

MPRA

Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Interdependence in Multinational Production Networks

Chen, Maggie
George Washington University

2009

Online at <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23506/>
MPRA Paper No. 23506, posted 25. June 2010 / 16:57

Interdependence in Multinational Production Networks*

Maggie X. Chen[†]
George Washington University

January 2010

Abstract

The majority of multinational firms today operate a multilateral production network. Most existing empirical analyses have, however, focused on firms' choice between producing at home and investing overseas and assumed that a firm's decision to invest in a foreign country is independent of its locations in third countries. This paper examines the effect of existing production network on multinationals' entry decision. Using detailed French multinational subsidiary level data, the paper finds strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdependence across multinationals' foreign production locations. There is, however, little evidence of horizontal interdependence between home-country production and foreign investment when the third-country effects are taken into account, constituting a sharp contrast to the conventional emphasis. This result is robust to the various specifications and sensitivity analyses undertaken in the paper, and highlights the importance of investigating the causes and effects of foreign direct investment in the context of multinational production network.

Key words: multinational firm, production network, interdependence, entry decision, trade cost, input-output linkage

JEL codes: F23, D21

*I am very grateful to Ron Davies, Jonathan Eaton, Peter Egger, Jim Markusen, Keith Maskus, Mike Moore, Andreas Waldkirch, Stephen Yeaple and participants of the 2008 Empirical Investigation of International Trade (EIIT) Conference, the 2009 Midwest International Trade Group Meeting, and the 2009 Econometric Society Summer Meeting for valuable comments and suggestions. Research funding from George Washington University Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) is also acknowledged.

[†]2115 G Street, NW, #367, Washington, DC 20052; Email: xchen@gwu.edu; Phone: (202) 994-1092.

1 Introduction

The majority of multinational corporations (MNCs) today operate a *multilateral* production network. An average French multinational, for example, invests in 3.8 foreign countries in 2007, with an increase of 0.93 country per firm compared to 2005. The vast empirical literature of multinational firms has, however, largely ignored the multilateral nature of MNC production and primarily focused on the relationship between home-country production and foreign investment. Most studies in the literature assume that a multinational firm's decision to invest in a foreign country is *independent* of its existing production network in third countries, an assumption that is increasingly at odds as multinationals expand their production across foreign nations.

This paper addresses the above issue by examining the effect of third-country production network on multinationals' entry decisions. To achieve the goal, the paper employs a rich dataset that provides detailed information on French manufacturing firms' foreign subsidiaries in 2005 and 2007. For each subsidiary, the data reports the location, ownership status, and production activities. These information allows the paper to identify each individual firm's production network around the world and compare the structure of the network over time. They also enable the paper to establish intra-firm linkage between subsidiaries, in particular, the input-output relationship between subsidiaries' production activities. This makes it possible to distinguish the nature of interdependence between multinationals' foreign subsidiaries.

Figure 1, for example, plots the geographic distribution of Renault's global production network. Two observations emerge in this figure. First, Renault owns subsidiaries in more than 10 countries outside of France. Second, Renault segments its production across its foreign production locations by producing components in countries such as Argentina, South Korea, and Spain (represented by the darker area) and performing end processes in countries such as Russia and Colombia (represented by the lighter area). These phenomena are not exclusive to Renault, however. Figure 2 shows a similar pattern for another French multinational firm, Essilor, which specializes in lens products. In fact, our data indicates that as of 2007 French multinational firms have, on average, 0.72 upstream subsidiaries abroad (in which they produce intermediate inputs required for final-good production) and 2.49 downstream subsidiaries (in which they produce the final products). It is clear that multinationals' investment decision can no longer be viewed as a choice between producing at home and investing abroad; it involves instead a *network of vertically linked subsidiaries*.

[Figures 1-2 about here]

The econometric evidence suggests strong interdependence in multinationals' foreign production network. Existing subsidiaries in third countries exert a significant effect on multinationals' expansion decision, in both downstream and upstream production. First, MNCs are more likely to locate downstream production in countries where the cost of importing final goods from the

firms' existing foreign subsidiaries is relatively high. We refer to this effect as *horizontal interdependence*. Second, multinationals tend to produce the final product in countries with better access to large export markets where the MNCs do not have downstream production. We label this effect as the *market potential* factor. Third, there is a significant interaction between upstream and downstream subsidiaries. Specifically, multinationals tend to locate the final-good production in countries where the cost of importing intermediate inputs from the firms' existing foreign upstream subsidiaries is relatively low. Similarly, they are more likely to select countries with better market access to the existing downstream subsidiaries as intermediate-input production locations. We refer to this type of interaction as *vertical interdependence* and show that it is not uniform across vertically linked subsidiaries. The interdependence increases in the extent of input-output linkage between subsidiaries as well as the size of market demand in downstream production locations.

In sharp contrast to the strong interaction between MNCs' foreign production locations, there is little evidence of horizontal interdependence between multinationals' production at home and new investment abroad. We find in the paper that evidence that would support the traditional argument — on the tradeoff between foreign investment and home-country production — becomes insignificant once we take into account the third-country network factors. Instead, we observe a vertical interdependence. These results are robust to the various specifications and sensitivity analyses undertaken to address the bias of omitted variables and the potential endogeneity of network factors. This deviation from the literature suggests that assuming away the interdependence between foreign production locations is likely to give rise to biased estimates on the relationship between home-economy performance and FDI activities and, more generally, biased understanding of the true causes and effects of FDI. It calls for a reconsideration of the conventional specification to take into account the effect of third-country network. The findings also convey an important message to host-country policy makers that seek to influence the inflow of foreign investment: FDI inflow to third countries can affect a country's ability to attract multinationals. The effect can be either positive or negative dependent on the linkage of FDI flows.

This paper is closely related to a growing theoretical literature, led by Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), and Bergstrand and Egger (2008), that applies FDI modeling to a three-country framework. These studies build on the seminal work of Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) and influential empirical contributions by Brainard (1997), Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003b), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005), who point out the two main motives for multinationals to invest abroad are market access and comparative advantage.¹ Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), and Bergstrand and Egger (2008) show that the combination of the market-access and comparative-advantage motives can lead to export-platform FDI, where a

¹See Blonigen (2005) for an excellent survey of this literature.

multinational firm invests in a host country with the intention to serve third nations via exports from the host country. This prediction suggests that multinationals' investment decision cannot be viewed as a binary choice between exporting from home and investing abroad; it engages other, third nations.

The majority of the empirical literature has, however, not taken into account the third-country effect, much less the interdependence between multinationals' foreign production locations. The following few studies took the step to examine the determinants of export-platform FDI. Head and Mayer (2004) show that third-country market demand plays a significant role in a country's ability to attract multinational firms. They find that Japanese multinationals are more likely to locate their production in regions proximate to large markets. Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2007) consider a broader set of third-country characteristics, and find that most of the characteristics exert a significant effect on the level of U.S. outbound FDI even though there is no conclusive evidence on export-platform or vertical FDI. Chen (2009) examines how a host country's preferential trade agreement with third nations can affect the country's receipt of FDI and finds that countries integrated with large markets tend to experience an increase in total and export-platform investment. She also shows that the effect is especially strong for labor-abundant countries, but at the expense of the labor-scarce preferential trading partners.

