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## **Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America**

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## Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America

### Abstract

South America's security agenda demands the simultaneous management of domestic crises, interstate conflicts and transnational threats. Though located at different systemic levels (national, international, transnational), the three conflict clusters are often interrelated and tend to overlap in the region's border areas. The region's policy makers, aware of this highly complex agenda and in spite of their striking differences, have tended to build regional structures of authority that coordinate, manage and rule collective responses to these threats. In addition, the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral structures and the region's capabilities to solve conflicts have become more important than the respective inter-American bodies over the past decade. Given this shift in the management of regional security affairs, we ask if a multilevel approach on the part of an overarching security architecture is more effective than separate governance schemes regarding each specific security threat. Since neither the traditional models of power balancing and alliance building nor the security-community approach can sufficiently explain the region's security dynamics, we assume and provide evidence that different systems of security governance overlap and coexist in South America.

Keywords: South America, Brazil, United States, OAS, Rio Group, governance, security governance, structures of authority, multilevel approach, security threats, security agenda, UNASUR, MERCOSUR

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## **Zusammenfassung**

### **Sicherheits-Governance in Südamerika: Auf dem Weg zu einer Mehrebenenarchitektur**

Südamerikas sicherheitspolitische Agenda erfordert die zeitgleiche Bearbeitung innenpolitischer Krisen, zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte und transnationaler Bedrohungen. Diese drei Konfliktcluster sind – obschon analytisch auf verschiedenen systemischen Niveaus (national, international, transnational) zu verorten – oft eng miteinander verwoben und neigen insbesondere in den Grenzregionen dazu, sich wechselseitig zu überlappen. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger in der Region sind sich der komplexen Agenda bewusst und haben, unbeschadet ihrer offenkundigen Differenzen, damit begonnen, den Bedrohungen durch die Schaffung regionaler Autoritätsstrukturen auf uni-, bi- und multilateraler Ebene gemeinsam zu begegnen. Hinzu kommt die Beobachtung, dass die Fähigkeiten der Region zur eigenständigen Konfliktregulierung gegenüber den entsprechenden interamerikanischen Organen in der letzten Dekade insgesamt an Gewicht gewonnen haben. Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier fragt angesichts dieser neuartigen Entwicklungen und Verschiebungen danach, ob in Südamerika ein Mehrebenenansatz auf der Grundlage einer bedrohungsübergreifenden Sicherheitsarchitektur effektivere Ergebnisse zu zeitigen vermag als einzelne, voneinander separierte Governance-Schemata, die jeweils auf ein spezifisches Bedrohungscluster abstellen. Da weder traditionelle Modelle (Machtbalance, Allianzenbildung) noch konstruktivistische Konzepte (Sicherheitsgemeinschaft) die sicherheitspolitische Dynamik in der Region hinreichend zu erklären vermögen, gründet das Papier auf der im folgenden empirisch unterfütterten Prämisse, wonach in der Region unterschiedliche, sich überschneidende Sicherheits-Governance-Schemata koexistieren.

# Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America

Daniel Flemes and Michael Radseck

## Article Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Region's Security Agenda
- 3 Structures of Authority Impacting Regional Security
- 4 Forms and Cases of Multilevel Security Governance
- 5 Conclusions

## 1 Introduction

Security governance is a recent concept in the discipline of international relations. It reflects the increasing fragmentation of the structures of authority<sup>1</sup> that manage international security issues. Security governance has been applied to the trans-Atlantic security architecture in order to explain the latter's transformation in terms of a shift from "government" to "governance" since the end of the Cold War (Krahmann 2003: 6). This transformation is explained by the absence of a unifying military threat, something that has led to the broadening of the notion of security to include a variety of new security threats and, hence, to the emergence of

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<sup>1</sup> Lake (2006, 2007) introduces the concept of authority, distinguishing it from coercion, as the defining character of power relations between different actors. In such a relationship, legitimacy and moral obligation are the drivers that motivate the followers to follow. "To build and maintain authority, there are two necessary requirements: to provide a social order that benefits subordinates, and thereby binds them into that order, and to commit credibly not to exploit subordinates once they have consented to one's authority" (Lake 2006: 28).

an increasing number of new actors relevant to the management of international security. Even though states are still the key units in security affairs, other—formal and informal—structures of authority have become more influential at different systemic levels.

In short, the current security order is characterized by a higher degree of fragmentation and complexity than the centralized security system of the Cold War. To capture this global transformation, traditional models of security relations such as alliances (Wohlforth 1999), security regimes (Krasner 1983) and security communities (Adler/Barnett 1998) must be complemented, and security governance is a promising concept in this regard. Adler and Greve (2009: 59) conceptualize the traditional models as different “security systems of governance” that can overlap or coexist across time and space, and apply Ruggie’s (1993) “multiperspectival” vision to regional security governance. For the purposes of our article, we will restrict and apply the governance concept to, on the one hand, the political field of security and, on the other hand, the regional level of analysis. Whereas the bipolar competition of the Cold War era largely overlaid regional security considerations, the security concerns of most states today are almost entirely regional and regions are an increasingly salient unit of analysis (Lake/Morgan 1997, Lemke 2002, Buzan/Weaver 2003).

We assume that different systems of security governance overlap and coexist in South America. On the one hand, a variety of bilateral and multilateral security initiatives—most prominently the recent establishment of the South American Defense Council (CDS) under the umbrella of the Union of South American States (UNASUR)—reflect patterns of a nascent security community. On the other hand, key regional actors such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are engaging in armament and military alliances with external powers, namely, France, the United States and Russia (Flemes/Nolte 2009). These alliances seem to result from the logic of power balancing and are potentially contributing to a regional arms race while also fueling already existing historical and ideological conflicts between neighboring states. Hence, neither the traditional models of power balancing and alliance building nor the security-community approach can sufficiently explain the security dynamics in South America. Our empirical analysis will, thus, be informed by two distinct and often competing systems of rule, by different ways of conceiving of power and by different security practices such as mechanisms for conflict resolution (Adler/Greve 2009: 63); in our exercise we will focus on the latter.

With a view to the region under consideration, a further differentiation of the actors relevant to the management of regional security is reasonable. Unlike the case in Europe, national sovereignty is still the clearly dominant underlying norm of South American regional politics in general and South American security affairs in particular. Thus, the participation of private and other actors (NGOs, academic organizations, media) in regional security management and decision making is highly restricted. Other relevant non-state actors such as guerrilla armies and organized crime will be addressed here as security threats or challenges, but not as constructive actors or managers of regional security.

Reinforcing this view, we reject the tendency of “securitization” (Waeber 1995) enhanced by the concepts of “human security” and “societal security”. Even though it is true that South America’s security is endangered by more than military threats, the analytical utility of widening the traditional concept of national security through the inclusion of economic, health and environmental aspects is questionable. The enlargement of the security agenda through the inclusion of social matters transforms the latter into matters of state security, making ill-conceived military approaches to these issues more likely. This applies particularly to South America, where the armed forces have traditionally played a key role in politics by intervening militarily in domestic affairs and still exert great influence in the security sectors of many states (Flemes 2004, Radseck 2005a). With a view to security thinking and the different systems of security governance, most military institutions, including South America’s armed forces academies, still adhere to balance-of-power thinking and practices, even though other parts of the policy-making bureaucracy, such as the diplomatic corps, have deeply internalized security-community discourses and practices. In order to delineate the analytical scope of this article, regional security governance will be understood as an order-creating mechanism:

Regional security governance denotes formal and informal structures of authority that coordinate, manage and rule collective responses to threats to the security of states in a delineated region or common efforts of these states to promote security and stability outside their region. Collective security challenges can be subdivided into interstate conflicts, domestic crises affecting regional stability, and transnational threats. The unilateral, bilateral and multilateral structures of authority can be codified in formally binding institutional forms, but they may also be identified in the norms of behavior and action accepted informally among the regional states.

