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ABSTRACT

Market exchange is subject to an endogenously determined level of predation which impedes specialization and gains from trade. We construct a model in which utility-maximizing agents opt between careers in production and careers in predation. Three types of equilibria may emerge: autarky (with no predation and no defense), insecure exchange equilibria (with predation and defense), and secure exchange equilibria (in which defense completely deters predation). Trading equilibria, two-thirds of them secure, are supported only in a narrow range of security parameter values. Since changes in the technologies of defense and predation have terms of trade effects, some producers may be hurt by enhanced security. We show cases of 'immiserizing security' in which producers in large poor countries are harmed by increased security.

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Security is neither perfect nor free. Moreover, insecurity and the consequent costs of enforcing property rights have varied widely over time and across societies. Forcing these transactions costs into the background of an economic model obscures a critical variable. For example, Trefler (1995) shows trade volumes to be far below those predicted by factor endowment models, and the United States and Canada trade much less with each other than predicted with a gravity model (McCallum, 1995). The insecurity of international exchange, marked by competing sovereignties which complicate jurisdiction and enforcement, may drive these apparent anomalies in the pattern of trade. We believe insecurity to be important not only in the extreme instances of theft and extortion associated with some African economies (Rubin, 1997) and in trading relationships characterized by widespread corruption (Elliott, 1997), but also in trade with the transition economies and even trade among OECD members.

We initiate research on these topics with a simple model in which the security of exchange is endogenous. Security can only be properly understood in a general equilibrium model, since it depends on the interaction of predators and prey. An increase in predatory activity (treated here as theft) will increase the risk associated with market transactions and impede specialization and trade; on the other hand, a decrease in the volume of trade will shrink the pool of property which is subject to appropriation and diminish the incentive to engage in predation. We thus develop a general equilibrium model in which the security of property rights in trade is endogenously determined from the allocation of resources to production, predation and defense.

We assume that rational agents allocate labor across different activities. Agents differ only in their relative labor productivities in two goods, which will spur specialization and exchange provided that enough of the gain from trade is retained. Some agents may opt for careers in predation provided it pays well enough. The interaction of predation and production and the usual general equilibrium interaction between two trading

economies (two sets of productive agents) jointly determine the terms of trade and the gains from trade.

The anarchic model excludes cooperation among agents in the form of state, mutual defense clubs or mafias. However, while not introducing nations we borrow the language of "international" trade theory both for convenience and to set the stage for a subsequent paper incorporating the various forms of cooperative activity. The present model applies equally well or better to regional trade. Where convenient, we shall use "country" to denote a group of agents with the same technology.

The general equilibrium model permits us to explore several questions: Can exchange arise at all when predatory forces are powerful and defense is uncoordinated? The terms of trade of a large country improve as the volume of trade falls; could such a country benefit from increased predation? If only one country supplies predators, that country's terms of trade will improve as labor is withdrawn from production; would even the productive forces of the "predating" country therefore prefer lax enforcement? Numerical simulations suggest that the existence of trade is rather delicate in anarchistic models, varying in an intuitive way with the technologies of predation and defense. Simulations also show that relatively large poor countries may be hurt by enhanced enforcement of property rights, a case we call "immiserizing security."

Our formal analysis and our simulations are based for simplicity on a quite special model, but we show at various points that our conclusions about the delicacy of trade and the importance of immiserizing security should hold in a large class of models.

The "immiserizing security" effect may provide an insight into government behavior.¹ Large poor economies such as India and Indonesia have been tolerant of predation on international trade, either through regulations which permit officials to extract payment from traders or through

¹ This paper is about anarchic economies, so we concede it is awkward to introduce governments.

alleged tolerance of piracy. The model of this paper shows that a benevolent government in such a country might very well serve its citizens by tolerating predation. Immiserizing security may also provide insight into the early history of commercial relations between nations. It is sometimes claimed that one-sided commercial treaties imposed by Europeans through overwhelming naval power served to impoverish the less-developed "partners." Immiserizing security may be a mechanism through which European trade with China and India did operate to impoverish.

The paper has five sections. We first set out the basic elements of the model. In the second section, we explore international equilibria for given levels of insecurity and show that insecurity can prevent trade in spite of technological differences which could generate gains from trade. The third section of the paper characterizes the payoffs associated with individual decisions about predation and defense. The fourth section incorporates all three decisions, predation, defense, and production, into a single model in which autarky, secure trade, and trade subject to predation are all possible general equilibrium outcomes. The fifth section uses numerical simulation to explore the impact of changes in the technologies of predation and defense, tracing out their effect on the type of equilibrium and on the terms of trade and demonstrating the possibility of "immiserizing security."

1. The Elements of the Model

In general equilibrium, agents endogenously allocate labor across defense, predation, and the production of two goods. Agents differ in their constant relative productivity in the two goods, giving rise to incentives to specialize in production and to exchange goods through the market. Predation takes the form of banditry, the seizure of the traded goods. Defensive expenditure reduces the risk of banditry. Insurance is impossible due to the absence of state enforcement.² The degree of specialization and the

² Our sequel paper builds a general equilibrium model of insurance, production, exchange and predation.

gains from trade depend on the balance among predation, defense and production.

We model a long run static equilibrium of exchange between two "countries" (or regions or groups of agents with identical technologies). Because each country is composed of agents with identical Ricardian production technologies, there is no reason to trade internally nor any domestic predation. Countries differ in that the constant opportunity cost of good 1 in terms of good 2 is higher in the home country than in the foreign country. The closest our model can come to the standard Ricardian trade equilibrium is when no resources are in fact devoted to predation. Even in this case, however, some labor must be devoted to defense in each country to deter incipient predation. There are two other possible equilibria. One is autarky, where specialization and trade are deterred by the expectation of banditry. The other is an equilibrium in which positive levels of banditry, defense and international trade all coexist.

The model is related to that of Grossman and Kim (1995), who also explore a general equilibrium of predation, production and defense. We borrow their reduced form description of how the balance of offense and defense results in a probability of loss. However, Grossman and Kim have a single good technology subject to predation in the form of seizure of the agent's endowment.³ We assume perfect security of the "endowment" in the sense that autarky is secure. Our focus is instead on the interesting issues which arise once specialization in production and exchange are possible.

1.1. *The Choice of Defense*

Agents choose whether to commit any labor to defense prior to subsequent decisions.⁴ They solve the discrete choice problem:

³ Skaperdas (1992) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996,1997) also use models of this type.

