

# The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Investment in Nicaragua

by

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# THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ON CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT IN NICARAGUA

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***Abstract:** This article examines the impact of a conditional cash transfer programme in Nicaragua on a range of consumption and productive investment measures. Programme effects are estimated using household panel data collected as part of a randomised evaluation. Despite clear evidence that the programme increased current expenditures, there is only limited evidence that it increased investment. An estimated MPC out of the transfers of nearly one, combined with no effect of cumulative past transfers on consumption, corroborate the direct evidence on investment. In contrast to gains made by the programme in human capital, the potential for long term increases in consumption as a result of increased investment, while positive, may be limited.*

Key Words: impact evaluation, conditional cash transfer, productive assets

Word count for text, endnotes, and references: 9700.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of human capital in stimulating economic growth and social development. There is also growing recognition of the need for social safety nets to protect households from poverty and its consequences during the push for economic growth (de Janvry *et al.*, 2006; World Bank, 1997). Consistent with this, several Latin American countries have introduced conditional cash transfer programmes that integrate investing in human capital with access to a social safety net (Handa and Davis, 2006; Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). One of the first, and largest, programmes was the *Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y Alimentación* (PROGRESA, now called *Oportunidades*) in Mexico, begun in 1997. Another large programme is *Bolsa Alimentação*, a nutrition-oriented cash transfer programme in Brazil. A third such programme, examined in this article, is the Nicaraguan *Red de Protección Social* (RPS).

The broad objective of these programmes is to generate a sustained decrease in poverty in some of the most disadvantaged regions in their respective countries. Their entry point for doing so is human capital, starting with the premise that a significant cause of the intergenerational transmission of poverty is the inability of poor households to invest in the human capital of their children. These programmes attack this problem by targeting transfers to poor households and conditioning them on actions intended to improve children's human capital development. This effectively transforms cash transfers into human capital subsidies.

Substantial research has demonstrated the effectiveness of such programmes for a range of outcomes related to current consumption and human capital investments (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Skoufias, 2005). Much less, however, is known about other, indirect, programme effects that also may contribute to their overall objective of poverty reduction, such as increased economically productive investment, particularly in agriculture and livestock, the main income-generating sources in the rural areas targeted by these programmes (Gertler *et al.*, 2006; Todd *et al.*, 2007; Davis and Stampini, 2002). By providing transfers, these programmes alleviate liquidity and, possibly, credit constraints that are

typically thought to inhibit investment in developing countries (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Moreover, to the extent that transfers are considered permanent or reliable flows, risk-averse households that receive them may be more willing to undertake risky investments (Gertler *et al.*, 2007).

Given the short-term nature of transfers (for only three years), for RPS the liquidity and credit constraint channels are likely to be the most important. Given their size, the mere transfer of cash under RPS, even with conditionality, almost certainly relaxes liquidity constraints. Moreover, Nielson and Olinto (2006) find some evidence that RPS relaxed credit constraints for beneficiary households. Sadoulet *et al.* (2001), in the context of the Mexican programme PROCAMPO, which includes transfers, demonstrate that the indirect effects of transfers loosening such constraints may include purchase of productive inputs (leading to short-run gains) as well as productive assets leading to longer-run gains. When households are liquidity constrained, assets may be underemployed or inefficiently allocated. In this article, I explore whether RPS has stimulated productive investment, examining some of these indirect mechanisms through which the programme might have contributed to a reduction in poverty.

More specifically, I first present quantitative impacts of RPS on consumption, measured by household expenditures, as well as on a wide range of outcomes related to productive investments. This is done using a randomised evaluation in which the same households were interviewed both before and after the programme began, in both intervention and control areas. While only limited information was collected on productive activities, the strength of the evaluation design permits a rigorous assessment of many possible productive investment behaviours. Second, as an alternative approach to exploring whether productive investments are being made, I estimate a consumption equation which provides the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transfers, as well as the effect of cumulative past transfers, which may have been invested, on consumption (Gertler *et al.*, 2007). While there is ample evidence that the programme increased consumption, the evidence that it increased investment is weak, and limited to small increases in agricultural equipment. Moreover, the assessment of the MPC out of transfers shows that nearly 100 per cent of the transfers are spent, and cumulative past transfers have no effect on current consumption. To some extent, the results are unsurprising, given the programme objectives of increasing

food expenditures and improving child human capital. In contrast to the gains made in human capital development of children (reported elsewhere), the potential for long term increases in consumption as a result of increased investment due to RPS appear to be limited.

## **2. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE *RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL***

Modelled after PROGRESA, RPS was designed to address both current and future poverty through cash transfers targeted to poor households in rural Nicaragua. The transfers were conditional, and households monitored to ensure that, among other things, their children were attending school and making visits to preventive healthcare providers and a household representative attended a series of health education workshops. When households failed to fulfil those obligations, they lost their eligibility. RPS's specific stated objectives included:

- supplementing household income for up to three years to increase expenditures on food,
- reducing dropout rates during the first four years of primary school, and
- increasing the healthcare and nutritional status of children under age five.

There were no formal, or informal, conditions related to productive investments other than (child) human capital.

RPS comprised two phases over six years, starting in 2000. Phase I (the pilot phase) lasted three years with a budget of \$11 million, representing approximately 0.2 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2001). In late 2002, based in part on the positive findings of the various evaluations, the Government of Nicaragua (GON) and Inter-American Development Bank agreed to a continuation and expansion of the programme, referred to as Phase II, for four more years with a budget of \$22 million. In Phase II, original beneficiaries were phased out of the programme and new beneficiaries were incorporated.

### *2.1 Programme targeting*

For Phase I of RPS, the GON first targeted rural areas in two departments (Madriz and Matagalpa) from the Central Region, on the basis of poverty as well as on their capacity to implement the programme. The

focus on rural areas reflected the distribution of poverty in Nicaragua—of the 48 per cent of Nicaraguans designated as poor in 1998, 75 per cent resided in rural areas (World Bank, 2001). In 1998, approximately 80 per cent of the rural population of Madriz and Matagalpa were poor, and half of those were extremely poor. In addition, these departments had easy physical access and communication, relatively strong institutional capacity and local coordination, and good coverage of health posts and schools.

In the next stage of geographic targeting, six (out of 20) municipalities were chosen based on criteria similar to those used at the department level. The six were well targeted in terms of poverty. Between 36 and 61 per cent of the rural population in each of the chosen municipalities were extremely poor and 78–90 per cent were poor or extremely poor (Maluccio, 2005), compared with 21 and 45 per cent for Nicaragua as a whole (World Bank, 2003). While not the poorest municipalities in the country, or in the chosen departments for that matter, the proportion of impoverished people living in these areas was still well above the national average.

In the last stage of geographic targeting, a marginality index was constructed for all 59 rural census *comarcas*<sup>1</sup> (hereafter localities) in the selected municipalities. The index was the weighted average of a set of locality-level indicators (including family size, access to potable water, access to latrines, and illiteracy rates) in which higher index scores were associated with more impoverished areas. The 42 localities with the highest scores were selected as eligible and form the evaluation area examined in this article. Although the initial programme design only called for geographic targeting in these 42 localities (that is, with all resident households eligible), about 6 per cent of households, deemed to have substantial resources, were excluded *ex ante* from the programme (Maluccio, 2005).

## *2.2 Programme design*

RPS had two core components:

Food security, health, and nutrition. Each eligible household received a bimonthly (every two months) cash transfer known as the ‘food security transfer,’ contingent upon attendance at bimonthly health educational workshops and on bringing their children under age five for scheduled preventive

healthcare appointments with specially contracted providers. Children under age two were seen monthly and those between two and five, bimonthly. The workshops were held within the communities and covered household sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, and other related topics.