South America is confronted with all of the above-mentioned sets of security challenges. Interstate conflicts, domestic crises and transnational security threats might even overlap and interrelate in some South American border zones (Fuentes 2008: 13). The region’s policy makers, aware of this highly complex security agenda and in spite of their striking differences,<sup>2</sup> seem increasingly disposed to building a regional-security governance structure. South America’s structures of authority and the region’s ability to solve conflicts has become more important than the respective inter-American bodies over the past decade. Given this shift in the management of regional security affairs, it is questionable that a multilevel ap-

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<sup>2</sup> Alongside common values such as democracy and human rights articulated by all South American state leaders, the region is marked by power asymmetries and sharp ideological cleavages: some South American states, such as the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez and the Bolivia of Evo Morales, no longer share the market economy paradigm. In stark contrast, Chile, Colombia and Peru have signed bilateral free trade agreements with the US. And while Bogotá seeks security and military cooperation with Washington in the framework of the Plan Colombia, Caracas feels threatened by a potential military intervention by the US. Brasilia takes a moderate stance and tries to mediate between these polar positions.

proach by an overarching security architecture is more effective than separated governance schemes regarding to each specific security threat. How functional have the different structures of authority been in managing South America's multilevel security agenda? With this question in mind, the present article (1) defines the region's security agenda, (2) identifies the region's structures of authority in terms of core security functions (containment of transnational threats, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding), and (3) addresses the different forms and cases of multilevel security governance emerging in South America.

## 2 The Region's Security Agenda

South America's security agenda is an extensive, multilevel and complex one. It demands the simultaneous management of domestic crises, interstate conflicts and transnational threats. Though located at different systemic levels (national, international, transnational), the three conflict clusters are often interrelated and tend to overlap in the region's border areas—which is why they are often referred to as “border conflicts” in the media.<sup>3</sup> However, for analytical reasons it is important to make a distinction: While “classical” border conflicts are disputes *over* frontiers, the so-called “new border conflicts” are permanent conflict matrices *at* settled, but often uncontrolled, frontiers serving as cross-border theaters for operations by organized crime actors or as areas of retreat for guerrilla groups. By assigning the “new border conflicts” to the conflict cluster of transnational threats, we do not deny their dual characteristics. Quite the contrary: it is evident that South America's borders zones have become “hot spots” because traditional and new threats tend to overlap and mutually intensify one another in these often poorly patrolled spaces. This is illustrated most obviously in the case of Colombia, where the continent's longest-running armed conflict has already infringed on all neighboring countries.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.1. Domestic Crises

The epicenter of South America's domestic crises is the Andean subregion. The threat to democracy and security is based on the crises' potential to radiate to and encroach on neighbor-

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<sup>3</sup> Examples are the continuously occurring “border conflicts”—most notably in the Amazon—with drugs and arms smugglers, illegal migrants and clandestine gold prospectors. Even the serious diplomatic crisis between Ecuador and Colombia in March 2008, sparked by Bogotá's violation of its neighbor's sovereignty when Colombian troops attacked a base of the Colombian guerrilla group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) inside Ecuador, has been labeled as “border conflict” in the media.

<sup>4</sup> As a result of the US-supported “War on Drugs” and through the Plan Colombia, which puts military pressure on the Colombian drug cartels and the FARC, coca cultivation, cocaine production and rebels were edged out even beyond the country's borders. Hence, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are already plagued with the effects of the drug trade and guerrilla activities (armed struggle, kidnapping).



ing states and, therefore, to compromise the political stability of the subregion as a whole. While the crises differ clearly in terms of their conflict potential, we distinguish between domestic crises affecting the political order, democratic governability and territorial integrity:

- *Domestic crises affecting the political order:* Though South America's armed forces are no longer on the front line appointing themselves as governors, they are still partly important political actors. Since the region's last wave of democratization, two successful coups d'état (self-coup of Peruvian president Fujimori in 1992, irregular overthrow of Ecuadorian president Mahuad in 2000) and four attempted military coups (Paraguay 1996 and 2000, Venezuela 1992 and 2002) have taken place—not to mention the periodic coup rumors in the region.<sup>5</sup>
- *Domestic crises affecting democratic governability:* In the Andean subregion successive governmental crises have expanded to permanent state crises in recent years (Llanos/Marsteintredet 2009). Amidst political turmoil, mass protests and revolts, democratic governance eroded most notably in Bolivia (with four heads of state between 2002 and 2006) and Ecuador (with seven presidents coming and going between 1997 and 2007). A similar crisis temporarily convolved the post-Fujimori era in Peru (2000 ff.). Once these internal conflicts are exploited for nationalistic purposes, the region's interstate relations, especially those between direct neighbors, seriously deteriorate. Recent examples include the "Bolivian gas war" in 2003<sup>6</sup> and the paramilitary rising of a populist-nationalist movement in Peru in 2005.<sup>7</sup> To make matters worse, the current president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, has added fuel to these flames and, in doing so, has compromised the security and stability of the subregion as a whole.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> With the domino effect in mind, when military regimes emerged in the 1970s across almost the entire subcontinent, it was an imperative of the region to prevent the overthrow of democratically elected governments. In addition, South America, aware of the fragility of the region's democracies, is consistently committed to democracy as the "only game in town." In the 1990s, democracy promotion and protection clauses were adopted by the OAS, the Rio Group, the Andean Community, and the MERCOSUR.

<sup>6</sup> The project of Bolivia's former President Sánchez de Losada to export natural gas via Chile became a catalyst for extremely violent protests, which saw approximately 60 people killed, and led to the premature resignation of his government in October 2003.

<sup>7</sup> The "*ethnocaceristas*" demanded the resignation of former President Toledo, whom they accused of selling Peru to Chile because of extensive investments by Chileans in the Peruvian economy. The movement is called "*ethnocacerist*" in honor of General Cáceres, the nineteenth-century president of Peru who organized a guerrilla war against the Chilean occupation after the Pacific War of 1879. The movement wants to arm Peru for war with Chile in order to recover Arica, the territory that remained in Chilean possession after the Pacific War. The "*ethnocaceristas*" also revile Ecuador.

<sup>8</sup> Venezuela's president Chávez not only dreams of "taking a bath at a Bolivian beach" but is also not afraid to interfere in the domestic affairs of alleged "sister states," as he did in the last presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru by providing support to "his" populist-nationalist candidates Morales, García and Humala (Kozloff 2009).

- *Domestic crises affecting territorial integrity:* Socioeconomic disparities which strongly correlate with provincial or local entities have become a threat to the territorial integrity of the region's (centralist) states. In Bolivia, the demands of the resource-rich eastern provinces for greater regional autonomy have escalated into a warlike conflict with the central government of President Morales; the wealthiest department, Santa Cruz, wheeled by the high commodity prices, has even threatened secession. Fundamentally, the clash is a struggle over revenues from the country's vast natural gas and oil reserves.<sup>9</sup> A similar conflict emerged recently in mineral-rich Peru. The Garcia government declared martial law in the southern department of Tacna (bordering Chile) in 2008 in order to contain violent protests against its decision to revise a law that regulates the distribution of mining revenues (Slack 2009). OPEC-member Ecuador, with its persistent regional conflicts between the coast, the highlands and the oil-rich Amazon area, demonstrates high potential to become the next victim of a domestic crisis affecting its territorial integrity.

## 2.2 Interstate Conflicts

A second cluster of South America's security agenda consists of long-standing territorial conflicts and border disputes, so-called traditional threats (Domínguez 2003a, 2003b). When South American states became independent in the 1820s, most of their external frontiers were the largely unmarked administrative borders of the colonial empires. The disputed territories and boundaries have consistently been the subject of diplomatic crises or have even turned into arenas of military operations within the eight wars that have taken place so far in the region.<sup>10</sup> Actually, only 27 percent of the region's contemporary frontiers—measured according to their overall length—can be traced back to colonial times; of the remainder, 26 percent have been defined by wars, 17 percent by unilaterally imposed claims to power, another 17 percent by bilateral agreements, and 13 percent by contended arbitrations (Foucher 1991). This bellicose legacy has strongly affected the region's attitudes and patterns of behavior. Hence, it is not the exception in South America when (neighboring) nations face each other with mutual distrust and resentment or generals extrapolate disputed areas to a *casus belli*, partly following geopolitical assumptions in their conflict scenarios (Child 1985). Long-standing territorial disputes, which have already resulted in armed conflicts, have now trick-

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<sup>9</sup> The mixed-race elite in the eastern lowlands wants greater control over local revenues, while Morales, who is supported by the impoverished indigenous majority of the highlands, wants the wealthier eastern departments—which account for most of the country's natural gas production, industry and gross domestic product—to contribute more to the poorer west.

<sup>10</sup> The wars in chronological order: The Argentina-Brazil War (1825–28), the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–70, Paraguay vs. Argentina/Brazil/Uruguay), the War of the Pacific (1879–83, Chile vs. Bolivia/Peru), the Leticia War (1932–34, Colombia vs. Peru), the Chaco War (1932–35, Bolivia vs. Paraguay), the Paquisha War (1981, Ecuador vs. Peru), the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982, Argentina vs. the UK) and the Cenepa War (1995, Ecuador vs. Peru).

led down to tense relations, where neighbors or former opponents of wars are seeing each other as enemy, rival or scapegoat.

