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Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

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Abstract

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [24]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [13] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [20].

Keywords: Insurance Market, Adverse Selection, Incentive Efficiency.

JEL Classification Numbers: D86

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1 Introduction

This paper readdresses an old but still open question in applied micro-economic theory: how a competitive market will allocate insurance policies when firms cannot distinguish amongst the different risk-classes of customers. To this end, it restricts attention to the simplest depiction that captures the essential features of this question, an economy in which each of a continuum of agents observes a binary parameter indicating the probability of suffering an income loss. For this version of the problem, we propose a game-theoretic structure under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed insureds and uninformed insurers delivers the strongest of results. The equilibrium is unique and sorts the two types by maximizing the welfare of the low-risk agents. More importantly, it does so in a way that renders the equilibrium outcome interim incentive efficient (i.e., Pareto-efficient in the interim sense and subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality). In fact, and in a sense to be made precise below, it is the most desirable allocation on the interim incentive efficient (IIE) frontier.

Needless to say, we examine the interactions between the market participants under the lenses of non-cooperative game-theory. This has become the standard tool for analyzing markets with adverse selection because of its main virtue, every detail of the economic environment is made explicit. Indeed, a well-defined extensive-form game with incomplete information describes all the institutional details of the market, the information that is available to each of the players and the actions they may take. With respect to studying markets for insurance provision, this approach was first adopted by Rothschild and Stiglitz [24]. Yet, the main implication of their study (as well as of the subsequent generalization by Riley [23]) was that, abstracting away from specific market structures but viewing market participants as engaging in Nash-type strategic behavior, adverse selection can be too cumbersome for competitive markets to function, even under the simplest of settings. It limits the form of contractual arrangements that are consistent with equilibrium, to the extent that it can even preclude its existence altogether.

Specifically, under Nash-type strategic behavior (it is common knowledge amongst all players that no player can influence the actions of any other player), there might be no (pooling) equilibrium arrangement offering a single price per unit of coverage. This occurs when insurance firms have an incentive to charge higher prices for greater coverage because, by doing so, they are able to sort their lower-risk customers from the higher-risk ones (for whom additional coverage yields greater marginal benefits). In this case, the only possible contractual arrangement is separating with each risk-class paying its own premium, equal to its true accident probability. Unfortunately, the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) allocation is a viable equilibrium only under limiting conditions.

This alarming observation led to the emergence of a significant body of literature whose principal aim has been to propose allocation mechanisms, along with implementing market structures, which ensure that always some allocation will be supported as competitive equilibrium, under some associated notion of equilibrium. The respective models can be broadly classified into three sets, based upon the extent to which the mechanism allows the players' behavior to be strategic. All but two, however, share an unsatisfactory feature: whenever the RS allocation is not IIE, the same

is almost always true also for the suggested equilibria. The two exemptions are Miyazaki [19] and Bisin and Gottardi [2] but either suffers from deficiencies regarding the implementation of the proposed equilibrium.

One class of models has focused on Walrasian mechanisms. In its purest form, this approach was initiated by Prescott and Townsend [21]-[22] and revisited recently by Rustichini and Siconolfi [25]. The central message of these papers is that general economies with adverse selection do not always admit pure Walrasian equilibrium pricing systems and, when they do, the resulting allocations are not necessarily IIE. To guarantee existence, some studies have introduced rationing (Gale [9]-[10], Guerrieri et al. [12]) or suppressed the requirement that firms are profit-maximizing, imposing at the same time quantity constraints on trade (Dubey and Geanakoplos [5], Dubey et al. [6]).

Either of these approaches arrives at some equilibrium that is essentially unique and involves a separating allocation. Typically, however, this is not IIE while uniqueness obtains by restricting the out-of-equilibrium actions and beliefs often in strong ways. Under rationing, the refinement criteria range from subgame perfection (Guerrieri et al. [12]) to the Universal Divinity of Banks and Sobel [1] (Gale [9]) or the Stability of Kohlberg and Mertens [15] (Gale [10]). The latter notion has been deployed also under quantity constraints (Dubey and Geanakoplos [5], Dubey et al. [6]) but seems to be more binding in that environment. As shown in Martin [17], its weakening to something akin to trembling-hand perfection allows for many pooling equilibria which typically Pareto-dominate the separating allocation but are not IIE either.

Instead of constraining the Walrasian mechanism, Bisin and Gottardi [2] enhance it with the implicit presence of institutions that monitor trade appropriately. Restricting attention to the same insurance economy as the one in the present paper, they show that the RS allocation obtains always as the unique Walrasian equilibrium if there are markets for contingent claims in which agents trade only incentive-compatible contracts. To ensure that incentive efficiency is attained whenever the RS allocation is not IIE, they introduce also markets for consumption rights. The ensuing Arrow-Lindahl equilibria internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection. In fact, by varying the endowment of consumption rights, the authors are able to trace the entire IIE frontier but for one point. The latter, which is no other than the unique equilibrium allocation in the present paper, can be obtained only as the limit of a sequence of equilibria.

Another perspective has been to look at mechanisms in which competitive equilibrium is supported by strategic behavior. This has produced two separate lines of approach. In earlier models, some of the players exhibit strategic behavior which is not of the Nash-type. Specifically, the sellers in Wilson [26], Riley [23], Engers and Fernandez [7], and Miyazaki [19] but also the buyers in Grossman [11] are able to foresee the unraveling of equilibrium Rothschild and Stiglitz warned about and modify their plans so as to prevent it. By contrast, most later studies have been built upon the game-theoretical foundation in Hellwig [13] or its generalization in Maskin and Tirole [18]. Under these structures, whenever the RS allocation is not IIE, a multiplicity of contractual arrangements can be supported as sequential equilibria. Within the richness of the resulting equilibrium set, however, the IIE subset is of negligible size.

Evidently, even though there are by now many views about how a competitive market might

allocate insurance policies under adverse selection, a crucial question has been left open: whether, if at all, and under which game-theoretic structure a competitive market whose participants engage in Nash-type strategic behavior may ensure that resources are allocated efficiently. This motivates the present paper which answers this question in the affirmative, and in the strongest sense, using structural elements that are well-known in the literature. Our main message is that a simple extension of Hellwig's game-structure delivers always and uniquely a particular efficient allocation as Nash equilibrium.

As we argue in the sequel, the analysis of Rothschild and Stiglitz can be interpreted by means of a two-stage game in which, at stage 1, the firms make binding offers of insurance contracts while, at stage 2, the customers choose amongst them. By contrast, Hellwig turns the offers firms make at stage 1 non-binding by adding a third stage in which, after observing the other firms' contractual offers at stage 1 and the customers' choices at stage 2, a firm may withdraw any of its own contracts. Regarding this game, we envision expanding the strategy space of the insurance providers along two dimensions. Our firms may subsidize their net income across contracts by offering menus of them at stage 1. They can also publicly pre-commit, if they so wish, to an offer on either of two levels: not withdrawing a contract at stage 3, irrespectively of the history of play at that point (commitment on the contractual level), or not withdrawing an element of a menu unless they withdraw the menu itself (commitment on the policy level).

Under this structural enhancement, the IIE allocation that maximizes the welfare of low-risk customers can always be supported as the unique equilibrium, for a given distribution of the two risk-types in the population, even when one does not exist in the Rothschild-Stiglitz setting. The equilibrium outcome coincides with the RS allocation when the latter is IIE. Otherwise, it involves cross-subsidization across risk-classes but also contracts. Each class pays a different risk premium, the one paid by the high-risk (low-risk) agents being less (more) than their true accident probability. As a result, insurers expect losses on their high-risk customers to be offset by profits from the low-risk ones.

In fact, our equilibrium allocation is the one suggested by Miyasaki who was the first to allow suppliers to offer menus rather than single contracts. His focus, however, was on adverse selection in the labor market and he chose to identify a firm with its wage-structure, its menu of wage-effort contracts. As a result, he viewed free entry and exit in the labor market as dictating that a firm may withdraw its menu but not only a single contract from that menu. This restriction, which is fundamental for Miyasaki's analysis, was heavily criticized in the realm of insurance markets by Grossman. This author pointed out that insurance suppliers more often than not require buyers to submit applications. That is, they may indeed offer menus of contracts but are also able to withdraw specific contracts from these menus by simply rejecting the corresponding applications. Allowing firms to do so, Grossman concluded that the equilibrium contractual arrangement ought to entail pooling, unless it is the RS allocation.

We do take into account this insight but also another equally realistic element of insurance suppliers' behavior: they often choose to send certain customers "pre-approved" applications. As long as it is public belief that the latter term is binding in an enforceable manner, the two elements

together permit an insurance supplier not only to withdraw a particular contract from a menu at stage 3, but also to publicly-commit, at stage 1, to not withdraw it. As it turns out, endogenizing in this way the commitment of firms upon their insurance promises restricts dramatically the equilibrium set. In conjunction with endogenous commitment on the policy level, it delivers always the same singleton one. As it happens, on the one hand, commitment on the contractual level is not observed in equilibrium. “Pre-approved” applications are deployed only off the equilibrium path to restrict the players’ beliefs so that the many equilibria in the standard version of Hellwig’s game are ruled out. On the other, the equilibrium insurance menu is introduced under commitment on the policy level.

Needless to say, it is not simply the interaction between menus and Hellwig’s game that drives our result. Cross-subsidization of net income between contracts has been considered also by Maskin and Tirole [18] under a game-theoretic structure similar to Hellwig’s but a much more general interpretation of contractual arrangements. This paper identified the set of equilibrium allocations that would emerge if the latter are actually mechanisms: specifications of a game-form to be played between two parties, the set of possible actions for each, and an allocation for each pair of strategies. Even though the authors’ main focus was on signalling, they established that the set of equilibrium outcomes remains essentially the same under screening as long as the out-of-equilibrium actions and beliefs are left unrestricted. Much in agreement with Hellwig’s intuition, this set is rich to an extent that renders its IIE subset negligible.

By comparison, the present paper demonstrates the necessity of restricting the market participants’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs in order to arrive at the given IIE outcome. Our augmented version of Hellwig’s game is an example of a mechanism that restricts the out-of-equilibrium beliefs appropriately. It does so by relying heavily on the notion of endogenous commitment and, in this sense, attests to the important role of what are called public actions in Myerson [20]. These are enforceable decisions individual players can publicly-commit themselves to carry out, even if they may turn out ex-post to be harmful to themselves or others. Myerson assigns to the set of public actions center-stage in establishing the existence of neutral optima. The latter form the smallest class of incentive-compatible allocations that are attainable as sequential equilibria of the game in which the informed party proposes mechanisms and satisfy four fundamental axioms of mechanism selection. As we argue in the sequel, our equilibrium allocation is the unique neutral optimum for the insurance economy under study.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the market for insurance provision in the context of Hellwig’s three-stage game. It revisits important results which are commonly-used in applications of Hellwig’s model but have been shown rather heuristically in the literature. In particular, we identify their strategic underpinnings and show how, viewed under the light of contractual commitment, they set the stage for our main result. This is presented in Section 3 which analyzes how the interplay between commitment on the contractual and policy levels leads in fact to efficient insurance provision. In Section 4, we discuss and interpret our findings further, in particular vis a vis relevant ones in the literature. Section 5 concludes. It is followed by an Appendix containing the analytical version of our arguments. By contrast, wherever possible, the

main text presents the economic intuition behind our claims via graphical examples of cases in which they are true.

2 The Simple Model Revisited

To parsimoniously describe adverse selection in the market for insurance provision, imagine that, after having inferred as much as possible from observable characteristics, the insurance firms have grouped a continuum of customers into two classes of otherwise identical individuals.¹ Across these, the agents differ only in the probability of having an accident, which is known by no one else but the agent herself. For the low-risk class, which contains a fraction $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ of the population, this probability is p_L . The high-risk class includes the remainder of individuals whose accident probability is p_H , with $0 < p_L < p_H < 1$.

Each individual is endowed with wealth $W \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$, to be reduced by the amount $d \in (0, W)$ if she suffers an accident. She may insure herself against this event by accepting an insurance contract $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$. That is, by paying a premium a_0 if no accident occurs (state $s = 0$) in exchange for receiving the net indemnity a_1 otherwise (state $s = 1$). Having entered this agreement with an insurance supplier, her state-contingent wealth is given uniquely by the vector $\mathbf{w} = (w_0, w_1) = (W - a_0, W - d + a_1)$, a transfer of wealth across states at the premium rate $\frac{dw_1}{dw_0} = -\frac{da_0}{da_1}$. Her preferences over such vectors (equivalently, over the respective contracts) admit an expected utility representation with an identical for all consumers, strictly-increasing, strictly-concave, twice continuously-differentiable Bernoulli utility function $u : \mathbb{R}_{++} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$. For an agent of risk-type $h \in \{L, H\}$, the preference relation will be denoted by \succsim_h , its representation being $U_h(\mathbf{w}) = (1 - p_h)u(w_0) + p_h u(w_1)$.

On the supply side of the market, insurance is provided by risk-neutral firms which maximize expected profits: $\Pi_p(\mathbf{a}) = (1 - p)a_0 - pa_1$, when the typical insurance contract is sold to a pool of customers whose average accident probability is $p \in [0, 1]$. It will be convenient to use the particular notation $\Pi_h(\cdot)$ and $\Pi_M(\cdot)$ whenever this probability is, respectively, p_h or the population average, $\bar{p} = \lambda p_L + (1 - \lambda)p_H$. These firms are supposed to have adequate financial resources to be willing and able to supply any number of insurance contracts they think profitable.

In fact, they may supply any collection of contracts that is expected to deliver aggregate profits, even if some of its members might be loss-making in expectation. As will be apparent in the sequel, in the market under study, the relevant collections of this kind are binary and will be referred to henceforth as insurance menus. Unless otherwise stated, the typical one $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ is separating (the subscript indicating the respective risk-class the contract is meant for) with single contracts corresponding to trivial menus $\{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}\}$. The latter will be referred to as pooling policies if meant to be bought by customers of either risk-class.² Needless to say, designing insurance provision in this

¹The continuum hypothesis is standard in models of this type. It allows us to invoke the strong law of large numbers and claim that an insurance supplier whose policy will serve both types of customers can expect, with virtual certainty, the composition of risk-types in its client pool to be identical to that in the population.

²Formally (see Step 5 of our RSW analysis in the Appendix), the distinction between pooling policies and sepa-

way entails the usual incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality constraints:

$$U_h(\mathbf{w}_h) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_{h'}) \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

$$U_h(\mathbf{w}) \geq \bar{u}_h \equiv U_h(W, W - d) \quad h, h' \in \{L, H\} \quad (2)$$

The insurance market is taken to be competitive in that there is free entry and exit. In equilibrium, therefore, we may observe only menus that expect at least zero aggregate profits. As a consequence, with respect to pooling policies, the admissible space consists of contracts $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ that satisfy

$$U_h(\mathbf{w}) \geq \bar{u}_h \quad h, h' \in \{L, H\}$$

$$\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}) \geq 0$$

Moreover, any menu may be supplied if expected to be demanded (i.e. at least one of its contracts is expected to be bought given that customers choose insurance contracts to maximize their expected utility) and profitable. The workings of this market will be modeled by means of the three-stage game in Hellwig [13]. At stage 1, the insurance companies offer menus of contracts. At stage 2, customers choose contracts from these menus to apply for, each being allowed to apply for only one contract. At stage 3, the firms may reject whatever applications they have received at stage 2.

To make predictions, we will use the notion of sequential (equivalently, with only two risk-types, perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. We seek that is a vector of strategies - one for the firms and one for each type of customer - and a vector of beliefs - at each information set in the game tree - such that the strategies are optimal at each point (sequential rationality) given that the beliefs are (fully) consistent. Under this notion and using the terms “honoring” (or “not withdrawing”) a contract to mean that none of its applications is rejected at stage 3, an equilibrium insurance menu is such that (a) in equilibrium, each of its constituent contracts is honored at stage 3 and chosen by at least one risk-class of customers, and (b) there is no other admissible menu that, if offered alongside the one in question, would expect strictly positive profits.

Even though by now standard in the pertinent literature, this definition hinges upon the market participants’ beliefs about the profitability of insurance menus. And these beliefs are unambiguous only under full information, in which case the equilibrium set is a singleton, the strictly-separating menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^F, \mathbf{a}_H^F\}$ where \mathbf{a}_h^F maximizes the expected utility of risk-type h amongst the contracts that break even when demanded exclusively by this type.³ Otherwise, under adverse selection, these beliefs depend fundamentally upon two defining features of the model: the type of separating

rating menus is that the latter entail at least one strict inequality in (1). If both inequalities bind, the menu will be referred to as strictly separating.

³Let $FO_p^k = \{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : \Pi_p(\mathbf{a}) = k\}$ be the level set of expected profits for some pair $(p, k) \in [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}_+$. In the (a_0, a_1) -space, this is a line of slope $\frac{da_1}{da_0} = -\frac{1-p}{p}$ with $k = 0$ defining that through the trivial contract $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$, the endowment point $(W, W - d)$ in the (w_0, w_1) -space. When the accident probability in question is, respectively, p_h or \bar{p} , the latter line will be referred to as the fair-odds line of risk-type h (FO_h^*) or of the market (FO_M^*). In the (w_0, w_1) -space, $\mathbf{a}_h^F = \arg \max_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : \Pi_h(\mathbf{a}) \geq 0} U_h(\mathbf{w})$ corresponds to the point of tangency between the indifference curve of risk-type h and the line FO_h^* . This coincides with the intersection of the latter with the 45-degree line, the locus of full-insurance $\{\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^2 : w_0 = w_1\}$.

menus it admits and the strategies under which insurance policies are marketed. In what follows, we investigate this relation and its implications when all players' strategies are of the Nash-type.

2.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium

Suppose for now that, at stage 1 of the game described above, we admit only menus that (i) do not involve cross-subsidization, and (ii) constitute binding contractual offers. Formally, the first requirement restricts the admissible set to menus $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^4$ that satisfy (1)-(2) and

$$\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h) \geq 0 \quad h \in \{H, L\} \tag{3}$$

The second requirement, on the other hand, renders common knowledge that being called upon to act at stage 1 comes with an irreversible commitment to the action chosen at that point. Specifically, no part of an insurance menu may be withdrawn at stage 3, irrespective of the risk-class composition of the pool of customers who chose it at stage 2. This is an exogenous restriction which renders the third stage of Hellwig's game obsolete. It reduces it to a two-stage game in which, at stage 1, the uninformed insurance providers make contractual offers while, at stage 2, the informed customers choose amongst them.⁴

It is easy to see that this version of the game leads to exactly the same equilibrium outcome as the analysis in Rothschild and Stiglitz [24]. First of all, it is not possible to have pooling policies in the equilibrium set. For a hypothetical pooling equilibrium policy \mathbf{a}^* ought to just break-even in expectation. To do so, however, it must involve cross-subsidization, expecting losses on the high-risk customers to be matched exactly by expected profits from the low-risk ones.⁵ Yet, the very fact that strictly positive profits are extracted by the low-risk type allows for the existence of another contract \mathbf{a}_L^1 which delivers strictly positive profits if accepted only by low-risk agents and is such that $\mathbf{a}_L^1 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^1$ (Section C.1.1 in the Appendix). In the presence of \mathbf{a}^* , therefore, \mathbf{a}_L^1 will attract away only the low-risk customers. Clearly, offering it at stage 1 is a strictly-profitable deviation given that the pooling policy is also on offer.

Graphically, this deviation is depicted by any point in the interiors of the shaded areas on the left-hand side diagrams of Figures 1-2 and of the lower shaded area on the right-hand side diagram of the latter figure. With respect to the latter diagram, its upper shaded area refers to

⁴In terms of interpreting the third stage of our game by means of Grossman's insight, insurance contracts here can be introduced in the market only via sending out "pre-approved" application forms. Recall that we take the term to mean that it is common knowledge amongst all market participants that any customer who files such an application is guaranteed, in a way that is enforceable whatever her risk-type, delivery of the respective contract.

⁵Given free entry, we ought to have $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) \geq 0$. Yet, this cannot be a strict inequality. For if $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) = \epsilon > 0$, we may consider the contract $\hat{\mathbf{a}} = \mathbf{a}^* - (1, -1) \frac{\epsilon}{2}$ which is such that $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ by either h (it provides strictly more income in either state of the world). In the contingency, therefore, in which \mathbf{a}^* and $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ are the only policies on offer, the latter contract would attract the entire population of customers and, as a pooling policy itself, would expect profits $\Pi_M(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) = \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) - \frac{\epsilon}{2} > 0$. It constitutes, that is, a profitable deviation, contradicting part (b) of the definition for \mathbf{a}^* to be a market equilibrium. To arrive at the claim in the text, notice that $p_H > p_L$ requires $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}) < \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}) \forall \mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$. Recall also condition (17) and the opening discussion in Step 1 of our IIE analysis in the Appendix. Clearly, $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) = 0$ only if $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}^*) < 0 < \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}^*)$.

a case in which the hypothetical equilibrium pooling policy allows in fact the deviant contract to be strictly-preferred by either risk-type ($\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ for either h) and strictly-profitable as a pooling policy itself. The analytical description of such cases is given by the latter part of Section C.1.1 in the Appendix. A similar example is depicted by the diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 1, the deviant pooling policies being again the interior points of the shaded area.




Figure 1: Deviations against pooling policies




Figure 2: Deviations against pooling policies

An equilibrium policy, therefore, cannot be but a separating menu. Amongst the admissible ones, though, the only legitimate candidate is what will be henceforth referred to as the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) menu and denoted by $\{\mathbf{a}_L^{**}, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}\}$. Its corresponding income allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^{**}, \mathbf{w}_H^{**}\}$, the so called Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation, solves the problem⁶

$$\max_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^4} U_h(\mathbf{w}_h) \quad \text{s.t. (1), (2), (3)} \quad h \in \{L, H\}$$

⁶This is the definition of an RSW allocation relative to zero reservation profits, as it appears in Maskin and Tirole [18]. For the economy under study here, it can be identified via an equivalent formulation (see Appendix B).

To see why no other separating menu can be an equilibrium, suppose otherwise and let $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\} \neq \{\mathbf{a}_L^{**}, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}\}$ be one. Observe also that the RSW allocation is unique and maximizes the welfare of the high-risk agents amongst all the separating allocations that are admissible here (see Appendix B). It can only be, therefore, $\mathbf{a}_H^{**} \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H$. As shown in Section C.1.2 of the Appendix, this necessitates the existence of another contract \mathbf{a}_L^2 such that $\mathbf{a}_L^2 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}$ but $\mathbf{a}_H^{**} \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^2$ and which delivers strictly-positive profits if chosen only by low-risk agents. Consider now a firm offering the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^2, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}\}$. This is separating and attracts either risk-type away from $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$. Doing so, moreover, it breaks-even on the high-risk agents but is strictly profitable on the low-risk ones. Examples of \mathbf{a}_L^2 are given by the interior points of the shaded area in either diagram of Figure 3.




Figure 3: Deviations against a non-RS separating menu

Clearly, the RS menu is the unique equilibrium candidate. Yet, there can be parameter values for which even this is not a viable equilibrium. As Rothchild and Stiglitz pointed out, albeit heuristically, this is bound to happen when there are enough low-risk agents in the population so that the market fair-odds line FO_M^* cuts through the low-risk indifference curve associated with \mathbf{a}_L^{**} . Formally, the RS menu is an equilibrium here if and only if there exists no contract the low-risk type prefers strictly (resp. weakly) to \mathbf{a}_L^{**} and which delivers zero (resp. positive) profits as pooling policy.

The contrapositive of the “only if” part of this statement is established in Section C.1.3 of the Appendix where it is shown that, if there are contracts that expect positive (resp. zero) profits as pooling policies and are weakly (resp. strictly) preferred to \mathbf{a}_L^{**} by the low-risk type, we can construct profitable deviations against the RS menu. These are contracts \mathbf{a}^3 that are strictly profitable as pooling policies and attract at least the low-risk type away ($\mathbf{a}^3 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$). Obviously, if they pull away also the high-risk agents ($\mathbf{a}^3 \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^{**}$), they are strictly profitable pooling deviations. Otherwise, the high-risk type opts to leave \mathbf{a}^3 with only the low-risk agents and, hence, at least as large profits as before (recall the one before the last footnote). Examples of the former case are points in the interior of the shaded area in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Deviations against the RS menu

For the “if” part of the claim, notice that there are no separating menus able to steal any risk-type away from her RS contract since \mathbf{a}_h^{**} maximizes h ’s welfare amongst the separating menus that are admissible in this version of the game. Hence, credible challenges may come only from contracts intended to be strictly-profitable as pooling policies.⁷ Yet, any such contract ought to be designed so as to attract at least some of the low-risk customers. And, by hypothesis, there are no such contracts.

2.2 When in doubt, withdraw...

Suppose now that, in the game we just analyzed, the admissibility condition (ii) is altered so as to allow only non-binding contractual offers.⁸ This re-enacts the third stage of the original game by rendering two important elements common knowledge. Being called upon to act now at stage 1 carries no commitment to the action chosen at that point. Indeed, a firm will have to decide whether or not to withdraw any part of its current offer at stage 3. It will make that decision, moreover, after having observed the actions of all other firms at stage 1 and after having tried to infer the subsequent choices of all customers at stage 2.

To analyze what we will be calling henceforth the standard three-stage game, observe first that the same argument as before precludes any admissible separating menu, but the RS one, from being an equilibrium. The deviant strategy consists now of offering the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^2, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}\}$ at the first stage with the intention to honor it at the third, irrespective of the history of play at that point. Being

⁷No contract is able to attract only one risk-type away from the RS policy and avoid losses doing so. For suppose that \mathbf{a} is designed in this way with respect to the risk-type h . It ought to be then $\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}) \geq 0$ and $\mathbf{a}_{h'}^{**} \succ_{h'} \mathbf{a} \succ_h \mathbf{a}_h^{**}$ for $h' \neq h$. As, however, $\mathbf{a}_h^{**} \succ_h \mathbf{a}_{h'}^{**}$, this would mean that the separating menu $\{\mathbf{a}_{h'}^{**}, \mathbf{a}\}$ Pareto-dominates the RSW allocation while satisfying the constraints of the efficiency problem the latter solves.

⁸To relate the description once again to Grossman’s interpretation of withdrawals, no firm has any “pre-approved” application form at its disposal now. It is common knowledge amongst all market participants that no customer who files an application may be guaranteed delivery of the respective contract.

strictly-separating with $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^2) > 0 = \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^{**})$, the menu guarantees at least zero profits in any possible contingency. And along the subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2 and in which this and the original menu are the only ones that have been introduced at stage 1, the former expects strictly-positive profits irrespectively of whether or not the latter is withdrawn at stage 3.

Regarding the admissible pooling policies, reasoning similarly as in the previous version of the game, we conclude that only contracts $\mathbf{a} \in FO_M^*$ are legitimate candidates.⁹ And from these, only the ones leaving the low-risk agents at least as well-off as \mathbf{a}_L^{**} . This is because, given any $\mathbf{a} \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}_L^{**} \succ_L \mathbf{a}$, there are contracts \mathbf{a}_L^4 which are strictly-profitable if selected only by low-risk agents and such that $\mathbf{a}_H^{**} \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^4 \succ_L \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}$ (see the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 5).¹⁰ Consider then the strategy of offering $\{\mathbf{a}_L^4, \mathbf{a}_H^{**}\}$ at stage 1 in order to honor it at stage 3, irrespectively of the history of play at that point. Being strictly-separating, this menu guarantees at least zero profits in any possible contingency. And in the event in which itself and the pooling policy are the only ones that have been introduced at stage 1, it mounts a strictly-profitable deviation.

