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An Empirical Model for Strategic Network Formation

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ABSTRACT

We develop and analyze a tractable empirical model for strategic network formation that can be estimated with data from a single network at a single point in time. We model the network formation as a sequential process where in each period a single randomly selected pair of agents has the opportunity to form a link. Conditional on such an opportunity, a link will be formed if both agents view the link as beneficial to them. They base their decision on their own characteristics, the characteristics of the potential partner, and on features of the current state of the network, such as whether the two potential partners already have friends in common. A key assumption is that agents do not take into account possible future changes to the network. This assumption avoids complications with the presence of multiple equilibria, and also greatly simplifies the computational burden of analyzing these models. We use Bayesian markov-chain-monte-carlo methods to obtain draws from the posterior distribution of interest. We apply our methods to a social network of 669 high school students, with, on average, 4.6 friends. We then use the model to evaluate the effect of an alternative assignment to classes on the topology of the network.

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1 Introduction

In this paper we develop and analyze an empirical model for strategic network formation. The example we have in mind is the formation of a network of friendship links between individuals in a community. Following Jackson (2008) we refer to these models as Strategic Network Formation Models. Such models are also referred to as Network Evolution Models (Toivonen *et al.*, 2009), or Actor Based Models (Snijders, 2009; Snijders, Koskinen, and Schweinberger, 2010). Starting with an empty network, with a finite set of individuals, each with a fixed set of characteristics,¹ we model the network as the result of a sequential process, driven by a combination of what Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009b) call chance (through randomly arising opportunities for the formation of links) and choice (in the form of optimal decisions by the individuals whether to establish the potential links), culminating in a complete network. See also Moody (2001), Snijders, Koskinen, and Schweinberger (2010), and Zeng and Xie (2008) for related models.

The goal of the current paper is to develop an empirical model that, using observations from a single network, at a single point in time, in combination with information on the characteristics of the participants, can be used for predicting features of the network that would arise in a population of agents with different characteristics or different constraints. To make this specific, in the application we consider the effects that alternative assignments of students to classes (e.g., based on ability tracking, or single sex classrooms) might have on the topology of the network of friendships in a high school.

The motivation for focusing on determinants of network formation comes from the large literature that has found that links in networks are associated with correlations in outcomes. For example, Christakis and Fowler (2007) find that changes in weight of individuals is a predictor of weight changes in their friends. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) find that social networks are correlated with employment prospects. Uzzi (1996) and Uzzi and Sprio (2005) find that certain network configurations are correlated with improved group performance. In experimental settings Leider, Möbius, Rosenblat, and Do (forthcoming), and Fowler and Christakis (2010), find the networks matter for altruism. See Christakis and Fowler (2009) and Jackson (2009) for surveys of this literature. In the related literature on peer effects, researchers have found that outcomes and measures of behavior of an individual's classmates predicts outcomes for that individual (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Carrell, Fullerton, and West, 2009). In the peer effect literature the peer group is often defined broadly in terms of easily measurable characteristics, e.g., being in the same class. It is plausible that these correlations are stronger for individuals who identify themselves as connected through friendship or other social networks.

If policy makers have preferences over these outcomes, and if the correlations between networks or peer groups and outcomes found in the aforementioned studies are causal, policy makers may be interested in policies that affect the formation of networks. The current study is potentially useful in understanding how the various manipulations policymakers may be able to carry out affect the networks, and thus indirectly affect the outcomes of interest. It will also shed light on the plausibility of the causal interpretation of the claims by adding to the

¹The model could be extended to allow for time-varying characteristics.

understanding of the determinants of network formation. The models for network formation developed in the game-theoretic literature (e.g., Myerson (1977), Auman and Myerson (1988), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) often imply that networks are at least partly the result of random shocks (through randomly arising opportunities for forming links) that imply that established links are partially exogenous, even if individuals optimally decide to form links when such opportunities arise.

We focus on models for network formation based on individual choices motivated by utility maximization. This follows in the econometric tradition on discrete choice established by McFadden (1981, 1984), and the theoretical work on strategic network formation by Jackson (2003, 2008). One approach would be to consider the utilities each individual associates with all possible networks, and formulate rules for the game that determines the realized network given the preferences of all individuals simultaneously. This set up often leads to multiple equilibria. Such models also tend to be computationally extremely demanding, for both the agents, and for the econometrician, even in moderately sized networks, given that the number of links is quadratic in the number of nodes, and the number of possible networks is exponential in the number of possible links. In the context of our application with 669 individuals, these considerations severely constrain the ability to analyze such models.

Here, we side-step these complications by modeling the network formation as a sequential process, where at each step a single pair of individuals is offered the chance to establish a link. Alternative sequential network formation models have been considered in Myerson (1977), Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009b), and Snijders, Koskinen, and Schweinberger (2010). In our model both members of the pair that is given the opportunity to form a link, weigh the options open to them, taking into account the current state of the network and their own, as well as their potential partner's, characteristics. If both individuals view the link as beneficial (that is, if their utility from establishing the link is higher than the utility of not establishing the link), the link materializes. After a number of opportunities for links have arisen, the network is complete. A key restriction we impose is that at each step (that is, at each opportunity to form a link), the potential partners take into account the current state of the network, but do not anticipate future changes in the network: they compare the net utility from forming (or breaking) a link as if the current state of the network will remain unchanged in the future. Such myopic behavior eases the computational burden for both the agents and the econometrician substantially, as well as removes the complications arising from multiple equilibria. Jackson (2008) discusses some arguments in support of such behavior, and the relation to pairwise stability. Despite this assumption, the computational burden for this model remains large. With N nodes the number of different sequences of meetings (opportunities to form links) is equal to $(N \times (N - 1)/2)!$. Nevertheless, we illustrate in the application that for these data with $N = 669$ that this model is still tractable.

We specify the function that describes the utility an individual derives from a link in terms of characteristics of the individual and the potential partner, and the current state of the network, as a function of unknown preference parameters. A key feature is that we explicitly allow the decision of the individuals to form a link to depend on features of the current state of the network. Earlier work, (e.g., in a similar context, Moody, 2001, and in a different context, Fox,

2009ab), allows the utility to depend only on individual characteristics, which greatly improves the computational tractability. Specifically, in our application, we allow the utility of a link to depend on *ex ante* degrees of separation between the potential friends and the number of friends they already have. We shall demonstrate in the context of our application that this dependence on network features substantially improves the ability of the model to generate commonly observed features of networks, such as clustering.

We focus on Bayesian methods for inference and computation. One reason is that no large sample asymptotic theory has been developed for the maximum likelihood estimator in such models (see Kolaczyk (2009) for some discussion). A second argument is that obtaining draws from the posterior distribution is much easier than calculating the maximum likelihood estimates. We illustrate these methods using data from a network of high school friends with 669 individuals and 1,541 mutual friendships (hence an average of 4.5 friendships per person).