Territorial and border conflicts in South America share the mechanism which sparks them, even though the former type of conflict appears to be motivated mainly by a prestige mentality and (wounded) national pride and the latter seems to be more strongly linked with material interests, in particular, (potential) oil and mineral deposits and fish.<sup>11</sup> The region's interstate conflicts are often fueled by domestic motives and power-political calculations. The region's populists in particular appeal in old-fashioned caudillo style to the rah-rah patriotism of their countrymen in order to distract from internal deficiencies and to ensure the general public's support. The political instrumentalization of interstate conflicts, especially in times of crises, helps to explain why the same old disputes flare up over and over again—but also refreeze repeatedly—without ever being settled.

With two emblematic cases having recently been peacefully resolved—Argentina and Chile settled all remaining disputes in 1994, and Ecuador and Peru signed a peace accord in 1998 (Herz/Nogueira 2002, Bonilla 1999)—at least three territorial conflicts and four border conflicts, mainly involving Chile and Venezuela—remain in South America:

- *The Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute:* Landlocked Bolivia has made claims to Chilean territory, which would enable sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, for 130 years. Bolivians see this territorial claim, now magnified to a vital national question, as compensation for their mineral-rich littoral department, annexed at the end of the nineteenth century by the Chilean military. Since any agreement requires the approval of the Peruvian government, the case is particularly complicated. Lima has vetoed every attempt at an agreement between La Paz and Santiago in the past (Maldonado 2005). Hence, albeit off the record, Chileans consider Lima's behavior in this dispute as proof of its revanchist longings, since Peru, as well as Bolivia, supposedly never overcame the loss of its coastal provinces in the Saltpeter War (1879–83).
- *The Argentina-United Kingdom territorial dispute:* Argentina has made claims to a group of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean in the possession of the United Kingdom. The islands have been a British Overseas Territory since 1833; the most famous are the Falklands/Malvinas. Even after its defeat in the Falklands War (1982), Buenos Aires repeatedly reasserted its historical claim, which is actually fixed as an imperative in the country's constitution (Schindler 1998: 29ff.).
- *The Antarctica territorial dispute:* Sectors of Antarctica are claimed by Argentina and Chile as part of their national territories. The claims, based on geological data and physical

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<sup>11</sup> The region's resource conflicts proper are currently limited to the access to and use of fresh water. Examples include the following: (1) The waters of the Silala River, disputed by Bolivia and Chile. The case is, in a bilateral manner, possibly soon to be resolved (Noyce 2009). (2) The recent clash between Buenos Aires and Montevideo about the construction of a pulp mill next to the shared border, River Uruguay (Malamud 2006).

proximity, overlap with each other and also with the UK's claim. None of them is recognized by the international community, and all of them are frozen while the Antarctic Treaty is in force, until the year 2041.

- *The Colombia-Venezuela border dispute:* The maritime border in the Gulf of Venezuela has been disputed by Bogotá and Caracas since the 1830s. The discovery of oil reserves in the contested waters intensified the conflict during the twentieth century. In 1987 the dispute led to the Corbeta Caldas crisis, when a Colombian corvette trespassed into disputed waters and was forced to veer off by the Venezuelan Air Force. In 1992 the conflict served inter alia as a pretext for Hugo Chávez's attempted coup in Venezuela. Since 2002 the quarrel has been particularly charged due to the major problem caused by the Colombian guerrilla group FARC and the ideological differences that separate the presidents of Venezuela and Colombia, Hugo Chávez and Álvaro Uribe.
- *The Chile-Peru border dispute:* Lima and Santiago have been in dispute over their maritime boundary since the Peruvian Congress unilaterally approved a law which extended the stated sea border in the contested waters, abundant in fish, in 2005. Peru's position was that the border has never been fully demarcated, but Chile disagreed, reminding Peru of treaties, which supposedly defined the sea border, from 1952 and 1954 between the two countries.
- *The Guyana-Venezuela border dispute:* In 1999 Venezuela revived a territorial claim against its small eastern neighbor for a mineral-rich area that covers two-thirds of Guyana. Already in 1981 Caracas had refused to renew a protocol that placed a moratorium on the border dispute. Venezuela's claims to the Essequibo region of Guyana are based on what Caracas considers a "colonial swindle" in a treaty signed in 1899 in Paris.
- *The Suriname border disputes:* Significant parts of Suriname's borders, formed by the Marowijne River in the east (with French Guiana) and the Corantyne River in the west (with Guyana), remain disputed. The century-old dispute over the maritime boundary with Guyana has been intensified by the discovery of vast off-shore oil and gas reserves in the disputed territorial waters. In 2000, a Canadian oil company, conducting exploration with the permission of the Guyanese government, was expelled from the contested area by the Surinamese military in a demonstration of force.

### 2.3 Transnational Threats

The third cluster of South America's multilevel security agenda consists of transnational, so-called new threats. In the following we will limit our analysis to the region's most challenging and often overlapping cross-border threats: organized drug crime, guerrilla organizations and transnational terrorism. First, government officials and academic observers agree that organized drug crime is the principal transnational threat in South America (Rojas

Aravena 2006). Second, cross-border guerrilla organizations and paramilitary forces can hardly be analyzed separately from organized crime activities such as arms and drug trafficking. Third, guerrilla groups such as the FARC and paramilitary forces such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) have been branded terrorist organizations by Colombia, the United States and the European Union. The other South American states have avoided connecting these actors in the Colombian conflict to the global threat of radical Islamic terrorism by using this notion. Fourth, until today there has been no evidence of Islamist terrorist cells in South America; therefore, the region is not confronted with a concrete threat from Al-Qaeda or related extremists. Intelligence services have observed financial flows from Muslim communities in the tripartite border area between Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina to “welfare groups” in Palestine that may have been subsequently transferred to extremist groups. And fifth, although organized crime is also highly present in South America’s urban centers, particularly in Brazil and Colombia, transnational threats culminate in the peripheral border areas of South America, where they overlap with the above-mentioned dimensions of the region’s multilevel security agenda.

One of the most complex situations is that along the southern border of Colombia, where the territorial control of border zones by paramilitaries and guerrilla militias has permitted the relatively stable cultivation of coca. In particular, an important part of the Colombian-Ecuadorian border is under control of the FARC and is marked by child prostitution and the traffic of drugs, arms, and human beings.<sup>12</sup> Colombia’s frontiers with Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil are the locations with the highest murder rates in these countries. According to mostly unconfirmed reports, FARC units also occasionally cross the Venezuelan-Brazilian Amazon border, on the one hand to evade the Colombian army and on the other to traffic drugs and arms. Brazil’s Amazon frontiers are likewise notorious for their sparse population and limited state presence. For instance, the border to Suriname, a transfer country for cocaine whose security forces and government officials are tainted by allegations of involvement in trafficking networks (Briscoe 2008: 4), is virtually uncontrolled.

Another focal point of transnational threats is Ciudad del Este, on the Paraguayan side of the tripartite border zone between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. It has been denominated a “lawless” area because of poor state control in the face of several illicit activities: arms and drug trade, marijuana production, money laundering and the smuggling of genuine and faked goods (Fuentes 2008: 7). Additionally, the city has long been suspected by the Argentine and US intelligence services of harboring active jihadist cells in its large Lebanese and Syrian trading community. However, claims that cells located in the tripartite border area

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<sup>12</sup> The FARC actually still holds positions in neighbouring countries, as evidenced in March 2008 when the Uribe government deliberately violated Ecuador’s national sovereignty, carrying out a military operation against a FARC camp two kilometers into Ecuador. The FARC Central High Command demonstrably maintains contact with the highest governmental authorities in Ecuador and Venezuela—in the former case through an agent, in the latter case through direct access to the head of state.

planned the attacks on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the AMIA Jewish community center in 1994 have never been substantiated.

What the remote border zones of South America have in common is that the rule of law has been replaced by drug tsars and guerrilla forces who rule with an iron hand. The dilemmas of tackling illicit trafficking and the presence of armed groups along these frontiers are most clearly reflected by the dispute between Colombia and Ecuador over the former's bombardment of a FARC camp in the latter's territory in March 2008. In addition to the overlapping of transnational guerrilla and organized crime activities with the underdeveloped rule of law and the domestic Colombian conflict, the dispute between Colombia and Ecuador was fueled by ideological differences, including the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez, and therefore led to a regional diplomatic crisis. Colombia and Venezuela have not consensually demarcated their border, and political rivalry is used in both countries to deflect internal conflicts by unifying the nation against an external enemy. The diplomatic hostilities and the alleged mobilization of the Venezuelan army that followed Colombia's bombardment can be interpreted as the first military manifestation of the Bolivarian alliance and the consolidation of Colombia's status as a leading US ally (Briscoe 2008: 4).