⁴ This timing assumption is realistic, as trade actually requires investment in finding markets, building warehouses and other infrastructure, etc. The descriptive literature on early long distance trade reveals that trading companies maintained agents in foreign cities who operated secure storage facilities, exchanged goods between ship arrivals, and gathered commercial intelligence (often defensive in nature). The formal consequence of the timing specification is to

$$(1.1) \quad \max_l \max \{d(l)v^S(l), [1-d(l)]v^A, [1-d(l)]v^B\},$$

where $d(l)$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if $l > 0$ and equal to zero if $l = 0$, and $\{v^S, v^A, v^B\}$ are the utilities associated with specialized production, autarky and banditry respectively. (In Section 3, these utilities will be made explicit indirect utility functions.) This problem serves to sort all agents into specialized producers who commit l and trade, on the one hand, and those who spare the defense expense and operate as bandits or as autarkic producers, on the other hand.⁵

Now consider the choice of the level of defense for a specialized producer. For simplicity, the choice is discrete. The individual's probability of successful exchange is assumed to be equal to

$$\begin{aligned} & \phi(l/\bar{l})\pi \\ & \phi' = 0, \phi(1) = 1, \phi(0) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Here, π is the anticipated social success rate for exchange (treated as a parameter by all agents) and ϕ is the individual success rate. This specification is rationalized by thinking of the predation on exchange as first of all singling out shipments which appear to be easy prey. Under our assumptions, the producer can guarantee success equal to the common rate with a defense commitment equal to \bar{l} .⁶ In the exchange stage, bandits are concentrated around the exchange points, and the balance of defensive and offensive resources collectively sets the success rate with expectation (made rational in Section 3) equal to π . With this specification, we introduce a realistic element of fixed cost to the trading and defense decision while avoiding, for simplicity, modeling the choice of continuously variable defensive effort. An appendix

make autarky equilibrium a Nash equilibrium. If all decisions are simultaneous, in contrast, the absence of bandits in autarky means that some agents have an incentive to deviate and start trade. A dynamic model with sunk costs is needed to penalize deviations and assure that autarky is a Nash equilibrium, and the simplest such mechanism is the one we select.

⁵ Allowing for some members of the household to enter banditry complicates the notation but adds nothing essential to the analysis.

⁶ The defense effort \bar{l} also fully deters predation by opportunistic trading partners.

available on request shows that our results are robust with respect to this simplification.

Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor. For agents choosing specialized production, due to the discrete choice setup, the labor supply to specialized production is simply $l^s = 1 - \bar{l}$, and we may suppress the separate notation ϕ in what follows.

1.2. Determination of Production and Exchange

All agents share identical homothetic preferences. The Ricardian technology for each agent in the home economy is described by:

$$(1.2) \quad a_1 y_1 + a_2 y_2 \leq l^s$$

where a is a unit labor requirement with a subscript denoting the index label of a good, y is its production level and l^s is the amount of labor devoted to specialized production. For analytic convenience the level of predation will be treated as exogenous until Section 3.

Each of the agents who chooses production over predation must decide how much of each good to produce and to trade at price p (the price of good 1 in terms of good 2). The production vector is y and the trade vector is m , where exports appear as negative quantities. The agent's final stage decision problem, given a decision to specialize in production and to devote \bar{l} to defense, is:

$$(1.3) \quad \begin{aligned} & \max_{y, m} \pi u(y + m) + (1 - \pi) u[y + \min(m, 0)] \\ & \text{subject to} \\ & \mathbf{a}' y \leq l^s = 1 - \bar{l} \\ & \mathbf{p}' m \leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

The first constraint is the Ricardian production constraint at the individual level. The second is the exchange constraint. The agent maximizes the utility of consumption; in the event of predation, consumption is equal to the production level for imported good and equal to the production level less the stolen exports for exported good.

The first order conditions of the maximization program reveal the characteristics of the choices which the agent will make. It is useful to denote the case where shipments are successful with a superscript G (Good state) and where they are not successful with a superscript B (Bad state). Subscripted variable labels denote partial differentiation. In the bad state, the utility function is not differentiable with respect to \mathbf{m} at the autarky point, but elsewhere yields

$$u_{m_j}^B = \begin{cases} u_j^B & \text{for } m_j < 0 \\ 0 & \text{for } m_j > 0 \end{cases}$$

Since the home country imports good 1, at a bad state interior solution $u_{m_1}^B = 0$, and the first order conditions in the trade vector \mathbf{m} imply:

$$(1.4) \quad \frac{\pi u_1^G}{E[u_2]} = p.$$

This can also be written as:

$$(1.5) \quad \frac{u_1^G}{u_2^G} = p + p \frac{1 - \pi}{\pi} \frac{u_2^B}{u_2^G}.$$

The first order conditions in the output vector \mathbf{y} require, at an interior solution, the two conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi u_1^G + (1 - \pi) u_1^B &= \lambda a_1 \\ \pi u_2^G + (1 - \pi) u_2^B &= \lambda a_2 \end{aligned}$$

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the labor constraint. Taking the ratio of the first equation to the second and using (1.4)

$$(1.6) \quad \frac{a_1}{a_2} \equiv \alpha = \frac{E[u_1]}{E[u_2]} = \frac{\pi u_1^G}{E[u_2]} + \frac{(1 - \pi) u_1^B}{E[u_2]} = p + \frac{(1 - \pi) u_1^B}{E[u_2]}.$$

Thus, the interior solution involves a specialization in which the “marginal rate of expected substitution” is equal to the marginal rate of transformation α , and both of these, along with the marginal rate of substitution in the good state, are greater than p .

The system (1.4), (1.6) and the two constraints of the maximization program give four equations to determine the four variables \mathbf{y} , \mathbf{m} . These variables are implicit functions of the exogenous variables $p, \pi, a..$ With

concave utility, the solution is globally unique. The Appendix develops the special Cobb-Douglas case, for which closed form solutions obtain for trade and production. Diversified production is guaranteed in this case, if the trading equilibrium is insecure. Despite the income-risk neutrality of the Cobb-Douglas form, the consumption risk associated with specialized production and predation makes complete specialization suboptimal. An infinitely risk averse agent (who maximizes his minimum utility) will stay at autarky no matter how favorable the price. Indifference to consumption risk requires both straight line isoutility loci (infinite elasticity of substitution between goods) and income risk neutrality.

2. The Trading Equilibrium

This section sets out the determination of exchange equilibrium in terms of parameters of the model, focusing especially on boundary cases where one or another type of equilibrium obtains. For simplicity of exposition, in this section of the paper we treat the number of predators as exogenous; hence, the number of productive agents and the amount of defense effort are also exogenous, as is the success rate π . For concrete results we employ the Cobb-Douglas version of the model and use it as a basis for simulation. The aggregate levels of production, trade and productive labor are denoted by upper case letters, with lower case reserved for individuals. An asterisk designates the foreign economy.