Education: Each eligible household also received a bimonthly cash transfer known as the ‘school attendance transfer,’ contingent on enrolment and regular school attendance of children ages 7–13 who had not completed fourth grade of primary school. Additionally, for each eligible child, the household received an annual cash transfer at the start of the school year, intended for school supplies (including uniforms and shoes) known as the ‘school supplies transfer,’ which was contingent on enrolment. Unlike the school attendance transfer, which was a fixed amount per household regardless of the number of children in school, the school supplies transfer was per child.

At the outset, nearly all households were eligible for the food security transfer, which was a fixed amount per household, regardless of household size. Households with children ages 7–13 who had not yet completed the fourth grade of primary school were also eligible for the education component of the programme. The initial US dollar annual amounts and their Nicaraguan Córdoba equivalents (using the September 2000 average exchange rate of C\$ 12.85 to US\$ 1.00) were as follows: the food security transfer was \$224 a year and the school attendance transfer \$112. On its own, the food security transfer represented about 13 per cent of total annual household expenditures in beneficiary households before the programme. A household with one child benefiting from the education component would have received additional transfers of about 8 per cent, yielding an average total potential transfer of 21 per cent of total annual household expenditures. Over the two years, the actual average monetary transfer was approximately \$272 (C\$ 3500 or 17 per cent of total annual household expenditures).<sup>2</sup> This is approximately the same percentage of total annual household expenditures as the average transfer in PROGRESA (Caldés *et al.*, 2006). In contrast to PROGRESA, which indexes transfers to inflation, the nominal value of the transfers remained constant for RPS, with the consequence that the real value of the transfers declined by about 8 per cent due to inflation over two years in Phase I. In Phase II, which began in 2003 and incorporated new beneficiaries, demand-side transfers were reduced. The food security

transfer started at \$168 for the first year of programme participation and then declined to \$145 and \$126 in the second and third years. The school attendance transfer also declined, to \$90 per year. Partly offsetting these reductions was an increase in the school supplies transfer, which rose from \$21 to \$25 per student. These figures represent potential transfers.

To enforce compliance with programme requirements, beneficiaries did not receive the food or education component(s) of the transfer when they failed to carry out any of the relevant conditions described above. Annually, approximately 10 per cent of beneficiaries were penalised at least once and therefore did not receive the food, education, or combined transfers. Only the designated household representative was allowed to collect the transfers and, where possible, RPS appointed the mother to this role. As a result, more than 95 per cent were women.

### *2.3 Principal findings from earlier quantitative assessments of Phase I of RPS*

Overall, RPS had positive and significant double-difference estimated average effects on a broad range of indicators and outcomes from 2000 to 2002 (during Phase I), including expenditures, healthcare inputs, nutritional status of children under age five, and school enrolment. Where it did not, it was often due to similar, though smaller, improvements in the control areas. Nearly all estimated effects were larger for the extremely poor, reflecting their lower starting points (for example, lower percentages of children enrolled in primary school before the programme). As a result, the programme reduced inequality across expenditure classes for these outcomes (Maluccio and Flores, 2005).

## **3. DESIGN OF THE EVALUATION AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY**

### *3.1 Evaluation design*

The evaluation for Phase I of RPS was based on a randomised, community-based intervention. One-half of the 42 eligible localities were randomly selected into the programme; thus, there are 21 localities in the ‘original’ intervention group (starting in late 2000) and 21 distinct localities in the ‘original’ control group. The selection was carried out after ordering the localities by the marginality index into seven strata



of six localities each, and randomly selecting from each stratum three localities as intervention and three as control.

In mid-2003 (during Phase II), original control localities were incorporated into the programme. Initially, RPS was designed to provide transfers and related services for a period of up to three years. During implementation, however, it was decided to extend the supply-side health and education (which included a small transfer to the schools) components for an additional two years, but not the demand-side transfers. As a result, in 2003, as the original control localities were beginning to receive the programme, the demand-side transfers were terminated in the original intervention localities, though households in those areas continued to be eligible to receive the supply-side health and education components through the end of the period examined in this article. I discuss the implications of the ‘cross-over’ design for the analysis in Section 3.4.

When randomised evaluations are done well, recipients and nonrecipients will have, on average, the same observed and, more important (since they are more difficult to control for), unobserved characteristics. As a result, they establish a credible basis for comparison, freed from selectivity concerns, and the direction of causality is certain. Even a well-implemented randomised design, however, is not without potential weaknesses. Heckman and Smith (1995) highlight that the apparent simplicity can be deceiving, particularly in poorly designed evaluations where there is contamination due to (1) randomisation bias (where the process of randomisation itself leads to a different beneficiary pool than would otherwise have been treated); (2) anticipation effects where control group behaviour changes as the result of changes in expectations; or (3) substitution bias where nonbeneficiaries obtain similar interventions or services from different sources. There is little reason to believe that randomisation bias is a concern in the RPS evaluation. For example, Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) found no evidence that households moved in part or in whole to obtain the programme. As for anticipatory changes in behaviour in the control group, since the programme was targeted to nearly all households in the localities, it is difficult to determine theoretically what such effects might have been. To the extent that households in original control localities incorporated the probability of receiving the transfers in the future into their

decision making, however, the most likely is that, if anything, they would have increased expenditures *before* the programme began, making the results reported below conservative. I address the possibility of contamination of the control group by other programmes in Section 3.3.

Another limitation with randomised evaluations, or nearly any other evaluation for that matter, is that the results pertain specifically to the study population—extrapolating them to other populations requires additional assumptions that may not be easy to verify (Burtless, 1995). This is typically referred to as the external validity problem. In the case of RPS, the purposive selection of the programme area may have affected programme performance; therefore the extent to which the results can be generalised is less certain. As described earlier, the selection of municipalities was conditioned on the likelihood of success, so that the observed outcomes might exaggerate the likely outcomes from programme expansion to other areas with, for example, weaker institutional capacity to implement the programme. On the other hand, the observed outcomes may understate the likely outcomes if there was less need for RPS in the targeted areas possibly even *because* of greater institutional capacity.

While it is not possible to claim that the 42 selected localities are representative of rural Nicaragua, there is evidence that they are similar to a large number of other rural areas in the Central Region and in the country more broadly. First, three-quarters of the approximately 150 rural localities in the departments of Madriz and Matagalpa have marginality index scores in the same range as the programme areas, as do three-quarters of the approximately 1000 rural localities in the country as a whole. If instead one considers levels of extreme poverty, there are more than 350 localities in the country with extreme poverty at or above 42 per cent, the average level in the targeted areas (Maluccio, 2005). On these broad indicators used for geographical targeting, then, there are a large number of similar localities, suggesting those chosen were not grossly atypical.

### *3.2 Data collection*

The data collected for the evaluation were a household panel data survey implemented in both intervention and control localities of RPS before the start of the programme, in 2000, and then afterward

in 2001, 2002, and 2004. A comprehensive household questionnaire based on the 1998 Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) was used (World Bank, 2001). The evaluation questionnaire was expanded in some areas (for example, child health and education) to ensure that all the programme indicators were captured but, unfortunately for this research, cut in other areas (such as income from all activities and agricultural inputs) to minimise respondent burden and ensure collection of high-quality data in a single interview.<sup>3</sup>

The household survey sample was a stratified (at the locality level) random sample of all 42 localities using as the sample frame a household census specially collected for RPS in these localities in May of 2000. Forty-two households were randomly selected in each of the 42 localities, yielding an initial target sample of 1764 households. The first wave of fieldwork was carried out in late August and early September 2000. For programmatic reasons, the first follow-up survey was delayed until the beginning of October 2001, to allow additional time for the interventions to take root. The 2002 and 2004 surveys were also carried out in October.

