Optimal Piecewise Linear Income Taxation

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Abstract

Given its significance in practice, the piecewise linear tax system seems to have received disproportionately little attention in the literature on optimal income taxation. This paper offers a simple and transparent analysis of its main characteristics.

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1 Introduction

The foundations of the theory of optimal income taxation were provided by the theory of nonlinear taxation first developed by James Mirrlees (1971), and the theory of linear taxation formulated by Eytan Sheshinski (1972). In Mirrlees’s analysis, the problem is seen as one of mechanism design. An optimally chosen menu of marginal tax rates and lump sum tax/subsidies is offered, and individuals select from this menu in a way that reveals their productivity type. As well as the government budget constraint therefore, a key role is played by incentive compatibility or self selection constraints. In Sheshinski’s linear tax analysis on the other hand, there is no attempt to solve the mechanism design problem. All individuals are pooled, and the problem is to find the optimal marginal tax rate and lump sum subsidy over the population as a whole, subject only to the government budget constraint. In each case, the theory provides an analysis of how concerns with the equity and efficiency of a tax system interact to determine the parameters of that system, and in particular its marginal rate structure and degree of progressivity. As Boadway (1998) points out, the optimal nonlinear tax is Pareto superior to a linear tax for any given revenue requirement and set of consumers, implying a superior tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Nevertheless, tax policy makers or "central planners" do not seem to adopt the Mirrlees approach to the design of tax systems in practice.

In reality most tax systems are neither linear in the sense of Sheshinski nor nonlinear in the sense of Mirrlees, but rather piecewise linear. Gross income is divided into (usually relatively few) brackets and marginal tax rates are constant within but vary across these brackets.\footnote{The German tax system is a rare exception to this. It has four brackets and in the second and third of these marginal tax rates increase linearly with income. For further discussion see Apps and Rees (2009a).} When we consider formal income tax systems, the marginal tax rates are typically strictly increasing with the income levels defining the brackets. We refer to this case of strict marginal rate progressivity as the convex case, since it defines for an income earner a convex budget set in the space of gross income-net income/consumption. However, when we widen the definition of the tax system to include cash transfers that are paid and withdrawn as a function of gross income we see that typically this may lead marginal tax rates to fall over some range as gross income increases. Since this introduces nonconvexities into the budget set income earners actually face, we refer to this as the nonconvex...
The reason for planners’ preference for piecewise linear as opposed to optimal nonlinear tax systems could be that the former overcome a large part of the inefficiency of a simple linear tax while remaining relatively simple to implement. The present paper is concerned with the realistic case in which policy makers are not trying to solve a mechanism design problem. It can therefore be regarded as an extension of optimal linear taxation, rather than a restricted or approximative form of optimal nonlinear taxation. As we see below, interpretation of the results draws heavily on optimal linear taxation theory.

The problem of the empirical estimation of labour supply functions when a worker/consumer faces a piecewise linear budget constraint has been widely discussed in the econometrics literature. Moreover, the literature on the estimation of the marginal social cost of public funds has been concerned with the deadweight losses associated with raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in the context of some given piecewise linear tax system, which is assumed not to represent an optimal tax system. Yet there is surprisingly little analysis of the general problem of optimal piecewise linear income taxation. There are two main papers in the theoretical literature on the continuum-of-types case, by Sheshinski (1989) and Slemrod et al (1994). We believe these papers leave the literature in a rather unfinished state, despite the fact that the paper by Slemrod et al gives a very thorough and insightful discussion of the results of its simulation analysis of the nonconvex case, as well as of the problem of piecewise linear taxation in a model consisting of only two types.