In the secure equilibrium in which predation is completely deterred, our model requires that the gains from trade be sufficient to pay the fixed cost of defense. This means that only completely specialized equilibria can be secure, implying that very large and small countries cannot reach a secure equilibrium. Otherwise, this case replicates the standard Ricardian result. In contrast, in an equilibrium with predation, it will not pay to completely specialize. It is convenient to work with the comparative labor productivity of each country's import good. For the foreign economy, α^* is the opportunity

cost of good 1. Whether predation exists or not (due to the fixed defense effort), $\alpha > p > 1/\alpha^*$.

Agents trade only once each period. We thus rule out for simplicity any ex post trade within countries between successful and unsuccessful agents. (Since they have different ex post endowments, there will exist possible gains from such exchange.)

2.1. International Exchange Equilibrium

The international equilibrium of the two country version of the model is determined by the market clearing condition for the home country's imported good:

$$(2.1) \quad N^S m_1(p, \pi, l^S, \alpha, a_2, \gamma) + N^{*S} m_1^*(p, \pi, l^{*S}, \alpha^*, a_1^*, \gamma) = 0.$$

Here, m denotes per capita excess demand, $*$ denotes the foreign values, N^S equals the number of identical agents in specialized production/defense (equal to L^S/l^S , the aggregate labor devoted to specialized production divided by the fraction of the individual's labor endowment which is devoted to specialized production), and we write the excess demand for good 1 as an implicit function of the variables which the agents take as exogenous at this stage. We assume a complete separation between legitimate trade and the thieves' market in which captured goods are exchanged. In proceeding with the analysis, relative country size alone matters, so we divide through by N^S .

Tastes are identical and Cobb-Douglas with the parametric expenditure share for good 1 (the home country import) denoted by γ . The import share, the ratio of imports to home production, is defined by (see the Appendix):

$$(2.2) \quad \frac{m_1}{y_1} \equiv f(\cdot) = \left[\frac{(1-\pi)p}{\pi(a_1/a_2 - p)} \right]^{-1/(1-\gamma)} - 1.$$

The international equilibrium condition (2.1) reduces to:

$$(2.3) \quad \frac{f(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma)}{pf(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) + \alpha} l^S / a_2 - \frac{1}{p} \frac{f^*(1/p, \pi, \alpha^*, \gamma)}{f^*(1/p, \pi, \alpha^*, \gamma) / p + \alpha^*} \frac{N^{*S}}{N^S} l^{*S} / a_1^* = 0.$$


Here, we use the budget constraint $-m_2^*/p = m_1^*$, and we note that the foreign import share f^* gives the ratio of foreign imports to foreign output of importables.

Analysis of the existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibrium in this model follows standard lines since import demand functions are downward sloping in the relevant range of prices.⁷ The sole question of existence arises from the effect of lower π in reducing and eventually eliminating the range of potential equilibrium prices.

To see how this arises, consider the incipient autarky price at which the home country is just barely unwilling to trade. By (2.2), this implies $p = \pi\alpha$. For the foreign economy, the incipient autarky price is similarly defined by $1/p = \pi\alpha^*$, or $p = 1/\pi\alpha^*$. Solving the two equations simultaneously, the critical value of π which eliminates the range of trading equilibria is: $\bar{\pi} = (\alpha\alpha^*)^{-1/2}$. For values of π below the critical value, a trading equilibrium does not exist, since the upward sloping export supply function has a vertical intercept above the vertical intercept of the downward sloping import demand function. Trade can occur only at a mutual loss. Figure 1 illustrates.

⁷ Analytic methods do not rule out upward sloping portions of world excess demand for good 1. However, the import demand functions are downward sloping throughout and the export supply functions must therefore be upward sloping at least near autarky. Uniqueness cannot be guaranteed, and unstable equilibria, if they exist, will be flanked by stable equilibria.

Figure 1. Trade Equilibrium and Security



The equilibrium at E permits trade according to comparative advantage, and mutual benefit despite some predation. With lower values of π , the relative positions of the import demand and export supply schedules will eventually reverse, resulting in equilibria which will not be chosen by rational agents who compare their real income in autarky with their real income in the hypothetical loss-making equilibrium with trade. The need to cover the fixed costs of trade imposes still tighter limits on the admissible range of prices.

Proposition 1. Nonexistence of risky trade equilibrium

For π sufficiently small in the special Cobb-Douglas case, no trading equilibrium exists.

Proposition 1 is useful because it shows that even leaving aside the fixed cost of trading \bar{l} , when traders are faced with exogenous predation, the market cannot always find a price at which voluntary exchange will occur, in spite of technological comparative advantage. Larger defense expenditures will shift π upward but will also shrink the interval of welfare-improving relative prices.

The diagram also shows that the analysis leading to Proposition 1 is actually quite general. The Ricardian Cobb-Douglas case serves to pin down the exact shape of the import demand and excess supply functions and the value of the vertical intercepts. In more general cases, the vertical intercepts (the prices at which risky trade is just deterred) should ordinarily move with lower π just as in the diagram, as more risk requires a more favorable price compared to autarky in order to induce trade. Existence will always depend on a π large enough so that the relative positions of the two intercepts are not reversed.

Finally, note that the diagrammatic analysis shows the relation of our model to the familiar "iceberg melting transactions costs", with $1-\pi$ equal to the melting rate. However, away from the autarky point, our model differs by embodying behavior modified by the consumption risk due to predation. Moreover, in what follows, the transactions cost is endogenous.

2.2. *Predation and the Terms of Trade*

The terms of trade will respond to changes in parametric levels of predation. By application of standard comparative static methods to (2.1),

$dp/d\pi$ has the sign of $m_{1\pi} - \frac{1}{p} m_{2\pi}^* \frac{N^{*S}}{N^S}$. When $m_{1\pi} = m_{2\pi}^* / p$ (a natural

benchmark case), *lowering π has the effect of improving the terms of trade of the larger country.* In Figure 1, the excess demand function of the larger country shifts to the left by more. This benchmark result holds in the symmetric case of $\alpha=\alpha^*$ and $\gamma=1/2$ (see the Appendix). For asymmetric parameters, a sufficiently larger country will experience terms of trade

improvements as π falls. Simulation results confirm this. In general we thus have a presumption:

Presumption:

Lower security ordinarily improves the terms of trade of the larger country.

