

Do EU-MED agreements  
improve democracy and  
the quality of institutions in  
EU partner countries?

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
# Purposes

- To assess the effects of the EU-MED agreements on the respect of democratic principles and the promotion of “good governance”
- To investigate the timing of these effects



# Motivations

- A recent trend in North South preferential agreements: non-trade conditionality;
- Particularly true for the EU:
  - since the beginning of the 90's the EU has included in all its trade agreements provisions connected with the respect of democratic principles and the promotion of “good governance”;



# Motivations (continued)

- EU-MED agreements:
  - Barcelona declaration;
  - MEDA program
  - EU-MED agreements
- Particularity of EU-MED agreements:
  - Mainly autocratic countries
    - Has the “political conditionality” imposed by the EU been strong enough to allow people to enjoy more liberties?
  - No « obligation to achieve a result »
    - Has EU-MED agreements contributed to improving the quality of the institutions of Mediterranean countries?



# Governance measures

- Two indicators of democracy:
  - Polity IV
  - Freedom House: political rights and civil liberties
- Governance indicators: IRCG
  - Quality of bureaucracy
  - Corruption
  - Law and order
    - An overall governance indicator



# The overall impact of EU-MED agreements

$$y_{it} = a_i + \sum \phi_t T_t + \sum \alpha_m x_{m,it} + \delta \text{Euromed}_{it} + e_{it}$$

- $Y_{it}$  is governance in country  $i$  at time  $t$ ,
- $a_i$  is a time-invariant effect unique to individual  $i$
- $T_t$  is time effect common to all countries at time  $t$ ,
- $X_{it}$  is a set of other control variables,
- $\text{Euromed}_{it}$  is a binary Euro-Med membership indicator, it takes the value of 1 from the year the agreement was signed and 0 otherwise
- $e_{it}$  is an unobserved error term

# The timing in the effects

$$y_{it} = a_i + \sum \phi_t T_t + \sum \alpha_m x_{m,it}$$

$$+ \delta_1 \text{Euromed}(-2)_{it} + \delta_2 \text{Euromed}13_{it} + \delta_3 \text{Euromed} \geq 4_{it} + e_{it}$$

- $y_{it}$ ,  $a_i$ ,  $T_t$ ,  $x_{it}$ ,  $e_{it}$  are defined in the same way as in equation (1);
- $\text{Euromed}(-2)_{it}$  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one the two years before the agreement was signed, and zero otherwise;
- $\text{Euromed}13_{it}$  equals to one the year when the agreement was signed and the two following years;
- $\text{Euromed} \geq 4_{it}$  equals to 1 from the 4th year after the agreement was signed.



# Two estimations techniques

- Within comparisons: only use the time variation in the data. It consists in estimating equation (1) and (2) on a sample made only with countries that have signed an agreement.
- Difference-in-differences estimations (DID): consist in identifying a specific intervention or treatment. One then compare the difference in a dependent variable before and after the intervention for groups affected by the treatment to the same difference for unaffected groups.



# Effects on democracy using Within Comparisons

	<i>Polity 020</i>				<i>FH</i>			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Euromed	<b>-0,24</b>	<b>0,37</b>	—	—	<b>-0,32</b>	<b>-0,53**</b>	—	—
Euromed(-2)	—	—	<b>0,16</b>	<b>0,52</b>	—	—	<b>-0,32*</b>	<b>-0,53*</b>
Euromed13	—	—	<b>0,03</b>	<b>0,67</b>	—	—	<b>-0,42</b>	<b>-0,72***</b>
Euromed>= 4	—	—	<b>0,61</b>	<b>1,92*</b>	—	—	<b>-0,38</b>	<b>-1,01**</b>
Ln(GDP/capita)	—	<b>-7,75***</b>	—	<b>-9,21***</b>	—	<b>1,91*</b>	—	<b>1,83**</b>
% Fuel exports	—	<b>-0,02</b>	—	<b>-0,01</b>	—	<b>-0,01*</b>	—	<b>-0,02***</b>
Trade Openness	—	<b>0,07**</b>	—	<b>0,04*</b>	—	<b>-0,01</b>	—	<b>-0,01*</b>
Number of observations	114	110	133	124	108	105	126	118
R <sup>2</sup>	0,94	0,97	0,94	0,97	0,87	0,90	0,90	0,92
Time specific effects	3,97	14,64	1,61	8,43	6,41	9,44	1,55	3,32
Prob>F	0,00	0,00	0,15	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,17	0,01

