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ABSTRACT

The Changing Economic Advantage from Private School

Despite its relatively small size, the private school sector plays a prominent role in British society. This paper focuses on changing wage and education differentials between privately educated and state educated individuals in Britain. It reports evidence that the private/state school wage differential has risen significantly over time, despite the rising cost to sending children to private school. A significant factor underpinning this has been faster rising educational attainment for privately educated individuals. Despite these patterns of change, the proportion attending private school has not altered much, nor have the characteristics of those children (and their parents) attending private school. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the idea that the private school sector has been successful in transforming its ability to generate the academic outputs that are most in demand in the modern economy. Because of the increased earnings advantage, private school remains a good investment for parents who want to opt out, but it also contributes more to rising economic and social inequality.

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I. Introduction

Private schooling, in its various guises, is an important feature of education systems across the world. The existence of a private education sector generates the possibility for parents to opt their children out of state provided education. In the case of the UK, private schools, though far less numerous than state schools, have for a long time played a very prominent role in the UK’s economy and society.¹ There is ample evidence that private school attendance generates significant economic advantages later on in life as individuals earn more in the labour market and more likely to get top jobs.² Indeed, the notion that privilege and later success are conferred on those attending private school remains a politically charged issue of debate.

Given this, it is surprising that we currently know very little about how the economic and social impact of private education has evolved over time. We know next to nothing about how the higher earnings of the privately educated and their ability to successfully access jobs higher up the occupational ladder have shifted through time, nor what the drivers of any observed shifts might be. This therefore forms the subject matter of this paper. We provide a range of empirical evidence on the extent to which private/state school wage and education differentials have changed over time, and discuss possible transmission mechanisms that could underpin the observed trends.

The economic and social backdrop to this is important. Much has been made of the rises in wage inequality and falls in social mobility that have occurred in the UK in the last thirty to forty years (see Machin, 2010, or Blanden and Machin, 2009). Yet, we do not know whether private versus state school attendance has contributed to these significant shifts.

¹ For example, in the UK there is plenty of descriptive evidence showing that, relative to state schools, private schools educate a significantly disproportionate number of those who find economic, political and social success in later life (Sutton Trust, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Boyd, 1973; Reid, 1986).
² See, inter alia, Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Dearden et al. (2002) and Naylor et al. (2002).
In this paper we therefore investigate the changing association between attendance at a private school and subsequent economic success in the labour market. We connect our findings to the discussions of changing wage inequality and social mobility, and also to the changing nature of the market for private schools. This is important as private school fees have risen very sharply over time and, as school fees ration access according to family wealth, the larger the economic returns to private education need to be to generate a ‘payoff’ for parents investing in such education for their children.

We document evidence that the private/state school wage differential has risen significantly over time, despite the rising cost to sending children to private school. A significant factor underpinning this has been faster rising educational attainment for privately educated individuals. Despite these patterns of change, the proportion attending private school has not altered much, nor have the characteristics of those children (and their parents) attending private school. This is suggestive that the pattern of sorting into private schools may not matter much in accounting for changes in wage and education differentials through time. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the idea that the private school sector has been successful in transforming its ability to generate the academic outputs that are most in demand in the modern economy. Because of the increased earnings advantage, private school remains a good investment for parents who want to opt out, but it also contributes more to rising economic and social inequality.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly review the marked changes that have taken place in private sector education provision over the last thirty years or so, and discuss the quite small body of working studying the economic advantages associated with private school attendance. Section III describes the data used in this study and presents some initial descriptive statistics. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V offers an interpretation of the findings, connecting them to the wage
inequality and social mobility literatures, discussing sorting and selection into private school, and offering a calculation of the net returns to private school investment, implied by our gross wage return estimates and information about average school fees. Section VI concludes.

II. The Changing Private Education Environment in Britain

Historical Context

Private schools in Britain have a long history dating back at least to 597 AD. In any modern economy with a fully-fledged education system, however, private schools have to contend with the threat that the state will crowd out private investments in time-honoured fashion. Private schools have, therefore, to offer their potential clients something in addition. Top of the list for most schools come better teaching resources, and supportive peer effects through selective admissions procedures. Private schools may also cater for pupils with specialised needs or with religious preferences, the latter being a common hallmark of private schooling in many countries.