The contribution by Sheshinski was the first to formulate and solve the problem of the optimal two-bracket piecewise linear tax system, including the choice of the bracket threshold, for a continuum of worker/consumer-types. However, he claims to have shown that, under standard assumptions, marginal rate progressivity, the convex case, must always hold: in the social

\footnote{It could also be mentioned that the mechanism design approach does not extend readily to deal with realistic aspects of tax systems, for example two-earner households and multiple time periods. For further discussion of this see Apps and Rees (2009b).}

\footnote{For a very extensive discussion see in particular Pudney (1989).}

\footnote{See in particular Dahlby (1998).}

\footnote{Strawczynski (1998) also considers the optimal piecewise linear income tax, but gross income in his model is exogenous and attention is focussed, as in Varian (1980) on income uncertainty, where taxation essentially becomes social insurance. Kesselman and Garfinkel (1978) compare linear and piecewise linear tax systems in a two-type economy, taking however the tax brackets as fixed. Sadka et al (1982) extend this to the case of a continuum of types.}
optimum the tax rate on the higher income bracket must always exceed that on the lower. Slemrod et al (1996) show that Sheshinski’s proof does not hold in general because it ignores the existence of a discontinuity in the tax revenue function in the nonconvex case. They then carry out simulations which, using standard functional forms for the social welfare function, the individual utility function and the distribution of wage rates/productivities, in all cases produce the converse result - the upper-bracket marginal tax rate is optimally always lower.

The result that a nonconvex system could be optimal should not be surprising; for example it is foreshadowed by Sadka (1976), who established the "no distortion at the top" result for optimal nonlinear taxation and provided a strong intuition for why marginal tax rates could be lower at higher levels of income. The fact that the nonconvex case always turns out to be optimal is however also somewhat problematic, for two reasons. First, in general non-parameterised models there is no reason to rule out the convex case, and there is the possibility that the specific functional forms and parameter values chosen by Slemrod et al for their simulations are biased toward producing the nonconvexity result. Secondly, in practice, in virtually all countries, tax systems do in fact exhibit a substantial degree of marginal rate progressivity. It is as if tax policy makers when designing the formal tax system aim for a basically convex system. However, adjustments are made, possibly by other agencies of government, which relate to specific income ranges, typically at the low-to-middle end of the income distribution, and which have the effect of introducing nonconvexities. Leading examples are earned income tax credit systems or "targeted" cash benefit payments which are withdrawn as a function of gross income.

In this paper, we find it useful to separate the two types of system and examine the conditions that characterise a system when it is optimal. We provide a simple and transparent model which allows the characteristics of each type of tax system, and particularly the optimal bracket thresholds, to be easily seen and compared, and characterise for the first time the optimal marginal tax rates in the nonconvex case.

\footnote{Which does however exhibit average tax rate progressivity.}
2 Individual Choice Problems

We present first the analysis of the choice problems for the individual in the face of respectively convex and nonconvex tax systems. In the next section we discuss the optimal tax structures in each case.

Consumers have identical quasilinear utility functions\(^7\)

\[ u = x - D(l) \quad D' > 0, \quad D'' > 0 \quad (1) \]

where \(x\) is consumption and \(l\) is labour supply. Gross income is \(y = wl\), with the wage rate \(w \in [w_0, w_1] \subset \mathbb{R}_+\). Given a two-bracket tax system with parameters \((a, t_1, t_2, \hat{y})\), with \(a\) the lump sum payment to all households, \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) the marginal tax rates in the first and second brackets respectively, and \(\hat{y}\) the income level determining the upper limit of the first bracket, the consumer faces the budget constraint

\[ x \leq a + (1 - t_1)y \quad y \leq \hat{y} \quad (2) \]

\[ x \leq a + (t_2 - t_1)\hat{y} + (1 - t_2)y \quad y > \hat{y} \quad (3) \]

We assume a differentiable wage distribution function, \(F(w)\), with continuous density \(f(w)\), strictly positive for all \(w \in [w_0, w_1]\).

2.1 Convex case: \(t_1 \leq t_2\)

There are three solution possibilities:\(^8\)

(i) Optimal income \(y^* < \hat{y}\). In that case we have the first order condition

\[ 1 - t_1 - D'(\frac{y}{w}) \frac{1}{w} = 0 \quad (4) \]

Defining \(\psi(.)\) as the inverse function of \(D'(.)\), this yields

\[ y^* = w\psi((1 - t_1)w) \equiv \phi(t_1, w) \quad (5) \]

\(^7\)Thus we are ruling out income effects. This considerably clarifies the results of the analysis.