Blonigen, Davies and *et al.* (2007) is among the first to investigate cross-country interdependence in FDI. Using U.S. outbound FDI data, they examine how investments in third countries affect a country's receipt of FDI from the U.S. They find that the results are sensitive to the sample of host countries examined: the third-country effect can be either insignificant or of reverse signs. There is some evidence of negative interdependence across proximate host countries — a result that is consistent with the export-platform FDI theory — but mainly among European OECD members. They also find that including third-country FDI does not alter the estimated effect of traditional FDI determinants.

This paper examines the cross-country interdependence in individual multinationals' production networks using subsidiary-level data. The dataset employed here offers two distinct advantages relative to the aggregate data used in the literature. First, it allows us to distinguish horizontal and vertical linkage for each pair of subsidiaries at disaggregate industry level (NACE 4-digit), following the methodology introduced in Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming). This distinction cannot be done at the aggregate industry level that has been considered in previous studies (e.g., "industrial machinery and equipment") because as Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming) point out a large percentage of vertical FDI is intra-industry. This, to some extent, can explain the ambiguous evidence in Blonigen, Davies and *et al.* (2007) where estimates can reflect a mix of horizontal and vertical interaction. Second, we examine individual multinational firms' entry decision. In contrast to aggregate sectoral FDI data that combines all individual firms, this allows us to compare the effect of traditional FDI determinants with the effect of third-country network at firm level. We find that the ability to focus on intra-

firm interdependence leads to sharply different findings than previous studies: the estimated horizontal interdependence between FDI and home-country exports disappears once we include third-country network variables. This departure from previous findings is not surprising given the data used there is not equivalent to an individual firm’s investment decision.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we examine the geographic attributes of French MNC production networks. In Section 3, we use a simple three-country theoretical framework to provide a motivation for the empirical analysis. We then describe the econometric methodology in Section 4 and data sources in Section 5. We present the main econometric results in Section 6 and several sensitivity analyses in Section 7. The paper concludes in Section 8.

2 Attributes of French MNC production networks

We employ a dataset of French manufacturing MNCs for our empirical analysis. In this section, we first take a look at the attributes of French MNC production networks. Figure 3 plots the distribution of French multinational firms in 2005 and 2007 by the number of countries in which investments occur. The majority of French MNCs concentrate their foreign production activities in 3 or more countries in 2007 while some spread to as many as 63. Comparing 2007 with 2005, there is a significant expansion in the size of network with an average increase of 0.93 per firm. A large fraction of foreign production locations comprises downstream subsidiaries, i.e., subsidiaries that engage in final-good production.² The average number of countries in which firms own downstream subsidiaries is 2.49, significantly greater than the average number of countries in which firms have upstream production locations.

[Figure 3 about here]

Now we examine the geographic density of each production network. In Figure 4, we plot the level of distance between each pair of subsidiaries owned by the same French MNCs. As shown in the graph, the closest two subsidiaries are 66 kilometers apart (located in Austria and Slovakia) and the furthest pair is 19,845 kilometers apart (in Estonia and New Zealand). The majority of subsidiaries are within 6,126 kilometers, while the average distance is about 6,000. The graph also indicates that a large percentage of French MNC subsidiaries are either clustered in neighboring countries (such as EU members) or located relatively distant from each other. This is further confirmed at the multinational firm level where we calculate the average subsidiary distance for each French MNC: While a significant fraction of French multinationals have a dispersed subsidiary network, many of them concentrate their subsidiaries geographically.

We then compare the distance between downstream production locations (owned by the same French MNCs) with the distance between vertically linked subsidiaries. As shown in Figure 5,

²We describe in detail how we identify downstream and upstream subsidiaries in Section 4.

the former tends to be greater than the latter as expected. Multinationals tend to duplicate their final-product production in countries that are geographically distant from each other. But they build their upstream and downstream subsidiaries in proximate locations.

[Figures 4-5 about here]

The above observations similarly apply to tariffs. In Figure 6, we plot the level of tariff between each pair of subsidiaries on the subsidiaries' primary good. It is shown that more than 30 percent of subsidiary pairs do not have tariff between each other and more than 50 percent have 7% or lower tariff rates. This is also confirmed at the parent firm level: More than 15 percent of French MNCs locate their subsidiaries in countries where tariffs have been removed for each other and 50 percent face an average of 6% or lower tariff when exporting from one subsidiary to another. This suggests that French MNCs are not always driven by the tariff-jumping motive when they choose their foreign production locations; a large percentage of them invest in countries where they can export to without paying tariff. This becomes more clear when we compare in Figure 7 the tariff between downstream production locations (on firms' final good) and the tariff of importing intermediate inputs from upstream locations. The former is significantly higher than the latter, suggesting tariffs motivate firms to expand their production horizontally but discourage them from building vertical production network.

[Figures 6-7 about here]

3 Theoretical motivation

As a prelude to the empirical analysis, we consider a stylized theoretical framework in this section and provide a motivation for the empirical hypotheses.

3.1 General setup

Suppose the world consists of N countries $\mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$. The representative consumer in each country allocates a certain amount of her expenditure, denoted as I_j ($j \in \mathcal{N}$), to the industry of differentiated products. Within this industry, the consumer has a utility function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Maximizing the CES utility function subject to the consumer's expenditure level yields the consumer demand function for each representative variety $q_{ij} = Y_j p_{ij}^{-\sigma}$, where q_{ij} is the quantity of the differentiated product produced by firms in country i and sold to destination country j , $Y_j \equiv I_j / \sum_r p_{rj}^{1-\sigma}$ is the demand level in country j with r representing the set of varieties, p_{ij} the price of this product, and σ the constant elasticity of substitution. Note that $p_{ij} = \phi_{ij} \cdot p_i$, where p_i is country i 's product market price and $\phi_{ij} \geq 1$ is the iceberg trade cost of exporting from country i to country j (with $\phi_{ii} = 1$).

Each firm produces a different brand of the differentiated product. Given the interest of this paper, we assume that country 1's firms can produce their final good in any of the other countries while the other countries' firms produce only at home and serve the foreign markets via exports. Firms must pay a plant-level fixed cost F for each final-good production location. They must also produce one unit of intermediate input for each unit of final product.³ Like the final product, country 1's firms can produce the intermediate input in any of the countries. For simplicity, we assume that the plant-level fixed cost for intermediate-input production, G , is sufficiently large such that firms would build their upstream production in only one location.⁴ We also assume that the upstream subsidiary will sell the inputs to the downstream subsidiaries at $m_k\phi_{ki}$, where m_k is the marginal cost of producing the intermediate input and ϕ_{ki} is the cost of exporting the intermediate input from country k to country i .

Now let d_i be an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm locates the downstream production in country i and similarly u_i be an indicator variable that identifies the existence of upstream production location. We can then characterize each firm's production network as $g \equiv \{d_i, u_i\}$, where $i \in \mathcal{N}$. Based on the observed production network, we define a firm as a national firm if there is no subsidiary abroad, and a multinational if there is at least one foreign subsidiary. We also let $\mathcal{N}_d(g) = \{i \in \mathcal{N} : d_i = 1\}$ denote the set of countries in which the firm has downstream production and $\mathcal{N}_u(g) = \{i \in \mathcal{N} : u_i = 1\}$ the set in which the firm has upstream production. We use $n_d(g)$ and $n_u(g)$ to represent the cardinality of the two sets respectively.