In that case, it is strictly-dominant for the low-risk type to select \mathbf{a}_L^4 over \mathbf{a} . As a result, applications for the pooling policy at stage 2, if there exist any, cannot but come exclusively from high-risk agents. Hence, any insurer offering the pooling policy should expect losses and view its withdrawal as the only sequentially-rational choice at stage 3. Anticipating this, however, and whatever her preference between \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{a}_H^{**} , the high-risk type cannot but apply for the latter at stage 2. Nevertheless, the deviant menu is strictly-separating and expects to make profits against the low-risk agents and break even on the high-risk ones.

Evidently, whenever the RS policy is a Nash equilibrium in the previous version of the game, the path of play now evolves essentially in the same way as before. One equilibrium outcome is always that firms offer the RS menu at stage 1, in order to honor it at stage 3, while all agents select the RS contract designed for their type. The only difference is that now an additional equilibrium scenario obtains when there is a unique $\mathbf{a}^1 \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}^1 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$. Of course, by the continuity of the preference \succ_L , it cannot be then but $\mathbf{a}^1 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$ (see the right-hand side diagram of Figure 5). In this case, it is an equilibrium for this contract to be offered as a pooling policy at stage 1 in order to be honored at stage 3. Correspondingly, its suppliers believe that its applicants form a representative sample of the population and indeed every customer is applying for this contract.

⁹A similar argument to that in footnote 5 applies also here. The deviant strategy now offers $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ at stage 1 as a pooling policy. Along the subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2 and in which $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ and \mathbf{a}^* are the only policies that have been introduced at stage 1, the deviant plan is to honor the former contract at stage 3. In this contingency, the deviant firm expects strictly-positive profits irrespectively of whether or not \mathbf{a}^* gets withdrawn. In any other subgame, the deviant plan is to withdraw $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ at stage 3 if and only if some contract $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : \mathbf{a} \succ_L \hat{\mathbf{a}}$ has been introduced at stage 1. Needless to say, in this event, neither \mathbf{a}^* can be honored.

¹⁰ \mathbf{a}_L^4 is constructed in the same way as \mathbf{a}_L in Case 1 of Section C.3.1 in the Appendix, once \mathbf{a}_L^0 is replaced by \mathbf{a}_L^{**} . This gives $\mathbf{a}_L^{**} \succ_h \mathbf{a}_L^4$ for either risk-type. Hence, $\mathbf{a}_H^{**} \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^4$ given that $\mathbf{a}_H^{**} \sim_H \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$ at the RSW allocation. For the low-risk agents, on the other hand, letting $\Delta = U_L(\mathbf{a}_L^{**}) - \max\{U_L(\mathbf{a}_H^{**}), U_L(\mathbf{a})\}$ suffices for $\mathbf{a}_L^4 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^{**}, \mathbf{a}$. Finally, since the low-risk agents are under-insured at the RSW allocation, the substitution of \mathbf{a}_L^0 with \mathbf{a}_L^{**} works also for the profits, giving $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^4) > \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^{**}) = 0$. Needless to say, there are also here two possible ways to select (κ, ϵ) , partitioning the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 5 on the basis of whether or not $w_{0L}^4 \geq w_{0L}^{**}$.




Figure 5: Deviations and Equilibria in Hellwig's game

As before, the reason why each of these two scenarios can be supported as equilibrium is the very fact that no deviation can mount a credible threat against either unless it pulls away low-risk customers.¹¹ In both equilibrium outcomes, however, the low-risk type enjoys the welfare she gets under the RSW allocation. It follows then that she cannot be offered a strictly-better outcome by any deviant menu that is designed to be strictly-profitable while separating. Given, moreover, that the Nash equilibrium does exist in the previous version of the game, the only deviant contracts that can attract the low-risk agents and be strictly-profitable as pooling policies are those whose pools of applicants exhibit a fraction of low-risk agents higher than λ .¹²

But against these contracts, withdrawing the equilibrium policy is both credible and sufficient a threat. To see this for the pooling policy \mathbf{a}^1 , let the deviant firm believe that honoring its policy at stage 3 will be profitable, a consistent belief only if the policy-selection strategies at stage 2 are such that a larger than λ fraction of its customers are low-risk. Given these strategies, however, a smaller than λ fraction of those selecting \mathbf{a}^1 are low-risk. As a result, the firms offering the latter

¹¹Indeed, no contract can attract only the high-risk type and avoid losses doing so. With respect to the RS menu, this has been established in Footnote XX. Regarding the pooling policy \mathbf{a}^1 , suppose to the contrary that $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^2$ gives $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}) \geq 0$ and $\mathbf{a}^1 \succsim_L \mathbf{a} \succ_H \mathbf{a}^1$. Then if, on the one hand, $\mathbf{a}^1 \succ_H \mathbf{a}^{**}$, the separating menu $\{\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{a}\}$ Pareto-dominates the RSW allocation (recall that $\mathbf{a}^1 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$) while satisfying the constraints of the efficiency problem the latter solves (observe that $p_L < p_H$ implies that $p_L < \bar{p}$ and, thus, $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^1) \leq \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}^1)$, the inequality being strict as long as $\mathbf{a}^1 \neq \mathbf{0}$; recall also that $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^1) = 0$). If, on the other hand, $\mathbf{a}^{**} \succ_H \mathbf{a}^1$, the contradiction becomes that the separating (recall that $\mathbf{a}^1 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**} \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^{**}$) menu $\{\mathbf{a}^1, \mathbf{a}^{**}\}$ solves the RSW problem $\forall \mu \in [0, 1]$ even though it is not the RSW allocation.

¹²For $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^2$, let $\hat{p}^* \in (0, 1)$ be given by $\Pi_{\hat{p}^*}(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) = 0$. Since $\frac{d}{dp} \left(\frac{1-p}{p} \right) < 0$, we have $(p - \hat{p}^*) \Pi_p(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) < 0 \forall p \in (0, 1) \setminus \{\hat{p}^*\}$ so that $\hat{P} = [0, \hat{p}^*]$ is the set of average accident probabilities across its customers that allow $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ to avoid losses. Observe now that, the previous version of the game having a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it cannot be $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$ unless $\bar{p} \notin \hat{P}$. As long as $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$, therefore, the former contract may avoid losses only if $\bar{p} > \hat{p} = \hat{\lambda} p_L + (1 - \hat{\lambda}) p_H$, where $\hat{\lambda}$ is the share of low-risk customers in its pool of applicants. As $p_L < p_H$, however, the last inequality is equivalent to $\hat{\lambda} > \lambda$.

policy ought to expect losses and plan to withdraw it at stage 3. Yet, anticipating this at stage 2, none of the customers should apply for \mathbf{a}^1 . Their only sequentially-rational choice is to select the deviant contract, rendering it pooling with an average quality of applicants exactly equal to the population one. Which contradicts, of course, the deviant suppliers' original belief that honoring their policy at stage 3 will be profitable. Needless to say, the same scenario supports also the RS menu as equilibrium. As this delivers zero profits in every possible contingency, its withdrawal is not necessitated by the deviation but suffices as a credible threat against it.

The equilibrium predictions are different, however, and dramatically so, whenever the previous version of the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As we know already, this obtains when there are contracts that expect positive (resp. zero) profits as pooling policies and are weakly (resp. strictly) preferred by the low-risk type to her RS contract. In this case, the RS menu and any pooling policy $\mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}^* \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$ can be sustained as pure-strategy sequential equilibria. These are the pooling contracts on the segment between \mathbf{a}^1 and \mathbf{a}^5 in Figure 4. Recall that none of them were equilibrium in the previous version because, for each one, there existed deviant contracts certain to make strictly-positive profits (in some cases as pooling policies, in others servicing only the low-risk type) *in the presence* of the original policy. Yet, policies can be withdrawn now at stage 3 and this, being common knowledge amongst the players, renders the actual profitability of these deviations dependent upon the players' *beliefs* about their profitability.

Once again, these policies can be supported as equilibria because no deviation can mount a credible threat against them unless it pulls away low-risk customers. Given, however, that the low-risk type is at least as well-off as under the RSW allocation, she cannot be offered a strictly-better outcome by any deviant menu that is designed to be a strictly-profitable separating policy. In this version of the game, on the equilibrium path, all agents apply for the equilibrium pooling policy or the RS contract designed for their type. Threats of deviations can only arise from pooling contracts but none is introduced at stage 1 because everyone believes that, were it to be introduced, it would be loss-making and, hence, withdrawn at stage 3. Off the equilibrium path, the very fact that a deviant contract may be withdrawn at stage 3 turns itself into a self-fulfilling prophecy if a firm decides to offer it at stage 1. In this contingency, the equilibrium strategy may entail two different prescriptions. One works only against some deviations but does so robustly in a sense to be made precise shortly. The other may be deployed against any deviant contract without, however, the latter property.

The first scenario requires that also the equilibrium policy is withdrawn and may be used against deviations that lie above the line FO_M^* (e.g. the interior points of the lower shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 2). These contracts are strictly-profitable as pooling policies only if a larger than λ fraction of their customers are low-risk. For this reason, they cannot be honored at stage 3 if the equilibrium policy is withdrawn. Otherwise, they would be selected by either type at stage 2 and become loss-making, their fraction of low-risk customers being then exactly λ (see Section C.2.1 in the Appendix). This equilibrium scenario is described also in Hellwig [13] (pp. 323), his focus being explicitly on fending off deviations that are potentially-profitable against the Wilson pooling policy, the contract that maximizes the welfare of the low-risk type along FO_M^*

(depicted on the left-hand side diagram in Figure 2).¹³

Yet, the equilibrium set includes also other pooling contracts on FO_M^* as well as the RS menu, which can be challenged also by deviations on or below FO_M^* . Such deviations are depicted by the interior points of the shaded areas in Figure 4 and in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 1 as well as of the upper shaded area in the diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 2 and of the shaded area on the left-hand side diagram of Figure 1 that lies below the line FO_M^* . These cases call for the second strategic scenario, which is based on an equilibrium-sustaining argument that is equally straightforward although perhaps not as intuitive.

It rests entirely on the fact that the notion of sequential equilibrium puts rather limited constraints on the beliefs players may entertain on information sets off the equilibrium path. As before, any deviant contract, if introduced at stage 1, will be withdrawn at stage 3 because its suppliers expect it to be loss-making given their belief about the average quality of its applicants. Now, however, the equilibrium policy will not be withdrawn in this off-equilibrium event. Threatening to do so is without bite because the deviant contract can be profitable as a stand-alone pooling policy, even if a smaller than λ fraction of its applicants are low-risk. It cannot be profitable, though, if this fraction is too small (in particular, it makes losses on the high-risk type) and the corresponding beliefs of the deviant suppliers are what the equilibrium rests upon (see Section C.2.2 in the Appendix).

2.3 Equilibrium Selection

Re-introducing the third stage of the game, so that the insurance companies may withdraw their policies if they so wish, leads to a dramatic reversal of the results. Existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is no longer an issue. If anything, there are multiple equilibria whenever admissible pooling policies Pareto-dominate the RS menu. In fact, the issue now becomes that of equilibrium selection as the Wilson contract strictly Pareto-dominates all other equilibrium allocations.

With this in mind, Hellwig viewed the Wilson policy as the most plausible outcome, being the only equilibrium to survive the stability criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens [15]. Even though Hellwig's claim can be easily substantiated, it was not in his paper; an omission that has misled later scholars, working on applications of this model, into the view that it can be supported by the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps [3]. Of course, the criterion is indeed an interpretation of stability and, admittedly, the most straightforward one. In the game under study, however, it lacks the power to single out the Wilson policy.

¹³This is the contract $\mathbf{a}^W \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}^W \succ_L \mathbf{a} \forall \mathbf{a} \in FO_M^*$ and features prominently in Wilson [26]. Notice that no strictly-profitable pooling policy may attract the low-risk agents away from \mathbf{a}^W , unless it lies above FO_M^* . This is because, together, $\Pi_M(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) > 0$ and $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_L \mathbf{a}^W$ imply $\exists \mathbf{a} \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a} \succ_L \mathbf{a}^W$ (recall the opening observation in Section C.1.3 in the Appendix), an absurdity.

The Intuitive Criterion

To restrict the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in a way that justifies rejecting a given sequential equilibrium, the intuitive criterion rests upon two integral conditions. The first identifies the sender's types that do not have any incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message. These types should strictly prefer the equilibrium outcome to anything else they might get out of the receiver's sequentially-rational response to the message, given that the receiver might have any belief with support amongst the types that are allowed to send it. The second condition selects, out of the remaining types of sender, those that do have incentives to send the out-of-equilibrium message. For these types, the equilibrium must be strictly worse than any outcome they may get when the receiver responds to the message optimally, the receiver's belief being again any belief with support amongst the types that are allowed to send it (excluding, of course, the types for whom the first condition applies).

Designed for signaling games, the intuitive criterion may be deployed over the sub-game that begins at stage 2, an out-of-equilibrium sub-path on which, alongside the equilibrium policy, a deviant one has been introduced at stage 1. In this two-stage subgame, the customers move first, selecting the insurance policy they wish to apply for. Inducing the firms' beliefs about the average quality of applications, these choices are signals the informed players send to the uninformed. Following the receipt of these signals, a firm chooses whether or not to honor the policy it has on offer.

In the signalling sub-game, let the two policies introduced at stage 1 be a sequential equilibrium of the overall game and one of its potentially-profitable deviations, a contract that attracts at least the low-risk type away in its presence. We will establish that, applying the intuitive criterion, we may dismiss a non-trivial subset of pooling equilibria as unreasonable. We will also show, however, that this kind of reasoning rejects neither the also non-trivial remaining subset of pooling equilibria nor the RS policy.

With respect to the first claim, let the two policies be a pooling equilibrium, other than the Wilson one, and a deviant contract which (i) lies below the fair-odds market line, and (ii) is strictly-better (resp. -worse) for the low-risk (resp. high-risk) agents.¹⁴ As we already know, in this case, the fact that the deviation meets condition (i) means that the sequential-equilibrium strategy has the equilibrium contract being honored in the signaling subgame so that the equilibrium allocation corresponds to being insured under the equilibrium contract. By the very choice of deviation, therefore, the high-risk type strictly prefers this outcome over even the best-case scenario that might follow her application to the deviant policy (the event in which the latter is honored at stage 3). Of course, the same claim cannot be made for the low-risk agents.

The high-risk type being the only one with strong incentive to not send the out-of-equilibrium message, the two conditions of the intuitive criterion sort here the two risk-types so that the deviant suppliers should believe that, with probability one, applications for their policy originate from low-risk agents. As a result, they should expect their policy to be strictly profitable and, thus, plan

¹⁴Examples are points in the interior of the shaded area below the line FO_M^* in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 1 and of the area that lies between the two indifference curves and below FO_M^* in its right-hand side diagram.

to honor it at stage 3. Applying, therefore, the Cho-Kreps criterion in this example, we are led to regard intuitively unreasonable that the deviant contract gets withdrawn at stage 3 when the equilibrium one is not. In other words, we are led to characterize intuitively unreasonable the very premise upon which our sequential equilibrium argument was based.

Clearly, any of the pooling equilibria that is susceptible to potentially-profitable deviations that satisfy conditions (i)-(ii) is rejected by the intuitive criterion. This is the case for the entire part of the segment between \mathbf{a}^1 and \mathbf{a}^5 in Figure 4 that lies above \mathbf{a}^W . In our quest to single out the latter contract, however, we are still left with the remainder of the segment as well as the RS menu. Each of these may be challenged only by deviations that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium outcome or lie above the line FO_M^* , in which case the sequential equilibrium strategy requires that the equilibrium policy is withdrawn at stage 3.¹⁵ They are all, hence, susceptible only to deviant contracts that, if honored at stage 3, Pareto-dominate the equilibrium outcome. And this renders the intuitive criterion impotent.

When the Pareto-dominance is strict, in the sense that both risk-types are strictly worse off under the equilibrium outcome, the criterion fails because there is no type without strong incentive to send the out-of-equilibrium message. Technically speaking, no type meets the criterion's first condition, which means that also no type meets the second. Intuitively, we may reason as follows. As a pooling policy, the deviant contract avoids losses only if the fraction of its customers that are low-risk does not fall below some cutoff. It will be honored, therefore, as long as its suppliers entertain the corresponding beliefs, which they may well do since no risk-type (in particular, the low-risk) is excluded from applying to their policy.

The deviant policy being honored, though, is an outcome that both risk-types prefer strictly to the given equilibrium. As a consequence, there is no intuitive restriction we may put on the beliefs of the deviant suppliers regarding the average quality of the applications they receive. Precisely because either risk-type (in particular, the high-risk) has reason to aspire to their policy, we cannot rule out that the fraction of their applicants who are low-risk is in fact below the cutoff. It is also possible, therefore, that they will not honor their policy at the end, leaving whoever chose it at the endowment point; a prospect unpleasant enough to induce both types to stay at the incumbent equilibrium.¹⁶

This argument needs but a slight modification when the deviant contract Pareto-dominates the equilibrium outcome, albeit not strictly. In the game under study, this obtains when the low-risk agents are indifferent between their equilibrium and the deviant contract. In this case,

¹⁵Deviations with the former property are the points in the interior of the shaded area of Figure 4 and of the upper shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 2. With respect to the latter property, consider the points in the interior of the lower shaded area in the latter diagram, of the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of the same figure, or of the area delimited by the low-risk indifference curve and the lines FO_M^* and FO_L^* in Figure 4.

¹⁶The worst case scenario for an agent who applies for the deviant policy is to be left at the endowment point. This is an outcome that cannot be strictly preferred to the equilibrium one by either risk-type. Relative to the equilibrium outcome, the endowment is strictly worse for either risk-type whenever the equilibrium strategy prescribes that the equilibrium contract should be honored against the given deviation. It is as good as the equilibrium outcome whenever the equilibrium contract is withdrawn.

one type does lack strong incentives to send the out-of-equilibrium message; it (weakly) satisfies the first condition.¹⁷ Being, however, the low-risk type, the intuitive criterion has again no bite. If anything, intuition should have now the deviant suppliers believe that their applications come exclusively from high-risk agents. They should expect, therefore, their policy to make losses and plan to withdraw it at stage 3. Anticipating this, in turn, their applicants should expect to be left at the endowment point. As before, the feasibility of this prospect is enough to justify that both types apply for the equilibrium policy even though a Pareto-dominant one is available.

Divinity

Given the impotence of the intuitive criterion in selecting the Pareto-preferred equilibrium, another obvious recourse is interpreting stability as divinity in the sense of Banks and Sobel [1]. This is a criterion whose real force comes into play precisely when the first intuitive condition fails to identify types with no incentive to send the out-of-equilibrium message. Facing situations, such as the ones described above, where both risk-types wish to defect from the current equilibrium, divinity guides the receiver's beliefs by placing more weight on the type more likely to do so.

Inevitably, this entails utility comparisons across types and, hence, considerable loss of generality for our study.¹⁸ More importantly perhaps, adverse selection becomes most pressing an economic issue exactly if high-risk agents gain more than low-risk ones under a socially-desirable policy change. And in this case, by placing more likelihood on the high-risk type, divinity as well precludes the Pareto-dominant alternative from mounting a successful challenge to the current equilibrium. In fact, in the only case when utility gains here can be unambiguously compared across the two risk-types (the selection problem in the paragraph preceding the last), divinity leads to exactly the same conclusion as the intuitive criterion.¹⁹

¹⁷Such deviations are depicted by points on the low-risk indifference curve boundary of the shaded area in Figure 4 and of the lower shaded area in the diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 2. In the strict sense of the intuitive criterion as presented in Cho and Kreps [3] (Section IV.3), even in this case, the low-risk type fails to meet the first condition. Their definition depicts either of the criterion's conditions as strict preference. Yet, one could consider relaxing the first to a weak preference (as, in fact, the authors themselves do in Section IV.5). In the game under study, however, even this cannot render the criterion useful. There is no type that satisfies (even weakly) the second condition. Even if there were, actually, it could only be the high-risk and the withdrawal of the deviant policy would again be the only intuitive outcome.

¹⁸Upon receipt of a message, our receiver has only two pure responses available, withdraw (W) or honor (NW) the policy on offer. We may depict, therefore, her mixed strategy by the probability $r \in [0, 1]$ with which she withdraws her policy at stage 3. Then, in terms of the divinity presentation in Cho and Kreps [3] (Section IV.4), for either risk-type h , $D_h^0 = \{r_h\}$ and $D_h = [0, r_h)$, with r_h being the deviant suppliers' mixed response which corresponds to an expected utility for h equal to the utility she derives from her current equilibrium contract. Clearly, to identify the relative sizes of these sets across h , we need to rank the probabilities r_h . The same requirement arises with respect to the the divinity characterization in Banks and Sobel [1] (Section 3). Following an application for the deviant policy, to construct the beliefs of its suppliers that are consistent with no withdrawal - the set $\Gamma(0)$ - we have to compare the schedules $\bar{\mu}(h, r_h) = [0, 1]$ and $\bar{\mu}(h, r) = 0$ (1), if $r > r_h$ ($r < r_h$), across h .

¹⁹In this case, $D_L = \emptyset$ and $D_L^0 = \{NW\} \subset D_H = [0, r_H)$ with $r_H > 0$. According to Criterion D1, therefore, no pooling application may come from low-risk agents. Observe also that, having only two types of sender in this game, the Criteria D1 and D2 coincide. Regarding the exposition in Banks and Sobel [1], we have now $\bar{\mu}(L, 0) = [0, 1]$ and

Stability

In our attempt to single out the Wilson policy as the only reasonable equilibrium, we have yet to deal with a non-trivial set of pooling equilibria as well as with the RS menu. These share a common feature: they are all susceptible to deviant contracts that are strictly better, at least for the low-risk type, and lie below the market fair-odds line. And against deviations of this kind, the sequential equilibrium obtains only via the following strategic scenario (Section C.2.2). The deviant contract is deemed loss-making and gets withdrawn at stage 3. By contrast, the equilibrium one is honored because it is believed to be avoiding losses. Anticipating this at stage 2, all agents apply for the equilibrium contract with probability one.

To support this scenario, we need to construct a sequence of vanishing trembles $\{r_L^k, r_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (0, 1)$ with the intended interpretation that an agent of risk type h applies to the equilibrium and deviant contracts with probability $\sigma_h^k = 1 - r_h^k$ and $1 - \sigma_h^k$, respectively. This ought to evolve in such a way that, at least along a subsequence, the deviant suppliers believe that the ratio of low- to high-risk amongst their applicants does not exceed the quantity $\hat{\lambda}^* = \frac{1 - \hat{p}^*}{\hat{p}^*}$ (the probability as defined in footnote XX). And since strategies ought to be sequentially-consistent, this ratio is given by $\frac{1 - \sigma_L^k}{1 - \sigma_H^k}$, the relative frequencies with which the two risk-types apply for the deviant contract.

Let us perturb, however, the game by assigning to each risk-type an independent probability of accidentally implementing a fully-randomized strategy, instead of the one she is supposed to play. More precisely, consider a strategy profile $(\tilde{q}_L, \tilde{q}_H) \in (0, 1)^2$ and a mixture $(\epsilon_L, \epsilon_H) \in (0, 1]^2$ to mean that an agent of risk-type h , whose strategy in the original game was to apply for the equilibrium and deviant policies with probability σ_h and $1 - \sigma_h$ respectively, does so in the perturbed game with probability $\tilde{\sigma}_h = (1 - \epsilon_h) \sigma_h + \epsilon_h \tilde{q}_h$ and $1 - \tilde{\sigma}_h$, respectively. Define then any closed subset of the set of equilibria of the original game to be prestable if $\forall \epsilon_0 \in \mathbb{R}_{++} \exists \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ such that $\forall (\tilde{q}_L, \tilde{q}_H) \in (0, 1)^2$ and $\forall (\epsilon_L, \epsilon_H) \in (0, \epsilon)^2$ the perturbed game has at least one equilibrium in the ϵ_0 -neighborhood of this subset. Equilibrium stability, in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens [15], is an identifying feature of the minimal prestable sets.²⁰

Given this characterization, the sequential equilibrium scenario under study cannot be stable unless it remains a sequential equilibrium also under perturbations. Yet, as shown in Section C.2.3, we may construct perturbations that are arbitrarily close to the original game but for which no sequence of trembles can meet the condition $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_L^k}{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_H^k} \leq \hat{\lambda}^*$. Intuitively, the original equilibrium

$\bar{\mu}(L, r) = 0$ for any $r > 0$, while $\bar{\mu}(H, r_H) = [0, 1]$ and $\bar{\mu}(H, r) = 0$ (1) for $r > r_H$ ($r < r_H$). Clearly, $\forall r \in [0, 1]$, $\bar{\mu}(L, r) = 1$ implies $\bar{\mu}(H, r) = 1$ while the opposite direction is not true. Observe also that this is the only case in which another refinement, neologism proofness (Farrell [8]), may be deployed here. Given, though, that only the high-risk type strictly prefers the deviant outcome, this concept, as presented by Banks and Sobel (Section 5), also suggests that deviant applications ought to come exclusively from this type.

²⁰This definition of stability is in the spirit of Section 5.6 in Myerson R.B. *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict*, Harvard University Press (1997). Of course, analogous perturbations should be considered also regarding the insurers' strategies. In the subgame under study, these players can be indexed by $i \in \{\text{incumbent, deviant}\}$. Its pure strategies being to withdraw or honor its policy at stage 3, let σ_i be the probability that the i th firm chooses the latter. In the perturbed game, this becomes $\tilde{\sigma}_i = (1 - \epsilon_i) \sigma_i + \epsilon_i \tilde{q}_i$ where the mixture $\epsilon_i \in (0, 1]$ and the randomized strategy $\tilde{q}_i \in (0, 1)$ are chosen arbitrarily and are independent from those of other firms and customers.

hinges crucially upon forcing the deviant suppliers to be pessimistic enough regarding the average quality of the applications they would have received had they not withdrawn their policy. Perturbing, however, the strategies by which the customers select contracts at stage 2, translates under the sequential-equilibrium reasoning to perturbing the deviant suppliers' belief about the average quality of their applicants. And although the mixtures in these perturbations need to stay close to the original strategic profile, the additional range in the deviant suppliers' beliefs granted by the arbitrary introduction of the randomized profile precludes them from being pessimistic enough. As a result, they find it now optimal to honor their policy at stage 3, a response anything but close to the one they undertook in the original game.²¹

Needless to say, this strategic instability manifests itself also when the scenario under consideration is deployed to support the Wilson policy. Yet, the defining characteristic of this policy is that it is susceptible only to deviations above the market fair-odds line. As a consequence, it can always be supported also by the sequential equilibrium scenario in which both itself as well as the deviant contract are withdrawn at stage 3. Being then indifferent between selecting either policy at stage 2, an agent of risk-type h applies for the Wilson policy with probability $\sigma_h \in [0, 1) : 1 \leq \frac{1-\sigma_L}{1-\sigma_H} \leq \hat{\lambda}^*$ (Section C.2.1).

