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The impossibility of strategy–proof clustering

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Abstract

Clustering methods group individuals or objects based on information about their similarity or proximity. When the raw information to generate clusters cannot be easily observed or verified, the cluster designer must rely on information reported by individuals behind the observations. When these individuals receive utility from a public decision taken with aggregated data within each own's cluster and have single–peaked preferences, we prove that there do not exist clustering methods such that truth–revealing behavior is always a dominant strategy

1   Introduction

Let us imagine a society in which the agents or individuals live in some locations in a given region. A social planner must efficiently locate some public facilities - say, health services, police stations, schools, etc.- in the region based on reported information about each individual location. The individuals would like the public facility to be located on their own location -to minimize the transport costs, for example- and have preferences on the set of feasible locations that are continuous and single-peaked: the further the location is along a straight line starting from the single most preferred alternative -top location or peak, i.e., the agent's own location-, the worse it is for the agent. When individuals are asked to report their locations, they might have an incentive to lie and report false information in order to achieve a better location for themselves. When just one public facility must be chosen, the allocation problem can be solved in some cases. For example, in the one-dimensional case when the public facility must be located on a street, it is possible to design Pareto-optimal allocation methods such that no individual will ever have an incentive to report false information about her own location -see Moulin (1980)-.

In the real world usually more than just one public facility can be located and in this case, there are different possibilities open. For example, individuals might be allowed to choose the service point they like the most from a fixed amount of points to be chosen by society -see, for example, Miyagawa (1998, 2001)-. Other possibility consists in dividing society into different areas that group the set of individuals associated to each service point. In this note, we assume that the social planner has no clear constraint in the number of public facilities to locate, but would like to group individuals that live "close" to each other to allocate service points with a minimum of transport costs. Since the only information the planner has to build the groups or "neighborhoods" is about reported locations, she applies a clustering technique to those points generating the different areas that will deserve a service point of their own. For the problem to be meaningful we shall need to impose a minimal constraint on the admissible clustering techniques to avoid trivial results. Therefore, the extreme cases of always considering a unique cluster or as many clusters as individuals cannot be proper cluster techniques. After excluding these two extreme and trivial cases, we find that every other admissible clustering technique cannot rule out the possibility of individuals lying about their locations.

Notice that our model is not restricted to a spatial allocation problem, but admits a much wider range of economic problems. The information to be reported can be any measures of different socioeconomic variables of agents to be taken into account to create clusters. The next section is devoted to both the model and the main impossibility result.

2 The model and the result

Let $N = \{1, ..., n\}$ be a *society* composed by a finite number $n \geq 3$ of *agents* or *individuals* denoted by $i, j, h, w \in N$. Let π, π' denote different *partitions* of society, i.e., $\pi = \{S^1, ..., S^k\}$, where k denotes the number of sets in the partition. We use indexes $t, l \in \{1, ..., k\}$ to denote specific sets into a given partition $\pi = \{S^1, ..., S^k\}$. Let Π be the set of all possible partitions of society N. Therefore, for all $\pi = \{S^1, ..., S^k\} \in \Pi$, it must hold that $S^t \cap S^l = \emptyset \ \forall t, l \in \{1, ..., k\}$, $t \neq l$ and $\cup_{t=1}^k S^t = N$. Notice that given any partition π, if we denote as $\pi_i = \{S^t \in \pi \mid i \in S^t\} \ \forall i \in N$, it must hold that $\forall i, j \in N$, either $\pi_i \cap \pi_j = \emptyset$ or $\pi_i = \pi_j$ and $\pi_i \neq \emptyset \ \forall i \in N$ (since it must hold that $i \in S^i \ \forall i \in N$). Let E be the real line and let $x, y, z \in E^2$ denote arbitrary elements -locations- in E^2. Let $d(x, y) \in E_+$ denote the euclidean *distance* between the points or locations x and y. Each individual $i \in N$ has a *preference relation* defined on the set E^2 denoted as R_i, where P_i and I_i are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R_i respectively. A *utility function* u is a function of the kind: $u : E^2 \rightarrow E$. A preference relation R_i is represented by a utility function u_i if $\forall x, y \in E^2$, $x R_i y \longleftrightarrow u_i(x) \geq u_i(y)$. We require admissible preferences to be continuous in E^2 and such that (1) and (2) hold.