From the parents' perspective, outcomes of the investment in private school education can be academic (better qualifications, access to better universities) or non-academic (the ‘rounded individual’, the ‘confident leader’, better ‘soft skills’). Either the improved qualifications, or the non-academic outcomes, or both would then deliver economic returns to the investment as gauged by better pay or access to higher-ranking jobs (perhaps via higher-ranking university education). Such schools might also be thought to provide access to ‘old boys’ networks’ or ‘old girls’ networks’. To compete with state education, schools can also deliver consumption services superior to those available in government schools or elsewhere: sports facilities and tuition, music and other cultural goods, which are tied with the academic education package.
This range of strategies affords room for a variety of private schools, with mixed offerings and pricing structures. Indeed, private schools in Britain are quite heterogeneous. They include the traditional ‘public schools’, the ex-direct grant schools, other private secondary schools, the prep schools, and a small number of pre-prep and specialist schools. Most are for boarding, either exclusively or as a choice; almost all used to be single-sex, though many are now co-educational. Schools vary also in their mix of emphasis on academic and non-academic outcomes; and there is additional variation by religious affiliation. Nonetheless, what all private schools share is the facility to offer something different from state-maintained schools in return for a fee. To represent their common interests, most private schools belong to one or more of ten associations, which in turn are members or affiliates of the Independent Schools Council (ISC).

Recent Changes

The emphases of private education have changed over recent decades. In Rae’s (1981) perspicacious insider account of the public schools in the 1960s and 1970s, he describes how the schools were obliged to adapt to a new and uncertain environment, characterised by changes in state education, associated political conflict over private schooling, and changing social mores. During the 1950s and 1960s, there had been growing unrest about the UK educational system, primarily surrounding the use of selection at age 11 and the continued existence of the private educational sector, which was seen as a bastion of the upper classes. In 1964 Harold Wilson became Prime Minister as leader of the Labour Party, with commitments from the previous year’s party conference to call for an end of the selection system and tackle “the problem of public schools”. By 1965 the government had asked Local Educational Authorities (LEAs) to draw up plans to convert to a comprehensive system, and appointed a commission to review private education. One of the recommendations (later accepted) from its second report was the abolition of Direct Grant
grammar schools, which were partly fee-paying, partly subsidised and academically selective. These schools were given the option of joining the comprehensive system or becoming fully private, which is what two thirds of them did. While the commission did not broaden its attack on the rest of the private school system, the political uncertainty remained and in 1973 the Labour Party in opposition drew up a long-term strategy for proscribing private education altogether. It was only when these plans were abandoned once in power (supported only by a thin majority) that the threat to private schools was alleviated.

The need for political legitimacy in the face of ideological opposition is advanced by Rae as one reason why private schools were starting to become more academic over this period. Other pressures came from above – a decline in monopoly access to Oxford and Cambridge universities, the rise of other universities – and from below in the form of growing parent power. At the start of the 1970s private schools saw an opportunity in the closing of grammar schools around the country, with groups of parents fearing the effect the new comprehensive system would have on their children. These parents had only two options: to band together and appeal to their Local Education Authority (LEA) to maintain the selective schooling system or to send their child to a private school. The former was only moderately successful, with 19 out of 138 LEAs remaining selective.³ For private schools to take full advantage of grammar school closure they needed to attract parents by showing them that they provided an educational product worth paying for. All these factors meant that the private schools “became more ruthless and single minded in their pursuit of academic success” (Rae, 1981: 155). The balance of the curriculum was shifted away from the traditional emphasis on classics towards the sciences (Sanderson, 1999: 102-3). More entrance exams were introduced and pass marks were raised. Schools advertised their ever-

³ It has recently been shown (Manning and Pischke, 2006) that these remaining LEAs are not random, and selection to undertake the comprehensive system was correlated with the socio economic background of its population.
decreasing pupil-teacher ratios, the average A-level grades of their pupils, and the number of leavers attending Oxbridge; and they became themselves more business-like in their management.

These internal changes within private schools, along with the changing economic and political environment, coincided with a reversal of the schools’ fortunes. The sector, parts of which appear to have been in terminal decline during the 1960s and up till the mid 1970s, enjoyed a proportionate stabilisation and then a revival from the late 1970s. Figure 1, which shows the numbers of full time pupils, schools and teachers in the private sector since the mid-1960s, very clearly shows this revival of fortunes.4

Though the ‘revolution’, as Rae termed it, was said to be over by 1979, this was only the start of an era in which parents would be willing to pay continuously-increasing real fees for private education. Figure 2 shows the scale of these increases. Rising fees could be rationalised if parents thought they were getting increased benefits for their money, including rising earnings premia. Two broad socio-economic trends lay behind the rising propensity to pay: the “knowledge economy”, implying skill-biased technological change (Berman et al., 1994) with a rapidly-rising demand for qualified labour, and increasing female labour force participation. The former meant that high-level qualifications were going to be increasingly necessary for economic success, in contrast to previous eras when lower qualifications combined with family and school connections were enough. The latter meant that girls were increasingly committed to a successful future in the labour market, with its academic demands.5 These broad trends applied to all pupils, but the greater flexibility of the private sector, not held back by fiscal or political constraints, enabled it to offer the required improved academic services. The premium for private education would thus be predicted to

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4 See Glennerster (1970: 131-8) for a contemporaneous dissection of the reasons for private sector decline.
5 Even among boys, the increased fees were said to generate a moral commitment to try to ‘do well’ (Walford, 1986: 242).
have increased in this period. One indication of the improved services is that the pupil-teacher ratio declined slowly through the 1970s and more rapidly since then (Figure 3). The drive towards academic achievement was also given added emphasis at the margins by the secession of the direct grant schools and later by the Conservative government’s Assisted Places Scheme which, from 1980 onwards, began to subsidise places in private schools for a small proportion of able pupils.