### **3 Structures of Authority Impacting Regional Security**

In the following discussion we will divide the structures of authority impacting South America's security governance scheme into unilateral, bilateral and multilateral ones, not depending on the formally binding or merely informal features of these structures. Unilateral structures refers to key state actors, inside and outside the region; bilateral structures refers mainly to defense and military cooperation mechanisms; and multilateral structures implies issue-related bodies and instruments at the regional and the hemispheric level.

#### **3.1 Unilateral Structures of Authority**

South America's unilateral structures of authority are projected by those regional and extra-regional states that pursue their interests most effectively on the basis of their material capabilities or ideational and diplomatic resources. These power resources can be converted into political influence through the creation and shaping of regional institutions or through the mediation of domestic and interstate conflicts in South America, both practices which are in accord with the powerful state's (security) interests. In this regard, we will shed light on the roles of the regional power Brazil and the United States, the most influential external player.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Venezuela also plays a pivotal role in the region's integration dynamics. For instance, UNASUR itself can be seen as a Brazilian-Venezuelan initiative (Flemes 2007). President Chávez champions the integration of Latin America on his own terms through the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) as an "anti-neoliberal"

Brazil is South America's key actor, even more so in terms of regional security than economic affairs. This is because Brazil's readiness to provide public goods differs with regard to the issue area under consideration. Brasilia is not ready to pay the costs of economic integration (Flemes 2007), but it is willing to do what is necessary to provide regional stability. The willingness to do the latter can be explained by the expected economies of scale induced by providing regional security and protection. Brazil not only plays the leading part in defense and security cooperation in South America (Flemes 2006), but it has recently been increasing its military spending in order to secure its status as the region's dominant military power (Flemes 2008).<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, as the only Latin American country, Brazil has controlled the technology to enrich uranium since 2006; however, it is not willing to accept the IAEA demands that it sign the additional protocol of the NPT. The military upgrading added, for instance, to the only aircraft carrier in service in Latin America is justified in Brazil's new National Defense Strategy (END), published in 2008. The central factor stressed in this document is the effort to achieve for energy security by protecting offshore oil and gas drilling through military power projection and deterrence. In this regard, Brazilian conflict hypotheses include the intervention of "extra-regional powers," namely, the US, in the South Atlantic and the Amazon, where Brazil's natural resources are concentrated.

Unlike investments in regional states' economies, the volume of Brazil's investments in regional stability—for example, through the acquisition of military technology and equipment intended to project force over distance (in particular, sea and air capabilities)—varies relatively little in relation to the number of states included in the regional sphere of influence. The number of beneficiaries of the stability induced by Brazil has increased over recent decades from Argentina alone to the Southern Cone and then to South America as a whole. This has led to the problem of free-riding: Brazil's neighbors have received the benefits of the

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counterproposal to the US-led project of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Additionally, Venezuela projects power by concluding biregional and subregional energy agreements that create dependence among the raw-material importers. Venezuela's resource-based diplomacy constitutes a competing leadership claim to that of Brazil. It is true that Venezuela is an alternative partner for smaller countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador, something which gives these states room to maneuver in their bilateral relations with Brazil. But unlike Brazil, Venezuela lacks broad international legitimacy, something which is a precondition for projecting unilateral authority in peaceful conflict resolution. President Chávez was only once, and exceptionally, accepted as a mediator in the Colombian conflict.

<sup>14</sup> In its search for state-of-the-art military technology, Brazil entered into a strategic partnership with France in December 2008, signing armament contracts for US\$8.5 billion. The acquisitions include four conventional Scorpene submarines, 50 transport helicopters, and assistance in the construction of a hull for a future Brazilian nuclear submarine. Despite Brazil's investments in its neglected defense sector, these expenditures relative to its GDP remain low when compared to the cases of Chile and Colombia. If Brasilia were to decide to bring itself to their level, it would have to invest approximately US\$30 billion in arms (Calle 2009). However, with respect to the relative military potential, Brazil ranks far ahead of its South American neighbors. Brazilian military spending in recent years (2005–2007) was higher than the sum total of the defense expenditures of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela (SIPRI 2008).

evolving social order “for free”, without having to accept its rule or comply with its demands. A solution to the problem of free-riding has been the multilateralization of the Brazilian commitment to South American stability through the CDS. Mutual aid and reciprocity are the main principles for avoiding free-riding and increase regional states’ dependence (Lake 2009). The CDS reduces the number of independent alliances among regional states and increases Brasilia’s influence over their security policies.

In addition to their functional dimension as responses to the increasing regional interconnectedness, regional governance structures such as the CDS and UNASUR feature a power dimension. They are instruments of domination, promoting of the dominant state’s interests through its agenda-setting capacity (Nolte 2009, Tussie 2009). Brazil’s cooperative hegemony (Pedersen 2001) strategy aims not least to aggregate power in the regional context in order to project power to the global level—for instance, with a view to its ambitions to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As the collective good of regional stability induced by Brazilian security initiatives also serves the interests of minor regional states, it is less likely that the regional governance structure will be used to hedge against Brazil. In addition, Brazil shares an interest in excluding extra-regional players from South American security affairs with most regional actors.

However, the process of region building has been limited first and foremost by one external power: the US. The “borderline” became visible during negotiations about the FTAA. Brasilia prevailed as Washington’s main opponent, even though many Latin American countries were interested in a continental free trade area. The Central American and Caribbean states (plus Colombia, Peru and Chile) have already concluded bilateral trade agreements with the US. This is not to mention Mexico, which is linked to the US economy by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Nonetheless, the US hegemony in Central America and the Caribbean no longer seems to be undisputed. In December 2008 the Brazilian government simultaneously hosted four summits on the coast of Bahia. Only the MERCOSUR and UNASUR summits reflected its South American sphere of influence. The Rio Group and the novel Latin American and Caribbean Summit, intended to replace the Organization of American States (OAS), can be interpreted as an expansion of Brazil’s reference region, particularly because both summits excluded the US and included Cuba. Except for Colombia and Peru, the countries of the region no longer allow the presence of US armed forces in their territories. One example is the US airbase in Manta, Ecuador, which was closed by order of President Rafael Correa after the expiry of the respective contract in 2009.

The theoretical assumption that security governance structures can overlap and change across time and space is also confirmed by the fact that the US is still part of the South American security order. In 2008 the US Navy announced the reactivation of its Fourth Fleet to patrol Latin American waters. The fleet, originally established to defend US oil interests in Venezuela during WWII and dismantled in 1950, will be the Navy component of the US



Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). It will conduct contingency operations and counter-narcoterrorism and so-called theater security cooperation (TSC) activities. Colombia can be seen as the bridge into South America which allows to Washington to project (military) power in the region. Intra-regional relations have been seriously strained by Bogotá's military and political proximity to the United States. Contrary to the region's mainstream tendency, President Uribe has fostered relations with Washington, as evidenced by the recent extension of the US military presence in Colombia. US military personnel will use seven Colombian military bases for the next 10 years in order to support Colombia's anti-drug-trafficking strategy, known as Plan Colombia. The competing unilateral structures of authority applied by Brazil and the US to South America clearly reveal the power dimension of regional governance. But this competition might be overshadowed by the functional dimension as both players are interested in regional stability. In this regard, Washington has delegated power to Brasilia by confirming its regional power status on several occasions.

### **3.2 Bilateral Structures of Authority**

Bilateral structures of security governance have been established, on the one hand, in order to tackle transnational threats such as the cross-border drug trade and, on the other hand, in order to build trust between the armed forces of neighboring states and to coordinate their defense policies. With a view to the former, Brazil has established anti-drug commissions (Comisiones Mixtas Antidrogas) with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. These commissions aim to support collaboration between the federal police forces and intelligence agencies of the participating states. With regard to the latter, a dense network of bilateral military and defense cooperation in South America includes, for instance, common maneuvers, personnel exchange and military-technical collaboration. The defense and military cooperation, with its confidence-building impetus, is centered among Argentina, Brazil and Chile; these states have built a security community since the 1990s (Flemes 2006).