In the rest of this section, we examine firms' decision to undertake horizontal and vertical investments in a given production network. First, we note at profit maximization each firm will set the price at

$$p_i = \frac{\sigma(c_i + m_k\phi_{ki})}{(\sigma - 1)}, \quad (1)$$

where c_i is the marginal cost of producing the final good in country i . This implies that the operating profit the firm will earn by producing the intermediate input in country k and final good in country i and selling to destination country j , i.e., $g = \{d_i = 1, u_k = 1\}$, is

$$\pi_{ij}(g) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{1}{c_i + m_k\phi_{ki}} \right)^{\sigma-1} \phi_{ij}^{-\sigma} Y_j. \quad (2)$$

It is clear that π_{ij} is an increasing function of country j 's demand (i.e., Y_j) and a decreasing

³Given this paper's focus on intra-firm linkages, we do not consider here the option of purchasing intermediate inputs from unaffiliated suppliers. The latter possibility and its role in firms' location decision is an interesting research question in its own right and has a large scope for future empirical research. For seminal theoretical studies in this area, see, for example, Krugman and Venables (1996), Venables (1996), and Puga and Venables (1997). The empirical analysis of this paper attempts to control for these factors using host-country and firm fixed effects as firm-level data that identifies intermediate-input suppliers is largely missing.

⁴While this assumption is roughly in alignment with the data which shows French multinationals have, on average, 0.72 upstream subsidiaries abroad and 2.49 downstream subsidiaries, it is not crucial for the comparative analysis the model seeks to conduct.

function of the final good marginal cost (i.e., c_i) and the trade cost to ship the final good from country i to country j (i.e., ϕ_{ij}). Furthermore, because production consists of two stages, π_{ij} also decreases in the marginal cost of producing the intermediate input (i.e., m_k) as well as the trade cost of shipping the input to the final good production location (i.e., ϕ_{ki}).

Now suppose the firm has chosen $\mathcal{N}_d(g)$ as the set of locations to produce the final good and country k as the location to produce intermediate inputs, i.e., $\mathcal{N}_u(g) = k$. The total profit function will then be

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(g) = & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_d(g)} \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{1}{c_i + m_k \phi_{ki}} \right)^{\sigma-1} Y_i \\ & + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{N}_d(g)} \max_{i \in \mathcal{N}_d(g)} \left[\frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{1}{c_i + m_k \phi_{ki}} \right)^{\sigma-1} \phi_{ij}^{-\sigma} Y_j \right] - n_d(g)F - G. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

In this equation, the first term represents the operating profit from domestic sales (in countries with has downstream production), the second term represents the operating profit from export sales (in markets without downstream production), and the last two the fixed costs of downstream and upstream production (which increases as firms expand the number of production locations). Note that the export profit depends on the choice of export-platform countries, i.e., the downstream production locations in $\mathcal{N}_d(g)$ from which the firm exports to the other markets. Firms will strictly prefer location configuration g^* to g if and only if

$$\Pi(g^*) \geq \Pi(g). \quad (4)$$

3.2 Downstream location decision

Given our goal to examine firms' investment decision in a given production network, suppose the current production network comprises a downstream plant in country \tilde{i} and an upstream plant in country \tilde{k} , i.e., $g_0 = \{d_{\tilde{i}} = 1, u_{\tilde{k}} = 1\}$. We first look at the decision to build a new downstream production subsidiary in country i , i.e., Δd_i . If $\Delta d_i = 1$, the production network will move from g_0 to $g_1 = \{d_i = d_{\tilde{i}} = 1, u_{\tilde{k}} = 1\}$.

Firms will build a downstream subsidiary in i if and only if

$$\Pi(g_1) > \Pi(g_0). \quad (5)$$

Given equation (3), we can simplify the above condition to

$$(c_i + m_{\tilde{k}} \phi_{\tilde{k}i})^{1-\sigma} M_i > \mu_{\tilde{i}} (\phi_{\tilde{i}i}^{-\sigma} Y_i + M_i^e) + \sigma F, \quad (6)$$

where $M_i \equiv Y_i + M_i^e = Y_i + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \mathcal{N}_d(g_1)} (\phi_{ij}^{-\sigma} Y_j)$ represents country i 's market potential, which

includes country i 's domestic market size Y_i and the size of export markets M_i^e in which the firm does not have downstream production, and $\mu_i \equiv (c_i + m_k \phi_{ki})^{1-\sigma}$.⁵ Let $\rho_{ki} \equiv m_k/c_i$ denote the extent of vertical linkage between intermediate input and final good; the above expression can be re-written as:

$$c_i^{1-\sigma} (1 + \rho_{ki} \phi_{ki})^{1-\sigma} M_i > \mu_i (\phi_{ii}^{-\sigma} Y_i + M_i^e) + \sigma F. \quad (7)$$

As monotonic transformations and terms such as μ_i and M_i^e do not affect the ordering of host countries (i), we simplify condition (7) (and take natural logs on both sides) to obtain a simple and intuitive empirical specification:

$$\Pr [\Delta d_i = 1 | g_0] = \Phi[\beta_{d1} \ln c_i + \beta_{d2} \ln Y_i + \underbrace{\lambda_d^u \ln(1 + \rho_{ki} \phi_{ki})}_{vertical} + \underbrace{\lambda_d^m \ln M_i}_{market\ potential} + \underbrace{\lambda_d^d \ln \phi_{ii}}_{horizontal} + \varepsilon]. \quad (8)$$

In this specification, $\Pr [\Delta d_i = 1 | g_0]$ represents each firm's probability to build a new downstream production location in country i given its existing production network g_0 and $\Phi[\cdot]$ is the cumulative probability function. The terms $\ln(1 + \rho_{ki} \phi_{ki})$ and $\ln \phi_{ii}$ represent the trade costs to import from the firm's existing upstream and downstream production locations respectively, capturing the *vertical and horizontal interdependence* in the network. The variable $\ln M_i$ represents country i 's *market potential* given firm's downstream production network. The residual ε captures all the remaining factors including μ_i and M_i^e , which comprise attributes of the firm's existing production location and are invariant with country i 's attributes. We control for these factors with firm dummies in the empirical analysis.

We expect, based on the model, that the effect of host-country variables satisfies $\beta_{d1} < 0$ and $\beta_{d2} > 0$. The effect of existing production network varies with the nature of the subsidiaries. We expect the effect of vertically linked subsidiaries to satisfy $\lambda_d^u < 0$, i.e., firms have a greater incentive to build downstream subsidiaries where the cost of importing intermediate inputs is low, especially when the vertical linkage between upstream and downstream production, i.e., ρ_{ki} , is large. The expected effect of existing downstream network is $\lambda_d^d > 0$, i.e., firms are more likely to expand horizontally when the trade cost of importing final goods is relatively high. The host-country market potential is predicted to have a positive effect, implying $\lambda_d^m > 0$.

⁵The above condition assumes that firm will choose the new downstream subsidiary as the export platform to serve countries in which it does not have downstream production. In reality firm can choose between all existing subsidiaries when deciding how to serve each market. However, since the supply strategy information is rarely observable at firm-market level, we take into account all potential export markets when measuring each country's market potential.

3.3 Upstream location decision

Now consider firm's upstream location decision. Given network g_0 (where $d_{\tilde{i}} = 1, u_{\tilde{k}} = 1$), firm will build a new upstream production subsidiary in country k and move to network $g_2 = \{d_{\tilde{i}} = 1, u_k = 1\}$ if and only if

$$\Pi(g_2) > \Pi(g_0). \quad (9)$$

Given equation (3), this is equivalent to

$$[(c_{\tilde{i}} + m_k \phi_{k\tilde{i}})^{1-\sigma} - (c_{\tilde{i}} + m_{\tilde{k}} \phi_{\tilde{k}\tilde{i}})^{1-\sigma}] M_{\tilde{i}} > 0. \quad (10)$$

It can be further transformed to

$$m_k^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{1}{\rho_{k\tilde{i}}} + \phi_{k\tilde{i}} \right)^{1-\sigma} > \mu_{\tilde{i}}, \quad (11)$$

where $\rho_{k\tilde{i}} \equiv m_k/c_{\tilde{i}}$ and $\mu_{\tilde{i}} \equiv (c_{\tilde{i}} + m_{\tilde{k}} \phi_{\tilde{k}\tilde{i}})^{1-\sigma}$.