(1). For every individual $i \in N$, there exists a unique location $p(R_i) \in E^2$ such that $p(R_i) P_i x \ \forall x \in E^2 \backslash p(R_i)$.

(2). For every individual $i \in N, \forall x \in E^2 \backslash p(R_i), \ \forall \lambda \in (0, 1)$,

$$[\lambda p(R_i) + (1 - \lambda)x] \, P_i x.$$

Let $\Re$ be the set of all continuous preferences on E^2 such that (1) and (2) hold[1]. An *economy* $\mathbf{R} = (R_1, ..., R_n) \in \Re^n$ is a list of one admissible preference relation for every agent, and for any economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$ there will be a vector of associated peaks $p(\mathbf{R}) = (p(R_1), ..., p(R_n)) \in E^{2n}$. We shall also make use of the following notation, given any agent $i \in N$: $\mathbf{R} = (R_i, \mathbf{R}_{-i}) \in \Re^n$.

A *clustering technique* is a function $C : E^{2n} \rightarrow \Pi$. A clustering technique is intended to put together as members of the same group or cluster the agents that are "similar" among themselves and separate them from those that are less similar, the definition of the similarity degree being implicit in function C. Therefore, $\forall \mathbf{x} = (x, y, ..., z) \in E^{2n}$, $C(\mathbf{x})$ is a possible partition of the set N, so whenever $i \in C_j(\mathbf{x})$, it must be true that $j \in C_i(\mathbf{x})$ and $C_j(\mathbf{x}) = C_i(\mathbf{x})$. In this case we say that agents $i \in N$ and $j \in N$ belong to the same cluster, that is, $C_j(\mathbf{x}) = C_i(\mathbf{x}) \in C(\mathbf{x}) \in \Pi$. The elements in E^{2n} used by function C to generate clusters are interpreted as the *reported* "peaks" of the agents, i.e., any agent $i \in N$ report a peak $x_i \in E^2$ that can be either the true peak $p(R_i)$ (agent i's most preferred location in the plane E^2) or a different one[2]. There

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[1] Conditions (1) and (2) together with the assumption of continuity of preferences is a possible definition of the concept of "single-peakedness" when extended to two dimensions.

[2] Notice that the declared or reported vector of peaks of the agents $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, ..., x_n)$ do not need to coincide with the true vector of peaks $p(\mathbf{R}) = (p(R_i), ..., p(R_n))$ given the (true) economy $\mathbf{R} = (R_1, ..., R_n) \in \Re^n$, but they are the only information that the planner has to make the clustering decision.

are hundreds of clustering techniques proposed in the literature -see Everitt (1993) for an excellent survey, for example-, each one characterized by different concepts of the "distance" between groups of individuals and the way they are formed, either using algorithms or optimization techniques. We only need a very loose characterization of admissible clustering techniques that is fulfilled by most of them.

Definition 1 *A clustering technique C is **admissible** if the following two conditions hold:*

(i). $\exists \widehat{d} \in E_{++}$, such that $\forall \mathbf{x} = (x_i, x_j, x_{-i-j}) \in E^{2n}$ such that $\exists i \in N$ with $d(x_i, x_j) \geq \widehat{d} \; \forall j \in N \rightarrow i \notin C_j(\mathbf{x}) \; \forall j \in N$.

(ii). $\exists \widetilde{d} \in E_{++}$, such that $\forall \mathbf{x} = (x_i, x_j, x_{-i-j}) \in E^{2n}$ such that $\exists i, j \in N$ with $d(x_i, x_j) \leq \widetilde{d} \rightarrow i \in C_j(\mathbf{x})$.

Condition (i) implies that when an agent's reported peak is far enough from any other's peak, it deserves to form an independent cluster. Analogously, condition (ii) means that when two agents' reported peaks are close enough they must belong to the same cluster. Notice that, in particular, (ii) guarantees that any two agents with preferences such that their peaks are located in the same place must always be in the same cluster. Now, we provide a very general model for the public choice taken in each cluster. We only assume that the choice must be efficient when considering the members of the cluster alone -they might vote or reach agreements to locate the public service.