The starting point for the institutionalization of bilateral defense cooperation dates back to 1995. Since then the COMPERSEG, which sits semiannually, has ensured a continuous political security dialogue between Argentina and Chile. This committee paved the way for a standardized methodology for the equalization of the defense budgets of the two countries and for the establishment of a binational battalion for joint peacekeeping operations in 2006. The military contingent Cruz del Sur is modeled on the German-French battalion. A precedent was set by the UNFICYP mission in Cyprus, where Chilean troops were embedded in the Argentine contingent. Brazil and Argentina also established a bilateral consultation mechanism for defense issues (MCC/MAE) in 1997. Since 2000 Brazil has been holding bilateral working groups for defense policy (GTBD) with most South American countries, and in 2001 the security and defense committee (COSEDE) between Chile and Peru was established

as a forum to discuss the different views on bilateral issues such as the maritime border and to build trust between the Chilean and Peruvian armed forces.

These coordination committees have strengthened the role of the traditionally weak defense ministries, particularly in relation to the military institutions. Nevertheless, the political dimension of intra-regional defense collaboration is still affected by structural deficiencies, which are assigned to the problem area of civil-military relations. The armed forces still dominate the bilateral working groups as well as the consultation mechanisms. Besides the lack of participation of civilian experts, the bilateral institutions suffer from a lack of transparency as the meeting records are mostly classified.

### 3.3 Multilateral Structures of Authority

The key multilateral structures impacting security governance in South America are the UNASUR and the MERCOSUR. Additionally, the Rio Group impacts security governance at the Latin American level, and the OAS at the inter-American level.

During the era of bipolarity, the OAS reflected the Cold War's "centralized security system" in Latin America. After the end of the Cold War the traditional scenarios of a "communist subversion" and the creation of satellite states became obsolete. Nevertheless, the institutional structures of the Cold War era, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB),<sup>15</sup> survived; additional structures such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) were added; and new conventions on transparency in conventional weapons acquisitions, against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, and against terrorism were adopted (Radseck 2005b). Additionally, new threats such as growing cross-border organized crime and transnational terrorism led to the foundation of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Committee (CIDAD). The OAS has fostered conflict prevention and resolution through an Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts (OPRC) as part of its Department for Democratic and Political Affairs. The department is mandated to become involved in the internal affairs of members when democratically elected governments are threatened.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The IADB was finally established in 2006 as an entity of the OAS. It provides technical advice and services to the OAS (demining programs in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures).

<sup>16</sup> The effectiveness of these agreements, however, is limited, not least because of the lack of consensus inside these regimes on many issues (Diamint 2004). Furthermore, all institutional mechanisms of the "Inter-American Security System" are characterized by weak infrastructure and very limited influence and, hence, by their need of reform. The wait-and-see policy towards the reform of the "Inter-American Security System" adopted by most Latin American states supports the assumption that particularly those South American states headed by Brazil are not interested in a hemispheric security system. Their lack of commitment indicates that the status quo is preferred to any change that would strengthen the US position in the region. From this perspective, it remains questionable whether, on the one hand, the lack of consensus and institutionalization is

Perceived to some extent as an alternative body to the US-dominated OAS, the region's political security consultation mechanism, known as the Rio Group, is an international organization of Latin American and some Caribbean states. The group dates back to 1986 and the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro, signed by the eight members of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group, both of which mediated the Central American conflicts in the 1980s. The Rio Group's perpetual commitment to adapt itself to the new regional and international scene led to its successive expansion.<sup>17</sup> It never actually became a permanent body; it is administered by a rotating and temporary secretariat and relies on yearly summits or extraordinary sessions with the heads of states. A political dialogue with the EU at the ministerial level, institutionalized in 1990, deals with peace and security issues such as drug trafficking and transnational terrorism.

Signed in May 2008 in Brasília, the UNASUR is an intergovernmental union integrating two existing customs unions: MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations.<sup>18</sup> It is intended to be modeled after the EU, with free trade agreements among the members, free movement of people, a common currency, and also a common passport. Its provisional structure includes the CDS—alongside a parliament, a bank and a scheduled council that would focus on drug trafficking and organized crime. Brazil originally wanted the CDS to be a NATO-like mechanism based on the principle of collective defense but was confronted with resistance, particularly from Colombia. The 12 members of the UNASUR ultimately agreed to the establishment of the CDS as a mechanism for conflict prevention on the basis of mutual consultations.<sup>19</sup> With two extraordinary summits held to date (Santiago de Chile 2008, to

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less striking in the South American context, and on the other hand, if the hegemonic role of the US is simply being replaced by Brazil as South America's dominant player.

<sup>17</sup> Cuba, expelled from the OAS in 1962, joined the group in 2008 as the organization's twenty-third member. What has officially been labelled as a measure that "makes the Rio Group more representative, stronger, more inclusive [and] more plural" (Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa, cited by Cortes 2008) in truth counters the group's basic commitment "to democracy, the rule of law, the protection and promotion of human rights."

<sup>18</sup> The genesis of UNASUR dates back to December 2004, when the South American presidents met in Cuzco, Peru to establish the South American Community of Nations. But even before Cuzco, the presidents had been holding summits, since 2000, and had set up various mechanisms aiming to promote continental integration. One significant mechanism is the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). At the core of IIRSA lies a network of energy, transportation, and ICT corridors linking the continent's economic centers. After the South American presidential summits in 2005 in Brasilia and 2006 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, the leaders decided at the South American Energy Summit, held 2007 in Venezuela, to change the community's name to the Union of South American Nations and to establish a general secretariat based in Ecuador.

<sup>19</sup> Brazil will be the dominant player in the CDS, as it is in UNASUR. The CDS will, first, consolidate the regional-power status of Brazil and support its ambitions to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Second, it can be seen as a Brazilian counter-initiative against the establishment of common armed forces by ALBA, as promoted by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. Third and most convincingly, the CDS

deal with the Bolivian unrest; Bariloche 2009, to address the use of Colombian military bases by the US), UNASUR has already proven its flexibility and relative effectiveness.

The regional initiatives of the Brazilian Lula da Silva administration have also introduced a shift from the institutional deepening of the MERCOSUR—with the Foreign Policy Consultation and Concertation Forum (FCCP) at its core—to its extension.<sup>20</sup> The admission of Venezuela as the fifth full member of MERCOSUR in 2006 reaffirmed Brazil's intention to extend its room to maneuver into the northern part of South America. Since 2003 Peru, Colombia and Ecuador have signed association agreements, as Bolivia and Chile had already done, with the MERCOSUR. The extended MERCOSUR is thus—apart from Surinam and Guyana—geographically congruent with the UNASUR, which is today the main forum for South American foreign-policy cooperation.

Within the MERCOSUR framework, the Conference of the Home Secretaries of the MERCOSUR (RMI), founded in 1996, is still the most significant forum for the dialogue on transnational threats and common measures for their containment. The RMI has given particular impetus to the common fight against the organized drug trade and transnational terrorism by establishing the Special Board on Organized Drug Crime (RED) in 1998<sup>21</sup> and the Working Group on Terrorism (GTE) in 1999. Initial achievements at the operative level include the coordinated action of the federal police forces of MERCOSUR states and a Security Data Network (SISME). In terms of military and defense cooperation, the UN Haiti mission MINUSTAH represents a landmark for South America in terms of the size and the politico-military importance of the operation. The stability mission consists mainly of South Ameri-

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aims to exclude the US (and Mexico) from South American security affairs by replacing the conflict resolution mechanisms of the OAS.

<sup>20</sup> The FCCP aims to systematize political cooperation among its member states and to represent common positions opposite third states and international institutions. For instance, foreign ministry officials of the MERCOSUR work together within the FCCP in the run-up to meetings of the Rio Group and the OAS. MERCOSUR members coordinate their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council within the FCCP. The US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 was disapproved of by Brazil and Chile in the UN Security Council after consultations in the FCCP, despite considerable pressure from Washington. The FCCP also gave impetus to the inclusion of the democracy clause in the MERCOSUR legislation in 1997. The democracy clause stipulates the immediate expulsion of any member whose political system does not comply with democratic norms. Additionally, the FCCP prepared the Ushuaia Agreement, which declared the MERCOSUR a peace zone. In this regard, the FCCP developed a mechanism for crisis prevention to secure regional stability and a MERCOSUR clause refusing residence to persons found guilty of genocide.

