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**Gender-Job Satisfaction Differences across Europe -
An Indicator for Labor Market Modernization**

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**Gender-Job Satisfaction Differences across Europe -
An Indicator for Labor Market Modernization**

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ABSTRACT

In 14 member states of the European Union, women's relative to men's levels of job satisfaction are compared by using data of the European Household Community Panel. The countries under consideration can be assigned to three different groups. Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands do not show significant gender-job satisfaction differences. In contrast, in Portugal men are more satisfied with their jobs than women. However, in the vast majority of the investigated countries female workers show a significantly higher level of job satisfaction. As the majority of women are disadvantaged compared to men in the labor market, the findings clearly demonstrate a gender-job satisfaction paradox in these countries. From this point of view, only Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands display gender-job satisfaction equality.

The results suggest that objective (socio-economic and institutional) determinants of labor market statuses and subjective (assessed and evaluated) perspectives are mutually complementary. The more restrictive the labor market access and process is for women, the more likely a gender-job satisfaction paradox is to emerge in any country. With regard to the process of labor market modernization, the results support the hypotheses that equal opportunities for women and men like in Scandinavian countries and also partially in the Netherlands implicate that the gender-job satisfaction paradox does not appear anymore due to a fading-out process over past decades.

JEL Classification: J 28

Keywords: cross-national comparison, gender-job satisfaction paradox, labor supply, labor market modernization

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Introduction

Job satisfaction plays a key role for the subjective well-being and is a crucial factor for labor market outcomes. "Greater employee well-being is associated with better job performance, lower absenteeism, and reduced job turnover, and is therefore of particular interest to firms and other organizations" (Frey and Stutzer 2002: 29). In addition to the focus on the pecuniary perspective, the aspect of job satisfaction contains potentials for an important variable to analyze the "inequality in the overall returns to work" (Hamermesh 2001: 1). Furthermore, job satisfaction is relevant for the economic performance, albeit "(e)conomic performance is not intrinsically interesting. (...) The relevance of economic performance is that it may be a means to an end. That end is not the consumption of beefburgers, nor the accumulation of television sets, nor the vanquishing of some high level of interest rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind's feeling of well-being" (Oswald 1997: 1815). Conclusively, "(t)he consideration of objective and subjective indicators is nowadays the prevailing research strategy" (Noll 2002: 51). For instance, job satisfaction is also relevant to social policy, which is never limited to exclusively material matters. Even a pecuniary redistribution is likely to have an impact on immaterial aspects like the stability of relationships between parents (Walker and Zhu 2005). Hence, social policy requires subjective indicators (Veenhoven 2002). Overall, job satisfaction is an important indicator for the economy and society as a whole. In the following, not job satisfaction as such, but gender differences in job satisfaction across member states of the European Union (the EU15, except Sweden¹) is the focus of attention. The objective is to test whether gender differences in job satisfaction are assignable to variations in labor market and welfare state regimes.

Job Satisfaction Positions, the Gender-Job Satisfaction Paradox and Labor Market Modernization

Job satisfaction positions can be presented in a fourfold matrix. The conditions of the workplace ('good' and 'bad') represent objective employment conditions. However, these conditions also strongly depend on the institutional background of the national and/or regional labor market regime like the social security system, taxation or the child day care infrastructure which influences labor supply opportunities (Dingeldey 2001). These aspects do have an important impact on labor supply prospects, both for women and men, as they affect incentives and the possibility to supply labor and the quantity supplied (Fahey and Smyth 2004). As "(h)appiness does not only lie within the realm of the individual person (...), the fundamental constitutional arrangements, as well as specific institutions, crucially affect how happy people are" (Frey and Stutzer 2002: 175). In a second stage, job satisfaction is of subjective nature, since individuals assess their objective conditions subjectively, for instance by means of comparison-groups (Staw 1986, Clark and Oswald 1996). Hence, job satisfaction-positions depend on a combination of objective employment conditions and a (subjectively assessed) job satisfaction level (table 1). Within such a framework, originally developed by Zapf for welfare positions, a fourfold job satisfaction matrix describes, for instance, 'Adaption' as a combination of bad objective employment conditions and a good subjective job satisfaction. In this case, job satisfaction is a result of leveling (table 1).

Referring to reference level effects, the so-called expectation hypothesis assumes that there is a job satisfaction premium in terms of overall job satisfaction for those who expect relatively little from their job. The expectations can, for example, concern the opportunities for advancement. In psychological terms, reference levels are

rationalized as a “function of the perceived relationship between what one wants from one’s job and what one perceives it as offering or entailing” (Locke 1969: 316).

Table 1: Job satisfaction matrix^a

Objective employment conditions	subjective job satisfaction	
	'good'	'bad'
'good'	'WELL-BEING'	'DISSONANCE'
'bad'	'ADAPTION'	'DEPRIVATION'

Notes: ^a Following Zapf (1984, p. 25).

Within this nexus, the alleged universally valid gender-job satisfaction paradox suggests that women possess a higher level of overall job satisfaction as compared to men despite an obvious disadvantaged position of women in the labor market, because the satisfaction gap of what is expected and what is actually reached is comparatively small for women. Accordingly, the more or less pronounced disadvantage in the labor market, e.g. in terms of earnings or promotion prospects (EUROSTAT 2002), forces women to reduce their job expectations. Therefore, “(w)omen’s higher job satisfaction does not reflect that their jobs are unobservedly better than men’s, but rather that,

perhaps because their jobs have been so much worse in the past, they have lower expectations” (Clark 1997: 365).

So far, the gender-job satisfaction paradox, i.e. the expectation hypothesis, was confirmed for the UK (Clark 1996; 1997, Sloane and Williams 2000), whereas little has been done so far to test this hypothesis on a cross-national basis. An exception is the analysis of Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, who remark that a higher overall job satisfaction for women especially occurs in liberal welfare states. Nevertheless, the authors do “have no ready explanation as to why it applies primarily to Great Britain and the United States” (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza 2000: 150).

However, Clark (1997) and Sousa-Poza/Sousa-Poza (2003) state that this apparent paradox is only a transitory phenomenon, as it has to be expected that gender-job satisfaction differences are diminishing as soon as employment opportunities for women and men are converging. Therefore, the (non-)existence of the gender-job satisfaction paradox can be utilized as a proxy for the level of gender-modernization of a labor market regime in terms of equal conditions and equal opportunities. Thus, job satisfaction-positions also reflect the institutional background.

With the selection of 14 European countries, an important aspect of cross-national research is taken into account, namely variation within a common basis of the analysis, namely Europe (cf. Scheuch 1990). Within this common frame, the countries can be assigned to different welfare state concepts and to different labor market regimes²: Denmark and Finland to a social-democratic, the Netherlands to a conservative/social-democratic, Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Germany to a corporatist,

Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to a residual and the UK and Ireland to a liberal regime. Conclusively, welfare-state regimes entail different labor market regimes with adequate structures and institutions.

Nonetheless, labor market regimes are non-static, as changes over time can be observed in many ways, for instance in terms of female labor supply which increased substantially over the past decades in the European Union. A shift in the female's bargaining power within marriage associated with a rise in the opportunity costs of raising children, has encouraged women to increase their supply of labor and combine a specialization in domestic work with market work, mainly by part-time employment (Ott 1992; 1995). However, cross-national differences in the institutional background are likely to affect the EU-wide rise of female economic activity, i.e. either they promote or they complicate the labor market integration of women. In macro terms, the micro-based development of changing employment patterns can be explained by the 'modernization-approach'. One of the leading contemporary commentators on modernization distinguishes between 'initial', 'catching-up', and 'advanced' modernization, with the latter describing the most recent stage (Zapf 1991a; 1991b; 1996). A main feature of advanced modernization, as emphasized by Zapf (2001: 501), is a 'new gender contract' that gives consideration to the rising labor market orientation of women. Thus, a cross-national comparison may use different levels of modernization to scale the current structure of welfare and labor market regimes in terms of a new gender contract.

By means of the following hypotheses, the (non-)existence of the gender-job satisfaction paradox can be interpreted as a proxy for the level of gender modernization in a labor market regime:

- If no significant gender-job expectation gap is observed, it can be assumed that labor market conditions and labor market opportunities of women and men tend to be equal ('Well-Being', see table 1 above).
- A gender-job satisfaction paradox, apparently to the disadvantage for men, suggests that women hold a disadvantaged position in the labor market ('Adaptive').
- An obvious gender job-satisfaction gap to the disadvantage of women occurs if their job satisfaction level is significantly lower than the job satisfaction of men ('Deprived').

What kind of job satisfaction-positions have to be expected if the respective institutional background that can be regarded as the objective employment condition, is taken into account? For Denmark and Finland, it can be assumed that no significant gender effect would appear, as Danish and Finnish labor market institutions, i.e. the social security system, the tax-system and the child day care infrastructure, tend to promote female labor supply, both in quantitative (employment and activity rate) and in qualitative terms (employment and job status). For the remaining countries, the emergence of a gender-job satisfaction paradox is likely, as their institutional backgrounds cannot be rated as modernized compared to Scandinavian institutions: "In the Nordic countries, the social democratic principles that guide policy design are generally paired with a commitment to gender equality, and the market-replicating principles in the conservative countries are often embedded in socially conservative

ideas about family and gender roles. In the liberal countries, the supremacy of the market system generally drives social welfare designs across all policy arenas" (Gornick and Meyers 2003: 51). This is true, for instance, with regard to child day care infrastructure. In contrast to the Scandinavian countries, the supply of child day care facilities is low in most countries although demand is high (Gornick et al. 1997; 1998).