2 Set Up

Consider a population of N individuals, the nodes, indexed by $i = 1, \dots, N$. Individual i has observed attributes X_i , where X_i is a K -vector. In our application to a network of friendships among high school students, these attributes include sex, age, current grade, and participation in organized sports. Let \mathbf{X} be the $N \times K$ matrix with i th row equal to X_i' . Pairs of individuals i and j , with $i, j \in \{1, \dots, N\}$, may be linked. The symmetric matrix \mathbf{D} , of dimension $N \times N$, with

$$D_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i \text{ and } j \text{ are friends,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

is called the adjacency matrix. This is the dependent variable in our analysis. The diagonal elements D_{ii} are normalized to zero. We focus in the current paper on undirected links (so \mathbf{D} is symmetric). In some settings it may be more appropriate to allow the links to have a direction, and the methods here can be extended to cover such cases. We will also allow for link-specific covariates. For ease of exposition we only allow for one link-specific covariate, although generalizing this is straightforward in principle. For pair (i, j) , let C_{ij} be the link-specific covariate, with \mathbf{C} the symmetric $N \times N$ matrix with typical element C_{ij} . In our application C_{ij} is the number of classes individuals i and j have in common. One can think of C_{ij} as a function of individual characteristics, that is, a function of the list of all classes taken by each individual, but we analyze it here as a link-specific covariate.

There are $N \cdot (N - 1) / 2$ different pairs (i, j) with $i \neq j$. For each such pair there either is, or is no, friendship link, so there are $2^{N \cdot (N - 1) / 2}$ different values possible for the adjacency matrix \mathbf{D} . We are interested in modeling the probability associated with adjacency matrix \mathbf{D} , given the matrix of individual characteristics \mathbf{X} , and given the matrix of link-specific characteristics \mathbf{C} . Let $p(\mathbf{D} | \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta)$ denote this probability, as a function of an unknown vector of parameters denoted by θ .

Using the observed data, including the adjacency matrix \mathbf{D}_{obs} , the individual characteristics \mathbf{X}_{obs} , and the link characteristics \mathbf{C}_{obs} , and postulating a prior distribution for θ , we can use

the model $p(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta)$ to derive the posterior distribution of θ given $(\mathbf{D}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{X}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{C}_{\text{obs}})$:

$$p(\theta|\mathbf{D}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{X}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{C}_{\text{obs}}) \propto p(\mathbf{D}_{\text{obs}}|\mathbf{X}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{C}_{\text{obs}}; \theta) \cdot p(\theta). \quad (2.1)$$

We then use this model to calculate the probabilities of (features of) particular networks given alternative populations of individuals, associated with alternative values for \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{C} , say \mathbf{X}' and \mathbf{C}' . The predictive distribution of the network for this new configuration of characteristics, conditional on the parameters θ , is $p(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}', \mathbf{C}'; \theta)$. Unconditionally, the predictive distribution that is ultimately the main object of interest in our analysis, is

$$p(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}', \mathbf{C}') = \int_{\theta} p(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}', \mathbf{C}'; \theta)p(\theta|\mathbf{D}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{X}_{\text{obs}}, \mathbf{C}_{\text{obs}})d\theta. \quad (2.2)$$

Specifically, in our example of a network of high school students, one may be interested in features of the network that would emerge if classes were configured in different ways. Leading examples include ability tracking, where students would be allocated to classes based on prior grades, or single sex classes. Given a fixed set of individuals (or a fixed distribution from which future cohorts are drawn), such changes in allocation rules would change the value of some components of the matrices \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{C} , and thus generate different probabilities on future networks. A school administration may care about the network, for example wishing to avoid networks where many students have no friends, networks with many separate cliques, or networks that are associated with undesirable behavior, and generally preferring networks with a high degree of cohesion and a well-connected student body. We do not directly address the question of the optimal configuration of classes, that is optimal assignment of \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{C} given restrictions (see for some related discussion Graham, Imbens and Ridder, 2009), but note that the derivation of a predictive distribution for the network would be an important component of some such analyses.

There are two main challenges confronting these analyses. First, we need to specify a model for the adjacency matrix given characteristics, $p(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta)$. We do not do so directly, instead specifying a technology for sequential network formation that implies a distribution for \mathbf{D} given (\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}) , indexed by a parameter θ . This model need not merely fit the data well. In order for the prediction exercise to be accurate, it also needs to be a structural model in the Goldberger (1991) sense that its parameters θ do not change if we change the distribution of the covariates \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{C} . Second, we need computational methods for drawing from the predictive distribution of \mathbf{D} given the observed data. The main specific challenge in this is obtaining draws from the posterior distribution of θ given the observed data, in the context of a single, fairly large network and a rich model for network formation. In our application there are 669 individuals, with 1,541 friendships among the set of 223,446 potential links.

It is useful to have some additional notation. Let \mathbf{F} to be the $N \times N$ matrix equal to $\mathbf{D}'\mathbf{D}$. The diagonal element F_{ii} of \mathbf{F} is equal to the number of friends individual i has, and F_{ij} , for $i \neq j$, is equal to the number of friends individuals i and j have in common. Define \mathbf{G} to be

the $N \times N$ matrix that gives the degree of separation between individuals, or the geodesic:

$$G_{ij} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = j, \\ 1 & \text{if } D_{ij} = 1, \\ 2 & \text{if } D_{ij} = 0, \text{ and } F_{ij} \geq 1, \\ 3 & \text{if } D_{ij} = 0, F_{ij} = 0, \exists(k \neq m), D_{ik} = 1, D_{km} = 1, D_{mj} = 1, \\ \vdots & \\ \infty & \text{if there is no path between } i \text{ and } j. \end{cases}$$

3 Exponential Random Graph and Strategic Network Formation Models

In this section we discuss two approaches to modelling network formation. Models in the first approach are referred to Exponential Random Graph (ERG) models. These models directly focus on distributions for the adjacency matrix itself. Models in the second approach are referred to as Strategic Network Formation (SNF) models. They start by modelling the probability of two nodes forming a link. See for a discussion of some of these models from a statistics perspective Kolaczyk (2009).

3.1 Exponential Random Graph Models

Exponential Random Graph models, for example those developed by Holland and Leinhardt (1981) and Frank and Strauss (1987), Anderson, Wasserman, and Crouch, (1999) and Snijders (2005), can capture commonly observed structures in the network such as transitivity and clustering. ERG models tend to be parsimonious models effective at generating commonly observed structure in networks, and these models often do well at matching the predicted and actual degree distribution. The basic approach is to specify the probability of a network \mathbf{D} in terms of some functions of \mathbf{D} . The simplest model is the Erdős-Reny model, where the probability of any link is the same:

$$p(\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{d}) = \prod_{i < j} \alpha^{D_{ij}} (1 - \alpha)^{1 - D_{ij}}.$$

An important early extension is the p_1 model by Holland and Leinhardt (1981), who allow the probability of a link to vary by node. Holland and Leinhardt model the probability of a network \mathbf{D} (in the absence of attribute information), simplified to the undirected link case, as

$$p(\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{d}) = \exp \left(\sum_{i=1}^N \alpha_i f_{ii}(\mathbf{d}) - k(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_N) \right).$$

Here $f_{ii}(\mathbf{d})$ is the number of friends individual i has in network \mathbf{d} , $f_{ii}(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_{j=1}^N d_{ij}$. The unknown parameters are $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_N$, and $k(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_N)$ is a constant that ensures that the probability distribution sums up to one, with the summing over all $2^{N \times (N+1)/2 - N}$ possible values of the adjacency matrix \mathbf{D} .