\(^8\)It is assumed throughout that all consumers have positive labour supply in equilibrium. It could of course be the case that for some lowest sub interval of wage rates consumers have zero labour supply. We do not explicitly consider this case but it is not difficult to extend the discussion to take it into account.
giving in turn the indirect utility function

\[ v(a, t_1, w) = a + (1 - t_1)\phi(t_1, w) - D\left(\frac{\phi(t_1, w)}{w}\right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

with derivatives

\[ \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} = 1; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_1} = -\phi(t_1, w); \quad \frac{dv}{dw} = D'(\frac{y}{w})\frac{\phi(t_1, w)}{w^2} > 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

We define the unique value of the wage type \( \hat{w} \) by

\[ \hat{y} = \phi(t_1, \hat{w}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Note that \( w < \hat{w} \Rightarrow y^* < \hat{y}, \) and \( \partial \hat{w}/\partial \hat{y} > 0. \)

(ii) Optimal income \( y^* > \hat{y}. \) In that case we have

\[ 1 - t_2 - D'(\frac{y}{w}) \frac{1}{w} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

implying

\[ y^* = \phi(t_2, w) \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

and the indirect utility

\[ v(a, t_1, t_2, \hat{y}, w) = a + (t_2 - t_1)\hat{y} + (1 - t_2)\phi(t_2, w) - D\left(\frac{\phi(t_1, w)}{w}\right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (11)

with derivatives

\[ \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} = 1; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_1} = -\hat{y}; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_2} = -(\phi(t_2, w) - \hat{y}); \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial \hat{y}} = (t_2 - t_1) \]  \hspace{1cm} (12)

and \( dv/dw > 0 \) just as before. We define the unique wage type \( \hat{w} \) by

\[ \hat{y} = \phi(t_2, \hat{w}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (13)

and we have \( w > \hat{w} \Rightarrow y^* > \hat{y}, \) and \( \partial \hat{w}/\partial \hat{y} > 0. \)

(iii) Optimal income \( y^* = \hat{y}. \) In that case the consumer’s indirect utility is

\[ v(a, t_1, \hat{y}, w) = a + (1 - t_1)\hat{y} - D\left(\frac{\hat{y}}{w}\right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (14)

and the derivatives of the indirect utility function are

\[ \frac{\partial v}{\partial a} = 1; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_1} = -\hat{y}; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial \hat{y}} = (1 - t_1) - D'(\frac{\hat{y}}{w}) \frac{1}{w} \geq 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (15)
To summarise these results: the consumers can be partitioned into three subsets according to their wage type, denoted \( C_0 = [w_0, \bar{w}), C_1 = [\bar{w}, \bar{\bar{w}}), C_2 = (\bar{\bar{w}}, w_1] \), with \( C \equiv C_0 \cup C_1 \cup C_2 = [w_0, w_1] \). \( C_0 \) consists of consumers in equilibrium at tangencies along the steeper part of the budget constraint, \( C_1 \) the consumers at the kink, and \( C_2 \) the consumers at tangencies on the flatter part of the budget constraint.\(^9\)

Note that the consumers in \( C_1 \), with the exception of type \( \bar{w} \), are effectively constrained at \( \bar{y} \) in the sense that they would prefer to earn extra gross income if it could be taxed at the rate \( t_1 \), since \( D'(\bar{w}) < (1 - t_1)w \), but since it would in fact be taxed at the higher rate \( t_2 \), they prefer to stay at \( \bar{y} \).

Given the continuity of \( F(w) \), consumers are continuously distributed around this budget constraint, with both maximised utility \( v \) and gross income \( y \) continuous functions of \( w \). \( v \) is strictly increasing in \( w \) for all \( w \), and \( y^* \) is also strictly increasing in \( w \) except over the interval \( C_1 \). Finally, note that if \( t_1 = t_2 \), \( C_1 \) shrinks to a point.