As with any panel survey, first round nonresponse and latter round attrition in the survey are potential concerns for the analysis. Overall, 90 per cent (1581) of the stratified random sample of 1764 was interviewed in the first round with slightly lower completion in original control localities (87%) compared with original intervention localities (92%) [*Appendix Table A1. Please note: Appendix Tables are included for the review process—I would suggest they be removed from the final publication version of the article, should the submission be successful*]. For the follow-up surveys in 2001 and 2002, the target sample was limited to these 1581 first round interviews. In 2002, 88 per cent of these were re-interviewed and in 2004, 85 per cent of the original 1581 were re-interviewed, but 90 per cent of the households targeted that year (which included only those who had been interviewed at least once in 2001 and 2002), again with similar percentages across original intervention and control localities. Both the completion rate at baseline and subsequent attrition levels are on a par with similar surveys in other developing countries (Alderman *et al.*, 2001; Thomas *et al.*, 2001).

The principal reasons for failure to interview targeted sample households were that household members were temporarily absent (that is, more than the several days the survey team were in the area) or that the dwelling appeared to be uninhabited—both of which are likely to be associated with temporary or permanent migration. Since the advantages of randomisation are dissipated with nonrandom attrition, I examine the correlates of the observed attrition to assess the likely possible effects or biases on the ensuing analyses (Thomas *et al.*, 2003). Due to the RPS household census in the localities, which collected a variety of information relevant to the programme, there is information on those households not interviewed in the baseline or follow-up surveys. Probit regressions (not shown) on all original target sample households and predicting the probability of having been interviewed in at least the first round or, separately, having been interviewed in all four rounds, indicate that attrition is indeed nonrandom. Households that were not interviewed were more likely to have an older, more educated household head, larger family size, higher predicted expenditures, or more land. Moreover, the coefficient on an indicator of whether the household was in an original intervention or control locality is both small and insignificant. I interpret this evidence to mean that attrition in the sample was not systematically related to the intervention. I reconsider the potential for attrition bias in the analysis in Section 3.4.

### *3.3 Validity of the experiment and the evaluation*

#### *a. Outcome of the randomisation*

While the selection of localities into intervention and control groups was undeniably random, it was at the same time only one of the millions of possible random draws from a finite (42) number of localities. As a result, original intervention and control localities may still differ in statistically significant or, more importantly, substantive ways due to an ‘unlucky’ random draw. In this subsection, I provide evidence that the two groups are indeed quite similar, examining differences between the groups for a set of indicators pertinent to the analysis (Behrman and Todd, 1999). Perfect ‘equality’ between the two groups is not necessary for the analysis, since for most outcomes considered it is possible to estimate double-differences which control for pre-existing differences. Similarity, however, does put the analysis on a

sounder footing, particularly if there is the possibility of heterogeneous programme effects associated with initial differences between the groups and for those effects estimated using single-difference techniques (see Section 3.4).

In Table 1, I first compare households in original intervention and control localities on a set of demographic, education, wealth, and other indicators. Of 17 indicators compared in the top panel, only one, the number of children less than five years old, is significantly different at a conservative 10 per cent level of significance. This is unlikely to be problematic for the analyses, however, since while they are significantly different they do not appear to be substantively different, differing by less than 0.1 children. Further, comparisons of the same set of 17 indicators across original intervention and control localities *within* each poverty group (extreme poor, poor but not extremely poor, and nonpoor) reveal only five significant differences in 51 comparisons. In all these comparisons, then, the percentage of indicators that are statistically significant across groups is approximately as would be expected by random chance.

[TABLE 1 – ABOUT HERE]

In the bottom portion of the table, household expenditures and the proportion of households classified as extremely poor, poor but not extremely poor, and nonpoor are compared.<sup>4</sup> While total annual household expenditures are not statistically different across the groups, annual per capita household expenditures are about 5 per cent higher in original intervention localities, largely explained by the small differences in household size seen in the first row. It is expected that the different poverty groups should be about equally represented in original intervention and control localities, in particular because of the stratification into groups of six localities each according to the marginality index for randomisation. However, reflecting the difference in per capita expenditures, the extreme poverty rate in original control localities is more than 7 percentage points lower than in original intervention localities, and significantly different. Differences between overall poverty rates are half that, but no longer significantly different. As in the case of children under five, however, the magnitude of these differences does not appear to be such that they should greatly affect the results.

*b. Potential contamination of the original control localities: Other programmes*

Contamination due to substitution bias occurs when households in control localities participate in programmes similar or complementary to RPS. The delay of an additional year (beyond that originally planned) before including the original control localities may have increased the probability of such contamination, as it gave NGOs and others more time to adjust to the presence of RPS in original intervention localities, possibly by pulling their programmes out of those localities and increasing their efforts in control localities. While the RPS evaluation was sanctioned by the GON and, therefore, plans were coordinated such that other large government programmes with similar objectives avoided entering these localities over this period, other actors less tied to the government were not prohibited from doing so. To the extent other programmes are not simply reacting to the evaluation itself, this design offers a more realistic counterfactual compared to one in which no other programme were allowed to enter the localities (what might be referred to as a ‘sterile’ control group)—in Nicaragua, as in many developing countries, there are a multitude of overlaying programmes and policies with related objectives. If other programmes *do* react to the intervention, while the pure RPS programme impact is more difficult to assess, it is also reasonable to characterise the changes in other programmes as being a result of RPS and therefore the net effects as those reflecting the effectiveness of the programme in a real world context.

Potential contamination due to other development programmes providing services to households was monitored in the annual household surveys. These data allow one to calculate the percentage of households in each locality that were benefiting from an array of possible programmes and services, and to determine whether or not RPS was the provider. Overall, the extent of such development programmes operating in these localities was limited, and there were no substantive changes in programmes related to the outcomes assessed in this article, though there is a little evidence that RPS crowded out some programmes related to its primary objectives of education and healthcare (Maluccio and Flores, 2005).

*3.4 Econometric methodology for estimating programme effects*

*a. Main specifications*

Household level panel data were collected in both the intervention and control localities before and after RPS was implemented. This enables the use of the double-difference method to estimate the average programme effect.<sup>5</sup> The resulting measure can be interpreted as the expected effect of implementing the programme in a similar population elsewhere. In this analysis, the double-difference technique is extended to account for the four measurements taken in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004. A basic estimating equation employing double-differences and incorporating household fixed effects is:

$$(1) Y_{ict} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D_{2001} + \alpha_2 D_{2002} + \alpha_4 D_{2004} + \delta_1 D_{2001} P_{ct} + \delta_2 D_{2002} P_{ct} + \delta_4 D_{2004} P_{ct} + \mu_{ic} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where

$Y_{ict}$  = outcome variable of interest for household  $i$  in locality  $c$  at time  $t$ ,

$D_t$  = (1) if year  $t$ , for  $t=2001, 2002$ , and  $2004$ ,

$P_{ct}$  = (1) if programme intervention in locality  $c$  at time  $t$ , this changes over time given the cross-over design

$\mu_{ic}$  = all household-level time-invariant factors for household  $i$  (the household-level fixed effect)<sup>6</sup>,

$\varepsilon_{ict}$  = unobserved idiosyncratic household- or locality-level, time-varying error, and

all the  $\alpha$ s and  $\delta$ s are unknown parameters.