The aggregate outcome of these developments has been that the academic achievements of private school pupils have been maintained, or even increased, relative to those of state-school pupils, despite the continued improvements of the latter as the education system expanded in the late 1980s and 1990s. At the top, especially, private schools re-asserted and defended their share of places at Oxford and Cambridge despite the earlier loss of traditional exclusive routes. The lowest points in Oxford and Cambridge acceptances from private schools were encountered in 1976 and 1980 respectively (see Figure 4). The early 1980s leap in their Oxbridge success rates is partly associated with the addition of the previous, highly academic, direct grant schools; but the rate was maintained at a high level, in the range 45% to 55%, until the present. More broadly, private schools tend on average to score higher than state schools on sixth form value-added measures.

High aggregate success rates do not, however, prove anything per se about the efficacy of private schooling in generating academic achievements or higher pay, if only because private school pupils come from well-resourced family backgrounds and are often selected on cognitive ability as well as ability to pay. Formal evidence, which conditions for these background variables, is necessary.

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6 Within the private school sector, there is evidence that lower pupil-teacher ratios lead to superior academic performance (Graddy and Stevens, 2003).
7 Though means-tested, the scheme’s beneficiaries were often children of professional and managerial parents, many of whom had been at private school (Fitz et al., 1989).
Existing Evidence on the Economic and Education Returns to Private School

There are just a few studies that consider the economic and education returns to a private school education in Britain. On education, for both sexes, there is sound evidence that private schooling raises overall academic achievements (Dearden et al., 2002). A caveat to this finding, though, is that on average university students who had attended a private school are, ceteris paribus, less likely than similar students from state schools to obtain a good degree (Naylor and Smith, 2004; Smith and Naylor, 2001, 2005).

In terms of wages, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) report a premium on wages of approximately 7% six years after graduation, using a sample of 1980 graduates. Dearden et al. (2002), while investigating school quality, report a 20% wage premium (after allowing for highest qualification) at age 33 for employees who had attended private school at age 16 in 1974; but found no evidence of an effect at age 23, or for females at either age. Covering a later time, Naylor et al. (2002) found an average private-school premium of 3% for university students graduating in 1993; they also found considerable variation in the premium, which was positively correlated with the fees paid.

In total, not a great deal is known about the economic impact of private schools on their pupils. Moreover, there is little evidence about the channels through which the impact takes effect and none at all about how the impact and the channels may have changed as the schools have been modernised.

III. Data and Initial Descriptive Analysis

Data

The main data sources we use are two British cohort studies, the National Child Development Study (NCDS), a cohort of individuals born in a week of March 1958, and the

9 Walford (1990: 44-59) provides a review of earlier mainly non-formal studies.
British Cohort Study (BCS), a similarly structured cohort born in a week of April 1970. Information is gathered about these cohort members and their immediate families at ages 7, 11, 16, 33 and 42 for NCDS (and 5, 10, 16, 30 and 34 for BCS). The design of these surveys has allowed use of a host of comparable characteristics before and after the major educational choices made throughout a child’s life. For the dependent variable used in our earnings analysis, we use information obtained at age 33 (NCDS) in 1991 and age 34 (BCS) in 2004, where employees are asked to provide information on their usual pay, pay period and number of hours worked. From this we have derived a figure of gross hourly earnings.\(^{10}\) We also look at educational attainment as an outcome of interest, placing attention on whether NCDS and BCS cohort members obtain a degree by age 23 (in 1981 and 1993 respectively).

One of the main benefits of using the NCDS and BCS is that it allows us to consider pre-school treatment characteristics, both cognitive and non-cognitive. On the former, we look at a range of cognitive tests taken by the cohort members.\(^{11}\) The non-cognitive attributes of the child are observed in the first sweep, where the mother is asked to describe the child’s characteristics through a series of 20 questions. We place these questions into two categories similar to the Rutter Scales (Blanden et al., 2008) for externalising behaviour such as: temper tantrums, hyper-activity, fights often; and for internalising behaviour including: sleeping problems, being a solitary child, biting of nails and experiencing headaches. This

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\(^{10}\) There is significant attrition and as we shall see the useable number of observations is considerable smaller than the 17000 or so in the original samples. We have run validation checks to ensure that there have been no significant biases introduced in terms of the characteristics identified in the Birth Sweep, which by definition is representative.