The Data

The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a longitudinal EU-15 data set for the years 1994 to 2001. The data are processed by EUROSTAT while the field studies are carried out by the respective EU-member states.³ The questionnaire of the ECHP contains questions regarding overall job satisfaction and questions that are related to specific aspects of job satisfaction, using a scale of 6 degrees, ranging from '1' (not satisfied at all) to '6' (fully satisfied). The full data set is used for the investigation of job satisfaction-positions with the analysis focusing on 'overall job satisfaction' and on two specific aspects of job satisfaction: 'job security' and 'number of working hours'. Three job satisfaction categories are taken into account as it may be difficult to interpret the results of the broad category 'overall job satisfaction' without the reference points of more concrete job satisfaction categories. Due to the 'main activity concept' of the ECHP, a questionnaire filter assigns levels of self-reported job satisfaction only to employment of at least 15 working hours per week. Hence, job satisfaction in small part-time or occasional jobs cannot be considered using ECHP data. The following analyses, however, initially investigate some features of employment that are due to objective employment conditions (employment rates, employment status, and job status) to sort out general differences in men's and women's labor supply. Afterwards, job satisfaction discrepancies between men and

women are considered. To guarantee compatibility between the initial description and the analyses with regard to gender-job satisfaction differences, the former is also limited to the working population with at least 15 working hours per week.

Employment Rates, Employment Status and Job Status

The employment rate is a suitable indicator for the quantity of labor supplied. Moreover, beside the employment rate, the activity rate is a figure that additionally accounts for unemployment. With the exception of men in Luxembourg, both average employment and activity rates are highest for men and women in Denmark during the years 1994-2001 (see table 2). Additionally, activity rates are highest for Danish and Finnish women. However, if comparing differences between countries, the (relative) distance regarding labor supply opportunities between men and women should be considered. From this point of view, Finland leads with the smallest (relative) distance between male and female labor supply. Denmark is second, the UK third, Portugal fourth, followed by Austria and France. The highest discrepancies are observed in the three Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy and Greece.

Table 2: Employment rates in % of total employable population, 1994-2001

	FI	DK	UK	PT	AU	FR	DE	BE	NL	LX	IE	IT	GR	SP	EU
male	69.6	82.5	79.9	78.3	79.6	68.3	76.3	71.7	79.1	83.3	71.6	68.3	73.9	66.3	74.0
a)	77.4	86.9	82.5	81.7	82.0	74.6	81.2	75.1	81.8	83.7	80.1	76.9	79.2	77.2	79.6
female	63.5	70.8	64.5	60.7	59.8	50.5	56.3	50.2	53.9	53.4	44.1	38.6	39.7	34.3	50.7
a)	71.7	75.9	65.9	64.5	62.8	58.5	61.8	54.7	58.0	53.8	49.0	48.5	47.4	47.4	57.1

Notes: ^aActivity rates. Ascending ranking according to female-male relative difference in the employment rate, except EU-average. (AU: 1995-2001, FI: 1996-2001). Population 16-65 years of age, working time \geq 15 hours per week. Source: ECHP 1994-2001 (for GE: GSOEP-ECHP, for LU: PSELL-ECHP, for UK: BHPS-ECHP). Author's own calculations.

The employment status, however, here defined as standard employment, non-standard employment⁴ or self-employment, are distributed quite differently among the working population. With respect to the (relative) difference in standard employment, the four Mediterranean countries, Finland, Denmark and Ireland occupy the first seven ranks of this comparison. Due to the comparatively high proportion of part-time employment amongst female workers, the remaining seven countries incorporate a high (relative) distance regarding the share of standard employment. The largest difference occurs in the Netherlands (see table 3).

Table 3: Employment status in % of total employed population, 1995-2001^a

	GR	FI	PT	IT	SP	IE	DK	FR	UK	BE	LU	AU	DE	NL	EU
	male														
standard	56.5	79.8	74.7	68.4	74.3	71.7	88.1	83.0	79.8	82.5	89.5	85.7	88.0	87.8	78.2
non-standard	3.5	3.7	1.4	3.3	2.5	6.6	2.8	3.9	2.9	1.9	1.7	1.6	2.0	5.0	3.0
self-employm.	39.9	16.5	23.9	28.3	23.2	21.7	9.2	13.2	17.2	15.6	8.8	12.7	10.0	7.2	18.8
	female														
standard	66.6	82.2	74.8	65.3	70.4	66.2	79.0	74.4	64.7	66.7	71.4	68.2	70.0	54.2	69.3
non-standard	13.1	8.9	6.9	18.5	13.5	28.1	16.4	19.2	28.1	23.2	23.1	21.3	23.5	40.8	20.1
self-employm.	20.3	8.9	18.3	16.2	16.2	5.7	4.6	6.4	7.1	10.1	5.5	10.4	6.6	5.0	10.6

Notes: ^aStandard (full-time & permanent contract), non-standard (full-time or part-time temporary contract or part-time permanent contract). Ascending ranking according to female-male relative difference with respect to proportion of standard employment, except EU-average (FI: 1996-2001). Population 16-65 years of age working time \geq 15 hours per week. Source: ECHP (for GE: GSOEP-ECHP, for LU: PSELL-ECHP, for UK: BHPS-ECHP). Author's own calculations.

Concerning the job status (see table 4), i.e. a supervisory, intermediate or non-supervisory job position, Ireland and the UK head the considered EU states with the smallest (relative) difference in the share of supervisory jobs. At the very end of that ranking, Germany appears with a more than threefold higher proportion of male supervisory job holders as compared to females.

Table 4: Job status in % of total employed population, 1994-2001^a

	IR	UK	FR	SP	AU	DE	FI	GR	BE	LU	PO	NE	IT	GE	EU
	male														
supervisory	15.4	13.1	17.1	10.1	13.4	20.8	20.1	8.3	16.7	14.3	6.8	16.2	11.5	15.4	13.5
intermediate	15.6	13.5	23.8	19.5	28.8	13.6	16.4	9.1	24.1	26.9	7.3	18.8	17.3	25.8	17.9
non-superv.	69.0	73.5	59.2	70.4	57.8	65.7	63.5	82.6	59.2	58.9	85.9	65.1	71.2	58.8	68.5
	female														
supervisory	8,1	6,3	7,3	4,3	5,5	8,5	8,0	3,3	6,4	5,2	2,4	5,6	3,9	4,6	5,5
intermediate	15,5	11,7	17,7	13,8	18,2	14,1	17,1	5,1	15,7	16,3	6,3	12,4	13,0	14,5	13,4
non-superv.	76,4	82,0	75,0	81,9	76,3	77,4	75,0	91,6	77,9	78,5	91,3	82,0	83,1	81,0	81,1

Notes: ^a(AU: 1995-2001, FI: 1996-2001, GE & UK: 1994-1996). Ascending ranking according to female-male relative difference with respect to proportion of supervisory job status, except EU-average. Employees below 65 years of age, working time at least 15 hours per week. Source: ECHP (for LU: PSELL-ECHP). Author's own calculations.

However, due to the highest share of supervisory jobs both among male and female workers, Denmark and Finland are positioned in the middle of this ranking. Overall, the discrepancies in the job status are enormous between men and women as well as between countries. For example, more than every fifth Danish male worker has a supervisory job status, whereas nearly 9 in 10 Portuguese male workers are placed in a non-supervisory job position. More than 20% of all Danish or Finnish female workers are at least employed in an intermediate position, while more than 90% of Portuguese women have a non-supervisory job status.

Especially the results of tables 2 and 3 but also of table 4 show that Denmark and Finland clearly display superior outcomes for the labor market position of women compared to their female counterparts in the other countries and compared to the relative position of women and men in the respective countries. German women, for example, hold a comparatively disadvantaged position. The situation in Portugal can be described as extraordinary, since the Portuguese labor market still features a

remarkably high share of self-employment. However, the employment rate, participation rate and the share of standard employment workers is comparatively high among women in Portugal, although their job status is far off the level of the other countries.

Gender-Job Satisfaction Discrepancies

Especially for an investigation in differences of self-reported job satisfaction, an implementation of unobserved individual fixed-effects within an ordered probit regression model would enhance the validity of the outcomes (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2005). Nevertheless, this rationale is only suitable for time-variant exogenous variables. As gender-differences in levels of job satisfaction are the main focus of this paper, a fixed-effect approach cannot be applied. Therefore, an ordinary ordered-probit regression model is employed to test for the (non-)emergence of a gender-job satisfaction paradox. This is the standard model that suits to an ordinal scale level of the endogenous variable (Zavoina and McKelvey 1975; Long 1997: 115-147; Greene 2002: cp. 9). The outcome of such a regression model is based on coefficients, rather than on marginal effects, so the interpretation of ordered-probit coefficients mainly account for the sign.

Table A-1 reports the set of exogenous variables of the job satisfaction regressions that refer to a range of job- and individual characteristics which, according to the literature, are likely to influence workers' levels of job satisfaction (Clark 1996; Clark et al. 2001; Judge and Watanabe 1993). The exogenous variables are employment status, number of working hours, occupational background, institutional background, job status, job adequacy, number of jobs, income, household structure, number and

age of children, marital status, education, unemployment history, respondent's age and state of health. Last, but not least, especially in the case of self-reported (job) satisfaction, it is likely that a change in the habit of responding occurs due to social desirability when individuals are interviewed repeatedly in a panel survey. Therefore, the consecutive numbers of interviews is included as an additional control. To test for the hypothesis that job satisfaction diversities between male and female workers within a supervisory job status tend to diminish, an interaction term of 'female' and 'supervisory job position' ('supervisory_f') is introduced into the regression.⁵

For 10 out of 14 countries, the expectation hypothesis cannot be rejected, as women display higher overall job satisfaction than men, pointing to the existence of a gender-job satisfaction paradox (table 5). Hence, women possess an 'adaptive job satisfaction position' in these countries. In Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, no significant gender job satisfaction differences are found, pointing to gender-job satisfaction equality in these three countries. Only in Portugal, a negative gender effect regarding overall job satisfaction emerges. This suggests a 'deprived' position of women in the Portuguese labor market. In 9 countries, women with a supervisory job position do not differ significantly in their job satisfaction as compared to their respective male counterparts. This finding supports the hypothesis of the irrelevance of gender-job satisfaction diversities within a higher job status level segment. An additional interesting finding is the general negative impact of temporary jobs on job satisfaction, which is detected in 12 out of 14 countries. A similar straightforward negative correlation is valid for age, although the negative trend diminishes with rising years of age since the results for the exogenous variable 'age squared' are slightly positive in the respective countries.