The parameters of interest are  $\delta_1$ ,  $\delta_2$  and  $\delta_4$ ;  $\delta_1$  is the double-difference estimator of the average programme effect for 2001 (relative to 2000),  $\delta_2$  for 2002 (relative to 2000), and  $\delta_4$  for 2004 (relative to 2000), controlling for household fixed effects.<sup>7</sup> For 2004, however, since the original control localities had entered the programme by this time and the original intervention localities had ceased to receive cash transfers about ten months earlier,  $\delta_4$  is the estimated effect of having had no programme for three years and the full programme (though with slightly lower transfers as described in Section 2.2) for the previous year, compared to having had the full programme for three years and the supply-side components only for the fourth year. Given the randomisation of  $P_{ct}$ , it (and any interactions involving it) is uncorrelated with all observed or unobserved household- or locality-level variables so that the  $\delta$ s can be estimated consistently and be given a causal interpretation.

For some outcomes examined below, where information was not collected in the baseline survey but only in 2002 and 2004, I present instead results from single-difference equations (that is, the difference between intervention and control localities after the programme had begun), also a valid estimate of the average programme effect given the randomised design and the evidence that original intervention and control localities were similar before the programme began. The estimating equation simplifies to (2) where components are defined analogously to equation (1) and  $\delta_{s2}$  and  $\delta_{s4}$  represent the single-difference estimates of the average programme effect corresponding to  $\delta_2$  and  $\delta_4$  above. It is no longer possible to include household fixed effects in this specification, so I control instead for a set of baseline demographic, education, and wealth characteristics of the household, measured in 2000 before the programme began and represented by the vector  $X_{ic}$ .<sup>8</sup>

$$(2) Y_{ict} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_4 D_{2004} + \delta_{s2} D_{2002} P_{ct} + \delta_{s4} D_{2004} P_{ct} + X_{ic} \phi + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

The above specifications do not condition on the household-level decision to participate in RPS but instead only on whether the programme was available in the household's locality. As a result, they estimate what is typically referred to as the (double-difference) 'intent-to-treat' average programme effect. Such estimates are not subject to selection biases associated with the decision to participate in the programme since they rely only on the randomised design. More than 10 per cent of the households in the intervention localities, however, were either excluded by RPS or chose not to participate in the programme. Survey sample households in this subgroup are not programme beneficiaries so that basing estimates on the sample that includes them potentially 'dilutes' the estimated effects of the programme.

To avoid this, I modify the above specifications by estimating instead the (double-difference) 'treatment-on-the-treated' average programme effect.  $P_{ct}$  is replaced throughout with a dummy variable indicator of *actual* participation by that household,  $P_{ict}$ . Since household-level programme participation was endogenous and may have been related to other characteristics that are also associated with the outcomes being considered, I endogenise the household participation decision with instrumental variables, using interactions of the locality-level random programme placement indicator ( $P_{ct}$ ) with the



year dummies as the instrumental variables for the household participation decision ( $P_{ict}$ ) interacted with year dummies.<sup>9</sup> Since household participation rates are high, the instrumental variables approach yields estimates similar to, though in nearly all cases slightly larger than, the intent-to-treat estimates, with identical patterns of significance. In the analyses presented, all households interviewed in any of the pertinent survey rounds, that is, the unbalanced panel sample, are included.

*b. Alternative specifications*

To verify the robustness of the results presented, I consider a number of alternative specifications.

Double-difference estimates that do not control for household fixed effects (but rather for an array of demographic, education, and wealth characteristics of the household measured at baseline) also yielded similar coefficient estimates. When the standard errors associated with those results were estimated allowing for clustering at the locality level, however, the estimates were less precise (though all estimated programme effects presented as significant here remained significant).

Household random effects are an alternative estimation strategy. In some instances, however, (for example, total expenditures), a Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2003) rejected the equality of coefficients across the fixed- and random-effects models. For this reason, I prefer the fixed-effects estimates (for outcomes for which they are possible), even though according to the Hausman test random effects were acceptable for some outcomes.

The results that follow also ignore the stratified sample design which can be corrected for statistically by using locality-level sample weights; correcting for this aspect of the design (instead of controlling for household fixed effects) made no substantive changes to the results (Deaton, 1997).

Previous evaluations of RPS indicate that for a number of indicators the programme was more effective for the extreme poor and poor, for example with larger estimated average programme effects on expenditures for these groups (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). While this is also true for the estimated effects on expenditures presented in this article, it is not true for the other outcomes examined—results for

productive investments and the MPC out of transfers do not differ by baseline poverty groups, in contrast to Gertler *et al.* (2006) and Todd *et al.* (2007).

Finally, the estimating strategy employed, while not formally incorporating attrition, is likely to be robust to attrition bias, particularly if (observed or unobserved) persistent heterogeneity is leading to attrition. Such heterogeneity is directly controlled for in the household fixed-effects regressions. Moreover, estimates based on a balanced panel data set, including only those 1259 households interviewed in all four years are similar, suggesting attrition related changes in sample composition are not driving the results. Therefore, I conclude that attrition is not a major concern for estimating programme effects in these data.

#### **4. THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ON CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT**

##### *4.1 Household expenditures*

Despite strong growth in the late 1990s and in 2000 when gross domestic product grew nearly 13 per cent, Nicaragua had the lowest per capita GDP in Central America in 2000. In addition, subsequent slow growth meant that income per capita was essentially stagnant over 2000–2002 (World Bank 2004). The Central Region was the only one to show worsening poverty between 1998 and 2001, a pattern that has been attributed in part to the decline in coffee prices which affected many of the agricultural labourers in that industry as well as a drought in 2001 (Varangis *et al.*, 2003; World Bank, 2003). Within the 42 localities selected for the programme evaluation, 42 per cent of the population was extremely poor before the programme—that is, their per capita annual household expenditures were less than the amount necessary to purchase a food basket providing minimum caloric requirements (World Bank 2003)—and 80 per cent extremely poor or poor. Finally, the majority of the remaining households, or nonpoor in the sample, was in the bottom two-thirds of the national Nicaraguan per capita annual household expenditure distribution and so was near-poor.

In the left-hand panel of Table 2, I present the double-difference estimated average programme effects of the treatment-on-the-treated, instrumenting for household-level programme participation with availability of the programme in the locality, and controlling for household fixed effects (see Section 3.4); hereafter I refer to these only as estimated programme effects.

The 2001 and 2002 annual dummy variables for total, per capita, and per capita food expenditures show approximately 10 per cent reductions for the original control localities relative to 2000, consistent with the economic downturn in the region.<sup>10</sup> In 2004, however, the annual dummy (which captures the difference in original intervention areas from 2000 to 2004, suggests a gain of similar magnitude, an apparent recovery or possibly continued increased expenditures for this group. In 2001 and 2002, when the original control group had not yet received the programme, the estimated programme effects are large and significant for all the expenditure categories considered.<sup>11</sup> For comparison, the average value of annual cash transfers for beneficiary households over the 2000–2004 period was approximately C\$ 3500 (C\$ 750 on a per capita basis). Thus the estimated programme effect on total annual household expenditures was more than C\$ 600 above average transfers in 2001, but below them (by approximately the same amount) in 2002. In both years, however, effects were of the same order of magnitude as average transfers and in neither year can one reject the hypothesis that the estimated programme effect is significantly different from the average annual transfer amount. It is clear, then, that the programme was effective in increasing total annual household expenditures, at least in the short term. In 2004, the estimated effect (comparing the original control localities that in 2004 had begun to receive the programme with the original intervention localities that are no longer receiving transfers) was even larger, despite the reduction in the size of transfers and the fact that the comparison here is made with the original intervention localities. This suggests the possibility that household expenditures did not undergo a permanent increase in the original intervention localities, and the increase seen over time in those areas was the secular trend, a theme I return to below.