\(^{11}\) We drew upon a range of similar tests the cohort members undertook, omitting tests that only one of the cohorts experienced. In the first sweep standardised scores on vocabulary tests and Harris Figure drawing exercises were used. Age 11/10 cognitive skills were derived from standardising reading comprehension, and maths scores, as well as word and pattern recognition matrices. Although reading based tests were undertaken at age 16, the NCDS used a comprehension based test and the BCS used a vocabulary base (this was the same test as aged 11 and so there was a lot of clustering near the top of the distribution). In its place we used English and Maths exam results taken at age 16, using two scales from 0-5, with 5 being an A grade or Grade 1, for O-levels and GCEs respectively.
information is then combined into two scales using principal component analysis and finally we ensured that the relationships between these responses and the behavioural scales were the same across cohorts, establishing that we were capturing the same childhood characteristics.

**Initial Descriptive Analysis**

Table 1 shows some initial descriptive statistics on the average log real earnings and degree acquisition of private and state educated individuals from the NCDS and BCS for all cohort members and separately by gender, together with cross-cohort changes. The latter show the change over time in the private/state earnings of education differential. These changes all move strongly in favour of the privately educated in all cases, for both earnings and education. For example, for all cohort members the private/state earnings differential rises significantly from .223 log points to .344 log points, a rise of .121. Similarly, the proportion getting a degree rises from .25 higher for private versus state up to .39 higher, corresponding to a 14 percentage point relative improvement. Sharp rises in both private/state earnings and degree acquisition differentials are seen for both men and women, with the cross-cohort change in the earnings differential increasing by more for women (.159 as compared to .083) but the degree acquisition differential increasing by more for men (.164 as compared to .124).

**4. Empirical Findings**

*Empirical Modelling Approach*

Our analysis considers cross-cohort changes in the statistical associations between our economic and educational outcomes of interest and private (versus state) school attendance. In a general way, we can represent a statistical model for log earnings $E$ of individual $i$ in cohort $c$ as follows:
\[ E_{ic} = \alpha_c + \beta_1^c P_{ic} + \delta_1^c X_{ic} + \epsilon_{1ic} \]  

where \( P \) is a binary indicator of private school attendance, \( X \) contains a set of control variables and \( \epsilon \) is an error term.

In (1) the cohort-specific private/state school earnings gap is the estimated coefficient \( \hat{\beta}_1 \). We are interested in how this changes over time for our two cohorts and thus want to test the null hypothesis of no temporal change, \( \hat{\beta}_{1NCDS} = \hat{\beta}_{1BCS} \). We thus present estimates of the change over time, \( \Delta \hat{\beta}_1 = \hat{\beta}_{1BCS} - \hat{\beta}_{1NCDS} \).

We also estimate an analogous model for degree acquisition, \( D \), as:

\[ D_{ic} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2^c P_{ic} + \delta_2^c X_{ic} + \epsilon_{2ic} \]  

where the change over time in the private/state school degree gap is \( \Delta \hat{\beta}_2 = \hat{\beta}_{2BCS} - \hat{\beta}_{2NCDS} \).

Finally, we are interested in how much of the changing earnings differential accruing to private schools can be explained by changes in degree acquisition. To do so we control for degree acquisition in (1) as

\[ E_{ic} = \alpha_3 + \beta_3^c P_{ic} + \delta_3^c X_{ic} + \theta_3 D_{ic} + \epsilon_{3ic} \]  

and calculate the change in the earnings differential conditional upon degree acquisition as \( \Delta \hat{\beta}_3 = \hat{\beta}_{3BCS} - \hat{\beta}_{3NCDS} \). Thus the share of the overall change \( \Delta \hat{\beta}_1 \) attributable to changes in degree acquisition is \( (\Delta \hat{\beta}_1 - \Delta \hat{\beta}_3) / \Delta \hat{\beta}_1 \).

**Cross-Cohort Changes in Private/State Earnings Differentials**

Table 2 shows estimates of cross-cohort changes in the private/state wage differential from three models. The first shows the raw gaps (as per Table 1) with no controls, the second shows estimates from regressions conditioning upon family background measures (detailed in the notes to the Table) and the third additionally includes early age test scores. It is evident that, in the cross-sectional cohort models, the estimated private/state wage differentials fall on the inclusion of the controls but, importantly, they fall by very much the
same kind of magnitude in both cohorts. This leaves the cross-cohort change at very much
the same magnitude. In the full specifications including family background and test score
variables, the private/state earnings differential rises by a statistically significant .13 log
points for all cohort members, and by .11 and .18 log points for men and women
respectively.