Table 5: Women’s satisfaction with their jobs (relative to men)

Aspect	AU	BE	DE	FI	FR	GE	GR	IR	IT	LU	NE	PO	SP	UK
Overall	↑↑	↑↑	/	/	↑↑↑	↑↑↑	↑↑↑	↑↑↑	↑↑	↑↑	/	↓↓↓	↑↑	↑↑↑
Job security	/	↑	/	↓↓	↑↑↑	/	/	↑↑	↑↑↑	↑↑↑	↑↑↑	↓	-	↑↑↑
Working hrs	↓↓	↓↓	↓↓↓	/	↓	/	/	↑↑↑	/	/	↓↓↓	↓↓↓	↓↓	/

Notes: Results from ordered probit regressions using three indicators of job satisfaction as dependent variables. Arrows indicate the significance of a dummy variable for women. ↑↑↑/↓↓↓ = $p < 0.01$, ↑↑/↓↓ = $p < 0.05$, ↑/↓ = $p < 0.10$, / = not significant. Additional controls include employment status, occupational background, institutional background (public vs. private), job status (supervisory vs. non-supervisory), job adequacy (self-estimation of skills), number of jobs, income, household context, child-day care context (number and age of children), relationship context, human capital, unemployment history, life cycle context (age), state of health and panel effects (number of interview), (see table A-1). Robust standard errors (Huber-White estimator). Population < 65 years of age, working time ≥ 15 hours per week. Source: ECHP (for LU: PSELL-ECHP, for UK: BHPS-ECHP, pooled across years: 1995-2001, except FI: 1996-2001, GE: 1995-1996). Author’s own calculations (see tables A-2 – A-4).

Turning to the other aspects of job satisfaction, in the countries where significant results occur, women display a higher satisfaction regarding job security than men (except for Finland and Portugal), but a lower satisfaction regarding the number of working hours (except Ireland). This is also true for Denmark and the Netherlands. Hence, although we find job satisfaction equality with regard to overall job satisfaction, the number of working hours is more sub-optimal for women as compared to men. Nevertheless, the concrete direction of the latter finding cannot be sorted out directly by means of the ECHP data. It has to be assumed that the full-time regime (part-time regime) in Denmark (the Netherlands) may cause dissatisfaction with long working hours (short working hours, i.e. part-time) for female employees, respectively.

The findings are only partially in line with former research results. For example, the Sousa-Pozas obtained no significant gender effects for Germany and Portugal, probably

because their analysis was based on a somewhat simpler measure of job satisfaction.⁶ However, the outcomes of table 5 can be explained by the results of the earlier analysis of men's and women's labor supply (see tables 2 to 4). In those countries with a comparatively conservative institutional background like Germany, women's employment opportunities are restricted by the relatively tight 'conservative' frame of the corporatist welfare regime that forces women to lower their expectations and to expect less than men concerning employment opportunities. This results in a German gender job-satisfaction paradox. The same is true for the UK and Ireland. Obviously, also a liberal setting of the labor market and the welfare state regime is no guarantee for equal opportunities for men and women on the labor market. Yet this finding still does not serve as a conclusive evidence as to why this may be typical of liberal Anglo-Saxon regimes. On the contrary, the emergence of the gender-job satisfaction paradox in Ireland and the UK is just one example of a higher job satisfaction level for women due to their comparatively low expectations that are generated within the frame of a liberal labor market setting. But this kind of gender-job satisfaction paradox does not necessarily occur in liberal labor market and welfare regimes only. A conservative setting, like in Germany, induces a job satisfaction surplus for women, too.

In Denmark and Finland, the rejection of the expectation hypothesis is due to relatively equal employment opportunities for women and men that are valid for full-time positions, too. The same is true in the Netherlands, but the labor regime for women is mainly part-time. However, the match of Danish and Dutch female workers seems to be sub-optimal, as their satisfaction with the number of working hours is below the satisfaction of male workers.

In contrast, the obvious Portuguese gender-job satisfaction gap to the disadvantage of women coincides with an 'extravagant' welfare state and labor market setting in this

South-European country. The relatively high employment rate of women in Portugal and the relative high proportion of women working full-time have to be explained in the light of the poor Portuguese wage level (ILO 1997). As there is no effective public support of employment opportunities for women and mothers, Portuguese women tend to have a level of overall job satisfaction that is even below that expressed by their male counterparts.

Conclusions

To investigate how far job satisfaction differences between men and women can be rated as a measure for the state of a gender-related labor market modernization, fourteen EU countries were analyzed. Overall, three different levels of modernization can be identified.

Denmark, Finland and (partially) the Netherlands at the top with an equal opportunity regime that has to be assessed as 'advanced' modernization. The Danish and Finnish welfare state and labor market regime are deliberately designed to encourage equal employment opportunities for men and women by appropriate child day care and tax and social security systems. Hence, female labor supply opportunities also include the access to full-time jobs to a comparatively high extent, and a flexible allocation of labor within private households in terms of labor supply opportunities is feasible. With regard to the extensive part-time regime in the Netherlands, advanced modernization is valid in this country too, albeit female labor supply opportunities and flexibility are mainly restricted to part-time opportunities, which entail specific wage and career penalties for female workers (Giovanni and Hassink 2005; Prowse 2005).

Secondly, concerning the hypothesis that a job satisfaction surplus for women is of transitory nature, it has to be expected that in those 10 countries where a gender-job

satisfaction paradox emerges, satisfaction differences will be reduced with an ongoing introduction of institutional devices that promote labor market related equal opportunities for men and women. Therefore, these 10 countries can be assigned to a second level of advanced modernization that incorporates an ongoing gender-related labor market modernization which is below the modernization level of Denmark, Finland or the Netherlands.

Thirdly, as Portugal still shows some features of a 'catching-up' modernization, the Portuguese case cannot unequivocally be assessed as 'advanced' modernization. Hence, Portugal cannot really be compared with the other countries. However, in the absence of institutional devices that foster equal opportunities for men and women, the somewhat surprisingly high labor market participation of Portuguese women can mainly be explained by the comparatively low wage level that obliges households to obtain a second, preferably full-time, income. This nexus is presumably correlated with a job satisfaction gap to the disadvantage of women in this country. Thus, for cross-national research, information cannot only be attributed to a specific welfare state policy or labor market regime. Additionally, general economic characteristics, for example the wage level, are indispensable to evaluate differences.

All in all, objective employment conditions and individual estimation of the job satisfaction level are mutually interdependent. The more restrictive the labor market access is for women, the more likely a gender-job satisfaction paradox is to emerge in that country. Finally, these findings also suggest that there is no universal 'female' attitude towards employment that arises intrinsically or even biologically. On the contrary, female labor market participation and gender-job satisfaction differences are due to different employment opportunities that are offered by different welfare state

and labor market regimes and their inherent respective institutions and to differences in economic characteristics.

In the context of a joint European strategy that is being considered to cope with the expected shortage of skilled labor resulting from demographic trends, the increasing educational attainment and rising labor market participation of women offer a unique opportunity to integrate women into European labor markets on a sustainable basis and implement their social rights in practice, that have been codified legally for decades. As 'the extension of social rights has always been regarded as the essence of social policy' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3), this rationale should be highly relevant for the political debate if the access to and/or exclusion from employment is on the agenda.

NOTES

1. Sweden cannot be considered since the Swedish ECHP data do not contain information with regard to job satisfaction.
2. For a recent cross-national conceptualisation, see Goodin et al. (1999). For Portugal, see Santos (1991).
3. An overview of the ECHP is given by Mejer and Wirtz (2002).
4. Frequently, no common definition or terminology for changing patterns of employment is offered by the literature. For instance, both the negative label 'marginal' and the positive label 'flexible' have emerged to describe new forms of employment, when a dividing line is drawn between what is said to be 'ordinary' or 'standard' (namely, permanent full-time waged employment) and 'atypical'. A normative interpretation is often assumed, in which the standard pattern is approved and 'atypical' work is judged to be inferior. There are obvious problems with normative preconceptions of this nature (Dekker and Kaiser 2000). A cross-gender comparison using the terms 'normal/atypical' cannot be applied consistently because part-time employment, for example, would be rather atypical for men but much more common for women. Hence, the terms 'standard' and 'non-standard' employment lead to a more comprehensive view, as female employment patterns have changed even more dramatically over the past decades than those of men. Furthermore, in a cross-national comparison equivalent or at least similar types of employment might be more typical in one country and less typical in another.
5. For the sake of a better overview, tables with prefix 'A' are placed to the annex of this paper.
6. Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) use the cross-sectional data of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and employ a binary probit model, distinguishing between low and high job satisfaction only. Therefore, their approach does not exploit the entire variation of job satisfaction as compared to an ordered probit model.