Based on the above condition, we obtain the following simplified specification to examine firms' decision to build upstream subsidiaries:

$$\Pr[\Delta u_k = 1|g_0] = \Phi[\beta_u \ln m_k + \underbrace{\lambda_u^d \ln \phi_{k\tilde{i}}}_{vertical} + \varepsilon]. \quad (12)$$

In this expression, $\Pr[\Delta u_k = 1|g_0]$ denotes firm's probability to build a new upstream production location in country k given its existing production network g_0 . We expect that $\beta_u < 0$ and $\lambda_u^d < 0$ (i.e., firms have greater incentives to produce the intermediate input in countries with relatively better access to the firms' existing downstream production locations, i.e., low $\phi_{k\tilde{i}}$).

4 Econometric framework

We now describe the econometric framework adopted in the empirical analysis. Following equations (8) and (12), we consider the following specifications:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{downstream} : \Pr[\Delta d_t = 1] &= X_{t-1} \beta_d \\ &+ \lambda_d^d \cdot W_{d,t-1}^d \cdot d_{t-1} + \lambda_d^u \cdot W_{d,t-1}^u \cdot u_{t-1} + \lambda_d^m \cdot \ln M_{t-1} + \epsilon_{d,t} \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

$$\text{upstream} : \Pr[\Delta u_t = 1] = X_{t-1} \beta_u + \lambda_u^d \cdot W_{u,t-1}^d \cdot d_{t-1} + \epsilon_{u,t}. \quad (14)$$

In the above equations, Δd_t and Δu_t are two vectors of observations of the two binary dependent variables which represent, respectively, each firm's decision to build downstream and upstream subsidiary in a given country, X_{t-1} is a matrix of observations of lagged exogenous variables, and β_d and β_u are vectors of parameters. The model includes a number of network variables

including (i) $W_{d,t-1}^d \cdot d_{t-1}$ (horizontal interdependence) where $d_{t-1} \equiv \{d_{it-1}(a)\}$ represents each firm's downstream production locations in the lagged period, (ii) $W_{d,t-1}^u \cdot u_{t-1}$ and $W_{u,t-1}^d \cdot d_{t-1}$ (vertical interdependence), where $u_{t-1} \equiv \{u_{it-1}(a)\}$ represents each firm's upstream production locations in the lagged period, and (iii) $M_{t-1} \equiv W_{d,t-1}^m \cdot (1 - d_{t-1})$ (market potential). Our goal is to estimate λ_d^d , λ_d^u , λ_d^m and λ_u^d along with β_d and β_u .⁶

We now define the four weighting matrices, $W_{d,t-1}^d$, $W_{d,t-1}^u$, $W_{d,t-1}^m$ and $W_{u,t-1}^d$, used in the model. First, consider four $N \times N$ matrices $\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^u(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^m(a)$, and $\omega_{u,t-1}^d(a)$ for each firm in the sample (where a denotes the firm and N the number of countries).

The cells in $\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a)$ are defined based on equation (8) and given by

$$\omega_{d,ijt-1}^d(a) = \ln \phi_{jit-1}(a), \quad (15)$$

where $i, j = 1, \dots, N$ and $\phi_{jit-1}(a) \geq 1$ is the trade cost firm a incurs when importing the final good from country j to country i . If firm a indeed produces the final product in country j , the higher this cost, the more incentive firm a has to invest in country i .

Similarly, the cells in $\omega_{d,t-1}^u(a)$ are given by

$$\omega_{d,ijt-1}^u(a) = \ln [1 + \rho_j(a) \cdot \phi_{jit-1}(a)], \quad (16)$$

where $\rho_j(a)$ is the input-output coefficient between the good produced by firm a in country j and its final good and $\phi_{jit-1}(a)$ is the trade cost for firm a to import the good produced in country j to country i . If firm a indeed produces in country j and the good produced serves as an intermediate input for a 's final good (i.e., $\rho_j(a) > 0$), a greater trade cost to import from j would lower firm a 's incentive to locate downstream production in country i .

Next, following Section 3.2, we define $M_i \equiv \sum_j (1 - d_j) Y_j / \phi_{ij}$ and the cells in $\omega_{d,t-1}^m(a)$ as

$$\omega_{d,ijt-1}^m(a) = Y_{jt-1} / \phi_{ijt-1}(a), \quad (17)$$

where Y_{jt-1} is the market demand in country j and $\phi_{ijt-1}(a)$ is the trade cost firm a would incur when exporting the final good from country i to country j . Each cell in $\omega_{d,t-1}^m(a)$ thus captures country i 's export market potential in country j .

Finally, the cells in $\omega_{u,t-1}^d(a)$ are defined based on equation (12):

$$\omega_{u,ijt-1}^d(a) = \ln \phi_{ijt-1}(a), \quad (18)$$

⁶We do not consider in this paper the potential contemporaneous correlation between entries for two reasons. First, the data includes all the entries observed between 2005 and 2007 but does not record the exact time of entry. To establish the causal effect of production network, we consider only the locations that existed in 2005 when we construct the third-country network variables. Second, the data shows that only a small number of multinational firms make more than one entry between 2005 and 2007. The results were largely similar when we excluded these firms from the sample.

where $\phi_{ijt-1}(a)$ is the trade cost for firm a to export intermediate inputs from country i to country j . If a has a downstream production location in j , this trade cost is negatively correlated with a 's incentive to produce the intermediate input in i .

Given $\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^u(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^m(a)$ and $\omega_{u,t-1}^d(a)$, we can construct the aggregate weighting matrices, $W_{d,t-1}^d$, $W_{d,t-1}^u$, $W_{d,t-1}^m$ and $W_{u,t-1}^d$. These aggregate matrices consist of $\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^u(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^m(a)$ and $\omega_{u,t-1}^d(a)$ respectively along the diagonal and 0 everywhere else. For example, $W_{d,t-1}^d$ is an $NK \times NK$ matrix given by

$$W_{d,t-1}^d = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a_1)}{n_{d,t-1}(a_1)} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a_2)}{n_{d,t-1}(a_2)} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \ddots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \frac{\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a_K)}{n_{d,t-1}(a_K)} \end{bmatrix} \quad (19)$$

where a_1, a_2, \dots, a_K represent the set of firms in the sample (with $K = 1698$) and N represents the number of host countries and equals to 99. Note we scale $\omega_{d,t-1}^d(a)$, $\omega_{d,t-1}^u(a)$ and $\omega_{u,t-1}^d(a)$ with the firm's (downstream and upstream) production network size, i.e., $n_{d,t-1}(a_1)$, $n_{u,t-1}(a_1)$ and $n_{d,t-1}(a_1)$ respectively. The purpose of doing this is to estimate average interdependence across subsidiaries.

Finally, we include a firm fixed effect throughout the empirical analysis to control for all firm-specific factors such as factor intensities and the aggregate attributes of existing subsidiaries.⁷ The use of firm dummies allows us to focus exclusively on the cross-country interaction within each multinational's production network.