And this is a set of strategic profiles that contains a stable subset. Specifically, as we show in Section C.2.4, every profile in the set $\left\{(\sigma_L, \sigma_H) \in [0, 1)^2 : 1 < \frac{1-\sigma_L}{1-\sigma_H} < \frac{1+\hat{\lambda}^*}{2}\right\}$ remains a sequential equilibrium under arbitrary perturbations. Which also means, of course, that each of these perturbations has some equilibrium arbitrarily close to the end points of the set. Its closure, therefore, is prestable. In fact, it is stable because it is minimally prestable. Indeed, with respect to any profile such that $\frac{1+\hat{\lambda}^*}{2} < \frac{1-\sigma_L}{1-\sigma_H} \leq \hat{\lambda}^*$, there are perturbations that are arbitrarily close to the original game and for which the deviant contract will not be withdrawn.

Endogenous Commitment

As the preceding discussion suggests, to single out the Pareto-optimal amongst the many equilibria of the standard Hellwig game, the notion of stability must be deployed in its pure sense. This is arguably too abstract a refinement, especially when it comes to applications of Hellwig's model. An equally successful but more intuitive one is to restrict the out-of-equilibrium beliefs directly via contractual commitment. By allowing, that is, insurance suppliers to publicly pre-commit, if they so wish, at stage 1 upon honoring their contracts at stage 3. This works as equilibrium selection device because rendering commitment upon delivering on a contract endogenous is useful here only to deviant suppliers.

Indeed none of the equilibrium contracts identified in Section 2.2 would ever be introduced via "pre-approved" application forms because each faces deviations against which it survives only via the threat of its withdrawal. The Wilson contract aside, however, each is susceptible also to deviant

²¹Recall the preceding footnote. To show instability, we establish that some strategy σ_i , substantially different than the equilibrium σ_i^* in the original game, is optimal for the i th firm against the perturbed selections of customers. Of course, in the perturbed game, the firm's actual strategy is restricted to be $\tilde{\sigma}_i$. Nevertheless, this can be arbitrarily close to σ_i by appropriate choice of ϵ_i and \tilde{q}_i .

contracts that lie below FO_M^* and offer strict welfare improvements for either risk-type. And against such deviations, the equilibrium scenario is based entirely on offsetting the customers' preference by the belief that the deviant contracts will be withdrawn at stage 3. Yet, this belief is no longer in the support of their reasonable beliefs if the deviations are introduced through "pre-approved" application forms. If their suppliers pre-commit upon honoring them, the deviant contracts will be chosen by all customers at stage 2 and turn into strictly-profitable pooling deviations.

3 Efficient Insurance Provision

Enabling insurance firms not only to withdraw their contracts at stage 3 but also commit at stage 1 upon not withdrawing them singles out the Wilson policy, the only stable equilibrium outcome of the standard Hellwig game. As a notion, therefore, endogenous commitment on the contractual level is powerful in delivering uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies. And its power increases even more, along the efficiency dimension, when one allows also insurance suppliers to subsidize net income across contracts.

The latter structural change enlarges the space of admissible insurance menus $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ into consisting of ones that satisfy (1)-(2) and $\tilde{\lambda}\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1 - \tilde{\lambda})\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \geq 0$, where $\tilde{\lambda}$ is the average ratio of low- to high-risk customers amongst the applicant pool. In equilibrium, of course, the menu must serve both types of customers and the belief of its provider about the average quality of applicants cannot but coincide with the population average ($\tilde{\lambda} = \lambda$). This, along with the act that contractual commitment is now endogenous, restricts dramatically our predictions regarding the outcome of the augmented Helwig game. There is now a unique sequential equilibrium which Pareto-dominates even the most desirable pooling equilibrium of the standard version. In fact, the equilibrium allocation solves the IIE problem²²

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^4} \quad & \mu U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) + (1 - \mu) U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) \quad \text{s.t. (1)-(2) and} \\ & \lambda \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1 - \lambda) \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

when the weight is placed entirely upon the welfare of the low-risk type ($\mu = 1$).

We will establish this in two steps. First, we will show that the outcome in question, referred to henceforth as the IIE(1) allocation, is the only candidate equilibrium allocation. Then, we will argue that the unique menu which delivers this allocation is a sequential equilibrium of the augmented three-stage game. To establish that only the IIE(1) may be an equilibrium allocation, it suffices to show that, as long as the corresponding allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ of a candidate equilibrium menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^*, \mathbf{a}_H^*\}$ does not solve the IIE(1) problem, we can construct a profitable deviation. This is based upon the fact that, in this case, we can always find another menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ whose allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$ is IIE for some $\mu^0 \in (0, 1]$ and which constitutes a welfare increase (resp. decrease) for the low-risk (resp. high-risk) agents ($\mathbf{w}_L^0 \succ_L \mathbf{w}_L^*$ but $\mathbf{w}_H^* \succ_H \mathbf{w}_H^0$).

²²The solutions to this problem are the IIE allocations, relative to zero reservation profits, in the sense of Maskin and Tirole [18]. For their identification in the economy under study here, see Appendix B.

Suppose then that some firm introduces this menu at stage 1 soliciting applications for \mathbf{a}_L^0 via “pre-approved” forms. In this event, being guaranteed a strictly-better outcome, the low-risk customers will leave the equilibrium menu with only high-risk potential applicants on whom it does not expect but losses. It follows that the equilibrium strategy cannot but withdraw the contract \mathbf{a}_H^* at stage 3. Anticipating this at stage 2, the high-risk type cannot but also opt for the deviant menu; albeit, for the contract \mathbf{a}_H^0 since the menu is separating (being IIE).

Of course, the deviation just described does not offer a clear incentive to potential challengers of the hypothetical equilibrium. It does attract the low-risk type away but expects zero not strictly positive profits in doing so. Nonetheless, a strictly profitable deviation obtains by replacing one of the contracts in $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ with another in a way that generates a strictly-profitable menu while maintaining the two crucial elements of a successful challenge: the new menu continues to be separating and, relative to the equilibrium one, strictly-better for the low-risk customers. As it turns out, which element of $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ we need to replace depends on whether or not the hypothetical equilibrium menu is itself IIE and, if it is for some $\mu^* \in [0, 1)$, on whether or not $\mu^* \geq \lambda$.




Figure 6: Deviations against IIE policies

If $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ is IIE for some $\mu^* \in [\lambda, 1)$ (Case 1 of Section C.3.1 in the Appendix), the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ can be chosen so that $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$ is IIE for some $\mu^0 \in (\mu, 1]$. There exists, moreover, a contract \mathbf{a}_L which is strictly preferred to \mathbf{a}_L^* by the low-risk type, expects more profits than \mathbf{a}_L^0 when chosen by this type, and sorts strictly the types in conjunction with \mathbf{a}_H^0 ($\mathbf{a}_L \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^0 \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L$). Examples are points in the interior of the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 6. Here, either of the two IIE allocations offer full insurance to the high-risk customers and under-insurance to the low-risk ones (see our analysis of the IIE problem in the Appendix). In addition, both menus leave the high-risk type indifferent between the two constituent contracts while both expect to exactly break even if selected by a representative sample of the population of customers. By contrast, the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ expects strictly positive profits.

In all other respects, the scenario remains as described before: the deviant strategy is to offer the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ at stage 1 being pre-committed upon honoring \mathbf{a}_L at stage 3. This applies also when $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ is IIE but for some $\mu^* \in [0, \lambda)$ (Case 2 of Section C.3.1). In this case, $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$

can be constructed so that its allocation is IIE with $\mu^0 \in (\mu, \lambda)$. There exists then a contract \mathbf{a}_H which is strictly worse than \mathbf{a}_H^* for the high-risk customers, expects smaller losses when chosen only by them, and sorts strictly the types in conjunction with \mathbf{a}_L^0 . This is depicted by points in the interior of the shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 6. Here, the two IIE allocations offer full insurance to the low-risk customers and over-insurance to the high-risk ones. They both leave also the former risk-type indifferent between their elements while both expect to break even if selected by a representative sample of the population. By contrast, the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ expects strictly positive profits and the deviant strategy enters it at stage 1 soliciting applications for \mathbf{a}_L^0 with “pre-approved” forms.

Offering a strictly-profitable separating menu under “pre-approved” applications for the low-risk contract is a present and insurmountable challenge also when the hypothetical equilibrium menu does not correspond to an IIE allocation (Case 3 in Section C.3.1). The only difference is that now the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ may not be IIE but can be chosen to constitute a welfare improvement for all customers ($\mathbf{a}_h^0 \succ_h \mathbf{a}_h^*$ for either h). Situations of this kind are depicted in Figure 7 with respect to the RS menu and the Wilson contract. As we know already, the latter is the only equilibrium pooling candidate under endogenous contractual commitment. The former is an example of the case in which the RS menu is not interim incentive efficient even though it is an equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz setting. Such cases form a non-zero measure subset of the parameter space in the economy under study (see the necessity part of Section B.3).




Figure 7: Deviations against non-IIE policies

It remains to show that the unique equilibrium candidate, the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^1, \mathbf{a}_H^1\}$ that corresponds to the IIE(1) allocation, is indeed an equilibrium. This follows from its characteristic features. It is the unique maximizer of the welfare low-risk customers can get from any menu that satisfies (4). Moreover, it meets the latter condition as equality. Uniqueness implies that, by not withdrawing the contract \mathbf{a}_L^1 at stage 3, a firm offering this menu can successfully guard itself against deviations designed to attract away only the high-risk type.²³ The remaining properties ensure that, by

²³There is no policy able to attract away only the high-risk type and remain strictly-profitable doing so. For it would have to post a contract $\hat{\mathbf{a}}_H$ such that $\mathbf{a}_L^1 \succ_L \hat{\mathbf{a}}_H \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^1$. Since $\mathbf{a}_H^1 \sim_H \mathbf{a}_L^1$, this means that the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^1, \hat{\mathbf{a}}_H\}$

withdrawing the menu at stage 3, the firm can fend off any deviation that may attract away low-risk customers. In this case, anticipating the withdrawal, the high-risk customers cannot but opt also for the deviant menu at stage 2. Contrary to the initial plans of its suppliers, this turns now into one that serves both types. And no menu that does so may be preferred (even weakly) to \mathbf{a}_L^1 by the low-risk type unless it is loss-making.

To completely define the equilibrium strategy, a remark is in order regarding the credible threat just described. For one might think sufficient to withdraw only the contract \mathbf{a}_H^1 from the IIE(1) menu. Recall, however, that the high-risk type is indifferent between this contract and \mathbf{a}_L^1 (Claim 1). As a result, in front of a deviation that attracts away only the low-risk type ($\mathbf{a}_H^1 \succ_H \hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^1$), the high-risk will select \mathbf{a}_L^1 at stage 2 if it is not withdrawn at stage 3. In this case, it is necessary that the IIE(1) menu gets withdrawn entirely.

4 Discussion and Related Literature

Evidently, contractual endogenous commitment - the fact that insurance firms may choose at stage 1 to pre-commit upon honoring a given contract at stage 3 - plays exclusively here the role of restricting the out-of-equilibrium beliefs so that only the IIE(1) menu may be supported as sequential equilibrium. For as we saw, on the equilibrium path, this menu must be introduced at stage 1 without “pre-approved” application forms on either of its two contracts. Nonetheless, some commitment has to be present also in equilibrium; more precisely, on the policy level. As will become apparent by what follows, the IIE(1) menu needs to be introduced at stage 1 as an insurance policy, carrying the binding promise that none of its constituent contracts may be withdrawn unless the menu itself is.

Our equilibrium outcome has been known in the literature (see Crocker and Snow [4]) as the Miyazaki-Wilson allocation. It was established by Miyazaki [19] as the unique equilibrium in a labor market with adverse selection (due to two types of workers in terms of marginal productivity schedules) and firms possessing Wilson foresight. In Wilson [26], it is assumed that each firm correctly anticipates which policies already offered by other firms will become unprofitable as a consequence of any changes in its own offer. It expects then their withdrawal and calculates the profitability of its new offer accordingly. For the insurance provision problem under investigation here, this kind of firm behavior supports always an equilibrium which, with only two risk-types, is almost always unique. Depending on the primitives of the economy, it entails either the RS menu or the Wilson contract - apart from the knife-edge case in which $\mathbf{a}^W \sim_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$ and both are valid.

Of course, being able to adjust its current actions according to their effect upon the future choices of its opponents, Wilson’s typical firm is not restricted to Nash strategies. And it is the extent of the subsequent complexity in firms’ interactions that delivers equilibrium uniqueness. This becomes evident in Hellwig [13] which could be viewed as an attempt to reconcile anticipatory

is separating. Moreover, $\lambda \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^1) + (1 - \lambda) \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^1) = 0$ and $\Pi_H(\hat{\mathbf{a}}_H) > 0 > \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^1)$ render it also strictly profitable against a representative sample of customers. In other words, the new menu would also solve the IIE(1) problem, an absurdity since its solution is unique.

and Nash-type behavior. The three-stage game permits some anticipation of future reactions but the resulting flexibility in firms' behavior is nowhere near that envisioned by Wilson. Requiring, in addition, sequential rationality and consistent beliefs leads to a rich superset of equilibrium outcomes.

The latter observation is of importance when comparing Miyazaki's result with ours. Both studies regard firms as sophisticated enough to aggregate profits across contracts within doublet menus. And both deliver the IIE(1) allocation as the unique outcome, albeit of a Wilson equilibrium in one but sequential in the other.²⁴ We obtain it from Hellwig's game when commitment on insurance promises becomes endogenous. This is what keeps our equilibrium set singleton. It also adds a realistic component in the dynamics of insurance provision. Our analysis treats both the practice of requiring applications (which sellers regularly include as part of the insurance transaction) as well as the option to refrain from it (which is also commonly observed) as rational strategies for identifying high-risk buyers and enticing low-risk ones.

As a strategic element, the application process was first studied in Grossman [11]. It induced the high-risk buyers to conceal their identity by mimicking the low-risk choice when offered a separating contractual arrangement. Given that competition imposes zero aggregate profits on menus, the high-risk contract is necessarily loss-making and the firm has a clear incentive to avoid its delivery. Having sorted its customers with a separating menu, it can do so by rejecting applications known to be coming from the high-risk type. It will deliver instead her RS contract, the full-information allocation a high-risk customer can guarantee herself simply by announcing her type. Being able to foresee this, high-risk customers cannot but dissemble their preferences, turning the low-risk contract into a loss-making pooling policy. For the insurance economy under consideration here, we are led back to the Wilson equilibrium even if firms can subsidize net income across contracts.

Now, of course, also the high-risk customers engage in non-Nash strategic behavior, anticipating the effect of their current choices on the sellers' future reactions. This notwithstanding, the strategic dimension of the application process remains at work even when the underlying structure is game-theoretic. Interpreting the rejection of an application as the withdrawal of the respective contractual offer at stage 3, we cannot but conclude that no separating menu can be sustained as Nash equilibrium, unless it gets introduced as a policy. Yet, this is now a result of signalling rather than preference dissembling. The high-risk customers ought to be served on the equilibrium path. If they apply, however, for the high-risk contract at stage 2, the firm can infer their type at stage 3. In the signalling subgame, therefore, its optimal response is to withdraw this contract. And, this

²⁴There is another difference between the two studies, the underlying economic problem. In a labor market, it is natural to interpret contractual agreements as points in the wage-effort space and take effort as affecting firms' profits through the marginal productivity of labor. This schedule differs across worker-types but it may do so isomorphically-enough for the IIE(1) allocation to be actually first-best. As shown by his example, under certain parameter values of Miyazaki's model, it may be efficient even under full information. This cannot happen in our standard model of an insurance market. Taking the accident probabilities as given exogenously, independent of one's contractual choice, the iso-profits are always linear. More importantly, they have a particular conal shape between the risk-types which, in conjunction with the downward-sloping indifference curves, precludes the IIE(1) allocation from ever solving the full-information efficiency problem.

being a subgame reached in equilibrium, refusing service must be in the firm's overall strategy.

Grossman presented his insight mainly as a critique against Miyazaki's thesis which identified a given menu of wage-effort contracts with the internal wage structure of a particular firm. It viewed subsequently free exit from the market as sanctioning the withdrawal of entire menus, but not of only an individual contract from a menu. This is admittedly too strong an assumption regarding the market for insurance provision. Here, firms conventionally require customers to apply for particular contracts on a personal basis and they can do so independently of their practice on other elements in their menus. For this reason, the withdrawal of individual insurance contracts ought to be part of an environment with menus. And, as we saw in the preceding paragraph, it ought then to preclude separating contractual arrangements in equilibrium if the underlying structure is Hellwig's three-stage game.

In this case, the set of equilibrium outcomes would still be much richer than the one Grossman imagined, even with two risk-types. In fact, it would coincide with the one in the standard Hellwig model because the analysis of Section 2.2 applies even when firms are allowed to cross-subsidize net income within menus. Specifically, sequential rationality would allow for deviations by separating menus to be neutralized by the perception that the composition of their pools of applicants would be such that they are deemed loss-making and withdrawn. However, in the light of the latter part of the preceding section, this depends crucially upon the firms' being unable to commit on the contractual or policy level.

Under endogenous commitment, a dramatic reversal takes place: the equilibrium cannot but entail a separating contractual arrangement. As follows immediately from our analysis, if firms may choose whether to commit but only on individual contracts, the equilibrium is uniquely the RS menu whenever this is the IIE(1) allocation; otherwise, an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. If, in addition, they can introduce menus as policies, the equilibrium is uniquely and always the IIE(1) policy. For it should be clear from the preceding discussion that, on the equilibrium path, the firm ought to condition itself to not withdraw an individual contract from the equilibrium menu unless it withdraws the latter all together. Yet, this is now a matter of strategic choice, not exogenous restriction. It is the firm's optimal response to the equilibrium strategy of the high-risk type. The latter selects the high-risk contract from the IIE(1) menu only if this has been introduced as a policy; otherwise, it opts for the low-risk contract.

Given this epexegetis regarding the strategic underpinnings of our equilibrium outcome, we may turn our attention to its properties and compare it with equilibria in the pertinent literature. In doing so, our principal aim is to provide a convincing account for the central message of the present paper. Namely, under a simple theoretical structure, the augmented version of Hellwig's three-stage game, the forces of market competition should converge upon a single insurance allocation, the most desirable out of those that are efficient under adverse selection. To this end, it is best to first fix ideas about what efficiency ought to mean in the economic environment under investigation.

The standard efficiency concept in economics is the Pareto criterion, mainly due to its obvious appeal when information is complete (no individual has information, about her preferences, endowments, or productive capacity, which is not known by all other individuals). By definition, whenever

a given allocation is Pareto-inefficient, there exists another feasible allocation which improves the individuals' welfare unambiguously (in the sense that certainly some individual will be made better off and, equally certainly, no individual will be made worse off). All it takes, therefore, to achieve an unambiguously better economic outcome is for a good (and benevolent) enough outsider to identify and suggest this alternative. And even in the absence of such a welfare economist or social planner, an argument often known as Coase's Theorem suggests that we should still expect to move towards the Pareto-dominant allocation, as long as the costs of bargaining amongst individuals are insignificant. For if bargaining is costless, any of the individuals who will be made better off under the new outcome has a clear incentive to propose the reallocation while no one else has reason to object.

The strength of endorsing Pareto efficiency this way lies in anonymity: to justify a departure from Pareto-inefficient outcomes, there is no need for weighted distributions of gains and losses amongst individuals because no one loses. Its weakness is that it leaves open the question of who is to find the Pareto-improving allocation, an outside planner or members of the economy. It entails, that is, a normative and a positive justification, respectively. Of course, this distinction does not matter under complete information because, without loss of generality, we may assume that the planner knows everything individuals know, which is everything known (indeed, nothing precludes us from anointing any individual as planner).

The distinction is important, though, for economies with incomplete information. In these economies, the individual members have different private information at the time when choices are made. As a result, their decisions and the subsequent outcome depend upon the state of the individuals' information. What matters, therefore, is the decision rule or mechanism, the specification of how decisions are determined as a function of the individuals' information. When the comparison is between mechanisms, however, the normative and positive interpretation of the Pareto criterion may no longer be in agreement. Indeed, the former might admit decision rules the latter would not allow. For it could well be that individuals would unanimously agree to substitute one decision rule with another even though an outside planner could not have identified the new rule as Pareto-improving.

Yet, the role of an outside planner is precisely what an economic theorist assumes when it comes to mechanism design and implementation. To ensure, therefore, that our normative view of Pareto efficiency is not contradicted by that of the individuals in the economy under study, we cannot but disregard a decision rule if it depends upon information individuals hold privately and do not want to reveal. We have to restrict attention, that is, to incentive-compatible decision rules, mechanisms that incentivise each individual to report her private information honestly given that everyone else does the same.

Within the class of incentive-compatible mechanisms, the resulting Pareto-optimal allocations are the ones that achieve incentive efficiency. Albeit stemming from an intuitive requirement, this criterion is subject to when decision rules come up for welfare evaluation because what is optimal for an individual depends crucially on what information she possesses at the time. And, for economies like the market for insurance under consideration here, where at the time she is called upon to

act each buyer knows only her private information (her own probability of incurring an income loss), the relevant evaluation stage is the interim one. Indeed, IIE is the appropriate criterion since there cannot be unanimous agreement to depart from an IIE decision rule if some individual knows just her own private information (see Theorem 1 and the subsequent discussion in Holmstrom and Myerson [14]).

In the present setting, a (degenerate) decision rule is nothing but a (doublet) menu of contracts. This describes completely, in each state of the world, how income is allocated between customers and firms per customer-type. As a result, on the one hand, since only one individual (the customers) is informed, condition (1) defines the incentive-compatible allocations. On the other, as competition ensures that firms cannot extract social surplus, the objective function for Pareto-optimality is given by that of the IIE problem, where the weights depend only on the type of the informed party precisely because interim efficiency is the relevant concept.²⁵ In fact, the two optimality problems of the preceding section define, respectively, the RSW and interim incentive efficient allocations in Maskin and Tirole [18], the reservation allocation being the null trade.²⁶

Section 7 of that seminal study considered a three-stage game similar to the one we do, but under a significant generalization of what is meant by contractual arrangement. It assumed that at least two uninformed parties (UP) begin by simultaneously proposing contracts to one informed (IP). A contract, though, is actually a mechanism; it specifies a game form to be played between the two parties, the set of possible actions for each, and an allocation for each pair of their strategies. Following the proposal stage, the IP responds at stage 2. If she accepts a proposal, that game is played out and each party receives the respective outcome at stage 3. Otherwise, each gets its reservation payoff; a contingency that, in a modification, gets replaced by another game in which the two parties alternate in making proposals.

Under this three-stage game, the ensuing set of equilibrium outcomes is very large, even in our simple economy. Since any IIE allocation meets (4) with equality and whatever the value of λ , it does satisfy condition (iv) of Maskin and Tirole's Proposition 7. Any allocation, therefore, is an equilibrium one as long as it satisfies (1), (2), and (4), the latter with equality (see their Proposition 12). It is supported as such by a strategy which prescribes that, following a strictly-profitable deviation by another UP, the outcome of the equilibrium mechanism would be an allocation that all IP types prefer strictly to that of the deviant.

²⁵Technically speaking, this claim needs more general decision rules, mapping the type-space $\{H, L\}$ to possibly random allocations (probability distributions on the feasible set A). With respect to such mechanisms, the functions $U_h(\cdot)$ are linear and, consequently, the constraint set is convex as required. For the economy under study, however, the claim does apply even when only deterministic allocations are considered because, as shown by our analysis in the Appendix, the solutions to the IIE problem are of this kind. These were described also in Crocker and Snow [?] (see their Theorem 1). Yet, the present formulation is more general and our analysis more complete as we follow the Kuhn-Tucker approach. Given that the constraint set is not convex when attention is restricted to deterministic allocations, it is not immediate that the Lagrange conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality.

²⁶To be exact, we refer to their respective counterparts when only deterministic allocations are considered. This is, however, without loss of generality (recall the preceding footnote). We introduce also, with (2), individual-rationality constraints for the customers but this is again without consequence as they do not matter in either problem.

Yet, this allocation is offered by the equilibrium strategy as a latent threat, not to be delivered necessarily in equilibrium. And this is important in explaining why the Maskin-Tirole result seems so at odds with ours. It indicates fundamental dependence on mechanisms that are much more general than the ones in the present paper, even when attention is restricted to deterministic allocations. Both papers focus on incentive-compatible allocations; hence, on mechanisms in which truthful revelation is a Nash equilibrium (it is in the interest of each informed player to report her type honestly given that everyone else does the same). Nevertheless, seen as mechanisms, all of the games in the two preceding sections stay within the realm of direct revelation. They do not allow equilibrium strategies with latent contracts, to be offered in some off-equilibrium contingency but never implemented in equilibrium.

Of course, this is not the only difference between the two studies. Another emerges in the light of the modified game where mechanism design gets influenced also by the IP. In this case, the equilibrium set shrinks to the outcomes that satisfy the constraints of the IIE problem and (weakly) Pareto-dominate the RSW allocation (see Propositions 13 and 6 in Maskin and Tirole [18]). Equivalently, to the set of equilibrium allocations when the original game entails signalling rather than screening, the IP being now the one to propose mechanisms. And, under this perspective, the distinction between the two papers is drawn even sharper. Our augmented version of the Hellwig game leads to a unique equilibrium allocation with such properties that this game ought to be singled out by the IP under any reasonable theory of mechanism selection. It requires, however, that commitment on insurance provision is endogenous, both on the contractual and the policy level. And, within the Maskin-Tirole approach, the IP cannot exploit this element, even when she is able to stir the process towards a unique equilibrium.

When customers are the ones acting at stage 1, the game form restricts itself to the signalling subgame, the signal being now to suggest a particular contractual arrangement rather than select one already on offer. Adjusting, hence, our analysis in Section 2.2, it is easy to see that any admissible menu with the requisite dominance property, be it separating or trivial, may be supported as sequential equilibrium. It can be guarded against any deviation by the perception that the composition of the pool of customers who suggest the deviant menu renders it loss-making and, thus, precludes any firm from accepting it at stage 2. This logic was deployed above to import Grossman's insight into a version of Hellwig's game that was standard, apart from the fact that firms could subsidize net income across contracts. Under signalling, however, it produces a rich set of separating equilibrium allocations because, standing on the receiving end of insurance proposals, firms are no longer able to sort customers at will.

They can do so only with the consent of the low-risk type and by using the intuitive criterion, a combination powerful enough to admit only one equilibrium outcome. Given any equilibrium menu, separating or trivial, low-risk customers can signal their type by suggesting a contract which makes them (resp. the high-risk) strictly better (resp. worse) off and is strictly profitable when sold only to the low-risk type. More importantly, under the intuitive criterion, their communication is credible since firms interpret it as originating exclusively from this type. The lone survivor is the RS menu, the only allocation the low-risk type cannot improve upon unilaterally without violating

(3) for $h = L$. This can be verified using diagrammatic examples from the preceding section. It is also immediate from Proposition 7 in Maskin and Tirole [18]: their condition (ii) is met since our IP has only two types while the boundary of the feasibility set does not matter.