Definition 2 *Given any clustering technique C, a **public location function** is a function $L^C : \Re^n \rightarrow E^{2n}$ such that $\forall \mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$ with associated vector of peaks $p(\mathbf{R}) = (p(R_1), ..., p(R_n)) \in E^{2n}$, $L^C(\mathbf{R}) = (L_1^C(\mathbf{R}), ..., L_n^C(\mathbf{R})) \in E^{2n}$ is such that the following two conditions hold:*

(i'). $\forall i, j \in N$, $i \in C_j(p(\mathbf{R})) \rightarrow L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) = L_j^C(\mathbf{R}) \in E^2$.

(ii'). $\forall i \in N$, there does not exist $z \in E^2$ such that $zP_j L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) \; \forall j \in N$ such that $j \in C_i(p(\mathbf{R}))$.

A public location function establishes a common Pareto-efficient location for the public service for all members within each cluster. Condition (i') forces a single location for all the agents belonging to the same cluster and condition (ii') imposes that any location chosen for a given cluster cannot be Pareto-dominated by some other location. Notice that for any economy and for any cluster there always exist efficient locations and well-defined public location functions (consider, for example, choosing $\forall \mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$, $\forall i \in N$, $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) = p(R_h)$, where $h \in N$ is defined as $h = \min \{j \in C_i(\mathbf{R})\}$).

Definition 3 *An **allocation method** in our model is a pair (C, L) where C is an admissible clustering technique and L is a public location function.*

Now, we define the strategic property we are interested in:

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Definition 4 *An allocation method (C, L) is **manipulable** at economy $\mathbf{R} = (R_i, \mathbf{R}_{-i}) \in \Re^n$ by individual $i \in N$, if there exists a preference relation $R_i' \in \Re$ such that $L_i^C(R_i', \mathbf{R}_{-i}) P_i L_i^C(\mathbf{R})$.*

Definition 5 *An allocation method (C, L) is **strategy-proof** if it is not manipulable at any economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$ by any individual $i \in N$.*

We are now prepared to state our result.

Theorem 1 *There are no strategy-proof allocation methods under our assumptions*

Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Let (C, L) be a strategy-proof allocation method. Let us consider any two individuals $i, j \in N$ and the following economy $\mathbf{R} = (R_i, R_j, \mathbf{R}_{-i-j}) \in \Re^n : R_i \in \Re$, with peak $p(R_i)$ at $(0, 0)$ is any preference relation that can be represented by the following utility function: $\forall x = (x^1, x^2) \in E^2$,

$$u_i(x^1, x^2) = \begin{cases} -sign(x^2)x^2 + bx^1 & \text{if } x^1 \leq 0 \\ -sign(x^2)x^2 - cx^1 & \text{if } x^1 \geq 0 \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

where $b = \dfrac{\widetilde{\delta}}{2\left(\widehat{\delta} + \varepsilon\right)}$ and $c = 1$ ($\varepsilon > 0$ is any positive number)[3]. It is easy to check that preferences $R_i \in \Re$ above have indifference curves on the plane that correspond to a rhomboid with center in agent $i's$ peak - the origin $(0, 0)$- like the one depicted in *Figure 1*. The axis of the rhombus coincide with both x^1 and x^2. When we have $b = c = 1$, we obtain a symmetric rhombus. Notice that parameter b determines the slopes of the rhomboid left sides (for negative values of x^1) and parameter c determines the slopes of the rhomboid for positive values of x^2. The number $-a$ (the intercept of the rhomboid for negative values of x^2) is used as the measure of the utility that generates utility function $u_i(x^1, x^2)$, which is in fact a pyramid generating the rhomboids as level curves.