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Appendix:

Table A-1: Description of exogenous variables, ordered-probit model^a

Variable	Description	assignment
female	sex	gender-job satisfaction paradox
temp	fixed term job	
lnhpw	log working hours per week	employment status
selfemp	self-employed	
manager	legislators, senior officials and managers	
profession	professionals	
technician	(technicians and associate professionals)	
clerk	clerks	
service	service workers, shop and market sales workers	occupational background
agricult	skilled agricultural and fishery workers	
craft	craft and related trades workers	
plant	plant and machine operators and assemblers	
elementw	elementary occupations	
privsector	(private sector)	institutional background
pubsector	public sector	
supervisory_f	supervisory job status, women	
(supervisory_m	supervisory job status, men)	job status*
intermedian	Intermediate	
n_supervisory	non-supervisory	
inequivjob	(inadequat job in terms of skills)	job adequacy
equivjob	adequat job in terms of skills	
second	second job	multiple job holder effect
grossincph	gross income per hour	income effects
singlehhd	single household	
lownparent	single parent household	
kidshhd	(couple with kids)	household context
nokidshhd	couple, no kids	
elsehhd	other household	
sumkid0-2	number of children 3 - 6 years of age	
sumkid3-6	number of children 3 - 6 years of age	child-day care context
sumkid7-15	number of children 7 – 15 years of age	
nevmar	never married	
marri_wido	(married or widowed)	Relationship context
divor_sep	divorced or seperated	
yrsed	years of education	human capital
st_up5	short-term unemployment in past five years	
lt_up5	long-term unemployment past five years	unemployment history
age	age	life cycle context
age ²	age squared	
sick	self-reported bad or very bad health status	state of health
# interview	number of interview	panel effects

Notes: ^a Reference category in parentheses. * self-employees are assigned to supervisory job status.

Table A-2: Job satisfaction regressions (ordered probit model: overall satisfaction)

	AUS	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRE
female	0.070 (2.33)**	0.085 (2.48)**	-0.012 (0.39)	0.028 (0.96)	0.070 (2.96)***	0.135 (3.72)***	0.077 (2.90)***
temp	-0.195 (5.23)***	0.041 (1.03)	-0.062 (1.79)*	0.104 (3.13)***	-0.067 (2.24)**	-0.114 (2.75)***	-0.541 (19.82)***
lnhpw	-0.126 (2.72)***	0.044 (0.80)	0.005 (0.10)	0.094 (2.23)**	0.066 (1.91)*	0.045 (0.80)	0.532 (14.08)***
selfemp	-0.165 (2.58)***	0.027 (0.39)	0.159 (2.15)**	-0.000 (0.00)	0.002 (0.04)	0.203 (2.88)***	-0.230 (4.55)***
manager	0.108 (1.98)**	0.170 (3.29)***	0.075 (1.41)	0.044 (0.99)	-0.040 (0.90)	-0.007 (0.11)	0.019 (0.43)
profession	0.014 (0.25)	0.085 (2.51)**	0.048 (1.32)	0.075 (2.15)**	0.105 (2.86)***	0.123 (2.82)***	0.264 (6.63)***
clerk	-0.087 (2.40)**	-0.089 (2.61)***	-0.106 (2.70)***	-0.068 (1.60)	-0.102 (3.30)***	-0.006 (0.14)	0.062 (1.64)
service	-0.051 (1.36)	-0.042 (0.90)	0.032 (0.77)	-0.004 (0.10)	-0.098 (2.82)***	-0.012 (0.23)	-0.090 (2.18)**
agricult	-0.252 (3.77)***	0.071 (0.40)	0.184 (1.72)*	-0.445 (7.44)***	-0.033 (0.54)	-0.104 (0.82)	-0.493 (10.61)***
craft	-0.150 (4.02)***	0.074 (1.47)	-0.021 (0.50)	-0.236 (5.62)***	-0.062 (1.80)*	-0.110 (2.58)***	-0.146 (3.77)***
plant	-0.303 (5.98)***	0.109 (1.84)*	-0.040 (0.79)	-0.215 (4.05)***	-0.180 (5.04)***	-0.119 (1.90)*	-0.129 (2.90)***
elementw	-0.308 (6.53)***	0.007 (0.14)	-0.076 (1.59)	-0.150 (2.63)***	-0.228 (5.47)***	-0.225 (3.56)***	-0.286 (5.77)***
pubsector	0.158 (5.52)***	0.069 (2.33)**	0.029 (1.04)	0.046 (1.76)*	0.192 (8.97)***	0.114 (3.71)***	0.399 (15.08)***
supervisory_f	0.052 (0.89)	0.073 (1.06)	0.145 (2.34)**	0.069 (1.35)	-0.115 (2.32)**	0.058 (0.71)	0.107 (2.38)**
intermedian	-0.123 (3.43)***	-0.104 (2.55)**	-0.123 (3.04)***	-0.164 (4.01)***	-0.150 (4.86)***	-0.156 (3.37)***	-0.178 (3.15)***
n_supervisory	-0.194 (5.62)***	-0.286 (7.37)***	-0.100 (2.97)**	-0.275 (7.39)***	-0.329 (11.02)***	-0.293 (6.71)***	-0.253 (5.50)***
equivjob	-0.190 (9.83)***	-0.151 (6.27)***	-0.144 (5.94)***	-0.131 (6.38)***	-0.151 (9.52)***	-0.167 (6.23)***	-0.088 (5.01)***
second	-0.014 (0.32)	0.020 (0.35)	0.165 (5.11)***	0.034 (0.89)	0.084 (1.51)	-0.014 (0.27)	0.200 (5.25)***
grossincph	0.105 (5.78)***	0.086 (3.67)***	0.024 (0.87)	0.070 (3.43)***	0.123 (6.39)***	0.191 (6.62)***	0.331 (19.50)***
singlehhd	-0.110 (2.19)**	-0.111 (1.88)*	0.027 (0.65)	0.035 (0.82)	0.024 (0.65)	-0.046 (0.84)	0.017 (0.30)
lownparent	-0.082 (1.76)*	-0.100 (1.49)	-0.056 (0.94)	-0.039 (0.69)	-0.028 (0.71)	0.064 (0.90)	-0.060 (1.38)
nokidshhd	-0.095 (2.71)***	-0.025 (0.62)	0.066 (1.99)**	0.054 (1.77)*	-0.021 (0.83)	0.023 (0.64)	0.054 (1.65)*
elsehhd	0.027 (0.84)	0.136 (1.66)*	-0.132 (2.53)**	0.030 (0.48)	0.038 (0.90)	0.006 (0.09)	-0.037 (1.37)
sumkid0-2	-0.057 (2.27)**	-0.052 (1.87)*	0.017 (0.69)	0.090 (3.63)***	-0.030 (1.47)	-0.021 (0.46)	-0.010 (0.40)
sumkid3-6	-0.069 (2.54)**	-0.036 (1.44)	0.068 (2.57)**	0.053 (2.24)**	-0.044 (2.16)**	0.018 (0.45)	0.040 (1.65)*
sumkid7-15	0.003 (0.22)	-0.026 (1.44)	0.032 (1.75)*	-0.008 (0.55)	0.003 (0.23)	0.017 (0.76)	0.005 (0.35)
nevmar	-0.093 (2.58)***	-0.040 (0.93)	-0.126 (3.70)***	-0.090 (2.58)***	-0.035 (1.29)	-0.012 (0.25)	-0.000 (0.01)
divor_sep	-0.043 (0.85)	0.021 (0.38)	-0.095 (2.08)**	0.031 (0.64)	-0.032 (0.84)	-0.038 (0.63)	-0.012 (0.18)
yr sed	0.003 (0.91)	-0.006 (1.36)	0.000 (0.13)	-0.011 (3.92)***	-0.003 (0.95)	0.002 (0.51)	0.029 (10.86)***
st_up5	-0.014 (0.40)	-0.065 (1.50)	0.005 (0.18)	-0.065 (2.07)**	-0.096 (2.90)***	-0.133 (3.16)***	-0.105 (3.27)***
lt_up5	-0.320 (3.86)***	-0.003 (0.05)	-0.038 (0.79)	-0.031 (0.70)	0.008 (0.16)	-0.134 (1.93)*	-0.094 (2.80)***
age	-0.036 (4.80)***	-0.065 (5.35)***	-0.050 (5.48)***	-0.017 (1.91)*	-0.025 (3.38)***	-0.040 (3.85)***	-0.007 (0.91)
age ²	0.000 (4.05)***	0.001 (5.20)***	0.001 (5.95)***	0.000 (2.21)**	0.000 (2.35)**	0.000 (3.95)***	0.000 (0.66)
sick	-0.552 (7.47)***	-0.646 (5.74)***	-0.593 (7.73)***	-0.420 (5.91)***	-0.570 (11.83)***	-0.654 (8.53)***	-0.063 (0.66)
# interview	-0.011 (2.60)***	-0.008 (1.64)	-0.033 (7.20)***	-0.032 (6.77)***	-0.013 (3.86)***	-0.072 (3.98)***	0.005 (1.37)
l-likelihood_0	-25297.53	-21072.64	-23691.69	-23535.72	-39326.36	-12930.51	-36684.92
l-likelihood	-24666.10	-20790.25	-23322.47	-23117.04	-38461.71	-12588.35	-33295.17
Wald chi(37)	674.72	299.25	376.44	519.21	890.58	512.04	3805.43
Prob > chi ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.0250	0.0134	0.0156	0.0178	0.0220	0.0265	0.0924
N	19327	14235	18305	17507	29559	8936	23291

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses.