[TABLE 2 – ABOUT HERE]

The estimated programme effects shown in the left-hand panel of Table 2 also suggest that beneficiary households are spending a large proportion of their transfers on (current) food expenditures. RPS led to significant increases in per capita annual food expenditures of approximately C\$ 830 in 2001, C\$ 650 in 2002, and C\$ 700 in 2004. These increases were approximately 75–90 per cent of the average effects on per capita annual household expenditures. Consistent with RPS goals and the agreement signed by beneficiaries (in which the first ‘condition,’ though not officially monitored, is that they will use the transfer for improved nutrition and schooling of their children), additional expenditures as a result of the transfers were predominantly for food. Recommendations that the transfers be spent on food were emphasized during incorporation into the programme and in the health education workshops. In addition, Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) present evidence that some volunteer coordinators took this informal aspect of the programme seriously, asking to see receipts after transfers have been made, though it is not possible to gauge how widespread this practice is.

Another key component of the programme was education. Estimated average effects of RPS on educational expenditures were also significant; for example, in 2002 the effect was C\$ 214, slightly smaller than the per student value of the educational supplies transfer in Phase I (C\$ 275), consistent with the fact that not all households had children eligible for the educational transfers.

#### *4.2 Household consumer durables and economically productive assets*

To this point, the evidence suggests that households were following closely the programme recommendations. It was empirically shown that expenditures increased substantially with the programme, as has been the case in other contexts (Hoddinott and Skoufias, 2005), and possibly more than the amount of transfers given (at least in the first year). Such increases, however, are consistent with different underlying behaviours. For example, it is possible that investments were being made with the funds yielding (short-term) positive returns that enabled increased expenditures. Alternatively, it could be that households were spending nearly all of the transfers and investing or saving little. If the latter were the case, then one would expect to find the MPC out of transfers to be close to one.

In this subsection, I examine the evidence to determine whether and how transfers are being invested (savings are not observed) and certain productive activities within the household are changing. In Section 4.4 I estimate and examine the MPC. The questionnaire asked about various forms of investment, such as on consumer durable goods, agricultural or industrial machinery and equipment, livestock, and land use.

First, I explore ownership of consumer durables, many of which might make individuals more productive in the household (allowing more time for other productive activities or leisure) or be used in productive activities themselves. They include the following items: radio, sound system (tape recorder or stereo), television, video player, refrigerator, stove, iron, maize grinder, fan, toaster, mixer, microwave, air conditioner, sewing machine, typewriter, computer, bicycle, motorcycle, car, or boat. Ownership of most of these items before the programme was rare—2 per cent or less—with the exception of radios, sound systems, televisions, irons, maize grinders, and bicycles. Results examining the ownership of these items one at a time show little evidence that the programme led to increased ownership of these items, though ownership of televisions, irons, and maize grinders increased over time for all households [Appendix Table A2]. The story is similar when I consider ownership of at least one consumer durable, the total (sum of the) number of items reported, or the total value of the items owned (right-hand panel of Table 2). Ownership (and value) increased over time, but apparently not as a result of the programme.

When I examine instead an array of productive goods associated with agricultural activities, there is only minor evidence of increased investment. Questions about these assets were not asked in the baseline and 2001 rounds of the survey. I therefore present the single-difference estimated average programme effects of the treatment-on-the-treated, instrumenting for household-level programme participation with availability of the programme in the locality, and controlling for baseline characteristics of the households (see Section 3.4);<sup>12</sup> hereafter, estimated programme effects.

The first two columns show the estimated programme effect on the number and value of productive agricultural items owned, including: animal implements such as ploughs, water pump, sprayer, tools, carts, and other [all shown separately in Appendix Table A3]. There is some evidence of a

statistically significant positive programme effect on the number of items in 2002, though it is small. Slightly stronger evidence is seen in the third and fourth columns where I consider an alternative approach that examines the estimated programme effect on expenditures on agricultural or industrial equipment made in the previous 12 months. Expenditures on these items appear to have increased on the order of 15 per cent in 2002 relative to the original control group. Those entering the programme in 2004, however, spent less on these items relative to original intervention localities, reflecting continued high spending on these categories by original intervention households in 2004.

[TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE]

The next asset considered is land. It is possible to examine on the extensive margin whether households were more likely to be cultivating land or to own any land, and, on the intensive margin, whether they owned more land (though these questions were asked in 2004 only). Given that these latter measures represent longer-term investments, it is plausible that a single-difference estimate in 2004 yields a valid estimated programme effect in original intervention localities and is not subject to the immediate shift in behaviour that was seen in the programme effect on household expenditures, for example. This exploration, however, yielded no evidence of programme effects on these outcomes (results not shown).

A potentially easier avenue for expanding agricultural production than acquiring or cultivating new lands is to expand livestock activities. There is no evidence, however, that the programme affected investment in animal husbandry, as shown in the right-side panel of Table 3. In addition to the indicators considered in the table, estimates of the programme effect on 1) whether a household had a certain type of animal; 2) the number of animals of each type; and 3) the value of animals of each type yielded no systematic or significant pattern of investment.

#### *4.3 Non-agricultural micro enterprises*

The final dimension along which I consider changes in productive activities is household engagement in non-agricultural micro enterprise activities. Such self-employment activities are an

important area to consider since Davis and Stampini (2002) and Davis and Murgai (2003) find that rural self-employment is associated with reductions in poverty at the household level in Nicaragua. For such activities, it is again possible to carry out double-difference estimation since information was collected in all survey years. In 2000, just over 10 per cent of the sample were working in some sort of economic activity related to producing and selling non-agricultural goods, reselling or retailing goods, or selling specialised services (such as repairmen), and during the evaluation period, the overall percentage declined slightly. For 2001 and 2002, the estimated programme effects on these activities were in some cases negative and statistically significant, though small. In 2004, there were no significant effects. While the evidence is mixed, if anything, rather than spurring micro enterprise activities, RPS appears to have provided a disincentive to micro enterprises. It is possible that this is because in the rural areas where the programme operated, characterized by relatively poor infrastructure, such activities only yield low marginal returns. It is also possible that the emphasis on child schooling reduced the available labour pool for such activities.

[TABLE 4 – ABOUT HERE]

#### *4.4 The marginal propensity to consume out of transfers*

The previous sections provided ample evidence that RPS led to increased expenditures, but only minimal evidence that there was increased economically productive investment. An alternative approach to exploring whether households spent their transfers predominantly on current consumption is to estimate the MPC out of transfers (hereafter, MPC). If the MPC is close to one, for example, it would suggest there was little saving (and therefore, little saving for future investment). Because income and saving are not observed, I follow Gertler *et al.* (2006) and specify a consumption equation in which expenditures are a function of actual transfers, past actual accumulated transfers, initial assets and demographics (to control for family labour), and productivity shocks (captured in the error term). Within this framework, initial assets and demographics are the key determinants of permanent income, obviating the need to control for income directly.

$$(3) C_{ict} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D_{2001} + \alpha_2 D_{2002} + \alpha_4 D_{2004} + \beta_1 T_{ict} + \beta_2 \sum_{s=2001}^{s=t-1} T_{ics} + X_{ic} \gamma + \mu_{ic} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where in addition to the terms defined above

$C_{ict}$  = total annual household expenditures for household  $i$  in locality  $c$  at time  $t$ ,