Agent $j's$ preferences $R_j \in \Re$, with peak $p(R_j)$ at $(\widetilde{d}, 0)$ is any preference relation that can be represented by the following utility function: $\forall x = (x^1, x^2) \in E^2$,

$$u_j(x^1, x^2) = \begin{cases} -sign(x^2)x^2 + b(x^1 - \widetilde{d}) & \text{if } x^1 \leq \widetilde{d} \\ -sign(x^2)x^2 - c(x^1 - \widetilde{d}) & \text{if } x^1 \geq \widetilde{d} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

where $b = 1$ and $c = \dfrac{\widetilde{\delta}}{2\left(\widehat{\delta} + \varepsilon\right)}$ ($\varepsilon > 0$ is any positive number). This preference relation is analogous to the former one, the indifferent curves being rhomboids centered at $(x^1, x^2) = (\widetilde{d}, 0)$. The remaining agents $h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$

[3]Note that $\widehat{\delta}$ and $\widetilde{\delta}$ have already been defined inside *Definition 1*.

Figure 1:

have the same preferences $R_h \in \Re$, with peak $p(R_h)$ at $(\widetilde{d} + \widehat{d}, 0)$, that can be represented by the following utility function: $\forall x = (x^1, x^2) \in E^2$,

$$u_h(x^1, x^2) = \begin{cases} -sign(x^2)x^2 + b(x^1 - \left[\widetilde{d} + \widehat{d}\right]) & \text{if } x^1 \leq \widetilde{d} + \widehat{d} \\ -sign(x^2)x^2 - c(x^1 - \left[\widetilde{d} + \widehat{d}\right]) & \text{if } x^1 \geq \widetilde{d} + \widehat{d} \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

Again, with $b = c = 1$. Let $p(\mathbf{R}) \in E^{2n}$ be the vector of peaks of economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$, i.e., $p(\mathbf{R}) = (p(R_i), p(R_j), p(\mathbf{R})_{-i-j})$. By construction, (i) and (ii), it holds for $\mathbf{R} = (R_i, R_j, \mathbf{R}_{-i-j}) \in \Re^n$ that $i \in C_j(p(\mathbf{R}))$ and $\forall h, w \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$, it holds that $h \in C_w(p(\mathbf{R}))$ by (ii), while $i \notin C_h(\mathbf{x}) \; \forall h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$, so since $C(p(\mathbf{R}))$ is a partition of N, it must be the case of $j \notin C_h(\mathbf{x}) \; \forall h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$. Now, we prove that L^C must be such that $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) = L_j^C(\mathbf{R}) \in \left[(0,0), (\widetilde{d}, 0)\right]$ by (i') and (ii'). Given preferences $R_i, R_j \in \Re$, the only Pareto-optimal locations are on the straight line connecting both peaks -a segment lying on the x axis-: any other location $(x^1, x^2) \in E^2$ such that $x^1 < 0$ or $x^1 > \widetilde{d}$ are Pareto-dominated when considering only members of the cluster $i, j \in N$ by $(x^1, x^2) = (0, 0)$ and $(x^1, x^2) = (\widetilde{d}, 0)$ respectively and any other location such that $0 \leq x^1 \leq \widetilde{d}$ and $x^2 \neq 0$ is dominated by location $(x^1, 0)$ -both agents i and j attain a higher utility level given their preferences in (1) and (2) at the beginning of the proof-. Now, there are only two possibilities to consider: **Case**

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1: $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) = L_j^C(\mathbf{R}) = (\overline{x}^1, 0)$ with $\dfrac{\widetilde{d}}{2} \leq \overline{x}^1 \leq \widetilde{d}$. Then, we can imagine the admissible economy $\mathbf{R}' = (R_i', \mathbf{R}_{-i}) \in \Re^n$ where all preferences are the same as those in $\mathbf{R} \in \Re$ with the exception of individual $i's$ new preferences $R_i' \in \Re$, which can be represented by the following utility function u_i': $\forall x = (x^1, x^2) \in E^2$,

$$u_i'(x^1, x^2) = \begin{cases} -sign(x^2)x^2 + b(x^1 + \widehat{\delta}) & \text{if } x^1 \leq 0 \\ -sign(x^2)x^2 - c(x^1 + \widehat{\delta}) & \text{if } x^1 \geq 0 \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