Alternative versions of these models, for example the p^* models in Anderson, Wasserman, and Crouch (1999) use additional functions $h(\mathbf{d})$ in the exponential specification,

$$p(\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{d}) = \exp(\theta' h(\mathbf{d}) - k(\theta)).$$

These functions may include the number of triangles (the number of triples (i, j, k) such that $d_{ij} = d_{jk} = d_{ik} = 1$), and other features of the network topology.

There are two features of these models that make them unattractive for our purposes. The main problem is that, once estimated, it is difficult to simulate networks from these models in new settings with a different number of nodes, or a different distribution of characteristics. There is no clear reason why the parameters of the ERG models remain the same under such changes. As a result, they do not naturally lead to the prediction of network features in new settings, e.g., the prediction of networks given alternative rules for assigning students to classes. A second problem is that these models are difficult to estimate. The function $k(\theta)$ is difficult to evaluate, and as a result the likelihood function cannot easily be evaluated at multiple values for θ . Various approximations have been suggested but the accuracy of these methods is not clear. For a recent survey, see Kolaczyk (2009).

3.2 Strategic Network Formation Models

The second approach to modeling networks consists of what Jackson (2009) refers to as Strategic Network Formation (SNF) models. Such models are also referred to as Network Evolution Models (Toivonen *et al*, 2009), or Actor Based Models (Snijders, 2009). These models share features with the structural matching models studied in the econometric literature by Fox (2009ab), Choo and Siow (2006), and Galichon and Salanie (2009), and the models studied in the sociology and physics literature by Moody (2001), Barabási and Albert (1999), and Fowler, Dawes, and Christakis (2009). The game theoretic background to these models is discussed in Myerson (1977), Roth and Sotomayor (1989), and Jackson (2003). Empirical examples of such models include Fox (2009ab), Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009), and Snijders, Koskinen, and Schweinberger, (2010).

The key feature of these models is the recognition that links are at least partially the result of individual choices. These models assume that links between individuals are established, conditional on an opportunity for such a link arising, if both individual view these links as beneficial. The specific models differ in the amount of structure they place on the objective functions of the individuals. Most of the matching models (e.g., Fox, 2009ab; Choo and Siow, 2006; and Galichon and Salanie 2009) where each individual matches with at most one other individual, and some of the general network models (Moody, 2001) assume that the utility function depends only on the characteristics of the potential partner. Here, in a context where individuals can form links with multiple others, we explicitly allow the utility of a link between i and j to depend on the the existence of common friends of i and j . As in our application, Snijders, Koskinen, and Schweinberger (2010) allow for network effects in the utility function. Their model is very rich in allowing the probability of opportunities to form links to arise as a function of individua's characteristics, but in order to do so they can only deal with a small

number of nodes (their application has 32 individuals), and need multiple observations on the network over time.

4 The Model

There are three components to our model. The first component concerns the arrival of opportunities for the formation of links. Starting with a fixed population of N individuals or nodes, and an empty network, a sequence of opportunities or meetings (the “chances” in the terminology of Currarini, Jackson and Pin, 2009) arises. In each period a single pair of individuals is given the opportunity to form a link. The second component of the model determines whether a link gets formed or discontinued. Whether it does depends on the utility the two potential partners derive from such a link (the “choice” in the terminology of Currarini, Jackson and Pin, 2009b). The rule for forming a link may require that both potential partners derive positive net utility from the link, or there may be transfers so that a combination of the utilities determines whether the link is formed. The third part of the model consists of the preferences, in the form of a utility function relating the attributes of the potential partners and the current state of the network to the utility derived from a potential link. In the next three subsections we discuss these three aspects of the model.

4.1 Opportunities for Establishing Links

In our model there are T periods in the network formation, starting with an empty network. The total number of periods may be tied to the number of individuals in the network, N . In fact, when we implement the model the number of periods is exactly equal to the number of distinct pairs, $T = (N \times (N - 1))/2$. More generally, we may allow each pair of individuals to meet more than once, and there may be many periods, possibly an infinite number of them. When a pair of individuals is presented with an opportunity to evaluate a link, there are two possible states they may find themselves in. If they currently have no link, they must decide to form a link or not. If they currently have a link, they must decide whether or not to continue the link. This process leads to a slowly evolving network.

This decision to form or discontinue a link is assumed to be based on their characteristics, and on features of the current state of the network. Let \mathbf{D}_t denote the value of the adjacency matrix, that is, the state of the network, at the end of period t , with \mathbf{D}_0 the empty network, with $\mathbf{D}_{0,ij} = 0$ for all (i, j) , and $\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{D}_T$ the final network. In period t , two individuals, say individuals i and j have the opportunity to form or discontinue a link. The only possible change in the network in that period is in the values of the (i, j) (and, by symmetry, the (j, i)) th element of \mathbf{D}_{t-1} . Thus, for $(k, l) \neq (i, j)$ and $(k, l) \neq (j, i)$, it follows that $D_{t,kl} = D_{t-1,kl}$, whereas $D_{t,ij}$ may differ from $D_{t-1,ij}$. In the next period a new pair of individuals gets the opportunity to consider a link. After T periods the network is complete.

In the current version of the model we assume $T = N \cdot (N - 1)/2$, with a unique pair of individuals presented with an opportunity to evaluate the benefits of a link, so that each pair of individuals has exactly one opportunity to meet. The order in which the pairs meet is completely random. Because each pair meets only once, links, once established, will never get dissolved.

Conceptually it is straightforward to extend the technology to allow for multiple meetings of pairs of individuals. If a pair of individuals has already formed a link, such subsequent opportunities can lead to the re-evaluation of the link, and through that channel to a severance of the existing link. If a new meeting takes place between individuals whose previous meeting did not result in a link, the change in the network status may lead the individual to reconsider and establish a link. The main restriction in extending the model to allow for multiple meetings between pairs is computational. A second extension involves allowing the probability of a meeting to depend on the current state of the network, or on characteristics of the individuals. Although in the absence of direct information on the sequence of meetings it may be difficult to separate the parameters from the technology of meetings from those of the preferences for links, such extensions may lead to additional flexibility of the models. These extensions may also make the assumption that individuals do not take into account possible future changes to the network more palatable.

4.2 Link Formation

The decision to form a link between a pair, at the point when they meet, is based on their stochastic utility. The utility, for individual i , of forming a link with j , depends on the characteristic of i , the characteristics of j , and the current state of the network, and the time period t in which they meet. Thus, if i and j meet in period t , with the state of the network at the beginning of period t equal to \mathbf{D}_{t-1} , the net utility for i of forming a link can be written, without loss of generality, as

$$U_i(j|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t).$$

Similarly, the net utility for individual j of forming a link is

$$U_j(i|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t).$$

Whether or not a link gets formed, or whether a link gets discontinued if already formed, depends on these two utilities. We consider three different link formation rules.