<sup>21</sup> The key tasks of the RED include the prevention of drug abuse and the rehabilitation of drug users. The repression of the drug production and the problem of illegal drug trafficking, including connected illegal activities such as money laundering, are understood as part of the prevention of drug abuse. The technical sub-commissions of the RED—the institutional supervision of which was transferred from the RMI to the FCCP in 2002—reflect its main working areas: (1) the control of illegal trade in chemical substances, (2) the prevention of laundering of drug funds, (3) reduction of drug demand, and (4) the harmonization of the relevant legal norms of the MERCOSUR states.

can troops and is commanded by Brazil.<sup>22</sup> It is demonstrating, for the first time in history, the South American states' willingness and capability to handle regional crises by themselves. A so-called 2x9 mechanism, created to discuss common policies and concerns regarding Haiti and MINUSTAH, includes the deputy ministers of foreign affairs and of defense from the nine Latin American troop contributors (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay).

#### **4 Forms and Cases of Multilevel Security Governance**

In the following discussion we will analyze the functioning of the region's multilevel security governance scheme. We will therefore demonstrate how particular conflicts and security challenges have in the past been tackled by the structures of authority discussed above. For analytical reasons we structure the cases according to our three conflict clusters. In the subsections we proceed chronologically in order to shed light on the changes and shifts that have occurred within the region's specific security governance schemes.

##### **4.1 The Domestic Level**

The dominant method of resolving domestic crises in South America is mediation (see Table 1). Exceptionally—and only outside of South America, in Haiti—the South American governments intervened in 2004 with a military and police presence on the basis of a UN mandate in the context of the stability mission (MINUSTAH).

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<sup>22</sup> The multilateral peacekeeping force consists of more than 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries. Brazil has deployed the greatest number of troops with 1,200 men who are meant to protect the inhabitants' security in Port au Prince. Chile has provided a contingent of 600 soldiers who are responsible for security in the northern part of the country around Haiti's second-largest city Cap-Haitien. Argentina has provided a battalion of 600 soldiers for the control of the former stronghold of the Gonaives rebels. Uruguay's battalion of 600 soldiers patrols southern Haiti. Paraguayan, Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Peruvian units complete the South American contingent. In addition to Canada, France and the US—all of which supported the previous interim mission (MIF)—Guatemala, Jordan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Benin, Nepal and Croatia have sent smaller units and single specialists to Haiti.

**Table 1: Security Governance at the Domestic Level**

	<b>Mediation</b>	<b>Intervention</b>
Peru 1992	OAS, US	MINUSTAH
Guatemala 1993	OAS, US, Brazil	
Paraguay 1996, 1999	MERCOSUR, Brazil	
Ecuador 2000	OAS, US	
Venezuela 2002	Brazil, Rio Group, MERCOSUR	
Haiti 2004ff.		
Colombia 2007	Venezuela (failed)	
Bolivia 2008	UNASUR, OAS	
Honduras 2009	Brazil, OAS, US, ICJ	

Source: Authors' own calculation.

*Peru 1992:* In the case of the self-coup by President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in April 1992, when the Congress was shut down with the support of the military, the constitution was suspended, and the judiciary was purged, most South American states, including Brazil, argued that the strict application of the sanction mechanisms of OAS Resolution 1080 would further destabilize Peru and lead to a further deterioration of its ability to overcome its internal economic and security crisis. The region's cautious stance inhibited the effective use of the OAS mechanisms, sending mixed signals to President Fujimori, who finally proposed the scheduling of elections for a democratic constituent Congress. This offer was approved in an ad hoc OAS meeting made up of ministers who had originally condemned the *autogolpe*. Various states acted to condemn the coup individually: Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations, and Argentina withdrew its ambassador. Chile joined Argentina in requesting that Peru be suspended from the OAS. The United States immediately suspended all military and economic aid to Peru, with exceptions for counter-narcotic and humanitarian-related funds. Two weeks after the self-coup, the George H.W. Bush administration changed its position and officially recognized Fujimori as the legitimate leader of Peru.

*Guatemala 1993:* The attempted self-coup by President Jorge Serrano was similar to that carried out by Fujimori. In May 1993 the constitution was suspended and the Congress dissolved, allegedly to fight corruption. However, Serrano's action was met with strong protests by most elements of Guatemalan society and the international reaction was harsh and swift (Cameron 1994): The US immediately suspended all aid to the country, and the OAS quickly set in motion the procedures for sanctions. Brazil clearly announced that it would not allow a derailment of the peace process in which it had been involved as a member of the Contadora Support Group. In the face of this pressure, Serrano resigned as president within a few days and settled into asylum in Panama. The Congress replaced him with human rights ombudsman Ramiro de León.

*Paraguay 1996, 1999:* Brazilian diplomacy, based on the firm position of the other MERCOSUR members, was particularly effective in resolving the constitutional crisis in

Paraguay in April 1996 (Halperin/Lomasney 1998). Although Brazil found the recourse to OAS Resolution 1080 problematic because a coup had not actually occurred, it agreed with the broad interpretation of the crisis by other governments at the OAS as an interruption of the democratic institutional process. In addition, Brazilian president Cardoso repeatedly emphasized to his Paraguayan colleague Wasmosy that the MERCOSUR partners opposed Oviedo's direct challenge of the constitutional rule and that they would not tolerate a disruption of democracy in a member state. MERCOSUR members issued a communiqué noting their profound concern regarding the events in Paraguay, which they characterized as constituting "a serious menace to democratic institutions and the constitutional order." Hereby, MERCOSUR in general and Brazil in particular significantly raised the stakes of a potential disruption of the democratization process, thus altering the domestic actors' perceptions and positions. Similarly, Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners reacted swiftly to the reemergence of political turmoil in Paraguay following the assassination of Vice President Argaña in March 1999. As in 1996, President Cardoso played a key role in resolving the crisis, urging President Raúl Cubas to resign as the Senate proceeded to impeach him. The crisis was resolved by the end of March, when Luis González Macchi was sworn in as president. Cubas was granted asylum in Brazil, and Oviedo in Argentina.

*Ecuador 2000:* International pressure, especially from the US, probably influenced the Ecuadorian armed forces' decision to facilitate the return to civilian rule. In fact, the OAS intervention and the advertisement of the US government's intention to impose economic sanctions if the democratic institutional process in Ecuador was interrupted by a military government seem to have been decisive in the peaceful resolution of the coup d'état against Ecuadorian president Mahuad. The MERCOSUR, too, strongly objected to the irregular overthrow of Mahuad. In a communiqué, Brazil and its fellow member countries condemned the coup and called for the preservation of the rule of law and the upholding of the constitutional process. Furthermore, the Rio Group expressed its grave concern and denounced "any attempt to disrupt constitutional order and democratic institutions."

*Venezuela 2002:* MERCOSUR and especially Brazil reacted promptly to the attempted coup d'état in Venezuela in April 2002 against President Chávez, both through bilateral and multilateral channels. MERCOSUR members issued a statement in which they declared that their governments would not recognize Venezuela's de facto government unless and until new elections were held. Brazil closely monitored the developments in Venezuela and engaged in intense diplomatic negotiations to identify a common position among Latin American countries. Ultimately, the Venezuela crisis was addressed in the context of the "democratic clause" of the Rio Group, which happened to be meeting at the same time the coup was unfolding. The Rio Group governments reacted strongly to the attempted coup, issuing a joint statement which firmly condemned the "interruption of constitutional order" and called for the "normalization of democratic institutions."

*Haiti 2004-present:* The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is an example of a case of intervention by the South American states in order to manage a domestic crisis outside their region. Brazilian army generals have been in command of the peace operation since it was installed in 2004. The disarmament of the approximately 25,000 rebels and criminal gangs is the most difficult problem the blue berets are confronted with.<sup>23</sup> Besides disarmament efforts and security patrols, the military units are also providing medical care to the population and contributing to the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Latin America's poorest country. Moreover, nearly 4,000 civilian personnel from the UN, including more than 2,000 international police officers, are supporting the state-building process. In 2004 and 2005 MINUSTAH concentrated on organizing presidential elections in order to restore a legitimate political power. René Préval was elected in 2006 in an election marked by massive voter turnout. MINUSTAH's security work and logistic support were decisive factors in this first step towards a viable state (Gauthier 2006). In 2006, the Haitian government and the UN Security Council cosigned an agreement on the reform of Haiti's national police force in order to create a professional 14,000 person force that would be able to meet the country's basic security needs by 2011. However, the state institutions, including the police and the justice and prison systems, remain particularly weak. Human rights violations allegedly committed by national police officers and the problem of impunity continue to be a deep concern. In short, despite of these efforts and 43 fatalities amongst the military and civilian UN personnel, the common efforts of the UN in general and the South American states in particular to promote security and stability in Haiti by reforming the justice and penal systems and professionalizing the police force have yet not been successful.