Given the presumptive terms of trade effect, the impact of decreased security on the welfare of producers in the larger country is ambiguous. In contrast, producers in the smaller country lose both from increased insecurity directly and from a terms of trade deterioration. The analysis suggests that producers in the two countries may have opposing interests in security arrangements when terms of trade effects are powerful. Under the presumption, producers in the larger country may prefer less secure trade. To complete the welfare analysis of this case requires simulation, as the welfare of producers in the country enjoying a terms of trade improvement changes according to the magnitude of $dp/d\pi$, which is a deeply nonlinear function of the parameters. Moreover, π itself is determined by the endogenous choice of entry into predation and defense, and implicitly is thus a nonlinear function of the deep parameters of the model. We will return to the welfare analysis after developing the full model.

It is also helpful to consider the response of the terms of trade to country size and to tastes. The interior equilibrium price in the standard Ricardian Cobb-Douglas case is:

$$(2.4) \quad p = \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} \frac{N^s l^s / a_2}{N^s l^{*s} / a_1^*} \text{ for } \alpha \geq p \geq 1/\alpha^*.$$

In contrast, in our model (2.3) does not yield a closed form solution for p . Nevertheless, given the comparative cost ratios α and α^* , there are limits to the differences in effective country size ratios and consumption share ratios which are consistent with a trading equilibrium. The terms of trade of a country worsen with its relative size and with the intensity of demand for its import.

3. The Payoffs to Agents' Decisions

This section characterizes the payoffs to agents' actions, beginning with the exchange success rate and proceeding to the utilities of specialized producers and of bandits.

3.1. *The Success Rate, Predation and Defense*

We borrow the predation model of Grossman and Kim (1995) save that predation occurs on the flow of trade rather than the endowment. The interaction of the technologies of predation and defense is captured in the probability of successful exchange $\tilde{\pi}$, equal to the proportion of the aggregate value of shipments which escapes seizure. (Thus there is no aggregate uncertainty.) This is modeled as a function of the aggregate amounts of labor devoted to predation and to defense. The probability or proportion of successful exchange is

$$(3.1) \quad \tilde{\pi} = \frac{1}{1 + \theta L^B / L^D}.$$

Here, the superscript B denotes the labor devoted to (B)anditry and the superscript D denotes the labor devoted to (D)efense. The upper case L denotes the aggregate supply of labor to each activity. The parameter θ is meant to capture the relative efficiency of offensive and defensive activity. Obviously, $\tilde{\pi}$ is defined on the unit interval for all nonnegative levels of labor in each activity. The technology of defense is also represented in an exogenous proportionate 'spoilage' of the stolen goods, β , so that the proportion of trade falling to bandits is $(1 - \beta)(1 - \tilde{\pi})$.

This specification of the probability function can be rationalized as follows. Successful trade requires both a successful trip to market with the exports and a successful trip home with imports. The probability of success is independent on each portion of the round trip, with the joint probability being $\tilde{\pi}$. Shipments of number S flow to A possible meeting points. Both bandits and shippers pick meeting points to use and to attack according to

some random process. Any shipment not defended with intensity \bar{l} will be spotted by bandits and lost for sure; hence in equilibrium all shipments are defended. The determination of outcomes is that greater force wins (or wins more often). We do not specify the random process by which forces are allocated and shipments are sent to meeting points, nor the process which determines outcomes, but claim that our simple specification has reasonable qualitative properties.⁸ The expected number of bandits per meeting point is L^B/A . The goods shipments are defended with defensive intensity L^D/S . Then in this case $\theta \frac{L^B}{L^D} = \frac{L^B/A}{L^D/S}$ and the parameter θ is interpreted as the number of shipments per meeting point, S/A .⁹ Moving away from the literal interpretation, θ is a parameter reflecting the relative technological advantage of offensive forces.

3.2. The Payoff to Specialized Production and Defense

We substitute the equilibrium values of the Appendix functions (7.2)-(7.5) into the Cobb-Douglas utility function to obtain the specialized producer's indirect utility:

$$(3.2) \quad v^s(p, \pi, \alpha, l^s) = \left\{ \pi \left[\frac{1+f}{pf+\alpha} \right]^\gamma + (1-\pi) \left[\frac{1}{pf+\alpha} \right]^\gamma \right\} \frac{l^s}{a_2},$$

where $l^s = 1 - \bar{l}$. In autarky, the agent earns utility equal to $v^A = \frac{1}{a_2} \alpha^{-\gamma}$. Similar steps characterize the utility of the specialized foreign agent:

$$(3.3) \quad v^{*s}(p, \pi, \alpha^*, l^{*s}) = \left\{ \pi \left[\frac{1+f^*}{f^*/p+\alpha^*} \right]^{1-\gamma} + (1-\pi) \left[\frac{1}{f^*/p+\alpha^*} \right]^{1-\gamma} \right\} \frac{l^{*s}}{a_1^*}.$$

⁸ Taking the model literally, reasonable specifications of the allocation process produce more complex odds functions which all share the property of being increasing in defensive labor and decreasing in offensive labor.

⁹ The same formal model can be interpreted as a single market of circumference A , where exchange is safe inside the market but exposed to predation as it passes the circumference. Such concentration in a 'port town' suggests coordination but could be anarchistic as in the present paper.

The foreign agent's autarky utility is defined as $v^{*A} = \frac{1}{a_1} \alpha^{*-(1-\gamma)}$.

3.3. The Payoff to Predation

Banditry pays by seizing shipments. In the aggregate, the (certain) prize vector is $[(1-\beta)(1-\pi)M_1, -(1-\beta)(1-\pi)M_2]$. We have two possible ways to treat the exchange of the stolen goods. We could assume that they find their way into legitimate commerce again, and this is the appropriate setup when the household is treated as an integrated producing and predating agent. Alternatively, we assume here a separation of legal and illegal exchange, which serves to simplify the structure and affects the model only inessentially. The equilibrium thieves' market price differs from the legal market price only by a constant proportion:

$$p^B = \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} \frac{-M_2}{M_1} = \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} p.$$

The representative bandit realizes expected utility from his activity equal to:

$$(3.4) \quad v^B(p^B, \pi, \beta, M_1, M_2, L^B) \equiv (p^B)^{-\gamma} (1-\pi)(1-\beta) \frac{p^B M_1 - M_2}{L^B} \\ = \left(\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma} p \right)^{-\gamma} (1-\pi)(1-\beta) \frac{p M_1 / (1-\gamma)}{L^B}.$$

In the first line, the risk neutrality of the Cobb-Douglas utility function is used together with the property that the expected income of the bandit is equal to the aggregate endowment received from banditry divided by the number of bandits.¹⁰ In the second line we replace p^B using the Cobb-Douglas special case and use the international exchange equilibrium condition to replace the ratio of M 's. The agent chooses banditry if v^B (weakly) exceeds v^A and v^S .