We have also cross-validated these findings (to the extent we can on a comparable
basis) with data from the British Household Panel Survey. Appendix Table A1 and A2 show
estimates analogous to Tables 1 and 2 for birth cohorts born before and after 1960 from the
BHPS (there are only two regression specifications in Table A2 as the BHPS data is not as
rich as the cohort data and does not include test score information). Reassuringly, the results
in the BHPS Tables very much confirm the findings from the cohorts and are very close. In
the regression specification conditioning on the same family background variables as the
Table 2 middle specification, the private/state wage earnings differential rises by .10 log
points for all individuals, and by .05 and .11 for men and women respectively.

**Cross-Cohort Changes in Private/State Degree Acquisition Differentials**

Table 3 shows analogous models with degree acquisition by age 23 as the dependent
variable of interest. There are clear shifts in favour of the privately educated that occur over
time. In the full regression model there is a strongly significant rise in the private/state
degree acquisition proportion of .17. Increases are similar (and statistically significant) for
men and women at .18 and .16.

**The Role of Changes in Degree Acquisition in Changes in Earnings Differentials**

The analysis to date shows that earnings and educational attainment differentials
have moved sharply over time in favour of privately educated versus state educated
individuals. It is natural to ask how much of the rise in the earnings differential can be
explained by increased education. Table 4 shows a crude test of this by including highest
educational qualification in the Table 2 earnings equations. For all cohort members the .13 rise from the full specification from Table 2 falls to .06. Thus just over half (= [.13 - .06]/.13) of the rise in the earnings differential can be attributed to differentially increased education. The size of the education contribution from this naïve test is similar for men and women when considered separately.

Consideration of Non-Cognitive Skills

Many commentators argue that a key feature of private education is that it confers on people non-cognitive or behavioural skills that are of benefit in life. The cohort studies we analyse are very useful in this regard as they contain data on various of these skills. We have thus additionally included a range of measures of non-cognitive abilities into the full earnings specifications from Table 2. The results are reported in Table 5.

Additionally controlling for behavioural/non-cognitive skills makes very little difference to the overall results. The cross-cohort change in the private/state earnings differential rises by the same as it did in Table 2 - by .13 for all cohort members, and by .11 for men and .18 for women.

5. Discussion and Interpretation

The empirical results of the previous section make it clear that earnings and educational attainment have improved at a faster rate for privately educated versus state educated British individuals. So far this has been considered in isolation, but the findings have wider relevance and also require some careful interpretation as to their meaning. This is what we consider in this section, starting by linking the findings to the literatures on wage inequality and social mobility, and then offering some discussion of what the findings mean.

Connections to Changing Wage Inequality
Wage inequality (i.e. the gaps between the highest and lowest paid in society) have risen very markedly in Britain since the late 1970s (see the recent analysis of four decades worth of data in Machin, 2010). It is clear that the decade by decade evolution of wage gaps between the rich and the poor have been different, a significant aspect of the inequality rise has been the importance of changes in the wage returns to education (Katz and Autor, 1999; Machin and Van Reenen, 2008). Indeed, the common perception is that education has become more important as a determinant of labour market outcomes and that, as the average return to education has risen, so has the variance of returns.\footnote{Indeed, evidence exists showing more variation in returns to observable indicators like degree subject/college major (Machin and Puhani, 2003), to college quality (Black and Smith, 2006; Hussain, McNally and Telhaj, 2009) and tilts in the wage structure by years of education (Lemieux, 2008; Angrist et al., 2006).} Despite this, there is not much evidence connects information on schools attended to increased heterogeneity of wage returns.

As private/state earnings and education differentials have widened out at the same time as rising wage inequality, the findings we report suggest that type of school attended is likely to have been factor at play. This is both because of more rapid education acquisition and rising relative wages in the labour market.

\textit{Connections to Changes in Social Mobility}

On changing social mobility, one can see that the predominant economic and social position of private school graduands can be seen alongside evidence of persistent class separation in Britain (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004) and the period of decreased social mobility (Blanden et al, 2004) that accompanied the general educational expansion of the last quarter century. Argument over whether private education restricts mobility and inculcates privilege, or whether it merely reflects the existing inequality, dates back at least to the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Rae, 1981: 23). Indeed, the presence of a significant earnings premium attached to private school attendance underpins the argument that private schools
strengthen privilege, since this acts to reinforce across generations the already existent inequalities.