5 Data

The dataset employed in this paper is obtained from BvDEP AMADEUS, a comprehensive database that contains the financial and subsidiary information of public and private European firms. AMADEUS is collected by information providers at each national official public body (e.g., Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle (National Institute for Industrial Property) in the case of France) and has a particularly good coverage for countries including France, which partly motivated the use of French firms for this analysis.

The dataset reports French multinationals' subsidiary activities in 99 host countries in 2005 and 2007.⁸ It is compiled from two editions of AMADEUS that were published in 2006 and

⁷To avoid the incidental parameter problem that would arise with fixed-effect Maximum Likelihood Estimators, we adopt linear-probability model in Section 6. We also considered excluding firm fixed effect and using probit and logit models while controlling for firm characteristics such as capital intensity and productivity. The main results remain largely similar and are available upon request. We did not adopt conditional logit model because it would drop all multinational firms that did not incur any entry from the empirical analysis.

⁸The final sample is smaller in some specifications because of the missing values in explanatory variables.

2008 respectively.⁹ For each multinational firm, the data lists not only the subsidiary locations but also the primary product, sales, assets and employment of each location.¹⁰ There are in total 1,698 French multinational firms in the dataset. These firms invest in on average 2.88 host countries in 2005 and 3.81 countries in 2007. The average increase in the number of invested countries is 0.93.¹¹

As discussed in Section 3, we distinguish two types of subsidiaries. To do so, we follow the methodology introduced in Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming). First, we identify subsidiaries that engage in final-good production. To do so, we compare each subsidiary’s primary product with the parent firm’s primary and secondary products, all of which are reported at NACE 4-digit level.¹² If the subsidiary’s primary product is listed as one of the parent firm’s final products, it is considered as a downstream production location. We also identify subsidiaries that engage in upstream production. This is determined by examining the input-output relationship between the subsidiary’s primary product and the parent firm’s final products. A subsidiary is considered as an upstream production location if the direct requirement of the subsidiary’s primary product in the parent firm’s final-product production exceeds a threshold value.¹³ This direct identification of downstream and upstream subsidiaries has been generally absent in the literature, with the exception of Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming), mainly because of the lack of information on subsidiary-level activities.

According to our definition, we find the average number of countries in which French multinationals have downstream subsidiaries is 2.49 whereas the number of countries with upstream subsidiaries is around 0.72.¹⁴ More than 75 percent of newly established subsidiaries between 2005 and 2007 are downstream production locations, suggesting that firms are more inclined to expand horizontally than vertically.

Following Section 4, we use three subsidiary-level variables to construct the various weighting matrices needed to define existing network characteristics. These variables include (i) the distance between each pair of host countries (as a proxy for transport cost), (ii) the tariff rates between each pair of host countries on parent firms’ final products and intermediate inputs produced overseas, and (iii) the input-output coefficient between the parent firm’s final products and the subsidiary’s primary good. We obtain the distance data from the CEPII distance

⁹ AMADEUS does not directly report time series on subsidiary data. To obtain that information, one needs to acquire different editions of AMADEUS that were published in different years.

¹⁰ The coverage of sales, assets and employment data is not as complete as the location information.

¹¹ It is worth noting that there are very few exits (i.e., subsidiary shut-downs) in the dataset. Nearly all the subsidiaries that existed in 2005 are active in 2007.

¹² AMADEUS reports both primary and secondary products for parent firms. We take into account both in our definition of downstream and upstream subsidiaries.

¹³ The paper has considered different threshold values and found the results relatively similar. The results presented in the following sections are obtained based on the threshold value 0.1. We also weigh each upstream subsidiary with its input-output coefficient.

¹⁴ Less than 20 percent of subsidiaries belong to neither categories and engage in activities such as wholesale distribution services. They are hence not included in the construction of downstream and upstream network variables.

database and tariff data from the WITS. The tariff data are applied tariff rates measured at NACE 4-digit level and reflect preferential tariff rates between host countries. We use the input-output table from the 2002 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark survey. This I-O table is more disaggregated than the alternatives including the I-O table from the INSEE (and other available national sources).

In addition to the firm network variables, we take into account FDI determinants that have traditionally been emphasized in the literature. First, we include several conventional variables used to capture the trade cost between home and host countries. Existing studies point out that multinationals have a greater incentive to invest in countries that require larger trade costs to export the final goods from home. To examine the importance of this motive, we include the distance between a potential host and France and tariff rates set by host countries on France in each multinational firm’s primary final product category.¹⁵ The hypothesis predicts a positive parameter on both variables: the higher the transport cost and host-country tariff for firms to export the products from home, the more likely the firm will produce the product inside the host country. In addition to the above market access variables, we also include host-country domestic market size, measured by real GDP. Multinationals that are attracted by the host-country local market size are expected to have a greater probability of investing in larger countries.

We also control for multinationals’ comparative advantage motive. Specifically, we take into account host countries’ marginal cost of production by including each host country’s real unit labor cost. This data is aggregated from the industry level where each industry is weighed by its output share. The labor cost and output data are available from the World Bank Trade and Production Database. Furthermore, we include the tariff rate France sets on the host-country exports. The expectation is that multinationals seeking to export their products back to France would be adversely affected by this tariff.

Finally, we take into account various measures of investment costs. First, we control for host countries’ tax policy using the maximum corporate tax rate, available from the U.S. Office of Tax Policy Research.¹⁶ Second, we include the costs of starting a business, available from the World Development Indicators, as a proxy for entry cost. Third, we use the distance between France and the host country as a proxy for fixed cost of investment, with the expectation that subsidiaries located in remote markets are likely to require a larger fixed cost such as the cost of monitoring. Note all the explanatory variables are measured with the 2005 data. Table A.1 describes the source and summary statistics of the variables.¹⁷

¹⁵We also used the average tariff rate imposed on the firm’s primary and secondary products. The results were qualitatively similar.

¹⁶Ideally, we would like to use the applied corporate tax rate in each host country. But this data consists of a large number of missing values for the countries in our sample.

¹⁷In the empirical analysis, we also consider using a country fixed effect to control for omitted host-country characteristics such as political stability and existing stock of multinationals.

6 Empirical evidence

We now turn to the econometric analysis and examine the effect of existing production networks on multinationals' entry decision. We proceed by first estimating equations (13) and (14) with only conventional explanatory variables, i.e., excluding the effect of third-country locations and assuming $\lambda_d^d = 0$, $\lambda_d^u = 0$, $\lambda_d^m = 0$, and $\lambda_u^d = 0$.

Excluding network effects

The results are reported in Table 1. We find the effect of included explanatory variables is largely consistent with the existing literature when no third-country factors are taken into account.¹⁸ First, firms exhibit a significant market-access motive that is in alignment with the literature. They are more likely to build final-good production in countries with a larger GDP. They also have a greater incentive to enter countries that set a higher tariff on the imports of their final products from France. The parameter of EU membership is also consistent. Firms are more likely to choose FDI instead of export in countries outside the EU. The effect of distance is negative, a finding that has been shown in previous studies and explained by the role of distance in raising the fixed cost of investment.

The evidence also indicates a significant comparative advantage motive. Countries with a lower unit labor cost attract more multinationals to build downstream production. Investment costs also exert a significant effect on multinationals' entry decision. A larger cost of starting business is associated with a lower probability of attracting multinational firms. The sign of the corporate tax parameter is inconsistent with expectation, however. This can be a result of the tax measure included in the paper. The corporate tax data used here reports each host country's maximum corporate tax rate and does not necessarily capture the rate applied to multinational firms. The latter information is not systematically available and would reduce the sample size substantially.