# Effects on democracy using DID

	<i>Polity020</i>					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Euromed	<b>-1,38**</b>	<b>-1,28</b>	<b>-0,89</b>	—	—	—
Euromedmoins2	—	—	—	<b>-1,53*</b>	<b>-1,24</b>	<b>-1,67</b>
Euromed13	—	—	—	<b>-1,55*</b>	<b>-1,44</b>	<b>-1,17</b>
Euromed>=4	—	—	—	<b>-1,82***</b>	<b>-1,63</b>	<b>-1,45</b>
Ln(PIB/hab)	—	—	-1,10	—	—	-1,02
%Exportations Pétrolières	—	—	0,02	—	—	0,02
Ouverture Commerciale	—	—	0,01	—	—	0,01
Y*CONST	NON	OUI	OUI	NON	OUI	OUI
Nbre Observations	2428,00	2428,00	1258,00	2428,00	2428,00	1258,00
R-squared	0,79	0,82	0,86	0,79	0,82	0,86
Effets Spécifiques Temps	6,29	1,81	13,89	6,26	1,80	2,60
Prob>F	0,00	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,03	0,00

# Effects on democracy using DID

	<i>FH</i>					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Euromed	<b>0,52***</b>	<b>0,37</b>	<b>0,35</b>	—	—	—
Euromed(-2)	—	—	—	<b>0,44**</b>	<b>0,39</b>	<b>0,44</b>
Euromed13	—	—	—	<b>0,53***</b>	<b>0,38</b>	<b>0,38</b>
Euromed>=4	—	—	—	<b>0,74***</b>	<b>0,57</b>	<b>0,58</b>
Ln(PIB/hab)	—	—	-0,33	—	—	-0,35
%fuel exports	—	—	-0,01*	—	—	-0,01*
Trade openness	—	—	0,00	—	—	0,00
Y*CONST	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
Number observations	2321,00	2321,00	1198,00	2321,00	2321,00	1198,00
R <sup>2</sup>	0,78	0,81	0,84	0,78	0,81	0,84
Time specific effects	4,20	4,40	31,00	4,07	3,52	30,09
Prob>F	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00

# Impact on overall governance using within comparisons

	<i>Overall governance</i>			
	1	2	3	4
Euromed	0,35	0,48**	—	—
Euromed(-2)	—	—	0,06	0,11
Euromed13	—	—	0,06	0,38
Euromed>= 4	—	—	0,42	0,52
Ln(GDP/capita)	—	1,24	—	1,75
% Fuel exports	—	0,01	—	0,02*
Trade Openness	—	0,01	—	0,01**
Number of observations	120	110	140	124
R <sup>2</sup>	0,82	0,84	0,81	0,86
Time specific effects	4,88	13,73	40,28	4,48
Prob>F	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00

# Impact on the various aspects of governance using within comparisons

	<i>Corruption</i>		<i>Bureaucratic quality</i>			<i>Law and order</i>		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Euromed	0,34	–	-0,05	–	<b>0,80*</b>	<b>0,97**</b>	–	–
Euromed(-2)	–	-0,51	–	0,19	–	–	0,38	0,43
Euromed13	–	-0,43	–	0,15	–	–	0,39	0,97*
Euromed>= 4	–	-0,32	–	0,28	–	–	1,15	1,38*
Ln(GDP/capita)	–	–	–	–	–	2,37*	–	2,15
% Fuel exports	–	–	–	–	–	0,02	–	0,02*
Trade Openness	–	–	–	–	–	0,02*	–	0,02***
Number of observations	120,00	140,00	120,00	140,00	120,00	110,00	140,00	124,00
R <sup>2</sup>	0,68	0,63	0,75	0,76	0,81	0,85	0,82	0,86
Time specific effects	6,14	4,50	13,78	6,06	4,28	11,12	12,30	9,38
Prob>F	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00

# Impact on governance as a whole using DID

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Euromed	<b>0,36**</b>	<b>0,42*</b>	<b>0,52**</b>	—	—	—
Euromed(-2)	—	—	—	<b>0,28*</b>	<b>0,33**</b>	<b>0,36***</b>
Euromed13	—	—	—	<b>0,29*</b>	<b>0,38*</b>	<b>0,48**</b>
Euromed>=4	—	—	—	<b>0,58***</b>	<b>0,64**</b>	<b>0,82**</b>
Ln(PIB/hab)	—	—	0,56	—	—	0,53
%fuel exports	—	—	0,00	—	—	0,00
Trade openness	—	—	0,00	—	—	0,00
Y*CONST	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
Number observations	1994,00	1994,00	1128,00	1994,00	1994,00	1128,00
R <sup>2</sup>	0,74	0,78	0,82	0,74	0,78	0,82
Time specific effects	15,39	5,09	3456,59	15,77	5,89E+08	2022,31
Prob>F	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00





# Concluding remarks

- A strong positive effect on the quality of the judicial system;
- The impact on the overall governance is less clear-cut;
- No effect on the respect of democratic principles;
- Several reasons can explain this lack of results:
  - EU-MED agreements are still recent
  - the threat of sanctions by the EU is not credible
  - the weakness of the resources dedicated to democratization
- Our analysis must be extended to all Trade Agreements the European Community has ratified.