$T_{ict}$  = actual RPS transfers to household  $i$  in locality  $c$  in year  $t$ , and

all the  $\alpha$ s and  $\beta$ s and  $\gamma$ s are unknown parameters. The summation term represents actual cumulative past transfers for household  $i$  up to, but not including, year  $t$ 's actual transfers (so that  $s$  ranges from 2001 to 2004). Households in original intervention localities had zero actual cumulative past transfers in 2000 and 2001,  $T_{ic,2001}$  in 2002, and  $(T_{ic,2001} + T_{ic,2002} + T_{ic,2003})$  in 2004. Those in original control localities had zero actual cumulative past transfers in all years but 2004, when they were  $T_{ic,2003}$ .<sup>13</sup> Thus  $\beta_1$  represents the MPC and  $\beta_2$  the increase in consumption from investment. It is possible for  $\beta_1$  to be one and yet for  $\beta_2$  to be positive, if expenditures made in earlier periods were yielding positive returns

As with the household-level programme participation decision, the amount of actual (and thus cumulative) transfers received is endogenous. Therefore, in addition to (3) I also consider household fixed-effects instrumental variables estimates using potential and potential cumulative past transfers as instruments for actual and actual cumulative past transfers.<sup>14</sup> Potential transfers are calculated using the specific characteristics of each eligible household in the sample in each period. For example, a household with two school age children eligible for the programme would be eligible for the food security, school attendance, and two school supplies transfers (see Section 2.2).

Results, both with and without actual cumulative past transfers, are presented in Table 5. Controlling for the endogeneity of actual transfer amounts has only a small effect on the results, tending to reduce the estimated MPC coefficients by around 5 per cent, on average. The first two columns, where actual transfers are included but not cumulative transfers, yield a MPC greater than one, 1.1. This coefficient estimate raises the possibility that, despite the limited evidence on investment in previous sections, transfers had a multiplier effect on consumption expenditures, similar to (but smaller than) the income multiplier effects found in Mexico (Sadoulet *et al.*, 2001). For two reasons, however, such a



multiplier effect seems unlikely. First, the estimated coefficients for MPC in the first two columns are not statistically different from 1.0. Second, when I break out the effect of transfers by year of participation in the programme (which is not the same for all households given the cross-over design), a different pattern emerges. In columns three and four, the 2<sup>nd</sup> row represents the MPC estimated from transfers made during the first year that a household was a programme beneficiary. For Phase I households, this was 2001 and for Phase II households, 2004. The MPC during this year was higher still, 1.2, and is statistically different from 1.0 ( $p=0.04$  from a two-sided t-test using the estimates from the fourth column). In later years, however, the MPC drops by over 40 per cent to 0.7, well below one and also statistically different from it ( $p=0.04$ ).<sup>15</sup> The MPC estimate in the first two columns (1.1) is not the simple average of the two MPC estimates in the third and fourth column because there are more observations in the sample that were first-year programme beneficiaries. The simple average would imply an overall MPC of approximately 0.95, only slightly higher than that estimated by Gertler *et al.* (2006). Since it was clear that the transfers were to last for three years (and thus were not permanent), this suggests households closely adhered to programme recommendations regarding the use of transfers.

[TABLE 5 – ABOUT HERE]

First-year beneficiary households spend even more than the actual value of transfers received. It is possible that initially households are taking advantage of their newfound wealth accorded them by beneficiary status, including transfers projected to last for three years, and spending accordingly. They may even be satisfying pent-up demand. This is supported by the observation that the MPC decreases substantially in later years. The results are also consistent, however, with delays in the distribution of transfers. For example, in the first year of Phase I, only five out of a scheduled six transfers were distributed before the 2001 household survey, due to delays outside the programme's control (the final transfer was made later). If households planned to spend the entire transfer amount for that year, we would see a spending rate of 6/5 or 1.2 for every Córdoba transferred, identical to the estimated coefficient. It is not possible to empirically separate these different possibilities with the available data.

In the final two columns, I present results including actual cumulative past transfers. If some of those transfers were invested in income generating activities that had generated short-term returns leading to increased expenditures, then  $\beta_2$  would be positive and significant. This does not seem to have been the case; actual cumulative past transfers have no effect on current expenditures. While it is possible that any investments undertaken require a longer period than covered here to yield returns (up to 3 years in the case of the original intervention group), combined with the limited evidence on investments in the earlier sections, it seems more likely that there are no such effects.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Using a randomised community-based evaluation, in this article I have explored the extent to which a conditional cash transfer programme in Nicaragua led to economically productive investments other than human capital, the primary programme objective. This was done by assessing programme effects on both consumption and investment, during a period marked by economic decline and then recovery. The estimates presented are the overall average programme effects, that is, they combine supply- and demand-side components of the programme. They represent the short-term effects of the programme (after one, two, or four years), although some of the outcomes examined are themselves long-run indicators, such as investment in productive goods and land.

A crucial question not addressed by previous research is the extent to which effects of RPS will persist after the programme exited (in late 2006), and whether there are longer-term effects that have not been captured in what is necessarily only a short-term assessment. In late 2003, RPS delivered the final demand-side transfers to households in the original intervention localities, though it continued offering supply-side services until the end of 2005. At the same time (mid 2003), the original control group became beneficiaries of the programme. Continued survey work in 2004 provides information useful for examining the effects of that transition and to begin to understand better the sustainability of the large changes achieved by RPS.

Programme effects in years when transfers were being given are reflected clearly in increased expenditures, the lion's share of which was on food expenditures. Those increases largely disappeared, however, when the transfers ceased. With those findings on expenditures, I turned to an assessment of the programme on investment of various types. There was only limited evidence that the programme led to an increase in investment, for agricultural equipment. These results were corroborated by a separate analysis estimating a consumption equation, which demonstrated that cumulative past transfers had no effect on current expenditures.

The findings do not imply that the programme had no long term effects—it almost certainly did in terms of investment in child health and education which should continue to lead to benefits for many years to come. In contrast to Mexico, however, where there seems to be substantial investment and returns from it (Gertler *et al.*, 2006; Todd *et al.*, 2007), there was only weak, albeit positive, evidence that RPS improved investment activities in the rural localities in which it operates, possibly due to 1) the economic downturn experienced in these areas during the period, 2) the strong programme orientation toward increased food expenditures, and 3) the limited opportunities in the impoverished rural areas where it operated.

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<sup>1</sup> Census *comarcas* are administrative areas within municipalities that typically include between one and five small communities averaging 100 households each.

<sup>2</sup> The value of the supply-side services, as measured by how much RPS paid to the providers, was also substantial—approximately \$50 for the education workshops and \$110 for the healthcare services for children under age five, per beneficiary household.

<sup>3</sup> LSMS surveys are typically implemented in two visits to the household (Grosh and Glewwe, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> These and other descriptions of poverty in the sample are calculated based on 2001 per capita annual expenditure poverty lines of \$202 (\$C 2691) for extreme poor (calculated as the amount required to purchase a minimum requirement food basket) and \$386 (C\$ 5157) for poor, which adds nonfood requirements (World Bank, 2003). Households are classified into poverty groups based on their per capita annual total household expenditures (including own-production) measured before the programme in 2000 and using these 2001 Nicaraguan poverty lines.

<sup>5</sup> See Ravallion (2001, 2007) for useful discussions on this and related evaluation tools.

<sup>6</sup> The household fixed effects implicitly control for locality-level fixed effects as well.

<sup>7</sup> Household fixed effects are implicitly controlled for in the case where (1) is estimated on a balanced panel data set, but not when using an unbalanced panel, as I do in the analyses.

<sup>8</sup> For the single-difference specifications, standard errors are constructed allowing for clustering at the locality level (StataCorp, 2005).

<sup>9</sup> *t*-statistics on the programme availability instrument in each of the first-stage regressions are all over 100.