¹⁰ This specification is equivalent to pooled shares in banditry, where the aggregate proportion of goods stolen is certain and all individual risk is removed. With income-risk neutral bandits, as assumed in the Cobb-Douglas utility function, such pooling is irrelevant as the agent is indifferent between the expected per capita income with certainty and the uncertain stream with the same expected value. We prefer the individual uncertain return interpretation, as risk pooling presumes coordination.

Banditry is an international free entry activity, so L^B is equal to the sum of home (N^B) and foreign (N^{*B}) bandits, and $L^B = N^B + N^{*B}$. (Note that L^D , which affects π , likewise includes both foreign and domestic defense.)

4. Equilibrium Predation and Exchange

For rational expectations equilibrium, the labor allocation, production and trade decisions must be consistent with the information actually revealed in equilibrium.

First, the equilibrium with exchange must satisfy the entry condition into banditry. Domestic entry into banditry requires that

$$(4.1) \quad v^B = v^S > v^A$$

where v^S is given by (3.2). For the foreign entry into banditry,

$$(4.2) \quad v^{*B} = v^{*S} \geq v^{*A},$$

where v^{*S} is given by (3.3). For given π, p, M , and using the definition of bandit indirect utility (3.4), (4.1) and (4.2) determine the level of banditry resources, L^B . Only by chance will both equalities hold, implying entry into banditry by both countries. Generally, all the bandits will be supplied by the poorer country, the one with lower welfare for the representative producer.¹¹

The supplies of labor to defense and to production must also be consistent with equilibrium. The aggregate supply of home labor N is split into N^B (the number of bandits supplied), on the one hand, and the supply of labor to specialized production and defense, on the other hand. The technology of defense gives the defense requirement relative to specialized production as:

$$(4.3) \quad N^D = \bar{l}(N - N^B).$$

For the foreign economy similarly,¹²

$$(4.4) \quad N^{*D} = \bar{l}(N^* - N^{*B}).$$

¹¹ The case where utilities are equal between the two countries is consistent with entry to banditry in both. This is necessarily a knife edge type of equilibrium so we do not bother to analyze it.

¹² We now impose the same technology of defense in each country for simplicity.

Productive labor is thus equal to $L^S = (1 - \bar{l})(N - N^B)$ and $L^{*S} = (1 - \bar{l})(N^* - N^{*B})$ for the domestic and foreign economies respectively. The world supply of defensive and offensive labor is the sum of the supplies of the two countries,

$$(4.5) \quad \begin{aligned} L^D &= N^D + N^{*D} = \bar{l}(N + N^* - L^B) \\ L^B &= N^B + N^{*B}. \end{aligned}$$

In rational expectations equilibrium, there will be no supply of defense (and hence autarky) if, with trade, utility for producers in the poorer country would lie below their autarky utility. Using the knowledge that good 1 is the home country import, the reduced form import demand function at the aggregate level, and the supply of productive labor of the home economy, the aggregate trade volume M_1 is given by:

$$(4.6) \quad M_1 = \frac{\mathcal{Y}(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma)}{pf(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) + \alpha} (1 - \bar{l})(N - N^B) / a_2.$$

Based on the previous considerations concerning the supply of defense and inverting (3.4) and using (4.6), if a trading equilibrium exists then:

$$(4.7) \quad \begin{aligned} L^B &= \frac{1}{v^{*S}} \mu(p, \pi, \alpha, N, \beta, \gamma) \text{ for } v^S > v^{*S}, \\ L^B &= \frac{\mu / v^S}{1 + \mu / N v^S} \text{ for } v^S \leq v^{*S}, \text{ where} \\ \mu(p, \pi, \alpha, N, \beta, \gamma) &\equiv \left(\frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} p \right)^{1 - \gamma} (1 - \pi)(1 - \beta) \frac{f(1 - \bar{l}) N}{pf + \alpha a_2}. \end{aligned}$$

Here, $N^B = 0$ if $v^S > v^{*S}$ and $N^B = L^B$ if $v^S < v^{*S}$. Equation system (4.7) and the slackness conditions for banditry entry determine defensive and offensive labor L^B, L^D .

Plugging the offensive and defensive labor quantities into the probability of successful exchange $\tilde{\pi}$ function produces a value which must be equal to the anticipated probability (π) by the rational expectations assumption:

$$(4.8) \quad \pi = \tilde{\pi} = \frac{1}{1 + \theta \frac{L^B}{\bar{l}(N + N^* - L^B)}}.$$

The rational expectations interior equilibrium is the value of p, L^B which satisfies (4.7) and the exchange equilibrium condition (2.3) when the right hand side of (4.8) is substituted for π in all expressions.

Interior equilibrium need not exist. Unfortunately, analytic methods are not able to reveal much about when it does. We therefore describe a few special cases and then turn to simulation.

4.1. *Autarky*

Suppose that β is large enough that $L^D = \bar{l}(N + N^*)$ is sufficient to completely deter entry into banditry. Although π would equal 1, one or both countries might still not gain from trade if the equilibrium price lies too close to the autarky price. Since some fixed cost must be absorbed to trade at all, agents foreseeing a loss would not spend the necessary defense resources, and hence there would be no trading equilibrium --- autarky is the only solution.

By extension, we may expect a range of values of large β for which entry into banditry would be small, and π large although less than one, but the larger country (with terms of trade insufficiently favorable to pay for the fixed cost of trade) still refuses to enter trade.

As is usual in rational expectations equilibrium, there is a self-fulfilling prophecy autarky equilibrium where productive agents all expect a zero success rate, which is confirmed because no one trades.

Finally, even if β is large enough to deter entry into banditry and both countries would gain enough through trade to pay the fixed cost of trading, autarky may still prevail because of a coordination failure --- the export market exists only if other agents commit to their fixed cost of trading. This is similar to the coordination failures of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). Unraveling this story requires a more detailed account of the nature of trade than we have set out.

4.2. *Secure Equilibria*

Secure equilibria result when β is large enough that $L^D = \bar{l}(N + N^*)$ is sufficient to deter entry into banditry, given simultaneously a Ricardian complete specialization solution with mutual gains from trade sufficient to pay for the fixed cost of defense.

