-0.20	-1,400
Food, Beverages & Tobacco	-1.97	-66,289	-0.76	-2,5669	0.91	28,951	0.07	2,266	-0.01	-193	-0.34	-10,610
Textiles	0.21	1,667	-0.37	-2,724	-3.51	-42,474	-1.20	-14,486	0.02	198	0.47	5,685
Wearing Apparel	-5.33	-73,258	-4.92	-67,761	-8.48	-92,368	-2.08	-22,648	-0.02	-204	0.53	5,778
Leather Products & Footwear	-6.39	-6,991	-5.92	-6,492	-16.30	-23,720	-7.48	-10,886	-0.03	-42	-0.41	-604
Wood & Wood Products	0.24	4186	0.06	1,100	-0.06	-2,416	0.08	3,377	0.00	187	0.09	3,884
Chemicals	1.76	27,065	0.91	139,880	-0.13	-3,622	-0.07	-1,890	0.02	511	0.13	3,784
Non-metallic Min. Products	0.97	13,446	0.46	6,337	-0.36	-2,739	0.03	201	0.00	37	0.04	321
Metal Products	2.36	59,165	1.26	31,565	-0.28	-7,582	0.12	3266	0.00	-109	0.04	1,092
Transportation Equipment	5.54	32,396	2.70	15,796	-0.19	-3,811	0.04	881	0.02	340	0.15	2,995
Machinery & Equipment	3.33	78,930	1.61	37,817	-0.40	-11,649	-0.07	-2,080	0.02	468	0.38	11,145
Other Manufactures	2.48	8,136	0.04	2	-1.94	-35,265	-1.44	-26,162	0.00	68	0.68	12,358
Elec., Gas & Water	0.73	26,502	0.34	12,300	0.18	8,046	0.02	929	0.01	268	0.07	3,137
Construction	0.61	54,237	0.32	28,736	0.10	12,449	0.02	3,030	0.00	488	0.04	5,444
Trade & Transport	-0.18	-29,905	-0.30	-51,285	-0.42	-131,717	0.07	20,555	0.00	323	0.00	1,066
Other Private Services	0.39	70,274	0.19	34,796	0.09	33,009	0.04	15,829	0.00	-1,597	-0.03	-12,453
Government Services	0.12	5,762	0.09	4,100	-0.24	-63,683	0.04	10,761	0.00	-100	-0.04	-11,983
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.0</b>				<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>

Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.

**Table 5**  
**Sectoral Employment Effects of ASEAN Plus 3 FTA for China and Korea**  
**(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)**

Sector	China		Korea	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Agriculture	0.06%	218,916	-	-9,517
Mining	0.88	92,230	-4.17	-1,282
Food, Beverages & Tobacco	1.26	148,193	-0.59	-3,099
Textiles	-4.04	-687,516	11.58	7,5384
Wearing Apparel	30.84	1,476,033	4.87	28,551
Leather Products & Footwear	13.52	535,672	8.97	9,441
Wood & Wood Products	-0.77	-44,933	-0.59	-2,267
Chemicals	-1.78	-359,236	1.34	8,472
Non-metallic Min. Products	0.00	0	-2.36	-9,762
Metal Products	-0.35	-55,436	-2.38	22,916
Transportation Equipment	-3.45	-141,735	-0.28	-448
Machinery & Equipment	-1.62	-357,464	-3.43	16,832
Other Manufactures	5.85	310,678	1.52	7,537
Elec., Gas & Water	0.19	54,605	-0.09	-880
Construction	-1.06	-614,990	-0.10	-3,286
Trade and Transport	-0.36	-368,438	-0.15	-5,334
Other Private Services	0.72	282,858	-0.92	33,962
Government Services	-1.11	-489,436	-0.65	19,800
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>

Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.

**Table 6**  
**Sectoral Employment Effects of a NAFTA-Chile FTA and WHFTA**  
**(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)**