### 2.2 Nonconvex case: \( t_1 > t_2 \)

Here there are again three solution possibilities. Given \( \bar{y}, a, t_1 \) and \( t_2 \), with \( t_1 > t_2 \), there is a unique consumer type denoted by \( \hat{w} \), the solution to the equation

\[
(1 - t_1)\phi(t_1, w) - D\left(\frac{\phi(t_1, w)}{w}\right) = (1 - t_2)\phi(t_2, w) - D\left(\frac{\phi(t_2, w)}{w}\right)
\]

(16)

where \( \phi(.) \) has the same meaning as before. In equilibrium this type is indifferent between the two tax brackets. Note that

\[
\phi(t_1, \hat{w}) < \hat{y} < \phi(t_2, \hat{w})
\]

(17)

and that \( \partial \hat{w} / \partial \hat{y} > 0 \). The income of consumers in \([w_0, \hat{w})\) is \( \phi(t_1, w) \) and in \((\hat{w}, w_1]\) is \( \phi(t_2, w) \). They pay taxes of \( t_1 \phi(t_1, w) \) and \( t_2 \phi(t_2, w) + (t_1 - t_2)\bar{y} \) respectively.

For individuals of type \( \hat{w} \), the tax payments at the two local maxima are respectively \( t_1 \phi(t_1, \hat{w}) \) and \([t_2(\phi(t_2, \hat{w}) - \hat{y}) + t_1 \bar{y}] > t_1 \phi(t_1, \hat{w}) \). In this case, although maximised utility is a continuous function of \( w \) over \([w_0, w_1]\), optimal gross income and the resulting tax revenue are not. There is an upward jump in both at \( \hat{w} \).

Tax paid by a consumer of type \( \hat{w} \) if she chooses

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\(^9\)We assume that the tax parameters are such that none of these subsets is empty.
to be in the higher tax bracket is always higher than that if she chooses the lower bracket, even though the tax rate in the latter is higher. Since however consumers of type $\hat{w}$ are a set of measure zero, their choice of gross income is of no consequence for social welfare or tax revenue. Nevertheless, this discontinuity will play an important role in the optimal tax analysis, as we see in the next section.

Consumers with wages in $[w_0, \hat{w})$ have indirect utilities

$$v(a, t_1, w) = a + (1 - t_1)\phi(t_1, w) - D\left(\frac{\phi(t_1, w)}{w}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

with

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial a} = 1; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_1} = -\phi(t_1, w)$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

and for those in $(\hat{w}, w_1]$,

$$v(a, t_1, t_2, \hat{y}, w) = a + (t_2 - t_1)\hat{y} + (1 - t_2)\phi(t_2, w) - D\left(\frac{\phi(t_2, w)}{w}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

with

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial a} = 1; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_1} = -\hat{y}; \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial t_2} = -(\phi(t_2, w) - \hat{y}); \quad \frac{\partial v}{\partial \hat{y}} = (t_2 - t_1) < 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

We can now turn to the optimal tax analysis.

3 Optimal Taxation

3.1 The optimal convex tax system

We assume that the optimal taxation system is convex. The planner chooses the parameters of the tax system to maximise a social welfare function defined as

$$\int_{C_0} S[v(a, t_1, w)]dF + \int_{C_1} S[v(a, t_1, \hat{y}, w)]dF + \int_{C_2} S[v(a, t_1, t_2, \hat{y}, w)]dF$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

where $S(.)$ is a continuously differentiable, strictly concave and increasing social welfare function. The government budget constraint is

$$\int_{C_0} t_1\phi(t_1, w)dF + \int_{C_1} t_1\hat{y}dF + \int_{C_2} [t_2\phi(t_2, w) + (t_1 - t_2)\hat{y}]dF - a - G \geq 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)
where $G \geq 0$ is a per capita revenue requirement.

From the first order conditions$^{10}$ we derive the following:

**Result 1:**

$$\int_C \left( \frac{S'(v(w))}{\lambda} - 1 \right) dF = 0$$

(24)

where $\lambda$ is the shadow price of tax revenue.$^{11}$ This is essentially the same condition as for linear taxation. The marginal social utility of income averaged across the population is equated to the marginal social cost of public expenditure, implying that the dollar value of this average marginal social utility is equated to the dollar marginal cost of expenditure, which is 1. The first term in the brackets is a money measure of the marginal social utility of income to a consumer of type $w$.