Table A-2 (continued):

	IR	IT	LU	NE	PO	SP	UK
female	0.126 (3.80)***	0.088 (2.10)**	0.191 (2.37)**	-0.039 (1.60)	-0.073 (3.36)***	0.046 (2.27)**	0.190 (7.12)***
temp	-0.178 (5.67)***	-0.274 (4.11)***	-0.038 (0.28)	-0.075 (2.93)***	-0.265 (11.27)***	-0.164 (9.12)***	-0.161 (5.50)***
lnhpw	0.093 (2.31)**	0.287 (4.10)***	-0.093 (0.73)	-0.081 (2.38)**	0.367 (8.83)***	0.023 (0.72)	-0.199 (6.44)***
selfemp	0.157 (3.09)***	-0.149 (2.42)**	0.050 (0.30)	0.134 (2.41)**	0.067 (1.69)*	0.030 (0.84)	n.a.
manager	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.090 (1.29)	0.171 (1.09)	0.007 (0.23)	-0.055 (1.21)	0.005 (0.14)	0.072 (2.11)**
profession	0.075 (1.64)	0.069 (1.49)	-0.130 (1.06)	-0.030 (1.18)	0.060 (1.46)	0.118 (3.72)***	0.001 (0.04)
clerk	-0.109 (2.33)**	-0.155 (3.70)***	-0.241 (2.26)**	-0.086 (3.22)***	-0.103 (2.93)***	-0.121 (3.97)***	-0.088 (2.77)***
service	-0.015 (0.32)	-0.153 (2.58)***	-0.231 (1.81)*	-0.002 (0.06)	-0.110 (3.17)***	-0.043 (1.46)	0.068 (1.93)*
agricult	-0.071 (1.11)	0.046 (0.22)	-0.300 (1.56)	0.055 (0.69)	-0.386 (7.87)***	-0.265 (5.86)***	0.222 (1.91)*
craft	0.006 (0.13)	-0.228 (3.50)***	-0.223 (1.87)*	-0.047 (1.39)	-0.293 (8.39)***	-0.114 (4.02)***	0.051 (1.29)
plant	-0.200 (4.04)***	-0.273 (4.18)***	-0.162 (1.18)	0.092 (2.22)**	-0.256 (6.55)***	-0.228 (7.12)***	-0.147 (3.45)***
elementw	-0.230 (4.33)***	-0.547 (6.16)***	-0.431 (3.24)***	-0.062 (1.46)	-0.375 (10.49)***	-0.344 (11.18)***	-0.035 (0.77)
pubsector	0.046 (1.50)	0.144 (4.23)***	0.360 (4.97)***	0.057 (2.73)***	0.321 (13.32)***	0.179 (8.01)***	0.005 (0.22)
supervisory_f	0.101 (1.63)	-0.089 (1.06)	0.001 (0.00)	0.011 (0.20)	0.085 (1.73)*	-0.070 (1.61)	-0.083 (1.89)*
intermedian	-0.015 (0.37)	-0.169 (3.64)***	-0.292 (2.66)***	-0.066 (2.21)**	0.051 (1.22)	-0.098 (3.09)***	-0.126 (3.66)***
n_supervisory	0.010 (0.27)	-0.356 (7.63)***	-0.391 (3.66)***	-0.118 (4.15)***	-0.025 (0.89)	-0.189 (6.40)***	-0.156 (4.67)***
equivjob	-0.268 (12.78)***	-0.114 (4.12)***	-0.241 (3.99)***	-0.106 (6.65)***	-0.090 (5.71)***	-0.146 (10.77)***	n.a.
second	-0.128 (2.93)***	0.179 (1.77)*	-0.016 (0.11)	-0.069 (1.98)**	-0.007 (0.16)	-0.011 (0.27)	-0.011 (0.40)
grossincph	0.124 (6.16)***	0.407 (6.43)***	0.133 (2.00)**	0.039 (2.32)**	0.189 (13.39)***	0.168 (13.53)***	-0.013 (0.55)
singlehhd	-0.025 (0.38)	-0.041 (0.52)	0.080 (0.65)	-0.100 (2.82)***	-0.008 (0.13)	0.027 (0.64)	-0.063 (1.62)
lownparent	-0.035 (0.65)	-0.124 (1.47)	-0.024 (0.16)	-0.114 (2.09)**	0.033 (0.89)	-0.044 (1.39)	-0.079 (1.94)*
nokidshhd	0.060 (1.47)	0.032 (0.55)	-0.149 (1.70)*	0.028 (1.14)	0.117 (4.22)***	-0.004 (0.17)	-0.056 (2.20)**
elsehhd	-0.100 (2.59)***	0.023 (0.37)	0.172 (1.88)*	-0.025 (0.46)	-0.001 (0.05)	-0.007 (0.33)	-0.064 (1.95)*
sumkid0-2	0.008 (0.31)	-0.039 (1.01)	-0.057 (0.77)	-0.010 (0.45)	0.040 (1.82)*	0.016 (0.82)	0.008 (0.34)
sumkid3-6	0.012 (0.46)	0.027 (0.70)	0.095 (1.22)	-0.047 (2.19)**	0.008 (0.36)	0.042 (1.93)*	0.052 (2.26)**
sumkid7-15	-0.016 (1.19)	-0.027 (1.14)	0.014 (0.33)	-0.026 (2.01)**	-0.005 (0.43)	0.005 (0.42)	0.060 (4.35)***
nevmarrr	0.047 (1.03)	0.072 (1.16)	0.018 (0.19)	-0.062 (2.23)**	-0.070 (2.50)**	0.005 (0.18)	-0.094 (3.07)***
divor_sep	-0.014 (0.18)	-0.005 (0.06)	-0.069 (0.59)	-0.060 (1.42)	-0.068 (1.32)	0.014 (0.29)	0.016 (0.45)
yrsted	-0.007 (1.68)*	0.005 (1.55)	-0.010 (1.11)	-0.018 (3.04)***	0.006 (2.58)***	-0.005 (2.30)**	-0.016 (5.40)***
st_up5	-0.160 (4.24)***	-0.052 (0.65)	-0.222 (1.44)	0.010 (0.29)	-0.121 (3.60)***	-0.045 (2.00)**	0.027 (0.99)
lt_up5	-0.176 (3.53)***	-0.030 (0.38)	-0.369 (1.73)*	-0.048 (0.85)	-0.186 (5.05)***	-0.098 (4.44)***	0.075 (1.36)
age	-0.027 (3.45)***	-0.066 (4.20)***	-0.058 (2.34)**	-0.049 (6.80)***	-0.004 (0.73)	-0.039 (7.29)***	-0.049 (7.23)***
age ²	0.000 (4.21)***	0.001 (3.93)***	0.001 (2.40)**	0.001 (6.66)***	-0.000 (0.07)	0.000 (7.48)***	0.001 (7.55)***
sick	-0.535 (4.00)***	-0.304 (3.48)***	-0.448 (2.76)***	-0.656 (10.48)***	-0.309 (9.07)***	-0.375 (7.78)***	-0.218 (6.46)***
# interview	-0.010 (2.16)**	-0.019 (3.28)***	-0.014 (0.35)	-0.028 (8.15)***	0.012 (3.67)***	-0.014 (4.78)***	-0.020 (5.68)***
l-likelihood_0	-24529.21	-13642.60	-2610.66	-39477.84	-46257.28	-48818.21	-44391.43
l-likelihood	-24007.41	-13260.27	-2514.05	-39075.16	-44011.55	-47533.58	-43807.72
Wald chi(37)	574.31	445.90	149.04	453.43	1858.83	1640.95	566.25
Prob > chi ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.0213	0.0280	0.0370	0.0102	0.0485	0.0263	0.0131
N	16664	9345	1920	32093	36152	31074	30022

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses, n.a.=information not available.

Table A-3: Job satisfaction regressions (ordered probit model – satisfaction: job security)