Sector	NAFTA-Chile FTA								WHFTA									
	U.S. (1)		Canada (2)		Mexico (3)		Chile (4)		U.S. (5)		Canada (6)		Mexico (7)		Chile (8)		CCS (9)	
Agriculture	-0.02%	-656	-0.02%	-110	-0.03%	-2,907	0.45%	4,896	-0.48%	-19,640	-0.20%	-1,254	-0.16%	-15,595	0.71%	7,728	0.97%	21,6949
Mining	0.00	14	0.01	17	-0.02	-33	1.24	1,196	-0.20	-1,400	-0.49	-946	-0.12	-191	-1.18	-1,138	0.64	7179
Food, Bever- ages & To- bacco	-0.01	-193	-0.01	-52	-0.01	-47	-0.04	-99	-0.34	-10,610	-0.05	-251	0.02	75	-0.37	-838	0.67	28,096
Textiles	0.02	198	-0.01	-2	0.13	364	-1.28	-467	0.47	5,685.	-0.40	-137	0.61	1,660	-1.21	-439	0.14	1,746
Wearing Apparel	-0.02	-204	-0.02	-25	-0.03	-52	0.26	157	0.53	5,778	-0.63	-906	-1.15	-2,179	0.72	429	2.10	35,488
Leather Prod- ucts & Foot- wear	-0.03	-42	-0.07	-5	-0.01	-11	0.62	27	-0.41	-604	-1.52	-114	-0.33	-426	0.08	4	2.92	9,996
Wood & Wood Products	0.00	187	-0.02	-86	-0.03	-118	0.21	89	0.09	3,884	-0.08	-385	-0.32	-1,384	0.28	120	-0.91	-12,007
Chemicals	0.02	511	0.00	-15	0.04	98	-1.97	-1,577	0.13	3,784	0.18	730	0.31	772	-1.36	-1,087	-0.42	-10,756
Non-metallic Min. Products	0.00	37	0.00	-2	0.01	399	-0.55	-50	0.04	321	0.01	9	0.36	12,221	-1.53	-139	-0.66	-1,730
Metal Prod- ucts	0.00	-109	-0.01	-42	0.06	163	1.72	1,902	0.04	1,092	-0.04	-100	-0.25	-724	2.47	2,731	-0.48	-8,372
Transportation Equipment	0.02	340	-0.02	-29	0.25	322	-2.89	-296	0.15	2,995	0.52	986	1.25	1,638	4.89	501	-1.45	-13,332
Machinery & Equipment	0.02	468	0.06	86	-0.05	-105	-5.27	-760	0.38	11,145	0.19	273	-0.46	-954	-3.33	-480	-3.00	-34,525
Other Manu- factures	0.00	68	0.00	-1	-0.04	-11	-1.92	-20	0.68	12,358	-0.27	-159	-0.46	-114	0.66	7	-1.33	-1,394
Elec., Gas & Water	0.01	268	0.00	17	0.01	94	0.04	101	0.07	3,137	0.02	163	0.02	134	0.01	20	-0.22	-11,475
Construction	0.00	488	0.00	70	0.01	256	-0.05	-284	0.04	5,444	0.05	846	0.10	1,809	0.19	1,086	-0.27	-26,865
Trade and Transport	0.00	323	0.01	240	0.01	1,340	-0.54	-7,756	0.00	1,066	0.05	1,917	0.05	6,231	-0.71	-10,226	-0.49	-10,770
Other Private Services	0.00	-1,597	0.00	-96	0.00	10	0.59	5,466	-0.03	-12,453	-0.01	-325	-0.06	-3,462	0.59	5,474	-0.22	-48,196
Government Services	0.00	-100	0.00	36	0.01	238	-0.42	-2,525	-0.04	-11,983	-0.02	-348	0.02	490	-0.62	-3,752	-0.16	-25,030
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>

Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.

**Table 7**  
**Global Welfare Effects of Bilateral Negotiating Options for Japan and the United States**  
**(Percent of GNP and Millions of Dollars)**