*Colombia 2007:* In 2007, Venezuelan president Chávez was acting as authorized mediator in the ongoing humanitarian exchange between the FARC and the government of Colombia. Colombian president Uribe had given Chávez permission to mediate, under the condition that all meetings with the FARC would take place in Venezuela and that Chávez would not contact members of the Colombian military directly but would instead go through the proper diplomatic channels. However, President Uribe abruptly terminated Chávez's mediation efforts after Chávez personally contacted the commander of the Colombian National Army. In response, Chávez said that he was still willing to mediate, but he withdrew Venezuela's ambassador to Colombia and froze Colombian-Venezuelan relations. President Uribe responded that Colombia needed "mediation against terrorism, not for Chávez to legitimize terrorism." Later, in 2008, Chávez expressed his disapproval of the FARC strategy of armed struggle and kidnapping. In the same year FARC released four political hostages "as a gesture of goodwill" towards Chávez, who had brokered the deal.

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<sup>23</sup> The number of guns in circulation in Haiti is put at more than 200,000 (Amnesty International 2006). So far, MINUSTAH has recovered a mere few hundred of them. The illegal drugs and arm trades, which are facilitated by the country's porous border with the Dominican Republic and its extensive coastline, give criminal groups ample opportunity to consolidate their power.



*Bolivia 2008:* The violent unrest which threatened Bolivia's territorial integrity in September 2008 was the UNASUR's baptism of fire. Bolivia became locked in a serious political crisis after Santa Cruz, the richest province in the subcontinent's poorest country, declared autonomy in a contested referendum and another three eastern provinces, Beni, Pando and Tarija, followed in an open rebellion against the federal government of President Evo Morales. The violent clashes between government supporters and opposition protesters resulted in at least 30 casualties and sparked a diplomatic dispute which culminated in the expulsion of the US ambassador. UNASUR reacted immediately. Chilean president Michelle Bachelet, its pro tempore chair, called for an emergency summit to discuss the crisis in Bolivia. Generally, no (centralist) state in the region is immune from separatist demands, a fact which explains the unanimous advisory of all UNASUR members from September 2008 (the Moneda Declaration) that they would not tolerate any threat to Bolivia's territorial integrity (Malamud 2008). This statement reaffirmed an analogue declaration of the Rio Group from April 2008 which had announced the group's "strong support to preserve unity and territorial integrity" for the Morales administration. The members of UNASUR also agreed to establish a commission to investigate the massacre that had occurred in Pando.

*Honduras 2009:* On June 28 democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya was ousted by the Honduran army after he defied Supreme Court orders to cancel a referendum on the re-writing of the constitution. While the Honduran Congress replaced him the same day with its president, Roberto Micheletti, the entire hemisphere, including the United States, immediately denounced the coup. The OAS called for an emergency meeting and issued a statement calling for Zelaya's return, saying it would not recognize any other government. Though Zelaya was denied permission to reenter Honduras, he returned on September 21 and took refuge at the Brazilian embassy. Brazil supports Zelaya's demand to be reinstated and has not pressured him or his supporters to leave the embassy. In answer, the de facto government of interim president Micheletti filed a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on October 29 accusing Brazil of meddling in internal Honduran affairs by allowing ousted president Zelaya to stay at its diplomatic mission in Tegucigalpa and by using the embassy "as a platform for political propaganda [...] thereby threatening the peace and internal public order of Honduras" as authorities prepare for the November 29 presidential election. So far, it is not clear if the court will take on the case of an administration installed following a coup. Brazil immediately disputed the claim, saying the de facto Honduran government has no legitimacy to lodge a lawsuit at the ICJ.

#### **4.2 The Interstate Level**

The region's territorial conflicts and border disputes—resolved or not—have normally been managed either through mediation or through arbitration (see Table 2). The latter seems to be the preferred approach, because arbitration is seen by most of South American govern-

ments as the most firm and binding way to resolve such conflicts definitely. That said, bilateral negotiations between the parties to a conflict can also lead to success, as demonstrated by Argentina and Chile in the 1990s.

**Table 2: Security Governance at the Interstate Level**

	Bilateral negotiation	Mediation	Arbitration
Argentina-Chile, 1994	x	Guarantor process	x
Ecuador-Peru, 1998			
Colombia-Venezuela, 2002	x (unsolved)		
Argentina-Uruguay, 2006			ICJ (pending)
Guyana-Surinam, 2007			PCA
Chile-Peru, 2007			ICJ (pending)
Bolivia-Chile, 2008	x (unsolved)		

Source: Authors' own calculation.

*Argentina-Chile 1994:* In the 1990s Argentina and Chile settled, in an exemplary manner, all remaining disputes—except one (Laguna del Desierto), which was decided through international arbitration in 1994<sup>24</sup>—through direct bilateral negotiations. The case of these two countries can be seen as a prime example for the region: given strong political will on both sides, even neighbors with a legacy marked by long-standing hostility—in the 1980s the two countries almost clashed militarily on the occasion of the Beagle Conflict—can resolve numerous border disputes within a few years. Colombia and Venezuela as well as Bolivia and Chile are following this path: bilateral committees are negotiating the respective interstate disputes (the waters of the Gulf of Venezuela, the waters of the Silala River, access to the Pacific).

*Ecuador-Peru 1998:* In 1998, three years after the Cenepa War, Ecuador and Peru signed a peace accord (Itamaraty Peace Declaration) establishing the framework for ending their border dispute and initiating the demarcation of the border regions. The agreement was ratified without opposition by both nations' congresses. Mediation had been embedded in and underpinned by the Guarantor Process (Simmons 1999), which refers to the four guarantors of the Rio Protocol, signed in 1942 by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the US: the illegal sale of weapons and munitions to Ecuador by the Argentine defense ministry and the Chilean army during the conflict were most damaging for the legitimacy of this process. The sales created an international scandal and certainly affected the image of Argentina and Chile as impartial guarantors.

*Guyana-Surinam 2007:* The century-old dispute over the maritime boundary between Guyana and Surinam was settled peacefully in 2007 following a decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. Argentina and Uruguay as well as Chile and Peru will fol-

<sup>24</sup> A 50-kilometer section of the boundary in the Southern Patagonian ice field, which is still pending of mapping and demarcation according to the borders already settled, is occasionally a matter of friction: in 2006 the Chilean government sent a note to Buenos Aires complaining about Argentine tourism maps that showed a normal boundary in the Southern Patagonian ice field with most of the area belonging to Argentina.

low this path: disputes between the two sets of countries have reached the ICJ, and verdicts are expected in 2010 and 2015 respectively.

### 4.3 Transnational Threats

The MERCOSUR has developed several practical mechanisms to prevent and contain transnational threats on the ground. The starting point of multilateral police and intelligence collaboration can be seen in the establishment of the Trilateral Federal Police Command (Comando Tripartito de la Triple Frontera) at the border triangle between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in 1996. Further coordinated action is demonstrated by the MERCOSUR Coordination Center for Police Training, the Agreement on Operative Police Cooperation, and the MERCOSUR Security Data Network (SISME).

The Coordination Center for Police Training was created at the RMI meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 2000. Its cross-disciplinary character is intended to support the scientific and technological development of police training. The center encourages best-practice exchange among the national police colleges and aims to develop common training schemes and, hence, common prevention and repression measures. For this purpose a data archive has been established to evaluate the training programs of the member states' police academies. However, the coordination center lacks continuous leadership and a seat of its own. Instead, the rotating (semiannually) RMI presidency appoints the center's director, who sits in the respective national interior ministry.

In 2001 MERCOSUR's home secretaries signed an agreement on operative police cooperation in Buenos Aires. The treaty enhances cooperation between the member states' federal police services, particularly in the border areas, on efforts to fight the illegal trade in drugs and arms, terrorism, and money laundering, as well as environmental crimes and bio-piracy. The cross-border prosecution of delinquents is regulated in article 13 of the agreement. On-duty policemen on duty are permitted to cross the state border if the criminal offender has been caught in flagrante and if the federal police of the receiving state have been informed and have asked for support. Previously, the prosecution authorities of MERCOSUR countries had to ask INTERPOL for an international arrest warrant. This was more time-consuming and, therefore, often proved to be ineffective.

In spite of these promising initial steps, transnational police collaboration is undermined by several shortcomings. For instance, many MERCOSUR states lack clear distinctions between military and police security forces: some federal police services are housed at defense ministries, and armed forces and military intelligence services are often legally assigned to repress organized crime. Additionally, the relationships between these security forces are sometimes marked by considerable rivalry, which hinders collaboration even at the national level. In addition to the overcoming of these shortcomings of the national security sectors, legal harmonization at the regional level is vital for operative police cooperation. The prerequisite of

equal definitions of criminal offences under the respective legislation of the MERCOSUR countries has so far not been achieved by the RMI.