Hence, when the IP selects mechanisms in the Maskin-Tirole general context, she cannot guarantee herself the IIE(1) allocation apart from a special case (when the RS menu is an IIE and, consequently, the IIE(1) allocation - see the sufficiency part of Section B.3 in the Appendix). Yet, the latter is the IP's only reasonable choice when she is called upon to propose mechanisms. This follows from Myerson [20]. In this seminal investigation of mechanism design, an informed party, the principal, plays essentially the same signalling game as above but for the generalization that the other parties, the subordinates, may also be informed. Myerson identified a subset of incentive compatible allocations, the core allocations, and characterized a subset of these, the neutral optima. These are sequential equilibrium outcomes of the game and form the smallest class of allocations satisfying four fundamental axioms of mechanism selection.

Intuitively, if an allocation is not core, there must exist another incentive compatible allocation that would be (i) strictly preferred by some of the principal's types and (ii) implementable given the information revealed by its selection, provided that all the principal's types who prefer the new allocation are expected to propose it. In the paper, the second property is defined as the new allocation being conditionally incentive compatible for the subordinates. Here, however, it can be characterized more simply since the subordinates are uninformed. Suppose that the UP expects the new allocation to be proposed only if the IP's type falls in a particular subset of her type-space. Then the UP should accept it even when he knows that the IP's type lies in this subset.

In the simple insurance economy under investigation here, free entry and exit ensures that firms will acquiesce to a feasible allocation $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ (separating or trivial) as long as it is incentive compatible and satisfies (4), if it is selected by both risk types, or the relevant condition in (3), otherwise. Within the realm of these restrictions, the IIE(1) allocation is the unique selection of the low-risk type and, by satisfying (4) and $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^*) > 0$, implementable if $\mathbf{a}_h^* \succ_h \mathbf{a}_h$ for either h or $\mathbf{a}_L^* \succ_h \mathbf{a}_L$ but $\mathbf{a}_H \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^*$. In the latter case, moreover, the new proposal comes exclusively from the high-risk type and implementability is ruled out as $\mathbf{a}_H \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^{**}$ necessitates that $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) < 0$ (see the argument preceding Step 1 of our IIE analysis in the Appendix). Clearly, the IIE(1) is the only core allocation; hence, the unique neutral optimum.

5 Concluding Remarks

In this sense, one may conclude that the present paper leads back to the issue Rothschild and Stiglitz raised originally, albeit under a different perspective. Our result suggests that the lack of efficient outcomes in competitive markets under adverse selection may not be due to the presence of private but rather due to the absence of public information. More precisely, due to the lack of institutions that guarantee the enforcement of two kinds of public commitments by insurance suppliers: to deliver on contracts their customers have applied to via "pre-approved" forms and to abide by insurance promises themselves have marketed as policies.

Our analysis rests upon augmenting contractual admissibility along two dimensions, an accounting and a strategic. The former allows firms to subsidize their net income across contractual offers via the deployment of menus. The latter has firms choosing the extent to which they commit upon their offers. In either of its two forms, the endogeneity of commitment allows the suppliers' promises to play the same strategic role as the public actions do in Myerson [20]. Indeed, be it on the contractual or the policy level, an insurance offer with commitment is a decision which a firm can publicly commit itself to carry out even if it may turn out ex-post to be harmful to itself.

For the insurance economy under consideration here, the interaction between these two dimensions of contractual admissibility renders the IIE(1) allocation the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of a simple direct revelation mechanism that has been used extensively in the literature on applications of contract theory. The game-theoretic structure of Hellwig's model addresses the issue of existence of market equilibrium in pure strategies in a way that is both simple and realistic. Its standard version, however, admits multiple equilibria of which only the RS allocation may be incentive efficient.²⁷ And, when this is not the case, the selection of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium calls for the exact specification of the equilibrium strategies because it requires the deployment of stability in its technical sense.

As we saw, endogenous contractual commitment can be used as an alternative selection method. Yet, even though intuitively straightforward, this restricts the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of market participants to an extent that precludes the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies if admissibility is augmented also along the accounting dimension. Existence of equilibrium but also uniqueness as well as Pareto-efficiency are restored when the strategic dimension of admissibility allows endogenous commitment also on the policy level. In this sense, our equilibrium outcome demands the simultaneous application of two facets of endogenous commitment in a way that is probably too difficult to establish via real-world market institutions. More realistic settings, such as that in Guerrieri et al. [12], might be viewed as approximating it via the unique equilibrium of another mechanism involving market imperfections. Under this view, the present paper outlines the benchmark mechanism for such approximations.

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²⁷This statement requires the following qualification. There are cases in which the pooling equilibria include the allocation that offers full-insurance to both risk-types, the only incentive efficient pooling allocation (it solves the IIE problem for $\mu = \lambda$). This occurs whenever the contract \mathbf{a}^5 in Figure 4 lies on or above the 45-degree line. Yet, as we saw in Section 2.3, this equilibrium cannot survive the intuitive criterion.

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Appendices

A Preliminaries

Lemma 1 *Let the functions $F, \tilde{F} : I \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ be defined on the open interval $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ and the function $\kappa : I^4 \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ be given by $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = F(y_2) - F(y_1) + \tilde{F}(x_2) - \tilde{F}(x_1)$. Suppose, moreover, that F and \tilde{F} are differentiable on I with $f, \tilde{f} : I \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ the respective derivatives. If $\mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{y}^* \in I^2$ are such that $x_1^* < x_2^*$ and $\mathbf{y}^* = k\mathbf{x}^*$ for some $k \in \mathbb{R}^*$, then*

$$\Delta(\mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) = \left[kf(k\theta) + \tilde{f}(\theta) \right] (x_2^* - x_1^*)$$

for some $\theta \in (x_1^*, x_2^*)$.

Proof. By the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have

$$\begin{aligned} F(y_2^*) - F(y_1^*) &= \int_{y_1^*}^{y_2^*} f(z) dz = \int_{kx_1^*}^{kx_2^*} f(z) dz = k \int_{x_1^*}^{x_2^*} f(kt) dt \\ \Delta(\mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) &= \int_{x_1^*}^{x_2^*} \left[kf(kt) + \tilde{f}(t) \right] dt = G(x_2^*) - G(x_1^*) \end{aligned}$$

where $G : I \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ is defined by $G(t) = F(kt) + \tilde{F}(t)$. Letting $g : I \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ be its derivative function, the required result is an immediate consequence of the mean value theorem, which guarantees the existence of some $\theta \in (x_1^*, x_2^*)$ s.t. $\Delta(\mathbf{x}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) = g(\theta)(x_2^* - x_1^*)$. ■

Lemma 2 Consider an arbitrary risk-type h and contracts \mathbf{a} and $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$ related as follows

$$\tilde{\mathbf{a}} = \mathbf{a} + (\kappa, 1)\epsilon \quad \kappa, \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}^*$$

(i) For the corresponding income allocations, we have

$$U_h(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}) = \begin{cases} [p_h u'(w_1 + \tilde{\epsilon}) - \kappa(1 - p_h)u'(w_0 - \kappa\tilde{\epsilon})]\epsilon & \text{if } \epsilon > 0 \\ [p_h u'(w_1 - \tilde{\epsilon}) - \kappa(1 - p_h)u'(w_0 + \kappa\tilde{\epsilon})]\epsilon & \text{if } \epsilon < 0 \end{cases}$$

for some $\tilde{\epsilon} \in (0, |\epsilon|)$. In addition,

(ii) $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} \succ_h \mathbf{a}$ if one of the following hold

(a) $\kappa \in \left(0, \frac{p_h}{1-p_h}\right]$, $\epsilon > 0$, and $\tilde{w}_0 \geq \tilde{w}_1$ (i.e., $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$ does not offer over-insurance).

(b) $\kappa \in \left[\frac{p_h}{1-p_h}, \infty\right)$, $\epsilon < 0$, and $\tilde{w}_0 \leq \tilde{w}_1$ (i.e., $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$ does not offer under-insurance).

Proof. For (i), let first $\epsilon > 0$ and consider the corresponding income points: $\mathbf{w} = (w_0, w_1)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{w}} = \mathbf{w} - (\kappa, -1)\epsilon$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}) &= (1 - p_h)[u(\tilde{w}_0) - u(w_0)] + p_h[u(\tilde{w}_1) - u(w_1)] \\ &= (1 - p_h)[u(w_0 - \kappa\epsilon) - u(w_0)] + p_h[u(w_1 + \epsilon) - u(w_1)] \end{aligned}$$

and the required result follows immediately by applying the preceding lemma with $\mathbf{x}^* = (0, \epsilon)$, $\kappa = -k$, $F(z) = (1 - p_h)u(w_0 + z)$, and $\tilde{F}(z) = p_h u(w_1 + z)$. When $\epsilon < 0$, on the other hand, $\tilde{\mathbf{w}} = \mathbf{w} + (\kappa, -1)|\epsilon|$. In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}) &= (1 - p_h)[u(w_0 + \kappa|\epsilon|) - u(w_0)] + p_h[u(w_1 - |\epsilon|) - u(w_1)] \\ &= (1 - p_h)[u(w_0 + \kappa|\epsilon|) - u(w_0)] - p_h[u(w_1) - u(w_1 - |\epsilon|)] \end{aligned}$$

and we may apply the lemma as before but for $\mathbf{x}^* = (-|\epsilon|, 0)$.

With respect to (ii), under (a), $\kappa \leq \frac{p_h}{1-p_h}$ and the first result above gives $U_h(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}) \geq p_h[u'(w_1 + \tilde{\epsilon}) - u'(w_0 - \kappa\tilde{\epsilon})]\epsilon$. Moreover, $w_1 + \tilde{\epsilon} < w_1 + \epsilon = \tilde{w}_1 \leq \tilde{w}_0 = w_0 - \kappa\epsilon < w_0 - \kappa\tilde{\epsilon}$. The claim is now immediate since $U_h(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}) > U_h(\mathbf{w})$, due to $\epsilon > 0$ and risk-aversion ($u''(\cdot) < 0$). Part (b) is equally straightforward. Now, $U_h(\tilde{\mathbf{w}}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}) \geq p_h[u'(w_1 - \tilde{\epsilon}) - u'(w_0 + \kappa\tilde{\epsilon})]\epsilon$ while $w_1 - \tilde{\epsilon} > w_1 - |\epsilon| = \tilde{w}_1 \geq \tilde{w}_0 = w_0 + \kappa|\epsilon| > w_0 + \kappa\tilde{\epsilon}$ but $\epsilon < 0$. ■

Lemma 3 Let $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ be separating. There exists a contract $\mathbf{a}_h^0 = \mathbf{a}_h + (1, \kappa)\epsilon$, with $\kappa > 0$ and $\epsilon < 0$ (resp. $\epsilon > 0$) if $h = L$ (resp. $h = H$), such that $\mathbf{a}_h^0 \succ_h \mathbf{a}_h$ whereas the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_h^0, \mathbf{a}_{h'}\}$ (where $h \neq h'$) is strictly separating ($\mathbf{a}_h^0 \succ_h \mathbf{a}_{h'} \succ_{h'} \mathbf{a}_h^0$).

Proof. In the (a_0, a_1) -space, the indifference curve of risk-type h at an arbitrary contract point $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ has slope

$$I_h(\mathbf{a}) = \frac{da_1}{da_0} = -\frac{\frac{\partial U_h(W-a_0)}{\partial w_0} \frac{dw_0}{da_0}}{\frac{\partial U_h(W-d+a_1)}{\partial w_1} \frac{dw_1}{da_1}} = \left(\frac{1-p_h}{p_h} \right) \frac{u'(W-a_0)}{u'(W-d+a_1)} > 0 \quad h = H, L$$

As $p_H > p_L$, therefore, $I_L(\mathbf{a}) = \left(\frac{1-p_L}{p_L} \right) \left(\frac{p_H}{1-p_H} \right) I_H(\mathbf{a}) > I_H(\mathbf{a})$. In words, at least locally, the low-risk indifference curve is steeper than the high-risk one.

Consider now the contract $\mathbf{a}_L^0 = \mathbf{a}_L + (1, \kappa)\epsilon$ for some $\kappa \in (I_H(\mathbf{a}_L), I_L(\mathbf{a}_L))$ and $\epsilon < 0$. Let also $\Delta_h = |\kappa - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L)|$ for $h = L, H$. By Lemma 2(i), we get

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_L) &= [p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon}) - \kappa^{-1} (1-p_h) u'(w_{0L} + \kappa^{-1}\tilde{\epsilon})] k\epsilon \\ &= \left[\kappa - \frac{(1-p_h) u'(w_{0L} + \kappa^{-1}\tilde{\epsilon})}{p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon})} \right] p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon}) \epsilon \\ &= [\kappa - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^* - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\tilde{\epsilon})] p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon}) \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

for some $\tilde{\epsilon} \in (0, \kappa|\epsilon|)$. Yet, the function $I_h(\cdot)$ is continuous and $\lim_{\tilde{\epsilon} \rightarrow 0} I_h(\mathbf{a}_L - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}) = I_h(\mathbf{a}_L)$. For small enough $|\epsilon|$ (and, subsequently, $\tilde{\epsilon}$), therefore, $|I_h(\mathbf{a}_L - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}) - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L)| < \min\{\Delta_L, \Delta_H\}$ for either h . But then,

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) &= [I_L(\mathbf{a}_L) - \Delta_L - I_L(\mathbf{a}_L - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\tilde{\epsilon})] p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon}) \epsilon \\ &= -[I_L(\mathbf{a}_L - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}) - (I_L(\mathbf{a}_L) - \Delta_L)] p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon}) \epsilon > 0 \\ U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) &= [I_H(\mathbf{a}_L) + \Delta_H - I_H(\mathbf{a}_L - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\tilde{\epsilon})] p_h u'(w_{1L} - \tilde{\epsilon}) \epsilon < 0 \end{aligned}$$

imply that $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) \geq U_L(\mathbf{w}_H)$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) \leq U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)$. Here, the second inequality in either system is due to the fact that the original menu is separating. A similar argument produces the contract $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H + (1, \kappa)\epsilon$, with κ as before but now $\epsilon > 0$, such that $\mathbf{a}_H^0 \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H$ while $\mathbf{a}_L \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^0 \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L$. ■

B Efficiency

B.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson Allocation

For $\mu \in [0, 1]$, we are interested in the following problem

$$\max_{\{\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^4} \mu U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) + (1-\mu) U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) \quad \text{s.t. (1)-(3)}$$

Let β_h , γ_h , and δ_h be, respectively, the Lagrangean multipliers on the incentive-compatibility, individual rationality, and non-negative profit constraints of risk-type h . The Kuhn-Tucker first-

order conditions are then²⁸

$$(\mu + \beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**}) \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})}{\partial a_{0L}} = \beta_H^{**} \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})}{\partial a_{0L}} - \delta_L^{**} (1 - p_L) \quad (5)$$

$$(\mu + \beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**}) \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})}{\partial a_{1L}} = \beta_H^{**} \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})}{\partial a_{1L}} + \delta_L^{**} p_L \quad (6)$$

$$(1 - \mu + \beta_H^{**} + \gamma_H^{**}) \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})}{\partial a_{0H}} = \beta_L^{**} \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})}{\partial a_{0H}} - \delta_H^{**} (1 - p_H) \quad (7)$$

$$(1 - \mu + \beta_H^{**} + \gamma_H^{**}) \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})}{\partial a_{0H}} = \beta_L^{**} \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})}{\partial a_{0H}} + \delta_H^{**} p_H \quad (8)$$

$$\beta_h^{**} (U_h(\mathbf{w}_h^{**}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_{h'}^{**})) = 0 \quad h, h' \in \{H, L\} \quad (9)$$

$$\gamma_h^{**} (U_h(\mathbf{w}_h^{**}) - \bar{u}_h) = 0 \quad h \in \{H, L\} \quad (10)$$

$$\delta_h^{**} \Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h^{**}) = 0 \quad h \in \{H, L\} \quad (11)$$

$$\beta_h^{**}, \gamma_h^{**}, \delta_h \geq 0 \quad h \in \{H, L\} \quad (12)$$

along with (1), (2), and (3), where, for either h ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial U_h(\mathbf{w}_h)}{\partial a_{0h}} &= (1 - p_h) u'(w_{0h}) \frac{dw_{0h}}{da_{0h}} = -(1 - p_h) u'(w_{0h}) \\ \frac{\partial U_h(\mathbf{w}_h)}{\partial a_{1h}} &= p_h u'(w_{1h}) \frac{dw_{1h}}{da_{1h}} = p_h u'(w_{1h}) \end{aligned}$$

It is trivial to check, of course, that (5)-(6) and (7)-(8) give, respectively,

$$(\mu + \beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**}) p_L (1 - p_L) [u'(w_{1L}^{**}) - u'(w_{0L}^{**})] = \beta_H^{**} \begin{bmatrix} p_H (1 - p_L) u'(w_{1L}^{**}) \\ -p_L (1 - p_H) u'(w_{0L}^{**}) \end{bmatrix} \quad (13)$$

$$(1 - \mu + \beta_H^{**} + \gamma_H^{**}) p_H (1 - p_H) [u'(w_{1H}^{**}) - u'(w_{0H}^{**})] = \beta_L^{**} \begin{bmatrix} p_L (1 - p_H) u'(w_{1H}^{**}) \\ -p_H (1 - p_L) u'(w_{0H}^{**}) \end{bmatrix} \quad (14)$$

Our analysis will proceed through a series of observations regarding the characteristics of an RSW allocation.

1. *If the low-risk profit constraint binds at the optimum, the low-risk type cannot be fully insured.* We will establish the contrapositive statement, arguing ad absurdum. Let, thus, $w_{1L}^{**} = w_{0L}^{**}$. Then, $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}) = u(w_{0L}^{**})$ and the high-risk incentive constraint would read $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**}) \geq u(w_{0L}^{**})$. Which

²⁸As we will show, the only inequality constraint that does not bind at the optimum is the low-risk incentive compatibility one. The rank condition of the Khun-Tucker theorem requires here that the matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_H) \\ \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) \\ \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) \\ \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{0L}} & \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{1L}} & -\frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{0H}} & -\frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{1H}} \\ -\frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{0L}} & -\frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{1L}} & \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{0H}} & \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{1H}} \\ -(1 - p_L) & -p_L & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -(1 - p_H) & -p_H \end{bmatrix}$$

has rank at least 3 at the point $(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}, \mathbf{w}_H^{**})$. But this is obvious; for instance, no linear combination of its last three columns can be zero at the third entry given that $p_L > 0$.

cannot be, however, if $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^{**}) = 0$ because

$$\begin{aligned}
U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**}) &= (1 - p_H) u(w_{0H}^{**}) + p_H u(w_{1H}^{**}) \leq u((1 - p_H) w_{0H}^{**} + p_H w_{1H}^{**}) \\
&= u(W - (1 - p_H) a_{0H}^{**} + p_H (a_{1H}^{**} - d)) \\
&\leq u(W - p_H d) \\
&< u(W - p_L d) \\
&= u(W - (1 - p_L) a_{0L}^{**} + p_L (a_{1L}^{**} - d)) \\
&= u((1 - p_L) w_{0L}^{**} + p_L w_{1L}^{**}) = u(w_{0L}^{**})
\end{aligned}$$

The first inequality here is due to $u(\cdot)$ being everywhere strictly-concave (the binding case obtaining only if $w_{0H}^{**} = w_{1H}^{**}$). The third inequality follows from $p_L < p_H$ and $u(\cdot)$ being strictly-increasing. The second and fourth equalities use that $\mathbf{w}_h^{**} = (W - a_{0h}^{**}, W - d + a_{1h}^{**})$. The second inequality follows from $u'(\cdot) > 0$ since $-(1 - p_H) a_{0H}^{**} - p_H a_{1H}^{**} = -\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^{**}) \leq 0$, by the respective condition in (3). The latter condition, which binds by assumption for the low-risk, is responsible also for the second equality.

2. *The high-risk profit constraint must bind $\forall \mu \in [0, 1]$. The low-risk one must do so for $\mu > 0$.*

Suppose first that $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^{**}) > 0$. Then $\delta_L^{**} = 0$, by the corresponding complementary-slackness condition in (11), and (5)-(6) read

$$\begin{aligned}
(\mu + \beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**})(1 - p_L) u'(w_{0L}^{**}) &= \beta_H^{**} (1 - p_H) u'(w_{0L}^{**}) \\
(\mu + \beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**}) p_L u'(w_{1L}^{**}) &= \beta_H^{**} p_H u'(w_{1L}^{**})
\end{aligned}$$

Recall, however, that $u'(\cdot) > 0$ and $p_h \in (0, 1)$ for either h . It follows that, along with the non-negativity conditions in (12), $\mu > 0$ requires that neither side in either equation is zero. But then one equation may be divided by the other to give $\frac{1-p_L}{p_L} = \frac{1-p_H}{p_H}$, a contradiction.

A trivially similar argument, using the respective condition in (11) and (7)-(8), precludes $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^{**}) > 0$ when $\mu < 1$. If $\mu = 1$, then $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^{**}) = 0$ by the preceding paragraph and, subsequently, the first observation precludes the low-risk from being fully-insured. This requires, in turn, that $\beta_H^{**} > 0$. Otherwise, as also $\mu > 0$, $\beta_L^{**}, \gamma_L^{**} \geq 0$, and $p_L < 1$, (13) gives $u'(w_{1L}^{**}) = u'(w_{0L}^{**})$. Under the strict concavity of $u(\cdot)$, however, $u'(\cdot)$ is everywhere strictly-decreasing and the last equality is equivalent to $w_{1L}^{**} = w_{0L}^{**}$. Even when $\mu = 1$, therefore, it must be $\beta_H^{**} > 0$ and the argument in the preceding paragraph applies again for the respective condition in (11) and (7)-(8).

We have shown, therefore, that both profit constraints in (3) cannot but bind at the optimum, as long as $\mu \in (0, 1]$. When $\mu = 0$, the profit constraint on the low-risk type does not have bind at the optimum but we may take it to be so without any loss of generality. In this case, we restrict attention to the allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^{**}, \mathbf{w}_H^{**}\}$ we derive below, which is then but one of many optima. Indeed, when $\mu = 0$, any allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H^{**}\}$ is optimal, as long as it satisfies the constraints. Yet, $\{\mathbf{w}_L^{**}, \mathbf{w}_H^{**}\}$ is the only optimum that remains so $\forall \mu \in [0, 1]$.

In what follows, we continue our observations about the solution of the RSW problem, replacing (3) with its binding version:

$$\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h) = 0 \quad h \in \{H, L\} \quad (15)$$

3. *A pooling allocation cannot be optimal.*

For a pooling contract $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1)$ to satisfy the two zero-profit conditions in (15), we must have $a_0 = \left(\frac{p_h}{1-p_h}\right) a_1$ for either h . Which, since $p_H > p_L$, means actually that the only admissible pooling contract is the trivial one, $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$. Yet, as shown by what follows, we can do much better for either type than leaving them at the endowment point.

4. *The incentive compatibility constraint of the high-risk type binds.*

Suppose the opposite. By the corresponding complementary slackness condition in (9) then, $\beta_H^{**} = 0$, which, as we have seen already cannot be if $\mu > 0$ (recall observation 2). Let, thus, $\mu = 0$. If $\beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**} > 0$, the same argument leads again to the absurd conclusion that the low-risk type gets full insurance. On the other hand, $\beta_L^{**} + \gamma_L^{**} = 0$ can be only if $\beta_L^{**} = 0$ which, along with $\mu = \beta_H^{**} = 0$, $\gamma_H^{**} \geq 0$, and $p_H < 1$, oblige (14) to require that the high-risk is fully-insured ($w_{1H}^{**} = w_{0H}^{**}$). In this case, we may proceed directly to Step 7.

5. *The incentive compatibility constraint of the low-risk type does not bind.*

Otherwise, given the preceding step, both constraints in (1) bind. That is, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**}) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})$ which, in turn, imply that

$$\begin{aligned} p_L [u(w_{0L}^{**}) - u(w_{0H}^{**}) + u(w_{1H}^{**}) - u(w_{1L}^{**})] &= u(w_{0L}^{**}) - u(w_{0H}^{**}) \\ &= p_H [u(w_{0L}^{**}) - u(w_{0H}^{**}) + u(w_{1H}^{**}) - u(w_{1L}^{**})] \end{aligned}$$

This cannot be unless $u(w_{0L}^{**}) = u(w_{0H}^{**})$ and $u(w_{1L}^{**}) = u(w_{1H}^{**})$.²⁹ Equivalently, unless $w_{0L}^{**} = w_{0H}^{**}$ and $w_{1L}^{**} = w_{1H}^{**}$, an absurd conclusion given that the optimal allocation must be separating.

6. *The high-risk agents are fully insured.*

By the preceding observation and the low-risk type's complementary slackness condition in (9), it must be $\beta_L^{**} = 0$. We have already established (observation 4), though, that $\beta_H^{**} > 0$. And as $1 - \mu, \gamma_H^{**} \geq 0$ while $p_H < 1$, (14) necessitates that $u'(w_{0H}^{**}) = u'(w_{1H}^{**})$. Equivalently, $w_{0H}^{**} = w_{1H}^{**}$ as required.

7. *The high-risk individual-rationality constraint in (2) does not bind.*

Recall the argument in Step 1. Since the high-risk profit constraint binds and this type is fully insured, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}_H &= (1 - p_H) u(W) + p_H u(W - d) \\ &< u((1 - p_H) W + p_H (W - d)) \\ &= u(W - p_H d) = u(W - (1 - p_H) a_{0H}^{**} + p_H (a_{1H}^{**} - d)) \\ &= u((1 - p_H) w_{0H}^{**} + p_H w_{1H}^{**}) = u(w_{0H}^{**}) = U_h(\mathbf{w}_H^{**}) \quad h \in \{L, H\} \end{aligned}$$

²⁹Given $\alpha, \zeta \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\gamma, \delta \in \mathbb{R}^{**}$ with $\gamma \neq \delta$, $\gamma(\alpha + \zeta) = \delta(\alpha + \zeta) = \alpha$ implies $\alpha = \zeta = 0$.

The high-risk individual rationality constraint is slack ($\gamma_H^{**} = 0$).

8. *The contract for the high-risk customers is what they would get under perfect information.*

Under perfect information, each risk-type is offered the full-insurance contract that meets the respective condition in (15). Geometrically, this is the intersection point of the 45-degree and the fair-odds line through the endowment point, FO_h^* . Clearly, $\mathbf{w}_H^{**} = \mathbf{w}_H^F$.

9. *The low-risk customers are underinsured: $w_{0L}^{**} > w_{1L}^{**}$.*

We have just established that the optimal contract for the high-risk type involves full insurance. Hence, $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**}) = u(w_{0H}^{**}) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})$ and the two incentive compatibility constraints can be put together as $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}) \leq u(w_{0H}^{**}) \leq U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})$. The inequality between the first and the last quantities requires that $(p_H - p_L)[u(w_{1L}^{**}) - u(w_{0L}^{**})] \leq 0$. Given that $p_H > p_L$ and $u(\cdot)$ is strictly-increasing, this necessitates that $w_{1L}^{**} \leq w_{0L}^{**}$. In fact, $w_{1L}^{**} < w_{0L}^{**}$ since equality has been ruled out (Step 1).