<sup>10</sup> I use nominal Córdoba figures to facilitate comparison with transfer sizes; all regressions incorporate the relevant year dummy variables, capturing inflationary pressures common to both intervention and control localities.

<sup>11</sup> I focus on total expenditures since there is evidence that the programme influence migration which complicates the interpretation on the per capita measures (but not the comparisons across per capita measures that I make in the text) (Winters *et al.* 2005).

<sup>12</sup> Results using first-difference techniques for consumer durables yield similar results to those shown presented, reflecting the similar starting points in the original intervention and control areas.

<sup>13</sup> Although there is no household survey data in 2003, transfers are observed from an RPS administrative data source.

<sup>14</sup> *t*-statistics on the potential transfer and past cumulative transfer instruments in each of the first-stage regressions are all 200 or higher.

<sup>15</sup> Results are nearly identical if 2004, when Phase II households began receiving transfers, is dropped. The MPC

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estimate in the first two columns (1.1) is not the simple average of the two in the third and fourth column because there are more observations in the sample that were first-year programme beneficiaries. The simple average implies an overall MPC of 0.95. Since it was clear that the transfers were to last for three years (and thus not permanent), this suggests households closely adhered to programme recommendations regarding how to use the transfers.

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**Table 1–Comparison of intervention and control households at baseline 2000**

Indicator	Intervention (n=810)	Control (n=771)	Difference (Intervention – Control)	Total (n=1581)
Household size	6.06 (3.02)	6.25 (2.94)	-0.19 [0.11]	6.15 (2.99)
Number of children < 5 years old	1.10 (1.11)	1.17 (1.04)	<b>-0.07*</b> [0.09]	1.14 (1.08)
Number of children 5–10 years old	1.13 (1.12)	1.17 (1.19)	-0.04 [0.73]	1.15 (1.16)
Female-headed household (%)	13.5	14.5	-1.1 [0.54]	14.0
Age of household head	44.3 (16.1)	43.4 (15.3)	0.9 [0.44]	43.9 (15.7)
Years of education of household head	1.65 (2.18)	1.61 (2.21)	0.04 [0.74]	1.63 (2.19)
Average years of education of adults	2.12 (1.87)	2.19 (1.85)	-0.07 [0.24]	2.16 (1.86)
Number of rooms in the home	1.50 (0.79)	1.49 (0.82)	0.01 [0.81]	1.50 (0.81)
Toilet (%)	59.0	55.5	3.5 [0.16]	57.3
Block or brick walls (%)	14.7	13.7	1.0 [0.59]	14.2
Dirt floor (%)	82.1	82.7	-0.06 [0.73]	82.4
Electricity (%)	25.4	22.2	3.3 [0.13]	23.8
Number of consumer durables	1.65 (1.19)	1.64 (1.34)	0.01 [0.57]	1.65 (1.26)
Value of consumer durables	395.0 (1155)	362.0 (883)	33.0 [0.13]	378.9 (1031)
Size of land owned (hectares)	1.38 (1.45)	1.45 (1.82)	-0.07 [0.83]	1.41 (1.64)
Work as agricultural producer (%)	9.9	8.6	1.3 [0.40]	9.3
Use credit (%)	14.9	15.4	-0.5 [0.86]	15.2
Total annual household expenditures (\$C)	20387 (12085)	20188 (12878)	199 [0.31]	20290 (12475)
Per capita annual household expenditures (\$C)	4001 (2872)	3755 (2907)	<b>246***</b> [<0.01]	3881 (2891)
<i>Expenditure class</i>				
Extreme poor (%)	34.8	42.0	<b>-7.2***</b> [<0.01]	38.3
Poor (%)	76.4	79.5	-3.1 [0.14]	77.9
Nonpoor (%)	23.6	20.5	3.1 [0.14]	22.1

Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses and p-values in brackets for test of equality of populations across groups using two-tailed proportion test for proportions and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for all others (StataCorp, 2005). \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1 per cent, \*\* at the 5 per cent, and \* at the 10 per cent levels.

**Table 2–The double-difference estimated programme effect on expenditures and consumer durables, 2000–2004**

	Total expenditures (C\$)	Per capita total expenditures (C\$)	Per capita food expenditures (C\$)	Education expenditures (C\$)	(1) if any consumer durables	Number of consumer durables	Value of consumer durables (C\$)
Year 2001	-2582*** (497)	-507*** (118)	-423*** (88)	175 *** (43)	0.0464*** (0.0141)	0.1037** (0.0454)	98 (87)
Year 2002	-2135*** (501)	-367*** (119)	-368*** (88)	214 *** (43)	0.0551*** (0.0142)	0.1364*** (0.0457)	45 (87)
Year 2004	3691*** (490)	1009*** (117)	506*** (87)	373 *** (43)	0.0900*** (0.0139)	0.4614*** (0.0447)	365*** (85)
Year 2001 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	4131*** (719)	949*** (171)	827*** (127)	147 ** (62)	0.0013 (0.0204)	-0.0102 (0.0656)	-192 (125)
Year 2002 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	2817*** (734)	713*** (174)	655*** (130)	339 *** (64)	0.0128 (0.0208)	0.0576 (0.0669)	-109 (128)
Year 2004 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	4466*** (766)	950*** (182)	702*** (135)	222 *** (66)	0.0229 (0.0217)	-0.0304 (0.0700)	-177 (133)
Constant	20418*** (237)	3874*** (56)	2668*** (42)	333 *** (21)	0.8434*** (0.0067)	1.6564*** (0.0216)	387*** (41)
Household fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$\chi^2$ statistic	31544***	21581***	17907***	3548***	66978***	27199***	496***
Baseline mean [Standard Deviation]	20290 [12475]	3881 [2892]	2673 [1937]	319 [915]	0.842 -	1.648 [1.264]	379 [1031]

Notes: Household fixed-effects, instrumental variables models estimated on unbalanced household sample of N=5777. All three annual interactions with household-level participation treated as endogenous and annual interactions with locality-level programme availability used as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses and standard deviation in square brackets. \*\*\* Denotes significance at the 1 per cent, \*\* at the 5 per cent, and \* at the 10 per cent levels.

**Table 3–The single-difference estimated programme effect on agricultural and industrial investments, and on animal ownership, 2002 and 2004**

	Number of productive agricultural goods	Value of productive agricultural goods	(1) if any expenditure on agricultural or industrial equipment	Logarithm of Expenditures on agricultural or industrial equipment	Number of types of animals owned	Value of all animals owned	Tropical Livestock Units <sup>a</sup>
Year 2002 × RPS beneficiary (1 <sup>st</sup> Diff)	0.1029** (0.0516)	-28.8 (61.3)	0.0351* (0.0206)	0.1443* (0.0860)	-0.0385 (0.1072)	-138.2 (434.3)	-0.0297 (0.1107)
Year 2004 × RPS beneficiary (1 <sup>st</sup> Diff)	-0.0253 (0.0603)	-19.5 (94.1)	-0.0374** (0.0189)	-0.1567** (0.0801)	-0.0066 (0.1143)	180.6 (964.2)	-0.0794 (0.1434)
Household baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-statistic	16.3***	17.0***	2.2**	2.2**	8.5***	3.8***	3.6***

Notes: Instrumental variables models estimated on unbalanced household sample of N=2743 from years 2002 and 2004. Both annual interactions with household-level participation treated as endogenous and annual interactions with locality-level programme availability used as instruments. In addition to a constant and a year 2004 dummy variable, household baseline controls include: the number of persons in different demographic categories (children 4 and under, children 5 to 10, boys 11 to 14, girls 11 to 14, boys 15 to 19, girls 15 to 19, men 20 to 34, women 20 to 34, men 35 to 60, women 35 to 60, and men above 60, with the left out category being women above 60), education of the head of household (and its square), whether the household head was female, and age of the household head (and its square). Standard errors calculated allowing for clustering at the locality level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp, 2005). \*\*\* Denotes significance at the 1 per cent, \*\* at the 5 per cent, and \* at the 10 per cent levels.