The SISME implemented in 2005, contributes modestly to the harmonization of legal definitions of criminal offences by storing arrest warrants from the member states. These are rudimentarily subdivided as follows: criminal offences against the life and physical integrity of persons, kidnapping, child trafficking, organ trafficking, terrorism, the smuggling of animals and goods, illegal drug trafficking, money laundering, money counterfeiting, environmental crime, robbery and theft of vehicles, hijacking, and arms trafficking.

The data network consists of three components—data relating to persons, goods and criminal cases—and depends on the member states' readiness to provide this information. Data with reference to people include national as well as international arrest warrants, previous convictions, and missing persons announcements, as well as visas issued and refused. Data relating to goods refer to confiscated vehicles, vessels and aircrafts. Additionally, the database stores the serial numbers of seized arms. A register for cargo containers records the imports and exports of MERCOSUR countries in order to detect the transportation routes for smuggled goods. The data relating to solved and unsolved criminal cases includes information on police operations carried out in the individual states. This information exchange aims to identify transnational overlaps and connections between different cases and thus lays the ground for bilaterally or multilaterally coordinated measures at the operative level.

RED meetings have been conducted once or twice a year and have so far been dominated by the development of complementary strategies for border protection. In order to enable more efficient control of the trade in those pharmaceutical products and chemical substances that are potentially used for the production of drugs, the MERCOSUR countries have committed to informing each other on the export of these products. For this purpose, national registers recording the import and export of pharmaceuticals have been set up in the member states. With regard to the containment of the illegal trade in chemical drugs, the federal police forces of the MERCOSUR states simultaneously carried out the transnational operation *Seis Fronteras*, coordinated by the RED, in 2002 and 2003. In the course of this operation the respective security services arrested several drug dealers, confiscated chemical drugs, and destroyed drug production sites.

The crucial reason for the inclusion of transnational terrorism on the regional security agenda was the terrorist attacks on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and on the AMIA Jewish community centre in 1994. Through these suicide attacks in the country with South America's largest Jewish community, more than 100 people were killed. After the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 the RMI announced far-reaching collaboration against the intensified terrorist threat and an upgrading of the GTE through the creation of a Permanent Counterterrorism Working Group (GTP). The participating experts include officials from the foreign, finance and interior ministries as well as intelligence and federal police agents. The activities of the GTE/GTP, both of which meet every two weeks, consist of the exchange and analysis of

relevant information as well as the evaluation of current operations related to potential terrorist threats in the MERCOSUR. The GTP/GTE has established an institutionalized communication mechanism (Sistema de Consulta Rápida) to guarantee immediate communication between the anti-terrorism forces in the event of terrorist threats or attacks. In 2002 the GTE/GTP initiated a multilateral agreement of the RMI on the operative counterterrorism cooperation of police intelligence services. On the basis of this agreement, each member state may initiate common operations against terrorism and invite agents of the partner states as observers. The operations are supervised by the federal police of the receiving state, and the agents of partner countries must be accompanied by federal police agents of the receiving state.

In addition to terrorism prevention and containment, the expert meetings aim to prepare common positions on the part of the RMI—and, hence, the MERCOSUR governments—with respect to issues of transnational terrorism in international forums such as the OAS and the UNO. The modest practical outcome of these efforts could be observed at the 2007 INTERPOL Assembly when Argentina, supported by Israel and the US, demanded the international capture of five Iranians and one Lebanese citizen for the attack on the AMIA community centre. The behavior of South American states varied widely on this occasion: Venezuela did not send a delegate to cast a vote; Ecuador under President Correa voted in favor of Argentina's claim; and Brazil abstained from voting (Calle 2009). The considerable trade between Brazil and Iran and the intense activity of Brazil's state oil company Petrobras in Iran might have influenced the willingness of South America's key actor to enhance coordinated action.

## 5 Conclusions

South America seems to be disposed to the creation of its own security governance scheme. Novel defense and security structures and the region's contributions to peacekeeping missions under its own direction provide evidence in this regard. These changes go along with and fit in with regional efforts to strengthen a common political profile, as showcased by the formation of the UNASUR, and to become emancipated from traditional US hegemony, as evidenced by the various countries' preference for South American-, Latin American-, or even UN-based conflict resolution schemes over those of inter-American bodies and instruments. However, the continuing presence of the US military on the subcontinent demonstrates that the regions' emancipation from the US ends whenever Washington's vital security interests are concerned. The expansion of US military engagement in Colombia and the growth of Brazilian cooperation initiatives into Central America and the Caribbean demonstrate how regional-security governance structures overlap and travel over time and space. Though it is too early for a conclusive assessment of the nascent regional security governance model, it is clear, first, that the South American security governance scheme will primarily be

a state-centric one, with little input from parliaments or non-state actors. The strong bias in favor of the executive authorities and especially the presidential figures may provide the necessary flexibility given the complexity of the region's multilevel security agenda—an agenda which culminates in the region's border zones, where traditional and new threats overlap and are mutually intensifying at different systemic levels (domestic, interstate, and transnational). In contrast, the strong personalist component will make the scheme incalculable and its outputs more dependent on the willingness and the “chemistry” between the heads of state than on institutionalized or at least formalized structures of authority.

Second, the current security governance scheme confirms South America's liability to informal ad hoc proceedings or at least to appeal to UN arbitration, when interstate conflicts and domestic crises are tackled, mostly successfully.

Third, in the case of transnational threats, the regional security scheme's underlying principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention will impede real progress as long as regional state and non-state actors are not willing to view the threatened border areas as a common security space whose effective control requires the same transnational course of action to which the organized crime and guerrilla groups have resorted to for years. Beyond a doubt, the softening of these dominant and sacrosanct principles would imply an enormous step in a region which still maintains classical territorial and border disputes.

Fourth, at first glance the region's security governance scheme displays a strong impetus of multilateral structures of authority, even beyond the containment of transnational threats, which can hardly be managed in another way. Cases involving the arbitration of interstate conflicts by the UN courts are exceptions as the ruling power is thereby delegated to multilateral bodies outside the region, which decide unilaterally once the conflicting parties agree to submit their case. However, the analyses of domestic and interstate conflicts demonstrate that conflict management inside the multilateral bodies of the region is mainly based on unilateral structures of authority, with Brazil as the outstanding regional state actor. Brazil is the most important initiator and the dominant agenda setter in South America's security governance institutions. It has played pivotal roles in most multilateral mediation and intervention efforts, particularly at the domestic level. Multilateralism must be strengthened by upgrading and democratizing the regional cooperation schemes at the political level, as at the operative level, in order to downplay the inherent structures of unilateral authority. As long as the power dimension overshadows the functional dimension of regional governance, South America's multilevel security challenges can hardly be managed effectively.

Fifth, even though regional stability is a shared interest of all regional and extra-regional state actors, the diverging preferences of the key players imply—even in medium-term—serious limits to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the region's security governance schema. The region's key actors differ clearly in terms of motives, the perception of threats, and their interests in meeting the region's security challenges. Even more harmful, most South American states, due to mutual mistrust or power-driven calculus, maintain their ambiguous bal-

ancing act between rhetorical trust-building and conventional military armament. Thus, the empirical analysis in this paper has reinforced our assumption that different systems of security governance and different security practices coexist in South America. The practices of power balancing and participation in the security community even interact; for instance, when unilateral and multilateral structures of authority compete within the UNASUR and its defense council, or when regional states engage in external armaments alliances while disapproving of extra-regional influence and claiming that the management of regional security is an exclusively South American affair.

Beyond the way structures of authority are codified in South America's security governance scheme, its effectiveness and legitimacy depends decisively on the context the security scheme as a whole is embedded in. Two variables seem to be crucial: the patterns of civil-military relations, which differ notably in the region in terms of civil supremacy and military autonomy, and the patterns of interstate behavior, which is partly marked by deep-seated distrust and resentment as a result of the region's tumultuous past. In this regard, the initial reforms within the defense ministries, the institutionalization of bilateral and multilateral security dialogs, and the creation of binational military contingents have marked significant progress, contributing to both real confidence-building and the securing of peace. The fact that an increasing number of non-state-actors (universities, think tanks, media, schools) are now engaging in security affairs too, launching exchange programs for students, publishing in common or creating academic networks on regional defense and security, is also promising.

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