	AU	BE	DE	FI	FR	GE	GR
female	0.043 (1.38)	0.066 (1.88)*	0.004 (0.13)	-0.058 (1.99)**	0.074 (3.11)***	-0.042 (1.14)	0.028 (1.05)
temp	-0.627 (16.20)***	-0.719 (16.23)***	-1.014 (26.04)***	-1.086 (32.08)***	-1.322 (38.38)***	-0.451 (9.57)***	-1.202 (42.36)***
lnhpw	0.025 (0.53)	-0.012 (0.23)	0.115 (2.02)**	0.132 (3.08)**	0.101 (2.73)**	0.013 (0.23)	0.539 (14.40)***
selfemp	-0.188 (2.79)***	-0.307 (4.32)***	-0.068 (0.82)	-0.244 (4.45)***	-0.208 (4.32)***	0.066 (0.91)	-0.549 (9.83)***
manager	0.090 (1.64)	0.101 (1.83)*	0.084 (1.52)	0.006 (0.14)	-0.166 (3.60)***	-0.021 (0.33)	0.063 (1.45)
profession	-0.124 (1.97)**	-0.005 (0.15)	0.046 (1.18)	0.123 (3.44)***	0.031 (0.75)	0.099 (2.05)**	0.132 (3.20)***
clerk	0.058 (1.47)	0.010 (0.28)	-0.088 (2.26)**	-0.077 (1.73)*	-0.023 (0.72)	0.052 (1.18)	0.109 (2.74)***
service	0.081 (2.11)**	0.037 (0.77)	-0.125 (3.10)***	0.055 (1.37)	-0.133 (3.71)***	0.145 (2.74)***	0.026 (0.65)
agricult	0.204 (2.73)***	0.302 (1.58)	0.034 (0.31)	-0.271 (4.54)***	0.317 (5.43)***	0.171 (1.28)	-0.120 (2.58)***
craft	-0.074 (1.95)*	-0.070 (1.51)	-0.121 (2.71)***	-0.131 (3.14)***	-0.097 (2.82)***	-0.172 (4.01)***	-0.208 (5.32)***
plant	-0.097 (1.92)*	-0.071 (1.33)	-0.135 (2.72)***	-0.110 (2.30)**	-0.119 (3.35)***	-0.127 (2.13)**	-0.058 (1.29)
elementw	-0.029 (0.60)	-0.127 (2.73)***	-0.083 (1.73)*	-0.049 (0.93)	-0.123 (3.12)***	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.069 (1.47)
pubsector	0.614 (19.80)***	0.174 (5.62)***	0.230 (8.11)***	0.117 (4.38)***	0.877 (36.92)***	0.459 (14.17)***	0.771 (26.43)***
supervisory_f	0.179 (2.72)***	0.051 (0.69)	0.240 (3.62)***	0.241 (4.65)***	0.000 (0.01)	0.075 (0.86)	0.142 (3.21)***
intermedian	-0.058 (1.58)	0.008 (0.17)	0.155 (3.63)***	0.109 (2.63)***	0.010 (0.31)	0.014 (0.30)	0.007 (0.11)
n_supervisory	-0.176 (4.99)***	-0.093 (2.21)**	0.029 (0.80)	0.020 (0.51)	-0.065 (2.16)**	-0.137 (3.13)***	-0.143 (2.63)***
equivjob	-0.076 (3.84)***	-0.070 (2.87)***	-0.095 (3.81)***	0.023 (1.12)	-0.074 (4.53)***	-0.051 (1.89)*	-0.104 (5.97)***
second	0.014 (0.30)	0.127 (2.38)**	0.100 (3.01)***	0.025 (0.68)	0.101 (1.83)*	0.051 (0.90)	0.033 (0.86)
grossincph	0.077 (3.90)***	0.101 (4.13)***	0.053 (2.03)**	0.114 (5.29)***	0.193 (9.40)***	0.232 (8.50)***	0.258 (16.06)***
singlehhd	-0.070 (1.33)	0.048 (0.85)	0.111 (2.52)**	0.084 (2.05)**	0.060 (1.64)	0.087 (1.57)	-0.016 (0.29)
lownparent	-0.022 (0.46)	-0.033 (0.49)	0.124 (1.96)**	-0.015 (0.25)	-0.041 (1.02)	0.149 (2.04)**	-0.046 (1.04)
nokidshhd	-0.166 (4.49)***	0.067 (1.69)*	0.059 (1.74)*	0.087 (2.88)***	0.038 (1.51)	0.114 (3.08)***	0.022 (0.67)
elsehhd	-0.000 (0.01)	0.096 (1.17)	0.027 (0.51)	0.115 (1.67)*	0.101 (2.30)**	0.046 (0.70)	-0.060 (2.21)**
sumkid0-2	-0.069 (2.83)***	0.039 (1.42)	-0.000 (0.02)	0.016 (0.60)	0.015 (0.74)	0.079 (1.78)*	0.022 (0.90)
sumkid3-6	-0.027 (0.95)	0.024 (0.90)	0.047 (1.75)*	0.043 (1.76)*	-0.006 (0.31)	0.041 (1.05)	0.080 (3.16)***
sumkid7-15	0.008 (0.53)	0.014 (0.77)	0.026 (1.41)	0.044 (2.88)***	-0.023 (1.85)*	0.008 (0.35)	0.034 (2.40)**
nevmar	-0.033 (0.91)	-0.017 (0.39)	-0.106 (2.88)***	-0.073 (2.12)**	0.039 (1.41)	-0.032 (0.63)	0.002 (0.06)
divor_sep	-0.036 (0.66)	-0.059 (1.10)	-0.187 (4.09)***	-0.015 (0.32)	-0.002 (0.06)	-0.103 (1.63)	0.021 (0.34)
yrsted	0.009 (2.45)**	-0.000 (0.06)	0.004 (1.27)	0.006 (2.07)**	0.007 (2.31)**	-0.006 (1.61)	0.017 (6.43)***
st_up5	-0.155 (4.74)***	-0.267 (6.41)***	-0.159 (5.04)***	-0.200 (6.62)***	-0.125 (3.78)***	-0.204 (5.12)***	-0.221 (6.97)***
lt_up5	-0.304 (4.55)***	-0.099 (1.75)*	-0.292 (6.32)***	-0.313 (7.42)***	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.426 (6.43)***	-0.211 (6.40)***
age	-0.055 (7.09)***	-0.087 (7.10)***	-0.090 (9.75)***	-0.084 (9.50)***	-0.057 (7.53)***	-0.061 (5.92)***	0.008 (1.17)
age ²	0.001 (7.49)***	0.001 (7.50)***	0.001 (9.71)***	0.001 (9.14)***	0.001 (6.82)***	0.001 (6.07)***	-0.000 (0.78)
sick	-0.365 (4.86)***	-0.173 (1.92)*	-0.239 (2.86)***	-0.156 (2.34)**	-0.309 (6.52)***	-0.312 (4.18)***	0.099 (0.98)
# interview	-0.002 (0.46)	0.014 (2.82)***	-0.020 (4.45)***	0.038 (7.89)***	0.021 (6.02)***	-0.102 (5.78)***	-0.016 (4.35)***
l-likelihood_0	-26603.31	-22777.42	-26982.06	-27979.54	-46394.60	-14726.71	-39755.55
l-likelihood	-25485.76	-22154.11	-25743.42	-26451.13	-42193.29	-14141.07	-34582.28
Wald chi(37)	1190.94	598.49	1208.88	1926.43	3852.65	847.66	5672.98
Prob > chi ²	0.0420	0.0274	0.0459	0.0546	0.0906	0.0398	0.1301
Pseudo R ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
N	19306	14253	18406	17483	29545	8926	23301

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses.

Table A-3 (continued):

	IR	IT	LU	NE	PO	SP	UK
female	0.066 (1.99)**	0.110 (2.58)***	0.260 (3.40)***	0.160 (6.46)***	-0.038 (1.74)*	0.031 (1.50)	0.112 (4.20)***
temp	-1.032 (30.04)***	-1.056 (14.53)***	-0.488 (3.95)***	-1.024 (36.74)***	-0.825 (33.02)***	-1.080 (55.50)***	-0.924 (27.82)***
lnhpw	0.347 (8.06)***	0.272 (3.91)***	-0.130 (1.04)	0.078 (2.28)**	0.389 (8.71)***	0.166 (5.13)***	-0.041 (1.35)
selfemp	-0.089 (1.55)	-0.299 (4.30)***	-0.136 (0.84)	-0.171 (3.21)***	-0.051 (1.20)	-0.361 (9.57)***	n.a.
manager	0.002 (0.03)	-0.105 (1.39)	-0.007 (0.04)	0.015 (0.49)	0.067 (1.34)	0.060 (1.65)*	0.038 (1.07)
profession	0.037 (0.70)	-0.090 (1.93)*	0.215 (1.67)*	0.017 (0.65)	-0.080 (1.82)*	-0.064 (1.94)*	0.022 (0.65)
clerk	-0.051 (1.02)	0.045 (1.05)	-0.030 (0.27)	-0.191 (6.74)***	-0.050 (1.37)	0.026 (0.82)	-0.049 (1.51)
service	0.116 (2.34)**	0.135 (1.97)**	-0.082 (0.69)	-0.029 (0.93)	0.008 (0.23)	0.063 (2.19)**	0.127 (3.49)***
agricult	0.157 (2.23)**	0.380 (1.92)*	-0.348 (1.66)*	0.023 (0.26)	-0.077 (1.61)	0.059 (1.32)	0.061 (0.48)
craft	-0.212 (3.95)***	-0.058 (0.94)	-0.091 (0.76)	-0.024 (0.71)	-0.153 (4.31)***	-0.118 (4.22)***	-0.108 (2.70)***
plant	-0.376 (7.35)***	-0.033 (0.52)	-0.121 (0.94)	-0.061 (1.51)	-0.132 (3.27)***	-0.131 (4.25)***	-0.080 (1.94)*
elementw	-0.247 (4.56)***	-0.127 (1.46)	-0.040 (0.31)	-0.066 (1.62)	-0.168 (4.60)***	-0.098 (3.28)***	-0.001 (0.02)
pubsector	0.371 (10.95)***	0.583 (16.34)***	0.652 (8.38)***	0.120 (5.44)***	0.352 (14.29)***	0.303 (12.71)***	0.053 (2.11)**
supervisory_f	0.393 (5.76)***	-0.064 (0.69)	-0.041 (0.24)	0.015 (0.28)	0.098 (1.96)**	0.081 (1.93)*	0.021 (0.45)
intermedian	0.371 (7.65)***	0.003 (0.06)	-0.137 (1.17)	0.104 (3.28)***	0.276 (6.18)***	0.141 (4.12)***	-0.035 (0.95)
n_supervisory	0.414 (9.74)***	-0.162 (3.25)***	-0.248 (2.19)**	-0.039 (1.30)	0.070 (2.32)**	0.060 (1.86)*	-0.119 (3.35)***
equivjob	-0.186 (8.65)***	-0.055 (1.88)*	-0.122 (2.03)**	-0.032 (2.00)**	-0.050 (3.21)***	-0.042 (3.04)***	n.a.
second	-0.192 (3.71)***	0.203 (1.86)*	0.278 (1.88)*	-0.041 (1.17)	0.077 (1.86)*	0.012 (0.27)	0.048 (1.64)
grossincph	0.239 (10.63)***	0.262 (3.91)***	0.269 (4.00)***	0.040 (2.32)**	0.142 (10.09)***	0.149 (12.32)***	-0.105 (4.44)***
singlehhd	-0.032 (0.49)	0.074 (0.95)	-0.010 (0.08)	-0.028 (0.76)	0.031 (0.52)	0.047 (1.14)	-0.097 (2.50)**
lownparent	-0.057 (1.11)	-0.138 (1.72)*	-0.032 (0.22)	-0.004 (0.07)	-0.001 (0.04)	0.056 (1.85)*	-0.053 (1.26)
nokidshhd	0.033 (0.80)	0.059 (1.00)	-0.108 (1.26)	0.114 (4.72)***	0.088 (2.89)***	0.054 (2.17)**	-0.019 (0.74)
elsehhd	-0.005 (0.13)	0.042 (0.65)	0.011 (0.11)	0.031 (0.58)	-0.004 (0.17)	0.063 (2.92)***	0.009 (0.26)
sumkid0-2	0.006 (0.22)	0.027 (0.66)	0.119 (1.69)*	0.083 (3.85)***	-0.000 (0.01)	0.016 (0.78)	0.005 (0.22)
sumkid3-6	-0.058 (2.14)**	0.024 (0.58)	0.083 (1.06)	0.044 (2.05)**	-0.009 (0.43)	0.027 (1.22)	0.040 (1.69)*
sumkid7-15	0.006 (0.43)	-0.009 (0.38)	0.058 (1.38)	0.029 (2.14)**	-0.038 (3.15)***	-0.002 (0.14)	0.039 (2.79)***
nevmar	0.023 (0.48)	0.108 (1.76)*	0.018 (0.19)	-0.042 (1.47)	-0.148 (5.12)***	-0.061 (2.44)**	-0.045 (1.47)
divor_sep	0.037 (0.38)	0.078 (0.85)	-0.056 (0.47)	0.005 (0.12)	-0.053 (1.05)	-0.020 (0.42)	0.013 (0.38)
yrsted	-0.001 (0.16)	-0.004 (1.23)	-0.010 (1.21)	-0.021 (3.43)***	0.004 (1.66)*	-0.002 (0.95)	0.001 (0.23)
st_up5	-0.317 (8.26)***	-0.117 (1.56)	-0.178 (1.27)	-0.083 (2.57)**	-0.222 (6.48)***	-0.205 (9.39)***	-0.056 (2.14)**
lt_up5	-0.354 (7.48)***	-0.258 (3.70)***	-0.537 (2.45)**	-0.136 (2.53)**	-0.222 (6.29)***	-0.243 (11.06)***	-0.028 (0.55)
age	-0.047 (5.82)***	-0.039 (2.45)**	-0.009 (0.40)	-0.095 (13.06)***	-0.003 (0.60)	-0.029 (5.67)***	-0.078 (11.38)***
age ²	0.001 (6.12)***	0.000 (2.72)***	0.000 (0.75)	0.001 (11.88)***	0.000 (0.39)	0.000 (6.23)***	0.001 (10.44)***
sick	-0.427 (3.47)***	-0.020 (0.22)	-0.111 (0.62)	-0.354 (6.10)***	-0.123 (3.61)***	-0.142 (3.40)***	-0.181 (5.64)***
# interview	0.036 (7.04)***	-0.029 (5.08)***	-0.049 (1.16)	0.037 (10.24)***	0.020 (6.01)***	-0.003 (1.08)	0.016 (4.52)***
l-likelihood_0	-25558.35	-14261.78	-2768.45	-47639.38	-49643.18	-52735.54	-47789.59
l-likelihood	-23543.66	-13558.05	-2584.16	-45860.70	-46545.55	-48013.21	-46731.46
Wald chi(37)	2329.17	806.87	267.17	2061.29	2557.35	5870.85	1181.10
Prob > chi ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.0788	0.0493	0.0666	0.0373	0.0624	0.0895	0.0221
N	16566	9347	1920	32017	35871	31115	29855