a. Tropical Livestock Units calculated using Central American-specific weights for cattle [0.7], horsed [0.50], pigs [0.25], and chickens/poultry [0.01] (Zezza *et al.*, 2007)

**Table 4—The double-difference estimated programme effect on home business activities, 2000–2004**

	Number of people working in home business	Non-agricultural home production for sale	Resell/retail purchased goods	Sell services of some sort (not day labour)	Home production, retail, or services (previous three columns)
Year 2001 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	0.0284 (0.0292)	-0.0091 (0.0141)	-0.1015*** (0.0181)	-0.0020 (0.0056)	-0.1056*** (0.0217)
Year 2002 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	0.0209 (0.0298)	-0.0296** (0.0143)	-0.0462** (0.0185)	-0.0044 (0.0057)	-0.0708*** (0.0221)
Year 2004 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	-0.0311 (0.0312)	-0.0029 (0.0150)	0.0098 (0.0193)	0.0061 (0.0060)	0.0165 (0.0231)
Household Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$\chi^2$ statistic	439***	328***	631***	47***	955 ***
Baseline fraction or mean	0.176	0.045	0.089	0.005	0.124

Notes: See notes to Table 2.

**Table 5–The effect of actual and cumulative transfers on total annual household expenditures, 2000–2004**

	<b>Total expenditures</b>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Actual transfer	1.111*** (0.0830)	1.083*** (0.0851)				
Actual transfer (1 <sup>st</sup> year beneficiary)			1.221*** (0.0903)	1.194*** (0.092)	1.247*** (0.122)	1.190*** (0.130)
Actual transfer (later year beneficiary)			0.761*** (0.141)	0.703*** (0.146)	0.749*** (0.146)	0.705*** (0.152)
Past actual cumulative transfers					0.029 (0.091)	-0.004 (0.098)
Year 2001	-2572*** (375)	-2521*** (377)	-2783*** (381)	-2732*** (382)	-2830*** (410)	-2726*** (418)
Year 2002	-2961*** (384)	-2906*** (386)	-2265*** (446)	-2152*** (452)	-2295*** (455)	-2148*** (462)
Year 2004	3091*** (402)	3156*** (404)	3075*** (401)	3155*** (403)	2861*** (790)	3184*** (841)
Constant	20416*** (237)	20416*** (237)	20417*** (237)	20417*** (237)	20417*** (237)	20417*** (237)
Household fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Instrumental variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
$\chi^2$ statistic	***	***	***	***	***	***

Notes: Household fixed-effects models estimated on unbalanced household sample of N=5777. Specifications that also employ instrumental variables use potential transfers (in the relevant year and past potential cumulative transfers) as instruments for actual transfers and past actual cumulative transfers. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* Denotes significance at the 1 per cent, \*\* at the 5 per cent, and \* at the 10 per cent levels.

**Appendix Table A1–Nicaraguan RPS evaluation survey nonresponse and subsequent attrition**

	Baseline 2000	Follow-up 2001	Follow-up 2002	Follow-up 2004
Interviewed (% target sample)	1581 (89.6)	1453 (91.9)	1397 (88.4)	1346 (90.3)
<i>... of which</i>				
<i>Original intervention</i> (% target sample)	810 (92.5)	766 (94.6)	722 (87.5)	693 (88.6)
<i>Original control</i> (% target sample)	771 (87.4)	687 (89.1)	675 (89.1)	653 (92.1)
Interviewed in all 4 rounds (% 2000 sample)	1259 (79.6)	1259 (79.6)	1259 (79.6)	1259 (79.6)
<i>... of which</i>				
<i>Original intervention</i>	644	644	644	644
<i>Original control</i>	615	615	615	615
<i>Number households not interviewed</i>				
Uninhabited dwelling	60	51	83	98
Temporary absence	100	28	46	30
Refusal	17	6	12	17
Urban (misclassified)	6	0	0	0
Contaminated	0	37	37	37
Lost questionnaire	0	6	6	0
<b>Target Sample</b>	<b>1764</b>	<b>1581</b>	<b>1581</b>	<b>1491</b>

Notes: Target sample in 2001 and 2002 comprised households interviewed in 2000. Target sample in 2004 comprised households interviewed at least once in 2001 and 2002.

**Appendix Table A2–The double-difference estimated programme effect on individual consumer durables, 2000–2004**

	Radio	Sound system <sup>a</sup>	Television	Iron	Maize grinder	Sewing machine	Bicycle
Year 2001	0.0581** (0.0237)	0.0023 (0.0161)	0.0113 (0.0113)	-0.0316* (0.0167)	0.0672*** (0.0190)	-0.0043 (0.0062)	-0.0036 (0.0094)
Year 2002	0.0471** (0.0238)	-0.0470*** (0.0161)	0.0275** (0.0114)	0.0366** (0.0168)	0.0766*** (0.0192)	-0.0113* (0.0063)	0.0118 (0.0094)
Year 2004	-0.0081 (0.0233)	-0.0365** (0.0158)	0.0828*** (0.0111)	0.2313*** (0.0165)	0.1205*** (0.0188)	0.0006 (0.0061)	0.0224 (0.0092)
Year 2001 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	0.0363 (0.0342)	-0.0763*** (0.0232)	-0.0156 (0.0163)	0.0278 (0.0242)	0.0311 (0.0275)	0.0045 (0.0090)	0.0049 (0.0135)
Year 2002 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	0.0508 (0.0349)	-0.0288 (0.0237)	-0.0314* (0.0167)	-0.0142 (0.0247)	0.0639** (0.0281)	0.0109 (0.0092)	0.0190 (0.0138)
Year 2004 × RPS beneficiary (DD)	-0.0436 (0.0365)	0.0093 (0.0247)	-0.0388** (0.0174)	-0.0696*** (0.0257)	0.0217 (0.0293)	0.0020 (0.0100)	-0.0117 (0.0144)
Constant	0.4957*** (0.0113)	0.1797*** (0.0077)	0.1080*** (0.0054)	0.1206*** (0.0080)	0.6414*** (0.0091)	0.0198*** (0.0030)	0.0315*** (0.0045)
Household fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$\chi^2$ statistic	8286***	1466***	2209***	2755***	23857***	148***	329***
Baseline fraction	0.495	0.104	0.176	0.120	0.644	0.020	0.030

Notes: See notes to Table 2.

a. Includes a tape recorder or stereo.



**Appendix Table A3–The single-difference estimated programme effect on owning individual agricultural investments items, 2002 and 2004**

	Small tools	Water pump	Fumigation pump	Cart	Plough or other animal equipment	Other agricultural equipment
Year 2002 × RPS beneficiary (1 <sup>st</sup> Diff)	0.0514* (0.0314)	0.0029 (0.0034)	-0.0126 (0.0339)	0.0152** (0.0071)	0.0045 (0.0149)	0.0417** (0.209)
Year 2004 × RPS beneficiary (1 <sup>st</sup> Diff)	-0.0229 (0.0338)	-0.0121 (0.0096)	0.0549 (0.0410)	-0.0050 (0.0066)	-0.0407** (0.0191)	0.0005 (0.0081)
Household baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-statistic	3.8***	1.0	20.1***	1.1	8.5***	2.6***

Notes: See notes to Table 3.