	Japan-Singapore FTA (1)		U.S.-Singapore FTA (2)		Japan-Korea FTA (3)		U.S.-Korea FTA (4)		Japan-Chile FTA (5)		U.S.-Chile FTA (6)		Japan-Mexico FTA (7)	
<b>Industrialized Countries</b>														
Japan	0.17%	\$10,857	0.02%	\$1180	0.42%	\$27,365	0.004%	\$268	0.07%	\$4,341	0.002%	\$130	0.10%	\$6,343
United States	0.02	1,561	0.18	16,724	-0.00	-207	0.32	29226	-0.00	-46	0.046	4,215	-0.01	-750
Canada	0.02	114	-0.01	-90	0.00	36	0.04	252	-0.00	-4	0.005	34	-0.01	-33
Australia	0.03	125	0.03	140	0.01	51	0.00	10	0.00	2	-0.002	-10	0.0	9
New Zealand	0.02	18	0.03	19	0.01	7	0.00	2	-0.00	-0	-0.001	-1	0.0	2
EU and EFTA	0.01	1,249	0.01	956	-0.00	-214	0.00	196	0.00	-52	0.000	-42	-0.0	-121
<b>Developing Countries</b>														
<b>Asia</b>														
Hong Kong	0.01	9	-0.02	-27	0.01	11	0.06	78	0.00	-0	0.003	3	-0.0	-4
China	-0.01	-73	-0.01	-57	-0.00	-30	0.00	42	0.00	-4	-0.001	-11	0.0	0
Korea	0.01	53	0.02	96	0.57	3,232	1.44	8,172	-0.00	-18	-0.003	-17	-0.0	-13
Singapore	2.43	1,808	2.70	2,009	-0.04	-31	0.02	16	-0.00	-1	0.004	3	-0.0	-3
Taiwan	0.02	64	-0.00	-109	-0.03	-117	0.00	0	-0.00	-8	0.002	7	-0.0	-26
Indonesia	-0.02	-42	0.01	17	0.01	34	0.01	34	0.00	-1	-0.001	-3	0.0	5
Malaysia	-0.34	-401	-0.20	-244	-0.03	-38	0.01	16	-0.00	-2	0.004	5	-0.0	-10
Philippines	-0.03	-22	-0.04	-31	-0.00	-0	0.01	12	-0.00	-1	0.004	4	-0.0	-9
Thailand	-0.01	-28	0.00	6	-0.00	-3	0.00	11	-0.00	-4	0.002	4	0.0	10
Rest of Asia	0.00	30	-0.01	-28	0.00	17	0.01	82	0.00	-2	0.001	4	-0.0	-3
<b>Other</b>														
Chile	-0.00	-2	0.01	118	0.02	12	0.01	6	0.86	688	0.596	478	-0.0	-0.9
Mexico	0.02	52	-0.02	-53	0.00	18	0.02	61	-0.00	-8	-0.001	-5	0.5	1,912
Cent., Carib., S.Amer.	0.00	53	-0.00	-32	0.00	45	0.01	135	0.00	16	-0.008	-128	-0.0	-21
Middle East & N. Africa	-0.00	-7	0.00	24	0.01	105	0.02	200	0.00	6	-0.002	-16	0.0	16
<b>Total</b>		<b>15,419</b>		<b>20,612</b>		<b>30,292</b>		<b>38,821</b>		<b>4,903</b>		<b>4,652</b>		<b>7,302</b>

**Table 8**  
**Sectoral Employment Effects for Japan and for the United States of Bilateral Negotiating Options**  
**(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)**

Sector	Sectoral Employment Effects for Japan								Sectoral Employment Effects for United States					
	Japan-Singapore FTA (1)		Japan-Korea FTA (2)		Japan-Chile FTA (3)		Japan-Mexico FTA (4)		Japan-Chile FTA (5)		U.S.-Singapore FTA (6)		U.S.-Korea FTA (7)	
Agriculture	0.03%	1,206	-0.05%	-2,096	0.00%	-204	-0.02%	-746	-0.02%	-730	0.09%	3,794	1.28	52,508
Mining	0.35	240	-0.17	-116	0.07	50	-0.12	-80	0.00	-10	0.08	586	-0.10	-707
Food, Beverages & Tobacco	0.01	222	-0.05	-1,631	-0.01	-389	-0.01	-367	-0.01	-206	0.04	1,118	0.12	3,958
Textiles	0.08	618	-0.04	-328	0.01	61	-0.01	-41	0.02	216	0.05	614	-0.45	-5,429
Wearing Apparel	0.05	702	-0.24	-3,361	0.00	54	-0.01	-109	-0.02	-203	-0.03	-372	-0.68	-7,452
Leather Products & Footwear	0.07	82	-0.75	-816	0.01	6	-0.02	-20	-0.03	-40	0.18	262	-0.78	-1,131
Wood & Wood Products	0.03	472	-0.01	-151	0.00	60	0.00	-32	0.00	49	0.03	1,145	-0.03	-1,317
Chemicals	0.09	1,455	0.18	2,808	0.01	204	0.01	200	0.02	507	0.06	1,649	0.01	223
Non-metallic Min. Products	0.04	546	0.06	871	0.00	61	0.00	47	0.00	27	0.04	304	-0.02	-154
Metal Products	0.10	2,464	0.16	4,040	0.02	420	0.02	560	0.00	-95	0.07	1,975	-0.06	-1,568
Transportation Equipment	0.30	1,748	-0.04	-207	0.08	461	0.05	318	0.02	373	0.06	1,151	-0.08	-1,546
Machinery & Equipment	0.16	3,722	0.29	6,893	0.02	439	0.06	1,397	0.02	515	0.15	4,296	0.01	194
Other Manufactures	0.17	897	-0.01	-50	0.02	77	0.05	277	0.00	78	0.18	3,270	-0.34	-6,164
Elec., Gas & Water	0.02	876	0.05	1,660	0.00	143	0.01	262	0.01	269	0.02	694	0.01	294
Construction	0.01	481	0.05	4,044	0.00	169	0.01	607	0.00	514	0.00	482	0.00	-218
Trade and Transport	-0.09	-15,961	-0.09	-14,493	0.00	-585	-0.02	-2,730	0.00	341	-0.07	-21,804	-0.06	-17,633
Other Private Services	0.00	510	0.02	3,148	-0.01	-1,015	0.00	405	0.00	-1,568	0.00	-206	0.00	-650
Government Services	-0.01	-281	0.00	-215	0.00	-13	0.00	53	0.00	-38	0.00	1,041	-0.05	-13,210
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>

Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.

**Table 9**  
**Sectoral Employment Effects for Japanese and U.S. FTA Partner Countries**  
**(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers)**

Sector	Singapore				Korea				Chile				Mexico	
	Japan FTA		U.S. FTA		Japan FTA		U.S. FTA		Japan FTA		U.S. FTA		Japan FTA	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)							
Agriculture	-1.65%	-78	-2.71%	-127	0.14%	3,909	-3.93	-111,887.8	0.01%	103	0.30%	3,258.4	-0.07%	-6,833
Mining	-3.29	-20	-2.97	-18	-1.16	-357	0.67	206.6	-2.18	-2,097	1.14	1,093.7	-0.12	-200
Food, Beverages & Tobacco	0.07	39	-5.23	-2,796	0.18	939	-0.92	-4,836.3	0.40	900	-0.11	-251.3	-0.03	-168
Textiles	-5.67	-257	-4.91	-223	0.85	5,561	4.86	31,653.4	-0.85	-309	-0.77	-280.0	-0.40	-1,080
Wearing Apparel	-4.69	-2,583	15.28	8,411	3.64	21,338	8.68	50,828.1	-0.20	-120	0.24	143.6	-0.39	-736
Leather Products & Footwear	-4.10	-105	-5.40	-139	4.92	5,179	7.03	7,398.4	-0.89	-39	0.36	15.9	-0.20	-264
Wood & Wood Products	-4.46	-1,874	-4.63	-1,944	-0.18	-687	0.08	298.0	-1.05	-446	0.08	34.8	-0.26	-1,157
Chemicals	-6.07	-8,769	-5.87	-8,483	-1.13	-7,172	0.24	1,540.1	-1.18	-944	-1.74	-1,394.6	-0.34	-848
Non-metallic Min. Products	-3.41	-558	-3.33	-545	-1.34	-5,533	-0.67	-2,763.6	-0.76	-70	-0.46	-42.4	-0.23	-7,844
Metal Products	-7.83	-3,283	-7.13	-2,989	-1.71	-16,535	0.71	6,888.1	-2.61	-2,892	1.41	1,556.4	-0.29	-858
Transportation Equipment	-4.94	-183	-5.43	-202	-0.25	-401	0.24	376.5	-4.34	-445	-2.15	-220.1	-0.61	-793
Machinery & Equipment	-6.70	-4,651	-4.42	-3,067	-2.20	-10,798	1.37	6,707.8	-3.59	-517	-5.20	-749.0	-0.07	-136
Other Manufactures	-6.16	-1,778	-4.69	-1,355	-0.24	-1,207	4.74	23,586.8	-2.23	-24	-1.95	-20.7	-1.22	-305
Elec., Gas & Water	-0.67	-253	-0.79	-298	-0.23	-2,192	0.24	2,310.2	-0.36	-996	0.03	88.6	-0.05	-414
Construction	-0.02	-32	-0.05	-98	-0.22	-7,164	-0.08	-2,811.5	-0.17	-983	-0.05	-262.7	-0.03	-531
Trade and Transport	2.73	20,521	1.89	14,225	1.09	39,627	0.61	22,197.7	-0.02	-316	-0.41	-5,926.9	0.21	24,374
Other Private Services	1.61	5,160	0.60	1,911	-0.37	-13,670	-0.87	-31,933.1	1.16	10,701	0.54	5,010.9	0.03	1,722
Government Services	-0.92	-1,296	-1.60	-2,265	-0.35	-10,839	0.01	240.6	-0.25	-1,505	-0.34	-2,054.6	-0.13	-3,930
<b>Total</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>		<b>0.0</b>

Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.

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