10. *The low-risk individual-rationality constraint in (2) does not bind.*

This is immediate once the preceding observation is combined with Lemma 2(ii), applied for $h = L$ with $\tilde{\mathbf{w}}$ and \mathbf{w} being, respectively, the endowment point and \mathbf{w}_L^{**} . To this end, recall that either of the latter two points are on the line FO_L^* . Hence, $\mathbf{a}_L^{**} = \mathbf{0} + (a_{0L}^{**}, a_{1L}^{**}) = \mathbf{0} + \left(\frac{p_L}{1-p_L}, 1\right) a_{1L}^{**}$ with $a_{1L}^{**} > 0$.

11. *The low-risk contract is the intersection of FO_L^* with the high-risk indifference curve $U_H(\mathbf{w}) = u(w_{0H}^F)$.*

The contract offered to the low-risk type is given by the following two equations: (i) the binding incentive compatibility constraint of the high-risk type, $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}) = u(w_{0H}^F)$, and (ii) the equation in (15) for the low-risk type.

B.2 Interim Incentive Efficient Allocations

Consider now the same optimization exercise as before but for the fact that the two profit conditions in (3) are replaced by the one in (4). Letting δ be the Lagrangean multiplier of the new constraint, the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are the same as before but for the fact that δ_L and δ_H are replaced by $\delta\lambda$ and $\delta(1-\lambda)$, respectively, and (11) reads now $\delta[\lambda\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^*) + (1-\lambda)\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^*)] = 0$. It follows then that, as also $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, the argument in Step 2 of the RSW analysis applies requiring that (4) binds at the optimum $\forall \mu \in [0, 1]$. We may replace it, therefore, by

$$\lambda\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1-\lambda)\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) = 0 \tag{16}$$

Observe also that, throughout this proof, we will restrict attention to high-risk contracts that satisfy $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \leq 0$. This is entirely innocuous because, as it will turn out, at the IIE optimum and for all $\mu \in [0, 1]$ we have $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) > u(W - p_H d) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^{**})$, the equality following from Step 7 of our RSW analysis. Clearly, the IIE optimal \mathbf{a}_H^* must be loss-making given that the RS contract

\mathbf{a}_H^{**} solves the first-best efficiency problem: $\max_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2, \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}) \geq 0} U_H(\mathbf{a})$.

In what follows, therefore, the relevant domain consists of menus $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ such that

$$\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \leq 0 \leq \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) \quad (17)$$

As before, we proceed via a series of observations.

1. A menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ satisfying (16)-(17), corresponds uniquely to a contract $\mathbf{a} \in FO_M^*$ such that

$$a_0 \geq 0 \quad (18)$$

$$[\lambda(1-p_L) + (1-\lambda)(1-p_H)]a_0 = [\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H]a_1 \quad (19)$$

$$(1-p_h)(a_{0h} - a_0) = p_h(a_{1h} - a_1) \quad h = H, L \quad (20)$$

Let \mathbf{a} be defined (uniquely) by (20), as the intersection of the two fair-odds lines FO_h through the members of the given menu. As pooling policy, it expects profits

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}) &= \lambda[(1-p_L)a_0 - p_L a_1] + (1-\lambda)[(1-p_H)a_0 - p_H a_1] \\ &= \lambda[(1-p_L)a_0 - p_L a_1] + (1-\lambda)[(1-p_H)a_0 - p_H a_1] \\ &\quad + \lambda[(1-p_L)(a_{0L} - a_0) - p_L(a_{1L} - a_1)] \\ &\quad + (1-\lambda)[(1-p_H)(a_{0H} - a_0) - p_H(a_{1H} - a_1)] \\ &= \lambda[(1-p_L)a_{0L} - p_L a_{1L}] + (1-\lambda)[(1-p_H)a_{0H} - p_H a_{1H}] \\ &= \lambda \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1-\lambda) \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \end{aligned}$$

exactly the same as the given menu. Hence, $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}) = 0$ which is just another way to express (19). Of course, as the latter equation is satisfied also by the endowment point - the trivial contract $(0, 0)$ - \mathbf{a} cannot but lie on the market fair-odds line through the endowment point. Finally, notice that

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{1-p_L}{p_L}\right)a_0 &= \frac{1}{p_L}[(1-p_L)a_{0L} - p_L a_{1L} + p_L a_1] = \frac{1}{p_L}[\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + p_L a_1] \\ &\geq a_1 = \frac{1}{p_H}[(1-p_H)a_0 - \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H)] \geq \left(\frac{1-p_H}{p_H}\right)a_0 \end{aligned}$$

where the first and third equalities are due to the respective relations in (20) while the two inequalities follow from the respective sides of (17). Given this, (18) follows immediately since $p_H > p_L$.

In what follows, we study the IIE problem after having substituted (16) by its equivalent system of conditions (18)-(20) above. Of course, for the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ to satisfy the two conditions in (20), we can only consider movements along the same slope as the corresponding fair-odds lines FO_h , i.e. contract changes of the form $da_{1h} = \left(\frac{1-p_h}{p_h}\right)da_{0h}$. This means that the solution to the IIE problem can be fully characterized in terms of its a_0^* , a_{1L}^* , and a_{1H}^* components. For once these three choice variables are determined, so are the remaining ones since

$$a_1^* = \left(\frac{1}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} - 1\right)a_0^* \quad (21)$$

$$a_{1L}^* = \frac{1}{p_L} \left[(1-p_L)a_{0L}^* - \frac{(1-\lambda)(p_H-p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0^* \right] \quad (22)$$

$$a_{1H}^* = \frac{1}{p_H} \left[(1-p_H)a_{0H}^* + \frac{\lambda(p_H-p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0^* \right] \quad (23)$$

Here, the first equality follows from (19) and, given this, the other two by (20).

The IIE problem can be re-formulated, therefore, to be subject to (18), the four constraints in (1)-(2), and

$$\begin{aligned} w_{0L} &= W - \left(\frac{1}{1-p_L} \right) \left(p_L a_{1L} + \frac{(1-\lambda)(p_H-p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0 \right) \\ w_{1L} &= W - d + a_{1L} \\ w_{0H} &= W - \left(\frac{1}{1-p_H} \right) \left(p_H a_{1H} - \frac{\lambda(p_H-p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0 \right) \\ w_{1H} &= W - d + a_{1H} \end{aligned}$$

Letting β be the Lagrangean multiplier on (18), the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are given by (1)-(2), (5)-(11), and ³⁰

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda \left[1 - \mu + \beta_H^* + \gamma_H^* - \beta_L^* \left(\frac{1-p_L}{1-p_H} \right) \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) &- \\ (1-\lambda) \left[\mu + \beta_L^* + \gamma_L^* - \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1-p_H}{1-p_L} \right) \right] u'(w_{0L}^*) &= -\frac{\beta^* \bar{p}}{p_H - p_L} \\ \beta^* a_0^* &= 0, \quad \beta^* \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

where $\bar{p} = \lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H$. Regarding this new formulation, notice that the slackness of (18) is what distinguishes the IIE and RSW problems. For if $a_0^* = 0$, (19) requires that also $a_1^* = 0$ and, hence, (20) reduces to (15). In what follows, then, we require that $a_0^* > 0$. As a consequence, $\beta^* = 0$ and (24) can be re-written as

$$\lambda \left[1 - \mu + \beta_H^* + \gamma_H^* - \beta_L^* \left(\frac{1-p_L}{1-p_H} \right) \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) = (1-\lambda) \left[\mu + \beta_L^* + \gamma_L^* - \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1-p_H}{1-p_L} \right) \right] u'(w_{0L}^*)$$

2. *At least one of the two incentive constraints in (1) binds at the optimum*

To see this, suppose that they are both slack so that $\beta_L^* = 0 = \beta_H^*$ by the complementary slackness conditions in (9). It follows immediately, by the last condition above, that this cannot be if $\mu = \gamma_L^* = 0$ or $1 - \mu = \gamma_H^* = 0$. For then, we would have, respectively, $u'(w_{1H}^*) = 0$ or $u'(w_{1L}^*) = 0$; either an absurd conclusion given that $u(\cdot)$ is everywhere strictly monotone. It can only be, therefore, $\mu + \gamma_L^*, 1 - \mu + \gamma_H^* > 0$ and conditions (13)-(14) together dictate that both risk-types ought to be fully-insured. But then, $U_h(\mathbf{w}_{h'}^*) = u(w_{0h'}^*)$ for $h, h' \in \{H, L\}$ and, thus, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) \geq U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) =$

³⁰In each of the cases 2(i)-(ii) below, the only inequality constraint that binds at the optimum is the respective incentive constraint. The rank condition of the Khun-Tucker theorem, therefore, requires that the matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_H) \\ \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) \\ \nabla_{(\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H)} \lambda \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1-\lambda) \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{0L}} & -\frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{1L}} & \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{0H}} & \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{1H}} \\ \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{0L}} & \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{1L}} & -\frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{0H}} & -\frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)}{\partial w_{1H}} \\ \lambda(1-p_L) & \lambda p_L & (1-\lambda)(1-p_H) & (1-\lambda)p_H \end{bmatrix}$$

has rank at least 2 at $(\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*)$. As in the RSW problem, this is trivial to verify. Take, for instance, a linear combination $(\zeta_0, \zeta_1) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ of the first two columns. For this to be zero at the first two entries, we ought to have $\sum_{s=0,1} \zeta_s \frac{\partial U_h(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{sL}} = 0$ for $h = L, H$. Equivalently, $\frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{0L}} / \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{0L}} = \frac{\partial U_L(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{1L}} / \frac{\partial U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)}{\partial w_{1L}}$. Given the utility specification here, this reads $\frac{p_L}{p_H} = \frac{1-p_L}{1-p_H}$. Yet, $p_H > p_L$ requires that $\frac{p_L}{p_H} < 1 < \frac{1-p_L}{1-p_H}$.

$U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \geq U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^*) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$; another absurd conclusion if both incentive constraints in (1) are slack.

This observation allows for an exhaustive investigation of the IIE problem by examining the following three cases. In the first two, we ignore the possibility that $\beta_L^* = 0 = \beta_H^*$. As we know already, this cannot be if $\mu = \gamma_L^* = 0$ or $1 - \mu = \gamma_H^* = 0$ whereas, in any other case, it implies that both incentive constraints bind, exactly the situation investigated by our third case.

(i). *Only the high-risk incentive constraint binds at the optimum.*

Since $\beta_L^* = 0 < \beta_H^*$, (14) requires that the high-risk type gets full insurance: $w_{0H}^* = w_{1H}^*$. Which implies, in turn, under- or full-insurance for the low-risk type: $w_{0L}^* \geq w_{1L}^*$ (recall the argument in Step 9 of our RSW analysis). In fact, it suffices here to consider only strict inequality: $w_{0L}^* > w_{1L}^*$. For, as we have already seen above, if both types are full-insured both incentive constraints in (1) bind, a situation examined in Case (iii) below.

At the optimal high-risk income point (w_{0H}^*, w_{1H}^*) , we have now

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}_H &= (1 - p_H)u(W) + p_H u(W - d) < u((1 - p_H)W + p_H(W - d)) \\ &= u(W - p_H d) < u\left(W - p_H d + \frac{\lambda(p_H - p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1 - \lambda)p_H} a_0^*\right) \\ &= u((1 - p_H)w_{0H}^* + p_H w_{1H}^*) = u(w_{0H}^*) = U_h(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \quad h = L, H \end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality follows from $a_0^* > 0$, $p_H > p_L$, and non-satiation. That is, the high-risk individual rationality constraint in (2) is slack (and, thus, $\gamma_H^* = 0$). For that of the low-risk agents, on the other hand, observe that the last equality above also gives

$$\begin{aligned} u((1 - p_H)w_{0H}^* + p_H w_{1H}^*) &= U_L(w_{0H}^*) = (1 - p_H)u(w_{0L}^*) + p_H u(w_{1L}^*) \\ &< u((1 - p_H)w_{0L}^* + p_H w_{1L}^*) \end{aligned}$$

where (similarly to the first inequality before) the inequality is due to risk-aversion. Hence, by non-satiation, we ought to have $w_{1L}^* - w_{1H}^* > -\frac{1-p_H}{p_H}(w_{0L}^* - w_{0H}^*)$. In addition, since $w_{0L}^* > w_{1L}^*$, the second equality above implies also that $u(w_{0H}^*) < u(w_{0L}^*)$ or $w_{0H}^* < w_{0L}^*$.

Let us allow ourselves now a small digression on the following set

$$C_{\mathbf{z}} = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^2 : x_2 - z_2 = l(x_1 - z_1), l \in [l_1, l_2]\}$$

where $l_1 < l_2$ with $l_1 l_2 > 0$. This is the intersection of two half-planes, the one to the left of the line $\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^2 : (x_2 - z_2) = l_1(x_1 - z_1)\}$ and the one to the right of $\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^2 : (x_2 - z_2) = l_2(x_1 - z_1)\}$. Graphically, it is depicted by a convex cone pointed at \mathbf{z} and separated into two half-cones, the left ($x_1 < z_1$) and the right ($x_1 > z_1$).

Let now $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in C_{\mathbf{z}} \setminus \{\mathbf{z}\}$. There must exist $r_1, r_2 \in [l_1, l_2]$ such that $x_2 - z_2 = r_1(x_1 - z_1)$ and $y_2 - z_2 = r_2(y_1 - z_1)$. Consider now the sets of inequalities below, (25) and (26), which ensure, respectively, that the points both lie in the left and right half-cone.

$$r_2 > r_1 \quad x_1 \geq y_1 \quad \text{and} \quad x_2 - y_2 > r_2(x_1 - y_1) \quad (25)$$

$$r_2 > r_1 \quad x_1 \leq y_1 \quad \text{and} \quad x_2 - y_2 < r_2(x_1 - y_1) \quad (26)$$

This because the second inequality in (25) is equivalent to $x_2 - z_2 > r_2 (x_1 - z_1)$. But this implies $0 = x_2 - z_2 - r_1 (x_1 - z_1) > (r_2 - r_1) (x_1 - z_1)$ or $x_1 < z_1$. Which requires, in turn, that also $y_1 < z_1$. The argument for (26) is trivially similar.

Returning now to our proof, given (20) and $\mathbf{w}_h = (W - a_{0h}, W - d + a_{1h})$, condition (25) can be applied here for $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{w}^*$, $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{w}_L^*$, $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{w}_H^*$, $r_1 = -\frac{1-p_L}{p_L}$, and $r_2 = -\frac{1-p_H}{p_H}$. Graphically, the situation may be depicted by the left-hand side diagram of Figure 6. Analytically, it requires that $w_0^* < w_{0H}^* < w_{0L}^*$ or $a_{0L}^* < a_{0H}^* < a_0^*$. Yet, by fully-insuring the high-risk type, we also have

$$a_{0H}^* = d - a_{1H}^* \quad (27)$$

and, for $h = H$, (20) gives $a_{0H}^* - a_0^* = p_H (d - a_1^* - a_0^*)$. It must be, therefore, $d - a_1^* > a_0^*$. Similarly to the low-risk contract, the pooling one also offers under-insurance: $w_1^* < w_0^*$. Which actually allows us to apply Lemma 2 twice, taking $\mathbf{a}^* = \mathbf{0} + (a_0^*, a_1^*)$ and $\mathbf{a}_L^* = \mathbf{a}^* + (\epsilon_{0L}^*, \epsilon_{1L}^*)$ with $a_0^* = \frac{\bar{p}}{1-\bar{p}} a_1^*$, $\bar{p} = \lambda p_L + (1-\lambda) p_H$, and $\epsilon_{0L}^* = \frac{p_L}{1-p_L} \epsilon_{1L}^*$, in order to conclude that $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) > U_L(\mathbf{w}) > \bar{u}_L$. Hence, the low-risk constraint in (2) is also slack (and, thus, $\gamma_L^* = 0$).

Given the above, the IIE solution is fully characterized here by (21)-(22), (27), the equality below - which is due to (27) and (23) -

$$a_{1H}^* = \frac{\lambda(p_H - p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0^* + (1-p_H) d \quad (28)$$

and the following conditions

$$\mu p_L (1-p_L) [u'(w_{1L}^*) - u'(w_{0L}^*)] = \beta_H^* \begin{bmatrix} p_H (1-p_L) u'(w_{1L}^*) \\ -p_L (1-p_H) u'(w_{0L}^*) \end{bmatrix} \quad (29)$$

$$\lambda (1-\mu + \beta_H^*) u'(w_{0H}^*) = (1-\lambda) \left[\mu - \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1-p_H}{1-p_L} \right) \right] u'(w_{0L}^*) \quad (30)$$

$$U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^*) = u(w_{0H}^*)$$

a system of seven equations in the seven unknowns: a_0^* , a_1^* , a_{0L}^* , a_{1L}^* , a_{0H}^* , a_{1H}^* , and β_H^* .

To complete the analysis, we should point out that this case is compatible only with the situation $\lambda < \mu$. This is because it combines full insurance for the high-risk agents with under-insurance for the low-risk ones. Specifically, since $u(w_{0H}^*) < u(w_{0L}^*)$, it must be $u'(w_{0H}^*) > u'(w_{0L}^*)$ due to risk-aversion. But then, for the right-hand side of (30), we get

$$\begin{aligned} (1-\lambda) \left[\mu - \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1-p_H}{1-p_L} \right) \right] u'(w_{0L}^*) &< \left[\mu (1-\lambda) + \lambda \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1-p_H}{1-p_L} \right) \right] u'(w_{0L}^*) \\ &\leq \left[\mu (1-\lambda) + \lambda \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1-p_H}{1-p_L} \right) \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) \\ &\leq (\mu (1-\lambda) + \lambda \beta_H^*) u'(w_{0H}^*) \end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality is due to $\beta_H^*, u'(\cdot) > 0$ and $p_h < 1$, the second one is because, by risk-aversion, $u(w_{0H}^*) < u(w_{0L}^*)$ is equivalent to $u'(w_{0H}^*) > u'(w_{0L}^*)$, and the last inequality follows from $p_H > p_L$. Yet, the above result rules out the case $\lambda \geq \mu$. For then, $\mu (1-\lambda) \leq \lambda (1-\mu)$ and

(30) cannot hold.

(ii). *Only the low-risk incentive constraint binds at the optimum.*

Now $\beta_L^* > 0 = \beta_H^*$ and, by (13), it is the low-risk type that gets full insurance. It follows, moreover (by a trivial adaptation of the argument in Step 9 of the RSW analysis), that the high-risk agents must be over- or fully-insured ($w_{0H}^* \leq w_{1H}^*$). And since the equality leads to a situation examined in (iii) below, as before, we will examine only the case: $w_{0H}^* < w_{1H}^*$.

These two findings are sufficient to conclude further that neither of the two rationality constraints in (2) bind so that again $\gamma_h^* = 0$ for either h . Since either risk-type h is risk-averse, $\bar{u}_h < u(W - p_h d)$ (the corresponding argument having been made already in the preceding case for $h = H$ and being valid also for $h = L$). Moreover,

$$\begin{aligned} u(W - p_H d) &< u(W - p_L d) = u((1 - p_L) w_{0L}^* + p_L w_{1L}^* - (1 - p_L) a_0 - p_L a_1) \\ &< u(w_{0L}^*) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^*) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality follows from $p_H > p_L$ and non-satiation, the second is due to non-satiation, $a_0^*, a_1^* > 0$, and the fact that the low-risk agents are fully-insured, while the last inequality obtains by assumption since the high-risk incentive constraint is taken to be slack. Regarding the equalities, on the other hand, the first one follows from (20) for $h = L$ and the other two from the fact that the low-risk type gets full insurance.

In this case, therefore,

$$a_{0L}^* = d - a_{1L}^* \tag{31}$$

$$a_{1L}^* = (1 - p_L) d - \frac{(1 - \lambda)(p_H - p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1 - \lambda)p_H} a_0^* \tag{32}$$

- the latter equality due to the former and (22) - and the IIE solution is defined by (21), (23), (31)-(32), and the conditions

$$(1 - \mu) p_H (1 - p_H) [u'(w_{1H}^*) - u'(w_{0H}^*)] = \beta_L^* \begin{bmatrix} p_L (1 - p_H) u'(w_{1H}^*) \\ -p_H (1 - p_L) u'(w_{0H}^*) \end{bmatrix} \tag{33}$$

$$(1 - \lambda) (\mu + \beta_L^*) u'(w_{0L}^*) = \lambda \left[1 - \mu - \beta_L^* \left(\frac{1 - p_L}{1 - p_H} \right) \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) \tag{34}$$

$$U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) = u(w_{0L}^*)$$

giving again a unique solution for the seven unknowns: $a_0^*, a_1^*, a_{0L}^*, a_{1L}^*, a_{0H}^*, a_{1H}^*$, and β_L^* .

In addition, offering full insurance to the low-risk type and under-insurance to the high-risk, the present case necessitates that $\lambda > \mu$. Specifically, $w_{0H}^* < w_{1H}^*$ forces the binding incentive constraint of the low-risk into giving $u(w_{0L}^*) < u(w_{0H}^*)$. Hence, $u'(w_{0H}^*) < u'(w_{0L}^*)$ and, regarding the left-hand side of (34), we have

$$(1 - \lambda) (\mu + \beta_L^*) u'(w_{0L}^*) \geq (1 - \lambda) (\mu + \beta_L^*) u'(w_{0H}^*) > [\mu(1 - \lambda) - \lambda \beta_L^*] u'(w_{0H}^*)$$

Here, the last inequality is due to $\beta_L^*, u'(\cdot) > 0$ which, along with $p_H > p_L$, requires also that the right-hand side of (34) gives

$$\lambda \left[1 - \mu - \beta_L^* \left(\frac{1 - p_L}{1 - p_H} \right) \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) \leq \lambda (1 - \mu - \beta_L^*) u'(w_{0H}^*)$$

Observe now that $\lambda \leq \mu$ is equivalent to $\lambda(1 - \mu) \leq \mu(1 - \lambda)$. Clearly, (34) cannot hold if $\mu \geq \lambda$. To complete the presentation, it is trivial to check (using the same substitutions as before) that this case satisfies (26). An graphical example is given by the hypothetical equilibrium allocation in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 6.

(iii). *Both incentive constraints in (1) bind at the optimum.*³¹

Recall Step 5 in our RSW analysis. If both incentive constraints are binding, we ought to have $\mathbf{w}_L^* = \mathbf{w}_H^*$ so that the optimal menu involves a pooling contract \mathbf{a}^* . To specify it, observe that, taking $w_{sh}^* = w_s^*$ for $(s, h) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{L, H\}$, the first-order conditions read now

$$(\mu + \beta_L^* + \gamma_L^*) p_L (1 - p_L) [u'(w_1^*) - u'(w_0^*)] = \beta_H^* \begin{bmatrix} p_H (1 - p_L) u'(w_1^*) \\ -p_L (1 - p_H) u'(w_0^*) \end{bmatrix} \quad (35)$$

$$(1 - \mu + \beta_H^* + \gamma_H^*) p_H (1 - p_H) [u'(w_1^*) - u'(w_0^*)] = \beta_L^* \begin{bmatrix} p_L (1 - p_H) u'(w_1^*) \\ -p_H (1 - p_L) u'(w_0^*) \end{bmatrix} \quad (36)$$

$$\lambda \left[1 - \mu + \beta_H^* + \gamma_H^* - \beta_L^* \left(\frac{1 - p_L}{1 - p_H} \right) \right] = (1 - \lambda) \left[\mu + \beta_L^* + \gamma_L^* - \beta_H^* \left(\frac{1 - p_H}{1 - p_L} \right) \right] \quad (37)$$

the last equation because $u(\cdot)$ is everywhere strictly monotone. It is trivial, however, to verify that these three equations together give

$$(p_H - p_L) [\lambda \beta_L^* p_L + (1 - \lambda) \beta_H^* p_H] u'(w_1^*) = 0$$

Equivalently, $\lambda \beta_L^* p_L + (1 - \lambda) \beta_H^* p_H = 0$ which, each term of the sum on the left-hand side being non-negative, can be only if $\beta_L^* = \beta_H^* = 0$. Yet, the system (35)-(36) gives then

$$[(\mu + \gamma_L^*) (1 - p_L) + (1 - \mu + \gamma_H^*) (1 - p_H)] [u'(w_1^*) - u'(w_0^*)] = 0$$

³¹In this case, the inequality constraints that bind at the optimum are the two incentive constraints. The rank condition of the Khun-Tucker theorem requires now that the matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} (1 - p_L) u'(w_0^*) & p_L u'(w_1^*) & -(1 - p_L) u'(w_0^*) & -p_L u'(w_1^*) \\ -(1 - p_H) u'(w_0^*) & -p_H u'(w_1^*) & (1 - p_H) u'(w_0^*) & p_H u'(w_1^*) \\ -\lambda (1 - p_L) & -\lambda p_L & -(1 - \lambda) (1 - p_H) & -(1 - \lambda) p_H \end{bmatrix}$$

has rank at least 3. But this is indeed the case since the 3x3 submatrix formed by the first two and the last column is non-singular. By adding the second column to the first and the last, its determinant is the same as that of the matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} u'(w_0^*) & p_L u'(w_1^*) & 0 \\ -u'(w_0^*) & -p_H u'(w_1^*) & 0 \\ -\lambda & -\lambda p_L & -p_H - \lambda (p_H - p_L) \end{bmatrix}$$

which is given by $[p_H + \lambda (p_H - p_L)] (p_H - p_L) u'(w_0^*) u'(w_1^*) > 0$.

which (at least one term in the first sum on the left-hand side being strictly positive) cannot be unless $w_0^* = w_1^*$. The optimal pooling allocation must provide, hence, full insurance. That is, $a_0^* = d - a_1^*$, which along with (21), define a system of two equations in the two unknowns, a_0^* and a_1^* . Needless to say, as either risk-type gets full insurance, the corresponding arguments (in Cases (i) and (ii) for the high- and low-risk type, respectively) ensure that none of the rationality constraints in (2) bind at the optimum ($\gamma_h^* = 0$ for either h). To complete the analysis, notice also that, by $\beta_L^* = \beta_H^* = 0$ and (37), it can only be $\lambda = \mu$. \square

The preceding analysis leads to a complete characterization of the IIE allocations. Specifically, given the relation between the parameters λ and μ of the IIE problem, the contrapositive of each of our closing observations in each of the Cases (i)-(iii) above leaves one of them as the unique possibility. For instance, if $\lambda < \mu$, our analysis rules out Cases (ii)-(iii), leaving Case (i) as uniquely relevant. The following claim then is immediate.

Claim 1 *The solution to the IIE problem is uniquely determined by (21)-(23) as well as*

1. $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$, $w_{0H}^* = w_{1H}^*$, and (29)-(30) if $\lambda < \mu$.
2. $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*)$, $w_{0L}^* = w_{1L}^*$, and (33)-(34) if $\lambda > \mu$.
3. $\mathbf{w}_L^* = \mathbf{w}_H^* = \mathbf{w}^*$ with $w_0^* = w_1^*$ if $\lambda = \mu$.