In the economic literature the extent of intergenerational income mobility is typically measured the coefficient $\beta$ in the following statistical regression for log earnings of children (when of adult age), and parents:

$$E_{i\text{child}} = \beta E_{i\text{parents}} + e_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Evidence from Britain based upon a cross-cohort comparison shows that $\beta$ has risen, implying a fall in intergenerational mobility (Blanden et al, 2004). A literature exists which tries to explore the reasons why (see Blanden and Machin, 2009) and it is straightforward to decompose a change in $\beta$ over time into earnings returns to given characteristics and the connection between such characteristics and parental earning. To see this, consider the following two life cycle stages:

Stage 1: The relationship between earlier age/childhood factors, $Z$, and parental earnings:

$$Z_i = \theta E_i^{\text{parents}} + u_i$$

Stage 2: The relationship between child earnings (as an adult) and these earlier age factors

$$E_{i\text{child}} = \lambda Z_i + v_i$$

Here $\theta$ measures the sensitivity $Z$ to parental earnings and $\lambda$ the income ‘returns’ to $Z$, ($u_i$ and $v_i$ are error terms). Substituting stage 1 into stage 2 yields the intergenerational function $E_{i\text{child}}^{\text{parents}} = \theta \lambda E_i^{\text{parents}} + \omega_i$, making it evident that $\beta = \lambda \theta$.

To be more concrete for our interest $Z$ can be though of as measuring private/state education, so that $\theta$ measures the sensitivity of private/state education to parental income (stylistically ‘how much more likely children from rich backgrounds are likely to be privately educated’) and $\lambda$ the earnings differential between private and state education (‘how much more the privately educated earn’).
We have already demonstrated a significant rise in \( \lambda \). What about \( \theta \)? We consider this in Table 6 where we report cross-cohort changes in the sensitivity of private versus state school attendance to family income. It is evident from all specifications that people from richer backgrounds are significantly more likely to attend private school. Importantly, however, the empirical association with income is constant over time. Thus, on the private/state school angle, falling social mobility is more connected to rising private/state earnings differentials.

*Changing Sorting and Selection*

One obvious issue that arises in point-in-time cross-sectional studies that estimate the private/state school earnings differential is the issue that potentially high earning individuals may select or sort themselves into private school. To the extent that this is the case this would bias estimates of the earnings gap between privately and state educated individuals.

Our analysis is different as we study changes through time. Thus only if any cross-sectional bias due to sorting/selection is constant over time would our estimates of the cross-cohort increase in the differential be accurate. We can however use the rich data from the cohorts to (at least partly) appraise this issue. We can first see whether private versus state school attendance differs on the usual kinds of observables that people are able to look at. One example of this has already been considered in Table 6 where the association with parental income is reasonably stable across cohorts.

However, there are many more observable and unobservable variables that may cause individuals to be differentially sorted in private school. We thus have looked at the constancy (or otherwise) of associations between private school attendance and a range of variables that can be consistently defined across the NCDS and BCS cohorts. To be more specific, we have considered the following variables:

i) parental income;
ii) demographic characteristics of children and their parents;

iii) cognitive test scores;

iv) non-cognitive skills;

v) school characteristics.

The richness of these variables is an advantage over many of studies since we do have variables that are usually thought of as unobservables (e.g. like the non-cognitive measures available in the data). If these show similar associations with private school attendance then it may be plausible that other variables that could cause differential sorting may also do so. This is not unlike the Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) argument on sorting on observables and unobservables for US catholic schools where ****** (SM to fill in).

Table 7 provides tests of cross-cohort constancy of the estimated coefficients for the sets of variables in i) to v) above. The pattern is striking in that private school attendance seems to be correlated with these factors in very much the same way across cohorts. Thus these factors do not cause any bias in the cross-cohort changes we report. It would need to be some other factor to start giving concerns that the rise in the estimated private state earnings and education differentials may not be accurate.

Estimates of the Net Return for Parents

To obtain the increased earnings benefits from private school attendance, pupils’ families had to pay fees. A key question to ask is: did they get good value? While it is impossible to provide a definitive answer to this question with available data, one can deduce an order-of magnitude estimate for the average net return. Taking the private-school-educated respondents in the BCS cohort, the average annual boarding fee was £2700 at 1980 prices, which with an assumed 10-year private-school period, and allowing for alternative cost reductions, equates roughly to £75,000 at 2000 prices. At this point in their lives our estimate (a 19% premium) implies an additional £5,000 extra pay received in 2000. While
this premium might alter over time it would extend into pension receipts. Using this figure as a rough estimate of annual returns over the course of a post-school lifetime gives a return on capital of approximately 7%.

The estimates of the net return and the premium, however, are also subject to a few caveats. Perhaps most importantly, the transformation of private schools changed considerably the experience of children at private schools. Vastly improved facilities for diverse sporting and cultural activities raised the quality of the experience over previous eras. These benefits, widely known to exceed those available in state schools, net out part of the cost of private school investments. The estimated average net rate of return, 7%, is thus an underestimate. For those groups of private-school pupils who were at the lower quantiles of the residual pay distribution and who appear to have received no financial premium, their consolation might have to be sought here.

6. Conclusions

Despite its relatively small size, the private school sector plays a prominent role in British society. A good understanding of the magnitude and source of the private school premium and any trends over time is important from a public policy perspective. However, for various reasons this subject has been almost entirely under-researched. In this paper we provide evidence that earnings and education differentials have risen significantly over time for privately educated versus state educated individuals.