where $c = b = 1$. This preference relation is a rhomboid centered at $(-\widehat{\delta}, 0)$, so $p(R_i') = (-\widehat{\delta}, 0)$. First of all, notice that given preferences $R_i \in \Re$, it holds that $u_i(-\widehat{\delta}, 0) > u_i(\overline{x}^1, 0)$, or, in other words,

$$(-\widehat{\delta}, 0)P_i(\overline{x}^1, 0) \tag{5}$$

Now, let us consider economy $\mathbf{R}' = (R_i', \mathbf{R}_{-i}) \in \Re^n$. Let $p(\mathbf{R}') \in E^{2n}$ be the vector of peaks associated to economy $\mathbf{R}' \in \Re^n$. Therefore, $p(R_i') = (-\widehat{\delta}, 0)$, $p(R_j') = p(R_j) = (\widetilde{\delta}, 0)$ and $p(R_h') = p(R_h) = (\widetilde{\delta} + \widehat{\delta}, 0)$ $\forall h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$. Now, notice that by (i), $j, h \notin C_i(p(\mathbf{R}'))$ $\forall h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$, so agent $i \in N$ form her own cluster in economy $\mathbf{R}' \in \Re^n$ and by (i') and (ii') above, it must be the case of $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}') = p(R_i') = (-\widehat{\delta}, 0)$, while the public location for agent $i \in N$ associated to economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$ is by assumption $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) = (\overline{x}^1, 0)$. Now, (5) above can be written as: $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}') = L_i^C(R_i', \mathbf{R}_{-i})P_iL_i^C(\mathbf{R}')$, so the allocation method (C, L) is manipulable at economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$ with vector of peaks $p(\mathbf{R}) \in E^{2n}$ by individual $i \in N$ by means of reporting false preferences $R_i' \in \Re$. Hence, (C, L) is not strategy-proof, entering into contradiction with our initial assumption. The only case left is **Case 2**: $L_i^C(\mathbf{R}) = L_j^C(\mathbf{R}) = (\overline{x}^1, 0)$ with $\dfrac{\widetilde{d}}{2} \geq \overline{x}^1 \geq 0$. If this is the case, let us consider the following economy: $\mathbf{R}'' = (R_j', \mathbf{R}_{-j}) \in \Re^n$, with associated vector of peaks $p(\mathbf{R}'') \in E^{2n}$ where all agents with the exception of $j \in N$ have the same preferences they had in economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$, and agent j's new preferences are: $R_j' = R_h$ $\forall h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$ (i.e., those represented by utility function (3) above). The vector of peaks $p(\mathbf{R}'') \in E^{2n}$ will then be: $p(\mathbf{R}'') = (p(R_i), p(R_j'), p(\mathbf{R})_{-i-j}) = ((0, 0), (\widetilde{\delta} + \widehat{\delta}, 0), ..., (\widetilde{\delta} + \widehat{\delta}, 0))$. By (i) and (ii), it holds for economy $\mathbf{R}'' \in \Re^n$ that $j, h \notin C_i(p(\mathbf{R}''))$ $\forall h \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$ and $\forall h, w \neq i$, $h \in C_w(p(\mathbf{R}''))$. By (i') and (ii'), $L_j(\mathbf{R}'') = p(R_j') = p(R_h) = (\widetilde{\delta} + \widehat{\delta}, 0)$. Now, notice that given preferences $R_j \in \Re$, it holds that $u_j(\widetilde{\delta} + \widehat{\delta}, 0) > u_i(\overline{x}^1, 0)$, -see *Figure 2*- or, in other words,

$$(\widetilde{\delta} + \widehat{\delta}, 0)P_i(\overline{x}^1, 0) \tag{6}$$

Now, notice that expression (6) above can be written as:

$$L_j^C(\mathbf{R}'') = L_j^C(R_j', \mathbf{R}_{-j})P_iL_j^C(\mathbf{R}). \tag{7}$$

Figure 2:

Hence, allocation method (C, L) is manipulable at economy $\mathbf{R} \in \Re^n$ with vector of peaks $p(\mathbf{R}) \in E^{2n}$ by individual $j \in N$ by means of reporting false preferences $R'_j \in \Re$. Thus, (C, L) is not strategy-proof in this case either, so we cannot avoid contradictions and the theorem is proved. ∎

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