[Table 1 about here]

In the fourth column of Table 1, we include a host-country fixed effect to control for all unobserved host-country characteristics. We find the effect of host-country tariff set on France remains significant and positive. This suggests controlling for country-level attributes does not change the estimated effect of the conventional market access variable. The parameter of home-country tariff also becomes significant: A higher tariff to export the final product back to France lowers multinationals' incentive to produce the good abroad. This result is consistent with the comparative advantage motive hypothesis: Some French multinationals serve their home country from foreign production location and are adversely affected by home-country tariff.

¹⁸The H_0 column in Table 1 (and the following tables) summarizes the hypotheses on the effect of explanatory variables that are predicted by either the model or the literature.

Next we examine multinationals’ upstream location decision. As shown in the last columns of Table 1, the results are largely similar. Countries with a larger GDP and a higher tariff have a greater probability to attract multinationals. Those that are relatively remote from France and have a higher real unit labor cost or a higher entry cost are less likely to become upstream production locations. A result that is not expected analytically is the positive effect of French tariff. A higher tariff to export the final product back to France motivates French firms to move upstream production overseas. Again, controlling for unobserved host-country attributes with host-country dummies does not change the estimated effect of host- and home-country tariffs on each other.

Including network effects

Now let us take into account the potential effect of foreign production network. Table 2 reports the estimates obtained for the downstream equation in (13). The table indicates strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdependence in multinationals’ foreign production network. First, multinationals are significantly more likely to build downstream production in countries that are relatively distant from the firms’ existing downstream locations. A 100-percent increase in third-country distance raises the probability of entry by 0.6 percentage point or equivalently 60 percent.¹⁹ This result similarly applies to tariff. The incentive to enter a host country rises in the tariff of importing final good from the existing locations. Export-market potential also plays a significant role. Multinationals have a greater probability to produce the final product in countries with a large export potential. This points out the significance of export-platform FDI, in which multinationals use host countries as the platform to supply third countries — in particular, the third countries where multinationals do not have downstream production activities present. These findings remain robust after we include host-country fixed effect and control for all host-country specific attributes.

[Table 2 about here]

The effect of the conventional market access variables is affected, however, by the consideration of downstream production network. As seen in Table 2, the parameter of host-country tariff on France becomes statistically insignificant when the third-country variables are taken into account. This constitutes sharp contrast with Table 1, where the evidence suggests a horizontal interdependence between foreign production and home-country exports: Market access from home has a significant effect on multinationals’ location choice. This change in the results suggests that it is not adequate to focus exclusively on the home-host interdependence. As multinationals’ production network expands over time, there is increasing interdependence across foreign production locations. The choice of where to invest is no longer conditional

¹⁹The average fitted probability of downstream entry is 0.01.

on the tradeoff between FDI and exporting from home alone; it has become a more complex decision involving third countries. Ignoring the third-country network effect is likely to give rise to biased estimates on the relationship between the performance of the home economy and FDI activities and, more generally, biased understanding of the true causes and effects of FDI.

In column (2) of Table 2, we take into account the effect of existing upstream production network. The results there show that the role of trade cost is reversed when there is a vertical linkage between foreign production locations. Multinationals are motivated to cluster vertically linked subsidiaries in proximate countries. For example, countries that are 100-percent farther to the multinationals' existing upstream locations have a 0.1-percentage-point (equivalently 10 percent) lower probability to attract multinationals. This result suggests that upstream FDI in neighboring countries can trigger an increase in downstream FDI.

The effect of upstream production network also increases in the extent of vertical linkage, as shown in Table 3. Here, we interact the trade cost of importing intermediate inputs with the input-output coefficient with respect to the multinationals' final product. The parameters indicate that the incentive to cluster production stages is especially large when there is a strong vertical linkage. These results, again, are not sensitive to the use of host-country dummies.

[Table 3 about here]

Now we proceed to examine multinationals' upstream entry decision. As shown in Table 4, we find, again, significant evidence of vertical interdependence. Multinationals tend to build upstream production locations in countries that are relatively proximate to the existing downstream locations. This is especially true when the downstream country has a relatively large market potential. These results reflect firms' incentive to reduce intra-firm trade costs and build a geographically concentrated network of vertically linked subsidiaries.

[Table 4 about here]

7 Sensitivity analysis

7.1 Alternative weighting matrices

So far we have used distance and tariff to capture the extent of trade cost. While these two variables possibly represent the most prominent forms of trade barriers, they do not capture all the trade costs faced by multinationals. We hence consider in this section an alternative measure in the construction of weighting matrices. Specifically, we use disaggregate trade flows as a proxy for host countries' openness toward one another.

For example, when estimating firm a 's downstream entry decision in country i given its existing downstream production location in \tilde{i} , we use the import value of country i from country \tilde{i} in firm a 's primary final product (in NACE 4-digit level) as the proxy for country i 's openness

to country \tilde{i} . Countries that are relatively open to the multinational’s existing downstream locations are less likely to be selected as new hosts. We also obtain country i ’s import from country \tilde{k} where firm a has an upstream subsidiary (in the category of the subsidiary’s primary good). The hypothesis here is that multinationals are more likely to produce the final product in countries that are relatively more accessible from the firms’ existing upstream locations. Finally, we use country i ’s exports to all the third countries where firm a does not have downstream production (in a ’s primary final product) to construct i ’s export market potential. To avoid endogeneity, we use trade data in 2005 which is available from COMTRADE.²⁰

Table 5 reports the results obtained with trade-weighted network variables. The evidence indicates significant and consistent horizontal and vertical interdependence across multinationals’ foreign subsidiaries. Multinationals have a particularly strong incentive to expand their downstream production in countries that import relatively less from their existing third-country downstream locations. They are also motivated to choose countries where there are large trade inflows from the firms’ existing upstream subsidiaries.

[Table 5 about here]

When examining multinationals’ upstream entry decision, we take into account each host country’s market access to the firms’ existing downstream locations. Specifically, for each multinational firm a and host country i , we obtain i ’s average export value to all the third countries where firm a engages in final-stage production. Ideally, we would like to use the export of the subsidiary’s primary good, but this information is only observable for countries that have been selected as production locations. The counterfactual information is not available for those that were not chosen. As a result, we use each host country’s average export in manufacturing industries to construct the country’s market access. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 5. There is a clear and significant motive to locate vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with close trade relationships.

7.2 Endogeneity of network variables

In this sub-section, we address the potential endogeneity that can arise with the network variables. So far we have used lagged location variables, i.e., d_{t-1} and u_{t-1} , to construct measures of existing production networks. While the time lag between these variables and the dependent variables, i.e., Δd_t and Δu_t , and the control of firm fixed effect helps establish the causal effect, the former can still be endogenous because of the serial autocorrelation in the residuals, ϵ_t . To address this issue, we adopt a two-stage instrumental variable approach. In this approach, we use $W \cdot X_{t-1}$, where W represents $W_{d,t-1}^d$, $W_{d,t-1}^u$, $W_{d,t-1}^m$ or $W_{u,t-1}^d$ and X_{t-1} is a matrix of lagged host-country attributes, as potential instruments for the network variables.

²⁰We also considered pre-2005 trade data and found largely similar results.