One possibility, and the one we focus on in the application, is the non-cooperative version. If i and j meet at in period t , they will form a link if both potential partners i and j see the link as increasing their utility:

$$D_{t,ij} = 1 \text{ if } U_i(j|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t) \geq 0, \text{ and } U_j(i|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t) \geq 0. \quad (4.3)$$

This is the link formation rule we will use in the application in Section 6.

A second link formation rule allows for cooperative behavior through the possibility of transfers:

$$D_{t,ij} = 1 \text{ if } \left(U_i(j|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t) + U_j(i|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t) \right) \geq 0. \quad (4.4)$$

Fox (2009ab) considers such matching models for marriage markets.

More generally, one can allow for the possibility of partial transfers of utility, making the link formation an increasing function of both utilities, with some limited degree of substitutability:

$$D_{t,ij} = 1 \text{ if } g\left(U_i(j|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t), U_i(j|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, t)\right) \geq 0. \quad (4.5)$$

Both the non-cooperative version (4.3) and the cooperative version (4.4) are special cases of the general rule (4.5). Although we focus in the current paper on settings with mutual friendships, often data are available on directed friendships where i may consider j a friend, but j need not consider i a friend. In such cases the value of D_{ij} may reflect the net benefits for i of being friends with j , not depending on the utility j attaches to a friendship with i .

4.3 Preferences

The first, and most important restriction we impose on the utility function is that it does not depend on t :

$$U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, t) = U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}). \quad (4.6)$$

This is a crucial restriction. In the early periods of the game the adjacency matrix is still relatively sparse: few friendships have been established at that point. In deciding to evaluate the benefits of potential links, however, we assume that individuals do not anticipate future changes to the network. Given the current network, the probability of a link does not depend on whether the opportunity arose early (and therefore the network is likely to subsequently change) or late (when it the network is close to its final value). This restriction to myopic behavior is more plausible if the technology allows for multiple meetings between each pair of individuals, and it allows for opportunities to sever existing links. See Jackson (2008) for more discussion on this and the link to the concept of pairwise stability of the resulting network. Relaxing this assumption is difficult. It would require individuals to take into account the likelihood of further links, and the impact such links would have on the utility of their own links. Problems concerning the presence of multiple equilibria would arise, as well as severe computational difficulties.

Next, we specify a parametric form for the stochastic utility function $U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{D})$ in terms of some unknown preference parameters θ . This follows in the econometric tradition established by McFadden (1981, 1984). Call this function $U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \varepsilon_{ij}; \theta)$. In this expression ε_{ij} represents a component of the utility that is not observed by the econometrician. Combined with a parametric model for the joint distribution of the unobserved components ε_{ij} for all i and j , this leads to a parametric form for the probability of a link with individual j having positive net utility for individual i :

$$P_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta) = \Pr(U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{C}, \varepsilon_{ij}; \theta) > 0).$$

The methods we suggest for inference work generally for any specification of the probability, although in practice we need to limit the dependence of the utility (and thus indirectly the dependence of the probability of a profitable link) on the state of the network. Here we discuss some of the restrictions we may impose on the utility function.

First, we restrict the dependence of the utility function $U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \varepsilon_{ij}; \theta)$ on the current state of the network to be a function of the number of friends j already has, F_{jj} ; the degree of separation (distance, or geodesic), G_{ij} ; the match-specific covariate C_{ij} ; and a scalar stochastic term indexed by the match (i, j) . Moreover the dependence on the characteristics is only through the characteristics of i and j themselves:

$$U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{C}; \varepsilon_{ij}; \theta) = U\left(X_i, X_j, F_{jj}, G_{ij}, C_{ij}, \varepsilon_{ij}; \theta\right).$$

The particular parametric form we use in the application in Section 6 is

$$\begin{aligned} U(x_1, x_2, f_{22}, g_{12}, \varepsilon; \theta) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1' x_2 & (4.7) \\ &- (x_1 - x_2)' \Omega (x_1 - x_2) \\ &+ \alpha_1 f_{22} + \alpha_2 f_{22}^2 + \alpha_3 \mathbf{1}_{g_{12}=2} + \alpha_4 \mathbf{1}_{g_{12}=3} \\ &+ \delta C_{ij} + \varepsilon, \end{aligned}$$

where full parameter vector is $\theta = (\beta_0, \beta_1, \Omega, \alpha)$. There are four components to the utility function. First, individuals may have direct preferences over the attributes of the potential partners. This is captured by the $\beta_1' x_2$ term. More generally, the preferences of individual i for attributes of potential partners, captured by $\beta - 1$, may vary by characteristics of i , and we could model β_1 as $\beta_{i1} = B' x_i$, leading the first term of the utility function to have the form $x_i' B x_j$. This component of the utility is similar to the way utility functions are specified in the analysis of the demand for differentiated products in the Industrial Organization literature (e.g., Akerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes, 2007), where x_j would capture characteristics of choice j and x_i would correspond to characteristics of the agent that affect the marginal utility of choice characteristics. A component of the utility function that is less familiar from the traditional econometric discrete choice literature is the second term, $(x_1 - x_2)' \Omega (x_1 - x_2)$. This term captures the disutility associated with differences in the characteristics between the two potential partners. The tendency of individuals to form links with individuals who are similar to them, referred to as homophily in the network literature (Jackson, 2009; Christakis and Fowler, 2009), has been found to be pervasive in social networks (e.g., Christakis and Fowler, 2009). In our specification Ω is a diagonal matrix. The third component, including four terms, captures network effects. The utility is allowed to depend quadratically on the number of friends the alter already has, f_{22} , and whether the degree of separation is two or three. The first two terms simply capture that the utility of having j as a friend may depend on how many friends j has already. On the one hand, one may not want to have friends who have too many friends already, but on the other hand there may be benefits associated with having very popular friends. Including a quadratic function in the number of friends in the specification of the utility function allows us to potentially capture both effects. A common finding in the social network literature is that if i and j are friends, and j and k are friends, i and k are more likely to be friends than one would expect if links were formed randomly. The dependence of the utility function on attributes of the potential partners, and in particular the homophily, may already generate such patterns in the network, but α_3 and α_4 allow for more flexibility in

generating patterns commonly observed in networks. Finally, the fourth component allows the utility of the link to depend directly on the link-specific characteristic C_{ij} .

As a second, more restrictive, specification we use

$$U(x_1, x_2, f_{11}, f_{22}, f_{12}, g_{12}, \epsilon; \theta) = \beta_0 + \beta_1' x_2 - (x_1 - x_2)' \Omega(x_1 - x_2) + \delta C_{ij} + \epsilon. \quad (4.8)$$

Here we rule out network effects ($\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha_3 = \alpha_4 = 0$), so that the utility of a link between i and j depends only on characteristics of i and j , and not on the degree of separation between i and j , or on how many friends they already have. This model is more in the spirit of the models used by Moody (2001) and Fox (2009ab), and so we will pay particular attention to the empirical evidence that the additional parameters that explicitly capture the network dependence, contribute substantially to the explanatory power of the model.