B.2.1 Properties of the Pareto-frontier

Lemma 4 *In the IIE(μ) problem just analyzed, express the solution as a function of the weight on the welfare of the low-risk type, $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*(\mu), \mathbf{w}_H^*(\mu)\}$, so that the value function $V : [0, 1] \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ may be written as $V(\mu) = \mu U_L(\mu) + (1 - \mu) U_H(\mu)$. Let also $\mu_1, \mu_2 \in [0, 1]$ with $\mu_1 \neq \mu_2$. Then,*

$$(\mu_1 - \mu_2) [U_L(\mu_1) - U_L(\mu_2)] > 0 > (\mu_1 - \mu_2) [U_H(\mu_1) - U_H(\mu_2)]$$

Proof. Recall that the IIE(μ) allocation is unique at every $\mu \in [0, 1]$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_1 [U_L(\mu_1) - U_L(\mu_2)] + (1 - \mu_1) [U_H(\mu_1) - U_H(\mu_2)] &> 0 \\ \mu_2 [U_L(\mu_2) - U_L(\mu_1)] + (1 - \mu_2) [U_H(\mu_2) - U_H(\mu_1)] &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

which gives

$$(\mu_1 - \mu_2) [U_L(\mu_1) - U_L(\mu_2) - (U_H(\mu_1) - U_H(\mu_2))] > 0$$

Hence, $\mu_1 > \mu_2$ requires that $U_L(\mu_1) - U_L(\mu_2) > U_H(\mu_1) - U_H(\mu_2)$. Observe, however, two things. First, given that μ_1 and μ_2 are both non-negative and at least one strictly positive, neither of the quantities on either side of this inequality may be zero (otherwise, at least one of the initial two inequalities above is violated). Moreover, since both allocations are Pareto-optimal, the two quantities cannot be of the same sign. Clearly, the larger one cannot but be positive. The result follows. \blacksquare

In the IIE(μ) problem, the objective function $\mu U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) + (1 - \mu) U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)$ is linear in the weight μ , for any given allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L, \mathbf{w}_H\}$. By part (i) then of the following result, $V(\cdot)$ is convex.

Claim 2 For $n, m \in \mathbb{N}^*$, let $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\mathcal{M} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ be, respectively, independent sets of choice and parameter vectors such that the problem $\max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}} f(\mathbf{x}, \mu)$ is well-defined for the function $f : \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{M} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$.³² Let also $V : \mathcal{M} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ be the associated value function $V(\mu) = \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}} f(\mathbf{x}, \mu)$ and consider the notation $\mu^k = k\mu' + (1-k)\mu''$ for $\mu', \mu'' \in \mathcal{M}$ and $k \in [0, 1]$.

Suppose that \mathcal{M} is convex. If $f(\mathbf{x}, \cdot)$ is (strictly) convex $\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}$, then V is (strictly) convex.

Proof. In what follows, given an arbitrary $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, $\mathbf{x}(\mu)$ denotes an optimal point for the optimization problem at hand while $k \in [0, 1]$ is arbitrary. Let $\mu', \mu'' \in \mathcal{M}$. As also $\mu^k \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} V(\mu^k) = f(\mathbf{x}(\mu^k), \mu^k) &\leq kf(\mathbf{x}(\mu^k), \mu') + (1-k)f(\mathbf{x}(\mu^k), \mu'') \\ &\leq kf(\mathbf{x}(\mu'), \mu') + (1-k)f(\mathbf{x}(\mu''), \mu'') \\ &= kV(\mu') + (1-k)V(\mu'') \end{aligned}$$

The first inequality is due to $f(\mathbf{x}(\mu^k), \cdot)$ being convex (and it is strict when the function is strictly so). The second inequality results from the optimality of $\mathbf{x}(\mu')$ and $\mathbf{x}(\mu'')$. ■

B.3 Conditions for IIE-RSW Equivalence

To complete our investigation of the two efficiency criteria, we establish first a condition that strengthens the IIE criterion into being RSW. As the latter admits as solution a separating allocation which fully-insures the high-risk type and under-insures the low-risk one, Claim 1 restricts our search to the case $\lambda < \mu$.

Sufficiency. Our analysis of the IIE problem was in terms of the a_{1h} components of the menu of contracts at hand. Here, it will be more instructive to employ instead the a_{0h} components. Given (22)-(23), the constraints of the IIE problem can be re-written now as (1)-(2), (18), and

$$\begin{aligned} w_{0L} &= W - a_{0L} \\ w_{1L} &= W - d + \frac{1}{p_L} \left[(1-p_L)a_{0L} - \frac{(1-\lambda)(p_H-p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0 \right] \\ w_{0H} &= W - a_{0H} \\ w_{1H} &= W - d + \frac{1}{p_H} \left[(1-p_H)a_{0H} + \frac{\lambda(p_H-p_L)}{\lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H} a_0 \right] \end{aligned}$$

The Khun-Tucker first-order conditions are as before but for the fact that (24) is replaced by

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda \left(1 - \mu + \beta_H^* - \frac{\beta_L^* p_L}{p_H} \right) u'(w_{1H}^*) &- \\ (1-\lambda) \left(\mu + \beta_L^* - \frac{\beta_H^* p_H}{p_L} \right) u'(w_{1L}^*) &= -\frac{\beta^* \bar{p}}{p_H - p_L} \end{aligned}$$

³²The sets \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{M} being independent is meant to say that, in the given optimization problem, none of the parameters enters the constraints.

As, though, only Case (i) of our IIE analysis is relevant here, we ought to have $w_{0H}^* = w_{1H}^*$, $\beta_L^* = 0$, and $\gamma_h^* = 0$ for either h . Thus, the last equation above reads

$$(1 - \lambda) \left(\mu - \frac{\beta_H^* p_H}{p_L} \right) u'(w_{1L}^*) - \lambda(1 - \mu + \beta_H^*) u'(w_{0H}^*) = \frac{\beta^* \bar{p}}{p_H - p_L}$$

and multiplying both sides by $A = p_H(1 - p_L)u'(w_{1L}^*) - p_L(1 - p_H)u'(w_{0L}^*)$ gives, under (29),

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\beta^* A \bar{p}}{p_H - p_L} &= (1 - \lambda) \left[\begin{array}{c} \mu [p_H(1 - p_L)u'(w_{1L}^*) - p_L(1 - p_H)u'(w_{0L}^*)] \\ -\mu p_H(1 - p_L)[u'(w_{1L}^*) - u'(w_{0L}^*)] \end{array} \right] u'(w_{1L}^*) \\ &\quad - \lambda \left[\begin{array}{c} (1 - \mu)[p_H(1 - p_L)u'(w_{1L}^*) - p_L(1 - p_H)u'(w_{0L}^*)] \\ +\mu p_L(1 - p_L)[u'(w_{1L}^*) - u'(w_{0L}^*)] \end{array} \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) \\ &= (1 - \lambda) \mu (p_H - p_L) u'(w_{1L}^*) u'(w_{0L}^*) \\ &\quad - \lambda \left[\begin{array}{c} (1 - \mu)(p_H - p_L)u'(w_{1L}^*) \\ +p_L[1 - \mu p_L - (1 - \mu)p_H][u'(w_{1L}^*) - u'(w_{0L}^*)] \end{array} \right] u'(w_{0H}^*) \end{aligned}$$

Recall, though, that $w_{1L}^* < w_{0L}^*$ in this case. By risk-aversion ($u''(\cdot) < 0$), $p_H > p_L$ and strict monotonicity ($u'(\cdot) > 0$), it follows then that $A > (p_H - p_L)u'(w_{0L}^*) > 0$. Hence, $\beta^* \geq 0$ iff

$$\begin{aligned} &\lambda p_L [1 - \mu p_L - (1 - \mu)p_H] [u'(w_{1L}^*) - u'(w_{0L}^*)] u'(w_{0H}^*) \\ &\leq [\mu(1 - \lambda)u'(w_{0L}^*) - (1 - \mu)\lambda u'(w_{0H}^*)] (p_H - p_L) u'(w_{1L}^*) \end{aligned}$$

If this inequality is strict at the IIE optimum, $\beta^* > 0$. But then, by complementary slackness, the constraint $a_0^* \geq 0$ must bind and, thus, the IIE and RSW problems coincide. In other words,

$$\begin{aligned} &\lambda p_L [1 - \mu p_L - (1 - \mu)p_H] [u'(w_{1L}^{**}) - u'(w_{0L}^{**})] u'(w_{0H}^{**}) \\ &< [\mu(1 - \lambda)u'(w_{0L}^{**}) - (1 - \mu)\lambda u'(w_{0H}^{**})] (p_H - p_L) u'(w_{1L}^{**}) \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

is a sufficient condition for the RSW allocation to be IIE. Observe, however that this can be re-written as follows

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &< (\mu(1 - \lambda)(p_H - p_L)u'(w_{1L}^{**}) + \lambda p_L [1 - \mu p_L - (1 - \mu)p_H] u'(w_{0H}^{**})) u'(w_{0L}^{**}) \\ &\quad - [\lambda p_L(1 - p_H) + \lambda(p_H - p_L)(1 - \mu + \mu p_L)] u'(w_{1L}^{**}) u'(w_{0H}^{**}) \end{aligned}$$

whose right-hand side has the following partial derivative w.r.t. μ

$$(\lambda(1 - p_L)u'(w_{1L}^{**})u'(w_{0H}^{**}) + [(1 - \lambda)u'(w_{1L}^{**}) + \lambda p_L u'(w_{0H}^{**})]) (p_H - p_L) u'(w_{0L}^{**}) > 0$$

Clearly, the RSW allocation cannot be IIE unless it is so for $\mu = 1$.³³

³³For $\mu = 1$, in fact, (38) becomes condition (4) in Rothschild and Stiglitz [?] (see Section II.3, pp.643-45), the sufficient condition for the Rothchild-Stiglitz allocation to be efficient with respect to the optimal subsidy problem. Their analysis follows from ours under a change of variables. Specifically, set $\gamma = (1 - \lambda)/\lambda$ and $a = \lambda(p_H - p_L)a_0/\bar{p}$. Then, (27)-(28) give $a_{0H} = p_H d - a$. By (19)-(20), moreover, $(1 - p_L)a_{0L} - p_L a_{1L} = (1 - p_L)a_0 - p_L a_1 = (1 - \lambda)(p_H - p_L)a_0/\bar{p} = \gamma a$. Notice, however, that $(1 - p_L)a_{0L} - p_L a_{1L} = \gamma a$ is satisfied, for any $\tilde{a} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$, as long as $a_{0L} = p_L \tilde{a}/(1 - p_L) + \gamma a$ and $a_{1L} = \tilde{a} - \gamma a$. Even though their result is identical to ours in this case, the transformation of the IIE problem into their formulation is not one-to-one as \tilde{a} cannot be pinned down. By contrast, our approach is robust because, within the triplet $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H, \mathbf{a}\}$, any contract is uniquely defined given the other two (recall Step 1 in our IIE analysis).

Necessity. In what follows, we restrict attention to the collection of menus that deliver zero-profits across contracts and for which the incentive compatibility of the high-risk type binds:

$$A = \{(\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^4 : \lambda \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1 - \lambda) \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) = 0, U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H)\}$$

As it turns out, the RSW allocation is IIE(1) only if

$$\max_{(\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H) \in A} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) \leq U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}) \quad (39)$$

To establish the contrapositive of this claim, observe first that the relevant set A is non-empty: it includes the RSW allocation as well as the entire line FO_M^* . The latter observation implies that there is nothing to show if $\exists \mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}^* \succsim_L \mathbf{a}_L^{**}$ since the corresponding pooling allocation satisfies trivially the constraints of the IIE(1) problem but, as we have seen, fails to be optimal.

Let then $\mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^*$ be the solution to the problem

$$\min_{\mathbf{a} \in FO_M^*} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) - U_L(\mathbf{w})$$

and notice that \mathbf{w}^* cannot but be below the 45-degree line in the $\{w_0, w_1\}$ -space. Otherwise, $w_0^* \leq w_1^*$ implies that $I_L(\mathbf{a}^*) = \frac{(1-p_L)u'(w_0^*)}{p_L u'(w_1^*)} \geq \frac{1-p_L}{p_L} \geq \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}}$ and we may repeat the construction in Lemma 3 for $\kappa = \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}}$. This produces a contract $\mathbf{a}^0 = \mathbf{a}^* + \left(1, \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}}\right) \epsilon$, for some $\epsilon < 0$, which for $|\epsilon|$ sufficiently small, gives $\mathbf{a}^0 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^*$. Yet, this is absurd given the definition of \mathbf{a}^* because also $\mathbf{a}^0 \in FO_M^*$ (as pooling policy, it makes exactly the same profits as \mathbf{a}^*).

It can only be, therefore, $w_0^* > w_1^*$ and we may define $\epsilon_H = (1 - p_H)(w_0^* - w_1^*) > 0$ and $\epsilon_L > 0$ such that

$$u(w_1^* + \epsilon_H) = (1 - p_H) u\left(w_0^* - \frac{p_L \epsilon_L}{1 - p_L}\right) + p_H u(w_1^* + \epsilon_L)$$

Consider now the associated contracts $\mathbf{a}_h^0 = \mathbf{a}^* + \left(\frac{p_h}{1-p_h}, 1\right) \epsilon_h$ for $h \in \{L, H\}$. By construction, $w_{0H}^0 = w_0^* - \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1-p_H} = w_1^* + \epsilon_H = w_{1H}^0$ so that \mathbf{a}_H^0 offers full-insurance while $\mathbf{a}_H^0 \sim_H \mathbf{a}_L^0$. Needless to say, \mathbf{a}_H^0 is uniquely-defined whereas there might be, in general, two values for ϵ_L that solve its defining equation above and, thus, two pertinent contract points \mathbf{a}_L^0 . Setting, however, $\delta = \epsilon_L - \epsilon_H$, the equation reads

$$\begin{aligned} u(w_{1H}^0) &= (1 - p_H) u\left(w_0^* - \frac{p_L \epsilon_L}{1 - p_L}\right) + p_H u(w_1^* + \epsilon_L) \\ &= (1 - p_H) u\left(w_0^* - \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1 - p_H} + \left(\frac{p_H}{1 - p_H} - \frac{p_L}{1 - p_L}\right) \epsilon_H - \frac{p_L \delta}{1 - p_L}\right) \\ &\quad + p_H u(w_{1H}^0 + \delta) \\ &= (1 - p_H) u\left(w_{0H}^0 + \left(\frac{p_H}{1 - p_H} - \frac{p_L}{1 - p_L}\right) \epsilon_H - \frac{p_L \delta}{1 - p_L}\right) + p_H u(w_{1H}^0 + \delta) \end{aligned}$$

and, under strict monotonicity ($u'(\cdot) > 0$), it always admits a solution $\delta < 0$.³⁴

³⁴This is because, for $\delta < 0$, we have $w_{1H}^0 + \delta < w_{1H}^0 = w_{0H}^0$ while $\left(\frac{p_H}{1-p_H} - \frac{p_L}{1-p_L}\right) \epsilon_H - \frac{p_L \delta}{1-p_L} > \left(\frac{p_H}{1-p_H} - \frac{p_L}{1-p_L}\right) \epsilon_H > 0$. By contrast, if $\delta > 0$, $w_{1H}^0 + \delta > w_{1H}^0 = w_{0H}^0$ but the quantity adding to w_{0H}^0 is not necessarily negative.

We make take, hence, $\epsilon_L < \epsilon_H$. As a consequence, $\frac{p_L \epsilon_L}{1-p_L} < \frac{p_H \epsilon_L}{1-p_H} < \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1-p_H}$ so that \mathbf{a}_L^0 offers less insurance than \mathbf{a}_H^0 in the case of an accident in exchange for a smaller premium. Which suffices, in turn, for either contract to be strictly preferred to the pooling policy by the respective type ($\mathbf{a}_h^0 \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$). This follows immediately from Lemma 2(ii.a) since \mathbf{a}_H^0 and \mathbf{a}_L^0 offer, respectively, full and under-insurance. Indeed, $w_{0H}^0 = w_{1H}^0$ by the definition of ϵ_H while $w_{0L}^0 = w_0^* - \frac{p_L \epsilon_L}{1-p_L} > w_0^* - \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1-p_H} = w_{0H}^0 = w_{1H}^0 = w_1^* + \epsilon_H > w_1^* + \epsilon_L = w_{1L}^0$.

Observe now that, as constructed, the menu corresponds uniquely to the pooling contract and is an element of A . Since $\mathbf{a}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbf{a} \in FO_M^*} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**}) - U_L(\mathbf{w})$, therefore, it must be $\mathbf{a}_L^0 = \arg \max_{(\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H) \in A} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})$.³⁵ By hypothesis then, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^{**})$. Yet, $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ is separating and, as $\mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^*$, breaks even across its contracts. It does meet, in other words, the constraints of the IIE(1) problem. Clearly, the RSW allocation cannot be the IIE(1) one.

C Results in the Text

C.1 Equilibrium in the Two-stage Game

C.1.1 Profitable deviations against pooling policies

Recall the proof of Lemma 3. We may consider the contract $\mathbf{a}_L^1 = \mathbf{a}^* + (1, \kappa)\epsilon$ for some $\kappa \in (I_H(\mathbf{a}^*), I_L(\mathbf{a}^*))$ and $\epsilon < 0$. This might be any point in the interior of the shaded area in the left-hand side diagrams of Figures 1-2 or of the lower-right shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of the latter. Small enough $|\epsilon|$ gives $\mathbf{a}_L^1 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^1$. Hence, in the presence of \mathbf{a}^* , the new contract attracts only the low-risk customers. And by doing so, it delivers profits

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^1) &= (1-p_L)(a_0 + \epsilon) - p_L(a_1 + \kappa\epsilon) = \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}^*) + [1-p_L(1+\kappa)]\epsilon \\ &= \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) + [\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}^*) - \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*)] + [1-p_L(1+\kappa)]\epsilon \end{aligned}$$

But $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}^*) > \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*)$ and, thus, $1+\kappa > \frac{1}{p_L}(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}[\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}^*) - \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*)])$ if $|\epsilon|$ is sufficiently small. Equivalently, $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^1) > \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) \geq 0$, the last inequality due to \mathbf{a}^* being an equilibrium, hence, an admissible policy. Clearly, \mathbf{a}_L^1 is a profitable deviation. \square

Other possible deviations/ Deviations against the Wilson policy

In constructing the deviation above, we could have taken also $\kappa \in (0, I_H(\mathbf{a}^*))$. In this case, the preceding analysis regarding the welfare of the low-risk agents would apply also for the high-risk ones so that the new contract, say $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$, would attract both risk-types away from \mathbf{a}^* ($\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ for either h). Another possibility would be to choose $\epsilon > 0$. As long as $\kappa \in (-\infty, I_H(\mathbf{a}^*))$, however, this corresponds to a meaningless deviation. The new contract would give $U_h(\hat{\mathbf{w}}) - U_h(\mathbf{w}^*) < 0$ for either h , and no agent would be tempted away from \mathbf{a}^* . In fact, to tempt the low-risk type

³⁵This is trivial to verify. The first-order conditions of the maximization problem are obtained by those of the IIE(1) problem. One keeps only (1) for $h = H$ as equality, (5)-(8), and (24), setting $\gamma_h^* = 0$ for either h and $\beta_L^* = 0$. The claim follows from the fact that $\frac{\partial w_{0L}}{\partial a_0} < 0$.

away from \mathbf{a}^* when $\epsilon > 0$, it must be $\kappa > I_L(\mathbf{a}^*)$. In this case, we have again $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ for either h . Observe now that, as a pooling policy, the contract $\hat{\mathbf{a}} = (a_0^* + \epsilon, a_1^* + k\epsilon)$ expects profits

$$\Pi_M(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) = (1 - \bar{p})(a_0^* + \epsilon) - \bar{p}(a_1^* + k\epsilon) = \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) + [1 - \bar{p}(1 + k)]\epsilon$$

If $\mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^*$, therefore, the deviation is profitable if and only if $(\kappa - \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}})\epsilon < 0$. Equivalently, as long as $\kappa \in (\frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}}, I_H(\mathbf{a}^*))$ for the first construction of $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ in the preceding paragraph or $\kappa \in (I_L(\mathbf{a}^*), \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}})$ for the second. Graphically, these are shown, respectively, by points in the interior of the shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 1 and of the upper-left shaded area in the right-hand side of Figure 2.

To exhaust the potentially-profitable deviation scenarios, notice that $\epsilon, \kappa < 0$ implies $\Pi_M(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) < \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*)$. There is no way for this deviation to be profitable if $\mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^*$.

To complete our analysis, suppose finally that $\mathbf{a}^* = \mathbf{a}^W$, the Wilson contract. As now $I_L(\mathbf{a}^*) = \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}}$, it follows that $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$, in either of its two viable constructions above, cannot be profitable. Against the Wilson policy, a profitable deviation scenario consists necessarily of introducing a contract \mathbf{a}_L^1 . This is shown by the interior of the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 2.

C.1.2 Profitable deviations against separating policies

Let $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ be an equilibrium separating policy and recall again the proof of Lemma 3. If $\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h) = \delta > 0$ for some h , we would have

$$\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h^0) = (1 - p_h)(a_{0h} + \epsilon) - p_h(a_{1h} + \kappa\epsilon) = \Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h) + [1 - p_h(1 + \kappa)]\epsilon = \delta + [1 - p_h(1 + \kappa)]\epsilon$$

and sufficiently small $|\epsilon|$ ensures that $|1 - p_h(1 + \kappa)||\epsilon| < \delta$; i.e., $\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h^0) > 0$. In this case, offering the contracts \mathbf{a}_h^0 and $\mathbf{a}_{h' \neq h}$ constitutes a separating policy that attracts at least the type- h agents away from $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ and makes strictly positive profits. Which is, of course, absurd given that the latter policy is supposed to be an equilibrium one.

Suppose now that $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\} \neq \{\mathbf{a}_L^*, \mathbf{a}_H^*\}$. We know that \mathbf{w}_H^* is optimal for the RSW problem with $\mu = 0$ and uniquely so (since its objective function $U_H(\cdot)$ is strictly concave). Hence, it must be $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) > U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) \geq U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)$, the latter inequality due to the fact that $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ is an equilibrium policy and, thus, incentive compatible for the high-risk agents.

Define then $\Delta_H = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)$. Let also $\mathbf{a}_L^2 = \mathbf{a}_L + (\kappa, 1)\epsilon$ for some $\kappa, \epsilon > 0$ (see the left-hand side diagram of Figure 3). For either risk-type h , the corresponding income allocation is $\mathbf{w}_L^2 = (w_{0L}^2, w_{1L}^2) = (w_{0L} - \kappa\epsilon, w_{1L} + \epsilon)$ and Lemma 2(i) gives

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}_L^2) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_L) &= [p_h u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_h) - \kappa(1 - p_h)u'(w_{0L} - \kappa\tilde{\epsilon}_h)]\epsilon \\ &= [\kappa^{-1} - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L + (\kappa, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}_h)]p_h u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_h)\kappa\epsilon \quad \text{for some } \tilde{\epsilon}_h \in (0, \epsilon) \end{aligned}$$

Suppose first that $w_{0L} > w_{1L}$. Then, $u'(w_{0L}) < u'(w_{1L})$ by risk-aversion and we may choose $\kappa \in (\frac{p_L}{1-p_L}, \frac{p_L u'(w_{1L})}{(1-p_L)u'(w_{0L})})$. But $\kappa^{-1} > I_L(\mathbf{a}_L) > I_H(\mathbf{a}_L)$ and, thus, we may define $\Delta = \kappa^{-1} - I_L(\mathbf{a}_L)$.

By the continuity then of the function $I_h(\cdot)$, choosing ϵ (and, subsequently, $\tilde{\epsilon}_h$) sufficiently small, ensures that $|I_h(\mathbf{a}_L + (\kappa, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}_h) - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L)| < \Delta$ for either h . Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}_L^2) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_L) &= [\Delta + I_L(\mathbf{a}_L) - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L + (\kappa, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}_h)] p_h u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_h) \kappa \epsilon \\ &\geq [\Delta + I_h(\mathbf{a}_L) - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L + (\kappa, 1)\tilde{\epsilon}_h)] p_h u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_h) \kappa \epsilon > 0 \end{aligned}$$

or $\mathbf{a}_L^2 \succ_h \mathbf{a}_L$ for either h . Regarding the high-risk agents, however, observe also that

$$\begin{aligned} U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^2) &= U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) - [U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^2) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L)] \\ &= \Delta_H - [\kappa^{-1} - I_H(\mathbf{a}_L + (\kappa, 1)\tilde{\epsilon})] p_H u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_H) \kappa \epsilon \\ &> \Delta_H - p_H u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_H) \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

Yet, $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} p_H u'(w_{1L} + \tilde{\epsilon}_H) \epsilon = 0$ and a sufficiently small ϵ ensures that $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) > U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^2)$, completing the argument in this case. For the policy $\{\mathbf{a}_L^2, \mathbf{a}_H^*\}$ is strictly sorting ($\mathbf{a}_L^2 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^2$) and attracts either risk-type away from $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$. More importantly, by doing so, becomes a profitable deviation because $\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^*) = 0$ while

$$\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^2) = \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) + (1 - p_L)\epsilon_0 - p_L\epsilon_1 = [\kappa(1 - p_L) - p_L]\epsilon_1 > 0$$

If $w_{0L} < w_{1L}$, on the other hand, our reasoning applies for some $\kappa \in \left(\frac{p_L u'(w_{1L})}{(1-p_L)u'(w_{0L})}, \frac{p_L}{1-p_L}\right)$ and a sufficiently small, in absolute terms, $\epsilon < 0$ (see the right-hand side diagram of Figure 3). To complete the proof, observe that the case $w_{0L} = w_{1L}$ is not possible. This is because, since $\Pi_h(\mathbf{a}_h) = 0$ for either h , the argument in Step 1 of our RSW analysis would apply, contradicting then that $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ is incentive compatible for the high-risk type.

C.1.3 Non-existence of equilibrium

Let $\mathbf{a}^2 \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ be s.t. $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^2) \geq 0$ and $\mathbf{a}^2 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^*$. If $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^2) = \epsilon > 0$, the contract $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{a}^2 - (1, -1)\epsilon$ is such that $\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}) = \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^2) - \epsilon = 0$ and $\mathbf{a} \succ_h \mathbf{a}^2$ by either h (it offers more income in either state of the world). It is without loss of generality, therefore, to suppose that $\mathbf{a}^2 \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}^2 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^*$. Since the low-risk individual-rationality constraint does not bind at the RSW allocation, we also have $\mathbf{a}^2 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^* \succ_L \mathbf{0}$, the latter contract corresponding to the endowment point (also on FO_M^*). By the continuity of the preference relation \succ_L , therefore, there must exist a convex combination of \mathbf{a}^2 and $\mathbf{0}$ such that the low-risk type is indifferent between this new point and her RS contract.³⁶ That is, $\exists \mathbf{a}^1 \in FO_M^* : \mathbf{a}^1 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_L^*$.