It is useful for later discussion to have the following

**Lemma:** $S'(v(w))$ continuous and monotonically decreasing in $w$ implies

$$\int_{w_0}^{\tau} \left( \frac{S'(v(w))}{\lambda} - 1 \right) f(w) dw > 0 \text{ for } \tau \in [w_0, w_1]$$

(25)

and

$$\int_{\tau}^{w_1} \left( \frac{S'(v(w))}{\lambda} - 1 \right) f(w) dw < 0 \text{ for } \tau \in (w_0, w_1]$$

(26)

**Proof:** Since $S'(v(w))$ is continuous and monotonically decreasing in $w$,(24) implies that there exists $w^* \in (w_0, w_1)$ such that $S'(v(w^*)) - \lambda = 0$, $S'(v(w)) - \lambda > 0$, for $w \in [w_0, w^*)$, and $S'(v(w)) - \lambda < 0$, for $w \in (w^*, w_1]$. Then $f(w) > 0$ on $[w_0, w_1]$ implies, again from (24), that

$$\int_{w_0}^{w^*} \left( \frac{S'(v(w))}{\lambda} - 1 \right) f(w) dw = - \int_{w^*}^{w_1} \left( \frac{S'(v(w))}{\lambda} - 1 \right) f(w) dw$$

(27)

which gives the result.

Assuming an interior solution with $t_1 < t_2$, the condition characterising the optimal lower bracket tax rate yields

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$^{10}$In deriving these conditions, it must of course be taken into account that the limits of integration $\bar{w}$ and $\bar{\bar{w}}$ are functions of the tax parameters. Because of the continuity of utility, optimal gross income and tax revenue in $w$, these effects all cancel and the first order conditions reduce to those shown here.

$^{11}$Or the marginal social cost of public expenditure. Needless to say, if we assume that the planner has optimised the tax system, the problem of estimating this parameter becomes much simpler than it is taken to be in the literature on this problem.
Result 2:

\[
  t_1^* = \frac{\int_{C_0} (\frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1)[\phi(t_1^*, w) - \hat{y}^*]dF}{\int_{C_0} \frac{\partial \phi(t_1^*, w)}{\partial t_1}dF} \tag{28}
\]

The denominator, which is negative, can be interpreted as the efficiency effect of the tax. The numerator is the equity effect. Using the above lemma it can be shown that this numerator is also negative and so the tax rate is positive. Thus, given \( C_0 = [w_0, \bar{w}] \) and \( \phi(t_1^*, w) - \hat{y}^* < 0 \) in this interval, \( \bar{w} \leq w^* \) gives the result immediately. If \( \bar{w} > w^* \), since \( (S'(v(w)) - \lambda)f(w) > 0 \) and \( \phi(t_1^*, w) < \phi(t_1^*, w^*) \) for \( w \in [w_0, w^*] \), we have

\[
  \int_{w_0}^{w^*} [\hat{y}^* - \phi(t_1^*, w)](S'(v(w)) - \lambda)f(w)dw > \int_{w_0}^{w^*} [\hat{y}^* - \phi(t_1^*, w^*)](S'(v(w)) - \lambda)f(w)dw \tag{29}
\]

while \( (S'(v(w)) - \lambda)f(w) < 0 \) and \( \phi(t_1^*, w) > \phi(t_1^*, w^*) \) for \( w \in (w^*, \bar{w}) \) implies

\[
  \int_{w^*}^{\bar{w}} [\hat{y}^* - \phi(t_1^*, w)](S'(v(w)) - \lambda)f(w)dw > \int_{w^*}^{\bar{w}} [\hat{y}^* - \phi(t_1^*, w^*)](S'(v(w)) - \lambda)f(w)dw \tag{30}
\]

Adding these two inequalities and applying the lemma with \( \tau = \bar{w} \) then gives

\[
  \int_{C_0} [\hat{y}^* - \phi(t_1^*, w)](S'(v(w)) - \lambda)dF > [\hat{y}^* - \phi(t_1^*, w^*)] \int_{C_0} (S'(v(w)) - \lambda)dF > 0 \tag{31}
\]

as required.