As in Section 4.1, there is also a secure equilibrium which is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If no bandits enter, then no shipments are captured and the expectation of a zero success rate in predation is confirmed. If trade occurs, it will in this case always be perfectly secure. Autarky may still be the only equilibrium if fixed costs of trade are high.

4.3. *Trade and Predation*

The most interesting and complex class of equilibria are the interior solutions -- allocations to both defense and predation are made and there is specialized production with trade. Interior solutions give rise to a rich set of comparative statics which cannot be derived as special cases of previously known results. Unfortunately, because of its complexity, the model yields the comparative statics only from simulations.

5. **Simulated Equilibria and Comparative Statics**

Simulation of the model illustrates the effect of changing parameters on the type of equilibrium which emerges. It also permits exploration of the comparative statics of interior equilibria. While simulation results are necessarily highly model specific, we will argue that our inferences are quite robust with respect to generalizing the specification of technology and preferences.

5.1. *Existence and Uniqueness of Autarkic, Secure and Interior Equilibria*

Simulation of the Ricardian Cobb-Douglas model shows that, depending on underlying parameter values, any one of the three types of equilibria may emerge. However, autarky obtains over much of the parameter space; equilibria with trade are surprisingly rare.

We have simulated the Cobb-Douglas model, outlined in the Appendix, with $\alpha = \alpha^* = 2$. These coefficients imply a home comparative advantage in the production of good 2 and large gains from trade. As shown in Section 2.1, these coefficients imply that a trading equilibrium cannot exist with $\pi \leq 1/2$, a critical value which falls as the α 's rise. The foreign country is both larger and poorer (such that at an interior equilibrium $v^{*B} = v^{*S} < v^S$), with $N=1000$, $N^*=1500$, and $\gamma=.45$. The home country will get more of the gains from trade both because it is smaller and because its import is less in demand. [This intuition is based on Equation (2.4).]

We solved the model for different values of the parameters θ , β , and \bar{l} . The relative effectiveness of predatory labor, θ , ranges from 0 to 1 in increments of .025. The spoilage factor, β , ranges from 0 to 100% in increments of 10%. The fixed cost of defending trade, \bar{l} , ranges in the following charts from 1% to 6% of the agent's labor endowment. No trading equilibria have been found with $\bar{l} > .06$.



Figure 2. Parameters Supporting Trade

Figure 2 plots the values of (β, θ) pairs for which an equilibrium with gains from trade for both countries exists for at least one of the \bar{L} . Equilibria with trade were found for 22.0% of this parameter sample. If the fixed costs of defense were permitted to run up to 100% of producer labor, we would find trading equilibria in only 1.32% of the expanded parameter space. As shown in Figure 2, the system is driven to autarky by combinations of high θ and low β , which tend, all else equal, to encourage banditry.

Figure 3. Parameters Supporting Interior Equilibria

Of the trading equilibria, 33.8% are interior equilibria with positive levels of trade, defense, and predation. Figure 3 shows the combinations of β and θ which support interior equilibria for at least one \bar{L} .

As one would expect, high β and low θ push the system toward secure trading equilibria.

Figure 4. Trading Equilibria with $\bar{l}=.01$ and $\bar{l}=.05$




Figure 4 shows separately for $\bar{l}=.01$ and $\bar{l}=.05$ the parameters which support secure and insecure trading equilibria. A comparison of these two plots suggests four important insights. First, for a given spoilage rate β , as the fixed costs of trade rise, so does the minimum θ necessary to draw the first agents into banditry. This is unsurprising, since the higher \bar{l} lowers trade volumes, all else equal, and lowers expected returns to predation. Second, for a given β , as \bar{l} rises so does the maximum θ compatible with trade because, given smaller trade volumes, a higher θ is needed to generate enough banditry to completely deter trade. Third, note that for some β and θ the equilibrium could be shifted from autarky to trade if \bar{l} could be raised through some sort of defensive cooperation.

Finally, note that for $\bar{l}=.05$, trading equilibria occur for an intermediate range of θ , but not for higher or lower θ . Unlike the others, this is quite a

surprising result, because one would expect to find secure trade with sufficiently low θ or high β . The simulations show, however, that at $\bar{l}=.05$ and $\beta=.2$ the foreign country gains from trade at $\theta=.1$ but loses from trade as the security of trade *improves* (θ decreases). This reflects the “immiserizing security” effect which is more completely explained in the following section.

Uniqueness of equilibrium conditional on being in the interior seems very difficult to prove analytically. Nevertheless, all interior equilibria we have found appear to be unique because grid searches with varying starting values failed to turn up any other equilibria. Global uniqueness is of course ruled out because of the self-fulfilling prophecy which can always deliver a secure equilibrium when starting with banditry levels sufficiently low.

5.2. *Simulated Comparative Statics*

A key question is the effect of changes in the level of security on the terms of trade and on the welfare of the predators and of the two groups of producers. This section investigates the effect of exogenous changes in two key parameters, the relative effectiveness of predatory labor, θ , and the proportion of the nonpredatory labor force which is employed in defense, \bar{l} . The simulations reveal cases of immiserizing security, in which one country (strictly, all the producers in one country) is harmed by improvements in security.

The probability of successful shipment is an endogenous variable. In our simulations, however, π is nonincreasing in θ and nondecreasing in \bar{l} . We argued in Section 2.2 that declines in security improve the terms of trade of the larger “country” for most parameter values. The simulations reported below all have this property.

The possibility of immiserizing security arises as follows. The poorer country supplies all the bandits, since migration to the richer country is assumed impossible, but banditry is a free entry career. Thus, an increase in predation incipiently raises the real income of producers in the poorer

country by reducing the size of its productive sector and improving its terms of trade. When the poorer country is also the larger country, a decrease in security improves its terms of trade for two reasons, the "emigration" effect and the direct effect discussed in Section 2.2. The terms of trade effect for a large poor country can dominate the negative impact on welfare of reduced trade volumes, at least when initial security is high and initial trade volumes are large.

Predator welfare responds in somewhat surprising ways. A partial equilibrium perspective suggests that predator welfare must fall as security improves through falling θ or rising \bar{l} . However, since the supply of predators is infinitely elastic at the level of utility of the poorer country, increases in security can reduce predator welfare if and only if security is immiserizing for the poorer country as a whole. Conversely, over the "normal" range in which improvements in security enhance welfare for the productive agents in the poorer country, the improvements in security also increase the welfare of the predators.