In the implementation below, we assume that the ϵ_{ij} are independent across all pairs (i, j) , including independent of ϵ_{ji} , and that the ϵ_{ij} have a logistic distribution. We also assume that the ϵ_{ij} do not vary across meetings between the same pair. Thus, if individuals i and j meet more than once, their decision whether to form or dissolve a link may change over time. The reason for the difference in the decision comes from the changes in the network between meetings. This property implies that if the number of meetings T is infinitely large, so that all pairs meet at least once after the final network has been established, and if the sequence of networks converge, the final network will be pairwise stable (Jackson, 2008).

The assumption of a type I extreme value distribution for ϵ_{ij} implies that the log odds of individual i being in favor of establishing the link is

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \left(\frac{P_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta)}{1 - P_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta)} \right) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1' X_j - (X_i - X_j) \Omega(X_i - X_j) \\ &+ \alpha_1 F_{jj} + \alpha_2 F_{jj}^2 + \alpha_3 \mathbf{1}_{G_{ij}=2} + \alpha_4 \mathbf{1}_{G_{ij}=3} + \delta C_{ij}, \end{aligned}$$

where again

$$P_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta) = \Pr(U_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{C}; \epsilon_{ij}; \theta) > 0).$$

As a result of the independence of the ϵ_{ij} , the probability of the establishment of a link between individuals i and j in period t , given their characteristics and given the current state of the network, and given that the opportunity for establishing a link between i and j arises in period t , is the product of the probabilities that both individuals perceive a net benefit from such a link:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(D_{t,ij} = 1 | X_i, X_j, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}, \mathbf{C}, (m_{1t}, m_{2t}) = (i, j)) \\ = P_i(j, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}; \theta) \cdot P_j(i, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_{t-1}; \theta). \end{aligned}$$

4.4 The Likelihood Function

The model outlined above describes a stochastic mechanism for generating a network, given a population of N individuals, with characteristics X_1, \dots, X_N , and given link characteristics

C_{ij} . Associated with a matrix of characteristics \mathbf{X} and a matrix of match characteristics \mathbf{C} , and conditional on a vector of parameters θ , there is therefore a probability for the adjacency matrix \mathbf{D} ,

$$\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta),$$

leading to a likelihood function associated with the sample $(\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C})$,

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}) = \Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta).$$

How can we analyze and estimate such models? The difficulty is that even in settings with only a moderate number of nodes and links, the likelihood function can be hard to evaluate directly.

To see this, let us rewrite the likelihood function in terms of the ordered meetings. Let \mathbf{M} be the matrix of ordered meetings. The matrix \mathbf{M} is an $(N \cdot (N - 1)/2) \times 2$ dimensional matrix, with t -th row m_t a pair of indices, $m_t = (m_{t1}, m_{t2})$, such that $m_{t1}, m_{t2} \in \{1, \dots, N\}$. The set of possible values for \mathbf{M} , denoted by \mathbb{M} , has $(N \cdot (N - 1)/2)!$ distinct elements.

First we construct the augmented data likelihood function $\Pr(\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta)$. In order to get the observed data likelihood function we then sum over the distribution of opportunities \mathbf{M} :

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}) = \Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) = \sum_{\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{M}} \Pr(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta).$$

A key observation is the fact that, given \mathbf{M} and \mathbf{D} , we can recover the entire sequence of networks, $\mathbf{D}_0, \mathbf{D}_1, \dots, \mathbf{D}_{N \cdot (N+1)/2 - N}$, and thus recover the full set of decisions faced and made by each agent. First let us look at the augmented data likelihood of a sequence of networks and opportunities. Let \mathbf{M}_t be the $t \times 2$ -dimensional matrix containing the first t rows of \mathbf{M} , so that $\mathbf{M}_{N \cdot (N+1)/2 - N} = \mathbf{M}$, and let $\mathbf{M}_0 = \mathbf{0}$. Then the complete data likelihood function is

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) &= \Pr(\mathbf{D}_0, \mathbf{D}_1, \dots, \mathbf{D}_{N \cdot (N-1)/2}, \mathbf{M}_1, \dots, \mathbf{M}_{N \cdot (N-1)/2}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \\ &= \prod_{t=1}^{N \cdot (N-1)/2} \Pr(\mathbf{M}_t|\mathbf{D}_{t-1}, \mathbf{M}_{t-1}, \mathbf{X}; \theta) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{D}_t|\mathbf{D}_{t-1}, \mathbf{M}_t, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \\ &= \Pr(\mathbf{M}) \cdot \prod_{t=1}^{N \cdot (N-1)/2} \Pr(\mathbf{D}_t|\mathbf{D}_{t-1}, \mathbf{M}_t, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \\ &= \Pr(\mathbf{M}) \cdot \prod_{t=1}^{N \cdot (N-1)/2} \left\{ \left(P_{m_{t1}}(m_{t2}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \cdot P_{m_{t2}}(m_{t1}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \right)^{D_{m_{t1}, m_{t2}}} \right. \\ &\quad \left. \times \left(1 - P_{m_{t1}}(m_{t2}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \cdot P_{m_{t2}}(m_{t1}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \right)^{1 - D_{m_{t1}, m_{t2}}} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

The marginal (or conditional) probability of the sequence of meetings is simply

$$\Pr(\mathbf{M}) = \Pr(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}) = \frac{1}{(N \cdot (N - 1)/2)!}.$$

Hence the (observed data) likelihood function is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}) &= \Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) = \sum_{\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{M}} \Pr(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \\
&= \frac{1}{(N \cdot (N-1)/2)!} \cdot \sum_{\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{M}} \left[\prod_{t=1}^{N \cdot (N-1)/2} \left\{ \left(P_{m_{t1}}(m_{t2} \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \cdot P_{m_{t2}}(m_{t1}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \right)^{D_{m_{t1}, m_{t2}}} \right. \right. \\
&\quad \left. \left. \times \left(1 - P_{m_{t1}}(m_{t2}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \cdot P_{m_{t2}}(m_{t1}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}_t; \theta) \right)^{1 - D_{m_{t1}, m_{t2}}} \right\} \right].
\end{aligned} \tag{4.9}$$

The likelihood function is a sum over $(N \cdot (N-1)/2)!$ terms, each of which is a product over $(N \cdot (N-1)/2)$ factors. In our application the number of nodes is $N = 669$, so that directly evaluating the likelihood function is not feasible. We therefore use simulation methods.

Note that these difficulties in evaluating the likelihood function with network effects would not arise if the network effects were not present (all the parameters α_k equal to zero). If the probability of a link between i and j depends only on the characteristics of the individuals i and j , and not on the current state of the network, the order of meetings does not matter, and calculating the log likelihood function for a given value of the parameters is straightforward. In that case

$$P(i(j|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta) = P(X_i, X_j, C_{ij}; \theta),$$

and we can write the likelihood function as

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}) &= \\
&\prod_{i=1}^{N-1} \prod_{j=i+1}^N \left(P(X_i, X_j, C_{ij}; \theta) P(X_j, X_i, C_{ij}; \theta) \right)^{D_{ij}} \left(1 - P(X_i, X_j, C_{ij}; \theta) P(X_j, X_i, C_{ij}; \theta) \right)^{1 - D_{ij}}.
\end{aligned}$$

Although the number of factors in the likelihood function is larger than the sample size $(N \cdot (N-1)/2)$, this likelihood function is straightforward to work with, and standard properties apply.