An interesting aspect of this condition is that \( t_1 \) is set in the light of its effects only on efficiency and income distribution within the subset \( C_0 \), in a way that is analogous to\(^{12}\) the setting of a linear tax on a population as a whole, even though it also affects utility and tax burdens of the consumers in \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \). The reason for this is that in both these subsets, the effect of a change in \( t_1 \) on utility \((-\hat{y}^*)\) is the negative of its effect on tax revenue \((\hat{y}^*)\).

The first order condition determining \( t_1^* \) can then be written as

\[
  t_1^* \int_{C_0} \frac{\partial \phi(t_1^*, w)}{\partial t_1}dF = \int_{C_0} \left( \frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1 \right)\hat{y}^*dF + \hat{y}^* \int_{C_1 \cup C_2} \left( \frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1 \right)dF \tag{32}
\]

Using (24) then gives Result 2.

\(^{12}\)But not identical to, since the numerator term is not the covariance of the marginal social utility of income and gross income for the subset \( C_0 \).
Result 3:

\[
t_2^* = \frac{\int_{C_2} \left( \frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1 \right) [\phi(t_2^*, w) - \hat{y}^*] dF}{\int_{C_2} \frac{\partial \phi(t_2^*, w)}{\partial t_2} dF}
\]  

(33)

Here \( \phi(t_1^*, w) - \hat{y}^* > 0 \) and is increasing in \( w \), and the numerator here can also be shown to be negative, along the same lines as for \( t_1^* \). Again, the optimal tax rate for the subgroup \( C_2 \) is determined (given \( \hat{y}^* \)) entirely by the characteristics of the wage types in this group. Thus, given the optimal choice of tax brackets, the optimal tax rates are set as optimal linear taxes over the sub-populations strictly within each bracket.

Since in the convex case we must have \( t_1^* < t_2^* \), we see that this case is likely to be globally optimal the greater the aggregate deadweight efficiency loss within the \( C_0 \) group relative to that in the \( C_2 \) group, and the more powerful the marginal tax rate is as a redistributive instrument within the \( C_2 \) group relative to the \( C_0 \) group, given of course the optimal choices of \( a \) and \( \hat{y} \). Note that the proportion of the consumers falling into group \( C_1 \), \( \int_{C_1} dF \), plays no direct role in determining these tax rates. It does however of course influence the choice of \( \hat{y} \).

Result 4:

The first order condition with respect to \( \hat{y} \) can be written as

\[
\int_{C_1} \left\{ \frac{S'}{\lambda} v_{\hat{y}} + t_*^1 \right\} dF = -(t_2^* - t_1^*) \int_{C_2} \left( \frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1 \right) dF
\]  

(34)

The left hand side gives the marginal social benefit of a relaxation of the constraint on the consumer types in \( C_1 \) who are effectively constrained by \( \hat{y} \). First, for \( w \in (\hat{w}, \bar{w}] \) the marginal utility with respect to a relaxation of the gross income constraint is \( v_{\hat{y}} = (1 - t_1) - D'(\frac{\hat{y}}{w}) \frac{1}{w} > 0 \), as shown earlier. This is weighted by the marginal social utility of income to these consumer types. Moreover, since they increase their gross income, this increases tax revenue at the rate \( t_1^* \). The right hand side is positive and gives the marginal social cost of increasing \( \hat{y} \), thus, since \( t_2^* > t_1^* \), reducing the tax burden on the higher income group. This can be thought of as equivalent to giving a lump sum payment to higher rate taxpayers proportionate to the difference in marginal tax rates, and this is weighted by a term reflecting the net marginal social utilities of income to consumers in this group. A necessary condition for the possibility of this solution is that \( \left[ \int_{C_2} dF \right]^{-1} \int_{C_2} \frac{S'}{\lambda} dF < 1 \), so that the marginal social utility of the upper bracket consumers is on average below
the population average. The planner then suffers a distributional loss from giving this group a lump sum income increase. Sheshinski argued that if \( t_2^* < t_1^* \) the term on the right hand side of (34) must be negative, yielding a contradiction, and therefore ruling out the possibility of nonconvex taxation. However, because of the discontinuity in the tax revenue function in the nonconvex case, this is not the appropriate necessary condition in that case, as was pointed out by Slemrod et al.