Return to the case in which $\bar{l}=.05$ and $\beta=.2$. Interior equilibria exist over the range $.1 \leq \theta \leq .15$. Simulation over this range shows that security decays monotonically with increases in θ , as do the home country's terms of trade and home gains from trade. The foreign country's gains from trade, however, bear a nonmonotonic relation to θ . Figure 5 illustrates the case, showing on the y-axis the foreign country's gains from trade as a proportion of autarky utility. For $\theta > .12$, the welfare of foreign producers (equal to the welfare of the predators) deteriorates with increases in θ and corresponding decreases in the security of exchange. However, for low θ , where trade is relatively secure and trading volumes are high, the foreign country actually gains from decreased security.


Figure 5. Immiserizing Security


Figure 5 also offers a clear answer to a question raised in the previous section. Why is there no secure trading equilibrium when the fixed costs of trade are as high as 5% of productive labor? The answer is that the terms of trade hypothetically consistent with international equilibrium in the market for the home country's import do not generate gains from trade for the foreign country. The flat portion of the curve in Figure 5 lies below the x-axis.

Summarizing, increases in θ increase banditry and lower security (π) endogenously, raise p (the price of the foreign country's export), and yet lower welfare on balance in both countries for the higher range of θ , when trade is highly insecure and hence the volume is low. However, at lower ranges of θ , implying higher π and hence larger trade volumes, the terms of trade effect and the migration effect dominate the volume effect of greater security and the larger poorer country is hurt by further improvements in security. In contrast, the smaller, richer "home" country gains from improvements in security throughout.

It is worth emphasizing that immiserization is not connected with inferiority or special conditions on backward bending export supply; it comes through the direct effect of security on the terms of trade and the indirect effect through changing relative country size through entry or exit from banditry.

In the second set of simulations, we examine the effect of a rise in \bar{l} , the minimum defense level, on welfare in the two countries. This can also be regarded as the payoff to coordinated levels of defense effort, assuming costless coordination.¹³ A common value of \bar{l} is altered in both countries simultaneously. Simulations show that as \bar{l} rises, the level of security (π) rises, the home country terms of trade (p) improve, and the home country's gains from trade steadily increase. The foreign country's gains from increased defense effort, however, first rise, then fall. Starting from very low levels of security in trade, both countries gain from enhanced defense. However, after some point the welfare improvement associated with increased trade volumes is swamped by the negative terms of trade effects for the foreign country, and further increases in defense lower its welfare. Notice that the foreign country loses from trade at both very low and very high levels of defense, so for these ranges of the security requirement, autarky will be the actual equilibrium. (Figure 6 is based on $\beta=.3$ and $\theta=.1$.)

Figure 6. Coordinated Defense and Gains from Trade




One other interesting nonmonotonicity arises for some parameter values. As shown in Figure 7, initial increases in the amount of labor

¹³ In practice, governments and various other institutions organize collective action for defense, in a costly manner to be examined in future work. Defense is a classic public good. In this case the free rider problem is international, presenting some extra complications of organization.

devoted to defense can actually call forth a greater commitment of labor to predation (with $\beta=.3$ and $\theta=.1$).

Figure 7. Coordinated Defense and Predatory Labor



Summarizing the results of the simulations, we have

Proposition 2

There exist parameter values for which improvements in security via greater defense effort or better technology of defense are immiserizing for large poor countries.

5.3. Robustness of Simulation Results

Our conclusions about the shape and relative magnitude of the predation/defense parameter space which supports trade are dependent on the values of α , α^* and N/N^* . Moreover, they are highly model specific. Nevertheless, we argue that the conclusions are robust with respect to variations in technology specification and relative country size.

The effect of variations in α and α^* on the measure of the parameter space supporting trade (1.32%) is obvious --- symmetric increases in α and α^* will raise the measure. The values chosen already force a large technological gain from trade, however, so our conclusion about the fragility of trade seems likely to be robust. Greater asymmetry of country size will reduce the measure by increasing the range of very unfavorable terms of trade which fail to

dominate autarky. Even completely symmetric countries have trade equilibria only in a small portion of the parameter space.

More general specifications of preferences and production technology are similarly unlikely to alter the conclusion of small measure. (i) Increases in the elasticity of substitution in consumption (equal to one above) will raise the volume of trade, *cet. par.*, while (ii) decreases in the elasticity of transformation in production (infinite above) will lower the volume of trade, *cet. par.* The net effect of changes to more realistic cases is likely to be trade reducing on balance. (iii) Risk aversion (in the sense of concave transformations of utility functions) is likely to shrink trade and also to shrink predation, with a net effect which is ambiguous but probably small.

The effect of changes in the specification of predation is more complex. Simply altering the functional form of the success rate to a concave function of L^B / L^D will not change the conclusions. Switching to a multi-factor model of production and predation opens up more possibilities, including one in which the larger, richer country may tend to benefit from insecurity.¹⁴

6. Conclusion

A general equilibrium trade model with endogenous predation has been thoroughly explored in this paper. We conclude by reviewing the main

¹⁴ In the Heckscher-Ohlin model we can sketch one plausible scenario. Assume that *ex ante* identical agents bring their per capita share of capital with them into banditry. We have to assume some sort of cooperation to get both factors their competitive factor reward in banditry. If the factor intensity of banditry lies between those of the two goods, for some factor endowments there will be bandits from both countries in equilibrium. Improvements in security will result in relative endowments being pushed further apart, so trade volume is more sensitive to security than in the Ricardian model. The possibility of immiserizing security in the larger, poorer country will be reduced, as both countries experience increases in their endowments which are trade creating. Indeed, it seems possible that producers in the smaller, richer country could prefer less security. This result will be even more likely if predation is the most capital intensive industry, as in this case the rich country has a comparative advantage in it. Immiserizing security will certainly be possible if the richer country is larger. In contrast, if predation is the least capital intensive industry, we return to the Ricardian result that predators come from the poorer country. We regard the latter specification as more plausible for banditry, but for some problems (e.g., intellectual property rights) it may be useful to think of predation as capital intensive.

results and suggesting the interesting future extensions to which they point.

Under anarchy, that is, without coordination of predation or defense, trade exists only for a narrow range of technological parameters which interact in the intuitive ways explored in this paper. An even narrower range of parameters supports insecure interior equilibria with trade and predation. This suggests the importance of institutions which foster common defense or which organize, and perhaps restrict, predation. The role of such institutions in enabling trade is explored in our sequel paper.