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses, n.a.=information not available.

Table A-4: Job satisfaction regressions (ordered probit model – satisfaction: number of working hrs)

	AUS	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRAU	GER	GRE
female	-0.064 (2.09)**	-0.067 (2.00)**	-0.112 (3.65)***	0.019 (0.67)	-0.033 (1.70)*	-0.023 (0.66)	0.004 (0.17)
temp	-0.199 (5.36)***	-0.026 (0.68)	-0.205 (5.80)***	-0.076 (2.30)**	-0.027 (0.94)	-0.078 (1.96)**	-0.468 (17.20)***
lnhpw	-1.042 (20.22)***	-0.934 (15.72)***	-1.179 (15.74)***	-0.508 (9.59)***	-0.390 (11.75)***	-1.159 (18.24)***	-0.882 (20.35)***
selfemp	-0.239 (3.67)***	-0.110 (1.72)*	-0.080 (1.17)	-0.241 (4.20)***	-0.048 (1.37)	-0.056 (0.86)	-0.507 (9.77)***
manager	-0.043 (0.79)	0.092 (1.76)*	-0.149 (2.92)***	-0.209 (4.52)***	-0.031 (0.85)	-0.152 (2.49)**	0.138 (3.17)***
profession	-0.223 (3.89)***	-0.017 (0.50)	-0.110 (3.19)***	-0.091 (2.55)**	-0.022 (0.74)	-0.005 (0.12)	0.171 (4.38)***
clerk	0.069 (1.84)*	0.014 (0.40)	0.032 (0.78)	0.088 (2.12)**	0.135 (5.36)***	0.038 (0.88)	0.181 (4.84)***
service	-0.092 (2.39)**	-0.048 (1.03)	-0.109 (2.51)**	-0.158 (3.76)***	0.020 (0.71)	-0.125 (2.30)**	-0.027 (0.68)
agricult	-0.130 (1.94)*	0.092 (0.50)	0.132 (1.23)	-0.247 (4.36)***	0.247 (5.17)***	-0.107 (1.17)	-0.304 (6.73)***
craft	0.085 (2.27)**	0.176 (3.68)***	0.113 (2.67)***	0.101 (2.52)**	0.138 (5.08)***	0.042 (1.01)	0.087 (2.26)**
plant	-0.131 (2.58)***	0.093 (1.60)	0.112 (2.11)**	-0.060 (1.21)	0.061 (2.11)**	-0.033 (0.57)	0.020 (0.44)
elementw	-0.116 (2.47)**	0.016 (0.33)	0.023 (0.47)	0.006 (0.11)	0.038 (1.15)	-0.165 (2.43)**	0.032 (0.65)
pubsector	0.244 (8.27)***	0.121 (4.13)***	0.118 (4.17)***	0.032 (1.22)	0.162 (9.35)***	0.137 (4.58)***	0.315 (12.07)***
supervisory_f	0.120 (2.05)**	0.072 (1.08)	0.059 (0.99)	0.087 (1.73)*	0.009 (0.23)	0.062 (0.80)	0.054 (1.23)
intermedian	0.012 (0.33)	0.052 (1.26)	0.073 (1.75)*	0.165 (3.93)***	0.038 (1.35)	-0.056 (1.29)	-0.202 (3.38)***
n_supervisory	0.037 (1.08)	0.006 (0.16)	0.078 (2.29)**	0.140 (3.63)***	0.077 (2.95)***	-0.040 (1.01)	-0.166 (3.43)***
equivjob	-0.102 (5.31)***	-0.056 (2.33)**	-0.085 (3.50)***	-0.035 (1.69)*	-0.047 (3.13)***	0.005 (0.20)	-0.051 (3.00)***
second	0.043 (0.95)	0.012 (0.22)	0.086 (2.46)**	-0.086 (2.31)**	-0.207 (3.87)***	0.005 (0.09)	0.033 (0.82)
grossincph	0.084 (4.60)***	0.061 (2.71)***	0.037 (1.50)	0.082 (4.19)***	0.216 (12.45)***	0.159 (6.24)***	0.146 (9.64)***
singlehhd	-0.094 (1.86)*	-0.054 (0.96)	0.094 (2.17)**	0.042 (0.96)	-0.166 (5.74)***	-0.048 (0.92)	0.019 (0.35)
lownparent	-0.008 (0.16)	-0.050 (0.76)	0.069 (1.20)	-0.007 (0.13)	-0.153 (4.61)***	0.085 (1.17)	-0.001 (0.03)
nokidshhd	-0.053 (1.57)	0.043 (1.18)	0.080 (2.41)**	0.031 (1.06)	0.076 (3.42)***	0.079 (2.25)**	-0.016 (0.51)
elsehhd	0.092 (2.79)***	0.056 (0.68)	-0.013 (0.23)	0.010 (0.18)	0.160 (4.10)***	0.031 (0.48)	-0.038 (1.48)
sumkid0-2	-0.059 (2.37)**	-0.016 (0.62)	-0.031 (1.13)	0.014 (0.56)	-0.017 (0.91)	-0.057 (1.34)	-0.034 (1.44)
sumkid3-6	-0.052 (1.99)**	0.005 (0.20)	0.023 (0.85)	0.011 (0.45)	-0.106 (5.57)***	0.051 (1.31)	-0.010 (0.43)
sumkid7-15	0.006 (0.40)	-0.013 (0.71)	0.017 (0.92)	0.001 (0.07)	0.001 (0.08)	-0.013 (0.61)	0.002 (0.13)
nevmar	0.043 (1.16)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.080 (2.32)**	-0.044 (1.26)	0.122 (5.17)***	0.069 (1.40)	-0.009 (0.27)
divor_sep	0.059 (1.18)	0.061 (1.17)	-0.017 (0.36)	0.048 (0.95)	0.271 (8.08)***	0.035 (0.57)	-0.023 (0.38)
yrsted	-0.008 (2.16)**	-0.011 (2.74)***	0.001 (0.16)	-0.009 (3.15)***	-0.008 (3.10)***	-0.001 (0.29)	0.015 (5.81)***
st_up5	-0.041 (1.16)	-0.032 (0.78)	0.031 (1.01)	-0.007 (0.21)	-0.053 (2.02)**	-0.067 (1.70)*	-0.084 (2.62)***
lt_up5	-0.199 (2.68)***	-0.067 (1.16)	0.008 (0.17)	0.083 (1.86)*	0.107 (2.38)**	-0.118 (1.92)*	-0.047 (1.43)
age	-0.024 (3.14)***	-0.052 (4.41)***	-0.046 (5.04)***	-0.029 (3.34)***	-0.088 (12.97)***	-0.025 (2.58)***	-0.012 (1.74)*
age ²	0.000 (3.19)***	0.001 (4.57)***	0.001 (5.83)***	0.000 (3.68)***	0.001 (11.09)***	0.000 (2.98)***	0.000 (1.63)
sick	-0.292 (4.06)***	-0.168 (1.70)*	-0.254 (2.94)***	-0.307 (5.07)***	-0.124 (2.81)***	-0.238 (2.99)***	0.096 (1.00)
# interview	0.002 (0.44)	-0.017 (3.67)***	-0.036 (7.86)***	-0.023 (4.97)***	0.379 (98.53)***	-0.015 (0.83)	0.005 (1.32)
l-likelihood_0	-27705.99	-22143.41	-26662.16	-27589.28	-44635.02	-14170.06	-36839.54
l-likelihood	-26330.06	-21555.31	-25770.32	-26789.03	-37271.55	-13647.79	-33714.83
Wald chi(37)	1300.80	497.74	687.05	777.27	14187.44	680.05	3569.44
Prob > chi ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.0497	0.0266	0.0334	0.0290	0.1650	0.0369	0.0848
N	19300	14233	18425	17502	29574	8919	23301