We can obtain more intuition on these results by considering Figure 1.

**Figure 1 about here**

Figure 1 illustrates the comparison between the optimal linear tax and the optimal convex two-bracket tax. The line \( a_L L \) represents the budget constraint facing all consumers under the optimal linear tax, \( a_C C D \) that under the optimal piecewise linear tax. One budget constraint cannot lie entirely above the other over the relevant domain of \( y \)-values since this would imply that one of them violates the government budget constraint. Thus there must be at least one intersection point within the domain of \( y \)-values. Special cases can be constructed in which there might be only one intersection, but here we consider the case of two such points, at \( A \) and \( B \), with \( a_C < a_L \).

The essential feature of the illustration is that the piecewise linear tax system redistributes welfare away from the ends towards the middle: all consumers of wage types in the interval \((w_A, w_B)\) are strictly better off under the piecewise linear tax, those in \([w_0, w_A)\) and \((w_B, w_1]\) are strictly worse off. All consumers in the lower tax bracket under the piecewise linear tax will expand their (compensated) labour supplies, all those in the higher bracket will contract theirs, as compared to the linear tax. Conditions that would tend to make the convex piecewise linear tax globally optimal therefore would be a marginal social utility of income that falls slowly over the low and middle income ranges and then then quickly over the upper income range, and substantially higher compensated labour supply elasticities in the middle income range. Note that we cannot rule out the case in which \( a_C \geq a_L \), in which the lowest income group would not be made worse off, but clearly there would have to be a compensatingly heavier burden on the upper tax bracket.
3.2 The optimal nonconvex tax system

Assuming that the nonconvex system is optimal we can state the problem as

\[ \max_{a,t_1,t_2,\hat{y}} \int_{w_0}^{\hat{w}} S[v(a,t_1,w)]dF + \int_{\hat{w}}^{w_1} S[v(a,t_1,t_2,\hat{y},w)]dF \]  \hspace{1cm} (35)

subject to

\[ \int_{w_0}^{\hat{w}} t_1 \phi(t_1,w)dF + \int_{\hat{w}}^{w_1} [t_2 \phi(t_2,w) + (t_1 - t_2)\hat{y}]dF - a - R \geq 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (36)

where it has to be remembered that indirect utility is continuous in \( w \), but that there is a discontinuity in tax revenue at \( \hat{w} \).

From (16)-(21) it is easy to see that a change in \( a \) does not affect the value \(^{13}\) of \( \hat{w} \), and so the first order condition with respect to \( a \) is just as before, and can be written again as

\[ \int_{w_0}^{w_1} \left( \frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1 \right)dF = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (37)

However, for each of the remaining tax parameters the discontinuity in gross income will be relevant, because a change will cause a change in \( \hat{w} \), the type that is just indifferent to being in either of the tax brackets.

Now define

\[ \Delta R = [t_2 \phi(\hat{w},t_2) - (t_2 - t_1)\hat{y}] - t_1 \phi(\hat{w},t_1) > 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (38)

This is the value of the jump in tax revenue that takes place at \( \hat{w} \).

From the first order conditions for the above problem, we then have

**Result 5:**

The condition with respect to the optimal bracket value \( \hat{y} \) is

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{w}}{\partial \hat{y}} \Delta R_f(\hat{w}) = (t_2 - t_1) \int_{\hat{w}}^{w_1} \left\{ \frac{S'}{\lambda} - 1 \right\} dF \]  \hspace{1cm} (39)

It can be shown that \( \partial \hat{w}/\partial \hat{y} > 0 \), and, on the same arguments as used before, but with \( (t_2 - t_1) < 0 \), the right hand side is also positive. Thus, there is nothing \textit{a priori} to rule this case out, contrary to Sheshinski’s assertion. The intuition is straightforward. The right hand side now gives the marginal benefit of an increase in \( \hat{y} \) to the planner, namely a lump sum reduction in

\(^{13}\)Note the usefulness of the quasilinearity assumption in this respect.
the net income of higher bracket consumers with, on average, below-average marginal social utility of income. The marginal cost of this is a jump downward in tax revenue from consumers who now find the first tax bracket better than the second. More precisely, a discrete increase $\Delta \hat{y}$ would cause a discrete interval of consumers to jump down into the lower bracket, and, in the limit, as $\Delta \hat{y} \to 0$, the resulting revenue loss is given by $\Delta Rf(\hat{w})$. Both marginal benefit and marginal cost are positive.