Security is shown to have significant terms of trade effects, amplified by the migration of labor into or out of predation. This can lead larger, poorer countries to lose from improvements in the security of international exchange. Immiserizing security suggests a potential for international conflict due to opposing interests with respect to security. It is natural, therefore, to investigate noncooperative approaches to the provision of international security. We plan to do so in our sequel research.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

7. Agents' Decisions in the Cobb-Douglas Case

A closed form solution for production and trade obtains if we assume that utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of the consumption bundle:

$$u = x_1^\gamma x_2^{1-\gamma}.$$

Here, x denotes consumption. With some judicious substitution, we obtain a closed form solution for the quantities in four steps.

First, we obtain a solution for the import relative share. The combination of the efficiency conditions (1.5) for imports and (1.6) for output implies

$$\frac{\pi u_1^G}{(1-\pi)u_1^B} = \frac{p}{a_1/a_2 - p}.$$

For the Cobb-Douglas case this implies

$$\frac{\pi (x_2^G/x_1^G)^{1-\gamma}}{(1-\pi)(x_2^B/x_1^B)^{1-\gamma}} = \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} (x_1^B/x_1^G)^{1-\gamma} = \frac{p}{a_1/a_2 - p}.$$

Here, we have used the fact that $x_2 = y_2 + m_2$ in each state. Now note that

$$x_1^B/x_1^G = y_1/(y_1 + m_1).$$

Solving this expression for the import relative share m_1/y_1 we obtain

$$(7.1) \quad \frac{m_1}{y_1} = \left[\frac{(1-\pi)p}{\pi(a_1/a_2 - p)} \right]^{-1/(1-\gamma)} - 1 \equiv f(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma),$$

where $\alpha = a_1/a_2$. The import relative share is undefined at $\pi=1$, as is appropriate since in that case the classic Ricardian model obtains and production will either be equal to zero or indeterminate. It is defined everywhere else, which means that with Cobb-Douglas preferences, complete specialization is never optimal in the presence of predation.

Second, we obtain the consumption ratio in the two states in terms of the import relative share and the production ratio. We substitute into the ratio of consumption in the two states using $m_2 = -pm_1$ to solve in terms of m_1/y_1 and y_2/y_1 .

$$\frac{x_1^B}{x_2^B} = \frac{y_1}{y_2 + m_2} = \frac{1}{y_2/y_1 - pm_1/y_1} \quad \text{and}$$

$$\frac{x_1^G}{x_2^G} = \frac{y_1 + m_1}{y_2 + m_2} = \frac{1 + m_1/y_1}{y_2/y_1 - pm_1/y_1}.$$

Third, we solve for the production ratio. Substituting the preceding expressions for the consumption ratios into the efficiency condition for imports and using $f(p)$ for the import relative share m_1/y_1 we obtain:

$$\frac{\pi u_1^G}{\pi u_2^G + (1-\pi)u_2^B} = p = \frac{\pi \gamma \left[\frac{1+f(\cdot)}{y_2/y_1 - pf(\cdot)} \right]^{\gamma-1}}{\pi(1-\gamma) \left[\frac{1+f(\cdot)}{y_2/y_1 - pf(\cdot)} \right]^{\gamma} + (1-\pi)(1-\gamma) \left[\frac{1}{y_2/y_1 - pf(\cdot)} \right]^{\gamma}}$$

This expression may be solved for y_2/y_1 to yield:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_2}{y_1} &= \frac{p \left\{ \pi(1-\gamma)[1+f(\cdot)]^{\gamma} + (1-\pi)(1-\gamma) \right\}}{\pi \gamma [1+f(\cdot)]^{\gamma-1}} + pf(\cdot) \\ &= p \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} + pf \frac{1}{\gamma} + p \frac{1-\pi}{\pi} \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} (1+f)^{1-\gamma} \\ &= p \frac{f}{\gamma} + \alpha \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} = \frac{pf + \alpha}{\gamma} - \alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, in combination with the full employment constraint $\mathbf{a}'\mathbf{y} \leq l^s$ the production ratio yields the closed form solution for y_1, m_1, y_2, m_2 as functions of the exogenous variables p and π and the technology parameter α .

$$(7.2) \quad y_1 = \frac{l^s / a_2}{pf(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) + \alpha}.$$

Then in turn:

$$(7.3) \quad m_1 = \frac{f(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma)}{pf(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) + \alpha} l^s / a_2$$

$$(7.4) \quad y_2 = l^G / a_2 - \alpha \gamma \frac{l^s / a_2}{pf(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) + \alpha}$$

$$(7.5) \quad m_2 = -\gamma pf(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) \frac{l^s / a_2}{f(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) + \alpha}.$$

Now we are in a position to consider the partial equilibrium comparative statics of system (7.2)-(7.5). It is immediate that a rise in 'effective size' l^G/a_2 will raise trade volume, as is intuitive. We anticipate that a rise in π will raise the level of trade m_1 and the degree of specialization measured by y_2 . A rise in α should also raise trade as it increases the gap between the autarky price ratio and the price available through trade.

To develop these ideas it is necessary as a preliminary step to differentiate the import relative share function $f(p, \pi, \alpha)$.

$$f(p, \pi, \alpha, \gamma) \equiv \left[\frac{p(1-\pi)}{(\alpha-p)\pi} \right]^{-1/(1-\gamma)} - 1, \text{ hence}$$

$$(7.6) \quad f_p = -\frac{1+f}{1-\gamma} [1/p + 1/(\alpha-p)] < 0$$

$$f_\pi = \frac{1+f}{1-\gamma} [1/\pi + 1/(1-\pi)] > 0$$

$$f_\alpha = \frac{1+f}{1-\gamma} [1/(\alpha-p)] > 0.$$

Now we are in a position to analyze the properties of the per capita import demand function $m_1(p, \pi, a)$. Differentiating (7.3) with respect to p :

$$(7.7) \quad m_{1_p} = m_1 \left[\frac{f_p}{f} \left(1 - \frac{pf}{pf + \alpha} \right) - \frac{1}{pf + \alpha} \right] < 0.$$

The negative sign follows from noting that the square bracket term is negative for positive imports.

As for the response of m_1 to a rise in π , we can show that this is positive and approaches zero as complete specialization is approached:

$$(7.8) \quad m_{1_\pi} = m_1 \left(1 - \frac{p}{pf + \alpha} \right) \frac{f_\pi}{f} > 0.$$

Deriving the foreign economy's excess demand functions in the Cobb-Douglas case simply replicates the steps above, recognizing that the role of goods 1 and 2 is switched, and recognizing that the relative price of imports for the foreigner is $1/p$ and that the marginal rate of transformation relevant to the steps above is that for the import good in terms of the export good, so $\alpha^* \equiv a_2^*/a_1^*$. All properties are the same, *mutatis mutandis*.