Formally, we estimate:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{downstream} \quad : \quad \Pr[\Delta d_t = 1] &= X_{t-1}\beta_d \\ &+ \lambda_d^d \cdot \widehat{W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}} + \lambda_d^u \cdot \widehat{W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}} + \lambda_d^m \cdot \widehat{\ln M_{t-1}} + \epsilon_{d,t} \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

$$\text{upstream} \quad : \quad \Pr[\Delta u_t = 1] = X_{t-1}\beta_u + \lambda_u^d \cdot \widehat{W_{u,t-1}^d d_{t-1}} + \epsilon_{u,t}, \quad (21)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}} &= E \left[W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1} | W_{d,t-1}^d X_{t-1} \right] \\ \widehat{W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}} &= E \left[W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1} | W_{d,t-1}^u X_{t-1} \right] \\ \widehat{\ln M_{t-1}} &= E \left[\ln M_{t-1} | \ln W_{d,t-1}^m X_{t-1} \right] \\ \widehat{W_{u,t-1}^d d_{t-1}} &= E \left[W_{u,t-1}^d u_{t-1} | W_{u,t-1}^d X_{t-1} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

The results are reported in Table 6. We find that most parameters remain qualitatively similar after we correct for the potential endogeneity of network variables with the exception of export market potential. We continue to observe significant horizontal and vertical interdependence across multinationals' foreign production locations.

[Table 6 about here]

8 Conclusion

This study is one of the first attempts to estimate the interdependence in multinationals' global production network. Using a detailed French multinational subsidiary dataset, the paper finds, for the first time, strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interaction between MNCs' foreign production locations. These results complement existing contributions where evidence of interdependence, obtained with aggregate FDI data, has been ambiguous. Here we show that third-country subsidiaries exert a significant effect on French multinationals' entry decision, in both downstream and upstream productions. But the effect varies considerably with the linkage of subsidiaries. Multinationals are more likely to expand horizontally when the trade cost of importing final products from existing downstream subsidiaries is relatively high. But they tend to locate vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with low intra-firm trade costs, especially when there is a strong input-output relationship. These results are robust to the choice of weighting matrices used in the econometric model and the control of potential endogeneity in the network variables.

Strikingly there is little evidence of horizontal interdependence between multinationals' production at home and new investment abroad once we take into account the third-country network effects. This constitutes sharp contrast to the literature where primary emphasis has been

placed on the horizontal linkage between home- and host-country production. This departure can be explained by the assumption made in most previous studies that views a firm's decision to invest in a foreign country as independent of its locations in third nations, even though the majority of multinationals today operate a multilateral production network.

This paper conveys important policy implications for both FDI home and host countries: It is crucial to analyze the causes and effects of FDI in the context of global production network. As shown in the paper, assuming away the interdependence between foreign production locations is likely to over-estimate the substituting relationship between home-country production and foreign investment. It would also fail to account for the spillovers between FDI flows, including, for example, the effect of FDI inflows to third countries on a host country's ability to attract multinational firms.

While our paper takes the step to examine the interdependence in multinational production network, more research is needed in this area. For example, future work can be undertaken to investigate the heterogeneity of multinationals' production networks and the role of firm characteristics such as productivity and knowledge capital intensity in explaining the network attributes. This type of analysis will provide us additional insights on the global organization of firms.

References

- [1] Alfaro, Laura and Andrew Charlton. (forthcoming) "Intra-Industry Foreign Direct Investment". *American Economic Review*.
- [2] Baltagi, Badi H., Peter Egger, and Michael Pfaffermayr. (2007) "Estimating Models of Complex FDI: Are There Third-Country Effects?". *Journal of Econometrics* 140 (1), 260-281.
- [3] Bergstrand, Jeffrey H. and Peter Egger. (2008) "Finding Vertical Multinational Enterprises". mimeo.
- [4] Blonigen, Bruce (2005). "A review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants", *Atlantic Economic Journal* vol. 33, pp. 383-403.
- [5] Blonigen, Bruce, Ronald Davies, Glen Waddell, and Helen Naughton (2007) "FDI in Space: Spatial Autoregressive Lags in Foreign Direct Investment". *European Economic Review* 51(5): 1303-1325.
- [6] Brainard, S. Lael (1997). "An Empirical Assessment of Proximity-Concentration Trade-off between Multinational Sales and Trade". *American Economic Review* 87: 520-544.
- [7] Carr, D., J. Markusen, and K.E. Maskus (2001). "Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise". *American Economic Review* 91: 691-708.
- [8] Chen, Maggie X. (2009). "Regional economic integration and geographic concentration of multinational firms". *European Economic Review* 53(3): 355-375.
- [9] Ekholm, Karolina, Rikard Forslid, and James Markusen (2007). "Export-Platform Foreign Direct Investment". *Journal of European Economic Association* 5(4): 776-95.
- [10] Hanson, G., R. Mataloni, and M. Slaughter (2005). "Vertical Production Networks in Multinational Firms". *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(4): 664-78.
- [11] Head, Keith, and Thierry Mayer (2004). "Market Potential and the Location of Japanese Investment in the European Union". *Review of Economics and Statistics* 86 (4): 957-72.
- [12] Helpman, E. (1984) "A Simple Theory of Trade with Multinational Corporations", *Journal of Political Economy* 92: 451-71.
- [13] Helpman, E., M. Melitz, and S. Yeaple (2004). "Export versus FDI", *American Economic Review*, vol. 94, pp. 300-16.
- [14] Krugman, Paul and Anthony Venables (1996). "Integration, Specialization, and Adjustment". *European Economic Review* 40: 959-67.

- [15] Markusen, James (1984). "Multinationals, Multi-Plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade". *Journal of International Economics* 16: 205-26.
- [16] Markusen, James, and Anthony Venables (2000). "The Theory of Endowment, Intra-industry and Multi-national Trade". *Journal of International Economics* 52: 209-234.
- [17] Motta, Massimo, and George Norman (1996). "Does Economic Integration Cause Foreign Direct Investment?". *International Economic Review* 37: 757-783.
- [18] Puga, Diego and Anthony Venables (1997). "Preferential Trading Agreements and Industrial Location". *Journal of International Economics* 43: 347-68.
- [19] Venables, Anthony (1996). "Equilibrium Locations of Vertically Linked Industries". *International Economic Review* 37(2): 341-59.
- [20] Yeaple, Stephen (2003a). "The Complex Integration Strategies of Multinational Firms and Cross-Country Dependencies in the Structure of Foreign Direct Investment". *Journal of International Economics* 60(2): 293-314.
- [21] Yeaple, Stephen (2003b). "The Role of Skill Endowments in the Structure of U.S. Outward Foreign Direct Investment". *Review of Economics and Statistics* 85 (3): 726-734.