5 Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo Methods

A key insight is that the likelihood function for the model with network effects would be easier to evaluate if we knew the history of opportunities, and, by implication, the history of the network formation. Snijders, Koskinen and Schweinberger (2010) exploit this in a setting with repeated observations on a network.

We exploit this by imputing the unobserved sequence of meetings in a Bayesian approach. The Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo algorithm consists of two parts. Given the parameters θ and the observed data, and given an initial value for the sequence of meetings \mathbf{M} , we use a Metropolis-Hastings step to update the sequence of meetings. In the second step, given the sequence of meetings, parameters and data we update the vector of parameters, again in a Metropolis-Hastings step. Let (θ_k, \mathbf{M}_k) denote the sequence of values in the chain. We describe these two steps in more detail in the next two subsections.

5.1 Drawing from the Posterior Distribution of the Parameters Given the Augmented Data

Let the prior distribution for θ be $p(\theta)$. (We will use independent Gaussian prior distributions for all elements of θ , centered at zero, and with unit variance, but the algorithms apply more generally.) Then, given the augmented data $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k)$, including the imputed sequence of meetings \mathbf{M}_k , and given a current value for the parameters θ_k , we draw θ from a candidate distribution $q_\theta(\theta|\theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k)$. We then calculate the ratio

$$\rho_\theta(\theta, \theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta) \cdot p(\theta) \cdot q_\theta(\theta_k|\theta, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k)}{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k) \cdot p(\theta_k) \cdot q_\theta(\theta|\theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k)} \right\}.$$

As the candidate distribution $q_\theta(\theta|\theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k)$ we take a gaussian distribution:

$$q_\theta(\theta|\theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k) \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta_k, \Sigma),$$

where Σ is a positive definite matrix. (In the application we run an initial chain with a diagonal matrix Σ and then choose Σ proportional to the covariance matrix of θ based on the results from that initial chain.) As a result of the choice of $q_\theta(\cdot)$ it follows that

$$q_\theta(\theta_k|\theta, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k) = q_\theta(\theta|\theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k),$$

which implies that the candidate distribution $q_\theta(\cdot|\cdot)$ drops out of the expression for the transition probability $\rho_\theta(\cdot)$, leaving us with

$$\rho_\theta(\theta, \theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}; \theta) \cdot p(\theta)}{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}; \theta_k) \cdot p(\theta_k)} \right\}.$$

The mcmc chain jumps to the new value with probability $\rho_\theta(\theta, \theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k)$, so that the new value is

$$\theta_{k+1} = \begin{cases} \theta & \text{with probability } \rho_\theta(\theta, \theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k), \\ \theta_k & \text{with probability } 1 - \rho_\theta(\theta, \theta_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbf{M}_k). \end{cases}$$

5.2 Updating the Sequence of Opportunities

Now consider imputing \mathbf{M}_{k+1} given current θ_k and given the data \mathbf{D} , \mathbf{X} , and \mathbf{C} , and the currently imputed \mathbf{M}_k . The conditional probability for a value \mathbf{M} given the data $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D})$ and the current value of the parameter θ_k is

$$\Pr(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{D}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k) = \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{M}) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k)}{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k)}.$$

We draw a potential new value \mathbf{M} from a distribution $q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta_k)$. Then define the transition probability

$$\rho_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{M}) \cdot q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}_k|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k)}{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{M}_k) \cdot q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k)} \right\}.$$

With the marginal distribution of \mathbf{M} uniform on \mathbb{M} , so that $\Pr(\mathbf{M}) = \Pr(\mathbf{M}_k)$, this transition probability simplifies to

$$\rho_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k) \cdot q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}_k|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k)}{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k) \cdot q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k)} \right\}.$$

For the candidate distribution $q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta_k)$ we random re-order a fraction $p_{\mathbf{M}}$ of the elements of \mathbf{M}_k . (In the application we fix $p_{\mathbf{M}} = 0.01$, so that 2,234 out of the 223,446 meetings are randomly reordered. The fraction $p_{\mathbf{M}} = 0.01$ is set by trial and error so that the jump probabilities are not too high or too low on average, aiming for a jump probability of 0.4.) This choice of $q_{\mathbf{M}}(\cdot)$ implies that the candidate distribution is symmetric in \mathbf{M} and \mathbf{M}_k , implying $q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta_k) = q_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}_k|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}; \theta_k)$, so that the expression for the transition probability is free of dependence on the candidate distribution $q_{\mathbf{M}}(\cdot|\cdot)$:

$$\rho_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k)}{\Pr(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}; \theta_k)} \right\}.$$

The mcmc chain jumps to the new value with probability $\rho_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k)$, so that the new value is

$$\mathbf{M}_{k+1} = \begin{cases} \mathbf{M} & \text{with probability } \rho_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k), \\ \mathbf{M}_k & \text{with probability } 1 - \rho_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{M}_k, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}, \theta_k). \end{cases}$$

6 An Application to High School Friendships

In this section, we estimate the model for network formation on a network of friendships among high school students. We estimate the specific parametric model with utility function

$$\begin{aligned} U(x_1, x_2, f_{22}, g_{12}, \epsilon; \theta) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1' x_2 - (x_1 - x_2)' \Omega (x_1 - x_2) \\ &+ \alpha_1 f_{22} + \alpha_2 f_{22}^2 + \alpha_3 \mathbf{1}_{g_{12}=2} + \alpha_4 \mathbf{1}_{g_{12}=3} \\ &+ \delta C_{ij} + \epsilon, \end{aligned}$$

with a type I extreme value distribution for the ϵ , independent across all pairs of students. We assume there are $T = N \cdot (N + 1)/2 - N$ periods in the network formation phase, with each pair of individuals having a single opportunity to establish a link. Links are formed if both potential partners derive net positive utility from the link. There are no utility transfers in the model. We also estimate a restricted version of this model with no network effects, where $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha_3 = \alpha_4 = 0$. We refer to this as the covariates-only model or the no-network-effects model.

We will first estimate these two models using mcmc methods. Next we investigate the fit of the model, focusing on network features such as clustering, the degree or distance distribution, and the distribution of the number of friendships or links. We assess the fit by comparing the actual feature, e.g., the clustering coefficient, to the predictive distribution of the clustering coefficient given the data. Third, we predict the effect, on the network characteristics, of an alternative distribution of characteristics, corresponding to making all classrooms single sex, so that the number of classes in common for pairs of students of different sex is zero.

6.1 Data

The data are from a single school in the AddHealth data set. The data set contains information on 669 students (nodes) in this school, and a total of 1,541 friendships (links), out of a set of 223,446 pairs of distinct students. We use four student characteristics, an indicator for sex (0 for male, 1 for female), grade (ranging from 8 to 13), age (ranging from 13.3 to 21.3), and an indicator for participation in sports. We also use a match-specific characteristic, C_{ij} , the number of classes individuals i and j have in common. When estimating the model we subtract 10 from the grade and 17 from the age variables.

Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the 669 students. Table 2 presents some summary statistics for the 223,446 pairs. Table 3 gives the triangle census of the network and the overall clustering coefficient. (The overall clustering coefficient is calculated as the ratio of the number of distinct triples with three friendships to the number of distinct triples with at least two friendships.) Given that the number of individuals in our sample is 669 and given that there are 1,541 links, if the links were formed completely randomly, the expected number of triangles with three edges would be 16.3, and the clustering coefficient would be 0.0023. In the actual network there are 656 triangles with three edges, and the clustering coefficient is 0.083, much higher than can be explained by completely random formation of links. The finding that there are many more triangles in the actual network than in a corresponding random network is common in the network literature, and developing models that are consistent with such clustering is one of the challenges facing researchers.

Table 4 presents summary statistics on the degree distribution. On average, students have 4.6 friends. Out of the full population of 669 students, 70 students have no friends in the grades surveyed. There is one student with seventeen, and one with eighteen friends. The two modes of the distribution of the number of friends are 4 and 5.

Table 5 provides statistics on the distribution of the degree of separation or geodesic. There is one large community, comprising 579 of the 669 students in the sample. The remaining 120 students consist of 70 students with no friends in the sample, 8 pairs, and 1 groups of four.

6.2 Estimation and Inference

We estimate two versions of the model in 4.7. First, the model with all network parameters fixed at zero (the “no-network-effects” model, or the “covariates-only” model), and then the model allowing for network effects (the “network-effects” model). For the covariates-only model we use two estimation methods. First, we calculate the maximum likelihood estimates. As discussed in Section 4.4, in the model without network effects we can evaluate the likelihood function relatively easily. Next we approximate the posterior distribution for the parameters in the covariates-only model. There are a couple of reasons for focusing on posterior distributions. One is computational. Obtaining draws from the posterior distribution is easier than evaluating the likelihood function. Second, ultimately our goal is to predict features of the network given chances in the distribution of the characteristics of the individuals, and for such a prediction problem Bayesian methods are particularly well suited.

We use independent normal prior distributions on all parameters, with prior mean equal to

zero, and prior variance equal to one. For both versions of the model we run one initial mcmc chain with 1,000 iterations. We fit a multivariate normal distribution to the output from these chains, after taking out the first 500 iterations. We then randomly draw 10 starting values for θ from this normal distribution, after multiplying the variance by 100 to ensure that the starting values are dispersed relative to the posterior distribution. We run the ten mcmc chains until, for all fourteen (full model with network effects) or ten (covariates only model) parameters, the ratio of the between-chain-variance of the ten chain means, and average of the ten within-chain-variances, is less than 0.1, following the suggestion in Gelman and Rubin (1992). Table 6 presents summary statistics for the posterior distribution. Prior to the estimation, we normalize two of the two covariates, subtracting 10 from the grade and 17 from the age.

There are a couple of interesting observations from the posterior distributions. First, the link-specific variable, the number of classes potential friends have in common, with parameter δ is very important in explaining friendship patterns. Each additional class in common increases the log odds ratio of friendship by approximately 0.12. Note that friends have on average 2.1 classes in common, and non-friends have on average 0.6 classes in common. Conditional on that grade, age, sex and sports participation are only moderately predictive of friendships.

Second, the homophily effects as captured by Ω are substantial, for all four covariates.

Third, network effects are very important. The number of friends a potential friend already has, F_{jj} , is somewhat important, with people preferring, everything else equal, friends who do not have many friends yet. Much more important though is the distance between individuals in the current network. If potential friends already have friends in common, the log odds go up by 2.66, and even if the degree of separation or geodesic distance is three (some friends of i have friends in common with j), the log odds goes up by 1.22. Compared to the effect of the covariates and the number of classes in common, these effects are large.

6.3 Goodness of Fit

Here we look at the two estimated models and compare features of the predicted networks with actual features of the network to assess the goodness of fit. We focus on three features of the network.

First, we focus on the triangle census and the clustering coefficient. The results are presented in Table 3. The model with the covariates only does a poor job in replicating the clustering present in the actual network. This model predicts that there would be very few full triangles (39.0), compared to the 656 triangles in the actual network. The model with the network effects predicts 459.6 triangles, ten times as much as the model without network effects, although still a little less than the actual number of closed triangles.

Second, we look at the degree distribution, that is, the distribution of the number of friends each individual has. The results are presented in Table 4 and in Figure 1a-c. Not surprisingly, both models predict accurately the mean number of friendships. The model with network effects does slightly better than the model with only covariates in terms of matching the dispersion of the distribution.

Third, we compare the distribution of the geodesic or degree of separation. The results are presented in Table 5 and in Figure 2a-c. Here the model with network effects does a considerably

better job than the model with covariates only. The model with covariates under predicts the number of pairs with high degrees of separation.

6.4 The Effect of Single-Sex Classrooms on Network Formation

Now let us consider the effect on network formation of policies the school may consider. Here we take a fairly extreme policy. Instead of the current mixed sex classrooms, we impose single sex classrooms, so that all boys and girls have no classes in common. Keeping the values of the individual characteristics X_i the same as in the actual data set, we change the value of C_{ij} to zero if (i, j) are a mixed-sex pair ($X_{i1} \neq X_{j1}$). Given the new values for \mathbf{C} , and the current values for \mathbf{X} , we simulate the network multiple times, and calculate the number of boy-boy, boy-girl and girl-girl friendships. Table 7 presents the results. The main quantity of interest is the rate of boy-girl friendships. In the actual network this is 0.0056. The network model predicts that to be 0.0055, again a sign that the model fits well. If we change \mathbf{C} so that boys and girls have no classes in common, the model predicts that this rate will decrease to 0.0037.

More generally, the school may consider various policies of assigning students to classes and grades, for example tracking students by ability. Such policies would change the interactions the students would have and as a result would change the social network in desirable or undesirable ways.

7 Conclusion

In this paper we develop an empirical model for network formation. The model allows for the formation of links depending on the characteristics of the nodes as well as on the status of the network. The model proposed here may be used for several analytic objectives. Its flexibility, and the fact that it can include information about the attributes of the nodes as well as capture aspects of topological constraints on tie formation, allows us to estimate the relative importance of such factors. Moreover, nested models allow for the determination of which elements of network structure are responsible for the formation of modules or communities in the network. For example, the tendency of students of the same race to form cliques may be a function of their attributes or at least partly a result of the tendency of people to befriend their friends' friends.

Such models may also be used in the service of policy objectives. For example, a school may face decisions concerning the assignment of a cohort of students to a number of classrooms. They can create homogenous classrooms by putting students together with similar characteristics, e.g., similar academic record, or on the basis of other interests, or create more heterogenous classrooms by putting together students with different characteristics. As a focal policy, consider a school contemplating segregating classrooms by sex. Such a policy will likely affect the properties of the network of friendships that will emerge, including the number of friendships, and the degree distribution. The school may have preferences over the possible networks that may arise, because they expect that peers affect educational outcomes, such as test scores. Other policy makers might directly intervene in networks, pairing high and low productivity students, or introducing, or closing triads.