The implications of these findings are as follows. On average those paying for private education in the 1970s and beyond were getting good value for their money. Above the fact that private school pupils were spending their school lives enjoying facilities normally far better than those available in state schools, these pupils benefited through improved pay later in life, and the financial return is broadly comparable to the returns on other capital. Around
the average the benefits were greater for some than for others, but so also did the fees vary. It is also apparent that the chief means of delivering the labour market return is through the better academic qualifications that are delivered by private schools using their rising resources. If academic achievements are, therefore, to be a target for government policy, emulation of the private schools would appear to be a policy worth considering. Nevertheless the exclusiveness of the private schools is also shown in the fact that the sector has not expanded beyond its roughly 8% of the total pupil base for many decades. Our findings also imply that many others could have benefited from the boost given by the resources available in private schooling, but did not do so. Since selection into the schools, despite some bursaries and the Assisted Places Scheme, is primarily based on families’ ability to pay, and given the substantial returns achieved, it is hard to escape the conclusion that private schools during the period under examination also served to reproduce inequalities in British society.13

Neither the NCDS/BCS comparison nor the BHPS split will have captured the effect of the inflation-busting rises in school fees of the recent decade. Therefore, the changes we have examined in this paper only cover the start of a period of long-term transformation of the private school sector fuelled by rising resources. There is an ongoing research need here, to examine whether very recent private school graduands are getting still larger premiums to match the rising fees. We think that research into these private returns should also be part of a broader plan for better understanding of the role of private schools in Britain, including their external effects on other schools and within the labour market, with concomitant implications for both education and taxation policies.

13 See Walford (1991: 103-121) for a balanced consideration of arguments for and against private schools in the light of contemporaneous evidence.
References


Boyd, D. (1973) Elites and Their Education. The Educational and Social Backgrounds of Eight Elite Groups, Slough, NFER.


Sanderson, *. (1999) ********.


Walford, *. (1986) ********.

Walford, *. (1990) ********.

Walford, *. (1991) ********.
Figure 1: The Relative Quantity of Private Education, England 1964-2006

Notes: Source-DSCF 2007; i) Full Time Pupils Only; ii) State Sector Includes; Primary, Secondary, Nursery & Special Schools; iii) Includes both the full-time and the full-time equivalent of part-time teachers; iv) From 1971 onwards, State Sector only includes qualified teachers; v) Independent Sector includes Direct Grant Grammar Schools up to and including 1980; vi) From 1990 Independent Sector includes City Technology Colleges; vii) From 2004 Independent Sector includes City Academies.

Figure 2: The Price of Private Education.

Notes: Source – Independent Schools Council Census Data, 1982-2008; Authors’ calculations; RPI, ONS 2006; Prior to 1992 the average fee is not weighted by school size.
Figure 3: The Pupil-Teacher Ratio, England, 1964-2006.

Notes: i) Full Time Pupils Only; ii) State Sector Includes; Primary, Secondary, Nursery & Special Schools; iii) Includes both the full-time and the full-time equivalent of part-time teachers; iv) From 1971 onwards, state sector only includes qualified teachers; v) Private Sector includes Direct Grant Grammar Schools up to and including 1980; vi) From 1990 Private Sector includes City Technology Colleges; vii) From 2004 Private Sector includes City Academies.
Figure 4: Applications and Acceptances to Oxbridge from Private Schools

Source: Oxford and Cambridge Admissions Offices.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NCDS Cohort</th>
<th>BCS Cohort</th>
<th>Cross-Cohort Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Earnings in 1991, age 33; Degree Acquisition in 1981, age 23]</td>
<td>[Earnings in 2004, age 34; Degree Acquisition in 1993, age 23]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Private/State Differential (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Real Earnings</td>
<td>2.385</td>
<td>2.162</td>
<td>0.223 (0.035)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.250 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Real Earnings</td>
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<td>2.305</td>
<td>0.230 (0.056)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.275 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Real Earnings</td>
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<td>1.976</td>
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<td>Degree</td>
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<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.219 (0.039)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sample sizes: All, NCDS 4,869; Men, NCDS 2,742; Women, NCDS 2,127; All, BCS 4,778; Men, BCS 2,573; Women, BCS 2,111.
Table 2: Earnings Differentials (Private Versus State School)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Additionally Include Early Age Test Scores</th>
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<td><strong>A. All</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.120</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCS, 2004</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCS, 2004</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCS, 2004</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sample sizes: All, NCDS 4,869; Men, NCDS 2,742; Women, NCDS 2,127; All, BCS 4,778; Men, BCS 2,573; Women, BCS 2,111. The No Controls specification for All includes a gender dummy. Family background variables: dummies for both parents for UK national, natural parent, also includes age they left school, current age, social status. For the cohort member regional and ethnic dummies are included along with number of siblings and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 1713).
Table 3: Degree Acquisition (Private Versus State School, Linear Probability)