**Result 6:**
The condition with respect to $t_1$ is:

$$t_1^* = \frac{\int_{w_0}^{\hat{w}} \left( y_1^* - \hat{y}^* \right) dF + \frac{\partial \hat{w}}{\partial t_1} \Delta Rf(\hat{w})}{\int_{w_0}^{\hat{w}} y_1(t_1^*, w) dF}$$ (40)

The new element here, as compared to the convex case, is the second term in the numerator, which, since $\frac{\partial \hat{w}}{\partial t_1} < 0$, is also negative. Thus this term acts to increase the absolute value of the numerator, and therefore the value of $t_1$, as compared to the convex case. The intuition for this term is simply that an increase in $t_1$ expands the subset of consumers who prefer to be in the upper tax bracket (with the lower tax rate) and so causes an upward jump in tax revenue, equal in the limit, as the change in $t_1$ goes to zero, to $\Delta Rf(\hat{w})$.

**Result 7:**
The condition with respect to $t_2$ is:

$$t_2^* = \frac{\int_{\hat{w}}^{w_1} \left( y_2^* - \hat{y}^* \right) dF + \frac{\partial \hat{w}}{\partial t_2} \Delta Rf(\hat{w})}{\int_{\hat{w}}^{w_1} y_2(t_2^*, w) dF}$$ (41)

Again the new element here is the second term in the numerator, which, since $\frac{\partial \hat{w}}{\partial t_2} > 0$, is positive. Thus this tends to reduce the tax rate in the upper bracket as compared to the convex case. The intuition for this term is that an increase in $t_2$ widens the subset of consumers who prefer to be in the lower bracket, and so causes a downward jump in tax revenue. This then makes for a lower tax rate in the upper income bracket.

The existence of the discontinuity terms in these expressions adds a new element to the discussion of the optimal tax parameters. Since $t_1^* > t_2^*$, their presence, other things equal, makes for a widening in the gap between the two tax rates. The influence of the other terms in the conditions is the same as in the discussion of the convex case.
Figure 2 about here
In Figure 2 we compare the optimal linear and nonconvex piecewise linear tax systems. The budget constraint corresponding to the linear tax is again \( a_L L \), that of the piecewise linear tax is \( a_N E F \). Thus we see that as compared to the linear tax the nonconvex piecewise linear tax redistributes welfare from the middle towards the ends.\(^{14}\) Lower bracket consumers, who now pay a higher marginal rate, reduce their labour supplies and gross incomes, higher bracket consumers do the reverse.

4 Conclusions
Given its significance in practice, the piecewise linear tax system seems to have received disproportionately little attention in the literature on optimal income taxation. This paper offers a simple and transparent analysis of its main characteristics. We have considered only the two bracket case, but it is easy to see how this can be extended to an arbitrary number of brackets. It is quite possible in this case that some portions of the tax system might be convex and some nonconvex, in a way that depends on the income distributional preferences of the tax policy maker and the way in which labour supply elasticities vary with wage type. The question of the optimal determination of the number of brackets is left open. Note, however, that we are not trying to find the best piecewise linear approximation to a nonlinear tax function that is optimal in the sense of Mirrlees. Rather, we start from the position that it is practical only to pool all consumer types. Given the complexity of the situation which faces the design of tax systems, this may be the only feasible approach.

References


\(^{14}\) Though we cannot exclude the case in which \( a_N < a_L \), with only upper bracket consumers being made better off. This could arise for a sufficiently high welfare weighting and/or sufficiently strong deadweight losses on high income consumers.


Figure 1. Optimal Convex vs. Optimal Linear Tax Schedules
Figure 2: Optimal Nonconvex vs Optimal Linear Tax Schedules
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