One alternative approach would be to focus directly on the effect of the manipulable variables (e.g., classroom composition) on the ultimate outcomes (e.g., test scores). Graham, Imbens and Ridder (2007, 2009) follow such an approach. The attraction of explicitly modeling the network formation first is that it requires fewer data: to evaluate the effect of classroom participation on test scores would require a substantial number of classrooms, whereas the approach in the current paper allows for estimation of the network formation parameters from a single network.

Our model also offers certain other potentially desirable properties for future exploration. The explicit inclusion of situations in which utilities $U_i(j)$ and $U_j(i)$ are unequal allows the existence of a continuous measure of tie asymmetry, and not just the simple directionality of a tie. It may be possible to use such tie asymmetry as an identification strategy (Christakis and Fowler, 2007; Bramoulle, Djebbaria, and Fortin, 2009).

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Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS (N=669)

Characteristic	Mean	Standard Deviation	median	Min	Max
Sex (0 Male, 1 Female)	0.48	(0.50)	0	0	1
Grade	10.7	(1.1)	11.0	8.0	13.0
Age	17.3	(1.3)	17.3	13.3	21.3
Sports Participation	0.49	(0.50)	0	0	1
Number of Friendships	4.6	(3.3)	4	0	18

Table 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF STUDENT PAIR CHARACTERISTICS (223,446 PAIRS)

Characteristic	All (223,446)		Friends (1,541)		Not Friends (221,905)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
# Classes in Common	0.65	1.45	2.13	2.48	0.64	1.44
Abs Diff in Gender	0.50	0.50	0.41	0.49	0.50	0.50
Abs Dif in Grade	1.21	1.01	0.43	0.67	1.22	1.01
Abs Diff in Age	1.43	1.07	0.70	0.64	1.43	1.07
Abs Dif in Sports Participation	0.50	0.50	0.40	0.49	0.50	0.50

Table 3: TRIANGLE CENSUS (TOTAL NUMBER OF TRIPLES 49,679,494)

Triangle Type	Actual Count	Predicted Count	
		Model I Covariates Only	Model II Network Effects
No Edges	48,660,171	48,660,484.8	48,697,654.4
Single Edge	1,011,455	1,010,674.3	974,304.9
Two Edges	7,212	8,294.5	7,075.2
Three Edges	656	40.3	459.6
Overall Clustering Coefficient	0.083	0.005	0.061

Table 4: NUMBER OF FRIENDSHIPS (669 INDIVIDUALS)

Number of Friendships	Actual Network	Number of Students Predicted Network	
		Model I Covariates Only	Model II Network Effects
0	70	39.7	50.8
1	67	59.5	72.8
2	60	77.0	85.45
3	77	87.5	89.1
4	79	89.6	82.6
5	79	81.3	71.8
6	57	69.7	58.9
7	52	55.0	47.6
8	38	41.0	35.7
9	35	27.5	25.4
10	21	17.6	17.5
11	14	6.3	7.6
12	10	3.5	4.8
13	4	1.6	3.1
14	3	0.7	1.5
15	1	0.3	0.9
16	0	0.2	0.7
17	1	0.1	0.3
18	1	0.0	0.21
19	0	0.0	0.1
20	0	0.0	0.1
21	0	0.0	0.0
22	0	0.0	0.0
23	0	0.0	0.0
24	0	0.0	0.0
≥ 25	0	0.0	0.0
Average Number of Friendships	4.60	4.60	4.44
Stand Dev of Number of Friendships	3.29	2.92	3.15

Table 5: DISTRIBUTION OF DEGREE OF SEPARATION (NUMBER OF PAIRS 223,446)

Degree of Separation	Actual	Number of Pairs Average Prediction	
		Model I Covariates Only	Model II Network Effects
1	1,541	1,540.3	1,484.0
2	5,893	7,998.2	6,159.3
3	18,090	33,775.0	21,320.8
4	38,828	73,457.7	47,553.0
5	49,053	56,698.9	55,079.7
6	33,032	17,662.0	33,607.2
7	14,211	3,269.8	13,205.5
8	4,837	497.7	4,033.9
9	1,447	7.6	1,090.7
10	350	9.7	291.4
11	59	0.8	78.3
12	4	0.0	18.5
13	0	0.0	3.8
14	0	0.0	0.7
15	0	0.0	0.1
16	0	0.0	0.0
17	0	0.0	0.0
18	0	0.0	0.0
19	0	0.0	0.0
20	0	0.0	0.0
Infinity	56,101	28,459.8	39,519.2

Table 6: ESTIMATES OF PREFERENCE PARAMETERS

Parameter	Description	ML Estimates		Moments of Posterior Distribution			
		Model I		Model I		Model II	
		No Network Effects	No Network Effects	No Network Effects	No Network Effects	Network Effects	Network Effects
		est.	s.e.	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.
α_1	# of friends of alter	0	–	0	–	-0.14	(0.03)
α_2	total # of friends of alter sq	0	–	0	–	0.004	(0.003)
α_3	degr of sep is two	0	–	0	–	2.66	(0.07)
α_4	degr of sep is three	0	–	0	–	1.22	(0.07)
β_0	intercept	-2.12	(0.05)	-2.11	(0.04)	-2.11	(0.06)
β_1	female	-0.06	(0.04)	-0.06	(0.04)	-0.04	(0.05)
β_2	alter grade	0.08	(0.03)	0.08	(0.03)	0.07	(0.03)
β_3	alter age	0.05	(0.03)	0.05	(0.03)	0.05	(0.03)
β_4	participates in sport	0.10	(0.04)	0.09	(0.04)	0.04	(0.05)
Ω_{11}	diff in sex	0.19	(0.03)	0.19	(0.03)	0.20	(0.03)
Ω_{22}	diff in grades squared	0.17	(0.02)	0.17	(0.01)	0.14	(0.01)
Ω_{33}	diff in age squared	0.10	(0.02)	0.10	(0.01)	0.09	(0.01)
Ω_{44}	diff in sports participation	0.21	(0.03)	0.22	(0.03)	0.19	(0.03)
δ	# of classes in common	0.14	(0.01)	0.14	(0.01)	0.12	(0.01)

Table 7: FRIENDSHIP RATES BY SEX COMPOSITION

Friendship Type	Actual		Predicted Rate Network Model	
	# of Pairs	Friendship Rate	Current Assignment (Mixed Sex Classrooms)	Counterfactual (Single Sex Classrooms)
Boy-Boy	61,075	0.0087	0.0082	0.0079
Boy-Girl	111,650	0.0056	0.0055	0.0037
Girl-Girl	50,721	0.0076	0.0074	0.0071

Figure 1a: Histogram Number of Friends




Figure 1b: Histogram Predicted Number of Friends (covariates only)




Figure 1c: Histogram Predicted Number of Friends (network effects)