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses.

Table A-4 (continued):

	IRE	ITA	LUX	NET	POR	SPA	UK
female	0.125 (3.86)***	-0.029 (0.69)	-0.016 (0.19)	-0.078 (3.21)***	-0.078 (3.57)***	-0.049 (2.49)**	0.023 (0.87)
temp	-0.302 (9.60)***	-0.342 (4.63)***	0.047 (0.37)	-0.069 (2.71)***	-0.122 (5.29)***	-0.191 (10.71)***	-0.105 (3.56)***
lnhpw	-0.626 (13.09)***	-0.769 (10.56)***	-0.801 (5.05)***	-0.786 (21.65)***	-0.622 (11.11)***	-1.117 (29.15)***	-0.847 (23.91)***
selfemp	0.063 (1.16)	-0.209 (3.41)***	-0.120 (0.75)	0.138 (2.75)***	-0.006 (0.14)	-0.008 (0.22)	n.a.
manager	-0.150 (2.90)***	-0.109 (1.64)	0.073 (0.50)	-0.083 (2.80)***	-0.101 (1.99)**	-0.079 (2.13)**	-0.063 (1.85)*
profession	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.023 (0.51)	0.150 (1.22)	-0.089 (3.50)***	-0.122 (2.82)***	-0.050 (1.63)	-0.134 (4.08)***
clerk	-0.029 (0.63)	0.056 (1.31)	0.127 (1.26)	0.027 (0.98)	-0.011 (0.29)	0.067 (2.27)**	-0.016 (0.52)
service	-0.126 (2.68)***	-0.042 (0.65)	-0.124 (1.01)	-0.083 (2.55)**	-0.156 (4.20)***	-0.086 (2.87)***	-0.087 (2.56)**
agricult	0.047 (0.68)	-0.017 (0.09)	-0.162 (0.83)	0.156 (2.34)**	-0.271 (5.45)***	-0.107 (2.46)**	0.169 (1.21)
craft	0.048 (0.98)	-0.085 (1.35)	-0.045 (0.40)	0.022 (0.63)	-0.102 (2.87)***	0.051 (1.83)*	-0.030 (0.75)
plant	-0.142 (2.93)***	-0.188 (2.87)***	-0.133 (1.02)	0.171 (4.20)***	-0.199 (4.93)***	-0.131 (4.06)***	-0.157 (3.73)***
elementw	-0.188 (3.58)***	-0.292 (3.06)***	-0.429 (3.07)***	0.032 (0.77)	-0.209 (5.76)***	-0.080 (2.66)***	-0.057 (1.29)
pubsector	0.161 (5.06)***	0.366 (10.68)***	0.264 (3.53)***	0.142 (6.71)***	0.369 (15.28)***	0.409 (19.12)***	0.012 (0.52)
supervisory_f	0.062 (1.00)	-0.030 (0.35)	-0.078 (0.44)	0.053 (1.05)	-0.048 (0.94)	0.033 (0.77)	-0.036 (0.82)
intermedian	0.193 (4.49)***	0.042 (0.86)	0.047 (0.45)	0.069 (2.25)**	0.067 (1.45)	0.085 (2.55)**	0.059 (1.66)*
n_supervisory	0.240 (6.34)***	-0.017 (0.34)	0.124 (1.22)	0.110 (3.85)***	0.061 (1.93)*	0.130 (4.14)***	0.046 (1.34)
equivjob	-0.220 (10.37)***	-0.078 (2.81)***	-0.121 (1.97)**	-0.096 (6.00)***	-0.051 (3.22)***	-0.082 (5.97)***	n.a.
second	-0.023 (0.50)	0.372 (3.76)***	0.130 (0.87)	-0.220 (6.17)***	-0.079 (1.93)*	-0.084 (1.96)*	-0.074 (2.64)***
grossincph	0.131 (6.22)***	0.105 (1.68)*	0.059 (0.89)	0.067 (4.18)***	0.072 (4.98)***	0.148 (12.07)***	0.077 (3.35)***
singlehhd	-0.015 (0.24)	0.045 (0.59)	0.029 (0.23)	-0.021 (0.60)	0.075 (1.28)	-0.034 (0.84)	-0.015 (0.39)
lownparent	0.046 (0.89)	-0.028 (0.38)	0.077 (0.56)	0.014 (0.26)	0.053 (1.42)	-0.018 (0.57)	-0.085 (2.16)**
nokidshhd	0.053 (1.24)	0.159 (2.86)***	-0.088 (0.99)	0.000 (0.02)	0.077 (2.70)***	0.057 (2.27)**	-0.048 (1.90)*
elsehhd	-0.021 (0.55)	-0.028 (0.43)	0.227 (2.27)**	0.028 (0.56)	0.022 (0.92)	-0.013 (0.62)	-0.015 (0.46)
sumkid0-2	0.006 (0.23)	0.047 (1.24)	-0.050 (0.63)	-0.020 (0.96)	0.018 (0.79)	0.041 (2.06)**	-0.044 (1.93)*
sumkid3-6	-0.019 (0.72)	0.069 (1.75)*	0.235 (3.10)***	-0.035 (1.71)*	0.028 (1.27)	0.021 (0.98)	0.022 (0.94)
sumkid7-15	0.002 (0.14)	-0.002 (0.11)	0.008 (0.20)	-0.006 (0.46)	-0.026 (2.07)**	-0.011 (0.90)	0.003 (0.24)
nevmar	0.100 (2.34)**	0.117 (1.92)*	-0.021 (0.22)	-0.055 (1.99)**	-0.057 (2.00)**	0.115 (4.62)***	-0.027 (0.90)
divor_sep	-0.048 (0.54)	0.068 (0.78)	-0.072 (0.55)	-0.022 (0.53)	-0.080 (1.59)	0.076 (1.70)*	0.001 (0.03)
yr sed	-0.008 (1.91)*	-0.004 (1.22)	-0.018 (1.90)*	-0.026 (4.59)***	-0.001 (0.56)	-0.002 (1.16)	-0.015 (5.10)***
st_up5	-0.131 (3.47)***	0.041 (0.55)	-0.068 (0.46)	-0.012 (0.36)	-0.085 (2.47)**	0.022 (1.00)	0.012 (0.44)
lt_up5	-0.123 (2.50)**	-0.129 (1.88)*	-0.237 (0.84)	-0.036 (0.66)	-0.114 (3.04)***	-0.065 (2.97)***	0.044 (0.89)
age	-0.038 (4.82)***	-0.037 (2.41)**	-0.044 (1.77)*	-0.056 (8.00)***	-0.011 (1.86)*	-0.007 (1.30)	-0.030 (4.43)***
age ²	0.000 (4.92)***	0.000 (2.45)**	0.001 (1.91)*	0.001 (7.72)***	0.000 (1.22)	0.000 (2.30)**	0.000 (4.42)***
sick	-0.345 (2.54)**	-0.289 (3.30)***	0.214 (1.42)	-0.222 (3.67)***	-0.151 (4.26)***	-0.195 (4.60)***	-0.107 (3.45)***
# interview	0.040 (7.88)***	-0.020 (3.61)***	0.064 (1.68)*	-0.021 (5.98)***	0.014 (4.05)***	-0.023 (7.83)***	-0.015 (4.35)***
l-likelihood_0	-24914.95	-14495.35	-2756.89	-46562.03	-43059.52	-52555.75	-48683.06
l-likelihood	-23980.67	-13892.68	-2652.51	-45391.26	-41708.86	-49922.95	-47364.14
Wald chi(37)	923.67	681.86	142.13	1026.36	1102.90	2930.55	1003.64
Prob > chi ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.0375	0.0416	0.0379	0.0251	0.0314	0.0501	0.0271
N	16533	9322	1917	32087	35882	31098	30027

*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; robust z statistics in parentheses, n.a.=information not available.