<table>
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<th>Additionally Include Family Background</th>
<th>Additionally Include Early Age Test Scores</th>
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</thead>
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<td>A. All</td>
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<td>Private School (.028)</td>
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<td>.143</td>
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<td>B. Men</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private School (.037)</td>
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<td>.439</td>
<td>.164</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private School (.039)</td>
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<td>.122</td>
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Notes: Sample sizes: All, NCDS 4,869; Men, NCDS 2,742; Women, NCDS 2,127; All, BCS 4,778; Men, BCS 2,573; Women, BCS 2,111. The No Controls specification for All includes a gender dummy. Family background variables: dummies for both parents for UK national, natural parent, also includes age they left school, current age, social status. For the cohort member regional and ethnic dummies are included along with number of siblings and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 1713).
Table 4: Earnings Differentials (Private Versus State School) Controlling For Highest Qualification

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Women</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sample sizes: All, NCDS 4,869; Men, NCDS 2,742; Women, NCDS 2,127; All, BCS 4,780; Men, BCS 2,573; Women, BCS 2,111. The No Controls specification for All includes a gender dummy. Family background variables: dummies for both parents for UK national, natural parent, also includes age they left school, current age, social status. For the cohort member regional and ethnic dummies are included along with number of siblings and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 1713).
### Table 5: Earnings Differentials (Private Versus State School), Including Behavioural/Non-Cognitive Skills

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Full Specification From Table 2 (Including Family Background and Early Age Test Scores)</th>
<th>Additionally Control For Behavioural/Non-Cognitive Skills</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. All</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.184</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sample sizes: All, NCDS 4,869; Men, NCDS 2,742; Women, NCDS 2,127; All, BCS 4,780; Men, BCS 2,573; Women, BCS 2,111. Family background variables: dummies for both parents for UK national, natural parent, also includes age they left school, current age, social status. For the cohort member regional and ethnic dummies are included along with number of siblings and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 1713). Non cognitive test scores: Internalising and Externalising behaviour generated by principal component analysis for the following characteristics; Internalising- headaches, sleeping problems, eating problems, wetting bed, worries a lot, unhappy, sucks thumb, bites nails, fearful, unliked, solitary; Externalising – Temper tantrums, highly active, fidgets, destroys belongings, fights, irritable, cannot settle.
Table 6: Private School Attendance and Standardised Family Income  
(Linear Probability)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NCDS, 1991</th>
<th>BCS, 2004</th>
<th>Cross-Cohort Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. All</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Family Income)</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Family Income)</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Log(Family Income)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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Notes: Sample sizes: All, NCDS 4,869; Men, NCDS 2,742; Women, NCDS 2,127; All, BCS 4,780; Men, BCS 2,573; Women, BCS 2,111. Family income determined at age 16.
Table 7: Cross-Cohort Differences in the Determinants of Private School Attendance
(Linear Probability)
## Appendix

### Table A1: Descriptive Statistics BHPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BHPS Pre-1960 Cohorts (Mean Age = 48.7)</th>
<th>BHPS Post-1960 Cohorts (Mean Age = 33.4)</th>
<th>Cross-Cohort Change</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Private/State Differential (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. All</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Real Earnings</td>
<td>2.233</td>
<td>2.079</td>
<td>0.154 (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.259 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Men</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Real Earnings</td>
<td>2.377</td>
<td>2.198</td>
<td>0.179 (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.230 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Real Earnings</td>
<td>2.089</td>
<td>1.951</td>
<td>0.138 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.4115</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.288 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors. Sample sizes: All, pre-1960 32,593; Men, pre-1960 16,915; Women, pre-1960 15,678; All, post-1960 30,875; Men, post-1960 14,865; Women, post-1960 16,010.
Table A2: Earnings Differentials (Private Versus State School) BHPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Controls</th>
<th>Additionally Include Family Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.154 (.038)</td>
<td>.289 (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.179 (.055)</td>
<td>.259 (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Women</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>.139 (.059)</td>
<td>.287 (.055)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors. Sample sizes: All, pre-1960 32,593; Men, pre-1960 16,915; Women, pre-1960 15,678; All, post-1960 30,875; Men, post-1960 14,865; Women, post-1960 16,010. The No Controls specification for All includes a gender dummy. Family background variables: age dummies, dummy for the south-east region, dummies for father having degree, further education qualification, some qualification (omitted cat: no qualification) an indicator for living in non-intact families when the respondent was 16, number of siblings, mother’s age when respondent was born and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 1713). All regressors are fully interacted with age dummies in specifications pooling pre- and post-1960 cohorts.