Of course, $\mathbf{a}^1 = \pi \mathbf{a}^2$ for some $\pi \in (0, 1)$. Hence, $a_1^2 > a_1^1$ which means that we ought to have $\mathbf{a}^1 = \mathbf{a}^2 - \left(\frac{\bar{p}}{1-\bar{p}}, 1\right)\epsilon$ for some $\epsilon > 0$. For the corresponding income points Lemma 2(i) gives

$$U_L(\mathbf{w}^2) - U_L(\mathbf{w}^1) = \left[p_L u'(w_1^1 + \epsilon') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_L)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\epsilon'}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \epsilon$$

³⁶Recall that there is a one-to-one relation between contract and income points. The continuity of the relation \succ_L derives from continuous preferences over lotteries on wealth vectors. Given this, the existence of the wealth vector in question (and, thus, of the corresponding contract) is a standard result to be found in textbook derivations of the expected utility theorem. See, for instance, Step 3 of Proposition 6.B.3 in Mas-Collel A., Whinston M.D., and J.R. Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford University Press (1995).

for some $\epsilon' \in (0, \epsilon)$. Notice also that the allocation $\mathbf{w}' = \mathbf{w}^1 + \left(-\frac{\bar{p}}{1-\bar{p}}, 1\right) \epsilon'$ corresponds to the contract $\mathbf{a}' = \mathbf{a}^1 + \left(\frac{\bar{p}}{1-\bar{p}}, 1\right) \epsilon'$ which is also on FO_M^* .

Now, since $\mathbf{a}^2 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^1$, it must be $\frac{\bar{p}}{1-\bar{p}} < \frac{p_L u'(w_1')}{(1-p_L)u'(w_0')}$ and we may consider another contract $\mathbf{a}^3 = \mathbf{a}' + (\kappa, 1) \varepsilon$ with $\kappa \in \left(\frac{\bar{p}}{1-\bar{p}}, \frac{p_L u'(w_1')}{(1-p_L)u'(w_0')} and $\varepsilon > 0$ (Figure 4). As a pooling policy, this gives$

$$\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^3) = \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}') + [\kappa(1-\bar{p}) - \bar{p}] \varepsilon = [\kappa(1-\bar{p}) - \bar{p}] \varepsilon > 0$$

the second equality since $\mathbf{a}' \in FO_M^*$. For either h , moreover, applying again Lemma 2(i) successively gives

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}^3) - U_h(\mathbf{w}^1) &= U_h(\mathbf{w}^3) - U_h(\mathbf{w}') + U_h(\mathbf{w}') - U_h(\mathbf{w}^1) \\ &= [p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon') - \kappa(1-p_h)u'(w_0' - \kappa\varepsilon')] \varepsilon \\ &\quad + \left[p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon'') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_h)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\varepsilon''}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \varepsilon' \\ &= [\kappa^{-1} - I_h(\mathbf{a}' + (\kappa, 1)\varepsilon')] p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon') \kappa \varepsilon \\ &\quad + \left[p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon'') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_h)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\varepsilon''}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \varepsilon' \end{aligned}$$

for some $(\varepsilon', \varepsilon'') \in (0, \varepsilon) \times (0, \varepsilon')$. Yet, $\kappa^{-1} > I_L(\mathbf{a}') > I_H(\mathbf{a}')$ and, letting $\Delta = \kappa^{-1} - I_L(\mathbf{a}')$, we may choose ε (and, subsequently, ε') sufficiently small to guarantee that $|I_h(\mathbf{a}' + (\kappa, 1)\varepsilon') - I_h(\mathbf{a}')| < \Delta$ for either h . But then

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}^3) - U_h(\mathbf{w}^1) &= [\Delta + I_L(\mathbf{a}') - I_h(\mathbf{a}' + (\kappa, 1)\varepsilon')] p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon') \kappa \varepsilon \\ &\quad + \left[p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon'') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_h)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\varepsilon''}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \varepsilon' \\ &> \left[p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon'') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_h)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\varepsilon''}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \varepsilon' \\ &> \left[p_h u'(w_1' + \varepsilon') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_h)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\varepsilon'}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \varepsilon' \\ &\geq \left[p_L u'(w_1' + \varepsilon') - \frac{\bar{p}(1-p_L)}{1-\bar{p}} u' \left(w_0^1 - \frac{\bar{p}\varepsilon'}{1-\bar{p}} \right) \right] \varepsilon' \\ &= [U_L(\mathbf{w}^2) - U_L(\mathbf{w}^1)] \frac{\varepsilon'}{\varepsilon} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality follows from the fact that $\varepsilon'' < \varepsilon'$ while $u(\cdot)$ is strictly concave and the last one exploits that $p_H > p_L$.

Let now the contract \mathbf{a}^3 be offered in the presence of the RS policy. As $\mathbf{a}^3 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^1 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_L^* \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^*$ (the first two preferences by construction, the last one by the properties of the RSW allocation), the low-risk type is pulled away. If $\mathbf{a}^3 \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^*$, this is also the case for the high-risk type so that \mathbf{a}^3 becomes a pooling policy, a strictly profitable one. Otherwise, the deviant contract attracts only the low-risk type, delivering even higher expected profits.³⁷ In either case, it is a strictly profitable deviation against the RS policy.

³⁷As $p_L < \bar{p} < p_H$, an arbitrary contract gives $\Pi_L(\mathbf{a}) \geq \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}) \geq \Pi_H(\mathbf{a})$, with either inequality strict unless $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}$.

C.2 The Standard Three-stage Game

C.2.1 Deviations above FO_M^*

We will show that the following is a sequential equilibrium scenario. Both the equilibrium and the deviant policies get withdrawn at stage 3. Being then indifferent between applying for either policy, an agent of risk-type h applies for the former with probability

$$\sigma_h \in [0, 1) : \quad 1 \leq \frac{1 - \sigma_L}{1 - \sigma_H} \leq \hat{\lambda}^* \quad \text{where } \hat{\lambda}^* = \frac{1 - \hat{p}^*}{\hat{p}^*} \quad (40)$$

To support this, consider a sequence of trembles $\{q_L^k, q_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (0, 1 - \sigma_h)^2$ such that $(q_L^k, q_H^k) \rightarrow (0, 0)$. The intended interpretation is that, along the sequence, an agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant contracts with probability $\sigma_h^k = \sigma_h + q_h^k$ and $1 - \sigma_h^k$, respectively. This is depicted in Figure 8 where the firm's two available end-actions, to honor or withdraw its offer, are given as NW and W, respectively, while its conditional belief as a deviant at the upper node of its information set is by $\frac{\lambda(1 - \sigma_L^k)}{\lambda(1 - \sigma_L^k) + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \sigma_H^k)}$. Hence, throughout the deviant information set, the average accident probability is $\hat{p}_k = \frac{\lambda(1 - \sigma_L^k)p_L + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \sigma_H^k)p_H}{\lambda(1 - \sigma_L^k) + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \sigma_H^k)}$. Equivalently,

$$\frac{1 - \hat{p}_k}{\hat{p}_k} = \frac{\hat{\lambda}_k \lambda (1 - p_L) + (1 - \lambda) (1 - p_H)}{\hat{\lambda}_k \lambda p_L + (1 - \lambda) p_H} \quad \text{where } \hat{\lambda}_k = \frac{1 - \sigma_L^k}{1 - \sigma_H^k} \quad (41)$$

But $\frac{d}{d\hat{p}_k} \left(\frac{1 - \hat{p}_k}{\hat{p}_k} \right) < 0 < \frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{\lambda}_k} \left(\frac{1 - \hat{p}_k}{\hat{p}_k} \right) \forall \hat{p}_k, \hat{\lambda}_k \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ while $\frac{1 - \hat{p}_k}{\hat{p}_k} = \frac{1 - \bar{p}}{\bar{p}}$ for $\hat{\lambda}_k = 1$. These expressions apply also for \bar{p}_k , the average accident probability on the equilibrium information set, once $\hat{\lambda}_k$ is replaced by $\bar{\lambda}_k = \sigma_L^k / \sigma_H^k$.




Figure 8: The Signalling Subgame

Let now $q_L^k < q_H^k \forall k$ and observe that $\sigma_L^k = \sigma_L + q_L^k < \sigma_L + q_H^k \leq \sigma_H + q_H^k = \sigma_H^k$, the second inequality due to (40). That is, $\bar{\lambda}_k < 1$ or $\bar{p}_k > \bar{p}$ along the sequence and, being on FO_M^* , the equilibrium contract is loss-making as a pooling pooling and should get withdrawn at stage 3. If it is the RS policy, on the other hand, it cannot but break even and we may actually impose its withdrawal without loss of generality. Regarding the deviant policy, we have $\hat{\lambda} \equiv \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{\lambda}_k =$

$\frac{1-\sigma_L}{1-\sigma_H} \leq \hat{\lambda}^*$. Equivalently, $\hat{p} \equiv \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{p}_k \geq \hat{p}^*$ so that, taking a subsequence if necessary, this policy will not make profits and should be withdrawn as well.

To complete the analysis, some additional observations are in order. It is immediate from the above analysis that the scenario in question cannot be supported if the inequality (40) is violated. For $\frac{1-\sigma_L}{1-\sigma_H} < 1$ and $\frac{1-\sigma_L}{1-\sigma_H} > \hat{\lambda}^*$ require, respectively, that the equilibrium and the deviant contract are honored at stage 3. It is equally immediate, however, that the scenario can be supported for $\sigma_L = \sigma_H = 1$. One needs only to define $\sigma_h^k = 1 - r_h^k$, for vanishing trembles $\{r_L^k, r_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (0, 1)^2$ such that $r_L^k > r_H^k \forall k$.

Notice also that it is impossible to sustain a pooling equilibrium under a scenario in which the deviant policy is not withdrawn at stage 3. For this to happen, the deviant policy must be profitable. Being above FO_M^* , though, the maximum average accident probability that allows it to be profitable is $\hat{p}^* < \bar{p}$. Hence, the deviant is profitable only if $\hat{\lambda}^* > 1$. Equivalently, only if $\bar{\lambda} \equiv \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \bar{\lambda}_k < 1$ or $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \bar{p}_k > \bar{p}$. Yet, the equilibrium contract is on FO_M^* and this inequality forces it to make losses as a pooling policy and precipitates its withdrawal at stage 3. Anticipating this at stage 2, all agents cannot but apply for the deviant policy. But then, $\hat{p} = \bar{p}$ and the deviation delivers losses.

Other sequential equilibria

It remains to consider the scenario in which the deviant policy is withdrawn at stage 3, the equilibrium one is not, and it is strictly dominant for either risk-type to apply for the latter at stage 2 with probability one. As sequential equilibrium, this can be supported by a sequence of trembles $\{(r_L^k, r_H^k)\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (0, 1)^2$ such that $(r_L^k, r_H^k) \rightarrow (0, 0)$ and $r_L^k/r_H^k \rightarrow 0$. Along the sequence now, an agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant contracts with probability $1 - r_h^k$ and r_h^k , respectively, and the preceding formulae apply with $\sigma_h = 1$ and $q_h^k = -r_h^k$ for either h . Hence, $\hat{\lambda}_k = r_L^k/r_H^k \rightarrow 0$ and $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1-\hat{p}_k}{\hat{p}_k} = \frac{1-p_H}{p_H} \leq \frac{1-\hat{p}^*}{\hat{p}^*}$, the equality by (41) while the inequality due to the fact that $\Pi_H(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) \leq 0$ by (17) and, hence, $\hat{p}^* \leq p_H$. In other words, $\hat{p} \geq \hat{p}^*$ and, taking a subsequence if necessary, the deviant policy is not expected to be profitable and will be withdrawn at stage 3. Regarding the equilibrium policy, taking a further subsequence if necessary, $\hat{\lambda}_k < 1$ necessitates that $\bar{\lambda}_k > 1$ everywhere along the subsequence. Hence, $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \bar{p}_k \geq \bar{p}$ and the equilibrium contract is expected to be profitable and be honored at stage 3. If it is the RS policy, honoring it at stage 3 can be imposed without loss of generality.

C.2.2 Deviations on/below FO_M^*

The argument of the preceding paragraph can be applied again to support the second sequential equilibrium scenario. Notice, moreover, that there exist deviations below the line FO_M^* against which this is the *only* equilibrium. This follows immediately from two observations.

First, against a deviant contract $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ that lies below FO_M^* , no equilibrium scenario can have the equilibrium policy withdrawn at stage 3. For, in this case, as long as the deviant suppliers honor their policy, all agents of either risk-type cannot but apply for it at stage 2. Yet, the deviant contract lying below FO_M^* , it must be $\bar{p} < \hat{p}^*$ and, thus, $\Pi_M(\hat{\mathbf{a}}) > 0$. If the entire population of

agents, therefore, applies for $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$, the strategy of offering it at stage 1 and honoring it at stage 3 is indeed a profitable deviation.

Second, there are contracts such as $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ above which must be withdrawn at stage 3 in any sequential equilibrium scenario. To see this, recall first that, being susceptible to deviations such as $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$, the equilibrium policy \mathbf{a}^* cannot be the Wilson one. Hence, we can always choose $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ such that either (i) $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ for either risk-type h or (ii) $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \succ_L \mathbf{a}^* \succ_H \hat{\mathbf{a}}$.³⁸ Suppose now that $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ is honored at stage 3 on the equilibrium path. Anticipating this at stage 2, either (i) all agents of either risk-type or (ii) only the low-risk ones would find it strictly-dominant to apply for $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$. In each case, the beliefs of its suppliers is such that $\hat{p} \leq \bar{p} < \hat{p}^*$. As before, the strategy of offering $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ at stage 1 and honoring it at stage 3 would be a profitable deviation.

When the equilibrium policy is the RS one, these arguments remain valid (recall the analysis in Section C.1.3). The claim becomes now that, under no equilibrium scenario, \mathbf{a}_L^* may be withdrawn at stage 3. If it is, honoring their own policy becomes optimal for the deviant suppliers. And against these strategies, the low-risk agents would find it optimal to apply for the deviant contract so that again $\hat{p} \leq \bar{p} < \hat{p}^*$.

C.2.3 All equilibria, but the Wilson policy, are unstable

The equilibria in question are the RS policy and the contracts on FO_M^* that Pareto-dominate it, but for the Wilson one. All of them are subject to potentially-profitable deviations that lie below FO_M^* and do satisfy one of the cases (i)-(ii) in the preceding section. And against these deviations, any sequential equilibrium requires that the deviant policy is withdrawn at stage 3, the equilibrium one is not, and all agents apply at stage 2 for the latter with probability one. Moreover, this will have to be supported by some vanishing sequence of trembles $\{r_L^k, r_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (0, 1)^2$ along which an agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant policies with probability $\sigma_h^k = 1 - r_h^k$ and $1 - \sigma_h^k$, respectively (Section C.2.1).

Consider now a perturbation $\{\epsilon_h, \tilde{r}_h\}_{h=H,L} \in (0, 1)^4$. Under the equilibrium strategy profile in question, an agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant contracts in the perturbed game with probability $\tilde{\sigma}_h^k = (1 - \epsilon_h) \sigma_h^k + \epsilon_h \tilde{r}_h$ and $1 - \tilde{\sigma}_h^k$, respectively. To support this also on the perturbed game, the deviant contract has to be withdrawn at stage 3 at least in the limit.

As $r_H^k \rightarrow 0$, however, $\exists (n, k_n'') \in \mathbb{N}^2 \setminus \{(0, 0)\} : r_H^k < [4n(1 - \epsilon_H)]^{-1} \forall k > k_n''$. Letting, therefore, $k^* = \max\{k', k''\}$ while choosing $n \in (1, \infty)$ sufficiently large, $\epsilon_L(1 - \tilde{r}_L) = \hat{\lambda}^*/n$, and $\epsilon_H(1 - \tilde{r}_H) = (4n)^{-1}$, we get

$$\begin{aligned} 1 - \tilde{\sigma}_H^k &\equiv (1 - \epsilon_H) r_H^k + \epsilon_H (1 - \tilde{r}_H) < \frac{1}{4n} + \frac{1}{4n} = \frac{1}{2n} = \frac{\epsilon_L (1 - \tilde{r}_L)}{2\hat{\lambda}^*} \\ &< \frac{(1 - \epsilon_L) r_L^k + \epsilon_L (1 - \tilde{r}_L)}{2\hat{\lambda}^*} = \frac{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_L^k}{2\hat{\lambda}^*} \quad \forall k > k^* \end{aligned}$$

³⁸Examples of $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ were constructed in Section C.1.1. Graphically, case (i) is depicted by points in the interiors of the shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 1 or of the upper-left shaded area in the right-hand side of Figure 2. Case (ii) corresponds to points in the interior of the shaded area in the left-hand side of Figure 1 that lies below the line FO_M^* .

That is, $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{\lambda}_k \geq 2\hat{\lambda}^* > \hat{\lambda}^*$ or $\hat{p} < \hat{p}^*$. Hence, the deviant policy is believed to be profit-making and will not be withdrawn at stage 3, a contradiction of the desired sequential equilibrium scenario. To complete the argument, observe that the sequence of trembles we considered was arbitrary. It follows, therefore, that the desired scenario cannot be supported as sequential equilibrium. Notice also that, being free to choose the randomized profile $\{\tilde{r}_L, \tilde{r}_H\}$ arbitrarily, our construction allows the mixture $\{\epsilon_L, \epsilon_H\}$ to be arbitrarily close to the original game.

C.2.4 The Wilson policy is stable

Against the Wilson policy, a potentially-profitable deviation cannot but lie above the line FO_M^* . And against this, the sequential equilibrium scenario has both contracts withdrawn at stage 3. Being then indifferent between applying for either policy, an agent of risk-type h applies for the Wilson contract with probability $\sigma_h \in [0, 1)$ such that (40) is satisfied. We will show that this scenario can be supported also under perturbations as long as we restrict (40) to

$$1 < \frac{1 - \sigma_L}{1 - \sigma_H} < \frac{1 + \hat{\lambda}^*}{2} \quad (42)$$

Consider the sequence of trembles $\{q_L^k, q_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (0, 1 - \sigma_L) \times (0, 1 - \sigma_H)$, with $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} (q_L^k, q_H^k) = (0, 0)$ and $q_H^k > q_L^k$ for all k , along which an agent of risk-type h applies for the Wilson and the deviant contracts with probability $\sigma_h^k = \sigma_h + q_h^k$ and $1 - \sigma_h^k$, respectively. It suffices to establish that such trembles continue to support the given scenario even when the game undergoes an arbitrary perturbation. To this end, consider a randomized profile $(\tilde{q}_L, \tilde{q}_H) \in (0, 1)^2$ and the perturbation that arises under this profile and a mixture $(\epsilon_L, \epsilon_H) \in (0, \epsilon)^2$ with $\epsilon < \min \left\{ \frac{\sigma_H - \sigma_L}{2 + \sigma_H}, 1 - \sigma_H - \frac{1 + \sigma_H - 2\sigma_L}{\hat{\lambda}^*} \right\}$. Under this perturbation, and along the given sequence of trembles, an agent of risk-type h applies for the Wilson and the deviant contract with probability $\tilde{\sigma}_h^k = (1 - \epsilon_h)\sigma_h^k + \epsilon_h\tilde{q}_h$ and $1 - \tilde{\sigma}_h^k$, respectively.

To replicate the sequential equilibrium argument, it is enough that the two required conditions, for the Wilson and the deviant contract to be both withdrawn, are met. The former requirement is indeed satisfied since

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\sigma}_H^k &= (1 - \epsilon_H) \left(\sigma_H + q_H^k \right) + \epsilon_H \tilde{q}_H &>& (1 - \epsilon) \left(\sigma_H + q_H^k \right) + \epsilon_H \tilde{q}_H \\ &&>& (1 - \epsilon) \left(\sigma_H + q_H^k \right) \\ &&>& \sigma_L + q_L^k + \epsilon \\ &&>& (1 - \epsilon_L) \left(\sigma_L + q_L^k \right) + \epsilon \tilde{q}_L > (1 - \epsilon_L) \left(\sigma_L + q_L^k \right) + \epsilon_L \tilde{q}_L = \tilde{\sigma}_L^k \end{aligned}$$

Here, the first and last inequalities follow from the fact that $\epsilon_L, \epsilon_H < \epsilon$ whereas the second and the one before the last inequality use the boundedness conditions $\epsilon_H \tilde{q}_H > 0$ and $\tilde{q}_L < 1$, respectively. The remaining inequality uses the first upper bound of ϵ . Specifically, as $q_L^k < q_H^k < 1$, we have

$$\epsilon < \frac{\sigma_H - \sigma_L}{2 + \sigma_H} < \frac{\sigma_H - \sigma_L}{1 + \sigma_H + q_H^k} < \frac{\sigma_H + q_H^k - (\sigma_L + q_L^k)}{1 + \sigma_H + q_H^k}.$$

It remains to verify that the other required condition, for the deviant contract to be withdrawn, is also met. To this end, observe that, given our assumptions, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\epsilon_L \left(\sigma_L^k - \tilde{q}_L \right) &= \epsilon_L \left(\sigma_L + q_L^k - \tilde{q}_L \right) < \epsilon_L \left(\sigma_L + q_L^k \right) < \epsilon \left(\sigma_L + q_L^k \right) < \epsilon \left(\sigma_H + q_H^k \right) \\ &= \epsilon \sigma_H^k \\ &< \epsilon \left(1 + \sigma_H^k \right) < \sigma_H^k - \sigma_L^k\end{aligned}\quad (43)$$

where the third inequality uses that $\sigma_H > \sigma_L$ - by the left-hand side of (42) - and $q_H^k > q_L^k$ while the last inequality follows from $\epsilon < \frac{\sigma_H^k - \sigma_L^k}{1 + \sigma_H^k}$ (as established at the very end of the preceding paragraph). In addition,

$$1 - \sigma_H^k + \epsilon_H \left(\sigma_H^k - \tilde{q}_H \right) > 1 - \sigma_H^k - \epsilon_H \tilde{q}_H > 1 - \sigma_H^k - \epsilon \tilde{q}_H > 1 - \sigma_H^k - \epsilon \quad (44)$$

the first two inequalities following from $\epsilon_H \sigma_H > 0$ and $\epsilon_H < \epsilon$, respectively, while the last one using the fact that $\tilde{q}_H < 1$. Regarding the last quantity above, moreover, we have

$$1 - \sigma_H^k - \epsilon = 1 - \left(\sigma_H + q_H^k \right) - \epsilon > 1 - \sigma_H - \frac{1 - \sigma_L}{\hat{\lambda}^*} - \epsilon > 1 - \sigma_H - \frac{1 + \sigma_H - 2\sigma_L}{\hat{\lambda}^*} - \epsilon > 0 \quad (45)$$

Here, the first inequality obtains because, choosing a subsequence of $\{q_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ if necessary, we can guarantee that $q_H^k < \frac{1 - \sigma_L}{\hat{\lambda}^*}$ for all k . The second inequality, on the other hand, follows from $\sigma_H > \sigma_L$ while the last one uses the second upper bound of ϵ . Putting now the results (43)-(45) together, we get

$$\frac{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_L^k}{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_H^k} = \frac{1 - \sigma_L^k + \epsilon_L \left(\sigma_L^k - \tilde{q}_L \right)}{1 - \sigma_H^k + \epsilon_H \left(\sigma_H^k - \tilde{q}_H \right)} < \frac{1 + \sigma_H^k - 2\sigma_L^k}{1 - \sigma_H^k - \epsilon}$$

For the deviant contract to be withdrawn, it suffices that the last ratio above doesn't exceed $\hat{\lambda}^*$. Which is indeed the case, at least along a subsequence of $\{q_L^k, q_H^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$, since

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 + \sigma_H^k - 2\sigma_L^k}{1 - \sigma_H^k - \epsilon} = \frac{1 + \sigma_H - 2\sigma_L}{1 - \sigma_H - \epsilon} < \hat{\lambda}^*$$

by the second upper bound of ϵ . Observe finally that, as $\hat{\lambda}^* > 1$, (42) is indeed a restriction of (40). Moreover, either upper bound of ϵ is well-defined: they are both positive since $\sigma_H > \sigma_L$ while $1 + \sigma_H - 2\sigma_L < \hat{\lambda}^* (1 - \sigma_H)$ is in fact the right-hand side of (42). \square

The unstable parts

Let now $\frac{1 - \sigma_L}{1 - \sigma_H} \in \left(\frac{1 + \hat{\lambda}^*}{2}, \hat{\lambda}^* \right]$. In this case, $\frac{1 - \sigma_L}{1 - \sigma_H} = \frac{1 + \hat{\lambda}^* + \delta}{2}$ for some $\delta \in \left(0, \frac{\hat{\lambda}^* - 1}{2} \right]$, and we may consider the trembles $\tilde{q}_L = \sigma_H$, $\tilde{q}_H = \frac{1}{q} [(1 + q) \sigma_H - \sigma_L]$ for some $q \in \left(\frac{\sigma_H - \sigma_L}{1 - \sigma_H}, +\infty \right)$, and the mixtures $\epsilon_L = 1/n$ and $\epsilon_H = q/n^2$ for some $n \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$.³⁹ Then,

$$\begin{aligned}\epsilon_L \left(\sigma_L - \tilde{q}_L \right) - \hat{\lambda}^* \epsilon_H \left(\sigma_H - \tilde{q}_H \right) &= \left(\frac{\hat{\lambda}^*}{n^2} - \frac{1}{n} \right) \left(\sigma_H - \sigma_L \right) \\ &> \sigma_H - \sigma_L = \left(\hat{\lambda}^* + \delta \right) \left(1 - \sigma_H \right) - \left(1 - \sigma_L \right)\end{aligned}$$

³⁹Here, the lower bound on q is introduced to ensure that $\tilde{q}_H < 1$.

where the second equality is just another way of writing our initial condition while the inequality is due to the fact that $\hat{\lambda}^* > 1$ and, thus, $\hat{\lambda}^* > \frac{n+1}{n}$ as long as n is taken to be sufficiently large. Under this perturbation, therefore,

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_L^k}{1 - \tilde{\sigma}_H^k} = \frac{1 - \sigma_L + \epsilon_L (\sigma_L - \tilde{q}_L)}{1 - \sigma_H + \epsilon_H (\sigma_H - \tilde{q}_H)} > \hat{\lambda}^* + \frac{\delta(1 - \sigma_H)}{1 - \sigma_H + \epsilon_H (\sigma_H - \tilde{q}_H)} > \hat{\lambda}^*$$

which is the desired contradiction: at least along a subsequence, the deviant policy is believed to be strictly profitable and will not be withdrawn at stage 3.

With respect to the second equilibrium scenario given in Section C.2.1, recall that it had the deviant policy withdrawn at stage 3, the equilibrium policy honored, and all agents apply at stage 2 for the latter with probability one. We have already established, though, in Section C.2.3 that this is not stable. That argument applies also for the case in which the first scenario above obtains with either risk-type applying for the Wilson contract with probability one.

C.3 Subsidization across Contracts and Endogenous Commitment

C.3.1 The IIE(1) is the only possible equilibrium allocation

There are three cases to consider.