Table 1: Estimating entry decision without network factors

Dependent variable:	H_0	downstream (Δd_t)		upstream (Δu_t)	
		(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
host-country GDP	+	0.008*** (0.000)		0.002*** (0.000)	
host-country product tariff	+	0.005*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
EU membership	+/-	-0.03*** (0.001)		-0.01*** (0.001)	
distance to home	+/-	-0.03*** (0.001)		-0.01*** (0.001)	
real unit labor cost	-	-0.03*** (0.002)		-0.02*** (0.001)	
home-country product tariff	-	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
corporate tax	-	0.009*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.001)	
entry cost	-	-0.006*** (0.000)		-0.003*** (0.000)	
firm fixed effect		yes	yes	yes	yes
country fixed effect		no	yes	no	yes
No. of observations		102,162	158,952	102,162	158,952
R square		0.07	0.27	0.04	0.18
Prob>F		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at firm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 2: Estimating downstream entry decision with network factors

Dependent variable: entry	H_0	downstream (Δd_t)		
		(1)	(2)	(3)
horizontal interdependence				
$W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (dist. weighted)	+	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
$W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (tariff weighted)	+	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
vertical interdependence				
$W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}$ (dist. weighted)	-		-0.14* (0.08)	-0.19* (0.07)
$W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}$ (tariff weighted)	-		-0.06 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)
market potential				
$W_{d,t-1}^d (1 - d_{t-1})$ (dist.)	+	0.57*** (0.01)	0.57*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)
$W_{d,t-1}^d (1 - d_{t-1})$ (tariff)	+	0.02*** (0.005)	0.02*** (0.005)	0.01** (0.004)
host-country GDP	+	0.02*** (0.005)	0.02*** (0.005)	
host-country product tariff	+	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
EU membership	+/-	-0.02*** (0.001)	-0.02*** (0.001)	
distance to home	+/-	-0.06*** (0.001)	-0.06*** (0.001)	
real unit labor cost	-	-0.04*** (0.002)	-0.04*** (0.002)	
home-country product tariff	-	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
corporate tax	-	0.02*** (0.001)	0.02*** (0.001)	
entry cost	-	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)	
firm fixed effect		yes	yes	yes
country fixed effect		no	no	yes
No. of observations		102,162	102,162	158,952
R square		0.09	0.09	0.27
Prob>F		0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at firm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 3: Estimating downstream entry decision with network factors: the extent of vertical linkage

Dependent variable: entry	H_0	downstream (Δd_t)	
		(1)	(2)
horizontal interdependence			
$W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (dist. weighted)	+	0.01*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.000)
$W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (tariff weighted)	+	0.001*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
vertical interdependence			
$W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}$ (dist. and IO-coef. weighted)	-	-3.06*** (1.38)	-3.15*** (1.01)
$W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}$ (tariff and IO-coef. weighted)	-	-1.55*** (0.61)	0.05 (0.42)
market potential			
$W_{d,t-1}^d (1 - d_{t-1})$ (dist.)	+	0.58*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)
$W_{d,t-1}^d (1 - d_{t-1})$ (tariff)	+	0.02*** (0.000)	0.008* (0.004)
host-country GDP	+	0.02*** (0.005)	
host-country product tariff	+	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.000)
EU membership	+/-	-0.02*** (0.001)	
distance to home	+/-	-0.06*** (0.001)	
real unit labor cost	-	-0.04*** (0.002)	
home-country product tariff	-	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
corporate tax	-	0.02*** (0.001)	
entry cost	-	-0.008*** (0.000)	
firm fixed effect		yes	yes
country fixed effect		no	yes
No. of observations		102,162	158,952
R square		0.09	0.27
Prob>F		0.00	0.00

Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at firm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 4: Estimating upstream entry decision with network factors

Dependent variable: entry	H_0	upstream (Δu_t)	
		(1)	(2)
vertical interdependence			
$W_{u,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (dist. weighted)	+	6.60*** (1.29)	2.31*** (0.80)
$W_{u,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (dist. and size weighted)	-	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.10*** (0.03)
host-country GDP	+	0.003*** (0.001)	
host-country product tariff	+	0.03*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
EU membership	+/-	-0.01*** (0.001)	
distance to home	+/-	-0.01*** (0.001)	
real unit labor cost	-	-0.02** (0.001)	
home-country product tariff	-	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
corporate tax	-	0.005*** (0.001)	
entry cost	-		
firm fixed effect		yes	yes
country fixed effect		no	yes
No. of observations		102,162	158,952
R square		0.04	0.18
Prob>F		0.00	0.00

Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at firm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 5: Estimating downstream and upstream entry decision with network factors: trade flow weighted

Dependent variable: entry	H_0	downstream (Δd_t)		upstream (Δu_t)	
		(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
horizontal interdependence					
$W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (imports weighted)	-	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)		
vertical interdependence					
$W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}$ (imports weighted)	+	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)		
market potential					
$W_{d,t-1}^d (1 - d_{t-1})$ (exports weighted)	+	0.006*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		
horizontal interdependence					
$W_{u,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (exports weighted)	+			0.11*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.01)
host-country GDP	+	0.01*** (0.005)		0.002*** (0.001)	
host-country product tariff	+	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
EU membership	+/-	-0.03*** (0.001)		-0.01*** (0.001)	
distance to home	+/-	-0.03*** (0.001)		-0.01*** (0.001)	
real unit labor cost	-	-0.03*** (0.002)		-0.02*** (0.001)	
home-country product tariff	-	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
corporate tax	-	0.007*** (0.001)		0.005*** (0.001)	
entry cost	-	-0.007*** (0.000)		-0.003*** (0.000)	
firm fixed effect		yes	yes	yes	yes
country fixed effect		no	yes	no	yes
No. of observations		102,162	158,952	102,162	158,952
R square		0.07	0.27	0.04	0.19
Prob>F		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at firm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 6: Estimating downstream and upstream entry decision with network factors: two-stage IV (second stage)

Dependent variable: entry	H_0	downstream (Δd_t)	upstream (Δu_t)
horizontal interdependence			
$W_{d,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (imports weighted)	-	-0.06*** (0.02)	
vertical interdependence			
$W_{d,t-1}^u u_{t-1}$ (imports weighted)	+	0.003*** (0.000)	
market potential			
$W_{d,t-1}^d (1 - d_{t-1})$ (exports weighted)	+	0.000 (0.000)	
vertical interdependence			
$W_{u,t-1}^d d_{t-1}$ (exports weighted)	+		0.10* (0.06)
host-country product tariff	+	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
home-country product tariff	-	-0.001* (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
firm fixed effect		yes	yes
country fixed effect		yes	yes
No. of observations		158,952	158,952
R square		0.27	0.19
Prob>F		0.00	0.00

Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at firm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variables	Source	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
downstream entry	AMADEUS	0.007	0.08	0	1
upstream entry	AMADEUS	0.002	0.04	0	1
GDP	WDI	26.24	1.35	23.85	30.00
real unit labor cost	World Bank	-2.17	2.17	-15.08	0.18
corporate tax	Office of Tax Policy Research	-1.25	0.29	-2.40	-0.91
distance to home	City Distance Calculator	7.81	1.19	5.57	9.73
between-host distance	City Distance Calculator	8.42	1.01	0	9.87
EU membership	—	0.45	0.49	0	1
host-country product tariff	WITS	0.04	0.06	0	0.85
home-country product tariff	WITS	0.01	0.02	0	0.42
I-O coefficient	BEA	0.06	0.06	0	0.33

Note: All variables except downstream/upstream entry, EU membership and I-O coefficient are measured in natural logs.




Figure 1: Renault's global production network (the darker and lighter areas represent upstream and downstream production locations, respectively)




Figure 2: Essilor's global production network (the darker and lighter areas represent upstream and downstream production locations, respectively)




Figure 3: The distribution of French MNCs by the number of invested countries




Figure 4: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by the distance between subsidiaries (kernel density estimates are represented by the curve)




Figure 5: The kernel density of between-subsidiary distance: downstream subsidiaries v.s. vertically linked subsidiaries




Figure 6: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by the tariff rate between subsidiaries (kernel density estimates are represented by the curve)




Figure 7: The kernel density of between-subsidiary tariff: downstream subsidiaries v.s. vertically linked subsidiaries