1. $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ is IIE(μ) optimal for some $\mu \in [\lambda, 1)$

Since $\mu < 1$, we can find another IIE allocation, say $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$, which solves the problem for some $\mu^0 \in (\mu, 1)$. Moving, of course, to the new allocation is strictly beneficial for the low-risk type, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$, but detrimental for the high-risk, $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*)$ (Lemma 4). As $\mu^0 > \mu \geq \lambda$, moreover, the low-risk incentive constraint is slack, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0)$, while the high-risk one binds, $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0)$ (recall Case 1 of the analysis that led to Claim 1). In addition, the high-risk agents ought to be fully-insured in either allocation: $w_{0H}^0 = w_{1H}^0$ and $w_{0H}^* = w_{1H}^*$ or $a_{0H}^* = d - a_{1H}^*$ and $a_{0H}^0 = d - a_{1H}^0$ for the corresponding contracts. Actually, the last two equations are equivalent to $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H^* - (-1, 1)\epsilon_H$ for some $\epsilon_H \in \mathbb{R}^*$. In fact, it must be $\epsilon_H > 0$ for otherwise $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H^* + (-1, 1)|\epsilon_H|$ and, by Lemma 2(i),

$$\begin{aligned} U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) &= [p_H u'(w_{1H}^0 + \tilde{\epsilon}_H) + (1 - p_H) u'(w_{0H}^0 + \tilde{\epsilon}_H)] |\epsilon_H| \\ &= u'(w_{0H}^0 + \tilde{\epsilon}_H) |\epsilon_H| \end{aligned}$$

for some $\tilde{\epsilon}_H \in (0, |\epsilon_H|)$; an absurd conclusion, however, since $\mathbf{a}_H^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^0$.

Putting these observations together, in this case, there exists a menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, defined by $\mathbf{a}_L^0 = \mathbf{a}_L^* - (\epsilon_{0L}, \epsilon_{1L})$ and $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H^* + (1, -1)\epsilon_H$ with $\epsilon_{0L}, \epsilon_{1L} \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\epsilon_H > 0$, which is IIE(μ^0) optimal for some $\mu^0 \in (\mu, 1]$ and satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) &\leq U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) < U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) \\ U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) &< U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \\ \lambda[(1 - p_L)\epsilon_{0L} - p_L\epsilon_{1L}] &= (1 - \lambda)\epsilon_H \end{aligned}$$

Here, at the new wealth allocation we have $\mathbf{w}_L^0 = (w_{0L}^* + \epsilon_{0L}, w_{1L}^* - \epsilon_{1L})$ and it follows that the only restriction $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$ places on ϵ_{0L} and ϵ_{1L} is that it cannot be $(\epsilon_{0L}, -\epsilon_{1L}) \leq \mathbf{0}$. Regarding the relations above that we haven't already explained, the last equality follows from the fact that both allocations are IIE and, thus, should deliver zero-profits overall. As a result, moving from the original to new allocation, the gain by making smaller losses from the high-risk type should be exactly offset by the fall in the profit collected from the low-risk one. The inequality $U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \leq U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$, on the other hand, is due to the fact that the original allocation is IIE and, thus, incentive compatible (for either risk-type). In fact, this inequality ought to be strict unless $\mu = \lambda$. Finally, the inequality $U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*)$ is due to the fact that, as established above, $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H^* - (-1, 1)\epsilon_H$ with $\epsilon_H > 0$ and, for some $\tilde{\epsilon}_L \in (0, \epsilon_H)$, Lemma 2(i) dictates that

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) &= [p_L u'(w_{1H}^0 - \tilde{\epsilon}_L) + (1 - p_L) u'(w_{0H}^0 - \tilde{\epsilon}_L)] \epsilon_H \\ &= u'(w_{0H}^0 - \tilde{\epsilon}_L) \epsilon_H > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Let now $\Delta = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$ and consider the contract $\mathbf{a}_L = \mathbf{a}_L^0 + (1, \kappa)\epsilon$ for some $\kappa \in (-\infty, I_H(\mathbf{a}_L^0))$ and $\epsilon > 0$. Let also $\Delta_h = I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0) - \kappa$ for $h = L, H$. Using Lemma 2(i) once again gives

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}_L) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_L^0) &= [p_h u'(w_{1L}^0 + \hat{\epsilon}_h) - \kappa^{-1} (1 - p_h) u'(w_{0L}^0 - \kappa^{-1} \hat{\epsilon}_h)] k \epsilon \\ &= \left[\kappa - \frac{(1 - p_h) u'(w_{0L}^0 - \kappa^{-1} \hat{\epsilon}_h)}{p_h u'(w_{1L}^0 + \hat{\epsilon}_h)} \right] p_h u'(w_{1L}^0 + \hat{\epsilon}_h) \epsilon \\ &= [\kappa - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0 + (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h)] p_h u'(w_{1L}^0 + \hat{\epsilon}_h) \epsilon \\ &= [I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0) - \Delta_h - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0 - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h)] p_h u'(w_{1L}^0 + \hat{\epsilon}_h) \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

for some $\hat{\epsilon}_h \in (0, \kappa\epsilon)$. Yet, the function $I_h(\cdot)$ is continuous and $\lim_{\hat{\epsilon}_h \rightarrow 0} I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0 + (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h) = I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0)$. For small enough ϵ (and, subsequently, $\hat{\epsilon}_h$), therefore, $|I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0 + (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h) - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0)| < \min\{\Delta_L, \Delta_H\}$ and, consequently, $U_h(\mathbf{w}_L) < U_h(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ for either h . With respect to the low-risk type, however, observe that the last quantity above vanishes as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$. Consequently, for sufficiently small ϵ , we can guarantee that $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) \in (-\Delta, 0)$ or $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$.

Hence, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0)$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*)$. The menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ is separating and such that $\mathbf{a}_L \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^*$ but $\mathbf{a}_H^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H^0$. Its introduction would attract the low-risk type away from $\{\mathbf{a}_L^*, \mathbf{a}_H^*\}$, leaving the latter policy with only high-risk customers and, thus, rendering it loss-making and forcing its withdrawal at stage 3. Anticipating this at stage 2, both risk-types apply for the deviant menu. Being separating, however, the latter menu delivers strictly positive expected profits when accepted by both types. Compared to $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, which is IIE optimal and, thus, makes zero total profits, the deviant makes exactly the same expected loss from the high-risk agents but more profit from the low-risk. More precisely,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L) - \Pi_L(\mathbf{a}_L^0) &= \left(\frac{1 - p_L}{p_L} - \kappa \right) p_L \epsilon > \left[\frac{1 - p_L}{p_L} - I_L(\mathbf{a}_L^0) \right] p_L \epsilon \\ &= (1 - p_L) \left[1 - \frac{u'(w_{0L}^0)}{u'(w_{1L}^0)} \right] \epsilon > 0 \end{aligned}$$

the last inequality due to the fact that, the allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$ being $\text{IIE}(\mu^0)$ with $\mu^0 > \lambda$, it under-insures the low-risk agents (see Case 1 of the analysis that leads to Claim 1 in the Appendix: $w_{0L}^0 > w_{1L}^0$ or $u'(w_{0L}^0) < u'(w_{1L}^0)$ by risk aversion).

In terms of representing the preceding construction graphically, it is depicted by the interior points in the shaded area of the left-hand side diagram in Figure 6 whose w_0 -coordinate does not exceed w_{0L}^0 .⁴⁰ It should be pointed out also that we could have taken the contract \mathbf{a}_L as above but with $\kappa \in \left(\frac{1-p_L}{p_L}, \infty\right)$ and $\epsilon < 0$. Letting now $\Delta_h = \kappa - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0)$ (recall that $I_L(\mathbf{a}_L^0) < \frac{1-p_L}{p_L}$), the preceding argument applies again. Graphically, this construction refers to that part of the interior of the shaded area in the diagram for which the w_0 -coordinate exceeds w_{0L}^0 .

2. $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ is $\text{IIE}(\mu)$ optimal for some $\mu \in [0, \lambda)$.

Reasoning in the same way as before, there ought to exist now a menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, defined by $\mathbf{a}_L^0 = \mathbf{a}_L^* + (-1, 1)\epsilon_L$ and $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H^* - (\epsilon_{0H}, \epsilon_{1H})$ with $\epsilon_L > 0$ and $\epsilon_{0H}, \epsilon_{1H} \in \mathbb{R}$ but $(\epsilon_{0H}, -\epsilon_{1H}) \geq \mathbf{0}$ not possible, whose allocation $\mathbf{w}_L^0 = \mathbf{w}_L^* + (1, -1)\epsilon_L$ and $\mathbf{w}_H^0 = \mathbf{w}_H^* + (\epsilon_{0H}, -\epsilon_{1H})$ is $\text{IIE}(\mu^0)$ for some $\mu^0 \in (\mu, \lambda)$ and satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) &< U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) \\ U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) &< U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \\ \lambda\epsilon_L &= (1-\lambda)[(1-p_H)\epsilon_{0H} - p_H\epsilon_{1H}] \end{aligned}$$

Here, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) > U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ are because the allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$ is $\text{IIE}(\mu^0)$ optimal with $\mu^0 < \lambda$ (see Case 2 of the analysis that leads to Claim 1 in the Appendix). On the other hand, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*)$ are by construction.

Let now $\Delta = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ and consider the contract $\mathbf{a}_H = \mathbf{a}_H^0 - (1, \kappa)\epsilon$ for some $\kappa \in (I_L(\mathbf{a}_H^0), \infty)$ and $\epsilon > 0$. Let also $\Delta_h = \kappa - I_h(\mathbf{a}_H^0)$ for $h = L, H$. Lemma 2(i) gives

$$\begin{aligned} U_h(\mathbf{w}_H^0) - U_h(\mathbf{w}_H) &= [p_h u'(w_{1H}^0 - \hat{\epsilon}_h) - \kappa^{-1}(1-p_h)u'(w_{0H}^0 + \kappa^{-1}\hat{\epsilon}_h)]\kappa\epsilon \\ &= [\kappa - I_h(\mathbf{a}_H^0 - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h)]p_h u'(w_{1H}^0 - \hat{\epsilon}_h)\epsilon \\ &= [I_h(\mathbf{a}_H^0) + \Delta_h - I_h(\mathbf{a}_H^0 - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h)]p_h u'(w_{1H}^0 - \hat{\epsilon}_h)\epsilon > 0 \end{aligned}$$

for some $\hat{\epsilon}_h \in (0, \kappa\epsilon)$ and sufficiently small ϵ to ensure that $|I_h(\mathbf{a}_H^0 - (\kappa^{-1}, 1)\hat{\epsilon}_h) - I_h(\mathbf{a}_L^0)| < \min\{\Delta_L, \Delta_H\}$ for either h . Regarding the high-risk type, though, observe that, for sufficiently small ϵ , we can also guarantee that $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) \in (-\Delta, 0)$; consequently, $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) > U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$.

Now, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_H), U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^*)$. The menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ is separating and such that $\mathbf{a}_L^0 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_L^*$ but $\mathbf{a}_H^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_H$. Compared, moreover, to $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, it makes exactly the same expected profit from the low-risk agents but smaller losses from the high-risk. Indeed,

$$\Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H) - \Pi_H(\mathbf{a}_H^0) = \left(\kappa - \frac{1-p_H}{p_H}\right)p_H\epsilon > (1-p_H)\left[\frac{u'(w_{0H}^0)}{u'(w_{1H}^0)} - 1\right]\epsilon > 0$$

⁴⁰This set can be partitioned further into two subsets, depending on whether the w_1 -coordinate exceeds w_{1L}^0 or not. These subsets correspond, respectively, to the cases $\kappa \in (0, I_H(\mathbf{a}_L^0))$ and $\kappa < 0$.

where the first inequality follows from the choice of κ whereas the last one obtains because the allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$ over-insures the high-risk agents.

Graphically, this construction is depicted by the interior points in the shaded area of the right-hand side diagram in Figure 6 whose w_0 -coordinate exceeds w_{0H}^0 . Of course, we could have taken instead \mathbf{a}_L as above but with $\kappa \in \left(-\infty, \frac{1-p_H}{p_H}\right)$ and $\epsilon < 0$. Letting $\Delta_h = I_h(\mathbf{a}_H^0) - \kappa$ (in this case, $I_H(\mathbf{a}_H^0) > \frac{1-p_H}{p_H}$), the preceding argument remains valid. This is depicted by the part of the interior of the shaded area in the diagram for which the w_0 -coordinate does not exceed w_{0H}^0 .⁴¹

3. $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ is not IIE(μ) optimal for any $\mu \in [0, 1]$

In what follows, $\{\mathbf{w}_L^1, \mathbf{w}_H^1\}$ denotes the IIE(1) allocation and $\{\mathbf{a}_L^1, \mathbf{a}_H^1\}$ its associated menu. Being an equilibrium allocation, $\{\mathbf{w}_L^*, \mathbf{w}_H^*\}$ satisfies the constraints of the IIE(1) problem and ought to be strictly dominated by its optimum for the low-risk type: $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^1) > U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$.

To construct a profitable deviation, we will proceed in the same way as in Case 1 albeit starting from the IIE(1) optimal allocation. For small enough $\epsilon_H > 0$, there exists a menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, defined by $\mathbf{a}_H^0 = \mathbf{a}_H^1 - (1, -1)\epsilon_H$ and $\mathbf{a}_L^0 = \mathbf{a}_L^1 + (\epsilon_{0L}, \epsilon_{1L})$ with $\epsilon_{0L}, \epsilon_{1L} \in \mathbb{R}$ but $(\epsilon_{0L}, -\epsilon_{1L}) \leq \mathbf{0}$ not possible, whose allocation $\{\mathbf{w}_L^0, \mathbf{w}_H^0\}$, with $\mathbf{w}_L^0 = (w_{0L}^1 - \epsilon_{0L}, w_{1L}^1 + \epsilon_{1L})$ and $\mathbf{w}_H^0 = \mathbf{w}_H^1 + (1, 1)\epsilon_H$, is IIE(μ^0) optimal for some $\mu^0 \in (\lambda, 1)$ and satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) &< U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^1) \\ U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^*) \leq U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) &< U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) \\ U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) &= U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) \\ \lambda[(1-p_L)\epsilon_{0L} - p_L\epsilon_{1L}] &= (1-\lambda)\epsilon_H \end{aligned}$$

Regarding these relations, $\mu^0 > \lambda$ is ensured by the continuity of the IIE problem in the parameter μ^0 : we can choose μ^0 to be arbitrarily close to 1 so as to guarantee that $1 - \mu^0 < 1 - \lambda$. Given $\mu^0 > \lambda$ then, at the solution, the incentive constraint of the low-risk type does not bind but that of the high-risk does. Hence, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0) < U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ and $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$. The remaining relations are by construction with only $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) < U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ possibly not immediate. To verify it, let $\Delta_1 = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^1) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)$ and observe that, as a mapping $V : [0, 1] \mapsto \mathbb{R}$, the value function of the IIE(μ) problem is continuous at any $\mu \in (0, 1)$.⁴² For μ^0 sufficiently close to 1, therefore, it must be $\max\{(1 - \mu^0)|U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0)|, |V(1) - V(\mu^0)|\} < \Delta_1/2$.⁴³ That is,

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) &> \mu^0 U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) + (1 - \mu^0) U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) - \frac{\Delta_1}{2} \\ &= V(\mu^0) - \frac{\Delta_1}{2} > V(1) - \Delta_1 = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^1) - \Delta_1 = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*) \end{aligned}$$

⁴¹As before, we may partition this set into the subset for which the w_1 -coordinate exceeds w_{1H}^0 and the one for which it does not. These correspond, respectively, to the cases $\kappa \in \left(0, \frac{1-p_H}{p_H}\right)$ and $\kappa < 0$.

⁴²Recall Claim 2 of Appendix A. Since $V(\mu)$ is convex on $[0, 1]$, it is continuous on $(0, 1)$ by a well-known result; see, for example, Theorem 2.14 of Chapter 6 in De la Fuente A.: *Mathematical Methods and Models for Economists*, Cambridge University Press (2000).

⁴³Since $\mu^0 > \lambda$, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) \neq U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0)$. Otherwise, we would have $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ but $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0)$ is absurd.

Define now $\Delta = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - \max\{U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0), U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)\}$ and proceed to construct the contract \mathbf{a}_L exactly as in Case 1. In the present case, $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) - U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) \in (-\Delta, 0)$ implies that $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) > \max\{U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0), U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^*)\}$. Clearly, the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ attracts the low-risk type away from \mathbf{a}_L^* . Moreover, it is separating ($\mathbf{a}_L \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^0 \sim_H \mathbf{a}_L^0 \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L$) and, compared to $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ (which is IIE optimal and, thus, makes zero total profits), makes exactly the same expected loss from the high-risk agents but more profit from the low-risk.

The equilibrium allocation cannot be pooling

In what follows, we give the formal constructions of profitable deviations against a pooling policy $\mathbf{a}^* \in FO_M^*$, whose corresponding wealth allocation will be denoted by \mathbf{w}^* . Recall that the intersection of FO_M^* with the 45-degree line corresponds to the allocation that is IIE for $\mu = \lambda$, a situation covered by Case 1 of the preceding result. There remain two cases to consider.

1. \mathbf{w}^* lies below the 45-degree line in the $\{w_0, w_1\}$ -space

Recall our analysis regarding the necessary condition for the RSW allocation to be IIE(1) in Appendix B. Starting from the given pooling allocation, we may construct the menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ in exactly the same way. Then, since $w_{0L}^0 > w_{1L}^0$, we get $(p_H - p_L)[u(w_{1L}^0) - u(w_{0L}^0)] < 0$ or $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) > U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0)$, the equality because $\mathbf{a}_L^0 \sim_H \mathbf{a}_H^0$ with the latter contract offering full-insurance ($U_h(\mathbf{w}_H^0) = u(w_{0H}^0)$ for either h).

Given that $\mathbf{a}_L^0 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H^0$ while $\mathbf{a}_h^0 \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ for either h , we can proceed as in Case 1 of the preceding result, setting now $\Delta = U_L(\mathbf{w}_L^0) - \max\{U_L(\mathbf{w}^*), U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0)\}$. This gives a contract \mathbf{a}_L such that $U_H(\mathbf{w}_L) < U_H(\mathbf{w}_L^0) = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0)$ and $U_L(\mathbf{w}_L) > \max\{U_L(\mathbf{w}^*), U_L(\mathbf{w}_H^0)\}$. The menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$ is separating and attracts either risk-type away from the original pooling policy. It delivers, moreover, strictly positive expected profits because, compared to $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, makes exactly the same expected loss from the high-risk agents but more profit from the low-risk. Graphically, \mathbf{a}_L is depicted by an interior point in the shaded area of the left-hand side diagram in Figure 1 and of either diagram in Figure 9. These differ in that the low-risk indifference curve at \mathbf{w}^* might be flatter/steeper than or of the same slope as the line FO_L^* .⁴⁴

2. \mathbf{w}^* lies above the 45-degree line

Now, $w_0^* < w_1^*$ and we may consider the contracts $\mathbf{a}_h^0 = \mathbf{a}^* + \left(\frac{p_h}{1-p_h}, 1\right) \epsilon_h$ with $\epsilon_L = (1-p_L)(w_0^0 - w_1^0) < 0$ and $\epsilon_H < 0$ such that

$$u(w_1^* + \epsilon_L) = (1-p_L)u\left(w_0^* - \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1-p_H}\right) + p_L u(w_1^* + \epsilon_H)$$

By construction, \mathbf{a}_L^0 offers full-insurance, is such that $\mathbf{a}_L^0 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_H^0$, and uniquely-defined whereas

⁴⁴Since $p_L < p_H$ while $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, we have $\bar{p} = \lambda p_L + (1-\lambda)p_H \in (p_L, p_H)$. In this case, moreover, $w_0^* > w_1^*$ and, hence, $u'(w_0^*) < u'(w_1^*)$ due to risk aversion. As a consequence, the indifference curve of risk type h is flatter at \mathbf{w}^* than FO_h^* : $\frac{dw_1}{dw_0}|_{\mathbf{w}^*} = \frac{\partial U_h(\mathbf{w}^*)/\partial w_1}{\partial U_h(\mathbf{w}^*)/\partial w_0} = -\frac{(1-p_h)u'(w_0^*)}{p_h u'(w_1^*)} > -\frac{1-p_h}{p_h}$. Since $\frac{1-p_H}{p_H} < \frac{1-\bar{p}}{\bar{p}}$, the high-risk indifference curve at \mathbf{w}^* is flatter also than FO_M^* .




Figure 9: Deviations against pooling policies

there might be two values for \mathbf{a}_H^0 . Yet, for $\delta = \epsilon_L - \epsilon_H$, the equation reads

$$\begin{aligned} u(w_{1L}^0) &= (1 - p_L) u\left(w_0^* - \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1 - p_H}\right) + p_L u(w_1^* + \epsilon_H) \\ &= (1 - p_L) u\left(w_{0L}^0 - \left(\frac{p_H}{1 - p_H} - \frac{p_L}{1 - p_L}\right) \epsilon_L + \frac{p_H \delta}{1 - p_H}\right) + p_L u(w_{1L}^0 - \delta) \end{aligned}$$

and admits for sure a solution $\delta < 0$. And this, in turn, ensures that \mathbf{a}_H^0 offers over-insurance. For if $w_1^* + \epsilon_H = w_{1H}^0 \leq w_{0H}^0 = w_0^* - \frac{p_H \epsilon_H}{1 - p_H}$, the right-hand side of the defining equation above has a lower bound at $u(w_1^* + \epsilon_H)$ and this is absurd since, under non-satiation, $\epsilon_L < \epsilon_H$ requires that $u(w_1^* + \epsilon_H) > u(w_1^* + \epsilon_L)$.

Now, since \mathbf{a}_L^0 and \mathbf{a}_H^0 offer, respectively, full and over-insurance, Lemma 2(ii.b) establishes that $\mathbf{a}_h^0 \succ_h \mathbf{a}^*$ for either h . In addition, as $\frac{p_L}{1 - p_L} < \frac{p_H}{1 - p_H}$, Lemma 2(ii.a) requires that $\mathbf{a}^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^0$. Let then $\Delta = U_H(\mathbf{w}_H^0) - U_H(\mathbf{w}^*)$ and construct the contract \mathbf{a}_H exactly as in Case 2 of the preceding result. In this case, we get $U_H(\mathbf{w}_H) > U_H(\mathbf{w}^*)$.

Therefore, $\mathbf{a}_L^0 \sim_L \mathbf{a}_H^0 \succ_L \mathbf{a}_H$ while $\mathbf{a}_L^0 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^*$. Moreover, $\mathbf{a}_H \succ_H \mathbf{a}^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}_L^0$. The menu $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H\}$ attracts either risk type away from the original pooling policy. It is also separating and delivers strictly positive profits as such; compared to $\{\mathbf{a}_L^0, \mathbf{a}_H^0\}$, it makes exactly the same expected profit from the low-risk agents but smaller losses from the high-risk. Graphically, \mathbf{a}_H corresponds to an interior point in the shaded area of the right-hand side diagram in Figure 1 and of either diagram in Figure 10, the difference between the three depictions being on the slope of the high-risk indifference curve at \mathbf{w}^* relative to that of the line FO_H^* .⁴⁵

3. \mathbf{w}^* is on the 45-degree line

In this case, $w_0^* = w_1^*$ implies $u'(w_0^*) = u'(w_1^*)$ and, thus, $I_h(\mathbf{a}^*) = \frac{1 - p_h}{p_h}$ for either risk-type h . As $p_L < \bar{p} = \lambda p_L + (1 - \lambda) p_H < p_H$, however, we may consider the contract $\mathbf{a}^0 = \mathbf{a}^* - (\kappa, 1)\epsilon$ with $\epsilon > 0$ and $\kappa^{-1} \in \left(\frac{1 - \bar{p}}{\bar{p}}, \frac{1 - p_L}{p_L}\right)$. Observe now that $I_H(\mathbf{a}^*) = \frac{1 - p_H}{p_H} < \frac{1 - \bar{p}}{\bar{p}} < \kappa^{-1} < \frac{1 - p_L}{p_L} = I_L(\mathbf{a}^*)$

⁴⁵In this case, $u'(w_0^*) > u'(w_1^*)$ so that the indifference curve of risk-type h is steeper than FO_h^* . For $h = L$, in particular, it is steeper also than FO_M^* .




Figure 10: Deviations against pooling policies

and let $\Delta_h = |I_h(\mathbf{a}^*) - \kappa^{-1}|$ for either h . For sufficiently small ϵ (and, subsequently, $\max_{h=L,H} \hat{\epsilon}_h$ below) so that $|I_h(\mathbf{a}^* - (\kappa, 1) \hat{\epsilon}) - I_h(\mathbf{a}^*)| < \Delta_h$, Lemma 2(i) gives

$$\begin{aligned}
U_h(\mathbf{w}^0) - U_h(\mathbf{w}^*) &= [\kappa(1 - p_h)u'(w_0^* + \kappa\hat{\epsilon}_h) - p_h u'(w_1^* - \hat{\epsilon}_h)] \epsilon \\
&= [I_h(\mathbf{a}^* - (\kappa, 1) \hat{\epsilon}_h) - \kappa^{-1}] p_h u'(w_1^* - \hat{\epsilon}_h) \kappa \epsilon \quad \text{i.e.} \\
U_L(\mathbf{w}^0) - U_L(\mathbf{w}^*) &= [I_L(\mathbf{a}^* - (\kappa, 1) \hat{\epsilon}_L) - (I_L(\mathbf{a}^*) - \Delta_L)] p_L u'(w_1^* - \hat{\epsilon}_L) \kappa \epsilon \\
&> 0 \\
&> [I_H(\mathbf{a}^* - (\kappa, 1) \hat{\epsilon}_H) - (I_H(\mathbf{a}^*) + \Delta_H)] p_H u'(w_1^* - \hat{\epsilon}_H) \kappa \epsilon \\
&= U_H(\mathbf{w}^0) - U_H(\mathbf{w}^*)
\end{aligned}$$

where $\hat{\epsilon}_L, \hat{\epsilon}_H \in (0, \epsilon)$. That is, $U_L(\mathbf{w}^0) > U_L(\mathbf{w}^*) = U_H(\mathbf{w}^*) > U_H(\mathbf{w}^0)$, the equality because \mathbf{a}^* offer full-insurance. Equivalently, $\mathbf{a}^0 \succ_L \mathbf{a}^* \succ_H \mathbf{a}^0$ so that the new contract attracts the low-risk type away from the original pooling policy, leaving the latter with only high-risk customers and, thus, rendering it loss-making and forcing its withdrawal at stage 3. Anticipating this at stage 2, both risk-types apply for the deviant contract, another pooling policy which, nevertheless, delivers strictly positive expected profits. Specifically, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^0) &= \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) + \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^0) - \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) \\
&\geq \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^0) - \Pi_M(\mathbf{a}^*) \\
&= -(\lambda[\kappa(1 - p_L) - p_L] + (1 - \lambda)[\kappa(1 - p_H) - p_H]) \epsilon \\
&= [\bar{p} - \kappa(1 - \bar{p})] \epsilon > 0
\end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality follows from the fact that the original pooling policy is an equilibrium one, hence, admissible.